Crowley Marine Services

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Nov 10, 1999

329 N.L.R.B. 1054 (N.L.R.B. 1999)

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1054
Crowley Marine Services, Inc. and Inlandboatmen’s
Union of the Pacific, International Longshore &
Warehouse Union, AFL–CIO. Case 32–CA–
16596
November 10, 1999
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN TRUESDALE AND MEMBERS FOX
AND HURTGEN
On April 29, 1999, Administrative Law Judge Joan
Wieder issued the attached decision. The Respondent
filed exceptions and a supporting brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and brief and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings,1 findings, and conclusions and
to adopt the recommended Order.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge and
orders that the Respondent, Crowley Marine Services,
Inc., Oakland, California, its officers, agents, successors,
and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Order.

Jo Ellen Marcotte, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Kenneth W. Anderson, Esq. (Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, LLP),
of Los Angeles, California, for the Respondent.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JOAN WIEDER, Administrative Law Judge. This case was
tried on February 9, 1999,1 at Oakland, California. The charge
was filed by Inlandboatmen’s Union of the Pacific, Interna-
tional Longshore & Warehouse Union, AFL–CIO (the Charg-
ing Party or the Union), on February 9, 1998, against Crowley
Marine Services, Inc. (Respondent). The compliant, as
amended, alleges Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1)
of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act).
Principally, the complaint alleges Respondent violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by refusing, since about Decem-
ber 10, 1997, to provide the Union with a copy of an arbitration
award between Respondent and Seafarers International Union,
which the Union claims is necessary for, and relevant to, the
Union’s performance of it representational duties.
Respondent’s timely filed answer to the complaint admits
certain allegations, denies others, and denies any wrongdoing.
Respondent asserts the requested information is not relevant.

1 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility
findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an adminis-
trative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear preponder-
ance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect.
Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362
(3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no
basis for reversing the findings.
1 All dates are in 1997 unless otherwise indicated.
All parties were given full opportunity to appear and intro-
duce evidence, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, to
argue orally, and to file briefs.2
Based upon the entire record, from my observation of the
demeanor of the witnesses, and having considered the posthear-
ing briefs, I make the following3
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Based on the Respondent’s answer to the complaint, as
amended, I find Respondent meets one of the Board’s jurisdic-
tional standards. I find the Union is a statutory labor organiza-
tion.
II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
Background
Respondent is a Delaware corporation with an office and
place of business in San Francisco, California, engaged in the
operation of tugboats and barges in interstate and International
commerce. Respondent is one of several corporations under
the overall corporate umbrella of Crowley Maritime Corpora-
tion (CMC).4 CMC owned companies operate on the East,
Gulf and West Coasts of the United States as well as in foreign
waters. These companies own and operate tugs, barges, tankers,
and other ocean-going vessels. Respondent primarily services
the West Coast, operating in Puget Sound, Alaska, and San
Francisco, California. Most of its current work involves tug and
barge service in the Puget Sound area.
Respondent’s operations in the San Francisco Bay area in-
volve the loading and discharge of oil barges. Prior to 1992,
this operation had been performed by the Harbor Tug & Barge
Company (HTBC), which was a separately owned subsidiary of
CMC. HTBC and the Charging Party have had a collective-
bargaining relationship for more than 30 years. In 1992, HTBC
was consolidated into CMS with a number of other separately
owned subsidiaries. Another separate subsidiary, Crowley
Towing and Transportation Company (CT&T), has historically
performed work on the East Coast, Gulf Coast, and the Los
Angeles/Long Beach Harbor. CT&T employees are primarily
represented by the Seafarers International Union (SIU). In the
Los Angeles/Long Beach Harbor area, CT&T tugs do contract
towing, including ship assist work. CT&T and the SIU have
had a collective-bargaining agreement for this work since about
1977.
Thomas Baldwin is employed by Respondent and has re-
sponsibility for its West Coast labor relations. In 1997 one of
Respondent’s affiliates formed Crowley Petroleum Transport,
Inc. (CPT) as a subsidiary of CT&T. Respondent, Crowley
Marine Services (CMS) is not in the oil tanker business. Bald-
win admitted he knew nothing about the formation of CPT. The
2 On April 5, 1999, Respondent filed a motion to clarify statements
in General Counsel’s brief, claiming several references to Respondent
should be corrected to refer to an affiliate, Crowley Petroleum Trans-
port, Inc. The motion is denied. The motion is in the nature of a reply
brief. Even if the statements alluded to in the motion are not accurate,
this decision is based on the evidence of record and applicable law, not
a parties argument concerning the evidence. Thus, there is no basis to
grant the motion, which should be, and is, denied.
3 I specifically discredit any testimony inconsistent with my find-
ings.
4 Another related company is Crowley Petroleum Transport.
329 NLRB No. 92
CROWLEY MARINE SERVICES 1055
Coast Range and Blue Ridge were the first tankers purchased
by a Crowley operation.
Respondent, for an undisclosed period of time, engaged in a
time charter of a barge called the 450-6 that was dedicated to
serve the Tosco Oil Company Avon facility. The 450-6 barge
was time chartered to Tosco in 3-year increments, with the
latest lease expiring June 30, 1997. The barge was loaded and
unloaded by tankermen under the collective-bargaining agree-
ment between the Charging Party and Respondent, in teams of
two. It is undisputed the following unit is appropriate for the
purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section
9(b) of the Act:

All employees of Respondent engaged in the loading and/or
discharging of Harbor Tug and Barge Company barges oper-
ating in Northern California, south to and including Morro
Bay, north to Coos Bay and split discharges involving Coos
Bay Oregon Ports of Call and Columbia River Area; exclud-
ing all other employees, guards, and supervisors as defined in
the Act.

Infrequently, the tankermen would load and discharge barges
when the barges were not docked. Usually, they drove to the
refinery and worked 10-hour shifts. The 450-6 barge had a load
capacity of 16,000 tons. After the barge was loaded, Respon-
dent towed it to another Tosco facility located the Los Angeles,
California area. The tankermen discharging the barge in the Los
Angeles area were represented by the SIU working for CT&T.
The Union’s tankermen do not accompany the barge while it is
being towed. The barges are unmanned when they are being
towed. In contrast, the tanker’s crew remains with the vessel
when it is underway.
Around March, Tosco purchased Union Oil Company of
California (Unocal), including a refinery in Rodeo, California,
which is in the San Francisco, California area. Unocal had three
tankers. Tosco determined it did not want to operate these
tankers. Crowley Petroleum Transport, Inc. (CPTI) was formed
in early 1997 as a subsidiary of CT&T to purchase two of these
oil tankers from Tosco, the Coast Range, and the Blue Ridge.
Another unrelated company purchased the third tanker. The
Coast Range and Blue Ridge had been used to transport oil
from Unocal’s Rodeo, facility. With the purchase of Unocal,
Tosco had two San Francisco Bay area refining facilities, one at
Avon and the other at Rodeo.
Commencing around July 1, the loading and unloading of
Tosco’s petroleum liquid products was accomplished at both
the Avon and Rodeo facilities by the crew of the Coast Range,
whose 12 unlicensed crew was represented by the SIU and 8
licensed officers were represented by the American Maritime
Officers. The SIU has represented the unlicensed personnel of
the two oil tankers since late May 1997. The Blue Ridge is op-
erated by CPTI on the East and Gulf Coasts. The Coast Range
is time-chartered to Tosco. Under this charter, CPTI provides
the vessel and crew whose primary operation is the transporta-
tion of Tosco oil and refinery products from the Rodeo and
Avon refinery to Southern California. Respondent never in-
formed the Union of the change prior to July 1. The Union
learned of the change when one of its member tankermen,
Eugene S. Tracy, filed his grievance.
The Charging Party represents Respondent’s tankermen. The
unit has about 15 members. Respondent and the Charging Party
currently have a collective-bargaining agreement and are in
negotiations for a successor agreement. Tankermen load and
discharge liquid cargoes, primarily petroleum products. They
must receive a Coast Guard certification prior to performing
this work. As here pertinent, the Charging Party’s members
work in the San Francisco Bay area, including its tributaries. In
the San Francisco area, the Charging Party represents solely
tankermen who work on barges. Its ILW charter allows the
Charging Party “to represent anybody on ships or tugs, barges,
ferries.” It has not made a demand to represent any of the crew
of the Coast Range or Blue Ridge. The Coast Range has the
capacity to carry 39,000 tons of petroleum or petroleum prod-
uct.
After the Coast Range commenced operations at the Tosco
refineries, Tracy filed a grievance. The grievance, dated July
15, claims: “On July 1, 1997, I was laid off by Crowley Marine
Services, Inc., due to Crowley shifting the work that I was for-
mally doing on the 450-6 to one of the new . . . tankers that
Crowley purchased from Tosco.” The grievance claimed Re-
spondent’s actions violated articles 1 and 38 of the collective-
bargaining agreement, and seeks rehiring of the grievant with
back pay for lost wages from July 1.
The Union determined to file a more generic grievance on
August 7, to cover all of its members. The grievance asserted:
“The company violated the agreement when they refused to
bargain the effects of this change, when they hired non-IBU
crews to perform our work, displacing the tug and barge and
towing services with tankers.” At the time of the grievance, the
Union knew the SIU was providing the unlicensed crew of the
Coast Range. Secchitano, the Union’s regional director, learned
from the Union’s national president, that “he talked to some-
body in the Crowley Company, and that there was an arbitra-
tion award assigning that work to the SIU.” Respondent never
disputed this information. Both of Respondent’s witnesses,
Baldwin and Norman George, the manager of tanker operations
for CPTI, did not know the contents of the SIU arbitration
award. The Union understood SIU members were loading the
Tosco products that used to be loaded by the Union’s tanker-
men. The Union does not know the details of the Coast Range
operation. The Union does not know if the SIU arbitration
award referred to any particular customer. Secchitano admitted
the Union suspected the SIU arbitration award had relevance to
the grievances but did not have certain knowledge if it was
relevant.
The August 7, grievance claimed articles 1, 2, 4, 6, 21, 38,
and other provisions of the collective-bargaining agreement
were applicable to the grievance. At hearing, the Union claimed
articles 1, 2, and 38 are applicable to the grievances. The col-
lective-bargaining agreement, which had an effective date of
October 21, 1996, was extended during the pendancy of nego-
tiations for a new agreement, and was in effect at all times per-
tinent to the matters discussed in this proceeding.
Article I, entitled “RECOGNITION AND WORK
PRESERVATION” provides:

The Company recognizes the Union as the exclusive bargain-
ing representative for all employees as described and classi-
fied herein. All work which has previously been performed
under the terms of this Agreement or its predecessors, includ-
ing but not limited to the following, shall be assigned exclu-
sively to Employees covered by this Agreement and shall not
be reassigned or transferred to non-bargaining unit employees
in other facilities or operations owned, managed, or controlled
by the Employer or is subsidiaries. All work was described in
the articles of this Agreement (including Responsibilities and
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1056
Duties, General Seamanship, and other parts of Tankerman’s
Handbook-Crowley Maritime Corporation, Third Edition5),
Oakland, CA, dated January 1991.

Article 2 of the agreement, entitled “SCOPE AND
GEOGRAPHICAL JURISDICTION OF AGREEMENT,”
provides:

All employees covered by the Agreement shall load and/or
discharge Harbor Tug and Barge Company barges operating
in Northern California, south to and including Morro Bay;
north to Coos Bay and split discharges involving the Coos
Bay Oregon Ports of Call and Columbia River area.

Article 38 of the agreement, entitled “FAVORED NATIONS
CLAUSE,” provides:

A. If the National, the San Francisco Region, or an
autonomous region of the Inlandboatmen’s Union of the
Pacific/International Longshoremen’s and Warehouse-
men’s Union hereafter enters into any contract with any
other company regularly operating or competing for busi-
ness within the geographical scope of this Agreement and
said contract is more favorable to that employer in total
IBU labor operating costs than this Agreement, and that
company uses or intends to use said contract to compete
directly against Crowley Marine Services, Inc. (formerly
Harbor Tug and Barge Company), the Union and the Em-
ployer will meet promptly to draft an amendment to equal-
ize the total IBU labor operating costs for the work in
question for the period during which the competition takes
advantage of its contract. In the event the parties cannot
reach agreement, within five (5) working days, either party
may submit the issues to the arbitrator under Article 6. The
arbitrator will schedule a hearing within five (5) days from
the date of the notice of arbitration and will issue a deci-
sion within 48 hours to determine which provisions will be
used to equalize labor cost.
B. Crowley Marine Services, Inc . . . agrees that for the
life of this Agreement [it] will not be able [to be] a partici-
pant in or contribute any assets, equipment under their
control, nor employees to any company, partnership, or
joint venture which intends or is tended to compete with or
replace the tug, barge and towing services which are pres-
ently offered or have been offered in the past by Crowley
Marine Services, Inc . . . or which would have the effect of
reducing the amount of work available to the Bargaining
Unit [sic].
C. The Union will provide the employer with a com-
plete copy of all Labor Agreements and Letters of Under-
standing that it has entered into with other employers upon
request and any subsequent Labor Agreements or Letters
of Understanding within five (5) calendar days of their
signing.

Respondent discussed the Tracy grievance with the Union on
July 15. On August 21, Respondent, by Baldwin, sent the Un-
ion a written response, asserting it did not shift the work for-
merly performed by the 450-6 barge to the newly purchased
tanker operated by CPTI. Tosco terminated the barge lease and
would not continue to use a barge “regardless of CPTI’s pur-
chase of oil tankers.” The letter also claimed CPTI is not in
competition with and is not replacing CMS’s barge services and

5 This handbook was not placed in evidence.
is not reducing the work available to San Francisco based
tankermen. The letter informed the Union the oil tankers had
been purchased by Crowley Petroleum Transporting, Inc.6 The
450-6 barge was reassigned to another service operated by
Alaska Oil services in Alaska. Respondent, in mid-July, trans-
ferred Barge 102 on the West Coast, and it operated between
Seattle and Portland and is available to work in other West
Coast ports. Baldwin asserted Respondent was not shrinking its
barge operations, rather, its was following historic practice of
reassigning barges. There is no evidence Barge 102 operated
within the Charging Party’s geographical jurisdiction. Respon-
dent denied violating either article 1 or 38 of the collective-
bargaining agreement when it laid off Tracy because the layoff
was the “result of normal business changes.”
Respondent denied the grievances at a meeting held August
8, claiming they were untimely. During this meeting, Baldwin
informed the Union CPTI was performing the transportation
services previously performed by the 450-6 barge. In a letter to
the Union dated August 21, from Baldwin, Respondent specifi-
cally denied the August 7 grievance because it was untimely
and the claim Respondent refused to engage in effects bargain-
ing is without merit because:

CPTI is in a separate company and in a substantially
different type of business than the barge transportation en-
gaged by CMS. CPTI is a deep-sea company utilizing oil
tankers. They are separate business competing for differ-
ent markets and thus CPTI does not displace, reduce or
have any effect on the bargaining unit work applicable to
the San Francisco-based tankermen.

In another letter to the Union dated August 29, Respondent
denied the Tracy grievance asserting “CMS did not shift the
work that was formerly performed by Barge 450-6 to one of the
new oil tankers that a separate company . . . (CPTI) purchased
from TOSCO. . . . It is our understanding that TOSCO, in light
of its new needs, decided that Barge 450-6 was not suitable.
Thus CMS was not going to be able to continue to use the 450-
6 to perform TOSCO’s work regardless of CPTI’s purchase of
oil tankers.” Respondent also asserted another barge, Barge
102, was transferred to the West Coast operation in mid-July
thus CMS was not reducing its barge operations, which were
always variable, as illustrated by the lapse of the time-charter
and the reassignment of the 450-6 barge.
By letter dated November 21, the Union requested the “IBU
grievance” be taken to arbitration to ascertain if Respondent
violated the collective-bargaining agreement. At the time of this
request, Respondent had already denied the grievances as un-
timely. The contract requires a grievance be filed within 20
days of the event giving rise to the grievance, which Respon-
dent claims is July 1. The Union asserts the contract violation
may be continuing since the Coast Range continues to operate
at the Tosco Avon facility. The letter also claims:

Your position has been that the grievance was un-
timely. As I have pointed out to you, the Company has not
been forth coming with information on this issue. In fact,
the Company did not come to us and inform us they would
6 The Union never requested Baldwin to provide information con-
cerning which Crowley Ccompany purchased the Coast Range. The
Union believed the SIU arbitration award would reveal that informa-
tion. Secchitano explained at hearing that the Union was investigating
to determine whether to pursue arbitration.
CROWLEY MARINE SERVICES 1057
be doing this.7 I have tried to get more information from
you on occasion and you have indicated “you do not
know.” How can the Union be expected “to know” infor-
mation regarding the purchase of the tankers and what the
Company intended to do with the tankers when you, Man-
ager of Labor Relations, don’t even know.
Please provide me with a copy of the arbitration with
the SIU that deals with the crewing of these ships at you
[sic] earliest convenience.

At the time Secchitano sent this letter, the Union knew the
SIU represented the unlicensed crew aboard the Coast Range.
The Union never considered making any claim for the work
performed by the licensed crew of the Coast Range. Secchitano
admitted the Union’s concern was not who was crewing the
Coast Range, rather, was the Coast Range was doing some of
the work previously done by tankermen; work the Union be-
lieved tankermen should still be performing. Secchitano also
admitted the collective-bargaining agreement with Respondent
covers loading the 450-6 barge but not tankers.
Baldwin responded to the union letter on December 10, as-
serting the Union’s November 21 letter does not specifically
identify a grievance, he assumed it related to the Union’s Au-
gust 7 grievance and the Tracy grievance. Baldwin asserted
both grievances had previously been found to be untimely and
without merit. Baldwin acknowledged the Union on September
18 asked for an extension of time to file an appeal, which he
was unwilling to grant. According to Baldwin: “By waiting
until November 21, 1997 to request arbitration, the IBU has
waived its right to proceed to arbitration. Article 6(b) has spe-
cific time limits which must be complied with.”
Concerning the requested information, Baldwin claimed in
his letter:

Your letter also requests that I provide you with a copy of an
arbitration decision involving the SIU which involves the
crewing on the tankers in question. I am at a loss to under-
stand the relevance of such a request. The crewing of such
blue water vessels would not be of any particular concern to a
union representing barge tankermen. I have a suspicion that
the request is really on behalf of the SUP[8] which I have been
told and I believe you know has filed an unfair labor practice
charge on the crewing issue which was dismissed by the
NLRB. If I am wrong in my suspicion, I apologize, but, in
any event, you need to explain to me why an arbitration deci-
sion on the crewing of a vessel on which the IBU has no rec-
ognition or other claim could possibly be relevant to the IBU.

As previously mentioned, the Union learned of the SIU arbi-
tration from its national office, which was informed of the
award by one of Respondent’s unnamed representatives. Ac-
cording the Union’s regional director, Marina Secchitano, the
Union requested a copy of the SIU arbitration because:

Well, because our understanding of the situation is
that, the response the company gave to us was that the rea-

7 Respondent admitted at hearing it did not inform the Union the
time lease of the 450-6 barge was not going to be renewed or that a new
affiliate was formed to purchase two tankers from Tosco which would
commence transporting the products previously handled by the 450-6
Barge operation of CMS. Thus, there is a question of whether the con-
tractual time period for filing grievances had been tolled.
8 The SUP previously represented the unlicensed crew of the Coast
Range.
son we don’t have, you know, we didn’t get that work or
they didn’t talk to us was that it was a different kind of op-
eration and that it wasn’t related to what we were doing, it
wasn’t replacing the services that we had been doing.
And when we found out that there was an arbitration,
and we heard that there was an arbitration that, you know,
assigned this work to someone else, we felt that it was
completely relevant because, you know, as much as we
know about that company that supposedly—we don’t
know what company the arbitration award is from. I guess
we would like to know that because we think the language
in our agreement provides us remedy in this situation.
And if we had that agreement, we could see where
they’re basing the fact that it’s not related to our work.
For example, if in fact the company were to say that it was
definitely related to, say, a tug and barge contract they
have with another organization, then we’d like, you know,
if they assigned that work to that union who has the tug
and barge workers, then we think we have a legitimate
complaint.
And we think we have a legitimate complaint, but in
order to prepare for our arbitration, we’d like to know ex-
actly what took place and how that work got assigned to
that other group.

The Union believed the SIU arbitration award related to the
tug and barge movement of the Tosco Avon petroleum products
for it involved the movement of the same products by the Coast
Range, owned and operated by an affiliate of Respondent. The
Union also believed the SIU arbitration award contained infor-
mation that supports its contention the operation of the Coast
Range is a replacement for the services of the tugboat and barge
operation of Respondent. Inasmuch as Respondent denied the
grievances because of its claim the work is being performed by
another organization and the Union’s members did not do that
work, the Union was justified in determining who the work was
assigned to and why. The Union believes the SIU arbitration
award contains that information.

Secchitano claims:

We have a contract that gives us the right to perform
certain work for this employer, and that work is related, in
this contract, to tug and barge movement of petroleum
products. And we have a section in our agreement that
was a bitter pill to swallow that—it’s two part. One, we
will not undercut this labor agreement with anyone else,
any other competing companies, and in exchange for that,
what we got is that the company agrees that they won’t put
us out of work by bringing someone in to do that work.
And the language itself says that—
What I would say is that the contract says that they
won’t replace the work that’s being performed, replace the
tug and barge and towing services. Tug and barge and
towing services are being performed, you know, by us
with some other company. They won’t use their assets,
they won’t participate in that.

Secchitano also asserted during her testimony the relevance
of the SIU arbitration award may extend beyond the crewing
issue “Because the Inland Boatmen’s union represents the peo-
ple on the tug, not my region, but my union, and the tug work-
ers are covered with the same language that we have in our
agreement for the tankermen. So it could extend beyond the
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1058
tankermen.” The collective-bargaining agreement between
Respondent and the Union is limited to barges. The Union has
not made any claim under the contract that it should represent
the unlicensed crew of the Coast Range. Secchitano testified
the Union’s charter allows it to represent the ships unlicensed
crew. Secchitano also testified the SIU arbitration award may
have relevance in determining whether the Union should make
a demand for recognition to represent the unlicensed crew of
the Coast Range.
The Union responded to Baldwin’s letter on February 13,
1998, 4 days after filing the unfair labor practice charge here
under consideration. The Union explained the reason for the
SIU arbitration request as follows:

It has come to our attention that the Company was claiming
the work was given to the SIU as a result of an arbitration. I
would like to know what contract the grievance that led to ar-
bitration was filed under, whether it was the tug and barge op-
eration or the ship operation that claims were made under. It is
important to determine whether the Company provided the in-
formation to another Union that should have been provided to
us. If so, under what circumstances was this information pro-
vided that led the Union to believe a contract violation oc-
curred. As you know, we were not given information in ad-
vance of the transfer of equipment, and the Company is
claiming that the tug and barge operation was not replaced by
the tanker operation.

The Union also sought information to determine the level of
work occurring in the San Francisco Bay area. This request for
information is not encompassed in the instant proceeding.
In another letter dated February 13, 1998, the Union ex-
plained the relevance of the request, including the information
concerning the level of work in the San Francisco Bay area: “In
order to determine whether we have any legitimate complaints,
we require you provide us the information requested.” In his
reply to this letter, dated March 10, 1998, Baldwin notes the
February 13 letter was mailed 3 days after the Union filed a
charge with the Board, so the charge was filed prior to provid-
ing the Respondent with its reason or reasons for asserting the
requested information was relevant. Baldwin remarked he was
still unclear why the SIU arbitration decision was relevant in-
asmuch as the IBU “has no recognition or other claim” con-
cerning the crewing of the oil tanker. Baldwin also asserts the
oil tanker service provided by CPTI is a different type of opera-
tion performed by a company “completely separate from”
CMS.
March 10, 1998, was the last correspondence and communi-
cation between the Union and Respondent concerning the SIU
arbitration award. At the time Respondent and the Union dis-
cussed the grievances, the Union was not informed the com-
pany that purchased the tankers was a subsidiary of Crowley
Towing and Transportation. Secchitano learned the identity of
the purchaser after the grievances were filed. It is the Union’s
position that if it had learned of the tanker purchase and plan to
eliminate the operations of the 450-6 barge prior to July 1, it
could have possibly made a claim for the crewing of the Coast
Range, even though its collective-bargaining agreement limits
its jurisdiction to barge operations. It is undisputed since July 1,
tankermen continue to be laid off from time to time by Respon-
dent, which has been a historical pattern, but it is the Union’s
position that less tankermen are currently working.
Baldwin asserts he still does not know why the Union
wanted to see the SIU arbitration award. Baldwin does not have
any responsibility for the tanker operation. These responsible
individuals, according to Baldwin, were Rick Mariner and
Norman George. Baldwin did not speak to either of these gen-
tlemen about the arbitration award. George testified he was
made aware of the transfer date of the vessels, which was
March 31. CPTI acquired the vessels on April 24. On June 24,
the Coast Range was time-chartered to Tosco for 3 years.
George was not involved in the SIU arbitration and did not
indicate he was knowledgeable about the award.
Baldwin and George testified the Coast Range could carry
more product than the 450-6 barge, with the Coast Range being
able to carry about two and one-half times that of the barge.
The tanker also has a faster steaming time and turn around time
so it can move more product in a given amount of time than a
single barge. The Coast Range is fitted with a vapor recovery
system and inert gas system,9 which are required by various
regulations in San Francisco and Los Angeles. The Coast
Range can segregate up to 10 grades of cargo and has the abil-
ity to carry clean and crude or black cargoes at the same time.
Respondent also claimed the tanker crew remains with the ship
while it is steaming and has Coast Guard certifications that are
different from the certifications held by tankermen.
While George detailed the virtues of the Coast Range, he did
not demonstrate possessing first hand knowledge of the capa-
bilities of the 450-6 barge and did not claim to have expertise in
barge operations. For example, Respondent failed to give the
steaming times of the barge compared to the tanker, the number
of various products the barge could carry, the number of prod-
ucts Tosco shipped per barge versus the tanker, or the actual
turn around times. George claimed: “It can be a considerably
more complicated operation, depending, of course, on what
cargoes you’re handling, but for the most part just because of
the nature of the fitted equipment on the vessel, on the tanker,
as opposed to the barge. It’s a more complicated piece of
equipment.”
Respondent’s witnesses admitted they did not know what
certifications from the Coast Guard the tankermen employed by
Respondent to load and unload the barge held. There was no
evidence concerning their ability to operate the ship cleaning,
vapor recovery, and inert gas systems. There was no evidence
adduced concerning the products transported by the barge com-
pared to those handled by the tanker and no demonstration the
type of cargoes handled by both vessels, whether the same of
different, made the operation of the vessel more complicated
than the loading of the barge. Respondent admitted having two
unions currently on the Coast Range. The number of union’s
representing its employees in the operations of its tankers was
not claimed to be outcome determinative to any of Respon-
dent’s decisions.
Respondent did not present convincing evidence the barge
did not possess inert gas or vapor recovery systems. George
surmised it did not, but there were no predicates presented for
this surmise. In fact, his engaging in such surmise works to
impede his credibility. George’s mien was such he appeared to

9 George described the inert gas system as:
Inert gas system is a system to produce inert gas to be supplied to the
cargo tank so that the unfilled part of a cargo tank, what’s referred to
as the vapor space, is inserted and has oxygen level less than five per-
cent so it is rendered, theoretically at least, explosion proof and fire-
proof. For the most part it is.
CROWLEY MARINE SERVICES 1059
be attempting to tailor his testimony in a light most favorable to
Respondent’s position rather than attempting to candidly de-
velop the record. In addition to engaging in surmise, he volun-
teered information; such as tankermen have a different coast
guard rating than its SIU tanker crews. When questioned he
admitted he did not know what Coast Guard endorsements the
tankermen involved in this proceeding held. Baldwin also
claimed the tanker was more versatile, but admitted the cargo
consist was up to the charterer and he did not know what deci-
sions Tosco made and accordingly, he did not know how, if at
all, such decisions effected operations. Baldwin and George did
not demonstrate first hand knowledge of the barge operation or
Tosco’s decisions. Baldwin at times failed to answer questions
on cross-examination and he appeared to engage in hyperbole.
Thus, their testimony will be credited only when credibly cor-
roborated or is an admission against Respondent’s interests.
Positions of the Parties
The General Counsel contends the requested arbitration
award concerning the SIU crewing the Coast Range is relevant
and is useful to the Union in meeting its statutory duties and
responsibilities as the employees collective-bargaining repre-
sentative. Associated General Contractors of California, 242
NLRB 891, 893 (1979), enfd. 633 F.2d 766 (9th Cir. 1980).
The General Counsel avers the Union met its obligation of
demonstrating a reasonable belief supported by objective evi-
dence for the requested information. Shoppers Food Ware-
house, 315 NLRB 258, 259 (1994). The merits of the Union’s
claim the contract has been violated is not relevant. Id.
This burden has been met, according to the General Counsel,
because when the Union learned in July Respondent purchased
the Coast Range and was using the vessel to transport petro-
leum products from Tosco’s Avon facility to the Los Angeles
area, work previously performed by the 450-6 barge, Tracy and
the Union filed grievances. At the same time Tracy was laid off
by Respondent. The Union learned the SIU was given the work
on the Coast Range pursuant to an arbitration award. According
to the General Counsel, the applicable collective-bargaining
agreement “prohibits Respondent from transferring or reassign-
ing unit work to non-unit employees in other facilities or opera-
tions owned, managed, or controlled by Respondent or its sub-
sidiaries.” Moreover, the General Counsel claims, article 38 of
the collective-bargaining agreement prohibits Respondent from
participating in or contributing equipment to any entity in com-
petition with it.
Therefore, the General Counsel avers, the Union “clearly had
a reasonable and objective basis for believing that the collective
bargaining agreement was being violated.” Accordingly, it
reasonably attempted to determine how the crewing on the
Coast Range was awarded to the SIU. That Respondent admit-
tedly gave the Union no notice of the termination of the opera-
tion of the 450-6 barge whose operation was replaced with the
Coast Range gave rise to a reasonable objective basis for the
information request. The General Counsel also argues the time-
liness of the grievances is not relevant, analogizing this case to
those situations where the Board finds the unfair labor practices
are recurring, and each recurrence is a separate and distinct
violation. Citing Beckley Belt Services Co., 279 NLRB 512
(1980); Farmingdale Iron Works, 249 NLRB 98 (1980), enfd.
mem. 661 F.2d 910 (2d Cir. 1981). That a grievance is no
longer pending does not exculpate an unfair labor practice and
the grievance was pending at the time Respondent was re-
quested to supply the information. Beverly California Corp.,
326 NLRB 153 (1998). The General Counsel also asserts the
issue of timeliness is for the arbitrator to decide.
Respondent contends the relevance of the requested informa-
tion was not established and there can be no valid grievance
because the grievances were untimely. Black Diamond Coal
Co., 298 NLRB 775 (1990); M. J. Santulli Mail Service, 281
NLRB 1288 (1986); Chambersburg County Market, 293 NLRB
654 (1989); Fountain Valley Regional Hospital, 297 NLRB 549
(1991); Leach Corp, 312 NLRB 990 (1993), affd. 54 F.3d 802
(D.C. Cir. 1995); Las Vegas Sands, 324 NLRB 1101, 1110
(1997); and California Portland Cement, 283 NLRB 1103,
1105–1106 (1987). Respondent admitted grievances are not the
only manner in which the Union can seek contract enforcement
it argues would by barred by Section 10(b) of the Act. I find the
10(b) argument unpersuasive, inasmuch as the charge was filed
within 6 months of the request for information and Respon-
dent’s continuing refusal to provide that information. Farming-
dale Iron Works, Inc., and Beckley Belt Services Co., supra.
Respondent claims the collective-bargaining agreement with
the Union does not cover the work of the tanker, it is limited to
barge operations. Respondent does not claim the requested
information is confidential or a trade secret, merely that they do
not supply information that is not shown to be relevant.
Respondent avers Tosco made the decision to terminate the
barge operation; however there was no official shown to have
directly communicated with a Tosco representative supporting
this claim. No Tosco representative testified. Respondent ar-
gues the initial request for information did not demonstrate its
relevance and the subsequent explanation for the request also
did not meet the Union’s burden of pointing to objective facts
that demonstrate the specific relevance of the information to the
grievances. An arbitration award to another union is not pre-
sumptively relevant. The crewing of a tanker, which is work the
Union has not claimed, also is demonstrative of the lack of
relevance of the requested information. The Union knew which
union was crewing the tanker prior to making its demand. The
collective-bargaining agreement between the Union and Re-
spondent is limited to barges, thus any other information in the
arbitration award sought by the Union has not been shown by
any objective evidence to be relevant to any union claim the
work should have been awarded to its members. All the Union
has demonstrated is “complete speculation,” which is not ade-
quate to demonstrate relevance.
According to Respondent, at best, the request is a fishing ex-
pedition designed to determine if the language in a rival union’s
collective-bargaining agreement might permit the Charging
Party to make recognition demands to crew deep-sea vessels.
Such an end does not constitute demonstrating the relevance of
the requested information. The collective-bargaining agreement
limits the Union’s jurisdiction to “employees . . . load[ing]
and/or discharg[ing] Harbor Tug and Barge Company barges
operating in Northern California.” The Union’s request for the
SIU arbitration award involves a different union and employer
and does not meet the standard of relevance required by the
Act. San Diego Newspaper Guild v. NLRB, 548 F.2d 863 (9th
Cir. 1977); and F. A. Bartlett Tree Expert Co., 316 NLRB
1312, 1313 (1995).
According to Respondent, the Union failed to clearly com-
municate a relevant objective to Respondent. Rice Growers
Assn., 312 NLRB 837 (1993). The Union also failed to com-
municate to the Respondent a specific factual and objective
basis for its information request at the time of the request. Hertz
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1060
Corp. v. NLRB, 105 F.3d 868, 872–873 (3d Cir. 1997); NLRB v.
George Koch Sons, Inc., 950 F.2d 1324 (7th Cir. 1991); Gen-
eral Electrical Co. v. NLRB, 916 F.2d 1163 (7th Cir. 1990); and
California Portland Cement, supra at 1106. The reasons prof-
fered at the time of the request by the union were not logically
or rationally related to the information requested. Detroit Edi-
son Co., 314 NLRB 1273 (1994); Uniontown County Market,
326 NLRB 1069 (1998). The Union failed in meeting its burden
of showing a reasonable objective basis for the request, it failed
to establish the relevance of the request.
Analysis and Conclusions
It is a violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1)10 of the Act for an
employer to “refuse to bargain collectively with the representa-
tive of [its] employees.” An employer’s duty to bargain in good
faith includes the duty “to provide information needed by the
bargaining representative for the proper performance of its
duties,” including information relevant to contract administra-
tion, negotiations, and grievance proceedings. NLRB v. Acme
Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432, 435–437 (1967). Accord: Detroit
Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301, 303 (1979). Failures to
fulfill the obligation to furnish relevant information upon re-
quest “conflict with the statutory policy to facilitate effective
collective bargaining.” Procter & Gamble Co. v. NLRB, 603
F.2d 1310, 1015 (8th Cir. 1979).
The duty to furnish information turns on “the circumstances
of the particular case.” NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149
153 (1956). The key question in determining whether informa-
tion must be produced is “one of relevance.” Emeryville Re-
search Center v. NLRB, 441 F.2d 880, 883 (9th Cir. 1971).
Information is relevant if it is germane and “has any bearing on
the subject matter of the case.” Detroit Newspaper Printing &
Graphic Communications Union v. NLRB, 598 F.2d 267, 271
(D.C. Cir. 1979). In determining if the requested information is
relevant, the Board need only find a “probability that the de-
sired information [is] relevant, and that it would be of use to the
union in carrying out its statutory duties and responsibilities.”
NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co., supra at 437. Accord: Oil Work-
ers Local 6-418 v. NLRB, 711 F.2d 348, 359 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
The standard for determining whether particular information
is relevant to the Union’s bargaining responsibilities is a liberal
“discovery-type standard” of relevance. NLRB v. Acme Indus-
trial Co., supra, 385 U.S. at 437 (citing 4 Moore, Federal Prac-
tice, Section 26.16(1), 1175–1176, 1181 (2d ed.) (“the standard
for determining relevancy at a discovery examination is not as
well defined as at the trial . . . . [C]ourts of necessity must fol-
low a more liberal standard”). “A broad disclosure rule is cru-
cial to full development of the role of collective bargaining
under the Act” because, “[u]nless each side has access to in-
formation enabling it to discuss intelligently and deal meaning-
fully with bargainable issues, effective negotiation cannot oc-
cur.” Detroit Newspaper Printing & Graphic Communications
Union, supra at 271. See also General Electric Co. v. NLRB,
466 F.2d 1177, 1183 (6th Cir. 1972).
Certain information is considered “so intrinsic to the core of
the employer-employee relationship as to be presumptively
relevant.” Electrical Workers v. NLRB, 648 F.2d 18, 24 (D.C.
Cir. 1980). See also Equitable Gas Co. v. NLRB, 637 F.2d 980,
993 (3d Cir. 1981) (“information directly relevant to mandatory
subjects of bargaining is ‘presumptively relevant,’ and must
therefore be disclosed unless it is plainly irrelevant”).

10 See Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693 (1983).
When the requested information concerns persons not repre-
sented by the union, however, there is no such presumption and
the union has the burden of establishing that the information is
necessary to the performance of its representational responsi-
bilities.” NLRB v. Postal Service, 18 F.3d 1089, 1101 (3d Cir.
1994) (citing Ohio Power Co., 216 NLRB 987, 991 (1975),
enfd. 531 F.2d 1381 (6th Cir 1978)). This burden is not a heavy
one. It requires only that a union show a “probability that the
desired information is relevant, and that it would be of use to
the union in carrying out its statutory duties and responsibili-
ties.” NLRB v. Acme Industries Co., supra at 437. See also New
Jersey Bell Telephone Co., 936 F.2d at 150 (citing Transport of
New Jersey, 233 NLRB 694 (1977) “it is sufficient that the
union’s request for information be supported by a showing of
‘probable’ or ‘potential’ relevance”)).
In making this showing, a union is not required to demon-
strate the facts it relied on to support its information request are
accurate or reliable but only that it had a reasonable basis to
suspect that the employer was in breach of the collective-
bargaining agreement and, therefore it requested information to
confirm its suspicions and make an informed choice about per-
forming representational duties. NLRB v. George Koch Sons,
950 F.2d 1324, 1332, 1334 (7th Cir. 1991); and Washington
Materials Inc. v. NLRB, 803 F.2d 1333, 1339 (4th Cir. 1986).
The Union may reasonably rely on the observations of union
officials or reports from employees. NLRB v. Associated Gen-
eral Contractors, 633 F.2d 766, 771–772 (9th Cir. 1980); Wal-
ter N. Yoder & Sons, Inc. v. NLRB, 754 F.2d 531, 534 (4th Cir.
1985) (reports by union members that employer was inter-
changing employees and work with a nonunion business is
sufficient to require disclosure). NLRB v. Leonard B. Herbert
Jr. & Co., 696 F.2d 1120, 1123–1126 (5th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied 464 U.S. 817 (1983).
Here the information sought is not presumptively relevant
because it does not relate directly to the terms and conditions of
employment of the employees represented by the Union. I find,
in this case, the Union has met its burden of establishing the
potential relevance of the requested information under the lib-
eral discovery standard applied in these cases. Respondent’s
own comments led the Union to reasonably believe the SIU
arbitration award contained information that would indicate if it
should pursue its belief that articles 1, 2, and 38 of the collec-
tive-bargaining agreement had been violated by Respondent
when it terminated the barge operation and handled the busi-
ness with the tanker staffed by SIU members. Prior to Respon-
dent’s acquisition of the Coast Range, the unlicensed deck crew
was represented by the Sailors Union of the Pacific. One of
Respondent’s representatives informed the Union’s national
president the award to the SIU was pursuant to an arbitration.
Also there is a question of whether Respondent violated any
duty to engage in effects bargaining.
The Respondent did not inform the Union of the pending
change in operation, rather, the Union learned of the termina-
tion of the operation of the 450-6 barge from the Tracy griev-
ance, dated July 15, more than 2 weeks after the commence-
ment of operations of the Coast Range in lieu of the 450-6
barge. Respondent admits CPTI is an affiliate of one of its af-
filiates, Crowley Towing and Transportation. Respondent’s
declaration, by Baldwin, that an affiliate with towing in its
company name had an affiliate that purchased tankers which
were performing the transportation of the products previously
transported by the 450-6 barge, could reasonably raise the ques-
CROWLEY MARINE SERVICES 1061
tion the SIU arbitration award contained information relevant to
contract enforcement. Moreover, the parties were negotiating a
new agreement, and the manner in which the SIU was awarded
the work in the arbitration may have relevance to the Union’s
wanting to retain or modifying paragraphs 1, 2, and 38 in the
new agreement.
Baldwin claimed “CPTI is a separate company and in a sub-
stantially different type of business than the barge transporta-
tion engaged by CMS.” Baldwin also asserted in a letter to the
Union: “CMS did not shift the work that was formerly per-
formed by Barge 450-6 to one of the new oil tankers that a
separate company . . . (CPTI) purchased from TOSCO.” The
Union explained to Respondent, in pursuit of information to
determine if the collective-bargaining agreement had been vio-
lated, it had “tried to get more information from you [Baldwin]
on occasion and you have indicated ‘you do not know’. How
can the Union be expected ‘to know’ information regarding the
purchase of the tankers and what the Company intended to do
with the tankers when you, Manager of Labor Relation, don’t
even know.” It was in this missive the Union asked Respondent
to provide a copy of the SIU arbitration award “that deals with
the crewing of these ships at your earliest convenience.” Re-
spondent does not deny the Unions understanding the SIU arbi-
tration award deals with the crewing of the Coast Range. Re-
spondent argues the crewing of its other ship, which may also
be included in the SIU arbitration award, is not relevant to the
Union. Respondent did not offer the SIU arbitration award with
materials relating to the operation of the second tanker ex-
punged.
The Union’s request was based on more than naked suspi-
cion, a representative of Respondent informed the Union’s
national president of the SIU arbitration award which led to the
replacement of the existing unlicensed crews representative.
The Union knew Respondent had an affiliate that owned and
operated the tanker that replaced the barge and was claiming it
was not a replacement because it was not a barge. The Union
knew Respondent did not inform it of the change in operations
and the details of the purchase. The Union also knew its mem-
bers were no longer loading barges at Tosco’s Avon facility
and one or more had been laid off by Respondent. These factors
form an objective factual basis justifying a reasonable suspicion
the SIU arbitration award was relevant to its representational
obligations including determination of whether to seek contract
enforcement through grievances or other means. Respondent
also knew the Union was claiming, by the grievances, that sev-
eral articles of the collective-bargaining agreement had been
breached and had requested arbitration of the matter. While
Respondent asserts the grievances were untimely, the question
may be considered by the arbitrator. Thus, I find the Union’s
request was made in good faith and in furtherance of its repre-
sentational responsibilities and duties.
Even if it is determined the grievances were not timely and
there were no justifiable grievances, the Union is not required,
“in order to establish entitlement to see the disputed document,
to have actually filed a contractual grievance or lawsuit.” It is
to enable the Union to make an informed judgement about pur-
suing such remedies that it seeks and needs to see the requested
information. Uniontown County Market, supra, 326 NLRB
1069. Respondent’s claim the Union has ulterior motivations
for requiring the SIU arbitration award is entirely speculative
and not supported by any probative evidence. The information
sought has the requisite probability of relevance in assisting the
Union in fulfilling its statutory duties and responsibilities as the
employees’ exclusive collective-bargaining representative un-
der a present collective-bargaining agreement which is cur-
rently being renegotiated. The information sought has the po-
tential of being relevant to the Union’s performance of its du-
ties to administer and police the collective-bargaining agree-
ment and/or negotiate a new collective-bargaining agreement.
Respondent clearly knew the Union’s members were no
longer working at Tosco, that it moved the 450-6 barge to
Alaska, which is not within the Union’s geographical jurisdic-
tion, and the barge it moved to the West Coast was not operat-
ing in the San Francisco Bay area. Respondent also knew the
new tanker company was an affiliate of an affiliate. Respon-
dent also knew the Union was seeking a copy of the SIU arbi-
tration award to access the change of operation intelligently to
assist in the effective determination of whether and how to
proceed in contract administration and contract negotiations.
The Union is entitled to equal access to the information Re-
spondent claims refutes its claim there may have been a con-
tract violation. Respondent knew the potential of the work
preservation provisions of the collective-bargaining agreement.
That Respondent may interpret these provisions differently
than the Union, does not relieve it of the responsibility to pro-
vide the requested arbitration award, which one of its own rep-
resentatives, the Union understood, without refutation, related
was the basis for the award of the work to the SIU. Respondent
made no claim the SIU arbitration award would not be of assis-
tance. Respondent’s witnesses testified they did not know what
the SIU arbitration award contained, therefore, there was no
predicate for Respondent’s representatives to determine the
representations by another of its agents to the Union’s national
president were incorrect or that the reasons advanced by the
Union were insufficient to establish relevance. The Union is
not required to show the information triggering its request was
accurate or ultimately reliable; a union’s request for informa-
tion may be based on heresay. Magnet Coal, 307 NLRB 444
fn. 3 (1992). The Union is not required to accept Baldwin’s
representation that the new company was a totally separate
operation and not an affiliate or towing company within the
meaning of the contract. Shoppers Food Warehouse Corp.,
supra, 315 NLRB 258.
Baldwin admitted he would have supplied the Union with
some of the information it believed was contained in the SIU
arbitration award, including the name of the affiliate operating
the Coast Range. Respondent confirmed an affiliate was in fact
operating at Tosco’s Avon facility in lieu of the 450-6 barge.
The Union believed such an operation may be in violation of
articles 1, 2, and 38 of the collective-bargaining agreement. The
Union also hoped to determine if the collective-bargaining
agreement the SIU was claiming the work under included tug
and barge operations, which could arguably be encompassed
within its contractual jurisdictional limits. The duty to provide
information includes information relevant to contract admini-
stration and negotiations. Barnard Engineering Co., 282 NLRB
617, 619 (1987); Leland Stanford Junior University, 262 NLRB
136, 139 (1982), enfd. 715 F.2d 473 (9th Cir. 1983). The Un-
ion’s initial information request and subsequent letter explained
these predicates to Respondent.
As revealed at the hearing, the Union also was considering
whether to make a claim for the work. The Union’s November
21 letter indicates it tried to get the information from Respon-
dent on previous occasions without success. That the informa-
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1062
tion may be later used for subsequent work demands does not
make it irrelevant to the union’s contract administration duties.
NLRB v. Associated Contractors of California, supra, 242
NLRB 891, 893, enfd. 633 F.2d 766 (9th Cir. 1980). Regard-
less of the eventual merits of the Union’s claim of contract
violation with the result its bargaining unit was unlawfully
reduced, the Union is entitled to the requested information un-
der the “discovery-type” standard established in NLRB v. Acme
Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432, 437 (1967). Potential or probable
relevance in sufficient to meet this standard. Children’s Hospi-
tal of San Francisco, 312 NLRB 622, 625 (1993); and Pfizer,
Inc., 268 NLRB 916, 918 (1984), enfd. 763 F.2d 887 (7th Cir.
1985).
The Union, in its initial contacts with Respondent concerning
the operation of the Coast Range, consistently claimed contract
enforcement as the nexus for its actions, including the informa-
tion request. At the time it made the request for the SIU arbitra-
tion award, the Union made clear this action was a continuance
of its claim there may be a violation of the collective-
bargaining agreement, which could require arbitration or other
enforcement action. Respondent continually failed to provide
the sought information, as indicated in the Union’s November
21 letter.
The Union is entitled to judge for itself, based on the reasons
for awarding the work to the SIU, whether to press its claim in
grievance procedure, through the Board, or in the courts. Dis-
coverable information need only appear “reasonably calculated
to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Fed.R.Civ.P.
26(b)(1). The Board does not evaluate the merits of the Un-
ion’s claim of contract breach in deciding whether the re-
quested information is relevant. Island Creek Coal Co., 292
NLRB 480, 487 (1989), enfd. mem. 899 F.2d 1222 (6th Cir.
1990). For the previously stated reasons, the Union has shown
an objective basis for its suspicions. Knappron Maritime
Corp., 292 NLRB 236, 238–239 (1988). See also Postal Ser-
vice, 310 NLRB 391 (1993).
In sum, I find the Union communicated to Respondent the
information was reasonably relevant to policing a current col-
lective-bargaining agreement and may have relevance to the
negotiations of a new agreement, under the liberal discovery-
type standard applicable in these cases, based on objective fac-
tors, including statements of Respondent’s own personnel, the
cessation of operations of the 450-6 barge, the layoff or its
members; and Respondent’s admission of affiliation with the
owner of the Coast Range. The Union demonstrated it had a
reasonable basis to suspect Respondent was diverting bargain-
ing unit work to an affiliate and the details of such diversion,
which Baldwin told the Union he did not know, were contained
in the SIU arbitration award.
Another factor raising concern of violation of the collective-
bargaining agreement was the failure of Respondent to notify
the Union prior to the termination of operation at Tosco’s Avon
facility of the 450-6 barge and the use, in lieu thereof, of an
affiliate’s tanker. This lack of timely notice may be construed
by an arbitrator as relieving the Union from the 20-day filing of
grievances requirement of the collective-bargaining agreement.
See, generally, Kansas Education Assn., 275 NLRB 638, 639
(1985); American Distributing Co. v. NLRB, 715 F.2d 446 (9th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied 466 U.S. 958 (1958), enfg. 264 NLRB
1413 (1982). The failure to provide advance notice is another
objective fact that could have raised suspicion the contact was
being subverted. The Respondent knew from the grievances
filed as well as the Union’s communications that the Union
suspected the diversion of unit work was a violation of articles
1, 2, and 38 of the collective-bargaining agreement. NLRB v.
George Koch & Sons, supra, 950 F.2d 1324 (7th Cir. 1991). If
Respondent did not possess a copy of the SIU arbitration
award, it could make reasonable efforts to obtain the informa-
tion from an affiliate in order to satisfy its bargaining obliga-
tion. Arch of West Virginia, 304 NLRB 1089 (1991). Assuming
arguendo, the grievances were not timely, Respondent over-
looks its own admission that the Union has other mechanisms
of policing the contract which are not claimed to be time barred
by the collective-bargaining agreement. There is no question
the charge was filed in this proceeding within the 10(b) period
and is timely. Section 10(b) of the Act does not constitute a bar
to the unfair labor practice allegation.
Respondent has failed to establish a persuasive reason for its
failure to provide the information. Respondent does not claim
the SIU arbitration award is confidential or contains trade se-
crets. There is no claim the Union has ever misused information
it received from Respondent. Respondent has not proposed any
practicable alternative to disclosure. Accordingly, I conclude,
for the above stated reasons, that Respondent failed to meet its
bargaining obligations and violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of
the Act by refusing to furnish the Union with a copy of its af-
filiates SIU arbitration award.
THE REMEDY
Having found Respondent has engaged in certain unfair la-
bor practice conduct in violation of Section 9(a)(5) and (1) of
the Act, I shall recommend that it be ordered to cease and desist
therefrom and to take certain affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Charging Party is a labor organization within the
meaning of section 2(5) of the Act.
3. The following employees of the Respondent constitute an
appropriate unit for the purposes of collective bargaining within
the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act:

All employees of Respondent engaged in the loading and/or
discharging of Harbor Tug and Barge Company barges oper-
ating in Northern California, south to and including Morro
Bay, north to Coos Bay and split discharges involving Coos
Bay Oregon Ports of Call and Columbia River Area; exclud-
ing all other employees, guards, and supervisors as defined in
the Act.

4. At all times material, the Union has been, and is now, the
exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the Respon-
dent’s employees in the above unit within the meaning of Sec-
tion 9(b) of the Act.
5. By refusing to provide a copy of the SIU arbitration award
to the Union on and after November 21, 1997, Respondent has
engaged in unfair labor practice conduct within the meaning of
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
6. The aforesaid unfair labor practice affects commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
CROWLEY MARINE SERVICES 1063
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended11
ORDER
The Respondent, Crowley Marine Services, Inc., San Fran-
cisco Bay area, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively with the Union by refus-
ing to furnish the Union with a copy of the SIU arbitration
award involving its affiliate Crowley Petroleum Transport, Inc.
(b) In any other like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative actions necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) On request, bargain collectively with the Union by fur-
nishing it with a copy of the SIU arbitration award, as sought
by the Union on and after November 21, 1997. Pursuant to the
Board’s decision in Excel Container, 325 NLRB 17 (1997), and
to require Respondent to provide the Union without any addi-
tional requests by the Union, all information requested by the
Union on and after November 21, 1997, concerning the SIU
arbitration award. People Care, Inc., 327 NLRB No. 144
(1999).
(b) Within 14 days after service by the Regional Director,
post at its San Francisco Bay area facilities, copies of the at-
tached notice marked “Appendix.”12 Copies of the notice, on
forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 32, after
being signed by the Respondent’s authorized representative,
shall be posted by the Respondent and maintained by it for 60
consecutive days thereafter in conspicuous places, including all
places were notices to employees are customarily posted. Rea-
sonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to ensure that the
notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by other material. In
the event that during the pendancy of these proceedings Re-
spondent has gone out of business or closed the facility in-
volved in these proceedings, Respondent shall duplicate and
mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current and

11 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.408 of the Rules, be
adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
12 If this Order is enforced by a Judgement of the United States court
of Appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a
Judgement of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of
the National Labor Relations Board.”
former employees employed by the Respondent at any time
since December 10, 1997.
(c) Within 21 days after service by the Regional Director,
file with the Regional Director a sworn certification of a re-
sponsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to
the steps that Respondent has taken to comply.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the
National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to post and abide
by this notice.

Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights.
To organize
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choice
To act together for other mutual aid or protection
To choose not to engage in any of these protected con-
certed activities.

Accordingly, we give you these assurances:
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with Inlandboat-
men’s Union of the Pacific, International Longshore & Ware-
house Union, AFL–CIO, in an appropriate bargaining unit, by
refusing to furnish the Union with a copy of the SIU arbitration
award involving our affiliate Crowley Petroleum Transport,
Inc., as requested by the Union, on and after November 21,
1997.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL, on request, furnish the Union with the above-
referenced information, as sought by it on and after November
21, 1997. Pursuant to the Board’s decision in Excel Container,
325 NLRB 17 (1997), and to require Respondent to provide the
Union without any additional requests by the Union, all infor-
mation requested by the Union on and after November 21,
1997, concerning the SIU arbitration award. People Care, Inc.,
327 NLRB 814 (1999).

CROWLEY MARINE SERVICES, INC.