Cresent Auto Supply Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Feb 16, 1979

240 N.L.R.B. 826 (N.L.R.B. 1979)

826 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Crestwood Auto Supply Company and Automotive,
Petroleum, and Allied Industries Employees Union,
Local 618, affiliated with International Brotherhood
of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and
Helpers of America. Cases 14-('A 10423 and 14
CA 10941
Februarv 16, 1979
DECISION AND ORDER
By Ml NMBIRS J NKINS. Mt RI'IY :N[i) TR[ S)AI I
On October 17, 1978, Administrative Law Judge
Frank H. Itkin issued the attached I)ecision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions
and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings.' and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to
adopt his recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re-
lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge and herehb
orders that the Respondent, Crestwood Auto Supply
Company, St. Louis Missouri, its officers. agents,
successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth
in the said recommended Order.
Respltidcnt has excep te d certain ct edihilit) finlHdings IIaIide h\ the
Administrative I.aw Judge. I1 is the Boalrd' c.stahlihhed polhc nlot to .er-
rule all Admini strati\e I.av. Judge's resolutiosi with respect to cicdlihili
unless Ihe clear preponderallce of a111 f Ihe i ele.allt eldencc CeOTiI I iices 1
that the resolutions are incorrect itindrd DrI li/ P'r, dudtl /n, 91
NlRB 544 (1950). cinfd. 188XX 2d 362 ( I (it 1951) We h'ive carefullk
examined the record and find nio hais fr re ersili his findlIII
DECISION
FRANK H IrKIN. Administrative Law Judge: The unfair
labor practice charges in the above-consolidated cases were
filed on June 16 and Novmeber 23. 1977. A consolidated
complaint issued on December 7, 1977. The cases were
heard in St. Louis, Missouri, on January 10 and 11, 1978.
General Counsel alleges that Respondent, Crestwood Auto
Supply Company, violated Section 8(a)(1) of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended, by interrogating em-
ployees concerning their union sympathies: by granting
240 NLRB No. 127
employees benefits, including new work schedules and
break periods, in order to discourage employee union ac-
tivities; and by offering to employees benefits, including
pension and medical insurance benefits, in order to dis-
courage employee union activities. General Counsel alleges
that Respondent Company violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1)
of the Act by refusing to furnish to Automotive, Petroleum,
and Allied Industries Employees Union, Local 618, affiliat-
ed with International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauf-
feurs. Warehousemen and Helpers of America, herein
called the Union certain payroll information, which infor-
mation was necesaary, relevant, and material to the
Union's administration of the collective-bargaining agree-
ment between Respondent and the Union, effective from
July 1., 1974, to June 30, 1977, and was also necessary,
relevant, and material to the Union's bargaining for a new
collective-bargaining agreement. General Counsel alleges
that Respondent Company further violated Section 8(a)(5)
and () of the Act by refusing to recognize and bargain
with the Union as the collective-bargaining representative
of its employees in an appropriate unit. In addition, Gener-
al Counsel alleges that the parties entered into a settlement
agreement in Case 14-CA-10423 on July 21, 1977, which
was approved by the Regional Director on October 8,
1977: that Respondent subsequently violated the terms of
the settlement agreement: and that, consequently, the Re-
gional Director has revoked his approval of and vacated
the settlement agreement. Respondent. in its answer, de-
nies that it has violated the Act as alleged, avers that the
allegations of the complaint have been satisfactorily
remedied in Case 14-CA 10423, and avers that at all times
material to this case it had a good-faith doubt and reason-
able basis for questioning the Union's majority status.
Upon the entire record, including my observation of the
witnesses, and after due consideration of the briefs of
counsel. I make the following findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law:
FINDINGS o: FA('
A. Introduction
Respondent Company is engaged in the sale and distri-
bution of automotive parts, accessories, and related items.
Respondent maintains an office and place of business on
Highway 66, in the suburbs of St. Louis, Missouri. During
the 12-month period ending November 30. 1977, Respon-
dent purchased and caused to be transported and delivered
to this place of business automotive parts, accessories, and
other goods valued in excess of $50,000, which goods were
transported and delivered directly from outside the State. I
find and conclude, as admitted, that Respondent is an em-
ployer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section
2(2), (6) and (7) of the Act. I also find and conclude, as
admitted, that Charging Party Union is a labor organiza-
tion within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
Charles Buckley, president of Respondent, explained
that the principal office of his Company is now located at
10016 Highway 66, in Crestwood, Missouri, a suburb of St.
Louis. The Company maintains a warehouse in the same
building. Across Highway 66, on the northerly side of the
CRESTWOOD AO SPPLY CO. 827
road, the Company maintains its Crestwood store facility
where the Employer is engaged in the wholesale and retail
sale of its products. The Company employs at the Crest-
wood store some five persons including a3 store manager.
The employees' duties include "putting merchandise up.
stocking shelves, driving delivers trucks, looking up mer-
chandise in catalogs, pricing and invoicing merchandise
out to our wholesale and retail accounts . . . land] answer-
ing the telephone .... " The Crestwood store has been
located on the northerly side of the highway for about 2
years. Previously, the C'restwood store was situated on the
southerly side of the road where the office and warehouse
facilities are now located.
Buckley further explained that the Company first started
business with the Crestwood store about 1963 and acquired
three other stores at various times thereafter. There is now
a store in Ellisville. Missouri. some 16 miles from Crest-
wood. This store was established about 8 or 9 ears ago.
There is also a store in Union. Missouri, some 36 miles
from Crestwood. There is also a store in Cedar Hill. Mis-
souri, some 23 miles from Crestwood. The Cedar tlill store
was established some 2 years ago.
Buckley also testified that the Employer maintains a hos-
pitalization and pension program for all of its employees
"regardless of the location" of the store. Buckley acknowl-
edged, however, that each of the four stores has "a separate
name"; each store has a separate manager with the "power
to hire and fire on their own": "new employees" hired at
each store are "normally" hired by the store manager: and
the customers at each store are "mostly" different. Further.
Buckley, in his prehearing affidavit, stated: "In the case of
sickness employees might transfer between facilities. It has
not happened recently and it does not happen often." In
addition, Buckles acknowledged that the Employer gives
sales commissions and bonuses to "some employees" and
these "commissions and bonuses differ between the
stores"; the "sales commissions and bonuses are set up b?
the managers at the stores, individual stores": and job
"classifications are different" at each store.
General Counsel, in his complaint, alleges that we are
concerned here only with a unit consisting of the Employ-
er's Crestwood store employees. The evidence pertaining to
this and to related contentions will be discussed further
below.
B. The Prior Bargaining Relationship Between the Partie,
William Shackles, an assistant business representative
for the Union, testified that "to the best of [his] knowl-
edge" that "first" collective-bargaining agreement between
Respondent Company and the Union was signed "in the
early sixties". Shackles was shown General Counsel's Ex-
hibit 3. a collective-bargaining agreement between Greater
St. Louis Automotive Parts and Equipment Association,
Inc., and Automotive Petroleum And Allied Industries
Union, Local 618, and International Association of Ma-
chinists, District No. 9. effective from July 1. 1962. to July
1, 1965. This document purports to be signed by Robert W.
Buckley for Crestwood Auto Supply Company and by
Richard Horn for .ocal 618. Shackles "definitely recog-
nize[d]" the signature of Richard Horn. "one of our assis-
tant business representatives". as a consequence of "uork-
ing with him for man ears and having seen his signa-
ture." Shackles found this document in the Union's "trans-
fer file" containing the "permanent records ... . on
companies that we have had dealings with over the years."
Shackles noted that Robert W. Buckles is deceased and
Richard Horn "works for the Federal Mediation Service."
Shackles "couldn't swear that that's Robert W. BuckleN's
signature. having not been that familiar with it .
Charles Buckley, president of Respondent, testified that
Robert W. Buckle>. his brother. is deceased, that the two
brothers worked together for about 13 ears, and that
Charles BuckleN witnessed the signature of Robert "prob-
abhl 100" times. lowexer. Charles Buckle\ claimed with
respect to General Counsel's Exhibit 3: "'1 recognize the
name but not necessarily the signature. It is a very old
document." Charles Buckley acknowledged:
I remember and I've testified that we were signed up
on or about that time, so it could be his signature. but
if ,ou're asking me to verifN it. I can't erifs it.
At the hearing. I sustained an objection to the receipt of
General Counsel's Exhibit 3 into evidence as not sufficient-
ly authenticated. Hlowever, upon reconsideration, after
having reviewed the full record including the subsequent
documents executed by the parties and the full testimony
of Charles Buckle), I am persuaded that General Counsel's
Exhibit 3 is what it purports to be. namely, a collective-
bargaining agreement executed b the parties. effective
from July . 1962. to Jul) 1. 1965. This contract is received
into evidence for background purposes since it sheds some
light on the relationship between the Compan) and the
Union.
Shackles next identified General Counsel's Exhibit 4. a
collective-bargaining agreement between Greater St. Louis
Automotive Parts And Equipment Association. Inc., and
Automotive Petroleum And Allied Industries Employees
Union. Local 618, and International Association of kMa-
chinists And Aerospace Workers. District No. 9. Shackles
signed this agreement for the Union and observed Charles
Buckley sign for Crestwood Auto Parts. The agreement
was effective from Jul, I. 1965 to Jul) I. 1968.
Shackles further identified General Counsel's Exhibit 7,
a collective-bargaining agreement between Greater St.
Louis Automotive Parts And Equipment Association. Inc.
and Automotive Petroleum And Allied Industries Employ-
ees Union. Local 618. and International Association Of
Machinists And Aerospace Workers, District No. 9, effec-
tive from July 1, 1968 to July 1. 1971. This agreement was
signed b Charles Buckley for Crestwood Automotive Sup-
ply. Inc. In addition, Shackles recalled that William Shaw
was a "long-time member of" the Union: that Shaw was
emploed at the CompanN's "Crestwood store and also the
Ellisville store": and that the Union filed a grievance with
the Employer on Shaw's behalf about May 1971. (See G.C.
Exhs. 5 and 6.)
On or about April 2. 1971, the Union sent Crestwood
Auto Supply Company a letter. stating (G.C. Exh. 8):
( Iharl ei uckle cl.imledi. In h .etlln. t1ll Sha o11I orked .1 Ilhe
o rllpll. tII, 11 C oi le 81 a 1C (.1IC r11;.iL!Ccr
C R E S IW O D A~~~~~~~~~ t O S U P P L Y C o . 27~~~~~~~~~1n _ _
828 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Please accept this letter as notification of our desire
and intention to reopen the present agreement be-
tween your Company and our Local Union on June
30, 1971, in accordance with the terms of the contract.
We shall be pleased to meet with you at any con-
venient time for the purpose of either negotiating a
new agreement, or modifying the terms and conditions
of the present one.
Shackles identified General Counsel's Exhibit 9 as the col-
lective-bargaining agreement which was later "approved
between the [Employerl Association and the Union", effec-
tive from July 1, 1971, to June 30, 1974. According to
Shackles,
The [Employer] Association will send us a list of the
employers with their signatures, who they have the
power of attorney to sign for. We do, however, send
each employer a copy of the contract, or two copies.
and ask that he return one for our permanent records
Shackles "believed" that a "signed contract" for 1971-74
was, in fact, returned to the Union by the Company.
2
Howard Eldridge, president of the United Automotive
Association Of St. Louis, Inc., testified that his association
negotiates collective-bargaining agreements for its em-
ployer members, that a nonmember employer may also
"authorize us to negotiate for him", and that in 1971 Re-
spondent Company gave "such an authorization" to the
association. General Counsel's Exhibit 15 is a document
signed by Charles Buckley on behalf of Crestwood Auto-
motive Supply, Inc. The document states in pertinent part:
The undersigned do hereby give [the Employer Asso-
ciation] exclusive authority to negotiate with [the
Union] the terms, conditions and economic issues for
a new contract replacing the one expiring on June 30,
1971.
It is also understood that I shall be bound by these
terms and conditions only and shall not communicate
with Ithe Union] concerning the terms and condi-
tions.
Shackles next identified General Counsel's Exhibit 10 as
the collective-bargaining agreement which was "negotiated
between the Association and the Union," effective from
July 1, 1974, to June 30, 1977. A copy of this agreement
was signed by Shackles for the Union and by Charles
Buckley for Crestwood Automotive Supply, Inc. Charles
Buckley asserted that the Union did not have a signed
copy of this agreement for its Ellisville store.4
Charles Buckley recalled that in about 1963 a union rep-
2 Shackles later identified (i.(' Exh. 18 as a master copy or work copy of
the 1971 74 agreement between the Employer association and the Union.
Attached to this agreement is a list of St. Louis area employers who are
represented by the association including. inter ablia. "(restwood Auto" and
"Ellisville Auto Parts." Ihe signature of Charles Buckle appears after each
of the separate store listings.
I note that a list of employees attached to the above document refers
separately to employees at Respondent's ('restood ad nd Ellisille facilities
4 The Employer Association identified in earlier agreements as Greater
St. Louis Automotive Parts And Equipment Association. Inc.. is named In
the 1974 77 agreement as United Automotive Association of St. I.ouis, Inc.
resentative named Horn attempted to "put all three of our
people [at Crestwood] into the Union and we would not go
along with that." According to Buckley, "we ended up on
an agreement of his taking only one." Horn assertedly as-
sured Buckley in about 1963:
We're only interested in getting a contract here in
some fashion. We want to be able to say that Crest-
wood Auto Parts is in the Union, so we will accept
one.
Buckley claimed: "That was the beginning of our relation-
ship, one in and two out." Buckley, as he further testified,
"never did see [Horn] again." In addition, Buckley assert-
ed, "never in 15 years did we ever negotiate a contract in
any form." Buckley also asserted that he has not "followed
over the years all the benefits set out in [the above] collec-
tive bargaining contracts" and the Union never "advised"
him, up to the end of 1976, that "all of [his] employees had
to belong to the Union." Buckley acknowledged, however,
that over the prior 15-year period he has deducted moneys
or made payments to the Union on behalf of some Crest-
wood store employees.
C. The Company's Crestwood Store Employees Sign Union
Welfare Enrollment Cards, Checkoff Authorizations, and
Membership Applications During February 1977; the Union
Requests the Employer To Comply With the Current
Agreement and Requests its Books and Records
Union representative Shackles testified that during the
summer of 1976 he requested Charles Merrill, an assistant
business representative of the Union, "to stop by Crest-
wood Auto Parts" because he, Shackles, "understood . . .
there were two new men down there and apparently the
Employer was not adhering to the contract ... ." Shack-
les requested Merrill to leave union "applications there for
the two men . . . and ask that they fill them out and return
[them] to the Union hall".5 Several weeks later, Shackles
asked Merrill "if he had received anything from out there"
and Merrill responded "no."
David Cantrell, an assistant business representative for
the Union, testified that during 1976, he went to the Em-
ployer's facility and spoke with Charles Buckley. Cantrell
recalled:
I [Cantrell] told him [Buckley] that I overheard a con-
versation that the contract was not being lived up to,
and that there was a possibility of pickets if it wasn't
done .... At that time, he said that there were other
stores in the area that [were] not organized and he was
unhappy about that; also that he had already or was
talking about a different insurance program for his
. nion representative Merrill explained that during the summer of 1976,
Shackles informed him "that we had a contract with Crest wood and there
were two of his people that weren't in the Union. and would I [Merrilll stop
b) and have them sign applications." Merrill later "went to C'restwood Auto
Suppl)". "asked to see Mr. Buckley", "was told he wasn't in", and informed
the person who "introduced himself as the store manager":
I [Merrilll was from Local 618. and I understood he had a couple of
drivers that weren't in the Union, and I'd like to leave applications.
Merrill then "asked him [the store manager] if he would get them filled out
and have the boys come down to the Union hall."
CRESTWOOD AUTO SUPPLY CO. 829
employees and didn't really worry too much about it
Thereafter, on or about February 25, 1977, according to
Shackles:
. . .three fellows came to my office .. . they stated
they worked at Crestwood Automotive or Auto Sup-
ply . . . . I explained to them we did have a contract
there already in effect. It wasn't a matter of joining the
Union, it was a matter of filling out the applications,
the authorization for dues, deduction of dues, the en-
rollment cards, health and welfare and insurance, etc.,
which they did.
The three employees were William McBride, Dan Rein-
bold, and Michael Hogan. They signed union welfare en-
rollment cards, checkoff authorizations, and membership
applications. (See G.C. Exhs. I IA. B, and C; 12A, B, and
C: and 13A, B, and C.)
A few days later, Union Representative Shackles "went
out to see Mr. Buckley .... "During this meeting, as
Shackles testified:
[I, Shackles,] expressed to him [Buckley] that I was a
bit disappointed in the way he was adhering to the
contract, that we had applications signed on three of
the people, and that he had neglected to send them to
the Union office to make application and fill out the
necessary forms as required within this agreement
.... I told him I expected him to move them up to
the rate immediately. I wanted a copy of his records
and books to determine actually what] had been paid
to these employees so that we could figure the differ-
ences that he owed since they'd been employed there,
and not having been employed under the conditions
of the contract to which he had agreed.
Buckley responded that "he couldn't supply his books to"
Shackles because "they were in the hand's of a bookkeep-
er" and he "asked for some time in which to get those
books and records". About I week later, Shackles again
spoke with Buckley. Buckley again claimed that "the books
still weren't available, he hadn't been able to get it all to-
gether, and he had to discuss some things with his partners
...." Shackles has never received the "payroll informa-
tion from the Employer.
On April 5, 1977, the Union sent a letter to William
Cody, attorney for Respondent Company, requesting, inter
alia, "that the Union's auditor be permitted to examine the
books and records of Crestwood Auto Supply Company
and Ellisville Auto Parts Company for the purpose of en-
forcing the terms of the collective bargaining agreement
and processing grievances ... ." (G.C. Exh. 2.) On April
25, 1977, Cody responded in a letter sent to Clyde Craig,
attorney for the Union, stating, inter alia, "Under the cir-
cumstances and background of the relationship between
Crestwood Auto Supply Company and [the Union], as well
as the arrangement concerning Ellisville Auto Parts Com-
pany, on behalf of the two Companies, your request that
the Union be permitted to examine unspecified books and
records has to be denied .... " (Resp. Exh. ).
Charles Buckley recalled that Union representative
Shackles met with him during late February or early
March 1977. Shackles then produced the checkoff forms
signed by the three Crestwood store employees. According
to Buckley:
He [Shackles] indicated that these men had been down
to the hall, and I [Buckley] said, well, fine, Bill, if they
want to go into the Union, it's all right with me. I said,
let me have some discussion with these men and call
me in a few days.
