Cruz-Hernandez, Juan Manuel.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jul 23, 2020

2019002575 (P.T.A.B. Jul. 23, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/947,321 11/16/2010 Juan Manuel Cruz-Hernandez IMM335
(051851-0396751)
1671
34300 7590 07/23/2020
Kilpatrick Townsend and Stockton/Immersion
Mailstop: IP Docketing - 22
1100 Peachtree Street
Suite 2800
Atlanta, GA 30309
EXAMINER
PATEL, SANJIV D
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2622
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/23/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
eofficeaction@appcoll.com
ipefiling@kilpatricktownsend.com
kts_imm_docketing@kilpatricktownsend.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte JUAN MANUEL CRUZ-HERNANDEZ
Appeal 2019-002575
Application 12/947,321
Technology Center 2600
Before JOHNNY A. KUMAR, JAMES W. DEJMEK, and JOYCE CRAIG,
Administrative Patent Judges.
CRAIG, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–10 and 12–27. See Final Act. 1. We
have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42 (2018). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as
Immersion Corporation. Appeal Br. 1.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to a systems and methods for increasing
haptic bandwidth in an electronic device. Claim 1, reproduced below, is
illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1 An apparatus comprising:
a touch-sensitive display;
a first actuator coupled to the touch-sensitive display;
a second actuator coupled to the touch-sensitive display;
a processor coupled to the first and second actuators, the
processor configured to:
determine a haptic event based on a user interaction with
a keyboard displayed on the touch-sensitive display;
determine a first haptic effect and a second haptic effect
based in part on the haptic event, the first haptic effect configured
to simulate a boundary between a first key and a second key on
the keyboard, and the second haptic effect configured to simulate
a boundary between the second key and a third key;
determine a third haptic effect based in part on the haptic
event, the third haptic effect configured to simulate an area
within the boundary of the second key, the third haptic effect
different from the first haptic effect and the second haptic effect;
determine a first selected actuator to output the first haptic
effect;
determine a second selected actuator to output the second
haptic effect;
apply a first command signal to the first selected actuator
to output the first haptic effect from a first start time to a first stop
time;
determine that the first selected actuator has decelerated;
apply a second command signal to the second selected
actuator to output the second haptic effect from a second start
time to a second stop time, wherein the first stop time occurs
before the second start time and wherein a period between the
first stop time and second start time is such that the first haptic
effect is felt distinctly from the second haptic effect;
apply a third command signal associated with the third
haptic effect to one or more of the first actuator or the second
actuator; and
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apply an AC voltage to at least a portion of the first
command signal to achieve a desired change in velocity from the
first selected actuator.
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Name Reference Date
Bailey US 7,161,580 B2 Jan. 9, 2007
Shimabukuro US 8,210,942 B2 July 3, 2012
Grant US 2006/0119573 A1 June 8, 2006
Colgate US 2007/0236450 A1 Oct. 11, 2007
Ramstein US 2007/0236474 A1 Oct. 11, 2007
Nogami US 2007/0290988 A1 Dec. 20, 2007
Meijer US 2009/0102805 A1 Apr. 23, 2009
REJECTIONS
Claims 1–8, and 12–15 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over the combination of Ramstein, Grant, Nogami, and Meijer.
Final Act. 2.
Claims 9, 10, and 16 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over the combination of Ramstein, Nogami, Grant, Meijer, and
Shimabukuro. Final Act. 11.
Claims 17–20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over the combination of Shimabukuro, Grant, Nogami, Ramstein, and
Meijer. Final Act. 13.
Claims 21–27 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over the combination of Shimabukuro, Bailey, Colgate, Nogami, and Meijer.
Final Act. 19.
