DePalma Printing Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 8, 1973

204 N.L.R.B. 31 (N.L.R.B. 1973)

DePALMA PRINTING CO. 31
DePalma Printing Co. and Local 1, Amalgamated
Lithographers of America , International Typograph-
ical Union, AFL-CIO. Case 22-CA-5136
June 8, 1973
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS JENKINS, KENNEDY, AND PENELLO
On March 7, 1973, Administrative Law Judge Jose-
phine H. Klein issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions
and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to
adopt her recommended Order.'
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Rela-
tions Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge and here-
by orders that Respondent DePalma Printing Co.,
Ridgefield Park, New Jersey, its officers, agents, suc-
cessors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in
the said recommended Order.
1 We find totally without merit Respondent's allegations of bias and preju-
dice on the part of the Administrative Law Judge We have fully considered
the entire record and the Administrative Law Judge's Decision and we pre-
ceive no evidence that the Administrative Law Judge prejudged this case,
made prejudicial rulings , or demonstrated a bias against Respondent or its
counsel in her analysis or discussion of the evidence
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JOSEPHINE H. KLEIN , Administrative Law Judge : Pursuant
to a charge filed on October 25, 1972, by Local 1 , Amalga-
mated Lithographers of America , International Typograph-
ical Union , AFL-CIO ( the Union ) against DePalma
Printing Company, a complaint was issued on December 1,
1972, alleging that since May 8 Respondent has engaged in
unfair labor practices within the purview of Section 8(a)(5)
and (I) of the Act I by refusing to furnish information re-
quested by the Union and refusing to honor an existing
collective -bargaining agreement with the Union, which has
been certified as the collective -bargaining agent of
Respondent 's production employees.
Respondent filed an answer to the complaint and also a
"Motion for Summary Judgment Dismissing the Com-
plaint ." On December 26 the Board denied Respondent's
motion, saying that "issues have been raised by the com-
plaint which can best be resolved on the basis of record
testimony ." The Board's order expressly granted Respon-
dent " leave to raise the issues herein at any hearing held."
A hearing was convened before me in Newark , New Jer-
sey, on January 3 , 1973. At the outset of the hearing, Re-
spondent orally renewed its motion for summary judgment
dismissing the complaint . That motion was denied . Respon-
dent also moved for an adjournment . I denied the motion
for adjournment at that time , expressly stating that it could
be renewed at the close of the General Counsel 's presenta-
tion of evidence At the conclusion of the General Counsel's
case , Respondent rested. It renewed its motion for summary
judgment but did not renew its motion for adjournment.
All parties were afforded full opportunity to be heard, to
present oral and written evidence , and to examine and
cross-examine witnesses Respondent presented brief oral
argument in support of dismissal of the complaint . Since the
hearing, the General Counsel has submitted a brief.
Upon the entire record,2 observation of the witness, and
consideration of the General Counsel's brief , I make the
following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I PRELIMINARY FINDINGS
A. Respondent, a New Jersey corporation, is now, and at
all times material herein has been, engaged in the manufac-
ture, sale, and distribution of offset and letterpress printing
products and related products at its plant in Ridgefield
Park, New Jersey. During the calendar year 1971, a repre-
sentative period, Respondent manufactured, sold, and dis-
tributed goods, products, and materials valued in excess of
$50,000, of which products, goods, and materials valued in
excess of $50,000 were shipped from its plant in New Jersey
directly to points outside New Jersey.
Respondent is, and has been at all times material herein,
an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
B. Uncontradicted testimony establishes that the Union
admits employees into membership and these employees
take an active part in the organization. The Union deals
with employers concerning grievances, wages, and rates of
pay and hours of employment
The Union is now, and at all times material herein has
been, a labor organization within the meaning of Section
2(5) of the Act.
