Curwood, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 21, 2003

339 N.L.R.B. 1137 (N.L.R.B. 2003)

CURWOOD, INC. 1137
Curwood, Inc., A Division of Bemis Company, Inc.
and Graphic Communications Union, Fox Val-
ley Local 77-P, AFL–CIO, CLC. Cases 30–CA–
15245–1 and 30–RC–6203–04
August 21, 2003
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS LIEBMAN, SCHAUMBER, AND ACOSTA
On February 2, 2001, Administrative Law Judge
Robert A. Giannasi issued the attached decision. The
Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and
the General Counsel filed cross-exceptions and a sup-
porting brief. The General Counsel and the Charging
Party filed briefs opposing the Respondent’s exceptions,
and the Respondent filed a reply brief. The Respondent
also filed a brief opposing the General Counsel’s cross-
exceptions.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions, cross-exceptions, and briefs,
and has decided to affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,1
and conclusions only to the extent consistent with this
Decision and Order and adopts the recommended Order
as modified.2
The Respondent manufactures flexible film packaging
for snack foods in Oshkosh, Wisconsin. The Charging
Party Union sought to represent the Respondent’s pro-
duction workers for purposes of collective bargaining. It
conducted an organizing campaign during the late winter,
spring, and summer of 2000.3 Employee retirement bene-
fits were a primary issue in the campaign. The Union
filed an election petition on May 8, and the election took
place on July 20–21. The Union lost the election by a
vote of 386 to 257.
The judge found that the Respondent unlawfully solic-
ited employees’ grievances and made unlawful promises,
threats, and other statements. He also found that these
statements, made in various documents made available to
employees during the election campaign, interfered with

1 The Respondent and the General Counsel have excepted to some of
the judge’s credibility findings. The Board’s established policy is not to
overrule an administrative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the
clear preponderance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they
are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950),
enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the
record and find no basis for reversing the findings.
2 In addition to the matters discussed below, we shall substitute a
new notice in accordance with our decision in Ishikawa Gasket Amer-
ica, Inc., 337 NLRB 175 (2001).
3 All dates hereafter are in 2000.
the election.4 Most of the violations the judge found re-
lated to the Respondent’s attempt to counter the Union’s
organizing drive by promising improved pension benefits
to the employees.
We agree with much of the judge’s decision, including
his recommendation for a new election. However, for the
reasons discussed below, we will reverse his findings
that the Respondent (1) unlawfully threatened that cus-
tomers and jobs would be lost if the employees chose the
Union; (2) unlawfully solicited grievances in a June 12
memorandum to employees; and (3) unlawfully solicited
employee grievances and unlawfully interrogated em-
ployees in a June 30 letter. Finally, we find no merit in
the General Counsel’s cross-exceptions to the judge’s
failure to address four additional grievance solicitation
allegations arising from a July 18 “question and answer”
document distributed to employees.
A. The Alleged Threat of Loss of Customers
and Jobs
In the penultimate paragraph of a June 30 letter sent to
each of the production employees, the Respondent stated:

Being unionized is also viewed negatively by our cus-
tomers. They are concerned about potential work stop-
pages and product interruptions, which would harm
their business. That is why we say remaining union-
free affects our business and our livelihood.

Analyzing this language under NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.,
395 U.S. 575 (1969), the judge found that it constituted an
unlawful threat of reprisal—specifically, a threat that anti-
union customers would abandon the Respondent, and con-
sequently employees would lose jobs, if the Union were
chosen to represent the employees. We disagree.
In conveying its customers’ concerns about possible
unionization, the Respondent’s June 30 letter contained
no threat of reprisal. Furthermore, the Respondent pro-
vided objective material reflecting its customers’ con-
cerns. See Gissel, supra, 395 U.S. at 618. The material
consisted of written inquiries from large customers such
as Nestle, Nabisco, Kraft, and Minute Maid, asking
whether the Respondent’s products were produced in
unionized plants. Some of the inquiries specifically
raised concerns about “possible interruption in receipt of
materials” and “continuity of supply” in the event of a
work stoppage. Contrary to the judge, the fact that the
Respondent’s customers also sent similar letters to other
4 The Respondent has not argued that the election should not be set
aside even if the Board affirms some or all of the judge’s 8(a)(1) viola-
tion findings. Thus, Member Schaumber finds that he need not decide
here whether the Board’s standard for setting elections aside ought to
be revisited.
339 NLRB No. 148
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1138
suppliers cuts against the violation finding, not in favor
of it. That the Respondent’s customers routinely and
generally ask their suppliers about their contingency
plans in the event of union-related supply disruptions
underlines just how much of a concern such disruptions
really are for those customers.5
The Board’s decision in Tri-Cast, Inc., 274 NLRB 377
(1985), makes clear that the Respondent’s statement here
was lawful. In Tri-Cast, the employer told employees
that if, as a result of unionization, it had to bid higher or
customers felt threatened because of strikes, the company
would lose business and jobs. The Board found that the
employer had accurately represented what others outside
its control might do. The Board said:

Higher bids or customer feelings of dissatisfaction be-
cause of problems caused by union strikes can lead to
lost business and lost jobs. [274 NLRB at 378.]

The Board found no objectionable conduct in “[m]aking
these reasonable possibilities known to employees.” The
facts in the instant case militate even more strongly against
finding the Respondent’s statement unlawful. In Tri-Cast,
supra, the employer had not actually received concerns from
customers. Here, the Respondent received expressions of
concern from various customers.
Seeking to distinguish Tri-Cast, our dissenting col-
league emphasizes that the employer there phrased its
statements in terms of what its customers might do if
employees unionized. But Tri-Cast does not stand for the
proposition that the only permissible statements about
customer loss are those expressed in the conditional. In
Tri-Cast, the employer reasonably talked about what its
customers might do because it had not actually received
concerns from customers. Here, the Respondent had re-
ceived such concerns, and, thus, reasonably dispensed
with the conditional mood.
Because the Respondent’s statement contained no
unlawful threat, we reverse the judge’s unfair labor prac-
tice finding and dismiss this allegation.
B. The June 12 Grievance-Solicitation Finding
The complaint alleges that by a memorandum to em-
ployees, dated June 12, the Respondent unlawfully solic-
ited grievances. The judge found that the June 12 memo
“memorialized an unlawful solicitation of grievances
with the implication that they would be resolved without
the need for a union.” Setting aside the variance between

5 The dissent argues that the Respondent is not entitled to rely on its
customers’ inquiries because they were not produced until the hearing.
See Yoshi’s Japanese Restaurant & Jazz House, 330 NLRB 1339, 1342
(2000). Because this argument is advanced sua sponte by the dissent,
rather than the parties, we do not reach it.
the violations alleged and found, we find that the record
supports neither violation.6
In the second and third paragraphs of the June 12
memo, the Respondent stated as follows:

During the meetings, a number of you raised very good
issues in regard to the comparison of benefits between
senior and junior employees under the BRP. The com-
pany has continually made improvements to your bene-
fit package over the years. Such changes in the past
have included adding the company match to the BIIP,
adding the performance match to the BIIP in 1997, and
providing more investment options. It is not uncommon
for us to make improvements when needed and when
financially prudent. When improvements are made,
they are made on a going forward basis, not a retroac-
tive basis. We have never reduced or taken away an ex-
isting retirement benefit.
A lot of good ideas, thoughts and concerns came out
during the employee meetings that we, quite frankly,
had not thoroughly considered. We appreciate your
honest reactions and input. While our target implemen-
tation date remains January 1, 2001, we are still in the
process of compiling the questions and answers that
came to light during our meetings. As we go forward
6 Our dissenting colleague seems to think that we are reversing the
judge because the violation found was not alleged. She contends that
(a) the violation found was “closely connected to the subject matter of
the complaint and has been fully litigated”; (b) the Respondent was not
“prejudiced by the General Counsel’s failure to formally allege the
violation the judge found”; (c) the complaint “clearly put the Respon-
dent on notice of a possible violation based on the promise made in the
June 12 memo”; and (d) Graham-Windham Services, 312 NLRB 1199
(1993), in which the Board upheld a violation finding despite its devia-
tion from the theory that had been alleged in the complaint, is “indis-
tinguishable” from the instant case. These contentions are beside the
point. We are not reversing the judge’s violation finding on due proc-
ess grounds because of its variance from the violation alleged in the
complaint. Rather, while we note that variance, we find it unnecessary
to rely on it in reversing the judge because, on the merits, the record
fails to support either the violation alleged or the violation found.
However, since his dissenting colleague has raised the due process
issue, Member Schaumber does not agree with her view that the com-
plaint provided sufficient notice. Again, the judge found that the June
12 memo “memorialized an unlawful solicitation of grievances” that
had taken place at employee meetings held a few days earlier, June 5–8.
In finding that the complaint put the Respondent sufficiently on notice
in this regard, Member Liebman points out that par. 11 of the complaint
refers to those June 5–8 employee meetings. What she fails to point
out, however, is that the complaint expressly excludes par. 11 from the
scope of the alleged violations. Complaint par. 16 alleges that the
Respondent violated Sec. 8(a)(1) “[b]y the conduct described above in
pars. 7, 10, 12, 13, 14, and 15.” By mentioning the June 5–8 meetings
in par. 11 and then excluding par. 11 from the alleged violations, the
complaint made it clear that the Respondent’s conduct at those meet-
ings was not at issue.

CURWOOD, INC. 1139
with this implementation, it is critical that the transition
into the BRP works as a benefit to all employees and
does not have any adverse, unintended consequences.

It is plain that this language contains no solicitation of
grievances. Thus, the violation alleged is without merit.
The violation found is equally meritless. The language
quoted above refers to employee meetings, which were
held June 5–8. The judge found that during those meet-
ings the Respondent engaged in unlawful solicitation of
grievances, which it “memorialized” in its June 12
memo. But the Respondent did not solicit grievances at
the June 5–8 meetings. It merely permitted employees to
ask questions about the Bemis Retirement Plan (BRP) at
an informational meeting concerning the newly an-
nounced plan. Permitting questions is not soliciting
grievances. But even if it were, the Respondent’s con-
duct in this regard was consistent with a procedure that
had been established before the onset of the Union’s
campaign. It is a long-settled principle that an employer
does not commit an unfair labor practice when it has a
past practice of soliciting employee complaints and
merely continues that practice during an organizing cam-
paign. See, e.g., Lasco Industries, 217 NLRB 527, 531
(1975). Further, apart from the conformity of these
meetings with past practice, the record evidence does not
support any theory that the Respondent implicitly prom-
ised to remedy the complaints that senior employees
were affected inequitably under the BRP.7
The June 12 memo referred to employee meetings held
on June 5, 6, 7, and 8 regarding the Respondent’s previ-
ously announced transfer of the production employees to
the BRP, a more generous retirement-benefit program.
Audra Mead, the Respondent’s human resources man-
ager, provided undisputed testimony that historically
when the Respondent changes or adds a fringe benefit it
holds informational meetings for the employees. The
employees attending are free to ask questions. During the
meetings, the Respondent records their questions and
concerns to determine if there are “patterns or subject
matter that maybe we hadn’t covered well enough for the
employees.” The employees are told that their questions
are being written down, and that a “question-and-
answer” document will be created and circulated subse-
quently. Mead confirmed that this was the nature of the
meetings held June 5–8, and that a question-and-answer
document was distributed a few weeks later.

7 However, we agree with the judge that the Respondent’s earlier
announcement of the BRP benefit and its repetition of the announce-
ment in the June 12 memo violated Sec. 8(a)(1). We also agree that the
Respondent violated Sec. 8(a)(1) in the June 12 memo by blaming the
Union’s campaign and the pending election for its inability to give the
employees more benefits.
Employee Brian Easton testified that he attended the
June 6 meeting. He said that the employees asked many
questions about the BRP, and that because the Respon-
dent’s managers could not answer all of them, they en-
couraged the employees to write down their additional
questions and submit them after the meeting. Easton also
stated that he, among other employees, complained that
the BRP would be less favorable to senior employees
because they would not get the maximum benefit from
the plan by the time they retired. As the meeting ended,
Easton approached Mead and asked whether financial
adjustments could be made for older employees to re-
solve the problem he had raised. Mead responded that
there were no plans to make any changes at that time.
In her testimony, Mead confirmed that the problem
Easton had raised came up repeatedly at the June 5–8
meetings. She responded at the meetings that there was
no plan to make adjustments for senior employees at that
time.
Thus, Easton and Mead both testified that Mead told
employees at the meetings that the Respondent did not
plan to resolve this issue. Accordingly, we reject the
judge’s finding that the June 12 memo implicitly prom-
ised that senior employees’ problem concerning maxi-
mum benefits under the BRP would be solved without
the need for a union. See, e.g., Kinder-Care Learning
Centers, 284 NLRB 509, 516 (1987), enfd. mem. 855
F.2d 861 (9th Cir. 1988) (employer rebutted the infer-
ence of an implicit promise to resolve by stating that it
could not promise to remedy its employees’ grievances).
C. The June 30 Letter: Alleged Grievance Solicitation
and Interrogation
The judge found that in a June 30 letter to employees
the Respondent unlawfully solicited employee griev-
ances and interrogated employees. We reverse both of
the judge’s findings and dismiss the underlying allega-
tions for the reasons that follow.
The June 30 letter expressed disappointment that the
Respondent’s maintenance employees had been excluded
from the voting unit by the Regional Director. In addi-
tion, the letter advised that the exact time and place of
the election would be communicated at a later time, and
that the Respondent was legally required to provide a list
of the production workers’ names and addresses for the
Union’s use. Further, the Respondent said that it would
explain its views on unionization to the employees at a
later time. The letter also urged that every employee cast
a vote, which “will be confidential.” In the final para-
graph the Respondent stated the following:

I [i.e., the Respondent’s Site Director, Sam Smith] am
enclosing a self-addressed, stamped envelope and a
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1140
blank sheet of paper. If you have questions, I highly
encourage you to write them down and return them in
the envelope provided. It is not necessary to sign your
name on any question you would like answered. I will
do my best to respond to every question prior to the
vote.

The judge found that this last paragraph solicited em-
ployees’ grievances with an implicit promise to resolve
them, violating Section 8(a)(1). He relied largely on em-
ployee Easton’s testimony that Easton understood this
part of the letter as an invitation to tell the Respondent
what his problems were and to ask what the Respondent
could do to make him happy. In addition, the judge found
that the manner in which the Respondent solicited ques-
tions of the employees, i.e., a blank piece of paper and a
stamped, self-addressed envelope, created the possibility
that the Respondent would learn the identity and union
views of responding employees. He found that the re-
sponses would allow the Respondent to gauge the depth
of union support among the employees. The judge con-
cluded that this amounted to an interrogation in violation
of Section 8(a)(1). We find merit in the Respondent’s
exceptions to both of these unfair labor practice findings.
First, the judge incorrectly analyzed the grievance-
solicitation issue. The standard for determining an
8(a)(1) violation is whether the employer engaged in
conduct that reasonably tends to interfere with the free
exercise of employees’ Section 7 rights. See, e.g., Ameri-
can Freightways Co., 124 NLRB 146, 147 (1959). This
standard is objective; it does not take into account the
subjective perceptions of individual employees. See, e.g.,
Lackawanna Electrical Construction, Inc., 337 NLRB
458, 464 (2002); Medcare Associates, Inc., 330 NLRB
935, 940 fn. 17 (2000). Thus, Easton’s own impression
of what the last paragraph of the letter meant is irrele-
vant. The context of the letter as a whole reasonably sug-
gests that the Respondent was soliciting questions about
the mechanics of the election process and about its own
views concerning unionization. In the circumstances
there is insufficient evidence that the Respondent’s re-
quest for employee questions here implied a promise to
resolve their grievances. Absent this promise, there is no
unfair labor practice. See, e.g., Reliance Electric Co., 191
NLRB 44, 46 (1971), enfd. 457 F.2d 503 (6th Cir. 1972).
Second, we do not agree that the Respondent unlaw-
fully sought to interrogate employees in this final para-
graph of the letter. The relevant legal standard for unlaw-
ful interrogations is well established: the Board deter-
mines whether under all the circumstances the inquiry
reasonably tends to interfere with, restrain, or coerce
employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights. See,
e.g., Greenfield Die & Mfg. Corp., 327 NLRB 237
(1998); Rossmore House, 269 NLRB 1176, 1177 (1984),
affd. sub nom. Hotel & Restaurant Employees Local 11
v. NLRB, 760 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1985).
The response from employees that the Respondent
sought in the June 30 letter was entirely voluntary. An
employee receiving the letter could choose to respond or
not, with no disciplinary implications attached to the
choice. If an employee decided to reply, he could choose
not to identify himself, as the Respondent pointed out in
the letter. Further, the Respondent’s appeal was not di-
rected at gauging the level of union support among the
production workers. As we have said, the context of the
overall document indicates that the Respondent’s interest
related to election mechanics and its own view of the
organizing campaign. Questions about either of these
subjects would not necessarily reveal individual employ-
ees’ union sentiments or the strength of their support for
the Union. Considering all the relevant circumstances,
we conclude that this paragraph of the June 30 letter was
neither coercive nor threatening, and did not restrain or
interfere with employees’ Section 7 rights.
D. The General Counsel’s Cross-Exceptions: Additional
Solicitation Allegations
The Respondent distributed a document dated July 18
that recited employee questions and the Respondent’s
answers. This material was gleaned from several meet-
ings that the Respondent had conducted earlier in July
with the production employees to discuss the pending
election and to persuade them to vote against union rep-
resentation. In his cross-exceptions, the General Counsel
argues that four of the question-and-answer sets in the
July 18 document represent unlawful grievance solicita-
tions, and he further argues that the judge failed to ac-
count for them in his decision. We disagree on both
counts. The judge did account for these allegations in his
decision by recommending that the complaint be dis-
missed “insofar as it alleges violations of the Act not
specifically found.” Moreover, for the following rea-
sons, the four question-answer sets did not constitute
grievance solicitations.
We will address these allegations in groups of two.
The first group reads:

Q. Why don’t employees have input in decisions
regarding benefits?
A. The National Labor Relations Board has
ruled that it is illegal for employers to negotiate with
employees over wages and benefits. The NLRB has
declared that company-dominated labor unions are
illegal. However, we recognize we need to do a bet-
CURWOOD, INC. 1141
ter job of explaining how changes are decided upon
and what is considered when decisions are made.
Salaried employees have the same concern. The
challenge is, how do we gather and consider input
from more than one thousand employees on ex-
tremely complex, government regulated benefits?
Q. Why didn’t the company start meetings
sooner?
A. The company did not receive notification
from the NLRB that the election was going to be
conducted July 20 and July 21, 2000, until Friday,
June 30, 2000, at 4:30 p.m. Earlier discussions with
the NLRB led the company to believe the election
would not take place until the first week in August.
If that had been the case, we would have had more
time to meet with employees. Due to scheduled va-
cations, we felt we would have missed too many
people if we had begun the meetings during the
week of July 4th. Therefore, we opted to begin meet-
ings the week of July 10, 2000. We scheduled
enough meetings to meet with all employees on
three separate occasions. In addition, we are making
every effort to respond to everyone’s questions and
will continue to do so until the election is over.

Quite simply, we find nothing in either of these ques-
tion-and-answers that would constitute a solicitation of
grievances accompanied by a promise—explicit or im-
plicit—to resolve them. Therefore, the relevant allega-
tions are dismissed.
The second group of questions and answers reads:

Q. Why are policies different from one depart-
ment to the next? This breeds inconsistency.
A. Being union-free has allowed employees
flexibility in determining guidelines for some work-
place policies. Every department has different needs
based on equipment and crewing needs. A number
of years ago, employees requested they be allowed
to determine such things as how vacancies are cov-
ered within each department or whether or not to use
plant or department seniority for vacation eligibility.
Some employees prefer everything in black and
white. However, the employees polled in 1994, told
the company they wanted to have the latitude to de-
termine these things on a department-wide basis.
If employees now prefer to have all policies the
same from one department to the next throughout the
complex, you don’t need to vote for a union.
The company can easily make all workplace poli-
cies the same across the board; however, that will
eliminate the flexibility many of you have come to
enjoy.
Q. You say we allow up to 20 percent off on va-
cation. That’s not true in the Rewind Department at
BSF. Why can’t we have a full 20 percent off?
A. Part of the issue in the Rewind Department is
that it has not been fully staffed. It is our understand-
ing that, as a result of department meetings, employ-
ees decided to go with the same number off on each
shift, even though crewing levels vary from shift to
shift. If employees would like to reconsider this de-
cision, they should contact John Durrant.

The Respondent provided testimonial evidence shed-
ding light on these two question-and-answers. Human
Resources Manager Mead testified that certain personnel
policies are self-determined by employees within their
departments, based on a practice established long before
the Union’s campaign. The examples she gave were
policies covering start-and-stop worktimes, vacation,
overtime, and personal holidays. The procedure is for the
employees to decide among themselves what the policy
will be for the department, and then to notify their de-
partment supervisor. The specific example Mead used
was vacation policy in the rewind department: should the
consensus among the rewind employees be to change the
vacation policy, they would notify Supervisor Durrant
and the change would be implemented. Mead’s testi-
mony was undisputed, and was corroborated by Site
Manager Sam Smith.
Thus, understood in the appropriate context, there are
no implicit promises here to resolve problems raised in
the employees’ questions. Both of the Respondent’s an-
swers merely refer to the employees’ previously estab-
lished authority to resolve problems themselves. Ac-
cordingly the allegation is dismissed.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge as
modified below and orders that the Respondent, Cur-
wood Inc., a Division of Bemis Company, Inc., Oshkosh,
Wisconsin, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall take the action set forth in the Order as modified.
1. Delete paragraph 1(a), insert the following two
paragraphs 1(a) and (b) in its place, and reletter the final
paragraph accordingly.
“(a) Announcing and promising improvements in pen-
sion or other benefits in order to discourage union sup-
port.
“(b) Blaming the Union for the absence of further
benefits.”
2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the admin-
istrative law judge.

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1142
MEMBER LIEBMAN, dissenting in part.
The majority errs in two respects.1 First, its conclusion
that the Respondent’s June 30, 2000 letter did not unlaw-
fully threaten employees with the loss of their jobs, if
they chose to unionize, is inconsistent with the Supreme
Court’s decision in NLRB v. Gissel Packing, 395 U.S.
575, 618 (1969). Gissel requires that employer predic-
tions about the effects of unionization be “carefully
phrased on the basis of objective fact,” which is not the
case here. Second, the majority errs in reversing the
judge’s finding that the Respondent unlawfully prom-
ised, through its June 12, 2000 memorandum, to resolve
employee grievances solicited earlier. The Board’s deci-
sion in Graham-Windham Services, 312 NLRB 1199
(1993), makes clear that we can and should find a viola-
tion here, where the Respondent essentially promised a
benefit to remedy prior grievances.
A. The Threat of Lost Jobs
At issue is the penultimate paragraph of the June 30
letter that the Respondent sent to the production workers.
It states in part:

Being unionized is also viewed negatively by our cus-
tomers. They are concerned about potential work stop-
pages and product interruptions, which would harm
their business. That is why we say remaining union-
free affects our business and our livelihood.

As the judge found, employees could reasonably have un-
derstood these statements as a threat that they inevitably
would risk their jobs if they selected union representation,
because the Respondent would lose its customers who dis-
approved of unionization.
The Respondent’s statement does not pass the test set
out by the Supreme Court in Gissel:

[A]n employer is free to communicate to his employees
any of his general views about unionism or any of his
specific views about a particular union, so long as the
communications do not contain a “threat of reprisal or
force or promise of benefit.” He may even make a pre-
diction as to the precise effects he believes unionization
will have on his company. In such a case, however, the
prediction must be carefully phrased on the basis of ob-
jective fact to convey an employer’s belief as to de-
monstrably probable consequences beyond his control.

1 I agree with my colleagues concerning the unfair labor practices
they have found in this case, and I agree that a new election is required.
I also agree with their reversal of the judge’s unlawful-interrogation
finding involving the Respondent’s June 30, 2000 letter. I find it un-
necessary to pass on the judge’s unlawful-solicitation finding in the
June 30 letter. See, infra.
395 U.S. at 618 (emphasis added). Here, the Respondent
had no objective factual basis for the claim that its custom-
ers viewed unionization negatively, much less for the im-
plicit claim that they would withdraw their business from
the Respondent simply because employees unionized. Em-
ployees, who are “particularly sensitive to rumors of plant
closings,” reasonably could have understood the statement
not as an “honest forecast,” but as a “coercive threat,” in the
words of the Gissel Court. Id. at 619.
The Respondent asserts that certain customer corre-
spondence formed an objective basis for its predictions.
That argument fails, for two reasons. First, as the judge
found, the June 30 letter did not refer to objective evi-
dence of customers’ supposed sentiments, nor did the
Respondent make any contemporaneous showing to em-
ployees. Rather, it provided customer correspondence
that assertedly supported the statement at the hearing.
This “later-produced” or “after the fact” evidence does
not satisfy the Gissel standard. See Yoshi’s Japanese
Restaurant & Jazz House, 330 NLRB 1339, 1342 (2000).
See also Savers, 337 NLRB 1039, 1040 (2002) (Member
Liebman, dissenting). If the objective basis for the state-
ment is not evident when the statement is made, the em-
ployees obviously cannot discern whether it is a threat or
a legitimate prediction.
Second, the correspondence belatedly offered by the
Respondent simply does not support the Respondent’s
claims. The correspondence inquired about which of the
Respondent’s plants were unionized,2 the termination
dates of collective-bargaining agreements, and any his-
tory of work stoppages. As the judge found, these were
no more than routine business inquiries manifesting a
customer interest in continuous product flow in the event
of a strike. Nothing in any of these documents reflected
that the Respondent’s customers held a “negative” view
of unionization. The correspondence contains no hint
that the Respondent’s customers would walk away sim-
ply because employees unionized. Indeed, Sam Smith,
the Respondent’s site director, whose testimony intro-
duced the documents into evidence, indicated that in his
19 years with the Company he was not aware that the
Respondent had ever lost any customers because union-
ized plants manufactured some of its products.
Lacking an objective factual basis in the customer cor-
respondence cited at the hearing, the Respondent’s
statement exceeded any permissible prediction and con-
stituted a threat of reprisal in violation of Section 8(a)(1).
See, e.g., Tellepsen Pipeline Services Co., 335 NLRB
1232, 1233 (2001); Reeves Bros., Inc., 320 NLRB 1082,
1083 (1996). It neatly illustrates the “brinksmanship”
2 The Respondent maintained unionized plants at other locations.
CURWOOD, INC. 1143
that the Gissel Court referred to in cautioning each em-
ployer to avoid “conscious overstatements he has reason
to believe will mislead his employees.” Gissel, supra,
395 U.S. at 620.
Tri-Cast, Inc., 274 NLRB 377 (1985), cited by the ma-
jority for support, is distinguishable. In that case, the
employer explained to its employees that if it had to bid
higher because of unionization, or if customers felt
threatened because of strikes, it would lose business and
jobs. The Board emphasized the conditional “if” in the
employer’s remarks and concluded that they amounted to
a permissible statement of “reasonable possibilities” due
to unionization. Id. at 378. However, Tri-Cast has never
stood for the proposition that an employer may concoct
an antiunion attitude on the part of its customers in order
to discourage unionization.
That is precisely what the Respondent did here. It of-
fered a simple equation: unionization meant lost jobs,
because of customers’ antiunion views. Because there
was no objective factual basis for making this equation,
the Respondent’s statement violated Section 8(a)(1). See
Tawas Industries, 336 NLRB 318, 321–322 (2001).
B. The June 12 Memorandum
The majority reverses the judge’s finding that in a June
12 memorandum the Respondent unlawfully promised to
resolve grievances raised earlier by employees. The
Board’s decision in Graham-Windham Services, supra,
however, strongly supports finding a violation here.
In Graham-Windham Services, the Board affirmed the
judge’s finding that the employer unlawfully promised
benefits that effectively would have remedied employee
grievances raised months earlier. Acknowledging that the
complaint alleged an unlawful grievance solicitation, the
Board concluded that the violation actually found was
reasonably encompassed by the complaint allegation,
that it was fully litigated, and that the Respondent failed
to demonstrate that it had been prejudiced. Describing
the matter as a “slight variance in phraseology,” the
Board pointed out that “[o]ffering to remedy previously
stated grievances by promising benefits does not signifi-
cantly differ from soliciting grievances and implicitly
promising to remedy them, the wording of the com-
plaint.” 312 NLRB at 1200.
This case is indistinguishable. The essence of a solici-
tation-of-grievance violation is not the solicitation itself
but the promise, express or implied, to remedy the prob-
lem drawn out by the solicitation. See, e.g., Capitol EMI
Music, 311 NLRB 997, 1007 (1993), enfd. 23 F.3d 399
(4th Cir. 1994); Columbus Mills, 303 NLRB 223, 227
(1991). The complaint here is replete with allegations of
unlawful promises and solicitations.3 Thus, the issue
raised by the promise in the June 12 memo is “closely
connected to the subject matter of the complaint and has
been fully litigated.” Pergament United Sales, 296
NLRB 333, 334 (1989), enfd. 920 F.2d 130 (2d Cir.
1990) (footnote citations omitted). In addition, the Re-
spondent has not shown that it was prejudiced by the
General Counsel’s failure to formally allege the violation
the judge found. See, e.g., Baytown Sun, 255 NLRB 154
fn. 1 (1981).
Accordingly, based on the pleadings and the record,
the judge appropriately found that the relevant passage in
the June 12 memo (quoted in the majority’s opinion)
“memorialized” the Respondent’s solicitation of griev-
ances at employee meetings held a few days earlier and
implicitly promised to resolve them. His finding is en-
tirely consistent with Graham-Windham Services, supra.
The Respondent’s defense of this conduct, endorsed by
my colleagues, is meritless. The Respondent has never
denied that it solicited employee complaints at the June
meetings.4 Rather, it contends that this conduct was con-
sistent with its past practice. Contrary to my colleagues’
view, however, the Respondent cannot rely on its prior
practice of holding informational meetings on new fringe
benefits to insulate it from its unlawful conduct here.
When an employer significantly alters its past manner
and methods of solicitation during an organizing drive,
its prior practice provides no justification for its conduct.
See, e.g., House of Raeford Farms, 308 NLRB 568, 569
(1992), enfd. mem. 7 F.3d 223 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. de-
nied 511 U.S. 1030 (1994).
To begin, the solicitation here was part of a context of
unfair labor practices designed to persuade the employ-
ees that pension improvements were available without
the assistance of the Union. This unlawful conduct dis-
tinguishes the situation from the Respondent’s past prac-
tice. See Eddyleon Chocolate Co., 301 NLRB 887, 899

3 The complaint clearly put the Respondent on notice of a possible
violation based on the promise made in the June 12 memo. Par. 11 of
the complaint alleges that the Respondent met with employees in in-
formational meetings on June 5–8. Par. 12 alleges that the Respondent
solicited employee questions and complaints in the June 12 memo. The
complaint also alleges, among other things, that the Respondent: solic-
ited employee grievances and promised them benefits on April 7; prom-
ised employees pension improvements on May 30 and in the June 12
memo; solicited employee grievances on June 30; promised pension
improvements on July 13; and promised to correct employee grievances
on July 18.
4 In stating that no grievances were solicited at the meetings, the ma-
jority contradicts the record. The testimony of Audra Mead and Brian
Easton, described in the majority opinion, establishes quite clearly that
the Respondent’s purpose in holding the meetings was to draw out
questions and complaints about the Bemis Retirement Plan, and that is
exactly what occurred.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1144
(1991). In addition, the June 12 memo marked a digres-
sion from the Respondent’s usual practice. This was not
the traditional “question-and-answer” document that
normally circulated within a few weeks of meetings of
this kind. The June 12 memo issued 4 days after the final
meeting; it focused exclusively on the senior employees’
complaint; and it suggested that the Respondent would
resolve the problem. The Respondent provided no evi-
dence that it previously took this approach in following
up on its informational meetings.
Contrary to the majority’s view, finally, it is immate-
rial that Audra Mead, the Respondent’s human resources
manager, told employees at the June meetings that the
Respondent could do nothing about the senior employ-
ees’ problem. What matters, rather, is the later promise
made in the June 12 memo.
Accordingly, I would adopt the violation found by the
judge in connection with the June 12 memo. Based on
this view, I find it unnecessary to consider the remaining
five grievance-solicitation allegations addressed by my
colleagues. Further violations of this kind would be cu-
mulative and would not affect the appropriate remedy.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey
this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist any union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on
your behalf
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.

WE WILL NOT announce and promise improvements in
pension or other benefits in order to discourage union
support.
WE WILL NOT blame the Union for the absence of fur-
ther benefits.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of your rights
guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.

CURWOOD, INC., A DIVISION OF BEMIS
COMPANY, INC.

Richard F. Czubaj, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Kevin J. Kinney, Esq. and Eugene M. Linkmeyer, Esq. (Kru-
kowski & Costello), of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, for the Re-
spondent.
Thomas D. Allison, Esq. (Allison, Slutsky & Kennedy), of Chi-
cago, Illinois, for the Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
ROBERT A. GIANNASI, Administrative Law Judge. This con-
solidated case was tried in Oshkosh, Wisconsin, on December 6
and 7, 2000. The complaint in Case 30–CA–15245–1 alleges
that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by various
statements and conduct, most of which were also alleged as
objections to a Board-conducted election, held on July 20 and
21, 2000, which the Charging Party Union (the Union) lost.
The representation case (Case 30–RC–6203–04) was consoli-
dated for hearing with the unfair labor practice case. The Gen-
eral Counsel seeks a remedial order for the unfair labor prac-
tices and the Union seeks an order overturning the election and
directing a new one. The Respondent filed an answer essen-
tially denying the allegations of the complaint and in the objec-
tions. The parties filed posttrial briefs, which I have read and
considered.
Based on the entire record, including the testimony of the
witnesses and my observation of their demeanor, I make the
following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent, a corporation, with an office and three manufac-
turing facilities in Oshkosh, Wisconsin, known as its South
Campus, is engaged in Oshkosh and elsewhere throughout the
United States in the manufacture of flexible film packaging. I
find, as Respondent admits, that it is an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of
the Act. I also find that the Union is a labor organization
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Facts
1. The union organizing campaign begins and
Respondent reacts
In September 1997, Respondent distributed a document to
the employees at Respondent’s South Campus in Oshkosh, as
well as to Respondent’s other unrepresented hourly employees.
In that document, Respondent informed the employees that
their pension benefit rates in the Bemis Hourly Retirement Plan
(BHRP) would increase by a certain amount on January 1 of the
next 3 years, including January 1, 2000. No further dates for
future increases were mentioned.
In part because of dissatisfaction with those pension benefits,
the Oshkosh employees began, in February 2000, to discuss
whether they should seek union representation. In March, em-
ployees began to distribute and sign authorization cards. Re-
spondent’s management officials became aware of the union
CURWOOD, INC. 1145
activity in March when certain literature passed out in the
plants came to their attention and employees spoke to supervi-
sors about the activity. At union meetings in March, the Re-
spondent’s pension and health benefits were prime topics of
discussion, with the pension benefits being the major topic.
On April 7, 2000, Respondent sent a letter to all Oshkosh
employees, which stated at the outset that Respondent was
aware that union cards were being circulated at the plants and
in organizational meetings. The letter continued by stating that
Respondent knew that two issues of concern to the employees
were pension and health care benefits. Respondent pointed out
that employee meetings had been held recently to address
health care concerns and that Respondent’s quality program at
affordable rates had been “accomplished without a union.”
In the April 7 letter, Respondent also referred to the Septem-
ber 1997 pension benefits document, stating that work had been
under way since 1999 to improve pension benefits even more,
effective January 1, 2001. The letter continued by stating that
“pension improvements will be announced in late spring to
early summer, this year. This has been in the works and im-
provements will continue to be made without union interven-
tion.”
The letter went on to list other improvements that the Re-
spondent had provided without a union and “will continue to
provide.” Respondent also stated that it would continue to
“recognize your valued input, listen to your concerns, and rou-
tinely address those areas of interest.” The document con-
cluded, “We urge you not to sign a card. If you have any ques-
tions or concerns, we ask that you contact your superintendent,
supervisor, or [any of the 6 management officials who signed
the document].”
On May 1, 2000, the Respondent distributed another docu-
ment addressed to its Oshkosh employees as a followup to its
April 7 letter. It stated that it had been comparing the BHRP
pension plan with the Bemis Retirement Plan (BRP) and con-
cluded that the BRP was “an improvement over the BHRP.”
The more generous BRP applied mostly to salaried personnel,
although it apparently had recently been applied to some hourly
workers. The Oshkosh employees were of course covered un-
der the less generous BHRP. In its May 1 distribution, Re-
spondent told employees that it would be conducting informa-
tional meetings “on this topic” and that the dates for the meet-
ings would be posted the next week. Those meetings did not
take place until June 2000, after the Union filed an election
petition.
2. The election proceedings
On May 8, 2000, the Union filed petitions seeking to repre-
sent certain of Respondent’s Oshkosh-based employees, not
including its maintenance employees. A representation hearing
was conducted on the petitions on May 23 and 24. An issue in
the representation hearing was whether the maintenance em-
ployees would be included in the election unit. The Union
wanted them excluded and the Respondent wanted them in-
cluded. In a June 20 Decision and Direction of Election, which
was not appealed, the Regional Director excluded the mainte-
nance employees. Pursuant to that decision, an election was
scheduled to be held on July 20 and 21, in the following unit,
which all parties agree is an appropriate unit:

All full-time production employees, including quality assur-
ance employees, warehouse employees, truck drivers, and
general workers employed by the Employer at its Bemis Con-
verter Films, Bemis Specialty Films, and Curwood Specialty
Films facilities at Oshkosh, Wisconsin, but excluding all part-
time employees, maintenance employees, office clerical em-
ployees and all professional employees, guards and supervi-
sors as defined in the Act.
3. Respondent’s preelection distributions
Between the time the election petition was filed and the date
of the election, the Respondent distributed, by letter to the
homes of employees, by inserting in employee paychecks or by
posting on bulletin boards at work, other documents addressed
to the employees. The contents of some of those documents
were alleged to be unfair labor practices and formed the basis
of union objections to the election.
On May 30, Respondent notified the employees of the re-
tirement plan meetings to which it had alluded in its May 1
letter to employees. After specifically referring to that letter,
the May 30 document stated that Respondent was “pleased to
announce” that the BRP, an improvement of and a change from
the existing retirement plan, would be “implemented effective
January 1, 2001.” The employees who had been covered under
the old BHRP would retain their earned credits under that plan,
but would begin earning new benefits under the BRP the next
January. The Respondent then set forth a schedule for manda-
tory informational meetings for different groups of employees
at various times from June 5 through 8, 2000.
On June 12, still another document was distributed to em-
ployees reporting on the early June meetings that had been
conducted on the new pension plan. Those meetings included
both production and maintenance employees. Officials of Re-
spondent answered questions that had been raised by employ-
ees in the meetings, particularly from those who had substantial
seniority under the old plan and might not work long enough
under the new plan to accumulate significant benefits under that
plan. Respondent pointed out that it had never taken away
existing retirement benefits and that the addition of the new
plan would be an improvement for all employees. It noted the
concerns which employees had unexpectedly expressed in the
meetings; and it proceeded to “compile the questions and an-
swers that came to light during our meetings” to assure that as
it went “forward with this implementation” the new plan would
work “as a benefit to all employees” and would have no “ad-
verse, unintended consequences.”
In the June 12 distribution, Respondent also referred to the
pending representation election. It said that, because of the
pending election, Federal labor law “restricts” its ability to
“change, add to or subtract from the various components of
both the BHRP, as well as the BRP.” It gave an example, stat-
ing that there would be advantages to “adding additional dollars
to the current BHRP funding level,” but that Respondent would
be “restricted from making such an improvement at this time.”
The Respondent ended the document by repeating its statement
that it was considering the input of employees at the retirement
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1146
meetings but that it was restricted by law from making changes
that had been suggested by employees.
On June 30, the Respondent sent a letter to all employees,
addressed to them individually, at their homes, notifying them
about the Board’s June 20 Decision and Direction of Election,
lamenting that the Board was excluding the maintenance em-
ployees from the unit and that the Union, by law, could contact
employees at their homes. The remainder of the letter was a
campaign effort to get the employees to vote against the Union.
The letter, which was signed by Sam Smith, the Bemis-
Oshkosh site director, ended as follows:

Most importantly, we want to make sure you under-
stand the Company’s position regarding unions. A union
would limit our overall flexibility—flexibility to run the
business and flexibility to address personal situations on
an individual basis without third party interference. Being
unionized is also viewed negatively by our customers.
They are concerned about potential work stoppages and
product interruptions, which would harm their business.
That is why we say remaining union-free affects our busi-
ness and our livelihood.
I am enclosing a self-addressed, stamped envelope and
a blank sheet of paper. If you have questions, I highly en-
courage you to write them down and return them in the
envelope provided. It is not necessary to sign your name
on any question you would like answered. I will do my
best to respond to every question prior to the vote.

On July 13, 2000, in a document addressed to the mainte-
nance employees but distributed generally in the work areas of
nonmaintenance employees, Respondent announced an increase
in BHRP benefits for the maintenance employees. Production
employees eligible to vote in the election, who were also cov-
ered under the BHRP, did not get the increases, which were
labeled “transition benefits” and were to be effective on Janu-
ary 1, 2001. In announcing the new benefit, the Respondent
specifically mentioned the “feedback” it had received from
employees in the June retirement meetings. It stated that it
learned from those meetings that the changeover from the
BHRP to the BRP would adversely impact the pensions of
more senior employees “since they may not have as many years
to earn benefits under the BHP as shorter term employees.”
The Respondent ended by stating that it “was pleased to offer
this transitional benefit enhancement to recognize the service of
long term employees who may not have the opportunity to
maximize their benefit under the BRP.”1

1 In finding that the document was generally distributed to all em-
ployees and was not limited to maintenance employees, I specifically
credit the testimony to this effect of employee Brian Easton, who im-
pressed me as an honest and credible witness. As indicated later in this
decision, I do not credit the testimony of the two management wit-
nesses who were unable to refute Easton’s testimony about how the
document was actually distributed, but who testified that the document
was intended to be delivered only to the maintenance employees. I
believe to the contrary that Respondent intended the document to fall
into the hands of the electorate, production employees who worked
side-by-side with the maintenance employees and who had the same
concerns about the new pension plan.
The Respondent held a number of meetings with employees
prior to the election to discuss the election and to campaign for
a vote against union representation. On July 18, 2 days before
the election, the Respondent distributed a document to employ-
ees providing a list of questions and answers about the election
issues, setting forth its position against union representation.
At the conclusion of the document, Respondent asked employ-
ees to notify it of any remaining unanswered questions and
promised to “continue responding to your questions to the full-
est extent the law will allow.”
4. The election results
The results of the election were 257 votes for and 386 votes
against the Union. There were 2 void and 14 challenged bal-
lots, which do not affect the results. The Union filed timely
objections to the election, all but one of which mirror the unfair
labor practice allegations in the complaint.2
B. Discussion and Analysis
1. Impression of surveillance
The General Counsel contends that, in the April 7 letter, Re-
spondent’s statement that it was “aware that union authoriza-
tion cards are being circulated at the plants and at organiza-
tional meetings,” along with its statement that “two issues of
concern are healthcare and pension benefits” created an unlaw-
ful impression of surveillance of union activities. Relying on
the testimony of its only witness, employee Brian Easton, the
General Counsel argues that Respondent could only have ob-
tained that information by covert means. That argument, how-
ever, reads too much into Easton’s testimony. Easton simply
testified that he personally was unaware of significant open
union activity in the plant before April 7, although he conceded
there was some; and that early union meetings were not gener-
ally open to all employees. That testimony does not address
whether employees knew or suspected that management offi-
cials had learned of the concerns of employees through ille-
gitimate means. Nor does it contradict the testimony of Human
Relations Manager Audra Mead that, in March, she learned
from employees and supervisors, who were reporting what they
were told by other employees, of union meetings and concerns
mentioned at those meetings. She also learned from those
sources and from her own observation that union authorization
2 The one objection that was not also alleged as an unfair labor prac-
tice was Objection 8. That objection alleged that Supply Side Supervi-
sor Steve Koehler coercively interrogated employee Cheryl Proctor in
her work area 2 days before the election. Proctor testified that, on that
occasion, she called Koehler over to her machine because it was not
functioning properly. At some point, according to Proctor, Koehler
asked what she thought about the Union and whether certain specifi-
cally named employees were going to vote for the Union. She also
testified that Koehler remained in the area when two other fellow em-
ployees came up to her and asked her basically the same questions
Koehler did. Neither of these employees testified. Koehler did, how-
ever, and he denied interrogating Proctor as she testified. I found
Koehler the much more credible witness. His testimony, unlike Proc-
tor’s, was candid, detailed, and understandable in context. I cannot
credit Proctor’s testimony. Accordingly, the Union’s objection based
on the alleged interrogation is overruled.
CURWOOD, INC. 1147
cards were being distributed, some in the plants. She also ob-
served and noted other union distributions in March. I have no
reason to discredit her testimony in this respect; and there was
no showing that she obtained the information she did by unlaw-
ful means. Nor did the Respondent’s statements in the April 7
letter delve into details of union meetings or covert activities.
They simply set forth what was general knowledge and would
not cause employees to believe that Respondent was monitor-
ing their union activities. The situation here is, thus, distin-
guishable from the circumstances in Ichikoh Mfg., Inc., 312
NLRB 1022, 1023 (1993); and United Charter Service, 306
NLRB 150, 151 (1992), cases cited by the General Counsel and
the Union. The Respondent did not therefore violate the Act by
creating the impression of surveillance as set forth in paragraph
7 of the complaint. See Burlington Times, 328 NLRB 750
(1999).
2. Announcement and promise of improved
pension benefits
The announcement, promise, or grant of benefits in order to
discourage union support is unlawful. As the Supreme Court
has stated, “[T]he danger inherent in well-timed increases in
benefits is the suggestion of a fist inside the velvet glove. Em-
ployees are not likely to miss the inference that the source of
benefits now conferred is also the source from which future
benefits must flow and which may dry up if it is not obliged.”
NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405, 409 (1964). See
also Burlington Times, Inc., supra; KOFY TV, 332 NLRB 771,
772–773 (2000); Acme Bus Corp., 320 NLRB 458 (1995);
Dealers Mfg. Co., 320 NLRB 947 fn. 4 (1996); and NLRB v.
Wis-Pak Foods, Inc., 125 F.3d 518 (7th Cir. 1997).
The evidence in this case clearly shows that Respondent
promised unspecified improved pension benefits on April 7,
2000, after it learned of the union campaign, which had as one
of its two major concerns improved pension benefits. The im-
proved benefits were explicitly tied to the nascent union cam-
paign, which was mentioned at the very outset of the April 7
letter. Although some of the details of the improvements were
left for later, the letter suggested that the improvements would
be implemented the following January. This was the first the
employees had heard of such improvements and they were the
first pension improvements announced to employees since Sep-
tember 1997. There is no doubt that the April 7 announcement
was timed and indeed intended to blunt the union effort. The
thrust of the letter was that the promised pension improve-
ments, as well as other improvements, past and future, were and
could be secured without a union. The April 7 announcement
was thus clearly unlawful. That announcement, in a somewhat
different form, was reiterated on May 1, 2000, when Respon-
dent identified the improvements more specifically as possible
coverage under the more generous BRP. But, even in that an-
nouncement, the Respondent said only that it was “evaluating”
the BRP in comparison to the BHRP, which presently covered
the Oshkosh employees. Nor did Respondent specifically say
that the BRP coverage would actually be implemented.3

3 The Respondent argues in its brief (Br. 14) that the April 7 letter
was a virtual “guarantee of pension improvements [emphasis in origi-
After the Union filed its election petition, the Respondent
continued to advertise its new pension improvements in de-
tailed meetings with employees and in other written announce-
ments on May 30 and June 12, basically reiterating the unlaw-
ful April 7 announcement in somewhat greater detail. The
union-based reasoning and motivation behind the April 7 an-
nouncement obviously infected the announcements of May 30
and June 12. On May 30, the Respondent announced that the
BRP would be implemented for the Oshkosh employees, effec-
tive January 1, 2001. This was the first time that that particular
announcement was made and the first definitive announcement
of a specific change in pension benefits. The June 12 distribu-
tion was clearly an election campaign document, reinforcing
the message that the pension improvements first announced on
May 30 were meant to dissuade employees from selecting the
Union. In these circumstances, I find that the April 7, May 30,
and June 12 distributions amounted to unlawful announcements
and promises of benefits to discourage union support, in viola-
tion of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
In its brief, Respondent defends the April 7 announcement
promising improved pension benefits by making a short and
conclusory reference to record evidence suggesting that the
“pension issue was under review since late 1999” and that con-
version to the BRP pension plan was “approved by corporate
on March 27, 2000” (R. Br. 14). That evidence does not ex-
plain away the union-based tenor of the April 7 letter. Nor does
it establish a legitimate business-based reason for the an-
nouncement. Indeed, the witness whose testimony provides the
basis for Respondent’s defense, Human Resources Vice Presi-
dent David Vierthaler, was not credible.
The April 7 announcement of improvements, with no men-
tion of conversion to the BRP, was directed only to the Osh-
kosh employees, who had recently initiated a union cam-
paign—a fact highlighted in the April 7 letter. Respondent
offers no reason why the Oshkosh employees were singled out
for improvements at this time, thus failing to rebut the obvious
reason—the onset of the union campaign. Even Respondent’s
evidence suggests that union considerations hastened the an-
nouncement of pension improvements for the Oshkosh employ-
ees. An e-mail exchange between Vierthaler and Bemis Corpo-
rate Benefits Manager Geof Workinger, who was stationed in
Minneapolis, Minnesota, shows a number of unresolved cost
issues about possible pension improvements for Oshkosh em-

nal].” The objective evidence refutes that argument. The letter did not
specify the forthcoming benefits, state that they were guaranteed or that
any final decisions had been made. Moreover, the author of the letter,
Vice President Vierthaler, conceded that the purpose of the letter was
simply to tell employees that Respondent was “looking at” pension
improvements. In any event, I fail to see how Respondent’s position
changes the impact of the April 7 letter. The letter certainly displayed
the fist in the velvet glove that the Supreme Court so aptly described in
Exchange Parts, supra. Without benefit of the Respondent’s argument,
the General Counsel did not allege that the April 7 letter amounted to a
grant of benefits. Nor did the General Counsel specifically allege that
the May 1, 2000 announcement to employees amounted to a separate
violation of the Act. Since, however, that announcement referred to the
April 7 letter, it had the some rationale and intent: to blunt the union
effort.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1148
ployees as late as March 23, 2000. There is no doubt that union
considerations were paramount at that time. Respondent admit-
tedly knew of the union activity in Oshkosh at this time, ac-
cording to both Vierthaler and Mead. Indeed, there is a refer-
ence in the March 23 e-mail of a need to have the Oshkosh
pension benefits be comparable to those of another of Respon-
dent’s plants, whose employees were represented by a union.
The Respondent’s attempt to show that the decision to con-
vert the Oshkosh employees to the BRP pension plan was made
on March 27, 2000, is also unavailing. First of all, there is no
showing that any such decision was devoid of any union con-
siderations; it is more likely than not that any such decision was
based on a desire to blunt the union effort, as shown by the
tenor of the April 7 announcement. More to the point, how-
ever, Respondent’s contention rests on the uncorroborated tes-
timony of Vierthaler, whom I do not credit. According to Vier-
thaler, the decision to place the Oshkosh employees under the
BRP was made during a March 27 meeting in Oshkosh between
Curwood President Henry Thiesen, Vierthaler himself, and
Workinger and Bemis Vice President Gene Seashore, both of
whom came in from Minneapolis for the meeting. Neither
Thiesen, Seashore, or Workinger testified in this trial and Re-
spondent submitted no documentary support for the decision
that was allegedly made at the meeting, even though the com-
mitment to convert the Oshkosh employees to the BRP would
cost Respondent about an additional $1.4 million a year.4
Other reasons support my decision not to credit Vierthaler’s
testimony. He was quite emphatic that the final decision to
convert the pension plans was made on March 27. But the
April 7 letter, which he admittedly wrote, made no mention of
the conversion to the BRP or of a final decision on any im-
provements. Actually, Vierthaler testified that his purpose in
that letter was simply to tell employees that Respondent was
“looking at” pension improvements. His testimony and the
language in the letter thus contradict the notion that a decision
was already made. The letter was replete with references to the
union campaign—a circumstance that supports my view that
whatever internal deliberations took place in March about some
kind of pension improvements were in response to the union
effort. But its references to pension improvements were gen-
eral in nature—another factor supporting my view that, in the
March deliberations, Respondent had not finally decided what
kind of pension improvements would help blunt the union ef-
fort. Indeed, in a May 3 e-mail from Andrea Gardner, a Bemis
corporate benefits manager, to Workinger, who allegedly at-
tended the March 27 meeting, she notifies him of “our intent to
implement” the BRP plan as of January 1, 2001. Workinger,
who, in responding, copies Seashore, who also allegedly at-
tended the March 27 meeting, replies, “Thank YOU!” A trier
of fact need not be so gullible as to believe that Workinger and
Seashore had to be told about something they allegedly already
knew. Moreover, I discerned an overall evasiveness and lack
of candor in Vierthaler’s demeanor, especially with respect to
the April 7 letter that he composed. To the extent that his tes-

4 Documentary evidence shows an estimate of $214,000 per year,
but that figure did not take into account necessary benefit adjustments
due to future wage increases.
timony may be thought to suggest that union considerations
played no part in the March deliberations that led to the April 7
letter, I reject that testimony as not credible. Nor can I credit
Vierthaler’s testimony about a corporate policy to “migrate” all
pensions for all unrepresented employees at all of Respondent’s
plants before the Union came on the scene in Oshkosh. Al-
though there may have been plans to do that or even some iso-
lated instances of applying the BRP to hourly employees, the
circumstances of such migration were unclear, particularly in
view of the absence of any documentary corroboration. In
short, I cannot rely on any of Vierthaler’s testimony on any
significant issue in this case, unless it is an admission against
interest.
In these circumstances, Respondent’s defense to the timing
and announcement of improved benefits in the April 7 letter
does not establish a legitimate nonunion business reason for the
improvements announced in the letter. The letter itself, which
was laced with references to the union campaign, mentioned no
legitimate business reasons for the improvements or for their
announcement at this particular time.5
3. Implicit promise of enhanced transitional
pension benefits
The General Counsel alleges that the July 13 announcement
of enhanced BHRP benefits only for the maintenance employ-
ees, who had been excluded from the election unit by the Board
some 3 weeks before, amounted to an implicit promise that the
same benefits would come to the production employees if they
rejected the Union. This pension benefit is separate and apart
from the benefit attached to application of the BRP to all Osh-
kosh employees. That benefit applied to both production em-
ployees and maintenance employees and would be operative in
the future. Veteran employees were still covered for past ser-
vice under the BHRP. But, in the employee meetings in early
June about the new BRP coverage, veteran employees com-
plained that their coverage under the BRP would not be so
valuable because they would not work very many years under
the new plan. They sought better benefits under the BHRP,
which would provide them with the bulk of their retirement
benefits. Armed with that information, Respondent announced
a “transitional BHRP benefit improvement” for the mainte-
nance employees but not the production employees.
The announcement, which was addressed only to the mainte-
nance employees, was widely distributed to production em-
ployees who would be voting in the election the very next
week. As I have indicated above at footnote 1, I reject Respon-
dent’s contention that it was not responsible for such wide dis-
tribution and intended only a limited distribution to the mainte-
nance employees. Even if it did not authorize the wide
distribution, Respondent did nothing to limit dissemination of
the announcement, even though one of its witnesses testified he
knew it would be widely distributed and that there would be
some anger among the production employees if they learned of
the announcement. Indeed, Respondent made no attempt, as it
5 Respondent’s defense to the May 30 and June 12 repetitions of the
April 7 promised improvements is based on the same defense it pro-
vided to the April 7 letter. It is similarly unavailing.
CURWOOD, INC. 1149
did in its June 30 letter to employees about the Board’s decision
and direction of election, to notify the maintenance employees
of their new benefits by letter addressed to their homes. Re-
spondent should reasonably have foreseen the dissemination of
the announcement; after all, the production employees, who
vastly outnumber the maintenance employees, work side-by-
side with them. In these circumstances, Respondent’s failure to
limit the announcement can fairly be said to have been deliber-
ate.
More importantly, the timing of the announcement—1 week
before the election—makes it clear that Respondent intended to
influence the votes of the production employees. Those em-
ployees obviously had the same objections as did the mainte-
nance employees to the impact of the conversion to the BRP on
veteran employees covered by the BHRP. In this respect, Re-
spondent was simply delivering on its unlawful April 7 promise
that it would make benefit improvements without a union and
its unlawful June 12 statement that BHRP enhancements were
precluded by the pendency of the election, a matter discussed in
more detail later in this decision. The message was as clear as
it could be that, if the production employees rejected the Union,
they would get the same transitional benefit as the maintenance
employees. The July 13 announcement was thus both discrimi-
natory and an unlawful promise of benefits in violation of Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) of the Act. See, in addition to cases cited above,
Yale Industries, 324 NLRB 848, 849 (1997).6
Respondent does not offer a rational explanation for the tim-
ing of the July 13 announcement or for why, in view of Re-
spondent’s knowledge of the potency of its effect on the elec-
torate, the announcement was not made in a private letter to the
homes of the maintenance employees. But, relying on the tes-
timony of Vierthaler and Oshkosh Site Director Sam Smith,
Respondent argues that the announcement was motivated solely
by an effort to retain skilled maintenance employees. There is
no evidence connecting the so-called transitional pension bene-
fits with any retention problems, but I reject any suggestions to
that effect in the testimony of Vierthaler and Smith. Their tes-
timony that this had nothing to do with the union campaign was
not credible.
According to Smith, sometime in June or July 2000, he se-
cured Vierthaler’s approval to grant enhanced BHRP benefits
to Respondent’s senior maintenance people. This was allegedly
occasioned by his concern that he could not retain maintenance
employees. He said he was understaffed in maintenance em-
ployees. But that had been true for some time and it does not
explain the timing of the July 13 announcement. Moreover,
Respondent was also understaffed in other job categories, in-
cluding in the rewind department. Smith also testified that one
maintenance employee left at about this time and that had some
bearing on Smith’s concern. But Smith testified in a conclu-
sory manner without meaningful detail; and his demeanor re-
vealed a reluctance to tell all he knew about this issue.

6 The General Counsel has not specifically alleged that the July 13
announcement amounted to an unlawful discriminatory grant of bene-
fits. Nor does the General Counsel ask that the same benefits be pro-
vided to the production employees as a remedial matter.
Vierthaler also testified about the circumstances behind the
July 13 announcement, but his testimony on this issue was no
more credible than his testimony about the April 7 letter, dis-
cussed above. He explicitly related the enhanced benefits to
employee complaints about the prospective application of the
BRP on veteran employees covered under the BHRP. He also
mentioned the loss of a maintenance employee at about this
time. According to Vierthaler, the maintenance employee left
for higher wages, but Vierthaler did not know if the employee
was replaced or even whether Respondent tried to replace him.
Indeed, the maintenance employee who left would not even
have qualified for the transitional benefit. No further details
were provided concerning the relationship between the prom-
ised transitional benefits and maintenance employee retention.
Nothing else in Vierthaler’s testimony adequately explains why
Respondent did what it did on July 13, just 1 week before the
election.
4. Blaming the Union for the absence of further benefits
Somewhat related to the above-unfair labor practices dealing
with announcements and promises of benefits is the General
Counsel’s contention that, in its otherwise unlawful June 12
distribution, Respondent held out further benefits, especially of
the kind eventually announced to the maintenance employees,
but blamed the Union and the pendency of the election for its
failure to grant those benefits. It is, of course, axiomatic that,
in deciding whether or not to grant benefits during an election
campaign, an employer must act as if there were no union in the
picture. Blaming the Union or the pendency of a union cam-
paign for the failure to grant benefits is a separate violation of
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. See KOFY, supra at 20–21, and
NLRB v. Industrial Erectors, Inc., 712 F.2d 1131, 1135 (7th
Cir. 1983).
This is exactly what Respondent did in its June 12 distribu-
tion to employees. After reiterating an unlawful promise of
BRP coverage, it observed that there was reason to improve
existing BHRP benefits, but that could not be done because of
the pendency of the election. Respondent had been alerted to
the need for BHRP improvements because of Respondent’s
solicitation of the views of employees, a matter discussed in
greater detail later in this decision. And, still later, Respondent
actually announced the implementation—for only the mainte-
nance employees—of the very changes the employees sug-
gested after their views were solicited. That announcement, as
indicated above, was unlawful. In this context, Respondent’s
suggestion to voters that further improvements of the type later
given to the maintenance employees were not possible because
of the pendency of the election was clearly violative of the Act.
In an astonishing act of legal legerdemain, Respondent
parses the language of the June 12 distribution and contends
that it did not blame the Union for anything and did not say that
further benefits were prohibited (Br. 20–22). According to
Respondent, it simply said Federal law restricted its ability to
grant further benefits, language it contends was a correct state-
ment of the law. I disagree. First, employees are not lawyers.
As the Supreme Court has stated, an “assessment of the precise
scope of employer expression . . . must be made in the context
of its labor relations setting . . . . [Balancing Section 7 rights
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1150
and employer freedom of expression] must take into account
the economic dependence of the employees on their employers,
and the necessary tendency of the former, because of that rela-
tionship, to pick up intended implications of the latter that
might be more readily dismissed by a more disinterested ear.”
NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617 (1969). Sec-
ond, Respondent’s language was less a statement of existing
law than a perversion of it. Unlike in Noah’s Bay Area Bagels,
331 NLRB 188 (2000), cited by Respondent (Br. 21), there was
no indication in the June 12 letter that the improved benefits
Respondent was holding out would simply be deferred until
after the election, without regard to the outcome. Instead of
discussing benefits that were normally due and carefully telling
employees that it needed to postpone them to avoid creating the
appearance of interfering with the election, Respondent bra-
zenly raised the possibility of new and further improvements in
order to influence the outcome of the election. See Jefferson
Smurfit Corp., 325 NLRB 280, 289 (1998); and Atlantic Forest
Products, 282 NLRB 855, 858 (1987).
5. Solicitation of grievances, complaints, and questions
The General Counsel has also made a series of allegations
that portions of the unlawful April 7 and June 12 distributions,
as well as other distributions made on June 30 and July 18,
were violative of the Act because they unlawfully solicited the
views of employees. Absent a past practice of inviting griev-
ances and resolving them when a union is not on the scene, an
employer who first solicits employee grievances during a union
campaign, with the implication that they will be resolved with-
out the need for a union, violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
The solicitation of grievances during a union campaign consti-
tutes an implied promise that they will be remedied, but that
inference is rebuttable. See Torbitt & Castleman, Inc., 320
NLRB 907, 909 (1996); and Capitol EMI Music, 311 NLRB
997, 1007 (1993).
The General Counsel alleges that one portion of the April 7
letter was unlawful because Respondent promised to recognize
the valued input of employees, listen to their concerns, and
routinely address areas of interest. Earlier in the letter, Re-
spondent referred to meetings it had held in the past with em-
ployees about health care issues, in which employees had par-
ticipated to offer their views. There is no suggestion that the
health care meetings had anything to do with the union cam-
paign. Nor was the language used specific enough to amount to
a solicitation of grievances. Accordingly, I can see nothing
separately unlawful in Respondent’s general language promis-
ing to consider employee concerns. Also alleged as unlawful is
that portion of the April 7 letter in which Respondent urges
employees not to sign an authorization card and asks them to
contact a supervisor if they have any questions or concerns. In
his brief (Br. 7), the General Counsel equates the above state-
ment with coercive interrogation that seeks to probe the depth
of union support. I am not convinced that is how employees
would view Respondent’s remarks. Here again, I find nothing
sinister in the Respondent’s language. I shall also dismiss these
allegations of the complaint.7
More troubling are the allegations based on the otherwise
unlawful June 12 distribution and the June 30 letter, which
notified employees of the Board’s decision and direction of
election. In the former, Respondent reported on the early June
meetings called to discuss the promised conversion to the BRP
retirement plan. Those meetings revealed a problem in the
conversion for senior people who were covered under the
BHRP. Respondent promised to make sure that those views
would be considered. Indeed, they were, to an extent, since the
maintenance employees received enhanced transitional BHRP
benefits as a result of employee input at those meetings. As
discussed above, the announcement of those transitional bene-
fits was unlawful. In view of the several illegal announcements
and promises with respect to pension benefits, I find that the
Respondent’s June 12 distribution memorialized an unlawful
solicitation of grievances with the implication that they would
be resolved without the need for a union. Although Respondent
had had employee input meetings before the Union came on the
scene, these recent meetings and Respondent’s use of them in
the June 12 distribution were far from normal. Those meetings
and Respondent’s use of them in the June 12 distribution were
part and parcel of its effort to mold and sell its pension im-
provements to discourage union support. The Respondent
thereby violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
Similarly, the June 30 letter explicitly sought general em-
ployee input on unspecified matters, including apparently the
union campaign, which was discussed immediately before the
request for employee input. Significantly, the Respondent in-
cluded, in a letter to the employees’ homes, a self-addressed
stamped envelope and a blank sheet of paper. This was un-
usual. There is no evidence that Respondent invoked that kind
of method for soliciting grievances in the past. Here, of course,
it was done in connection with Respondent’s campaign to de-
feat the Union. The impact of Respondent’s approach is clear.
Employee Easton understood Respondent’s use of the self-
addressed envelope and the blank sheet of paper to be an invita-
tion to tell Respondent “what was bothering me [and] what the
company could do to make me happy.” (Tr. 86.) Respondent’s
conduct clearly invited grievances with the implication that
they would be resolved without a union. Indeed, the Respon-
dent’s approach was doubly intrusive because it also invoked
something akin to coercive interrogation. Even though em-
ployees were permitted to submit questions without signing
their names, they clearly were free to sign their submissions.
The Respondent’s invitation thereby made it possible for it to
learn of the identified employee’s union views; but, even with-
out identification, the submission would tell Respondent the
depth of the employees’ views and what it would take to turn

7 I likewise dismiss the allegation, in par. 15 of the complaint, that
the tail end of the July 18 question-and-answer distribution amounted to
an unlawful promise to correct employee complaints. The Respondent
simply asked employees to notify it of any remaining unanswered
questions about the union campaign and promised only to continue
responding to questions “to the fullest extent of the law.” Respondent’s
language was general and innocuous and certainly not violative of the
Act.
CURWOOD, INC. 1151
them around. I find Respondent’s conduct in this respect an
unlawful solicitation of grievances and probe of union support
in violation of the Act.8
6. Threats of loss of work if employees selected a union
The General Counsel alleges that a passage in the June 30
letter violated the Act because it threatened a loss of work if the
employees selected the Union. The passage addressed by the
complaint allegation is that which states that “[b]eing unionized
is also viewed negatively by our customers. They are con-
cerned about potential work stoppages and product interrup-
tions, which would harm their business. That is why we say
remaining union-free affects our business and our livelihood.”9
All parties agree that the legality of the above language is to
be assessed in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in NLRB v.
Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618 (1969). In that case the
Court set forth the following standard for employer speech on
union organizational issues:

[A]n employer is free to communicate to his employees any
of his general views about unionism or any of his specific
views about a particular union, so long as the communications
do not contain a “threat of reprisal or force or promise of
benefit.” He may even make a prediction as to the precise ef-
fects he believes unionization will have on his company. In
such a case, however, the prediction must be carefully
phrased on the basis of objective fact to convey an employer’s
belief as to demonstrably probable consequences beyond his
control . . . . If there is any implication that an employer may
or may not take action solely on his own initiative for reasons
unrelated to economic necessities and known only to him, the
statement is no longer a reasonable prediction based on avail-
able facts but a threat of retaliation based on misrepresentation
and coercion, and as such without the protection of the First
Amendment.

On their face, Respondent’s June 30 remarks strongly imply
that if the employees choose to unionize Respondent would
lose customers and employees would lose their jobs. Respon-
dent professed to know that its customers viewed unionization
“negatively,” and, as a result, might pull their work if a union
won bargaining rights. Thus, the issue becomes whether Re-
spondent’s statement was a reasonable prediction based on
objective and available facts. I find that the statement was not a
prediction but an unlawful threat. See Reeves Bros., Inc., 320
NLRB 1082, 1083 (1996); and SPX Corp., 320 NLRB 219,
221–223 (1995).
Although Respondent gave no elaboration of its statement to
the employees prior to the election, at the trial it submitted
evidence to justify the statement. That evidence not only fails
to support Respondent’s position but it establishes that Respon-

8 It is unclear whether the General Counsel meant to allege that other
parts of Respondent’s distributions and letters amounted to unlawful
solicitation of grievances. In view of my specific findings set forth
above, however, any further findings would be cumulative and would
not affect the remedy.
9 Respondent repeated essentially the same message both in meet-
ings leading up to the July 18 question-and-answer distribution and in
the distribution itself.
dent misrepresented the available facts. There is no evidence
that customers viewed unionization negatively or mentioned
that asserted fact to Respondent at any relevant time. Respon-
dent seems to concede the point since in neither of its briefs to
me does it defend the statement that customers viewed unioni-
zation “negatively.” Instead, it continuously makes reference
to the “concerns” of the customers.
Here are the facts as developed at the trial: Several docu-
ments were received in evidence through Site Manager Sam
Smith that purported to support Respondent’s position on cus-
tomer reaction to unionization. Those documents, however,
were routine, periodic requests by large customers such as Nes-
tle, Nabisco, Kraft, and Minute Maid, which asked basically
whether its products were produced in unionized plants, when
labor contracts expired and whether there had been work stop-
pages in the past. Although Smith testified that these requests
were made yearly, two of the documents were dated in 1995
and 1996. One of the documents, dated March 28, 1998, was a
confidential form agreement between Kraft and its suppliers
that ran almost 30 pages and asked many other questions in
addition to those about union contracts. The purpose of those
requests seems to have been a desire to assure a continuous
flow of products. But similar requests were made to other sup-
pliers for these major customers and there is no evidence that
the requests were motivated by any “negative” views on un-
ionization by those major customers. Nor were the customer
requests prompted by the union campaign underway among the
Oshkosh employees. Indeed, in three of the four instances in
which Respondent submitted answers, Respondent told its cus-
tomers that their products were being manufactured at both
union and nonunion plants. Some of Respondent’s, and the
parent Bemis’ plants are unionized. Thus, customers knew,
even before their most recent requests for information, that
their products were being manufactured at some of Respon-
dent’s unionized plants. Significantly, Site Manager Smith
testified that he was not aware that Respondent ever lost a sin-
gle piece of business because customers’ products were being
manufactured at one of its unionized plants. On the contrary, it
appears that one major customer actually took work away from
one of Respondent’s nonunion plants, although the record is
silent as to the reason for this loss of business. In these circum-
stances, I find that Respondent has been unable to establish, by
objective and ascertainable fact, that customers would pull their
work out of Respondent’s Oshkosh facility if the employees
voted for the Union.
It is clear therefore that Respondent used alleged but unsup-
ported customer negativity toward unions to create a fear in the
minds of employees that work would be lost unless the Union
was rejected. This was a threat of reprisal. At the very least,
Respondent engaged in the type of “brinksmanship” and “con-
scious overstatement” condemned by the Supreme Court in
Gissel (395 U.S. at 620).
7. The representation case
As I have indicated, the Union’s objections mostly track the
alleged unfair labor practices. In view of the unfair labor prac-
tices that I have found above, I find that the objections coexten-
sive with those unfair labor practices are sustained. The Re-
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1152
spondent has thus interfered with employee free choice and the
election must be overturned. All but one set of the unfair labor
practices were committed after the election petition was filed
and thus constitute objectionable conduct. Even the April 7
letter, which was sent to employees before the petition was
filed but after the union campaign began, is relevant to the elec-
tion objections. That letter is appropriately considered as back-
ground and gives meaning to subsequent postelection conduct
that was the subject of objections. It is well settled that pre-
petition conduct is considered by the Board in an objections
context if there is “significant post-petition conduct related to
or continuing from pre-petition events.” Textron, Inc. v. NLRB,
638 F.2d 957, 960 (6th Cir. 1981), citing Parke Coal Co., 219
NLRB 546 (1976).
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. By announcing and promising improvements in pension
benefits in order to discourage union support; blaming the Un-
ion for the absence of further benefits; soliciting grievances
with the implication that they would be resolved without a Un-
ion, and probing the union views of employees; and threatening
the loss of work if employees voted for the Union, the Respon-
dent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
2. The above violations are unfair labor practices within the
meaning of the Act.
3. By committing the violations set forth above, Respondent
interfered with the election of July 20 and 21, 2000, thus, re-
quiring the election to be set aside.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended10
ORDER
The Respondent, Curwood, Inc., a Division of Bemis Com-
pany, Inc., Oshkosh, Wisconsin, its officers, agents, successors,
and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Announcing and promising improvements in pension or
other benefits in order to discourage union support; blaming the
Union for the absence of further benefits; soliciting grievances
with the implication that they will be resolved without a union

10 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be
adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
and probing the union views of employees; and threatening the
loss of work if employees vote for a union.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its
Oshkosh, Wisconsin facilities, copies of the attached notice
marked “Appendix.”11 Copies of the notice, on forms provided
by the Regional Director for Region 30, after being signed by
the Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by
the Respondent immediately upon receipt and maintained for
60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable
steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices
are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In
the event that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the
Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facility in-
volved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and
mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current em-
ployees and former employees employed by the Respondent at
any time since April 7, 2000.
(b) Within 21 days after service by the Regional Director,
file with the Regional Director a sworn certification of a re-
sponsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to
the steps that the Respondent has taken to comply.
IT IS ALSO ORDERED that Case 30–RC–6203–04 be severed
and remanded to the Regional Director to conduct a new elec-
tion when he deems it appropriate.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint is dismissed inso-
far as it alleges violations of the Act not specifically found.

11 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”