Crown Zellerbach Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 4, 1987

284 N.L.R.B. 111 (N.L.R.B. 1987)

CROWN ZELLERBACH CORP. 111
Crown Zellerbach Corporation and Frank J. J.
Mayer. Case 14-CA-18243
4 June 1987
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN DOTSON AND MEMBERS
JOHANSEN AND BABSON
On 3 December 1986 Administrative Law Judge
Martin J. Linsky issued the attached decision. The
Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegat-
ed its authority in this proceeding to a three-
member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the
record in light of the exceptions and brief and has
decided to affirm the judge's rulings, findings,' and
conclusions and to adopt the recommended Order
as modified.2
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the
recommended Order of the administrative law
judge as modified below and orders that the Re-
spondent, Crown Zellerbach Corporation, Hazel-
wood, Missouri, its officers, agents, successors, and
assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Order
as modified.
1. Substitute the following for paragraph 2(a).
"(a) Recall and make whole Frank J. J. Mayer
for any loss of pay and other benefits suffered by
him commencing on 19 December 1985. Backpay
to be computed in accordance with E W. Wool-
worth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950), with interest as set
forth in NeW Horizons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB
1173 (1987)."
2. Substitute the following for paragraph 2(d).
"(d) Notify the Regional Director in writing
within 20 days from the date of this Order what
steps the Respondent has taken to comply."
The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge's credibility find-
ings. The Board's established policy is not to overrule an administrative
law judge's credibility resolutions unless the clear preponderance of all
the relevant evidence convinces us that they are Incorrect Standard Dry
Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd 188 F 2d 362 (3d Cir 1951)
We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing
the findings
In adopting the Judge's finding that Mayer's filing of a grievance was
concerted activity we do not rely on the Judge's finding that the clear
thrust of the grievance filed by Mayer was to secure holiday pay for all
temporaries
2 In accordance with our decision in New Horizons for the Retarded,
283 NLRB 1173 (1087), interest will be computed at the "short-term Fed-
eral rate" for the underpayment of taxes as set out in the 1986 amend-
ment to 26 U.S C §` 6621
The judge provided a visitatorial clause authorizing the Board, for
compliance purposes, to obtain chscovei y from the Respondent under the
supervision of the United States court of appeals enforcing the Order
We find that undeT the circumstances of this case such a clau"se is not
warranted.
284 NLRB No. 10
Mary J. Tobey, Esq., for the General Counsel,
Richard L. Connors, Esq., of Kansas City, Missouri, for
the Respondent.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
MARTIN J. LINSKY, Administrative Law Judge. On 23
December 1985 a charge was filed against Crown Zeller-
bach Corporation (Respondent) by Frank J. J. Mayer
(Charging Party).
On 25 July 1986 the National Labor Relations Board,
by the Regional Director for Region 14, issued a com-
plaint alleging that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1)
and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act) by
threatening to discharge and discharging Frank J. J.
Mayer because he threatened to file and then did file a
grievance against Respondent. Respondent filed an
answer in which it denied that it violated the Act in any
way.
A hearing was held in St. Louis, Missouri, on 9 and 10
September 1986.
On the entire record in this case, to include posthear-
ing briefs submitted by the General Counsel and Re-
spondent, and on my observation of the demeanor of the
witnesses, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent Crown Zellerbach Corporation is a corpo-
ration duly authorized to do business under the laws of
the State of Missouri. Respondent has an office and place
of business in Hazelwood, Missouri, where it is engaged
in the manufacture of flexible packaging and related
products. Respondent admits, and I find, that it is now,
and has been at all times material, an employer engaged
in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and
(7) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Respondent admits, and I find, that District No. 9,
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace
Workers (the Union) is now, and has been at all times
material, a labor orgainization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE
A. Issues
It is alleged by the General Counsel that on 18 De-
cember 1985 Frank J. J. Mayer, a temporary employee
of Respondent, was threatened by Respondent with dis-
charge or layoff if he filed a grievance because he was
not paid holiday pay and was discharged or laid off min-
utes later by Respondent when he did file a grievance
over holiday pay.
Respondent defends by arguing that Mayer was laid
off because his services were no longer needed. Further,
that he was selected for layoff because one employee had
to be let go and Mayer was always complaining while
112 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the other two temporaries who were not laid off were
not complainers. Still further, that the person who laid
Mayer off was a leadman and not a statutory supervisor.
Lastly, that Mayer was a temporary employee, not cov-
ered by the collective-bargaining agreement, and there-
fore lacked the authority to file a grievance.
It is my conclusion that Mayer was threatened with
layoff if he filed a grievance over holiday pay and was
laid off when he did file the grievance. The threat to lay
off and the layoff were done by Kenneth Lincoln, who
acted as an agent of Respondent in threatening to lay off
and then laying off Mayer. Mayer was engaged in pro-
tected concerted activity when he filed the grievance.
Mayer acted reasonably and in good faith in believing he
had a right to file a grievance and that his grievance had
merit. And this is so even though as a temporary em-
ployee he probably was ineligible to file a grievance.
B. Analysis
Since 1980 Mayer had been a member of the Union.
The Union was a party to a collective-bargaining agree-
ment with Respondent. The agreement in effect during
the times material to this case ran from 1 May 1983 to 1
May 1986. The Union and Respondent are now operat-
ing under an agreement running from 1 May 1986 to 1
May 1989. For some time the Union was concerned that
Respondent was subcontracting out work that the Union
felt could be done by unemployed members of the
Union. Accordingly, in January 1983, the Union and Re-
spondent entered into a written agreement entitled
"Letter of Agreement," which provided, in pertinent
part, that Respondent would use temporary employees
from the union hall instead of employees of subcontrac-
tors to do "significant type project work." The written
agreement was silent concerning the pay and fringe ben-
efits to be given to these temporary employees hired by
Respondent, but orally it was agreed that the temporary
employees would get the same hourly wages and health
and welfare benefits as the permanent employees got.
In 1983 Mayer was hired as a temporary employee by
Respondent. He worked for Respondent during April,
May, and June 1983. He received the same hourly wage
and 'health and welfare benefits as the permanent em-
ployees received. He also received, along with all other
temporary employees, holiday pay for Memorial Day
1983, i.e., he was paid for that day as if he had worked,
although he had not worked that day. In June 1983
Mayer was laid off. Subsequent to his layoff the Letter
of Agreement referred to above was canceled.
In January 1985 the Union and Respondent entered
into another written Letter of Agreement regarding the
employment by Respondent of temporary employees re-
ferred from the union hall to work on "significant type
project work."
A change in operation under the 1985 agreement on
the use of temporary employees from the 1983 agree-
ment was that temporary employees were required on
being hired to sign a statement that provided, in perti-
nent part, as follows: "[I] understand I will not accrue
seniority or vacation credits, and any leave from work-
ing will not be paid."
On 18 September 1985 Mayer was hired by Respond-
ent as a temporary employee having been referred from
the union hall. On approximately 30 September 1985 he
was laid off. There were no holidays during this tour of
duty. On 2 October 1985 Mayer was rehired as a tempo-
rary. Mayer and a fellow temporary employee named
Jearl Lafferty had asked Richard Zambrzuski, the lead
man on the job they were working and a union steward,
if they were entitled to holiday pay. Zambrzuski said
that they were. The temporaries, including Mayer and
Lafferty, were not paid holiday pay for Columbus Day.
When they were not paid holiday pay for Columbus
Day, Mayer and Lafferty each asked Zambrzuski why
and he said they were not paid holiday pay because they
were temporaries and he had been wrong when he said
they would be paid. Mayer also asked Kenneth Lincoln,
another leadman and the person who handed out the
paychecks, why he did not get holiday pay. Lincoln said
he would look into it. Lincoln got back to Mayer and
told him that temporaries were not paid holiday pay.
Mayer, as noted above, had been paid holiday pay in
1983 and when he signed on as a temporary in 1985 with
the secretary in personnel he was not specifically told
that he would not get holiday pay.
Thanksgiving Day and the day after Thanksgiving
were also holidays. Although Mayer received a free
Thanksgiving turkey from Respondent like all the other
employees, neither he nor the other temporaries received
holiday pay for Thanksgiving Day or the day after
Thanksgiving like the permanent employees did. Mayer
then spoke with Claude Chambers. Chambers had
worked for Respondent for approximately 13 years. He
was not only a member of the Union, but in the past had
served as a shop steward. At the time of the hearing in
September 1986 Chambers was once again a shop stew-
ard in addition to being a union trustee and a delegate to
the Missouri State Labor Council. Chambers had been a
shop steward when Mayer worked as a temporary em-
ployee for Respondent in 1983. Mayer told Chambers he
was thinking of filing a grievance over Respondent's fail-
ure to pay him holiday pay. Chambers told Mayer that
he had a right to ,file a grievance, but told Mayer he did
not think Mayer would win the grievance.
On 17 December 1985 temporary employee Bob Prof-
fer complained to Chief Shop Steward Albert Perry that
temporaries were not receiving holiday pay. Perry said
they were not entitled to holiday pay. Mayer, who was
present at this conversation, said he might file a griev-
ance over it and Perry said that would cause trouble or
words to that effect.
At the end of the shift on Wednesday, 18 December
1985, and after Mayer had spoken to Chambers and se-
cured a copy of the collective-bargaining agreement and
the Letter of Agreement on the use of temporaries from
the secretary in personnel, Mayer approached Albert
Perry, the chief shop steward. It was approximately 3:45
p.m. Mayer was just finishing up his shift and Perry was
just coming in for the second shift. In the presence of
Kenneth Lincoln, Mayer asked Perry for a grievance
form. Perry told Mayer he did not have to sign it. Mayer
said he wanted a grievance form and was going to file it.
CROWN ZELLERBACH CORP. 113
Lincoln then said to Mayer, "If you sign that grievance
you know there won't be anymore work for you. What
will it be?" Mayer again asked Perry for a grievance
form. Perry did not respond. Mayer walked over to the
tool crib to put back some tools. He then went back to
where Perry and Lincoln were standing and asked Perry
again for a grievance form. Perry reluctantly gave him
the form. Mayer filled it out, signed it, and gave it to
Perry. The grievance was over Mayer's failure to be
paid holiday pay. Lincoln immediately said, "You are
laid off. Take your tools and go home, and don't come
back."
Mayer said he doubed that Lincoln had authority to
fire him Lincoln then told Mayer to follow him to Bob
Miller's office, since Mayer conceded that Miller—the
engineering manager for the plant—had the authority to
fire him. Miller was unavailable and Mayer and Lincoln
spoke with Keith Herron instead. Keith Herron was the
assistant plant engineer and a person whom Respondent
admits was a statutory supervisor and an agent at that
time. 1 Mayer told Herron—in Lincoln's presence—that
Lincoln threatened to fire him if he signed a grievance
and did fire him when he signed it.
Mayer said that he did not think Lincoln could lay
him off. Herron asked Lincoln how many people he had.
Lincoln replied that he had three and only needed two.
Herron looked at Mayer and said, "Well, I guess that is
that. You are laid off."
It is clear from these facts that Lincoln, whether he is
a statutory supervisor or not, acted as an agent of Re-
spondent in laying off or discharging Mayer, and that
Herron, a person Respondent admits was a statutory su-
pervisor and an agent of Respondent, adopted and rati-
fied this action by Lincoln. At the time of the hearing in
this case in September 1986, Mayer had not been re-
called to Respondent's employ, although other tempo-
rary employees had been hired. In addition, some months
prior to the hearing, Claude Chambers, once again a
shop steward, credibly testified that he told Lincoln that
the Union was referring some workers, to include
Mayer, to Respondent, and Lincoln told Chambers to
tell the union hiring hall that Respondent did not want
Mayer as an employee and Mayer was not referred.
At the time of Mayer's layoff on 18 December 1985 he
and two other temporaries were working on a project
called the "solVent recovery job" or the "tank farm job."
At one point as many as nine temporaries had worked on
this project under the direction of leadman Richard
Zambrzuski. A number of temporaries had been laid off
and the project was winding down. Prior to 18 Decem-
ber 1985 it had been leadman Richard Zambrzuski who
decided when temporaries should be laid off and not
Lincoln. Lincoln had not discussed with Zambrzuski the
matter of layoffs from the project or whether Mayer
should be laid off. In fact, Zambrzuski's plans called for
all three temporaries still on the project—Bob Proffer,
Ray Rader, and Mayer—to work not only for the rest of
the week but also to work the upcoming weekend—Sat-
urday, 21 December, and Sunday, 22 December—and to
Herron left Respondent's employ prior to the hearing He was not
called as a witness.
work through the Christmas plant shutdown period in
order to have one important aspect of the project com-
pleted by 2 January 1986. In fact, the two remaining
temporaries did not work that schedule and the solvent
recovery project was not finally completed until March
1986. Zambrzuski credibly testified he would not have
laid off Mayer but was overruled by Lincoln, a man de-
scribed in the record as a "super leadman."
In light of the record I conclude that Mayer was not
laid off for lack of work, but because he filed a griev-
ance. He was laid off because he handed the signed
grievance to Shop Steward Perry. Whether Mayer, as a
temporary employee, had a right to file a grievance or
not his handing of the grievance to Perry amounts to en-
gaging in protected concerted activity, i.e., he com-
plained to a steward—an official in his union—about his
pay. If this is not protected concerted activity I do not
know what is protected concerted activity. A complaint
by an employee about his pay to an official in his union
must be protected by Section 7 of the Act. This is espe-
cially so when that Union had negotiated for him being
hired in the first place, i.e., the Letter of Agreement re-
garding the use by Respondent of unemployed machin-
ists referred from the union hiring hall.
Mayer's filing a grievance with Chief Shop Steward
Perry (a coworker as well aS an agent of Mayer's Union)
over pay is the functional equivalent of an employee
asking another employee to talk to the boss about his pay
problem.
Recently, the Board in Meyers Industries, 281 NLRB
882 (1986), quoted with approval the following language
from the Third Circuit's decision in Mushroom Transpor-
tation Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 683 (3d Cir. 1964):
It is not questioned that a conversation may consti-
tute a concerted activity although it involves only a
speaker and a listener, but to qualify as such, it must
appear at the very least it was engaged in with the
object of initiating or inducing or preparing for
group action or that it had some relation to group
action in the interest of the employees.
In the instant case Mayer wanted the Union, through
Perry, to get holiday pay for himself and the other tem-
poraries. Mayer candidly admits, however, that when he
spoke with Perry, he did so without the express authori-
zation of the other temporaries to speak on their behalf.
The grievance filed by Mayer only asked for holiday pay
for himself, but the clear thrust of all that went on was
to secure holiday pay for all temporaries.
Mayer acted reasonably, and in good faith in filing the
grievance. He reasonably and in good faith believed that
he had a right to file the grievance and that his griev-
ance had merit. He was a dues-paying member of the
Union that had a contract with Respondent, which con-
tained a grievance-arbitration clause in it, and he was
told by Claude Chambers that he had a right to file a
grievance. 2 Mayer believed his grievance had merit be-
2 It was not until after Mayer filed his grievance and was laid off that
Union Business Agent Tom Williams told Mayer that Mayer had no right
Continued
114 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
cause he had received holiday pay in 1983, the language
of the collective-bargaining agreement and the Letter of
Agreement do not clearly provide that he would not get
holiday pay, and leadman Zambrzuski, at one point,
thought Mayer was entitled to get holiday pay. On the
other hand, Zambrzuski later told Mayer he was wrong
and that Mayer was not entitled to holiday pay. In addi-
tion, Lincoln and Perry both told Mayer he was not enti-
tled to holiday pay as a temporary. There was a conflict
and it would seem perfectly reasonable to file a griev-
ance and get a formal answer to the question. If a person
had conflicting reports whether he needed major sur-
gery, resorting to further medical authority could hardly
be called unreasonable or bad-faith behavior.
Respondent claims that the language in the statement
that all temporaries signed, who were hired in 1985 (in-
cluding Mayer) that "any leave from working will not be
paid," put all temporaries on notice that they would not
be paid holiday pay. I do not believe it clearly does that.
A statement that "temporary employees will not be paid
holiday pay," would have been significantly clearer.
Mayer credibly testified that he understood the clause to
mean "that if you took a day off, like I had to take a day
off to go to an auction for back taxed property and I was
not going to be paid for the day that I took off, any
leave. That would be leave that I would request." I note
that one could argue that temporaries do get holiday
pay, but do not get jury pay or funeral pay as provided
in articles XI and XII of the contract because you are on
leave from work while on jury duty or at a family mem-
ber's funeral but you are not on leave from work on a
holiday. It is interesting to note that beginning with
Good Friday 1986 temporaries were once again paid hol-
iday pay.
The Supreme Court held in the case of NLRB v. City
Disposal Systems., 465 U.S. 822 (1984), in approving the
Board's Interboro doctnne, 3 that an individual's reasona-
ble and honest assertion of the right contained in a col-
lective-bargaining agreement is an extention of concerted
action that produced the agreement and thus covered by
the Act. You can not discriminate against an employee
for filing a grievance if the employee reasonably and in
good faith invokes a right under the collective-bargain-
ing agreement. In the case of NLRB v. City Disposal
System, supra, the employee was covered by the agree-
ment. In this case Mayer may not have been covered by
the agreement, but he reasonably and in good faith be-
lieved he was covered.
It would be consistent with the policies of the Act to
process the grievance rather than lay off Mayer for filing
the grievance even if the processmg of the grievance
simply resulted in the Union advising Mayer in writing
that as a temporary employee he is not eligible to file a
grievance. In other words, labor-management due proc-
ess over the unemployment line.
In any event it is not at all clear that Mayer is ineligi-
ble to file a grievance. Article 1 of the contract is the
to file a grievance and that no temporary employee had the right to file a
grievance A second gnevance Mayer mailed to Respondent over his
firing was not Involved in this case,
3 Interboro Contractors, 157 NLRB 1295 (1966), enfd 388 F 2d 495 (2d
Or 1967)
recognition clause. Section 3, article 1 provides as fol-
lows:
The Machinists Union is the bargaining agency for
all employees of the Company's Hazelwood plant
working in those classifications listed on Exhibit C
attached herein and all other employees employed
by the Company to perform machinist work, which
shall include the maintenance and installation of all
machinery used from time to time in the Company's
Hazelwood plant and any other services which are
now being rendered by Machinists to the Company.
Section 6, article 1 provides as follows:
Anything herein to the contrary notwithstanding,
none of the four named Unions shall be recognized
as the bargaining agency for casual or extra em-
ployees, or office clerical, and professional employ-
ees, guards, watchmen, or supervisors as defined in
the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, as
amended.
At no time was Mayer ever referred to as a "casual"
or "extra" employee but always as a "temporary" em-
ployee, The 1983 and 1985 Letter of Agreements be-
tween Respondent and the Union on the use of tempo-
rary employees from the union hall did not use the
words "casual" or "extra." Claude Chambers testified
that the Teamsters and the Graphic Arts Union—two of
the four unions representing employees of Respondent—
had college students working with them during the
summer and he thought they were "casual" or "extra"
employees.
Claude Chambers testified that he was a member of
the Union's negotiating team for the 1977, 1980, and
1983 contracts and the subject of the right of temporaries
to file grievances was never discussed. The Union is not
a party to this unfair labor practice case and it would be
inappropriate for me to state categorically whether "tem-
poraries" are covered by the agreement or not. But I can
state categorically that Mayer could and did reasonably
and in good faith believe he was covered and had a right
to file a grievance. Therefore, pursuant to the Board's
recent decision in Regency Electronics, 276 NLRB 4 fn. 3
(1985), Mayer is entitled to the same protection as the
truckdriver m NLRB v. City Disposal System, supra.
During the hearing leadman Richard Zambrzusld testi-
fied that he told Chief Steward Albert Perry that he
thought Mayer had a right to file a grievance.,
There is no doubt that on 18 December 1985 Mayer
was laid off because he filed a grievance and minutes
before had been threatened with layoff if he filed a
grievance. In reaching this conclusion, I have credited
the testimony of Frank J. J. Mayer, jearl Lafferty, Rich-
ard Zambrzuski, and Claude Chambers. Lafferty, Zambr-
zuski, and Chambers are all employees of Respondent
and were employees at the time of the hearing. Lafferty
had only recently been made a permanent employee.
Zambrzusld and Chambers have worked for Respondent
for many years. All four of these men impressed me, on
the basis of demeanor and the inherent probability of
CROWN ZELLERBACH CORP. 115
their testimony, as truthful witnesses. Lafferty, Zambr-
zuski, and Chambers all corroborate Mayer. I do not
credit Kenneth Lincoln in so far as he is contradicted by
the General Counsel's witnesses. It chose to believe them
and not him.4
Lincoln says he did not lay off Mayer because Mayer
filed a grievance, but laid him off because of lack of
work. In fact, there was plenty of work left to be done
on the solvent recovery job. 5 Lincoln says he selected
Mayer to be laid off rather than Proffer or Radar (the
other two temporaries on the job) because Mayer was
always complaining but the only thing Mayer com-
plained about was not being paid holiday pay and he
complained about that by discussing the subject matter
with the other temporaries and by filing a grievance with
his Union. 6 In addition, several other temporaries com-
plained about no holiday pay, but did not file grievances.
As noted above, it is irrelevant if Lincoln was a statu-
tory supervisor or not. He acted as an agent of Respond-
ent when he laid off Mayer and this action was ratified
and adopted by statutory supervisor and agent Keith
Herron, the assistant plant engineer, and Herron, when
he ratified the layoff of Mayer knew that Lincoln laid off
Mayer because Mayer filed a grievance because Mayer
told him so. Herron's actions also ratified and adopted
Lincoln's threat to lay off Mayer if Mayer filed a griev-
ance.
In light of the Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v.
City Disposal Systems, supra, and the Board's decisions in
Meyers Industries, supra, and Regency Electronics, supra, I
must conclude that the threat to lay off Mayer if he filed
a grievance violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act and the
layoff of Mayer because he filed a grievance violated
Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.
REMEDY
The remedy in this case should include the posting of
a notice and the recall of Frank J. J. Mayer with a make-
whole remedy. Respondent should, of course, be ordered
to cease and desist from this or similar misconduct.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce
and in operations affecting commerce within the meaning
of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the mean-
ing of Section 2(5) of the Act.
4 I did find Respondent's witness, Engineering Manager Robert H.
Miller, to be a credible witness, but his testimony does not defeat the
General Counsel's case
5 Zambrzuski wanted to work all three temporaries through the Christ-
mas shutdown and other temporaries (Walter Hasselbrmg and Michael
Betsy) were hired after the Christmas shutdown for the solvent recovery
project The project was not totally completed until March 1986 In fact
no less than 16 temporary employees were kept on after Mayer was laid
off or hired between Mayer's discharge and the hearing in this case Usu-
ally there were approximately 30 machinists on the payroll at any time.
6 Claude Chambers testified that temporaries Mayer, Lafferty, Lee
Smith, and Jim Marshall all complained to him about lack of holiday pay
and temporary Bob Proffer complained to Perry about it on 17 Decem-
ber 1985.
3. By threatening to lay off Frank J. J. Mayer if he
filed a grievance over the holiday pay Respondent vio-
lated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and
on the entire record, I issue the following recommend-
ed7
ORDER
The Respondent, Crown Zellerbach Corporation, Ha-
zelwood, Missouri, its officers, agents, successors, and as-
signs, shall
I. Cease and desist from
(a) Threatening to lay off or laying off employees be-
cause the employees state they are going to file a griev-
ance or do file a grievance.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of rights
under Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Recall and make whole Frank J. J. Mayer for any
loss of pay and other benefits suffered by him commenc-
ing on 19 December 1985. Backpay to be computed in
accordance with F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 651
(1977) (see generally Isis Plumbing Co., 138 NLRB 716
(1962)).
(b) Preserve and, on request, make available to the
Board or its agents for examination and copying, all pay-
roll records, social security payment records, timecards,
personnel records and reports, and all other records nec-
essary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the
terms of this Order.
(c) Post at Hazelwood, Missouri, copies of the at-
tached notice marked "Appendix." 8 Copies of the notice,
on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region
14, after being signed by the Respondent's authorized
representative, shall be posted by the Respondent imme-
diately upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive
days in conspicuous places including all places where no-
tices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable
steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the
notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material.
(d) Notify the Regional Director, in writing within 20
days from the date of this Order what steps the Re-
spondent has taken to compy. For the purpose of deter-
mining or securing compliance with this Order, the
Board, or any of its duly authorized representatives, may
obtain discovery from the Respondent, its officers,
agents, successors or assigns, or any other person having
7 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102.46 of the Board's
Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended
Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the
Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur-
poses,
8 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Nation-
al Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of
the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National
Labor Relations Board"
116 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
knowledge concerning any compliance matter, in the
manner provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. Such discovery shall be conducted under the su-
pervision of the United States court of appeals enforcing
this Order and may be had upon any matter reasonably
related to compliance with this Order, as enforced by the
court.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
To organize
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choice
To act together for other mutual aid or protec-
tion
To choose not to engage in any of these protect-
ed concerted activities.
WE WILL NOT threaten an employee with layoff if the
employee files a grievance and WE WILL NOT layoff an
employee because the employee filed a grievance.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL recall Frank J. J. Mayer immediately and
make him whole for any loss of pay and benefits he suf-
fered with interest from 18 December 1985.
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated the National Labor Relations Act and has or-
dered us to post and abide by this notice.
Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights. CROWN ZELLERBACH CORPORATION