Later, according to Buckley, Shackles again met with
Buckley and said: "we're going to have to put these three
fellows in the Union" and Buckley responded, "All right."
Buckley claimed that Shackles also inquired about the em-
ployees at the Company's other stores and insisted:
"They'll all have to go in the Union now." Buckley further
claimed that Shackles insisted that "store managers" would
have to join as well. According to Buckley:
I said, fine Bill. Let me get with these people involved
and let's get it rolling.
Buckley, as he further testified, spoke with Shackles
later. He placed this conversation in March 1977. Buckley
recalled:
I remember telling Mr. Shackles, "Gee, Bill, I'm hav-
ing a problem. I can't seem to sell this idea across the
board to my people at all these stores .... "
Buckley then asked Shackles, "who we're [you] talking
about" and "if you have contracts." Shackles responded
that he had contracts at both the Crestwood and Ellisville
stores. Buckley asked for production of the contracts at
"our next meeting." Thereafter, at another meeting during
March 1977, Shackles "couldn't find" the contract for the
Ellisville store and "he intimated that one contract covered
all the stores anyway." Buckley claimed that store manag-
ers should be excluded from the Union because "they hired
and fired and set hours." Buckley recalled that Shackles
indicated that he "would back off of the two country
stores"--the stores in Union and Cedar Hills. Buckley also
referred to an "election." Buckley was asked: "Following
your conversations in March, considering the months be-
tween March and up through at least November, had Mr.
Shackles ever told you that . . . it was only Crestwood that
he was interested in?" Buckley responded: "I don't believe
so. He was constantly talking about the Ellisville people."
D. President Buckler Questions Employees About Their
Union Activities, the Employees Are Granted Additional
Benefits and Later File Decertification Petitions
Michael Hogan is employed by the Company at its
Crestwood store. Hogan testified that during March 1977,
the Company employed five persons at Crestwood. They
were Rick Wallach, the store manager; Dan Reinbold and
Mike McBride, driver-countermen; Hogan, a counterman;
and Robert Buckley (son of President Charles Buckley), a
driver. Hogan's employment with Respondent commenced
about August 1976. Hogan has never worked at any of the
Employer's other stores or facilities. Hogan could recall
only one incident during his employment when an employ-
ee from another store or facility "came up to work" at
C R E S T W OO D A U T O S U PP L Y C O . 29~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~1
830 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Crestwood, "because someone else was on vacation." Ho-
gan also noted that the Employer's stores have "separate
managers.
Hogan further testified that on or about February 25,
1977, he and coworkers McBride and Reinhold "went
down to the Union . . . to find out what the Union was all
about .... " Hogan "didn't know what the ties with the
Union were." The three employees then spoke with Union
representative Shackles who explained that the Compan
"already had a contract." The employees executed union
application and membership forms, as noted above.
About I or 2 weeks later, Shackles visited Buckley at the
Crestwood facility. Shortly thereafter, as Hogan further
testified:
[Buckley] asked us why we went down to the Union
.... tHogan replied, we]just weren't happy with 12-
hour days and we didn't feel the pay rate was up to
par, compared to the Union's rate ....
[WeJ just felt like if we wanted to go out on the
street and have a lunch hour, to sit down and eat
lunch, we felt it was our right ....
Buckley immediately changed the employees' scheduled
hours to conform to an 8-hour day.6 Further, with respect
to taking a lunch hour, Buckley then apprised the employ-
ees:
He [Buckley] said, sure, that's been there all along. It
was just an unwritten law that somebody catches
lunch and brings it back in ....
Hogan has since taken a lunch hour.
In addition, employee Hogan testified in part as follows:
Q. At the time that you signed these Union cards
and before Mr. Shackles spoke to Mr. Buckley, did
you have the benefit of the Employer's insurance or
health plan?
A. No, ma'am, not that I know of, no.
Q. Do you know what happened to change that?
A. Well, Charlie [Buckley] explained to me, as I
had gone through his probation period, that he was
he gave me an application for the Prudential Health
Insurance Plan, and I filled it out and sent it back.
Q. When was this?
A. I was put on the plan in May, May of '77.
Q. Do you recall when you filled out the applica-
tions for the health plan?
A. April.'
Charles Buckley acknowledged that during March 1977
he spoke with employees Reinbold and Hogan about with-
H ogan explained that ill the past. "we s.orked froitm eight to eight ,on
dais that were predestined to he ours. After this con.t.ersationl Ihe C1l -
plsces sh ould report to sork at I I ail arnd , ork until 8 p. il
On cro ss-examinatolln. HIogan acknowledged Ihat ahbout late M\larch
1977. he told Buckle' that he "did not want the tinion". that he subhsequent-
lN presented Buckle' with "some statements froll emploees or enmplilees'
signatures adaising him that [Ihe] didn't want the Union", and that he wski
also "the petitioner in a deccrtification peition filed" )11 tiwo separate Olcca-
sions lHogan recalled that Buckley had "a;dvied Ihle cnplolee .IhIIt Ihe
(Companx's insurance program when he wsas "initiall nliermiewed for em-
plosment" during August 1976 Hogan. however, was unl aware of aln spe-
cific time period for a worker to be a "prlhbatilolr ciliplosec-
holding union dues.s Buckley "thought it was time to con-
firm these checkoff lists with the men, so I called them in
and asked them about it." Buckley next identified Respon-
dent's Exhibit 3, a copy of employee Hogan's Union
checkoff authorization, which contains a handwritten nota-
tion: "As of 3--31-77, DO NOT AUTHORIZE DUES
DEDUCTION." Buckley claimed that "Hogan wrote that
on there himself." Likewise, according to Buckley, employ-
ee Reinbold made a similar entry on his authorization. (See
Resp. Exh. 4.) Buckley recalled:
. . .it was getting near the first of the month, . . . so
I called the men in and showed them these dues
checkoffs . . . and asked them did they sign ... , and
they said yes . . . but they didn't want me to deduct
dues.
According to Buckley, "... they suggested they revoke
them or write across them and they were the ones that put
this big check cross on here."
Buckley also claimed that former employee McBride
"was first put on" the Employer's insurance program "90
days after he started, which is our probationary period."
Buckley later indicated that McBride was on the program
during "late in 1976." McBride, however, had started work
for the Company "around the first of 1976." Buckley next
claimed that although employee Hogan started his employ-
ment in August 1976, Hogan had a 6- to 8-week "break in
service" because of a leg injury. Elsewhere, Buckley testi-
fied:
Q. Now, with respect to Mr. Hogan and Mr. Rein-
bold, could you tell us when did these two gentlemen
go into your Prudential Insurance Program?
A. Mr. Hogan came back to work for us the second
time at approximately the same time that Reinbold
started to work for us.
Q. And, again, when did Reinbold start?
A. It was in January or February [1977]. So at the
end of the 90-day period, our office wrote a letter to
Prudential asking that they be picked up on our insur-
ance program.
Buckley acknowledged that Hogan and Reinbold first
signed applications for this Prudential program "the first
part of April or May" in 1977.
In addition, Buckley acknowledged that Respondent's
Exhibit 5 is a copy of a speech which he delivered to all of
the Employer's store workers about April I, 1977. In that
speech, Buckley stated, in part, "We don't believe the
Teamsters have a contract that applies to all our stores be-
cause no contract has ever been applied or enforced by the
Teamsters .... " Also see Respondent's Exhibits 6 and 7,
the Board notice which Buckley posted at the Crestwood
store as part of the earlier settlement on July 21, 1977, and
an accompanying statement of the Employer's "position."
In that statement, which was also posted, Buckley apprised
the Crestwood employees:
We have presented our information to this 14th Re-
gion, including statements from employees at the
Buckles claimed that eplolee McBride had "resigned" on March 15.
1977
CRESTWOOD AUTO SUPPLY CO. 831
Crestwood store that they do not want the Teamsters.
but the 14th Region still claims the Teamsters is their
representative.
By the settlement we will have to recognize Team-
sters Local 618 and bargain with them since the Re-
gion is saying they are the representative of all em-
ployees excluding supervisors at the Crestwood store.
We are sorry the 14th Region of the NLRB does not
believe that our employees at Crestwood do not want
this Teamsters Union. If you feel you have a conm-
plaint about this settlement, or do not want the 14th
Regional Director to make this Union your represen-
tative, it is your right to contact the NLRB office
Thereafter, according to Buckle', employees at the
Crestwood store signed petitions opposing the Union on
August I (Resp. Exh. 8) and November 16, 1977 (Rcsp.
Exh. I I ). Also see Respondent's Exhibits 9 and 12, decerti-
fication petitions signed by employee Hogan and filed with
the Board on August 3 and November 23. 1977.
E. The Meeting of November 18, 1977, the (Corpanyl
Refuses To Bargain With the Union
Union Representative Shackles recalled that on Novem-
ber 18, 1977, following a settlement of the initial unfair
labor practice charges in these proceedings, he went to the
law offices of William Cody, attorney for Respondent. and
met with Cody and Buckley. Shackles explained:
I contacted Mr. William Cody, I believe it was,
that's the attorney for Crestwood Auto Parts. and in
accord with the agreement that has been reached
through the Board and the two attorneys and the
Company, and so forth, that they had agreed that all
charges and so forth be dropped and that they would
meet with us to negotiate an agreement continuing
from July of 1977.
Well. I arrived at Mr. Cody's office and Mr. Buck-
ley was there, of course, and after small talk and so
forth, prior to getting into negotiations, we started to
discuss the methods in which we would approach ne-
gotiations. I was advised that they didn't feel they
could negotiate with me.
He [Cody] said they could not negotiate with us.
that they had become aware of conversation with their
employees that they planned to re-enter their decertifi-
cation petition. I asked why he did not advise me of
this prior to me setting up a meeting, and so forth. and
he felt, well, he didn't think it was quite right to advise
me of that on the phone.
Company President Buckley recalled the November 18
meeting as a "quick meeting it was over rather fast."
Buckley stated the Company's "position" for "not bargain-
ing with the Union on November 18", as follows:
Well, we have a longstanding relationship with this
Union whereby we have always had people in the
Union and a majority of people out of the Union. and
we had this relationship which was very desirable for
our employees and ourselves, for approximately 12 to
14 years, and I find myself in a position where the
Government is asking me to sit down and negotiate a
contract with a Union and my people. 100 per cent of
my people in this unit called C restwood. are telling me
not to do it.u
I credit the testimony of William Shackles. Charles El-
dridge, and David Cantrell as detailed supra. Their testi-
mony is in large part mutually corroborative and support-
ed b documentary evidence of record. And, relying upon
demeanor, I find the above testimony of Shackles, El-
dridge. and Cantrell to be a truthful and trustworthy ac-
count of the sequence of events. Further. I credit the testi-
mony of employee Michael Hogan as recited above. His
testimony concerning his meeting with and interrogation
by Company President Charles Buckles about March 1977
and the ensuing sequence of events is essentially uncontra-
dicted. On this record, I am persuaded that Hogan. pres-
ently employed by Respondent. has truthfully related the
events during this critical period. On the other hand. I do
not find Charles Buckley to be a reliable or trustworthy
witness. His testimony was at times incomplete. contradic-
tory. vague, and evasive. In particular. I do not credit his
assertions that the Company had "a long standing relation-
ship" with the Union which permitted "a majority of peo-
ple out of the Union". that "100 percent of my people in
this unit called Crestwood were] telling me not to" recog-
nize or bargain with the Union. and that. consequentl)y.
Buckley withdrew recognition from the Union in 1977 be-
cause of "a good faith doubt" that the Union represented a
majority of the employees in an appropriate unit. Insofar
as the testimonies of Buckley and William Cod) differ
with the above testimony of Shackles, Eldridge. Cantrell,
and Hogan, I credit the testimonies of Shackles. Eldridge
Cantrell. and Hogan as more reliable.
Discussion
General Counsel alleges that Company President Buck-
ley violated Section 8(a)( 1) of the Act by interrogating em-
ployees Hogan. Reinhold. and McBride during earls
March 1977 about their protected union activities and, in
addition, by offering to and granting the employees bene-
fits in order to discourage their support of the Union. Gen-
eral Counsel further alleges that Company President Buck-
ley violated Section 8(a)(5} and (I) of the Act by refusing
to furnish to the Union requested payroll information and
' See Reap h 1. a letter from C(ids t Sh.ackles amd hi, ttrnie.,
('ralg. dted \ elllher 30. 1977 'Atornes (Cd!, alsNo tettlfied ",hC' this
letterl vils selt It) the unlr represenlttiives Buckie oln cros-exan linltllll.
Was quesloned oilcerinlng h L aim that the :l nin had agreed a.lhtt
1963 to require ,nit! rine of he three persols 'orkiig .t (ret.l d to he a
tember Biuckls ieL.alJed thit l it th linCe the CntpalIn hld Itil Ile ricslie
and h ,iton,.l hree "people omirked at he store at tha time" 'r"melf. ni
hrother and one e rtploce' Buckle Ilacknol edeed that he and his hbrother.
tlo .t decclsed aere then lhe "o ners" of the business Buckle\ aloI ac-
knoraledged that he made the filloti lg statemenl ii his prche.rtll g ffida-
It, d ted June 9. 197
Ihe sC .i'd c itLIt I hid 1 ithl [liC Ih H tat ds a iel I spoke to ii\
emploees ald ephiltied heir ight to ]'llI the I uIln One hundred
percellt of nl eilpl.o cc, ait te store , thanr shtl c ('r'slt .od aid ihe\
d itin'l .inr I l il ii I 1 mpllais supphedI
CRESTWOOD ALT SUPPLY CO.
. _ _ _ _ _ _ _
832 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
data relating to its employees since this information was
necessary, relevant, and material to the Union's adminis-
tration of the 1974-77 collective-bargaining agreement be-
tween the parties. The credible evidence of the record, as
found supra, establishes that Respondent has violated the
Act as alleged.
Thus, employees Hogan, Reinbold, and McBride went
to the union hall and signed union welfare enrollment
cards, checkoff authorizations, and membership applica-
tions on or about February 25, 1977. Union representative
Shackles revealed this information to company President
Buckley a few days later in an attempt to get the Company
to comply with the terms and conditions of the 1974-77
collective-bargaining agreement between the parties.
Shackles also requested copies of the company books and
records in order to determine the actual amounts of wages
paid and benefits provided to the employees in comparison
with the agreed-upon terms and conditions of employment
as contained in the 1974-77 contract. Buckley initially
claimed that his books and records were "in the hands of a
bookkeeper" and he needed "some time in which to get
those books and records." However, Buckley did not sup-
ply the requested financial information to Shackles. In-
stead, Buckley, shortly after his meeting with Shackles,
questioned his employees at work as to "why [they] went
down to the Union .... " As employee Hogan credibly
testified, the employees then informed Buckley that "we
just weren't happy with 12-hour days", "we didn't feel the
pay rate was up to par compared to the Union's rates", and
"[we] felt it was our right to have" a "lunch hour-to sit
down and eat lunch." Buckley immediately changed the
employees' hours to conform to an 8-hour day. Buckley
apprised Hogan that the employees were, in fact, entitled
to a "lunch hour." In addition, Buckley later explained to
Hogan that the employee "had gone through his probation
period" and was therefore now eligible to apply to the
Company's health insurance plan. Hogan, however, had
been employed by the Company since August 1976: the
Company's so-called probationary period was only for 90
days, and Hogan was previously unaware of the length of
this "probationary period." '° This health insurance plan
was similarly made available to employee Reinbold at the
same time.
I find and conclude that the sudden granting of such
benefits, following management's interrogation of the em-
ployees as to "why [they] went down to the Union," was
plainly calculated to undermine the employees' support of
the Union, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Man-
agement, by questioning the employees about their protect-
ed union activities and by then granting benefits to the
employees, had engaged in a course of conduct which was
"undoubtedly calculated to, and no doubt did, have a sig-
nificant intimidating effect on the organizational rights of
the employees." N.L.R.B. v. Louisiana Manufacturing Com-
pany, 374 F.2d 696, 699-701 (8th Cir. 1967). As the court
noted in N.L.R.B. v. WKRG-TV, Inc., 470 F.2d 1302,
1306-09 (5th Cir. 1973), "We cannot ignore decisional ac-
10 Hogan's employment with the Company. which commenced in August
1976. was interrupted for a 6- to 8-week period in late 1976 as a result of a
leg injury.
celeration in employee benefits preceded by months of
lethargy." Further, I find and conclude that management's
refusal to furnish the Union with the requested financial
and payroll data constituted a failure to bargain in good
faith, in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. For,
as the court stated in N.L.R.B. v. J. P. Stevens & Company,
Inc., 538 F.2d 1152, 1164 (5th Cir. 1976):
The case law allows no equivocation regarding the
obligation to supply data. A company which fails to
produce relevant information violates its duty to bar-
gain .... The only requirements are that the union
must request the data and it must be relevant to a
legitimate interest of the union.... In addition, an
employer fails to bargain in good faith when he unrea-
sonably delays production of requested, relevant data.
Here, the requested payroll data was sufficiently identified
by Union Representative Shackles at his meeting with
Buckley in early March and in the Union's letter of April 5,
1977, and this data was plainly relevant to the Union's
legitimate interest in bringing the Company into compli-
ance with the existing 1974-77 contract.
On July 21, 1977, the Company and the Union entered
into a settlement agreement in Case 14-CA-10423. The
Regional Director for Region 14 approved this settlement
on October 8, 1977. The settlement agreement provided,
inter alia, that the Company would, upon request, bargain
collectively with the Union as the exclusive representative
of its employees in an appropriate unit at the Crestwood
store, and further would, upon request, supply the Union
with payroll information and data required for collective-
bargaining purposes. Thereafter, union representative
Shackles, as he credibly testified, "contacted" the attorney
for the Company, William Cody, "in accord with the
agreement that [had] been reached through the Board
. and a meeting was arranged in Cody's office for
November 18, 1977. The purpose of this meeting was "to
negotiate an agreement continuing from July 1977." How-
ever, as Shackles explained, "I arrived at Mr. Cody's office
and Mr. Buckley was there .... I was advised that they
didn't feel they could negotiate with me .... I asked why
he [Cody] did not advise me of this prior to me setting up
a meeting . . . and . . . he didn't think it was quite right to
advise me of that on the phone .... "
Counsel for Respondent asserts that the Employer had
"a good faith doubt" of the Union's continued majority
status and therefore properly refused to bargain with the
Union. He argues that "from the time of the settlement
agreement in July 1977 until the end of November 1977,"
any alleged conduct with respect to 8(a)(1) allegations had
been satisfactorily remedied; compliance with any settle-
ment agreement had been completed; and the case had
been closed-all prior to the time that the Union's majority
was questioned in November 1977. However, in Poole
Foundry and Machine Company v. N.L.R.B., 192 F.2d 740,
743 (4th Cir. 1951). cert. denied 342 U.S. 954 (1952), the
court in agreement with the Board, held that an employer
"by entering into the settlement agreement, thereby secur-
ing a withdrawal of the charges of unfair labor practices, is
bound to bargain in good faith with the Union for a rea-
sonable period of time after such agreement, without ques-
CRESTWOOD AUTO SUPPLY CO. 833
tioning the Union's lack of majority." In Poole Foundry,
supra, the employer's refusal to bargain was "less than four
months after the settlement agreement." The court agreed
"that this was not a reasonable period." See also Brennan 's
Cadillac, Inc., 231 NLRB 225 (1977). In the instant case, I
find and conclude that Respondent, having agreed as part
of a settlement to bargain in good faith with the Union as
representative of the Crestwood store unit, must do so for a
reasonable period of time and, under the circumstances
present here, from October (when the settlement was ap-
proved) to November (when recognition was withdrawn)
was not a reasonable period. Accordingly, Respondent vio-
lated the terms of the settlement and unlawfully withdrew
recognition from the Union on November 18, 1977, in vio-
lation of Section 8(a)(5) and () of the Act. Consequently,
the Regional Director properly revoked and set aside the
settlement agreement.
Respondent may not, therefore, assert this claimed
good-faith doubt as justification for its refusal to bargain
on November 18, 1977. In any event, I find and conclude
that Respondent did not have, as claimed, "a good faith
doubt based upon objective considerations" either during
March and April 1977 (when it refused to provide the
Union with relevant bargaining data) or, later, during No-
vember 1977 (when it refused to negotiate with the Union).
The credible evidence of record shows, and I find and con-
clude, that Respondent was instead continuing throughout
this period in its unlawful attempt to undermine the Union
as majority representative of the Crestwood store employ-
ees. In short, the alleged "doubt of the Union's continued
majority status was [not] the real reason for the [Employ-
er's] refusal to bargain"; rather, the Employer was raising
this issue "'in a context of illegal antiunion activities, or
other conduct . . . aimed at causing disaffection from the
Union .... '" Cf. King Radio Corporation, 208 NLRB
578, 582 (1974), enfd. 510 F.2d 1154 (10th Cir. 1975), and
cases cited.
Counsel for Respondent cites in support of the Employ-
er's claimed "good faith doubt" the testimony that Crest-
wood store employees "had at the end of March revoked
their authorizations and advised the Employer that they
were not interested in having the Union represent them."
However, as found above, this and later disaffection by the
Crestwood store employees was plainly the intended conse-
quence of the Employer's earlier coercive conduct. The
Employer, in interrogating and granting benefits to the
Crestwood store employees, was attempting to, and in fact
did, undermine their support of the Union. The Employer
cannot now benefit by this unlawful conduct. Counsel for
Respondent next cites a longstanding "relationship with
the Union" whereby the Employer "was free to put in the
Union an employee and as long as [his] dues were paid,
[the] Union would not bother" the Employer. However. I
do not credit company President Buckley's testimony per-
taining to this claimed longstanding "relationship with the
Union." And, in any event, this belated contention is now
barred by the time limitations of Section 10(b) of the Act.
Cf. Barrington Plaza and Tragniew, Inc., 185 NLRB 962,
964 (1970). enfd. in part 470 F.2d 669 (9th Cir. 1972). Fur-
ther, I also reject counsel for Respondent's related argu-
ment that the Union had, in effect, abandoned the Crest-
wood store employees by its "inactivity" over the past
years. The successive 3-year contracts between the parties
since about 1962 or 1963 pertaining to the Crestwood unit
employees and the Union's recent efforts in 1976 to bring
the Employer into compliance with the 1974-77 contract
makes it quite clear that the Union has not abandoned the
unit employees or collective-bargaining relationship. Cf.
Ace-Doran Hauling & Rigging Co., 171 NLRB 645 (1968).
Counsel for Respondent further argues that the Union is
"not entitled to any presumption of [continued] majority
status due to any past contract or bargaining relationship."
He claims that there was "ambiguity in the definition of
the unit" and that the "boundaries" of the unit were not
"clearly defined." I reject this contention. I find and con-
clude that a unit consisting of all employees employed at
Respondent's Crestwood store, excluding office clerical
and professional employees, guards and supervisors, con-
stitutes an appropriate unit for collective-bargaining pur-
poses within the meaning of Section 9 of the Act and, fur-
ther, that this unit was, at all times material to this case,
sufficiently and "clearly defined" and understood by the
parties. As found above, the parties have executed succes-
sive 3-year contracts since about 1962 or 1963 pertaining to
these employees. Initially, Respondent only operated one
store in Crestwood. It was not until about 1969 when Re-
spondent opened another store in Ellisville, some 16 miles
from Crestwood. Thereafter, the Company and the Union,
for the most part, manifested an intention to treat these
two locations separately for collective-bargaining purposes.
Indeed. the 1971-74 collective-bargaining agreement lists
the two stores separately and Buckley signed separately for
each facility. And, although Buckley signed the later 1974-
77 collective-bargaining agreement for Crestwood, there
was assertedly no signed agreement for the Ellisville store.
Moreover, each of the Employer's stores has separate man-
agers who have individual authority to hire and fire, sepa-
rate names, and separate customers. Each store has differ-
ent and individual sales commissions and bonuses which it
provides to employees; these commissions and bonuses are
established by the separate store managers. Job classifica-
tions also differ at each store. And, as employee Hogan
credibly testified, there was only one time when an employ-
ee from another store worked at his Crestwood facility and
this was an unusual circumstance.
In sum, the Crestwood store alone is an appropriate unit
for collective-bargaining purposes and the parties under-
stood and agreed upon this at all times pertinent here. It is
true, as the record shows, that union representative Shack-
les has attempted to include the Ellisville store and the
Employer's remaining two stores under his Union's juris-
diction. However, Shackles' unsuccessful attempt in this
respect has not, on this record, created a basis for a
claimed good-faith doubt or rendered the Crestwood unit
ambiguous or inappropriate for collective-bargaining pur-
poses. I therefore find and conclude that Respondent has
violated Section 8(aXI) and (5) of the Act as alleged.''
I (,Counsel for Respondent's post-hearing motion to reopen the record in
this case for the limited purpose of receiving into evidence a portion of
Resp [Ish 14 . letter dated August 11. 1977. describing the Union's unit
contention, is granted oser he opposillon of counsel for the General Coun-
sel I hase considered the cited portions of this letter with the entire record.
CRESTWOOD AUTO SUPPLY CO.
834 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
CONCL!SIONS ()OF .AW
I. Respondent Company is an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7)
of the Act.
2. Charging Party Union is a labor organization within
the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. Respondent Company violated Section 8(a)( 1) of the
Act by coercively interrogating employees concerning their
union sympathies; by granting employees benefits, includ-
ing new work schedules and lunch periods, in order to dis-
courage their union activities; and by offering to employ-
ees benefits, including pension and medical insurance, to
discourage their union activities.
4. Respondent Company violated Section 8(a)(5) and (11)
of the Act by about March 1977, and continuing to date,
refusing to bargain with the Union as the exclusive bar-
gaining representative in the appropriate unit described be-
low by refusing to furnish to the Union payroll information
and data relating to the unit employees, which information
was necessary, relevant, and material to the Union's ad-
ministration of the collective-bargaining agreement be-
tween the parties; and by about November 18, 1977, refus-
ing to recognize and bargain with the Union as the
collective-bargaining representative of the unit employees.
The appropriate unit is:
All employees employed at Respondent Company's
Crestwood, Missouri, store, excluding office clerical
employees and professional employees, guards and
supervisors as defined in the Act.
5. The unfair labor practices found above affect com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the
Act.
REMEI)Y
Having found that Respondent has violated Section
8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act, Respondent will be directed to
cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative ac-
tion designed to effectuate the purpose of the Act. Respon-
dent will be directed to bargain, upon request, with the
Union as the exclusive representative in the unit found ap-
propriate and, if an agreement is reached, to embody the
agreement in a written signed contract. Respondent will be
directed to post the attached notice. Respondent will also
be directed to supply the Union, upon request, with payroll
information and data required for collective-bargaining
purposes at said unit store.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and con-
clusions of law, upon the entire record, and pursuant to
Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following rec-
ommended:
t In tile esent no exceptions aire filed as provided h, Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules anld Regulations of the National Iabor ,elations Board. the findings.
ciclnusiins. and reLOilinlenided Order hretil shall. as; provided in Sec.
102 48 )1 the Rules, and Regulations, he .doptcd h the Board and become
it, findin,. colllusimos, and Order, and all objections thereto shall he
decll)cd ac uled for ail purp ses.
ORDER 12
The Respondent, Crestwood Auto Supply Company, St.
Louis. Missouri, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Coercively interrogating its employees about their
union sympathies.
(b) Granting or offering to employees benefits in order
to discourage their activities on behalf of Automotive Pe-
troleum and Allied Industries Employees Union, Local
618, affiliated with International Brotherhood of Team-
sters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers Of Amer-
ica. or any other labor organization.
(c) Failing or refusing. upon request, to bargain collec-
tively concerning rates of pay, wages, hours of employ-
ment, or other terms and conditions of employment with
said Union, as the exclusive bargaining representative of its
employees in the following appropriate unit:
All employees employed by Respondent Company's
Crestwood, Missouri, store excluding office clerical
employees and professional employees, guards and
supervisors as defined in the Act.
(d) Failing or refusing to supply said Union, upon re-
quest. with payroll information and data required for col-
lective-bargaining purposes at said unit store.
(e) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their
Section 7 rights.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to ef-
fectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Upon request, bargain collectively with said Union
as the exclusive representative of the employees in the
above-described appropriate unit with respect to rates of
pay. wages, hours of employment, and other terms and
conditions of employment and, if an understanding is
reached, embody such understanding in a written signed
agreement.
(b) Upon request, supply the Union with payroll infor-
mation and data required for collective-bargaining pur-
poses at said unit store.
(c) Post at its Crestwood, Missouri, store copies of the
attached notice marked "Appendix." 3 Copies of said no-
tice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Re-
gion 14, after being duly signed by the Respondent's repre-
sentative, shall be posted by it immediately upon receipt
thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days
thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. Rea-
sonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure
"In the eenl that this Order is enforced h a judgment of a United
States (urt of Appeals. the words in the notice reading "Posled h Order
,of the Natioal ahor Relations Board" shall read Posted Pursuant to a
Judmenelt if the nited States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
N.itlon. ilabor Relations Board."
CRESTWOOD ATO S:PPLY CO. 835
that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered bv
any other material.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 14. in writ-
ing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps
the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
APPENDIX
NOTI(c. To EPIOYFFS
POSTED BY ORDER OF ITHE
NATIONAL. LABOR RFI.ATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE Wn.. NOr coercively interrogate our employees
about their union sympathies.
WE-. WII.L, Nor grant or offer to our employees bene-
fits in order to discourage their activities on behalf of
Automotive. Petroleum and Allied Industries Employ-
ees. Local 618. affiliated with International Brother-
hood of Teamsters. Chauffeurs. Warehousemen and
Helpers of America. or any other labor organization.
WE WILL. NOT fail or refuse upon request to bargain
collectively concerning rates of pay, wages hours of
employment, or other terms and conditions of em-
ployment with said Union as the exclusive bargaining
representative of our employees in the following ap-
propriate unit:
All employees employed at our Crestwood. Mis-
souri store excluding office clerical emploees and
professional emplo,,ees, guards and supervisors as
defined in the National Labor Relations Act.
Wit saIt o, fail or refuse to suppli said Union
upon request with payroll information and data re-
quired for collective-bargaining purposes at our Crest-
wood unit.
WIt WILL 'OI in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain. or coerce our employees in the exercise
of their rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the National
Labor Relations Act.
WWl WILL upon request. bargain collectivel\ with
said Union as the exclusive bargaining representative
of the employees in the above unit with respect to
rates of pav. wages. hours of employment. and other
terms and conditions of employment and. if an under-
standing is reached. embody such understanding in a
signed written agreement.
WI ILL upon request supplN said Union with pay-
roll information and data required for collective-bar-
gaining purposes at our Crestwood unit store.
CR SI(OO)D Ai I() S I PPI' ('()MPAN
CRESTWOOD AUTO SUPPLY CO. 5_ . . .