' National Labor Relations Act , as amended ( 61 Stat 136 , 73 Stat 519, 29
U S C Sec 151, et sey ) 2 As corrected by order issued simultaneously herewith
204 NLRB No. 12
32 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
11 THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Motion for Summary Judgment
The complaint alleges that since May 8 , 1972, Respon-
dent has violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act by refusing to
furnish the names and addresses of its employees and infor-
mation concerning wage rates and related matters to the
Union, which was certified as the collective -bargaining rep-
resentative of Respondent's production employees on July
12, 1971. The complaint further alleges .that Respondent has
refused "to recognize and honor the collective -bargaining
agreement entered into on April 14 , 1972, by Respondent
and the Union."
Respondent maintains , as it did in its "motion for sum-
mary judgment dismissing the complaint ," that the allega-
tions of the complaint , if proved , would establish only
"breaches of contract" and not unfair labor practices within
the purview of the Act . This contention must be rejected.
It is well established that an employer violates Section
8(a)(5) if it refuses to provide to the bargaining representa-
tive of its employees requested information reasonably rele-
vant and helpful for either negotiation or administration
and enforcement of a collective -bargaining agreement. See
Stahl Specialty Company, 175 NLRB 129 , 131; Scandia Res-
taurants, Inc., 171 NLRB 326, 329-330; Johns-Manville
Products Corporation, 171 NLRB 451 , 453; The Sawbrook
Steel Castings Company, 173 NLRB 381, 383 : "The Union's
right to the data arises , not out of the contract , but out of
the statute , and it is for the Company to establish what, if
anything, negates this statutory right."
Similarly , while a refusal to recognize and honor a collec-
tive-bargaining agreement , as alleged in the present com-
plaint, may well give rise to an action for breach of contract,
it is also an unfair labor practice cognizable by the Board.
N.L.R.B. v. M & M Oldsmobile, Inc., 377 F.2d 712, 715-716
(C.A. 2, 1967); The Crescent Bed Co ., 157 NLRB 296, 298-
299, enfd . 63 LRRM 2480 (C.A.D.C., 1966).
Accordingly , since the complaint alleges unfair labor
practices within the purview of Section 8(a)(5) and (1),
Respondent's "motion for summary judgment dismissing
the complaint," which motion was renewed at the hearing
before me, must be denied.
B. The Refusal To Supply Information
Although Respondent 's answer to the complaint denies
that the Union represents any employees in the bargaining
unit , Respondent admits that , as set forth in the complaint,
the Union was certified by the Board on or about July 12,
1971. The Union's majority was thus conclusively estab-
lished through July 11, 1972, which was after the initial date
of Respondent's alleged refusal to bargain. In the present
proceeding Respondent made no attempt to establish by
evidence that the Union did not represent a majority of the
employees after the end of the certification year. Thus, re-
gardless of the legal effects of the alleged existence of a
collective-bargaining agreement "entered into on April 14,
1972," the unrebutted presumption of continuing majority
representation requires a finding that the Union was the
authorized bargaining representative of the employees at all
time material herein.
Whether or not there was a collective -bargaining agree-
ment in effect between the parties , as alleged in the com-
plaint , the Union , as the employees ' bargaining
representative , was entitled , upon demand , to have Respon-
dent provide "the names and addresses of unit employees
and information as to wage rates and related matters as to
such employees," since such matters are at least presump-
tively relevant to either negotiation or administration of a
collective-bargaining agreement (Curtiss-Wright Corp. v.
N. L. R. B., 347 F .2d 61, 69 (C.A. 3, 1965 ); Industrial Welding
Company, 175 NLRB 477 , 479; Robert J. Weber, d/b/a We-
ber Veneer & Plywood Co., 161 NLRB 1054, 1056), and
Respondent adduced no evidence rebutting the presump-
tive relevance.