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OPINION
We have reviewed the rejections of claims 1–10 and 12–27 in light of
Appellant’s arguments that the Examiner erred. We have considered in this
decision only those arguments Appellant actually raised in the Briefs. Any
other arguments Appellant could have made, but chose not to make, in the
Briefs are waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive of error. We agree with and
adopt as our own the Examiner’s findings of facts and conclusions as set
forth in the Answer and in the Action from which this appeal was taken. We
provide the following explanation for emphasis.
With respect to the § 103 rejection of claims 1–8 and 12–15,
Appellant contends the Examiner erred in combining Ramstein, Grant,
Nogami, and Meijer. Appeal Br. 40–41. In particular, Appellant argues “the
Office Action’s motivation to include . . . disclosure from Meijer is hindsight
driven” and “not sufficient to establish a motivation to combine these four
disparate references.” Id. at 41.
We are not persuaded that the Examiner erred. Appellant’s argument
relies only on the Examiner’s statement on page 6 of the Final Action that
combines Meijer with the previously combined Ramstein, Nagomi, and
Grant. Id. The Examiner separately concluded that it would have been
obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art at the time of invention to
modify the base haptic vibrotactile device of Ramstein with the cited
teachings of Nogami “for the predictable result of applying a vibration
profile in order to facilitate sensation of a plane or object surface.” Final Act
4 (citing Nogami ¶ 17). The Examiner also concluded it would have been
obvious to an artisan of ordinary skill to modify the base haptic input device
of Ramstein and Nogami with the cited teachings of Grant “for the
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predictable result of providing acceleration and braking to an actuator.”
Final Act. 5 (citing Grant ¶¶ 43–44). Because Appellant’s argument does not
consider the Examiner’s separate reasoning for combining Ramstein with
Nogami (Final Act. 4) and for combining Ramstein and Nogami with Grant
(Final Act. 5), Appellant’s argument is not persuasive.
Moreover, Appellant’s argument seeks to hold the Examiner to the
teaching-suggestion-motivation standard (Appeal Br. 42); such a standard is
not required. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415 (2007). The
Examiner has provided adequate reasoning with rational underpinning to
combine the teachings of Ramstein, Nogami, Grant, and Meijer. See Final
Act. 4–6; In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[R]ejections on
obviousness grounds [require] some articulated reasoning with some rational
underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness”) (cited with
approval in KSR, 550 U.S. at 418). As the Examiner makes clear, the
Examiner’s Meijer modification is merely an improvement to Ramstein,
Nogami, and Grant’s base haptic input device. Final Act. 6; KSR, 550 U.S. at
417 (“[I]f a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of
ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar
devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual
application is beyond his or her skill.”).
Appellant has not persuasively argued that the Examiner’s conclusion
lacks rational underpinning, or that modifying Ramstein, Nogami, and
Grant’s haptic input device with Meijer’s teaching of a haptic input device
with a third haptic effect is not a predictable use of familiar prior art
elements according to their established functions. Appellant also has not
identified any knowledge relied upon by the Examiner that was gleaned only
from Appellant’s disclosure and that was not otherwise within the level of
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ordinary skill in the art at the time of invention. See In re McLaughlin, 443
F.2d 1392, 1395 (CCPA 1971). Nor has Appellant provided evidence of
objective indicia of nonobviousness which our reviewing court guides
“operates as a beneficial check on hindsight.” Cheese Sys., Inc. v. Tetra Pak
Cheese and Powder Sys., Inc., 725 F.3d 1341, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
For these reasons, we are not persuaded that the Examiner engaged in
improper hindsight reasoning in combining the cited teachings of Ramstein,
Nogami, Grant, and Meijer.
Appellant also contends that Ramstein teaches away from Meijer’s
third haptic effect. Appeal Br. 42 (citing Ramstein ¶ 21 (“with only two
distinct haptic effects, a user can navigate and select any desired key without
the need for visual guidance”)).
Appellant’s “teaching away” argument fails because Appellant has not
identified where Ramstein actually criticizes, discredits, or otherwise
discourages the limitation “determine a third haptic effect based in part on
the haptic event, the third haptic effect configured to simulate an area within
the boundary of the second key, the third haptic effect different from the first
haptic effect and the second haptic effect.” See In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195,
1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004); DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc.,
567 F.3d 1314, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“A reference does not teach away,
however, if it merely expresses a general preference for an alternative
invention but does not ‘criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage’
investigation into the invention claimed”) (citing Fulton). We note that
Ramstein teaches that, if a key is depressed, a third haptic effect can be
generated. Ramstein ¶ 22. Indeed, Ramstein teaches that up to six haptic
effects may be generated. Id.
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For these reasons, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in
combining Ramstein, Nogami, Grant, and Meijer.
Turning to the teachings of the prior art, Appellant contends Ramstein
does not teach or suggest a “boundary,” as recited in claim 1. Appeal Br. 43
(citing Ramstein ¶¶ 20–21).
We are not persuaded that the Examiner erred. We agree with the
Examiner that the plain language of claim 1 does not require a “boundary,”
but rather a “haptic effect configured to simulate a boundary.” Ans. 6. We
also agree with the Examiner’s finding that Ramstein teaches that, “during
sliding contact on the screen, in areas not part of the numbered areas, no
haptic effect will be generated,” while “the sliding motion of a finger on
touch screen 15 may generate a fifth haptic effect, and a sixth haptic effect
mav be generated when the finger encounters the edge of one of the keys.”
Id. (citing Ramstein ¶¶ 20, 22). Thus, we agree that Ramstein teaches or
suggests the limitation “haptic effect configured to simulate a boundary,” as
recited in claim 1. We further agree with the Examiner that Meijer also
teaches the disputed limitation. Id. (citing Meijer, Fig. 8, ¶¶ 48–50). In the
Reply Brief, Appellant has not persuasively rebutted the Examiner’s
findings.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s § 103(a) rejection of
independent claims 1 and 13, as well as the Examiner’s § 103(a) rejection of
dependent claims 2–8, 12, 14, and 15, not argued separately with
particularity. Appeal Br. 43.
Appellant makes hindsight arguments for claims 9, 10, and 16
(Appeal Br. 43–44), claims 17–20 (id. at 44–45), and claims 21–27 (id. at
45). We find Appellant’s arguments with regard to those claims
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unpersuasive for the same reasons discussed above with regard to claims 1–8
and 12–15.
Additionally, Appellant argues that the Examiner entered a new
ground of rejection in the Answer when the Examiner relied on Meijer rather
than Colgate as teaching the limitation “haptic effect configured to simulate
a boundary,” as recited in claim 21. Reply Br. 5–7; Ans. 10.
Allegations that an Examiner’s answer contains undesignated new
grounds of rejection must be resolved by filing a petition to reopen
prosecution under 37 C.F.R. § 1.181, the absence of which constitutes
waiver of such arguments. 37 C.F.R. §41.40 (“Failure of appellant to timely
file such a petition will constitute a waiver of any arguments that a rejection
must be designated as a new ground of rejection.”); accord MPEP
§ 1207.03. Appellant did not file a petition and, therefore, waived any
argument that the Examiner’s Answer includes new grounds of rejection.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s § 103(a) rejections of
independent claims 17 and 21, as well as the Examiner’s § 103(a) rejections
of dependent claims 9, 10, 16, 18–20, and 22–27.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–10 and 12–27.
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DECISION SUMMARY
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–8, 12–15 103(a) Ramstein, Grant,
Nogami, Meijer
1–8, 12–15
9, 10, 16 103(a) Ramstein, Nogami,
Grant, Meijer,
Shimabukuro
9, 10, 16
17–20 103(a) Shimabukuro,
Grant, Nogami,
Ramstein, Meijer
17–20
21–27 103(a) Shimabukuro,
Bailey, Colgate,
Nogami, Meijer
21–27
Overall
Outcome
1–10, 12–27
TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED