David L. Bupp, Appellant,v.William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (Allegheny/Mid-Atlantic Region),) Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionMar 17, 1999
01972472 (E.E.O.C. Mar. 17, 1999)

01972472

03-17-1999

David L. Bupp, Appellant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (Allegheny/Mid-Atlantic Region),) Agency.


David L. Bupp, )

Appellant, )

) Appeal No. 01972472

v. ) Agency Nos. 1D-234-1022-95

) 1D-234-1037-95

William J. Henderson, ) Hearing Nos. 120-96-5380X

Postmaster General, ) 120-96-5381X

United States Postal Service, )

(Allegheny/Mid-Atlantic Region),)

Agency. )

)

DECISION

Appellant timely initiated an appeal from a final agency decision

(FAD) concerning his equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint of

unlawful employment discrimination on the bases of sex (male), race

(White), and reprisal (prior EEO activity), in violation of Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.

Appellant alleges he was discriminated against when: (1) his request

for a change of craft/reassignment was denied on February 18, 1995;

and (2) his request for reconsideration was denied on July 24, 1995.

The appeal is accepted in accordance with EEOC Order No. 960.001.

For the following reasons, the agency's decision is AFFIRMED.

The record reveals that during the relevant time, appellant, a PS-4

Mail Processor on Tour 3 at the agency's Norfolk, Virginia, General Mail

Facility, submitted a request for change in craft/reassignment from an

unassigned regular in Automation to a position as a part-time flexible

PS-4 Mail Handler on Tour 1. Pursuant to processing the request (Request

1), appellant's supervisor rated his job performance and stated that

while appellant's work performance and attendance were average, and his

attitude towards supervision was poor, she recommended his acceptance

for a transfer. Appellant was informed by the Plant Manager (PM) of

the Hampton Roads Processing and Distribution Center on February 18,

1995, that Request 1 was denied, based on the supervisor's evaluation,

appellant's attendance record and other factors. Appellant subsequently

requested reconsideration of the denial of his initial request

(Request 2), and was rated by another supervisor, who evaluated his work

performance as average, attitude toward supervision as poor, and stated

that she would not accept him as a transfer. On August 1, 1995, appellant

was informed by the PM that his request for reassignment was denied due

to an unacceptable evaluation and increasingly poor attendance record.<1>

Believing he was a victim of discrimination, appellant sought EEO

counseling and, subsequently, filed formal complaints on April 19,

1995, and September 25, 1995. At the conclusion of the investigations,

appellant received copies of the investigative reports and requested a

hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). The AJ consolidated

appellant's complaints and, following a hearing, issued a Recommended

Decision (RD) finding no discrimination.

The AJ concluded that appellant failed to establish a prima facie case

of race or sex discrimination with regard to Request 1, as he failed to

establish that similarly situated employees not in his protected groups

were treated differently. However, the AJ found that while appellant

failed to establish a prima facie case of race discrimination regarding

Request 2, he did demonstrate a prima facie case of sex discrimination

as a similarly situated female Mail Processor was granted her request

for change of craft after her initial request was denied. The AJ further

found that appellant established a prima facie case of reprisal regarding

Request 2, as the agency was aware of his EEO activity at the time it

denied Request 2.

The AJ, however, found that the agency articulated legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reasons for denying Request 2, namely, that the PM

stated that he considered requests for reassignments on a case-by-case

basis, and denied appellant's reconsideration request due to his

unsatisfactory attendance records and poor human relations skills.

Finally, the AJ found that based on the credibility of the agency's

witnesses, appellant did not establish that more likely than not,

the agency's articulated reasons were a pretext to mask unlawful sex

discrimination and retaliation. The agency's FAD adopted the AJ's RD.

Appellant makes no new contentions on appeal, and the agency requests

that we affirm the FAD.

After a careful review of the record, the Commission finds that the

AJ's RD summarized the relevant facts and referenced the appropriate

regulations, policies, and laws. We agree with the AJ's finding that

appellant failed to present evidence that more likely than not, any of the

agency's actions regarding denial of Request 2 were a pretext for race or

sex discrimination or retaliation. Hochstadt v. Worchester Foundation for

Experimental Biology, Inc., 425 F. Supp 318 (D. Mass. 1976), aff'd, 545

F.2d 222 (1st Cir. 1976). We thus discern no basis to disturb the AJ's

findings of no discrimination which were based on a detailed assessment of

the record and the credibility of the witnesses. See Gathers v. United

States Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05890894 (November 9, 1989);

Wrenn v. Gould, 808 F.2d 493, 499 (6th Cir. 1987); Anderson v. Bessemer

City, 470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985). Therefore, after a careful review of

the record, including appellant's contentions on appeal, the agency's

response, and arguments and evidence not specifically addressed in this

decision, we AFFIRM the FAD.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0795)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in the

case if the appellant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available

when the previous decision was issued; or

2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,

regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or

3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial

precedential implications.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST

BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the

decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive

a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in

opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider

MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party

WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request

to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.407. All requests and arguments

must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received

by the Commission.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances

have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,

a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the

delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your

request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests

for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited

circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0993)

It is the position of the Commission that you have the right to file

a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN

NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive the decision.

You should be aware, however, that courts in some jurisdictions have

interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner suggesting that

a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the

date that you receive the decision. To ensure that your civil action is

considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR

DAYS from the date that you receive the decision or to consult an attorney

concerning the applicable time period in the jurisdiction in which your

action would be filed. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS THE

DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD

OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND

OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil

action must be

filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right

to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

March 17, 1999

DATE Ronnie Blumenthal, Director

Office of Federal Operations1 We note that although

appellant was informed by the PM on August 1,

1995, that Request 2 had been denied, he alleged

in the formal complaint that the discriminatory

act by the agency occurred on July 24, 1995,

the date he filed Request 2.