The only witness produced was Roy Woodward , assistant
to the president of the Union . He testified that on May 8,
1972, he and Frank Casino , business representative of the
Union , met with Joseph DePalma , Jr., Respondent's vice
president . The union representatives requested a list of the
current employees and "a list of their salaries , wages and
[the right to] visit the plant to see if the proper complements
were on the presses , according to the contract ." According
to Woodward , DePalma replied that he would have to con-
sult Respondent's attorney before he could agree to any part
of the Union 's request . The union representatives thereupon
turned the matter over to its attorney , James F . Gill, Esq.,
Woodward 's personal knowledge ends at that point. He
believes that the Union 's attorney wrote to the Company
but nobody in the Union itself wrote. Woodward testified
that he personally never received any information from the
Company . He was not asked and did not testify whether
anybody else in the Union had ever received any of the
requested information .3 Nor did he testify as to his personal
3 Woodward 's testimony on this phase of the case was, on direct examina-
tion
Q After this meeting did you or anyone from the Union receive any
of the information from the company that you requested?
A At that point we put it in the hands of our attorney and all letters
were going through the attorney.
Q. To your knowledge has the Union received any of the information
requested'
A. I personally have not received anything to my knowledge.
On cross-examination.
Q. (By Mr Frackman ) You stated that you made certain requests for
certain information, is that correct?
A That is right.
Q. And you made this request orally?
A That is right.
Q. In May9
A That is right.
Q. And you received no information in response to your oral request?
A Yes, we did . We were told that he would have to contact a lawyer
of the Company.
Q. And did you subsequently write a letter asking for this informa-
tion'
A We gave this to our attorney who in turn wrote to the Company
Q You believe that he wrote9
A. Yes
Q. But you never wrote9
A. I never wrote, no
Q Nobody from the Union ever wrote a letter9
A No.
Q. In respect to this9
A. No, we did not
DePALMA PRINTING CO.
functions and duties in the Union , which might have indi-
cated whether he would normally have received such infor-
mation if Respondent had provided it. Had Respondent
merely delayed compliance with the Union 's request for a
reasonable time within which to consult counsel , I should
not find an unlawful refusal to supply information. The
record , however , shows that Respondent never did supply
the material it was obligated to.
Although Woodward 's testimony does not establish an
explicit refusal by Respondent , Respondent 's answer to the
complaint supplies the deficiency.
In the answer , Respondent "states that on several occa-
sions the Employer has furnished the Union with the names
and addresses of all employees in the unit , and denies re-
quests for other information ." I credit Woodward's uncon-
tradicted testimony that on May 8 he and the Union's
business representative requested not only the names and
addresses , but also wage and salary data (plus the right to
visit the plant).
It is clearly implicit in the answer that Respondent did
not provide any information other than , at most , the names
and addresses of the unit employees .' A refusal to provide
part of the relevant information requested by the Union
violates Section 8(a)(5). Food Employer Council, Inc., 197
NLRB 651. Similarly , "tardiness and reticence" in provid-
ing information warrant a conclusion that Respondent vio-
lated the Act . International Union, United Automobile,
Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers v . N.L.R.B.,
455 F.2d 1357 (C.A.D.C., 1971).
Since I have found a proper request for relevant informa-
tion , Respondent's failure to provide the information is vio-
lative of Section 8(a)(5), even though there is no affirmative
evidence of an express refusal by Respondent . See N. L.R.B.
v. John S. Swift Company, Inc., 277 F.2d 641 , 645 (C.A. 7,
1960):
... And from a review of the record it is apparent that
although the company had not expressly refused to
furnish the information . . . there was substantial evi-
dence to support the Board 's finding that the company
"made no reasonably diligent effort to obtain it." The
Company 's inaction spoke louder than its words... .
Cf. N. L. R. B. v. Fitzgerald Mills Corporation, 313 F.2d 260,
265 (C.A. 2, 1963):
... [F]ailure to supply requested wage data is a refusal
to bargain in violation of § 8(a)(5) and ( 1), standing
alone . The Union need not show how the data will be
relevant to the bargaining : . . . And even if the Union
negotiated a contract without the data , this does not
render the information irrelevant. . . . The Union thus
had a right to this information under the N.L.R.A. as
well as under its contract , and the excessive delay in
providing it supports the ultimate conclusion that later
bargaining was not conducted in good faith.
In argument at the hearing, Respondent 's counsel appar-
4 There is no indication as when Respondent maintains that employee lists
were given to the Union . Woodward testified that on May 8 the union
representatives "requested that we see a list of the employees because we were
under the impression there were some new employees we hadn 't been told
about " Thus, it may well be that Respondent had supplied employee lists
in connection with the election and certification proceeding but not thereaf-
ter.
33
ently relied heavily on the General Counsel's failure to pro-
duce evidence of the Union's repeated requests for the de-
sired information after May 8. However, such proof was
unnecessary. See Aero-Motive Manufacturing Company, 195
NLRB 790 at 792:
We are unimpressed with Respondent's contention
that we should not find a violation because the request
was not repeated. If the Union was entitled to the
information at the time it made the request, then Re-
spondent was obligated to furnish it and there is no
obligation of the Union to repeat such a request any
given number of times. Rather the obligation is on the
Respondent to furnish as promptly as practical any
information properly requested by the exclusive bar-
gaining agent.
Although Respondent has not contended in this proceed-
ing that its failure to provide wage and related data was
occasioned by any doubt as to the Union's representative
status, in view of its present allegation "that the Union does
not represent any of the employees in the bargaining unit"
and its apparent support of a petition to decertify the Union
in July 1972, it perhaps should be pointed out that such
contention, even if advanced in good faith, would not serve
as a defense to the present allegation. See Curtiss-Wright
Corp., supra, 68-69:
Because of the need to facilitate effective collective
bargaining, a refusal to furnish data is an unfair labor
practice notwithstanding the good faith of an employer
in rejecting the request. This has been the declared
policy of many of the circuit courts.
Once relevance is determined, an employer's refusal
to honor a request is a per se violation of the Act.
As held in L.F. Strassheim Company, 171 NLRB 916,
"The fact that an employer contests the validity of the
Board's certification . . . does not preclude a finding that
any subsequent conduct in derogation of the duty to bar-
gain is violative of Section 8(a)(5)." Cf. Rod-Ric Corporation,
171 NLRB 922, 924, enfd. 428 F.2d 948 (C.A. 5); Keller
Aluminum Chairs Southern, Inc., 173 NLRB 947, 952; Sub-
urban Homes Corporation, 173 NLRB 497, 501.
Accordingly, I find that, as alleged in the complaint, Re-
spondent has violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act by refusing
to honor the Union's request for information.
C. Repudiation of the Contract
The remaining alleged unfair labor practice is the refusal
to honor a collective-bargaining agreement. In his answer to
the complaint, Respondent's counsel alleged "that there is
no collective-bargaining agreement." At the outset of the
hearing, in answer to my questions, Respondent' s counsel
disclaimed knowledge (or, in effect, refused to state) wheth-
er, as a matter of fact, a document purporting to be a collec-
tive-bargaining agreement with the Union had been signed
by a representative of Respondent.5
5 "JUDGE KLEIN I want to know how much is in issue As a matter of
fact, and I am not talking about legal conclusions to be drawn , do you deny
that representatives of the certified union and somebody representing the
company got together and negotiated and eventually some papers were
signed , or were not signed ') Now, what is your position on that as a matter
Continued
34 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The General Counsel introduced an agreement appearing
to be signed by Joseph DePalma, Sr., Respondent's presi-
dent, and Edward Swayduck, president of the Union.
Woodward properly identified Swayduck' s signature but
was unable to identify the DePalma signature. Thus, De-
Palma's signature was never physically identified. However,
there is ample evidence in the record establishing that he did
actually sign the collective-bargaining agreement with the
Union.
The General Counsel introduced into evidence a letter
dated April 21, 1972, from Respondent's counsel to the
Union's counsel, which letter read:
Your secretary sent me a copy of the agreement be-
tween DePalma Printing and Local 1 signed by Ed-
ward Swayduck. As requested, we enclose the copy
signed by Mr. DePalma, Sr.
However, you have not given us any advice as to
what, if anything, was done by the employees to ratify
this agreement. There are certain provisions therein
contained which we feel are of value to the employer,
and we should like to know that we can rely upon this
contract, and not have contentions of non-ratification.
At the hearing, Respondent's counsel acknowledged the
authenticity of that letter as one written by him.
On cross-examination of Woodward, over objection by
the General Counsel, Respondent's counsel adduced evi-
dence that a petition had been filed with the Board for
decertification of the Union as representative of
Respondent's employees. The General Counsel then intro-
duced the Regional Director's decision dismissing the peti-
tion and the Board's order affirming the dismissal (Case
22-RD-333). The dismissal was based on a bar arising from
a collective-bargaining agreement between Respondent and
the Union "entered into on April 14, 1972, and . . . effective
until September 30, 1974," the dates set forth in the contract
in the present record .6 The Regional Director's decision
discloses that Respondent participated in the decertification
proceeding, "urg[ing] that the contract is not a bar because
the membership never ratified it." the decision records that
copies were served upon Respondent and upon its present
counsel.' So far as the Regional Director's decision disclos-
es, Respondent raised no issue other than alleged absence
of employee ratification of the agreement.
of fact'[ MR FRACKMAN I can't answer that question. Not only can 't I answer
it, I doubt the propriety of let's say asking me this particular question as
Counsel " As shown below, counsel was fully aware of the fact that a collec-
tive-bargaining agreement had been signed by Respondent's president as well
as the Union's president
See Sec 102 35 of the Board 's Rules and Regulations "The [Adm inistra-
tive Law Judge] shall have authority (1) To request the parties at any
time during the hearing to state their respective positions concerning any
issue in the case or theory in support thereof, . " See also, Harvey Alumi-
num v. N L R B., 335 F 2d 749, 758 (C.A. 9, 1964). "[Counsel's] averment of
ignorance was clearly frivolous, and the trial imposing upon the Board the
burden of adducing proof. Administrative hearings, like court hearings,
should concern the real issues between the parties "
6 Although the Regional Director states only the contract bar as the reason
for dismissal , the decertification petition was also untimely because filed
within the certification year
7 Respondent 's good faith in urging nonratification of the agreement in the
decertification proceeding is at least open to question in view of counsel's
prior request for assurance by union counsel that it could "rely upon this
contract, and not have contentions of non-ratification "
In cross-examining Woodward at the present hearing,
Respondent's counsel also elicited evidence that a petition
had been filed with the Board, presumably under Section
9(e) of the Act, for elimination of the union-security clause
from the collective-bargaining agreement between Respon-
dent and the Union. Such a petition of necessity presuppos-
es the existence of a contract.
The letter from Respondent's counsel to the Union's at-
torney shows that sometime before April 21 Respondent
received a copy of the contract signed by the union presi-
dent and on that date Respondent sent the Union a copy
signed by Respondent's president. Woodward testified that
when he saw the Union president sign the contract, the
DePalma signature was already on it. Particularly where it
is undisputed that Respondent, through its counsel, did
send a signed copy to the Union, it would be totally unwar-
ranted for me to assume that the DePalma signature on the
contract in evidence had been forged.
In view of all the circumstances, I find that the evidence
is sufficient to establish, at least prima facie, that Respon-
dent and the Union executed the collective-bargaining
agreement which was introduced into evidence even though
there was no eyewitness testimony concerning DePalma's
signature.8 Respondent presented no evidence to rebut the
General Counsel's prima facie showing.9
Since Respondent's counsel failed to state any basis for
his contention that "no collective Bargaining Agreement
was entered into between the parties," I can only conjecture
that he is impliedly reasserting Respondent's position in the
decertification proceeding that the agreement never became
effective because not ratified by the employees or the union
membership. Even if it be assumed that such could have
been, and had been, raised and litigated before me in the
present proceeding, the result would be no different, since
the Regional Director was clearly correct in saying "[T]he
Board has held that only where the written contract itself
makes employee ratification a condition precedent to con-
tractual validity shall the contract be no bar until ratified."
See Appalachian Shale Products Co., 121 NLRB 1160, 1163.
See also, e.g., Houchens Market of Elizabethtown, Inc. v.
N.L.R.B., 375 F.2d 208, 212 (C.A. 6, 1962); Big Run Coal
& Clay Company, 152 NLRB 1144, 1147, enfd. 385 F.2d 788
(C.A. 6, 1967), cert. denied 393 U.S. 824. The contract in
evidence contains no provision for employee ratification.
Respondent neither alleged nor sought to prove that there
was any agreement between the parties that employee ratifi-
cation would be sought or obtained. On the entire record,
I find that, as alleged in the complaint, there is, and at all
times material herein there was, a collective-bargaining con-
tract between Respondent and the Union, effective from
March 1, 1972, to September 30, 1974.
Respondent's refusal to recognize and honor that con-
tract is shown by its conduct in the decertification proceed-
ing and by its answer in the present proceeding. As stated
8 General Counsel indicated that he was refraining from calling
Respondent's counsel as a witness as a matter of "courtesy of Counsel " No
representative of Respondent accompanied its counsel at the hearing.
Respondent initially objected to the General Counsel's introducing a
photographic copy rather than the "original" of the contract However, coun-
sel later withdrew the objection, saying. "We do not object to this document
on the basis that it is a copy rather than an original "
DePALMA PRINTING CO. 35
in the Regional Director's decision in the decertification
petition, in July 1972, Respondent "urge[d] that the contract
[was] not a bar [to an election] because the membership
never ratified it." In response to the paragraph of the pres-
ent complaint alleging refusal to recognize and honor the
contract, Respondent' s answer "[d]enies the allegations .. .
in that there is no collective bargaining agreement." Thus
it clearly appears that Respondent repudiates, i.e., refuses to
recognize and honor, the agreement . It may be added that,
even if Respondent had produced evidence to establish that
it was acting in good faith on a reasonable or arguable belief
that no legally effective agreement had been reached, "there
was still total repudiation of the contract and a resultant
failure to bargain." M & M Oldsmobile, supra, 717.
Accordingly, I find that, as alleged in the complaint, Re-
spondent has violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act by refusing
to recognize and honor the collective-bargaining agreement
in effect between it and the Union.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent, DePalma Printing Co., is an employer
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2),
(6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union, Local 1, Amalgamated Lithographers of
America, International Typographical Union, AFL-CIO, is
a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act.
3. At all times since July 12, 1971, the Union has been
and is now the exclusive collective-bargaining representa-
tive, within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act, for all
lithographic production employees including all lithograph-
ic pressmen and operators, tenders, and apprentices, em-
ployed at Respondent's Ridgefield Park, New Jersey, plant,
excluding all letter pressmen, papercutters, paper handlers,
shipping employees, compositors, truckdrivers, messengers,
office clerical employees, professional employees, guards
and supervisors, as defined in the Act.
4. By withholding from the Union wage and related data
and current lists of the names and addresses of employees
and permission to union representatives to visit and inspect
Respondent's plant, Respondent has refused and continues
to refuse to bargain with the Union in violation of Section
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
5. By repudiating and refusing to honor the written
agreement executed by it with the Union on April 14, 1972,
effective from March 1, 1972, to September 30, 1974, Re-
spondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of
the Act.
Market, 145 NLRB 1252 , 1253, enfd . 339 F.2d 568 (C.A. 9,
1964). Additionally , it will be recommended that Respon-
dent post appropriate notices in the customary manner.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact , conclusions of law
and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the
Act, I hereby issue the following recommended:
ORDER 10
Respondent, DePalma Printing Co., Inc., it officers,
agents, successors and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively with Local 1, Amal-
gamated Lithographers of America, International Typo-
graphical Union, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative
of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit by re-
fusing or failing to furnish to the Union current information
as to the names and addresses of employees within the
bargaining unit and requested information concerning wage
and related matters and by refusing to permit representa-
tives of the Union to visit and inspect Respondent's plant
in Ridgefield Park, New Jersey.
(b) Repudiating and refusing to recognize and honor the
written agreement executed by Respondent with the Union
on April 14, 1972, effective from March 1, 1972, to Septem-
ber 30, 1974.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their
rights under Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action, which is neces-
sary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Recognize the Union as the exclusive bargaining rep-
resentative of its employees in the appropriate bargaining
unit and honor the collective-bargaining agreement execu-
ted by it on April 14, 1972, effective from March 1, 1972,
to September 30, 1974.
(b) Furnish to the Union lists of names and addresses of
employees within the appropriate bargaining unit, together
with wage and related data previously requested, and, upon
request promptly, furnish to the Union other data and infor-
mation relevant to the Union's performance of its role as
collective-bargaining representative; and, upon request,
permit the Union's representatives to make reasonable in-
spections of Respondent's plant in Ridgefield Park, New
Jersey.
(c) Post at its facility in Ridgefield Park, New Jersey,
copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."11 Copies
of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director
for Region 22, after being duly signed by Respondent's
representative, shall be posted by Respondent immediately
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has unlawfully withheld
from the Union information and permission to inspect
Respondent's plant and has refused to honor an effective
collective-bargaining agreement between the parties, I shall
recommend that Respondent be ordered to cease and desist
from such unlawful conduct and to provide relevant infor-
mation requested by the Union and honor the collective-
bargaining agreement. Gene Hyde, d/b/a/ Hyde's Super
10 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102 46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided n Sec. 102 48
of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its
findings, conclusions, and order and all objections thereto shall be deemed
waived for all purposes
11 In the event that the Board's order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted pursuant
to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of
the National Labor Relations Board "
36 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
upon receipt thereof , and be maintained by it for 60 consec-
utive days thereafter , in conspicuous places , including all
places where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure
that said notices are not altered, defaced or covered by any
other material.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 22, in writ-
ing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps
Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a trial in which all parties had the opportunity to
present their evidence , it has been found that we violated
the law and we have been ordered to post this notice. We
intend to carry out the order of the Board and abide by the
following:
WE WILL recognize and bargain in good faith with the
above-named Union as the exclusive collective-bar-
gaining representative of the production workers at our
Ridgefield , New Jersey plant.
WE WILL recognize and honor the collective-bargain-
ing agreement executed by us with the Union , effective
from March 1, 1972, through September 30, 1974.
WE WILL forthwith give to the Union a current list of
the names , addresses , classifications and wage rates of
the lithographic production workers at our Ridgefield
Park, Ney Jersey, plant ; and, upon request , WE WILL
promptly give the Union such further data and infor-
mation as is reasonably relevant to administration of
the existing collective-bargaining agreement and to the
Union's performance of its function as exclusive bar-
gaining representative of our lithographic production
employees.
WE WILL, upon request , permit representatives of the
Union to visit and reasonably inspect our Ridgefield,
New Jersey, plant.
WE WILL NOT repudiate or refuse to honor the collec-
tive-bargaining agreement executed by us with Local 1,
Amalgamated Lithographers of America, International
Typographical Union, AFL-CIO, effective from
March 1, 1972, through September 30, 1974.
WE WILL NOT refuse or fail to provide to the Union
current lists of names , addresses, classifications, wage
rates and other relevant information , as requested by
the Union, concerning all lithographic production em-
ployees including all lithographic pressmen and opera-
tors , tenders and apprentices employed at our
Ridgefield Park, New Jersey, plant; and WE WILL NOT
refuse to allow representatives of the Union, upon re-
quest , to make reasonable inspections of our plant for
the purpose of effectively administering the collective-
bargaining agreement and otherwise performing its
functions as exclusive bargaining representative of our
production employees.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain , or coerce employees in the exercise of
their rights under Section 7 of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act.
Dated By
DEPALMA PRINTING CO
(Employer)
(Representative ) (Title)
This is an official notice and must not be defaced by
anyone.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered , defaced,
or covered by any other material . Any questions concerning
this notice or compliance with its provisions may be direct-
ed to the Board's Office, Federal Building , 16th Floor, 970
Broad Street , Newark , New Jersey 07102, Telephone 201-
645-2100.