Deborah Treschitta, Appellant,v.Rodney E. Slater, Secretary, Department of Transportation, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionMar 26, 1999
01982729_r (E.E.O.C. Mar. 26, 1999)

01982729_r

03-26-1999

Deborah Treschitta, Appellant, v. Rodney E. Slater, Secretary, Department of Transportation, Agency.


Deborah Treschitta, )

Appellant, )

)

v. ) Appeal No. 01982729

) Agency No. 5-98-5015

Rodney E. Slater, )

Secretary, )

Department of Transportation, )

Agency. )

______________________________)

DECISION

On February 23, 1998, appellant filed an appeal with this Commission

from a final agency decision (FAD), dated January 16, 1998, pertaining

to her complaint of unlawful employment discrimination in violation of

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e

et seq.<1> In her complaint, appellant alleged that she was subjected

to discrimination on the basis of sex (female) when:

Appellant's second line supervisor told his secretary that appellant

was a pathological liar;

Appellant's request for additional practice problems and additional

study time was denied in September 1997;

Appellant's familiarization trip, scheduled for October 17, 1997, was

denied because she did not arrive at the airport one hour prior to the

flight's departure;

Appellant's days off were changed because of a new policy requiring

developmental employees to be on a different team for associate radar

training in October 1997;

Appellant's familiarization flight privileges were revoked in September

1996;

Appellant's request to be placed in an administrative position in

October 1996, due to an on-the-job injury was denied;

Appellant's request for excused leave was denied in 1996 when she

reported six (6) minutes late;

Appellant was questioned about being two (2) minutes late in September

1996; and

Appellant's new supervisor questioned her in August 1996 about

allegations made by her former supervisor which were kept in an informal

personnel file.

The agency accepted allegations (1) - (4) for investigation, and dismissed

allegations (5) - (9) pursuant to EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. �1614.107(b),

for failure to timely file a formal complaint. The agency found that

although appellant did contact an EEO Counselor in 1996, regarding

allegations (5) - (9), she did not timely file a formal complaint of

discrimination.

On appeal, appellant argues, through her attorney, that her 1996

counseling was never formally terminated, and that she never filed a

formal complaint because her counselor never issued a Notice of Right

to File a Formal Complaint on the allegations. Appellant states, �Not

wanting to engage the EEO process, however, appellant has endeavored

to try informally to resolve her concerns.� Appellant claims that

the counselor made several unsuccessful attempts to resolve the

1996 allegations. Alternatively, appellant argues that her dismissed

allegations were part of a continuing violation, and therefore should

be deemed timely.

A review of the record reveals that after speaking with a counselor in

1996, appellant contacted a separate counselor on July 15, 1997, regarding

allegation (1). The second counselor issued a Notice of Right to File

a Formal Complaint on October 29, 1997, and appellant filed a formal

complaint on November 12, 1997, which is the subject the instant appeal.

The record includes notes of telephone conversations with the counselor

who handled the 1996 allegations, and with appellant. The counselor

claims that in 1996, appellant requested that EEO not step-in or

attempt to resolve her complaint. Further, the counselor explained that

appellant contacted an EEO counselor only to seek advice, not to file

a claim. The record of appellant's conversation states that appellant

attempted to resolve her allegations without filing a formal complaint.

After continuing harassment, however, appellant filed the complaint at

issue in the present appeal.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

While the agency dismissed appellant's complaint for failure to file

the formal complaint in a timely manner, upon review, we find that

the complaint is more properly dismissed on the grounds of untimely

EEO contact.

EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. �1614.105(a)(1) requires that complaints of

discrimination should be brought to the attention of the Equal Employment

Opportunity Counselor within forty-five (45) days of the date of the

matter alleged to be discriminatory or, in the case of a personnel

action, within forty-five (45) days of the effective date of the action.

The Commission has adopted a "reasonable suspicion" standard (as opposed

to a "supportive facts" standard) to determine when the forty-five (45)

day limitation period is triggered. See Ball v. USPS, EEOC Request

No. 05880247 (July 6, 1988). Thus, the time limitation can be triggered

before all the facts that support a charge of discrimination have become

apparent, but not until a complainant reasonably suspects discrimination.

EEOC Regulations provide that the agency or the Commission shall extend

the time limits when the individual shows that she was not notified of the

time limits and was not otherwise aware of them, that she did not know

and reasonably should not have known that the discriminatory matter or

personnel action occurred, that despite due diligence she was prevented

by circumstances beyond her control from contacting the Counselor within

the time limits, or for other reasons considered sufficient by the agency

or the Commission.

A complainant commences the EEO process by contacting an EEO Counselor

and �exhibiting an intent to begin the complaint process.� See Gates

v. Department of Air Force, EEOC Request No. 05910798 (November 22, 1991)

(quoting Moore v. Department of Treasury, EEOC Request No. 05900194

(May 24, 1990)).

Although appellant contacted a counselor at some point in 1996, she

did not exhibit an intent to begin the complaint process. By her own

admission, appellant attempted to resolve her allegations informally,

without filing a formal complaint. Accordingly, her 1996 counselor

contact does not suffice as the initial counselor contact pursuant to

EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. �1614.105(a). Appellant's initial contact

with an EEO Counselor, then, occurred on July 15, 1997 � the date on

which appellant contacted the second counselor and intended to pursue

a complaint. The July 15, 1997 contact occurred well beyond forty-five

(45) days after the 1996 incidents.

The Commission has held that the time requirements for initiating EEO

counseling could be waived as to certain allegations within a complaint

when the complainant alleged a continuing violation; that is, a series

of related discriminatory acts, one of which fell within the time period

for contacting an EEO Counselor. See McGivern v. U.S. Postal Service,

EEOC Request No. 05901150 (December 28, 1990); Starr v. U.S. Postal

Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01890412 (April 6, 1989).

A determination of whether a series of discrete acts constitutes

a continuing violation depends on the interrelatedness of the past

and present acts. Berry v. Board of Supervisors, 715 F.2d 971, 981

(5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 868 (1986). It is necessary to

determine whether the acts are interrelated by a common nexus or theme.

See Vissing v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, EEOC Request No. 05890308

(June 13, 1989); Verkennes v. Department of Defense, EEOC Request

No. 05900700 (September 21, 1990); Maldonado v. Department of the

Interior, EEOC Request No. 05900937 (October 31, 1990). Should such

a nexus exist, appellant will have established a continuing violation

and the agency would be obligated to "overlook the untimeliness of the

complaint with respect to some of the acts" challenged by appellant.

Scott v. Claytor, 469 F. Supp. 22, 26 (D.D.C. 1978).

Relevant to the determination are whether the acts were recurring or were

more in the nature of isolated employment decisions; whether an untimely

discrete act had the degree of permanence which should have triggered an

employee's awareness and duty to assert his or her rights; and whether the

same agency officials were involved. Woljan v. Environmental Protection

Agency, EEOC Request No. 05950361 (October 5, 1995).

Further, it is important, in determining whether a claim for a continuing

violation is stated, to consider whether an appellant had prior knowledge

or suspicion of discrimination and the effect of this knowledge.

Jackson v. Department of the Air Force, EEOC Request No. 05950780 (June

27, 1997); see Sabree v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners

Local No. 33, 921 F.2d 396 (1st Cir. 1990) (plaintiff who believed he

had been subjected to discrimination had an obligation to file promptly

with the EEOC or lose his claim, as distinguished from the situation

where a plaintiff is unable to appreciate that he is being discriminated

against until he has lived through a series of acts and is thereby able

to perceive an overall discriminatory pattern).

Upon review, we find that appellant has failed to establish a continuing

violation, because appellant fails to survive the Sabree analysis.

Appellant clearly appreciated that she was being discriminated against in

1996, when she contacted an EEO counselor, however, she did not pursue

a complaint at that time. Therefore, the agency's decision to dismiss

allegations (5) - (9) was proper for the reasons set forth herein.

CONCLUSION

The agency's dismissal of allegations (5) - (9) is AFFIRMED.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0795)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the appellant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available

when the previous decision was issued; or

2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,

regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or

3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial

precedential implications.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST

BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive this

decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive

a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in

opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider

MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party

WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request

to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.407. All requests and arguments

must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark,

the request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received

by the Commission.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances

have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,

a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the

delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your

request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests

for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited

circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.604(c).

RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0993)

It is the position of the Commission that you have the right to file

a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN

NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision.

You should be aware, however, that courts in some jurisdictions have

interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner suggesting that

a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the

date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your civil action

is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN THIRTY (30)

CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision or to consult

an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the jurisdiction

in which your action would be filed. In the alternative, you may file a

civil action AFTER ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY (180) CALENDAR DAYS of the date

you filed your complaint with the agency, or filed your appeal with the

Commission. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS THE DEFENDANT

IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD OR DEPARTMENT

HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE.

Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court.

"Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the

local office, facility or department in which you work. Filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

March 26, 1999

____________________________

DATE Ronnie Blumenthal, Director

Office of Federal Operations 1The agency was unable to supply

a copy of a certified mail return receipt or any other material

capable of establishing the date appellant received the agency's

final decision. Accordingly, since the agency failed to submit

evidence of the date of receipt, the Commission presumes that

appellant's appeal was filed within thirty (30) days of receipt

of the agency's final decision. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.402.