Cree Fayetteville, Inc.Download PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardNov 16, 20202020001134 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 16, 2020) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 15/441,857 02/24/2017 Austin Curbow 99077.25301 2719 30734 7590 11/16/2020 BakerHostetler Washington Square, Suite 1100 1050 Connecticut Ave. N.W. Washington, DC 20036-5304 EXAMINER KIM, JUNG H ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2842 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 11/16/2020 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): edervis@bakerlaw.com eofficemonitor@bakerlaw.com patents@bakerlaw.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte AUSTIN CURBOW and DANIEL MARTIN Appeal 2020-001134 Application 15/441,857 Technology Center 2800 Before JAMES R. HUGHES, JOHN A. EVANS, and JOYCE CRAIG, Administrative Patent Judges. CRAIG, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–12, 14–18, and 20–22. See Final Act. 1. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). An oral hearing was held on October, 27, 2020. We affirm. 1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as CREE FAYETTEVILLE, INC. Appeal Br. 3. Appeal 2020-001134 Application 15/441,857 2 CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER The claims are directed to a power module having an integrated clamp circuit. Spec. ¶ 3. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter: 1. A power module apparatus, comprising: a power substrate; at least one power device electrically connected to the power substrate; a gate-source board mounted relative to the power substrate, the gate-source board electrically connected to the at least one power device; a housing secured to the power substrate; a clamping circuit electrically connected to the at least one power device; and the clamping circuit being configured to reduce a voltage charge up at a gate of the at least one power device to within 8 V of a desired voltage. Appeal Br. 90 (Claims Appendix). REJECTION Claims 1–12, 14–18, and 20–22 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over the combination of McPherson et al. (US 9,426,883 B2, issued Aug. 23, 2016) (“McPherson”) and Pang (US 9,300,285 B2, issued Mar. 29, 2016). Final Act. 3–9. ANALYSIS Independent Claims 1, 10, and 16 With respect to independent claim 1, Appellant contends the cited portions of McPherson and Pang do not teach or suggest “a power module Appeal 2020-001134 Application 15/441,857 3 apparatus, comprising: ... a clamping circuit electrically connected to the at least one power device,” as recited in claim 1. Appeal Br. 8–13. Specifically, Appellant argues that “MCPHERSON does not disclose a clamping circuit; and PANG does not disclose a clamping circuit being integrated in the power module apparatus.” Id. at 12 (emphasis omitted). Appellant’s arguments do not persuade us that the Examiner erred. Appellant attacks McPherson and Pang individually, even though the Examiner relied on the combination of McPherson and Pang in rejecting claim 1. In re Mouttet, 686 F.3d 1322, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981)). The test for obviousness is not whether the claimed invention is expressly suggested in any one or all of the references, but whether the claimed subject matter would have been obvious to those of ordinary skill in the art in light of the combined teachings of those references. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d at 425. Here, Appellant provides no persuasive argument that the claimed subject matter would not have been obvious in light of the combined teachings of McPherson and Pang. For these reasons, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in finding that the combination of McPherson and Pant teaches or suggests the disputed limitation of claim 1. Appellant next argues that neither McPherson nor Pang teaches or suggests “the clamping circuit being configured to reduce a voltage charge up at a gate of the at least one power device to within 8 V of a desired voltage,” as recited in claim 1. Appeal Br. 13. In response to the Examiner’s assertion that such specific parameters in the degree of clamping do not support the patentability of the subject matter encompassed by the prior art unless there is evidence indicating the parameters are critical (Final Act. 5), Appeal 2020-001134 Application 15/441,857 4 Appellant argues that Figures 26–28 and paragraphs 97–109 of Appellant’s Specification support the criticality of the recited performance parameters. Appeal Br. 14. Appellant further argues that Pang teaches away from the disputed limitation because Pang “is a configuration of a clamp circuit with a gate driver—not a power module.” Id. at 15–16. Appellant’s arguments do not persuade us of Examiner error. The relevant case law supports a prima facie case of obviousness and a shifting of the burden to Appellant to show criticality in the claimed voltage. See Final Act 5 (citing In re Aller, 220 F.2d 454, 456 (CCPA 1955)). To show criticality of a claimed range, “it is not inventive to discover the optimum or workable ranges by routine experimentation.” Aller, 220 F.2d at 456. “Only if the ‘results of optimizing a variable’ are ‘unexpectedly good’ can a patent be obtained for the claimed critical range.” In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1469 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (internal citation omitted). In this case, Appellant does not show that the recited reduction in a voltage charge achieves unexpectedly superior results. See Appeal Br. 14– 15; see also Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 752 F.3d 967, 977 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“To be particularly probative, evidence of unexpected results must establish that there is a difference between the results obtained and those of the closest prior art, and that the difference would not have been expected by one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention.”). Rather, paragraphs 97–109, relied on by Appellant, describe experimental results involving “a clamped inductive load (CIL) test fixture schematic to provide test performance data for power modules” (Figure 26), “graphs of test data for a power module with no gate clamping” (Figure 27), and “graphs of test data for a power module with a clamping Appeal 2020-001134 Application 15/441,857 5 circuit located on a gate driver” (Figure 28). Spec. ¶¶ 97, 101, 102. We agree with the Examiner that, although the cited sections of the Specification describe why clamping located with the power module is advantageous compared to other embodiments, the cited sections do not describe why limiting the voltage charge up at a gate of the at least one power device to within 8 V of a desired voltage is critical. See Ans. 6. Appellant’s “teaching away” argument also fails because Appellant has not identified where Pang actually criticizes, discredits, or otherwise discourages “the clamping circuit being configured to reduce a voltage charge up at a gate of the at least one power device to within 8 V of a desired voltage,” as recited in claim 1. See In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004); DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 567 F.3d 1314, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“A reference does not teach away, however, if it merely expresses a general preference for an alternative invention but does not ‘criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage’ investigation into the invention claimed”) (citing Fulton). For these reasons, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in concluding that the determination of the optimum or workable range(s) given the guidance of the prior art would have been obvious to the skilled artisan. See Final Act. 7. Appellant next argues that the Examiner erred in combining the teachings of McPherson and Pang because “MCPHERSON provides no reasoning or teaching to alter the disclosed configuration of the power module as set forth in the Official Action” and “PANG provides no reasoning or teaching to alter the disclosed configuration of the gate driver as set forth in the Official Action.” Appeal Br. 17. Appellant contends that Appeal 2020-001134 Application 15/441,857 6 the Examiner engaged in impermissible hindsight in combining the cited references. Id. at 18. Appellant further argues that Pang teaches away from the claimed invention because Pang “teaches an implementation of the clamping circuit in the gate driver.” Id. at 20. We are not persuaded that the combination of McPherson and Pang is the result of improper hindsight, as the Examiner has set forth articulated reasoning with rational underpinnings for the combination. Ans. 7. Appellant has not identified any knowledge relied upon by the Examiner that was gleaned only from Appellant’s disclosure and that was not otherwise within the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time of invention. See In re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 1395 (CCPA 1971). Nor has Appellant provided objective evidence of secondary considerations, which “operates as a beneficial check on hindsight.” Cheese Sys., Inc. v. Tetra Pak Cheese and Powder Sys., Inc., 725 F.3d 1341, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2013). Appellant’s “teaching away” argument also fails because Appellant has not identified where Pang actually criticizes, discredits, or otherwise discourages the combination of teachings proposed by the Examiner. See In re Fulton, 391 F.3d at 1201; DePuy Spine, 567 F.3d at 1327. For these reasons, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in combining the cited teachings of McPherson and Pang. Appellant also attacks the Examiner’s taking Official Notice that a half bridge may be formed of an upper NMOSFET connected to a power supply and an output and a lower NMOSFET connected between the output and ground, and that the MOSFETs receive opposite gate signals to alternately turn on the transistors. See Appeal Br. 21; see also Final Act. 3–4 (citing US 7,292,451 to Rodriguez), Ans. 7. Appellant contends in a Appeal 2020-001134 Application 15/441,857 7 conclusory manner that “the noticed fact is not considered to be common knowledge or well-known in the art.” Appeal Br. 21. In support, Appellant argues only that “Appellant has reviewed the claims and no half bridge is recited by the claims.” Appeal Br. 21. We are not persuaded of error by Appellant’s arguments. Appellant does not adequately challenge the Examiner’s Official Notice that it was notoriously well known that that a half bridge may be formed of an upper NMOSFET connected to a power supply and an output and a lower NMOSFET connected between the output and ground, and that the MOSFETs receive opposite gate signals to alternately turn on the transistors. To adequately traverse the taking of Official Notice, Appellant must come forth with information or argument that, on its face, casts reasonable doubt regarding the justification of the Official Notice. See In re Boon, 439 F.2d 724, 728 (CCPA 1971) (explaining that an applicant has the right to challenge the official notice and demand production of evidence in support thereof, provided such challenge is accompanied by adequate information or argument that, on its face, creates a reasonable doubt regarding the circumstances justifying the official notice); see also MPEP § 2144.03(C). Because Appellant does not state persuasively why the noticed fact is not considered common knowledge or well-known in the art, Appellant has not adequately traversed the Examiner’s taking of Official Notice. Thus, the facts of which the Examiner took Official Notice are admitted prior art. See In re Ahlert, 424 F.2d 1088, 1091 (CCPA 1970) (where an applicant for a patent has failed to challenge a fact officially noticed by the Examiner, and it is clear that the applicant has been amply apprised of such finding so as to Appeal 2020-001134 Application 15/441,857 8 have the opportunity to make such challenge, the Examiner’s finding shall be considered conclusive). For these reasons, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in concluding that claim 1 is obvious in light of the teachings of McPherson and Pang. With regard to independent claim 10, Appellant makes a similar argument as that presented for claim 1 regarding the limitation “power module apparatus, comprising: ... a clamping circuit electrically connected to the at least one power device, the clamping circuit configured to clamp an input to a gate of the at least one power device,” as recited in claim 10. Appeal Br. 21. Appellant argues that “MCPHERSON does not disclose a clamping circuit; and PANG does not disclose a clamping circuit being integrated in the power module apparatus.” Id. at 26 (emphasis omitted). For the reasons discussed above with regard to claim 1, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in finding that the combined teachings of McPherson and Pang teach or suggest the disputed limitation. Also with regard to claim 10, Appellant makes an argument similar to that presented for claim 1 regarding the limitation “the clamping circuit is configured to clamp a voltage at the gate of the at least one power device to less than 10 V peak to peak,” as recited by claim 10. Id. at 27. Appellant makes similar arguments regarding the criticality of the clamping parameters (id. at 27–29), and argues that Pang teaches away from the recited limitation because “PANG is a configuration of a clamp circuit with a gate driver - not a power module.” (id. at 29). For the reasons discussed above for claim 1, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in concluding that the determination of the optimum or Appeal 2020-001134 Application 15/441,857 9 workable range(s) given the guidance of the prior art would have been obvious to the skilled artisan. See Final Act. 7. Appellant next argues that neither McPherson nor Pang teaches or suggests the limitation: power module apparatus, ... wherein the clamping circuit comprises a transistor discretely holding the at least one power device off; wherein the transistor is connected to the gate of the at least one power device; and wherein the transistor is connected to at least one of the following: a source/emitter of the at least one power device and a negative voltage bias (V), as recited by claim 10. Appeal Br. 30. Appellant argues that “[t]he control circuit 120 of PANG does not connect to ‘at least one of the following: a source/emitter of the at least one power device and a negative voltage bias (- V)’ as recited by claim 10.” Id. The Examiner found that the “clamping circuit” comprises a transistor (e.g., MN31 in Figures 2 and 3 of Pang) that is connected to the gate of the at least one power device (e.g., one of the upper NMOSFET and the lower NMOSFET making up the half bridge of 600 in Figure 2 of McPherson), connected between the output and ground and the MOSFETs to receive opposite gate signals to alternately turn on the transistors, wherein the transistor is connected to a source/emitter of the power device via the common ground (as shown in Figures 2 and 3 of Pang). Ans. 8. Because Appellant attacks Pang individually and presents no persuasive arguments regarding the Examiner’s findings directed to the combined teachings of McPherson and Pang (see Reply Br. 17), we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in finding that the combined teachings of McPherson and Pang teach or suggest the disputed limitation of claim 10. See Keller, 642 F.2d at 425. Appeal 2020-001134 Application 15/441,857 10 Appellant next argues that the Examiner erred in combining the teachings of McPherson and Pang. Appeal Br. 31–35. Appellant contends that the Examiner engaged in impermissible hindsight in combining the cited references. Id. at 33. Appellant further argues that Pang teaches an implementation of the clamping circuit in the gate driver, which teaches away from the claimed invention. Id. at 34. For the reasons discussed above with regard to claim 1, we are not persuaded that the combination of McPherson and Pang is the result of improper hindsight, or that Pang teaches away from the claimed invention. Appellant’s challenge to the Examiner’s taking of Official Notice with regard to claim 10 are similar to Appellant’s challenge to the Official Notice taken with respect to claim 1. Appeal Br. 20–21, 35. For the reasons set forth above with regard to claim 1, Appellant has not adequately traversed the Examiner’s taking of Official Notice for claim 10. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s § 103 rejection of independent claim 10. Appellant makes similar arguments for independent claim 16 (Appeal Br. 35–49), which we find unpersuasive for the reasons discussed above for claims 1 and 10. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s § 103 rejection of independent claim 16. Dependent Claims 2 and 11 Claim 2 depends from claim 1 and further recites “a control circuit implemented in the power module apparatus and configured to receive a gate drive signal from a gate driver, wherein the clamping circuit comprises a Appeal 2020-001134 Application 15/441,857 11 Miller clamp; and wherein the clamping circuit is responsive to the control circuit.” Appeal Br. 90 (Claims Appendix). In addition to the arguments made for claim 1, discussed above, Appellant argues that the gate driver of Pang does not include a control circuit implemented in the power module apparatus and configured to receive a gate drive signal from a gate driver, as claim 2 requires. Id. at 50. Appellant further argues that modifying the power module in McPherson in view of Pang’s gate driver to include “a control circuit implemented in the power module apparatus and configured to receive a gate drive signal from a gate driver ... and wherein the clamping circuit is responsive to the control circuit” would be “improper, unsupported, and an arbitrary rearrangement and positioning of the various components of MCPHERSON and PANG consistent with impermissible hindsight.” Id. at 51. We are not persuaded that the Examiner erred. Appellant’s arguments are conclusory, merely reciting the claim limitation, the teachings of Pang, and stating that the two are not the same. Id. As stated by the Federal Circuit, Rule 41.37 “require[s] more substantive arguments in an appeal brief than a mere recitation of the claim elements and a naked assertion that the corresponding elements were not found in the prior art.” In re Lovin, 652 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Moreover, the test for obviousness is not whether the claimed invention is expressly suggested in any one or all of the references, but whether the claimed subject matter would have been obvious to those of ordinary skill in the art in light of the combined teachings of those references. See Keller, 642 F.2d at 425. Here, Appellant has not persuasively rebutted the Examiner’s findings that the combination of McPherson and Pang teaches or suggests the disputed limitation. Appeal 2020-001134 Application 15/441,857 12 We are also not persuaded that the combination of McPherson and Pang is the result of improper hindsight, as the Examiner has set forth articulated reasoning with rational underpinnings for the combination. Ans. 7. Appellant has not identified any knowledge relied upon by the Examiner that was gleaned only from Appellant’s disclosure and that was not otherwise within the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time of invention. In re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d at 1395. Nor has Appellant provided objective evidence of secondary considerations, which “operates as a beneficial check on hindsight.” Cheese Sys., 725 F.3d at 1352. Accordingly, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 2. Appellant’s arguments for dependent claim 11 are similarly conclusory. See Appeal Br. 69–70. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s § 103 rejection of dependent claims 2 and 11. Dependent Claims 3, 12, and 18 Claim 3 depends from claim 1 and further recites: a signal line configured to receive a gate drive signal from a gate driver, wherein the clamping circuit is connected to the signal line between gate drive connectors and the at least one power device; wherein the clamping circuit is configured to clamp an input to the gate of the at least one power device; and wherein the clamping circuit is integrated in the power module apparatus and the clamping circuit is arranged with at least one of the following: a base plate, the power substrate, one of at least two power contacts, the at least one power device, the gate-source board, the gate drive connectors, and the housing. Appeal Br. 90–91 (Claims Appendix). The Examiner found that McPherson, as modified for claim 1, fails to teach that the clamping circuit is integrated with power device 500, as claim Appeal 2020-001134 Application 15/441,857 13 3 requires. Final Act. 6. The Examiner found, however, that it was notoriously well known to an artisan of ordinary skill that a clamping circuit may be integrated with a power device. Id. The Examiner took official notice of that fact, citing US 2015/0162321 to Briere. Id. The Examiner found that Briere teaches that a gate of MOSFET 220/420 in Figure 4 of Briere may be protected from high voltage using clamp 430, where the entire structure in Figure 4 may be monolithically integrated on common die 450. Id. (citing Briere ¶¶ 25, 38). In addition to the arguments made for claim 1, Appellant contends in a conclusory manner that modifying the McPherson power module in view of Pang’s gate driver to include the limitations of claim 3 “would be improper, unsupported, and an arbitrary rearrangement and positioning of the various components of MCPHERSON and PANG consistent with impermissible hindsight.” Appeal Br. 52–53. Appellant also argues in a conclusory manner, with regard to Briere, that “Appellant hereby states that the noticed fact is not considered to be common knowledge or well-known in the art.” Id. at 53. Appellant further argues that: [t]he ESD of BRIERE does not teach nor fairly disclose a “clamping circuit being configured to reduce a voltage charge up at a gate of the at least one power device to within 8 V of a desired voltage” as recited by claim 1, “clamping circuit is configured to clamp a voltage at the gate of the at least one power device to less than 10 V peak to peak” as recited by claim 11, and “clamping circuit is configured to reduce a voltage charge up at the gate of the at least one power device by at least 10%” as recited by claim 16. Appeal Br. 53. Appellant’s arguments do not persuade of Examiner error. Appellant does not put forth persuasive argument or objective evidence to rebut the Appeal 2020-001134 Application 15/441,857 14 Examiner’s finding that it was notoriously well known that a clamping circuit may be integrated with a power device. See id. Nor has Appellant persuasively rebutted the Examiner’s finding that gate drive connectors 700 in Figure 2 of McPherson “are disclosed in power module 100 corresponding to the power module apparatus of claim 3 and may be used to attach the clamping circuit integrated with power module 100.” Ans. 11. Moreover, for the reasons set forth above, we are not persuaded that the combination of McPherson and Pang is the result of improper hindsight. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s § 103 rejection of dependent claim 3. Appellant’s arguments for dependent claims 12 and 18, which depend from independent claims 10 and 16, respectively, are similarly unpersuasive. See Appeal Br. 70–72, 79–81. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s § 103 rejection of dependent claims 3, 12, and 18. Dependent Claims 4 and 14 Claim 4 ultimately depends from claim 1 and further recites “wherein the clamping circuit is configured to clamp a voltage at the gate of the at least one power device to less than 8 V peak to peak.” Appeal Br. 91 (Claims Appendix). As in claim 1, the Examiner found that such specific parameters in the degree of clamping by the clamping circuit will not support the patentability of the subject matter encompassed by the prior art unless there is evidence indicating the parameters are critical. Final Act. 6–7 (citing In re Aller, 220 F.2d 454, 456 (CCPA 1955)). In addition to the arguments made for claim 1, Appellant contends that, here again, the recited parameters in the degree of clamping by the clamping circuit are critical (Appeal Br. 55–56) and that Pang teaches away from them (id. at 56–57). Appeal 2020-001134 Application 15/441,857 15 We agree with the Examiner that, just as Appellant has not shown that reducing a voltage charge up at a gate of the at least one power device to within 8V of a desired voltage, as recited in claim 1, is not critical, Appellant also has not persuasively shown that clamping a voltage at the gate of the at least one power device to less than 8V peak to peak is critical. See Ans. 12. Moreover, Appellant’s “teaching” away” arguments with regard to Pang are unpersuasive for the reasons set forth above with regard to claim 1. Thus, we agree with the Examiner that the recited parameters in the degree of clamping by the clamping circuit will not support the patentability of the subject matter encompassed by the prior art for at least the same reasons discussed above for claim 1. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s § 103 rejection of dependent claim 4. Appellant’s arguments with regard to dependent claim 14 are similar and similarly unpersuasive. Appeal Br. 72–76. Thus, we also sustain the Examiner’s § 103 rejection of claim 14. Dependent Claim 5 Claim 5 ultimately depends from claim 1 and further recites “wherein the clamping circuit comprises a transistor discretely holding the at least one power device off; wherein the transistor is connected to the gate of the at least one power device; and wherein the transistor is connected to at least one of the following: a source/emitter of the at least one power device and a negative voltage bias (-V).” Appeal Br. 91 (Claims Appendix). In addition to the arguments made for claim 1, Appellant argues that McPherson and Pang do not teach or suggest “wherein the transistor is connected to at least one of the following: a source/emitter of the at least one Appeal 2020-001134 Application 15/441,857 16 power device and a negative voltage bias (-V).” Appeal Br. 58. Appellant argues that: the control circuit 120 of PANG is arranged with the gate driver as illustrated in Figures 2 and 3. Moreover, the control circuit 120 of PANG includes the transistor MN31 connected to ground. The control circuit 120 of PANG does not connect to ‘at least one of the following: a source/emitter of the at least one power device and a negative voltage bias (-V),’ as recited by claim 5. Id. Appellant attacks Pang individually, and has not addressed or persuasively rebutted the Examiner’s findings based on the combined teachings of McPhereson and Pang. For example, the Examiner found that: the transistor (e.g., MN31 in Figs. 2 and 3 of Pang) is connected to the gate of the at least one power device (e.g., one of the upper NMOSFET and the lower NMOSFET making up the half bridge of 600 in Fig. 2 of McPherson) connected between the output and ground and the MOSFETs receive opposite gate signals to alternately turn on the transistors, wherein the transistor is connected to a source/emitter of the power device via the ground. Final Act. 7; see Lovin, 652 F.3d at 1357; Keller, 642 F.2d at 425. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s § 103 rejection of dependent claim 5. Dependent Claims 6 and 15 Claim 6 depends from claim 1 and further recites “a sense and control circuit electrically connected to the clamping circuit, the sense and control circuit configured to control the clamping circuit as a function of a driver control signal.” Appeal Br. 92 (Claims Appendix). In addition to the arguments made for claim 1, Appellant further argues that McPherson and Pang do not teach the limitation additionally Appeal 2020-001134 Application 15/441,857 17 recited in claim 6 because “the control circuit 120 of PANG is arranged with the gate driver as illustrated in Figures 2 and 3.” Appeal Br. 59. Appellant also argues in a conclusory manner that modifying McPherson’s power module in view of Pang’s gate driver to include “a sense and control circuit electrically connected to the clamping circuit, the sense and control circuit configured to control the clamping circuit as a function of a driver control signal” would be “improper, unsupported, and an arbitrary rearrangement and positioning of the various components of MCPHERSON and PANG consistent with impermissible hindsight.” Id. at 59–60. Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive because Appellant argues claim 6 in a conclusory manner and attacks the Pang reference individually. Id.; see Lovin, 652 F.3d at 1357; Keller, 642 F.2d at 425. Appellant makes similar arguments for dependent claim 15 (Appeal Br. 76–77), which depends from independent claim 10 and recites limitations similar to those recited in claim 6 (id. at 94). Moreover, for the reasons set forth above, we are not persuaded that the combination of McPherson and Pang is the result of improper hindsight. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s § 103 rejection of dependent claims 6 and 15. Dependent Claims 7 and 17 Claim 7 depends from claim 6 and further recites “wherein the sense and control circuit is configured to control the clamping circuit as a function of the driver control signal based on a falling edge delay and rising edge pass through operation.” Appeal Br. 92. Appeal 2020-001134 Application 15/441,857 18 In addition to arguments similar to those made for claims 1 and 6, Appellant argues that McPherson and Pang do not teach or suggest the limitation recited in claim 7. Id. at 60. In particular, Appellant argues that the gate signal SG in Pang would not necessarily be present or inherent such that “the sense and control circuit is configured to control the clamping circuit as a function of the driver control signal based on a falling edge delay and rising edge pass through operation,” as recited in claim 7. Id. at 61. We are not persuaded that the Examiner erred. The Examiner found: in a semiconductor circuit such as the one shown in Fig. 3 [of Pang], there is always some delay through a path that a signal passes and logic gates forming part of such a semiconductor circuit also each have a delay between its input and output. Thus, the logic gates 121, 122, and 123 forming part of the semiconductor circuit in Fig. 3 of Pang and forming a path between SE and SF has an inherent delay. Ans. 13. In the Reply Brief, Appellant repeated the conclusory argument made in the Appeal Brief that the gate signal SG would not necessarily be present or inherent such that the disputed limitation is taught or suggested. Reply Br. 27. It is well settled that mere attorney arguments and conclusory statements, which are unsupported by factual evidence, are entitled to little probative value. In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also In re Pearson, 494 F.2d 1399, 1405 (CCPA 1974) (attorney argument is not evidence). For these reasons, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in finding that the combination of McPherson and Pang teaches or suggests the disputed limitation of claim 7. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s § 103 rejection of claim 7. Appellant makes similar arguments for dependent claim 17, which are Appeal 2020-001134 Application 15/441,857 19 similarly unpersuasive. Appeal Br. 78–79. Thus, we also sustain the Examiner’s § 103 rejection of claim 17. Dependent Claims 8 and 9 Claim 8 depends from claim 1 and further recites “wherein the clamping circuit is configured to reduce the voltage charge up at the gate of the at least one power device by at least 10%.” Appeal Br. 92. Claim 9 depends from claim 1 and further recites “wherein the clamping circuit is configured to reduce a voltage charge up at a gate of the at least one power device to within 6 V of a desired voltage.” Id. Appellant makes similar arguments for claims 8 and 9 as were presented for claim 1—namely, that the combination of McPherson and Pang do not teach or suggest a clamping circuit integrated into the power module apparatus, and that the parameters recited regarding the voltage charge are critical to the invention. Appeal Br. 62–69. For the reasons discussed above with regard to claim 1, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 8 and 9 under § 103. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s § 103 rejection of claims 8 and 9. Dependent Claim 20 Claim 20 depends from claim 16 and further recites “wherein the clamping circuit is configured to reduce the voltage charge up at the gate of the at least one power device by at least 30%.” Appeal Br. 96. Appellant makes similar arguments for claim 20 as were presented for claims 1 and 16—namely, that the combination of McPherson and Pang do not teach or suggest a clamping circuit integrated into the power module Appeal 2020-001134 Application 15/441,857 20 apparatus, and that the parameters recited regarding the voltage charge are critical to the invention. Appeal Br. 62–69. For the reasons discussed above with regard to claim 1, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 20 under § 103. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s § 103 rejection of claim 20. Dependent Claims 21 and 22 Claims 21 and 22 depend from claims 1 and 10, respectively. Both claims 21 and 22 recite the additional limitation “further comprising gate drive connectors configured to receive a gate drive signal from a gate driver, wherein the clamping circuit is connected to a signal line between the gate drive connectors and the at least one power device.” Appeal Br. 96. In addition to the arguments presented for claims 1 and 10, Appellant argues that modifying McPherson’s power module in view of Pang’s gate driver to include the power module apparatus of claim 1 or claim 10, “further comprising gate drive connectors configured to receive a gate drive signal from a gate driver, wherein the clamping circuit is connected to a signal line between the gate drive connectors and the at least one power device” would be “improper, unsupported, and an arbitrary rearrangement and positioning of the various components of MCPHERSON and PANG consistent with impermissible hindsight.” Appeal Br. 85–87. For the reasons set forth above, we are not persuaded that the combination of McPherson and Pang is the result of improper hindsight. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s § 103 rejection of dependent claims 21 and 22. Appeal 2020-001134 Application 15/441,857 21 DECISION We affirm the decision of the Examiner rejecting claims 1–12, 14–18, and 20–22. DECISION SUMMARY Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1–12, 14–18, 20–22 103 McPherson, Pang 1–12, 14–18, 20–22 TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation