D & B Commercial Body Sales, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Apr 23, 1976

223 N.L.R.B. 1048 (N.L.R.B. 1976)

1048 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
D & B Commercial Body Sales, Inc. and Charles
Spencer. Case 8-CA-9073
April 23, 1976
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS JENKINS, PENELLO, AND WALTHER
On January 26, 1976, Administrative Law Judge
Jerry B. Stone issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, the General Counsel filed ex-
ceptions and a supporting brief, and the Respondent
filed an answering brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge, as
herein modified.
The complaint alleges that Respondent's president,
John Conkle, unlawfully threatened plant closure be-
fore he would reinstate certain employees who had
been discharged. On March 7, 1975, the Union and
the Respondent met at the union hall to discuss out-
standing grievances, particularly those involving the
discharges of Delton Swartz, Charles Spencer, and
Farrol Waltz. Conkle said that since he had bought
the business, he had been operating at a loss and that
if he had to reinstate the dischargees, he would have
to close the business. The Union offered to arbitrate
the discharges. As found by the Administrative Law
Judge, Conkle in reply "stated pretty emphatically
that he, under no circumstances, would reinstate the
three employees; that if he was-that if we even took
him to arbitration and won, that in his particular
case he would close the plant down first before he
would reinstate them." At a membership meeting on
March 11, 1975, Union Representative Edward Finn
reported to employees of the Respondent what
Conkle had said about reinstatement.
In dismissing the 8(a)(1) allegation, the Adminis-
trative Law Judge found that the March 7 discussion
did not touch on the union activity or grievance-fil-
ing activity of the three dischargees. The Administra-
tive Law Judge then concluded that the statement
was protected by Section 8(c) of the Act as an expres-
sion of opinion and prediction of economic results to
flow from the reinstatements of Spencer, Swartz, and
Waltz. For the reasons below, we do not agree.
The Administrative Law Judge found, and we
adopt his findings , that employees Spencer and
Swartz were discharged in violation of Section 8(a)(3)
of the Act for engaging in the protected union activi-
ty of filing grievances. Thus, the critical factor here is
not, as found by the Administrative Law Judge, that
protected activity was not discussed at the March 7
meeting , but that employees Spencer and Swartz
were in fact discharged for engaging in protected ac-
tivity. In these circumstances, Conkle's statement
that he would close the plant before he reinstated the
dischargees constitutes a threat that he would contin-
ue to take discriminatory action against employees
because they filed and continued to press grievances.
The statement, although not made directly to em-
ployees, was made to union representatives of the
employees during negotiations within the grievance
procedure. In these circumstances, Conkle could ex-
pect that his threat would be communicated to em-
ployees, as it in fact was. For the above reasons, we
find that the Respondent, by threatening to close its
plant if forced to reinstate dischargees Spencer,
Swartz, and Waltz, interfered with, restrained, and
coerced its employees in the exercise of rights guar-
anteed in Section 7 of the Act. We shall accordingly
amend the recommended Order and the notice.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re-
lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge as modified
below and hereby orders that the Respondent, D & B
Commercial Body Sales, Inc., Lima, Ohio, its offi-
cers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the
action set forth in said recommended Order, as mod-
ified below:
1. Reletter paragraph 1(b) to 1(c) and add the fol-
lowing as paragraph l(b):
"(b) Threatening to take discriminatory action
against employees for engaging in grievance activity
by threatening to close the plant if required to rein-
state dischargees, including Charles Spencer and
Delton Swartz who were discriminatorily dis-
charged."
2. Substitute the attached notice for that recom-
mended by the Administrative Law Judge.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL offer to Charles Spencer and Delton
223 NLRB No. 161
D & B COMMERCIAL BODY SALES, INC.
Swartz immediate and full reinstatement to their
former positions or, if such positions no longer
exist, to substantially equivalent positions, with-
out prejudice to their seniority or other rights
previously enjoyed, and make each of them
whole for any loss of pay or other benefits suf-
fered by reason of the discrimination against
him.
WE WILL NOT discharge or otherwise discrimi-
nate against employees in regard to hire or ten-
ure of employment, or any term or condition of
employment because of their union or protected
concerted activities.
WE WILL NOT threaten to take discriminatory
action against employees for engaging in griev-
ance activity by threatening to close the plant if
required to reinstate certain employees, includ-
ing Charles Spencer and Delton Swartz.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exer-
cise of their rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the
Act, except to the extent that such rights may be
affected by lawful agreements in accordance
with Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
All our employees are free to become or remain, or
refrain from becoming or remaining, members of any
labor organization, except to the extent provided by
Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
D & B COMMERCIAL BODY SALES, INC.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JERRY B. STONE , Administrative Law Judge: This pro-
ceeding, under Section 10(b) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, as amended, was heard pursuant to due notice
on July 31, 1975, at Lima, Ohio.
The original charge was filed on April 7, 1975; the
amended charge was filed on April 28, 1975; the complaint
in this matter was issued on May 20, 1975. The issues con-
cern (1) whether the Respondent has threatened employees
with respect to their exercise of protected concerted activi-
ty rights and thereby has violated Section 8(a)(1) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, and (2) wheth-
er the Respondent discriminatorily terminated the employ-
ment of Charles Spencer, Delton Swartz, and Farrol Waltz
and thereby has violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
All parties were afforded full opportunity to participate
in the proceeding. A brief has been filed by the General
Counsel. Oral arguments by the parties and such brief have
been considered.
Upon the entire record in the case and from my observa-
tion of witnesses, I hereby make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1049
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE EMPLOYER
The facts herein are based upon the pleadings and ad-
missions therein.
D & B Commercial Body Sales, Inc., the Respondent, is
now, and has been at all times material herein, a corpora-
tion duly organized under and existing by virtue of the
laws of the State of Ohio, with its principal office and place
of business located in Lima, Ohio, herein called the plant,
where it is engaged in the business of truck body repair and
assembly. During the calendar year 1974 Respondent, in
the course and conduct of its business operations, derived
gross income in excess of $50,000 for services performed
for the Hoosier Equipment Company, River Forest, Illi-
nois, which business enterprise annually ships goods val-
ued in excess of $50,000 directly from its Illinois facility to
points located outside the State of Illinois.
As conceded by Respondent and based upon the fore-
going, it is concluded and found that the Respondent is,
and has been at all times material herein, an employer en-
gaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6),
and (7) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Imple-
ment Workers of America, Local 975, is, and has been at
all times material herein, a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Preliminary Issues: Supervisory Status I
At all times material herein , the following named per-
sons occupied the positions set forth opposite their re-
spective names and have been , and are now, agents of the
Respondent, acting on its behalf, and are supervisors with-
in the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act: John Conkle-
president ; Gerald W. Keysor-general manager.
B. Background Events 2
D & B Commercial Body Sales, Inc., the Respondent,
and United Automobile , Aerospace and Agricultural Im-
plement Workers of America , Local 975, the Union, have
engaged in a collective-bargaining relationship since
around January 1971. The current collective -bargaining
agreement was entered on February 18, 1974, and is to be
effective until midnight on January 27, 1977. Said agree-
ment has a grievance procedure but has no provision for
arbitration . The said agreement is silent as to whether
grievances may be filed during working hours . However,
article IX, section 7 provides that "Aggrieved employees
and representatives of the Union who are employees shall
1 The facts are based upon the pleadings and admissions therein.
2 The facts are undisputed and are based upon the exhibits and credited
testimony of the witnesses.
1050 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
be granted their regular pay for meetings with the Compa-
ny during regular working hours."
The events in this case concern, in part, the filing of
grievances and discussion of such grievances by Charles
Spencer and Delton Swartz during working hours. Counsel
for the parties narrowed the issues in this case by stating
that no issue was presented as to the propriety of such
grievances being filed or discussed on company time.
The Respondent operates only one shift of employees.
The hours of such shift are from 7:30 a.m. until 4 p.m. In
January 1975, the Respondent employed approximately 10
employees on such shift. General Manager Gerald W. Key-
sor is Respondent's only supervisor and agent who works
at the facility involved.
The issues of discrimination concern the discharges of
Charles Spencer and Delton Swartz on January 31, 1975,
and the discharge of Farrol Waltz on February 3, 1975. At
the time of their discharge Spencer, Swartz, and Waltz
were all classified as assemblers. At such time both Spencer
and Swartz had worked for the Respondent for about 5
years, and Waltz had worked for the Respondent over 2-
1/2 years.3
Farrol Waltz was the union chairman of the bargaining
unit employees for a period of time prior to August 1974,
and until a period of time in August 1974. Delton Swartz
became the union chairman of the bargaining unit employ-
ees in August 1974, and was such chairman at the time of
his discharge on January 31, 1975. Charles Spencer was
appointed the Union's safety man on October 9, 1974. At
some point of time, exactly when unrevealed by the evi-
dence, Spencer served as vice chairman of the Union.
At some point of time after October 9, 1974, and prior to
December 30, 1974, Spencer filed several grievances with
the Respondent relating to safety and health questions.
These grievances were not resolved to the satisfaction of
the Union. On December 30, 1974, Spencer filed a com-
plaint with the U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational
Safety and Health Administration. As a result thereof, an
agent for OSHA went to Respondent's plant on January 7,
1975, and conducted an investigation. During this investi-
gation Spencer, as safety agent for the Union, accompa-
nied the OSHA agent and Respondent's agents and offi-
cials Keysor and Conkle through the plant. As a result of
this OSHA investigation, the Respondent was cited for
some 13 violations.
Swartz credibly testified to the effect that during his
term as union chairman there were some 32 grievances
filed with the Respondent. Whether this testimony was in-
tended to reveal that 32 grievances were filed between the
point of time in August 1974, when Swartz became union
chairman, and January 31, 1975, when he was discharged,
is not clear. The record further reveals several grievances
filed by Swartz after January 31, 1975. In any event, the
facts reveal that Swartz filed 10 grievances relating to safe-
ty and health between October 9, 1974, and December 30,
1974, and that around 13 grievances were filed during the
period of time commencing on January 19, 1975, and end-
7 Spencer had been discharged in September 1974 but had, apparently
because of intervention by the Union, been reinstated , apparently shortly
thereafter.
ing on January 31, 1975.1
With respect to certain grievances filed with the Respon-
dent, the dates thereof, the subject matter thereof, and the
persons involved in filing of such grievances, the following
summary is made.
1/15/75; Re: General Manager Keysor's working;
Swartz and McCormick.
1/15/75; Re: reprimand to Spencer; Spencer and Mc-
Cormick.
1/17/75; Re: General Manager Keysor's working:
Swartz and McCormick.
1/18/75; Re: Paycheck; Swartz, Spencer, Waltz, Adkins.
1/27/75; Re: Suspension of Harrod and McCormick;
Swartz.
1/27/75; Re: Reprimand to Waltz; Swartz.
1/27/75; Re: Reprimands to Swartz; Swartz.
1/27/75; Re: Relieving of Adkins as Leadman; Swartz
and Adkins.
1/27/75; Re: General Manager Keysor's working;
Swartz.
1/30/75; Re: General Manager Keysor's working;
Swartz, Spencer, Waltz, Dameron, Harrod, and McCor-
mick.
1/30/75; Re: General Manager Keysor's working;
Swartz, Spencer, Waltz, Dameron, Harrod, and McCor-
mick.
1 /31 /75; Re: Overtime work; Swartz, Spencer, Waltz,
Adkins, and Harrod.
1/31/75; Re: Spencer's claim to bid for Leadman;
Swartz and Spencer.
It should also be noted that with respect to the griev-
ances of January 27, 1975 concerning the suspension of
Harrod and McCormick, the reprimand of Waltz, and the
relieving of Adkins as leadman, the Union noted protests
thereto on the company documents relating to suspension,
reprimand, or relieving of the employee as leadman.
On many of the occasions when Swartz or Spencer filed
grievances with the Respondent during the period of time
commencing on January 15, 1975, and through January 31,
1975, General Manager Keysor told Swartz or Spencer in
effect that if they didn't quit filing "Mickey Mouse" griev-
ances , they would be discharged. On Monday after the dis-
charge of Waltz, General Manager Keysor told employee
Dameron in effect that if he filed a grievance about anoth-
er matter, he would be discharged.'
4 Two other grievances were filed by Swartz on February 4, 1975, after the
discharges of Swartz , Spencer, and Waltz. Whether Swartz continued to
function as union chairman after his discharge on January 31, 1975, and
until July 31, 1975, the date of the hearing in this matter , is unclear. It is also
unclear as to whether other grievances were filed during the period of time
after February 4, 1975, and to July 31, 1975.
5 The facts are based upon a composite of the credited aspects of the
testimony of Swartz , Spencer, and Dameron. Swartz' testimony was to the
effect that General Manager Keysor told him every time that he filed a
grievance that he would be discharged if he kept filing grievances . As to the
testimony on this point, I found Spencer and Dameron to be the witnesses
most impressive as to truthfulness and objectivity. Swartz' testimony ap-
pears to be a little overstated . I am persuaded from the testimony of all the
witnesses and the logical consistency of the facts that Keysor made such
statements with reference to his description of grievances as "Mickey
Mouse" grievances . Further, Dameron's testimony was to the effect that he
was told by Keysor that, if he filed a grievance, he would be out in the street
with Waltz. Since Waltz had already been discharged , it is clear that the
D & B COMMERCIAL BODY SALES, INC. 1051
On January 27, 1975, the Union filed an unfair labor
practice charge in Case 8-CA-8903, alleging in effect that
the Respondent had refused to bargain with respect to the
handling of grievances. Thereafter on January 28, 1975, the
Union voted to engage in a strike at a future date with
respect to the question of settlement of grievances. On
March 7, 1975, officials of the Union met with the Respon-
dent for the purpose of resolving outstanding grievances.
At this meeting the Respondent indicated in strong terms
that it would not settle grievances relating to the discharges
of Swartz, Spencer, and Waltz, and that, if it had to rein-
state the three employees, it would close the plant .6 On
March 10, 1975, the charge in Case 8-CA-8903 was dis-
missed .7 On March 11, 1975, union officials reported to the
union membership the results of the March 7, 1975, union-
company meeting . At such meeting, the strike vote of Janu-
ary 28, 1975, was nullified.
C. Events of January 31, 1975; the Discharge of Spencer
and Swartz 8
1. Preliminary
The Respondent's operation is a small operation involv-
ing the employment of approximately 10 employees. The
Respondent has one supervisor, General Manager Gerald
Keysor.
On the morning of January 31, 1975, Respondent's em-
ployees were engaged in work on the production or finish-
ing of some van bodies. There were a number of crews of
two men each, working on each van body. Spencer and
Swartz were assigned to work on one van body. Employees
Waltz and Harrod were working on a van body next to the
one assigned to Spencer and Swartz. Employee Adkins was
working nearby.
Spencer and Swartz were at their assigned van body at
7:30 a.m., starting time , and were at such van body or in
the shop thereafter until their regular breaktime from
9:15 to 9:30 a.m.
During the period of time 7:30 to 10:30, on the morning
of January 31, 1975, there were one or two grievances filed
with the Respondent. The facts reveal that one grievance,
concerning Spencer's alleged right to be made "leadman,"
was filed around 8:30 a.m. by Swartz. The other grievance
that may have been filed during the period of time between
7:30 and 10:30 a.m. concerned a question of overtime.
Other than the fact that there was a grievance concerning
overtime, a copy of the grievance itself and who had signed
such grievance, the facts have not been presented as to
such grievance. Thus, it cannot be ascertained whether the
message was a threat of discharge . Although Keysor testified in denial of
remarks about "Mickey Mouse" grievances , his testimony was hesitant and
of a "I don 't recall" nature . I credit the testimony of Swartz, Spencer, and
Dameron as indicated . I discredit Keysor's testimony in denial of the facts
as found.
6 The details of this meeting are discussed more fully in sec. E hereof.
7 Apparently by the Regional Director of Region 8.
8 The facts are based upon a composite of the credited aspects of the
testimony of Swartz , Spencer, Waltz, Robert Keysor, Gerald Keysor, Ni-
cholson , Cook, Adkins, and Harrod , and upon exhibits and a consideration
of the logical consistency of facts. The testimony of any witness inconsistent
with the facts found is discredited.
grievance on overtime was filed before or after the dis-
charges of Spencer and Swartz, nor can it be ascertained as
to who filed such grievance with Respondent. The facts of
the grievance form itself reveal that Spencer , Swartz,
Waltz, and Harrod signed such grievance. Whether all four
were present and presented the grievance as a group, how-
ever, is not revealed by the facts.
On the morning of January 31, 1975, Spencer and Swartz
were assigned to work on a van body. According to
Spencer's credited testimony, under normal conditions it
would have taken about 3-1/2 hours to complete the work
on such van body. The work to be done consisted of cut-
ting some metal , drilling some holes, and riveting rivets in
some mesh upon the van body.
There is little dispute and the facts clearly reveal that
General Manager Gerald Keysor spoke to Spencer and
Swartz about their work on at least three occasions be-
tween 7:30 and 10:30 on the morning of January 31, 1975.
There is little dispute and the facts clearly reveal that
Spencer and Swartz did little real productive work on the
morning of January 31 between 7:30 and 10:30. A compos-
ite of Spencer's and Swartz' credited testimony reveals
that, between 7:30 and 8, they "put up a couple pieces of
metal" on the van body, and between 8 and 8:30 Spencer
cut some pieces of metal with a torch.
There is a dispute, at least by implication, in the testimo-
ny as to whether the rivet gun used by Spencer and Swartz
was operable, or if not functioning properly, as to the de-
gree of inoperability. Thus, Spencer, Waltz, and Swartz
testified in composite effect that the rivet gun, sometime
after 7:30 and before 8 on January 31, 1975, commenced to
function improperly, that thereafter attempts were made to
get the gun to function properly by "popping" air, later by
disassembling and reassembling and by oiling, and by
"popping" air, and that the attempts to get the gun to func-
tion properly were unsuccessful. Respondent's witness Ad-
kins testified to the effect that at some point of time after
7:30 he borrowed said rivet gun from Spencer and Swartz
and that the gun worked properly. Employee Harrod testi-
fied to the effect that he was using a rivet gun in the van
body next to the van body assigned to Spencer and Swartz
and that the gun he was using became jammed with a rivet
around 11. At such time Spencer and Swartz had been
discharged at 10:30. At some point of time, either at 11 or
later, Harrod secured a rivet gun out of the van body that
had been assigned to Spencer and Swartz and used such
gun that afternoon, and it worked properly.
There is no dispute that all of the rivet guns in
Respondent's shop, excepting the rivet gun used by Spenc-
er and Swartz and the rivet gun used by Waltz and Harrod,
were inoperable. As indicated, the condition of the rivet
gun used by Spencer and Swartz is in question.
The overall evidence reveals that the problem, ascribed
to the rivet gun by Spencer, Waltz, and Swartz, was one of
the jamming of rivets, that their attempts to get the gun to
function by "popping air" was essentially that of just trying
to use the gun in a testing like manner with the hope that
the gun would become unjammed and commence to func-
tion properly; that the oiling, disassembling and assem-
bling of the gun was for the same purpose.
In effect, the conflict in testimony suggests the possibili-
1052 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ty that the rivet gun used by Spencer and Swartz was work-
ing properly and that the two were utilizing the pretext of a
faulty gun to more or less "soldier on the job ." Adkins'
testimony as to his usage of such gun , however , was not
presented in such a way as to reveal whether or not he used
the gun before or after the contended improper functioning
of the gun . Such testimony , therefore , is of little value in
determining the details and events concerning said gun.
Harrod's testimony , although of a better quality , concerns
the usage of a rivet gun, apparently the one used by Spenc-
er and Swartz, hours after the critical events . It should be
noted in this respect that tools are apparently as a matter
of practice borrowed from various work stations by em-
ployees to be used at other stations . Whether such rivet gun
used by Spencer and Swartz had been worked on or used
by others in the time period between 10:30 a .m. and the
afternoon is speculative but possible . Harrod also testified
to the effect that Waltz, after the discharge of Spencer and
Swartz, essentially "soldiered on the job." 9 Thus, Waltz
also might have switched the rivet gun in furtherance, if
needed , of an excuse for not working.
With respect to the foregoing, I would note that the
Union had had a strike vote on January 28, 1975; that
Adkins told Spencer and Swartz on the morning of Janu-
ary 31, 1975, that he was going to the union hall concern-
ing such strike ; that one of the pending grievances con-
cerned the fact that Adkins had been relieved as a
"leadman"; that on the morning of January 31 , 1975, em-
ployees Swartz , Spencer , and Waltz discussed what could
be done about the problems at the company; and that be-
tween 8 and 8:30 Spencer engaged in discussions with the
union committee and with General Manager Keysor about
his claim to be appointed "leadman."
Around 8:30 a.m. General Manager Gerald Keysor told
employees Spencer and Swartz to go to work. Spencer and
Swartz complained in effect that the "rivet gun" would not
function properly . General Manager Keysor told Swartz to
fix the gun . Swartz complained that fixing the gun was not
his responsibility , that it was the Company's responsibility.
Considering all of the foregoing , I find a close question
as to whether the "rivet gun" used by Spencer and Swartz
was functioning improperly . However, I am not persuaded
that if the rivet gun had been working properly that Swartz
would have wanted some one else to work on such gun and
thus reveal that he and Spencer were using a phony excuse.
Considering all of the testimony and logical consistency of
facts , I credit the testimony of Spencer , Waltz, and Swartz
as to the improper functioning of Spencer and Swartz' rivet
gun.
There is also a dispute, at least by implication, as to
whether tools , other than rivet guns, for use in cutting met-
al, etc., were available for Spencer and Swartz . Spencer
testified that a "metal cutter" did not do a proper job, and
that the user of such tool would get shocked because of an
electrical shortage in such tool. Adkins testified to having
used such "metal cutter" at some point of time after 7:30
on the morning of January 31, 1975. Spencer also testified
9 1 credit Harrod's testimony to this effect over Waltz' testimonial denial.
Harrod , a vice president of the Union , has no interest in this proceeding and
appeared to be a more frank , truthful, and objective witness than Waltz.
to the effect that around 8:30 he complained to General
Manager Gerald Keysor that someone had borrowed the
"torch" and, therefore , that he had no torch . It is sufficient
to say that I am persuaded that Spencer 's testimony as to
the "metal cutter" and the "torch" is rationalization for an
excuse for the incidents involved . There is no evidence that
Spencer attempted to use the "metal cutter" on January 31,
or that it was working improperly on such date . There is
evidence that several employees borrowed the "torch" on
the morning of January 31, 1975; that at least on one occa-
sion Spencer or Swartz told an employee that he could use
it, that they didn' t need it.
2. The events; 7:30-8 a.m.
On the morning of January 31, 1975, at 7:30 Spencer
and Swartz were at their work station on an assigned van
body. After they had riveted several pieces of metal on the
van body, the rivet gun commenced functioning improper-
ly. Thus, it appears that the rivets were jamming, and the
gun was erratic. Swartz commenced to try to get the rivet
gun to function properly by "popping air." 10 Spencer ap-
parently was standing around Swartz while this was going
on. l t
Around 8 a.m., while the above "popping of air" with
respect to the rivet gun was going on, General Manager
Keysor came to Spencer and Swartz' work station and told
them to go to work. Spencer and Swartz complained that
the rivet gun was not working. General Manager Keysor
told Spencer and Swartz that there were other tools in the
shop and walked away.
8 to 8:30 a.m.
After General Manager Keysor left Spencer and Swartz
around 8 a.m., Swartz asked Waltz about using Waltz' rivet
gun and was told that Waltz needed it for his own work.
Swartz resumed trying to get the rivet gun to correct its
problem by "popping air." Spencer cut some metal with a
torch and then apparently went to the union grievance
committee to complain about his not receiving a job as
leadman which had been posted and for which he had bid.
Spencer and such committee went to see General Manager
Keysor about Spencer's claim for such leadman's position.
General Manager Keysor told the committee in effect that
Spencer would not be made leadman, that General Manag-
10 Apparently by activating the gun so that by "popping air," rivets would
become unjammed and with the hope that the gun would cure its own
functioning problem.
11 Swartz testified to the effect that he "reported" the rivet gun problem to
his leadman . Adkins; that Adkins told him that it was the Company's re-
sponsibility to fix the gun . The facts are clear that Adkins was not a lead-
man on January 31, 1975, having already been relieved from such position.
I discredit Swartz' testimony to the effect that he made a report. At the time
involved Swartz , Adkins, and others apparently were joined in opposition to
the Company's relief of Adkins as a leadman. I do not doubt and would
credit the fact that Swartz spoke to Adkins, not as a report but in a com-
plaining nature to a fellow employee, and that Adkins responded as indi-
cated . I note also that Adkins, in his testimony, testified to the effect that he
"ordered" Spencer and Swartz to go to work on the morning of January 31.
1975. Since Adkins was not a leadman at such time, I discredit his testimony
that he ordered them to go to work. Rather, I would credit the fact that
Adkins, as a fellow employee, may have suggested that they should go to
work.
D & B COMMERCIAL BODY SALES, INC. 1053
er Keysor's brother was being made "leadman." Later
Spencer tried to get the union committee to file a grievance
in his behalf, but the committee would not do so.
Apparently during the period of time 8 to 8:30 a.m. em-
ployee Waltz engaged in conversation with Spencer and
Swartz about what had to be done to correct conditions in
the shop. Apparently also during the same period of time,
employee Adkins spoke to Spencer and Swartz about his
going to the union hall concerning the Union's January 28,
1975, strike vote over his and other unresolved grievances.
During the period of time, 8 to 8:30 a.m., Spencer and
Swartz, from the observation of the others, appeared to be
standing around and not working.
Around 8:30 a.m., General Manager Keysor returned to
the van body where Spencer and Swartz were assigned.
Again it appears that Spencer was standing around, and
Swartz was "popping air" in the rivet gun. General Manag-
er Keysor told Spencer and Swartz to go to work, that if
they didn't he would give them a 3-day suspension.
Spencer and Swartz again complained that the rivet gun
would not work. General Manager Keysor told Swartz to
fix the rivet gun. At such time, Swartz complained that it
was not his job to fix the rivet gun. Spencer complained to
General Manager Keysor that someone had taken his
"torch." In sum effect , General Manager Keysor told
Swartz to fix the rivet gun and for Spencer and Swartz to
go to work or he would give them a 3-day suspension.
Spencer asked General Manager Keysor if he were going
to get the leadman's job or would he have to file a griev-
ance over the matter. General Manager Keysor told Spenc-
er that he was not going to get the job, that the job had
been posted, and that Spencer's name was not on the bid
sheet. Spencer and Swartz then argued that Spencer had
bid for the job and had seniority over Robert Keysor (who
was to get said job). General Manager Keysor reiterated
his statements . At this time Spencer and Swartz prepared a
grievance over Spencer's not getting the leadman's job and
filed it with General Manager Keysor.12
General Manager Keysor told Spencer and Swartz that
they were not to be going around and filing grievances on
company time.
8:30 to 10:30 a.m.
After General Manager Keysor left around 8:30 a.m.,
employee Waltz came over and he and Swartz disassem-
bled, oiled, and reassembled the rivet gun. Swartz attempt-
ed to use such gun, and it resumed its malfunctioning.
Swartz again attempted to get the gun to remedy its prob-
lems by "popping air." Around 10 a.m. General Manager
Keysor returned to Spencer and Swartz' work station and
again told them to go to work, that if they didn't, he was
going to send them home and give them a 3-day suspen-
sion. Apparently around this time, employee Waltz told
General Manager Keysor that Spencer and Swartz' gun
wouldn't work properly. General Manager Keysor told
Waltz to stay out of it and to get to work. Around this time
12 1 find Swartz' testimonial timing of events to appear more positive than
that of Spencer. Considering this and the logical consistency of facts, I find
the timing of events as indicated.
Spencer asked General Manager Keysor if he could go
home. General Manager Keysor told Spencer that he,
Spencer, was going home as soon as he could get his travel
papers written out.
Later, around 10:20 or 10:30, General Manager Keysor
came to Spencer and Swartz' work station and discharged
them. Keysor gave the two employees discharge slips to the
following effect.
SUBJECT: DISCHARGE: DATE; JAN. 31. 1975
MESSAGE : YOU ARE HERE-WITH NOTIFIED OF BEING DISCHARGED
FROM YOUR JOB AT D & B FOR INSUBORDINATION. (HAD THREE
DAYS OFF FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION PREVIOUSLY). REFUSING TO
STAY ON AN ASSIGNED JOB AND GETTING IT DONE. TAKING COMPA-
NY TIME TO HASSLE AND SIGN GRIEVANCES WHICH HAVE ALREADY
BEEN FILED.
HARASSMENT OF MANAGEMENT
REPLY
D & B BODY SALES, INC.
SIGNED Bill Keysor
DATE
After the discharge of Spencer and Swartz on January
31, 1975, grievances were filed over such discharges, and
General Manager Keysor met with Spencer and Swartz
and the union committee on the same date. At this meeting
Swartz asked General Manager Keysor why he and Spenc-
er had been discharged when he, Keysor, had told them
they were going to receive a 3-day suspension. General
Manager Keysor told the committee that it was because
they had been filing "Mickey Mouse" grievances.
In addition to the foregoing, it is noted that General
Manager Gerald Keysor testified to the effect that he dis-
charged Spencer and Swartz because they were not work-
ing, and that he did not discharge them for filing griev-
ances. General Manager Keysor's testimony relating to
whether he had ever used the words "Mickey Mouse"
grievance was particularly unimpressive. Nor did he ex-
plain satisfactorily the reference to grievances on the dis-
charge slip. To the extent that his testimony constitutes a
denial that he referred to "Mickey Mouse" grievances, it is
discredited. To the extent that Gerald Keysor denied that
grievances were a cause for discharging Spencer and
Swartz, his testimony is also discredited.
Contentions; conclusions
The General Counsel alleges and contends that the Re-
spondent discharged Spencer and Swartz on January 31,
1975, because they engaged in union and protected con-
certed activities, and that such conduct is violative of Sec-
tion 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. The Respondent contends
that the Respondent discharged Spencer and Swartz be-
cause they refused to work after being ordered to do so.
Considering all of the facts, I am persuaded and con-
clude that the Respondent believed that Spencer and
Swartz were not working when ordered to do so and was
planning to give them a 3-day suspension for not following
orders, that the filing of a grievance by Spencer and Swartz
and related conversation thereto motivated the Respon-
dent to discharge Spencer and Swartz instead of merely
giving them a 3-day suspension for failure to follow orders.
Thus, the filing of a grievance by Spencer and Swartz was
1054 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the major contributing factor for Respondent's discharge
of Spencer and Swartz on January 31, 1975.11
Thus Respondent has shown its hostility toward
Spencer's and Swartz' filing of grievances by remarks con-
cerning the filing of grievances and complaints with
OSHA, by the discharge notices, and by remarks to other
employees concerning the effect of filing of grievances. In
sum, the evidence preponderates for a finding that the dis-
charges of Spencer and Swartz on January 31, 1975, were
discriminatorily motivated and in violation of Section
8(a)(3) and (I) of the Act. It is so concluded and found.
D. The Discharge of Farrol Waltz, February 3, 1975
Farrol Waltz was initially hired by the Respondent on
July 13, 1972, and at the time of the critical events in this
case was employed as an assembler. During the year 1974,
Waltz served a term as a union chairman for a period end-
ing in August 1974. The facts previously set forth further
reveal that Waltz was active with Spencer, Swartz, and
others in processing a number of grievances during the pe-
riod immediately preceding his discharge on February 3,
1975. The facts previously set forth also reveal that Waltz
was present and somewhat involved in the question of
Spencer and Swartz' attempts to fix their rivet gun on Jan-
uary 31, 1975. Such facts reveal that Waltz made it clear to
General Manager Keysor that he considered that Spencer
and Swartz were having legitimate trouble with the rivet
gun and that Keysor told Waltz in effect to mind his own
business and to go back to work.
The facts are clear that Waltz considered that the dis-
charges of Spencer and Swartz were unfair, that Waltz in
effect engaged in a slowdown of his own in apparent pro-
test or disgust after the discharges of Spencer and Swartz,
and that Waltz, while at work and after the discharges of
Spencer and Swartz, made statements relating in effect that
he would have his wife come into the the shop and beat
Mrs. Louise Parlette , the office manager.14
General Manager Keysor owns and operates a bar
known as the "Band Stand" which is frequented and pa-
tronized by some of Respondent 's employees . In the late
afternoon or early evening of January 31, 1975, after
Respondent's workday, Waltz and fellow employees Ad-
kins, Dameron, and Robert Keysor decided to go to the
Band Stand. Apparently employees Waltz and Robert
Keysor were the first to arrive at the Band Stand that day.
Apparently employees Dameron and Adkins arrived at the
Band Stand a short time later.
Prior to going to the Band Stand and during the time
that the employees were discussing that they were going
there, Waltz had told fellow employee Dameron that they
should go to the Band Stand and razz Bill (Gerald ) Keysor.
Dameron told Waltz that he did not think this to be a good
idea, that Waltz was just asking for trouble. Waltz assured
13 The grievances were filed through union channels and constituted
union activity.
14 1 credit Harrod's testimony to such effect over Waltz' denial thereof.
Harrod, vice president of the union, appeared to be a witness without any
interest or ax to grind, and appeared more frank, forthright, and truthful
than Waltz did. Much of the evidence in this case was presented in a frag-
mentary manner and the reason for Waltz' making such remarks relating to
Mrs. Parlette was not revealed.
Dameron in effect that there would be no trouble.
Waltz, after arriving in the bar and finding a place at the
bar, commenced an attempt to razz Gerald Keysor.15 In a
high-toned voice, apparently to indicate a mimicking of
Mrs. Louise Parlette, Waltz ordered a drink. Waltz then
stated that, if it were "Louise" ordering the drink, Keysor
would already have the drink there. Waltz then addressed
himself to Mrs. Keysor in effect and asked her how she
would like to work under two bosses, one in the shop and
one in the office. Waltz told Mrs. Keysor in effect that he
didn't know who his boss was. Mrs. Keysor told Waltz to
shut his mouth, that they didn't need his trouble, that she
liked Louise. Gerald Keysor got off a stool from behind the
bar and approached the bar; he told Waltz in effect that he
knew he was angry because Spencer and Swartz had been
fired. Waltz told Keysor that he was angry, that it wasn't
right, that Spencer and Swartz had not had the tools to
work with on the job. When Keysor reached the bar, Waltz
told Keysor in effect that if he, Keysor, wanted to fight, to
come on out from behind the bar, that he would beat his
head in and whip his behind, that if he didn't like that, he
would have his wife whip Louise (Parlette). Keysor told
Waltz that he did not want to fight him, that he wanted
him to get out. Mrs. Keysor told her husband to call the
law. Waltz stated that he was leaving but continued his
argument. What Waltz said, however, is not revealed in the
record. Apparently one of Waltz' fellow employees and bar
patrons had been served with a drink by this time, and this
drink was handed to Waltz. Waltz took a sip or two from
such drink and then left the Band Stand.
Waltz reported to work on the morning of February 3,
1975. At the starting time fellow employee Harrod, appar-
ently a vice president of the union at such time, told him
that he was wanted in the office, that he was going to be
discharged for threatening bodily harm. Waltz told Harrod
in effect that he would just hit him (Keysor) now. In the
office, General Manager Keysor discharged Waltz by
handing him a discharge slip to the following effect.
D & B COMMERCIAL BODY SALES, Inc.
1512 Findlay Road Lima Ohio 45801 1-3-75
To Farrol Waltz
[The parties agreed the
date is in error and
should be 2-3-75]
SUBJECT: Harassment & threatening bodily injury
MESSAGE : You are being discharged from D & B Sales
for harassment & threatening bodily injury in a public
place of business. For differences between D & B
Body & UAW Local 975 Date 1-31-75-7-PM
Farrol Waltz said he was going to beat me up. He
also said he was going to have his wife come out to D
& B Body and have her beat up on the office girl.
REPLY
SIGNED Bill Keysor
DATED
15 The facts relating to what occurred at the Band Stand are based upon
a composite of the credited aspects of the testimony of Dameron , Gerald
Keysor. Waltz. Robert Keysor, and Adkins and a logical consideration of
the consistency of facts . Testimony of any witness inconsistent with the
facts found is discredited. Dameron's version of the events appeared the
most reliable and forms the cement of the total structure of facts . Consider-
ing the logical consistency of facts, I discredit Waltz' testimony to the effect
that he stated he "did not want to fight."
D & B COMMERCIAL BODY SALES, INC. 1055
In addition to the foregoing facts , it is noted that the
company insurance carried on Spencer , Swartz, and Waltz
was canceled effective January 31, 1975.
Contentions; conclusions
The General Counsel contends that the totality of the
facts reveal that the Respondent discriminatorily dis-
charged Waltz because of union considerations, that the
evidence that the insurance benefits for Waltz were can-
celed effective as of January 31, 1975, reveals the decision
to discharge Waltz to have been made on January 31, 1975,
and therefore related to the Spencer and Swartz discharges,
and that the wording on the discharge notice concerning
differences between the D & B and the Union so indicate.
The General Counsel also contends that the Respondent,
by pleading and asserting several reasons for the discharge
of Waltz that have not been supported by the evidence, has
shown the discharge to be pretextuous. The Respondent
contends in final effect that the discharge of Waltz was for
cause , for threats of bodily harm to Keysor and Office
Manager Parlette.
Considering all of the facts, I am persuaded that the
Respondent discharged Waltz for cause and not for dis-
criminatory reasons . The facts clearly reveal that Waltz
threatened General Manager Keysor at the Band Stand on
January 31, 1975, and threatened to have his wife whip
Office Manager Parlette. As I view the facts, the reference
in the discharge notice to differences between the Union
and the Respondent refers to the reason the Respondent
believed Waltz made his threats and not to the reason the
Respondent discharged Waltz. As to the evidence relating
to the cancellation of insurance benefits effective as of
January 31, 1975, I am not persuaded that the evidence has
sufficient probative clarity so as to reveal that the notice of
cancellation was made on January 31, 1975. Thus, the high
possibility exists that a cancellation of insurance coverage
by failure to pay premiums in February would result in an
effective date of cancellation as of the last date of work,
which was January 31, 1975, for all three employees.16 Al-
though the discharges of Spencer and Swartz on January
31, 1975, reveal discriminatory acts by the Respondent,
Waltz' conduct at the Band Stand was of such a nature
that I am persuaded that the discharge notice to Waltz
accurately reflects the reason for his discharge to be non-
discriminatory. Accordingly, it will be recommended that
the allegations of discriminatory conduct as to the dis-
charge of Waltz be dismissed.
E. Alleged Threat
The General Counsel alleged in his complaint that "on
16 The Respondent discharged Spencer and Swartz on Friday , January 31,
1975, the last workday of the week . The Respondent discharged Waltz at
the time he was to commence work on Monday , February 3, 1975. Thus,
Waltz' last workday was January 31, 1975. It appears logical that notifica-
tion of the cancellation of insurance premiums for Spencer, Waltz, and
Swartz would occur at the same time and with the same effective date of
cancellation.
or about March 7, 1975, Respondent , at its plant , through
its officer , agent and representative , more particularly,
John Conkle , threatened its employees by informing their
union business agent , under circumstances where it could
reasonably be anticipated that said threat would be com-
municated to, and was subsequently communicated to, em-
ployees of Respondent that it would close the plant before
it would reinstate certain employees terminated because of
their union activities and/or other mutual aid or protec-
tion ." The Respondent denies that it made such threats.
As of March 7, 1975, there were a number of grievances
that had been filed with the Respondent which had not
been resolved . Among such grievances were grievances
concerning the discharges of Spencer , Swartz , and Waltz.
It should also be noted that on January 28, 1975, the
Union had voted to strike over certain pending grievances.
Such strike had not occurred , but the vote for such strike
was still in effect . The facts reveal that the Respondent had
knowledge of such strike vote.
On March 7 , 1975, the Union and the Respondent met
at the union hall for the purpose of resolving outstanding
grievances , including grievances relating to the discharges
of Swartz, Spencer , and Waltz . The Respondent's represen-
tatives at such meeting were President John Conkle and
General Manager Gerald W. Keysor . The Union 's repre-
sentatives were Edward A. Finn and Joseph Tomasi.
At such meeting on March 7 , 17 the principal discussion
centered upon the question of resolving the grievances over
the discharge of Spencer , Swartz , and Waltz . In the discus-
sion concerning these discharges , there was no contention
and no reference to a contention that such employees were
discharged because of their union activities or the filing of
grievances . Rather the discussion centered around the
question of whether the employees were properly dis-
charged for insubordination , etc. The Respondent, by Pres-
ident Conkle , expressed statements to the effect that the
parties prior to the current time had settled labor agree-
ment negotiations with a raise and that the productivity he
expected had not been forthcoming , that he couldn't con-
tinue business at the pace of work , that if he had to rein-
state Spencer, Swartz, and Waltz , he felt he would have to
close the business down . The Union offered to arbitrate the
discharges of Spencer , Swartz, and Waltz . President
Conkle's reply is revealed by the following excerpts from
Finn 's testimony.
THE WITNESS : He stated pretty emphatically that he,
under no circumstances , would reinstate the three em-
ployees ; that if he was-that if we even took him to
arbitration and won , that in his particular case he
would close the plant down first before he would rein-
state them.
On March 11, 1975,18 Finn, for the Union, reported the
results of the March 7, 1975, meeting with the Company
and what President Conkle had related with respect to his
17 The facts are based upon a composite of the credited aspects of the
testimony of Gerald Keysor and Finn.
"The facts are based upon a composite of the credited aspects of the
testimony of Swartz, Spencer, and Finn. Finn's testimony constitutes the
main structure of facts and is credited over any testimony inconsistent
thereto on this point.
1056 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
position against the reinstatements . At the March 11, 1975,
union meeting , the members voted to nullify the earlier
strike vote and to accept the Company's rejection of the
discharge grievances.
Contentions ; conclusions
The General Counsel contends that the remarks by Con-
kle constituted remarks intended to be a threat to be com-
municated by the union representatives to employees, that
such conduct was violative in that the employees would be
restrained in the exercise of their Section 7 rights since, if
they realized the Respondent would close the plant rather
than reinstate employees through the grievance procedure,
the employees would be discouraged from filing grievances
over subsequent discharges . The Respondent contends that
such conduct as occurred does not constitute violative con-
duct.
Considering all of the facts , I am persuaded that the
General Counsel has not established that the Respondent
has violated Section 8(axl) of the Act by the remarks of
Conkle on March 7, 1975. The overall facts reveal that the
discussion on March 7, 1975, between the Union and the
Respondent did not touch upon or refer to any discussion of
the three discharges with respect to their union activity or
filing ofgrievances. The discussion centered upon economic
considerations and a contention that the dischargees were
insubordinate . In my opinion, it is clear that President
Conkle's message of opposition to the reinstatement of the
three discharges was that he was opposed to such reinstate-
ment on a basis of economics and a desire to obtain proper
production which he believed he would not get if he rein-
stated the three discharged employees . Thus, there is no
basis in such statement of Conkle to reveal that his opposi-
tion to the reinstatement of the three dischargees was be-
cause of their union or protected concerted activities. Nor
is there any evidence to reveal that he intended a message
of discriminatory motivation to be transmitted to employ-
ees by the union representatives . Further, I am not per-
suaded that Conkle 's statements reveal a message to em-
ployees that he would take discriminatory action against
them because they filed grievances or wished to strike over
grievances . Rather, I am persuaded that his remarks were
the expression of an opinion and prediction of economic
results to flow from the particular reinstatements of Spenc-
er, Swartz, and Waltz . Such statements in my opinion come
within the purview of Section 8(c) of the Act and are not
violative of the Act . In sum , I find that the facts are insuffi-
cient to support a finding of conduct violative of Section
8(a)(l) of the Act as alleged.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in unfair
labor practices, it will be recommended that Respondent
cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative ac-
tion to effectuate the policies of the Act.
It having been found that the Respondent discharged
Charles Spencer and Delton Swartz in violation of Section
8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act, the recommended Order will
provide that Respondent offer each reinstatement to his
job, and make each whole for loss of earnings within the
meaning and in accord with the Board's decisions in F. W.
Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289 (1950), and Isis Plumb-
ing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962), except as specifi-
cally modified by the wording of such recommended Or-
der.
Because of the character of the unfair labor practices
herein found, the recommended Order will provide that the
Respondent cease and desist from in any other manner
interfering with, restraining, and coercing employees in the
exercise of their rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act.
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and upon
the entire record in the case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. D & B Commercial Body Sales, Inc., the Respondent,
is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning
of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Im-
plement Workers of America, Local 975, is, and has been
at all times material herein, a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By discharging Charles Spencer and Delton Swartz,
the Respondent has discouraged membership in a labor
organization by discriminating in regard to tenure of em-
ployment, thereby engaging in unfair labor practices in vi-
olation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
4. By the foregoing and by interfering with, restraining,
and coercing its employees in the exercise of rights guaran-
teed in Section 7 of the Act, Respondent engaged in unfair
labor practices proscribed by Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the
Act, I hereby issue the following recommended:
ORDER 19
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON
COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III,
above, occurring in connection with the Respondent's op-
erations described in section I, above, have a close, inti-
mate , and substantial relationship to trade , traffic, and
commerce among the several States and tend to lead to
labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and
the free flow of commerce.
Respondent, D & B Commercial Body Sales, Inc., Lima,
Ohio, its officers , agents, successors , and assigns , shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Discharging or otherwise discriminating against em-
19 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings.
conclusions , and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec.
102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become
its findings , conclusions , and Order , and all objections thereto shall be
deemed waived for all purposes.
D & B COMMERCIAL BODY SALES, INC. 1057
ployees in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any
term or condition of employment because of their union or
protected concerted activities.
(b) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or
coercing employees in the exercise of their rights guaran-
teed in Section 7 of the Act, except to the extent that such
rights may be affected by lawful agreements in accord with
Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which it is
found will effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer to Charles Spencer and Delton Swartz immedi-
ate and full reinstatement to their former positions or, if
such positions no longer exist , to a substantially equivalent
position, without prejudice to their seniority or other rights
previously enjoyed, and make each whole for any loss of
pay or other benefits suffered by reason of the discrimina-
tion against each , in the manner described above in the
section entitled "The Remedy."
(b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all pay-
roll records, social security payment records, timecards,
personnel records and reports, and all other records neces-
sary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms
of this recommended Order.
(c) Post at Respondent's plant at Lima, Ohio, copies of
the attached notice marked "Appendix." 20 Copies of said
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 8, after being duly signed by Respondent's repre-
sentatives, shall be posted by it immediately upon receipt
thereof, and be maintained by Respondent for 60 consecu-
tive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all
places where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure
that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by
any other material.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 8, in writ-
ing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps
the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the allegations of unlawful
conduct not specifically found to be violative herein be
dismissed.
20 In the event the Board 's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order
of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board."