Daniel G. Kehoe et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Aug 12, 2019

14927445 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Aug. 12, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/927,445 10/29/2015 Daniel G. Kehoe 5121.02US02 3678
87197 7590 08/12/2019
Skaar Ulbrich Macari, P.A.
601 Carlson Parkway
Suite 1050
Minneapolis, MN 55305
EXAMINER
YEN, JASON TAHAI
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3715
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
08/12/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
pto@sumiplaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte DANIEL G. KEHOE, DAVID SANCHEZ ESCOBAR,
and BRIAN O’ROURKE
____________

Appeal 2018-0066511
Application 14/927,4452
Technology Center 3700
____________

Before MICHAEL C. ASTORINO, BRUCE T. WIEDER, and
KENNETH G. SCHOPFER, Administrative Patent Judges.

SCHOPFER, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
This is an appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from the rejection of
claims 1–6, 8, and 11–13. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 Our decision references the Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.,” filed Jan. 29,
2018), the Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed June 11, 2018), the Examiner’s
Answer (“Ans.,” mailed Apr. 9, 2018), and the Final Office Action (“Final
Act.,” mailed July 28, 2017).
2 According to Appellants, the real party in interest is “ZCO
ACQUISITIONS, INC.” Appeal Br. 1.
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BACKGROUND
The Specification discloses embodiments that “relate to the field of
fantasy sports systems and related methods.” Spec. ¶ 2.
CLAIMS
Claims 1 and 11 are the independent claims on appeal. Claim 1 is
illustrative of the appealed claims and recites:
1. A system for managing a plurality of direct challenges
between users of a game application, said system comprising:
an application services interface comprising a database
and an external data reader in communication with a plurality of
external data services;
a plurality of user interfaces to facilitate access to said
application services interface; and
a challenge application comprising a non-transitory
computer-readable medium containing program instructions for
managing a plurality of direct challenges between users, and one
or more processors of a computer system coupled to said non-
transitory computer-readable medium executing said program
instructions to:
receive a first competitor selected by a first user for
participation in a first direct challenge;
receive a second competitor to serve as a rival of
said first competitor in said first direct challenge;
receive a performance parameter for said first direct
challenge;
receive a time period for said first direct challenge;
receive an acceptance from a second user and, in
response, deploy said first direct challenge;
instruct said external data reader to collect a first set
of actual performance data for said first competitor during
said time period, and a second set of actual performance
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data for said second competitor during said time period,
from at least one of said plurality of external data services;
calculate a score for said first direct challenge,
wherein said score is based on a comparison of said first
set of actual performance data and said second set of actual
performance data;
report said score to said first user; and
store said score in said database; and
a social reporting engine, in communication with said
database, for collecting and storing user data, including
demographic facts and game-play behavior, for at least a first
subset of the users during a predetermined subset of interactions
with said plurality of direct challenges and for generating
automatically an aggregate data set for the first subset of said
users whom exhibit a challenge victory rate above a
predetermined threshold over a predetermined time period.
Appeal Br. 17.
REJECTION3
The Examiner rejects claims 1–6, 8, and 11–13 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as
claiming ineligible subject matter.
DISCUSSION
Standard for Patent Eligibility
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S.
208, 216 (2014) (citation omitted).

3 The rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 103 have been withdrawn. See Ans. 3.
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In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework,
we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice,
573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the
concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate
settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010)
(“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of
hedging, or protecting against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held that “[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We
view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
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products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having
said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by
attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological
environment.” Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now
commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula
to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent
protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an inventive concept
sufficient to transform the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible
application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (citation omitted). “A claim that recites
an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim]
is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’”
Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely
requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that
abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) recently
published revised guidance on the application of the Alice and Mayo
framework. USPTO’s 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Revised Guidance”). Under that
guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites:
(1) (see Revised Guidance Step 2A – Prong One) any judicial
exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e.,
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mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity
such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes); and
(2) (see Revised Guidance Step 2A – Prong Two) additional elements
that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application (see
MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th ed. 2019).4
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that
exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether the claim
(see Revised Guidance Step 2B):
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that are not
“well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of
generality, to the judicial exception.
See Revised Guidance.
Analysis
Appellants present arguments under a single heading for this rejection
and group all claims together. See Appeal Br. 10–15. We select
independent claim 1 as representative. The remaining claims stand or fall
with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. §41.37(c)(1)(iv).

4. We acknowledge that some of these considerations may be properly
evaluated under Step 2 of Alice (Step 2B of Office guidance). Solely for
purposes of maintaining consistent treatment within the Office, we evaluate
it under Step 1 of Alice (Step 2A of Office guidance). See USPTO’s
January 7, 2019 Revised Guidance, “2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter
Eligibility Guidance.”
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Step 2A, Prong One
The Examiner finds that the claims “are directed to the abstract idea of
managing challenges between users of a game by collecting, analyzing, and
displaying certain results of the collection and analysis, which is similar to
concepts of an idea of itself, certain methods of organizing human activity
and mathematical relationships.” Final Act. 3. With respect to claim 1, the
Examiner also finds:
For instance, the limitations of receiving information
(competitions, performance parameters, a time period),
instructing to collect data (set of actual performance data),
collecting and storing user data, calculating a score, reporting
and storing said score, generating an aggregate data set based on
a challenge victory rate are similar to the concept(s) of collecting
(i.e. receiving, storing, collecting) and analyzing data (i.e.
calculating), and displaying certain results of the collection and
analysis (i.e. reporting and generating) in [Elec. Power Grp.,
LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016)]. Moreover,
the limitations of using mathematical algorithms to manipulate
existing information to generate additional information in
[Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978)], collection, storage, and
recognition of data (receiving, collecting, reporting, storing) in
[Smart Sys. Innovations, LLC v. Chi. Transit Auth, 873 F.3d 1364
(Fed. Cir., 2017)], and rules for playing a game (i.e. receiving,
collecting, calculating, reporting) in [In re Smith, 815 F.3d 816
(Fed. Cir., 2016)].
Ans. 4–5. The Examiner determines that the claimed “concepts relate to
managing interpersonal and intrapersonal activities such as relationships or
transactions between people, social activities, human behavior and human
mental activity that can be performed in the human mind, or by a human
using a pen and paper, and mathematical concepts.” Id. at 6.
We agree with the Examiner that the claims recite a judicial exception
in the form of an abstract idea. Claim 1 recites “a system for managing a
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plurality of direct challenges between users of a game application” including
a “challenge application” that contains “program instructions for managing a
plurality of direct challenges between users,” and the program instructions
are executed to:
receive a first competitor selected by a first user for
participation in a first direct challenge;
receive a second competitor to serve as a rival of said first
competitor in said first direct challenge;
receive a performance parameter for said first direct
challenge;
receive a time period for said first direct challenge;
receive an acceptance from a second user and, in response,
deploy said first direct challenge;
instruct said external data reader to collect a first set of
actual performance data for said first competitor during said time
period, and a second set of actual performance data for said
second competitor during said time period, from at least one of
said plurality of external data services;
calculate a score for said first direct challenge, wherein
said score is based on a comparison of said first set of actual
performance data and said second set of actual performance data;
report said score to said first user; and
store said score in said database;
Appeal Br. 17–18. Thus, the claimed challenge application includes a set of
rules for playing a direct challenge game, as noted by the Examiner. And
we agree with the Examiner that this is substantially similar to the concept of
claims reciting rules for conducting a game found abstract in In re
Smith. Following rules or instructions, and, specifically, providing rules of a
game such as the one recited in claim 1, amounts to managing personal
behavior or relationships or interactions between people (including social
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activities, teaching, and following rules or instructions), which is one of
certain methods of organizing human activity. See Revised Guidance, 84
Fed. Reg. at 52; In re Smith, 815 F.3d at 818-819 (“the rejected claims,
describing a set of rules for a game, are drawn to an abstract idea.”) Such
methods of organizing human activity are abstract ideas. See Smith, 815 F.3d
at 818-819.
Step 2A, Prong Two
Having determined that claim 1 recites a judicial exception, we next
consider whether there are additional elements in the claim that integrate the
judicial exception into a practical application, i.e., evaluate whether the
claim “appl[ies], rel[ies] on, or use[s] the judicial exception in a manner that
imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is
more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception.”
See Revised Guidance Step 2A–Prong Two. Here we look to see if, for
example, (i) any additional elements of the claims reflects an improvement
in the functioning of a computer or to another technological field, (ii) an
application of the judicial exception with, or by use of, a particular machine,
(iii) a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different state or
thing (iv) or a use of the judicial exception in some other meaningful way
beyond generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular
technological environment. See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55; See
also MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h).
In addition to the limitations addressed above as part of the recited
abstract idea, claim 1 also recites a system including “an application services
interface comprising a database and an external data reader in
communication with a plurality of external data servers;” “a plurality of user
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interfaces to facilitate access to said application services interface;” and “a
non-transitory computer-readable medium . . . and one or more processors”
for executing program instructions. Additionally, the claim recites “a social
reporting engine, in communication with said database, for collecting and
storing user data” and “generating automatically an aggregate data set for the
first subset of said users whom exhibit a challenge victory rate above a
predetermined threshold over a predetermined time period.” The Examiner
finds that “[t]here is no indication that the combination of elements improves
the functioning of a computer or improves any other technology.” Final
Act. 5. The Examiner finds
Moreover, the claims do not recite improvements to
another technology or technical field. That is, they merely recite
rules for managing challenges between users of a game by
collecting, analyzing, and displaying certain results of the
collection and analysis. Nor, do the claims improve the
functioning of the underlying computer itself –they merely recite
generic computing elements. Furthermore, they do not effect a
transformation of a particular article to a different state or thing:
the underlying computing elements remain the same. As such,
viewed as a whole, these additional claim element(s) do not
provide meaningful limitation(s) to transform the abstract idea
into a patent eligible application of the abstract idea such that the
claim(s) amounts to significantly more than the abstract idea
itself.
Id. at 6. We agree with the Examiner, and we determine that the claim does
not integrate the judicial exception into a practical application under
Step 2A, Prong Two.
We determine that claim 1, unlike the claims found non-abstract in
prior cases, uses generic computer technology to store, process and transmit
data, and does not recite an improvement to a particular computer
technology. See, e.g., McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837
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F.3d 1299, 1314–15 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (finding claims not abstract because
they “focused on a specific asserted improvement in computer animation”).
In particular, we find that the structural limitations, noted above, are used for
basic computer functions, i.e., receiving data, issuing instructions, analyzing
data, reporting data, and storing data, which may be performed by any
computer system.
The Specification supports this finding. For example, the
Specification discloses that the challenge application is “implemented using
a programmed computer.” Spec. ¶ 37. The Specification also discloses that
a Service Interface is used to “integrate the roster management system” into
“existing fantasy sports applications,” and that this interface “may be part of
one or more central Server machines, which interact with remote client
devices, such as desktop computers, laptops, tables, and handheld devices.”
Id. at ¶ 78, 81. The Specification also discloses that the databases used
“may include a single database, a set of lookup tables, a set of relational
databases, or any other structure for storing and accessing information.” Id.
at ¶ 80. The Specification further discloses that the social reporting engine
“gathers user data . . . across multiple games, over an extended period of
time, resulting in the population and updating of potentially millions of user
data profiles, which may be stored in a user database.” Id. at ¶ 62. The
Specification discloses that user data “will be aggregated in order to derive
business intelligence and other useful information” and that the
“combination of demographic information and actual user behavior
contributes to the value of the user data collected and stored by the game
system.” Id. at ¶ 63.
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We see nothing in the Specification that indicates that the claimed
system uses any specialized computer equipment, and the descriptions of the
components used do not indicate that the claims reflect any improvement in
the functioning of a computer or the use of a particular machine, which may
indicate that the additional elements represent a practical application of the
abstract. We also find nothing in the record indicating that the claim effects
a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different state or
thing. Nor do we find anything of record, short of attorney argument, that
attributes any improvement in computer technology and/or functionality to
the claimed invention or that otherwise indicates that the claimed invention
“appl[ies], rel[ies] on, or us[es] the judicial exception in a manner that
imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is
more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception.”
See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55.
Appellants argue that the claims represent “specific improvements to
game management computing systems because [the claimed] features enable
the computer to do things it could not do before.” Appeal Br. 11. More
specifically, Appellants argue
In the case of claim 1, conventional computing systems cannot
permit a user to construct and initiate a custom direct challenge
to another user and the system cannot automatically generate an
aggregate data set of “guru” users that have a challenge victory
rate above a predetermined threshold over a predetermined time
period.
Id. Appellants further argue that the “claims are like the improved
computing systems claimed in Enfish, Thales, Visual Memory, Finjan and
Core Wireless because Appellant’s claims recite a specific improvement
over prior systems - an improved gaming system and prediction engine
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which enable a computer system to do things it could not do before.” Id. at
12–13.
Yet, Appellants do not explain adequately how claim 1 provides an
improvement to the functioning of the computer. To the extent Appellants
assert that the claim provides a means for conducting direct challenges and a
means for generating aggregate data sets, Appellants do not explain how
those elements result in an improvement to the functioning of the computer
itself. There is an important distinction between computer functionality
improvements and uses of existing computers as tools to perform a particular
task. Merely programming the computer to run a new program does not
constitute the type of technological improvement addressed in the cases
cited by Appellants. For example, in Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., the
court rejected a § 101 challenge at the step one stage of the Mayo/Alice
analysis because the claims at issue focused on a specific type of data
structure, i.e., a self-referential table for a computer database, designed to
improve the way a computer carries out its basic functions of storing and
retrieving data, and not on asserted advances in uses to which existing
computer capabilities could be put. 822 F.3d 1327, 335–36 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
Appellants also argue that the claims here may be distinguished from
those at issue in Smith. Reply Br. 2–3. Specifically, Appellants assert that
Smith’s claims were directed only to “merely manipulating standard cards in
standard ways,” whereas
Appellant[s’] claims allow a user to create a custom challenge
with custom parameters, which would give virtually limitless
permutations of possible challenges. In addition, Appellant[s’]
claims do not merely set the parameters of a challenge. The
claims address the technical challenge and difficulty in creating
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a device or system that can accurately predict outcomes of
events.
Id. at 3. Yet, as discussed above, we are not persuaded of any technical
improvement in the functioning of the computer. Here, Appellants indicate
that the claims address a “technical challenge and difficulty in creating a
device or system that can accurately predict outcomes of events.” Id.
However, without further explanation, we fail to see how claim 1 recites any
limitations for a system for predicting outcomes of events.
Based on the foregoing, we determine that claim 1 does not include
any practical application of the recited abstract idea.
Step 2B
Turning to Step 2B of the of the Revised Guidance, we must
determine whether the additional elements (1) add a specific limitation or
combination of limitations that is not well-understood, routine, and
conventional activity in the field, which is indicative that an inventive
concept may be present or (2) simply appends well-understood, routine,
conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception, which is indicative that an
inventive concept may not be present. See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg.
at 56.
As discussed above, the additional elements of claim 1 include an
“application services interface comprising a database and an external data
reader in communication with a plurality of external data servers;” “a
plurality of user interfaces to facilitate access to said application services
interface;” “a non-transitory computer-readable medium . . . and one or more
processors” for executing program instructions; and “a social reporting
engine.” The Specification only discloses that the system performs routine
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computing tasks related to processing information or executing software,
which would include processing the software for executing direct challenges
and collecting and storing user data for the social reporting engine. See, e.g.,
Spec. ¶¶ 37, 62, 62, 80, 81. The Specification provides sufficient evidence
that the additional elements claimed or the processes performed by those
elements are well-understood or used in a manner that is routine or
conventional. See In re Katz, 639 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(“Absent a possible narrower construction of the terms ‘processing,’
‘receiving,’ and ‘storing,’ discussed below, those functions can be achieved
by any general purpose computer without special programming”); Inventor
Holdings, LLC v. Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc., 876 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir.
2017) (holding that considering claims reciting data retrieval, analysis,
modification, generation, display, and transmission as an “‘ordered
combination’” reveals that they “amount to ‘nothing significantly more’ than
an instruction to apply [an] abstract idea” using generic computer
technology) (internal citation omitted).
Appellants argue that the claims do not present a risk of preemption
because “they do not prevent others from ‘managing challenges between
users of a game by collecting, analyzing, and displaying certain results of the
collection and analysis.’” Appeal Br. 14. “While preemption may signal
patent ineligible subject matter, the absence of complete preemption does
not demonstrate patent eligibility.” Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom,
Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015); see also OIP Techs., Inc. v.
Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1362–63 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[T]hat the
claims do not preempt all price optimization or may be limited to price
optimization in the e-commerce setting do not make them any less
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abstract”). And, “[w]here a patent’s claims are deemed only to disclose
patent ineligible subject matter under the Mayo framework, as they are in
this case, preemption concerns are fully addressed and made moot.” Ariosa,
788 F.3d at 1379. Thus, any relevant analysis related to preemption is
subsumed under our analysis with respect to Alice/Mayo and the Revised
Guidance above.
Appellants also argue that the claims here are “directed to specific
implementations of online challenge games” and “require far more detailed
technical implementation than ‘merely managing challenges between users
of a game by collecting, analyzing, and displaying certain results of the
collection and analysis.’” Appeal Br. 14–15. Thus, Appellants liken their
claims to those addressed in BASCOM. Id. at 13–14 (citing BASCOM Glob.
Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016)).
However, we can find no parallel between the present claims and those at
issue in BASCOM. Instead, we agree with the Examiner that the additional
elements taken alone or in combination do not result in anything more than
conventional computer implementation. See, e.g., Final Act. 5.
In BASCOM, the Federal Circuit held that the second step of the
Mayo/Alice framework was satisfied because the claimed invention
“represents a ‘software-based invention[ ] that improve[s] the performance
of the computer system itself.’” BASCOM, 827 F.3d at 1351 (stating that
like DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1256 (Fed. Cir.
2014), where the patent “claimed a technical solution to a problem unique to
the Internet,” the patent in BASCOM claimed a “technology-based
solution . . . to filter content on the Internet that overcomes existing
problems with other Internet filtering systems . . . making it more dynamic
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and efficient”) (citations omitted). Here, we are not persuaded that claim 1
represents any technological improvement, as opposed to an improvement in
a business practice, i.e., management of games in order to provide “deeper
user engagement,” which “increases the value of games, especially in the
commercial context,” for which generic computer components are used in
their ordinary capacity. Spec. ¶ 27.
Based on the foregoing, we determine that the claims do not include
an inventive concept under the Alice and Mayo framework.
Determination Regarding Patent Eligibility
Based on the foregoing, we are not persuaded of error in the
Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 as claiming ineligible subject matter.
Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claim 1–6, 8, and 11–13, which fall
with claim 1.
CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM the rejection of claims 1–6, 8, and 11–13.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED