Craig S. Etchegoyen

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Sep 24, 2019

13742972 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Sep. 24, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/742,972 01/16/2013 Craig S. Etchegoyen UN-NP-IM-086 2405
96051 7590 09/24/2019
Uniloc USA Inc.
102 N. College Avenue
Suite 303
Tyler, TX 75702
EXAMINER
PRATT, EHRIN LARMONT
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3629
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/24/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
kris.pangan@unilocusa.com
sean.burdick@unilocusa.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte CRAIG S. ETCHEGOYEN
____________

Appeal 2018-002359
Application 13/742,972
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before MURRIEL E. CRAWFORD, TARA L. HUTCHINGS, and
MATTHEW S. MEYER, Administrative Patent Judges.

CRAWFORD, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from the
Examiner’s final rejection of claims 1–10. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).

SUMMARY OF DECISION
We AFFIRM.

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THE INVENTION
Appellant claims “network-based computer services and, more
particularly, methods of and systems for accepting reports from anonymous
reporters while tracking reputations of individual reporters.” (Spec. ¶ 2.)
Claim 1 is representative of the subject matter on appeal.
1. A method for managing reputations of anonymous
sources of information, the method comprising:
generating, by a processor of a remotely located source
device, a one-way identifier by performing a combination of
operations on non-user-configurable data and user-configurable
data specific to the remotely located source device;
receiving, at a server, information from an anonymous
user via the remotely located source device through a computer
network, wherein the information includes the one-way
identifier;
deriving, by a processor of the server, reputation data
regarding the remotely located source device that represents a
measure of the veracity of information received from the
remotely located source device from feedback received from
other remotely located devices, wherein the feedback pertains
to one or more items of information previously received from
the remotely located source device; and
publishing, by a processor of the server, the information
received from the remotely located source device and
publishing, by a processor of the server, the reputation data
regarding the remotely located source device.

THE REJECTION
Claims 1–10 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to a
judicial exception without significantly more.
Claims 1–10 are rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
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unpatentable over Walker (US 5,884,272; Mar. 16, 1999) in view Johannsen
(US 2012/0215896 A1; Aug. 23, 2012) in further view of Shull
(US 2006/0212930 A1; Sept. 21, 2006).

ANALYSIS
35 U.S.C. § 101 REJECTION
We will sustain the rejection of claims 1–10 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
The Supreme Court
set forth a framework for distinguishing patents that claim laws
of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that
claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts. First, . . .
determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of
those patent-ineligible concepts. . . . If so, . . . then ask, “[w]hat
else is there in the claims before us?” . . . To answer that
question, . . . consider the elements of each claim both
individually and “as an ordered combination” to determine
whether the additional elements “transform the nature of the
claim” into a patent-eligible application. . . . [The Court]
described step two of this analysis as a search for an “‘inventive
concept’”—i.e., an element or combination of elements that is
“sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to
significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept]
itself.”
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 217–18 (2014) (citing Mayo
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72–73 (2012))
(citations omitted).
To perform this test, we must first determine whether the claims at
issue are directed to a patent-ineligible concept. The Federal Circuit has
explained that “the ‘directed to’ inquiry applies a stage-one filter to claims,
considered in light of the [S]pecification, based on whether ‘their character
as a whole is directed to excluded subject matter.’” See Enfish, LLC v.
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Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Internet
Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir.
2015)). It asks whether the focus of the claims is on a specific improvement
in relevant technology or on a process that itself qualifies as an “abstract
idea” for which computers are invoked merely as a tool. See id. at 1335–36.
In so doing we apply a “directed to” two prong test: 1) evaluate
whether the claim recites a judicial exception, and 2) if the claim recites a
judicial exception, evaluate whether the judicial exception is integrated into
a practical application. USPTO, 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter
Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Red. 50, 50–57 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Guidance”).
The Examiner determines that the claims are directed to “generating a
one-way identifier by performing a combination of operations on non-user-
configurable data and user-configurable data which is similar to concepts
related to processing of organizing information found mentally abstract in
‘Digitech.’” (Final Act. 2.) “[T]he claims are for a mental process (i.e., a
process of organizing information and reputation data information)[,] which
merely aids in associating and tracking reputational data with anonymous
sources as opposed to computer efficacy.” (Ans. 4.) The Examiner
determines that the claimed process “only recites generating, receiving, and
deriving the information and reputation data,” without adding any
meaningful limitation thereto. The publishing steps are limitations that add
insignificant extra solution activity to the judicial exception, such as merely
data transmitting in conjunction with the abstract ideas. (Id.).
The Specification discloses that systems by which individuals can
report incidents benefit from protecting the anonymity of the reporting
individuals, and is particularly true of whistle blowing systems in which
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individuals are encouraged to report wrong-doing. Unless the whistleblower
can remain anonymous, actual retribution can lead to costly legal
proceedings and unnecessary demonstrations of hostility. (Spec. ¶ 3.) The
Internet allows virtually anyone to write or report anything without being
limited by facts or honesty and without requiring the reporter to reveal his or
her identity. (Id. ¶ 4). What is needed is a way to evaluate and report
reputations of anonymous reporters of information. (Id. ¶ 7.) The
Specification, therefore, supports the Examiner’s determination that the
claims are directed to a mental process i.e., a process of organizing
information through mathematical correlations.
Claim 1 recites “receiving . . . information from an anonymous user,”
“deriving . . . reputation data,” “deriving . . . reputation data . . . that
represents a measure of the veracity of information,” and “publishing . . .
reputation data.” As such, claim 1 also supports the Examiner’s
determination that the claims are directed to a mental process, i.e., a process
of organizing information through mathematical correlations.
The steps of claim 1 constitute “analyzing information by steps people
go through in their minds, or by mathematical algorithms, which without
more, is essentially mental processes within the abstract-idea category.”
Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir.
2016); see also buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed.
Cir. 2014) (claims directed to certain arrangements involving contractual
relations are directed to abstract ideas). We, thus, agree with the Examiner’s
determination that the claims are directed to a mental process which is a
judicial exception. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52.
Turning to the second prong of the “directed to test”, claim 1 requires
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“processors,” a “server” and a “computer network.” These recitations do not
impose “a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is
more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception.”
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 53. We find no indication in the Specification,
nor does Appellant direct us to any indication, that the operations recited in
independent claim 1 invoke any inventive programming, require any
specialized computer hardware or other inventive computer components,
i.e., a particular machine, or that the claimed invention is implemented using
other than generic computer components to perform generic computer
functions. See DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245,
1256 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[A]fter Alice, there can remain no doubt: recitation
of generic computer limitations does not make an otherwise ineligible claim
patent-eligible.”).
We also find no indication in the Specification that the claimed
invention effects a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a
different state or thing. Nor do we find anything of record, short of attorney
argument, that attributes any improvement in computer technology and/or
functionality to the claimed invention or that otherwise indicates that the
claimed invention integrates the abstract idea into a “practical application,”
as that phrase is used in the revised Guidance. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg.
at 55.
In this regard, the recitation does not affect an improvement in the
functioning of the processors, servers, network or other technology, does not
recite a particular machine or manufacture that is integral to the claims, and
does not transform or reduce a particular article to a different state or thing.
The Specification discloses that the server computer, for example, includes
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one or more microprocessors that retrieve data and/or instructions from
memory and execute retrieved instructions in a conventional manner which
indicates that the computer is a generic computer. The Specification also
discloses that the memory of the server computer can include generally any
computer-readable medium including, for example, persistent memory such
as magnetic and/or optical disks, ROM, and PROM and volatile memory
such as RAM. The network is discloses as a wide area network, the Internet
or a mobile device data network. (Spec. ¶ 52.) Thus, claim 1 is directed to a
judicial exception that is not integrated into a practical application and, thus,
is directed to an abstract idea.
Turning to the second step of the Alice analysis, because we find that
the claims are directed to an abstract idea, the claims must include an
“inventive concept” in order to be patent-eligible, i.e., there must be an
element or combination of elements that is sufficient to ensure that the claim
in practice amounts to significantly more than the abstract idea itself. See
Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–73).
The introduction of processors into the claims does not alter the
analysis at Alice step two.
[T]he mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a
patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.
Stating an abstract idea “while adding the words ‘apply it’” is
not enough for patent eligibility. Nor is limiting the use of an
abstract idea “‘to a particular technological environment.’”
Stating an abstract idea while adding the words “apply it with a
computer” simply combines those two steps, with the same
deficient result. Thus, if a patent’s recitation of a computer
amounts to a mere instruction to “implemen[t]” an abstract idea
“on . . . a computer,” that addition cannot impart patent
eligibility. This conclusion accords with the pre-emption
concern that undergirds our § 101 jurisprudence. Given the
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ubiquity of computers, wholly generic computer
implementation is not generally the sort of “additional
featur[e]” that provides any “practical assurance that the
process is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize
the [abstract idea] itself.”
Alice, 573 U.S. at 223 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
Instead, “the relevant question is whether the claims here do more
than simply instruct the practitioner to implement the abstract idea . . . on a
generic computer.” Id. at 225. They do not.
Taking the claim elements separately, the function performed by the
computer at each step of the process is purely conventional. Using a
computer to retrieve, select, and apply decision criteria to data and modify
the data as a result amounts to electronic data query and retrieval—one of
the most basic functions of a computer. All of these computer functions are
well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the
trading industry. See Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1354; see also In re
Katz Interactive Call Processing Pat. Litig., 639 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (“Absent a possible narrower construction of the terms ‘processing,’
‘receiving,’ and ‘storing,’ . . . those functions can be achieved by any
general purpose computer without special programming”). In short, each
step does no more than require a generic computer to perform generic
computer functions. As to the data operated upon, “even if a process of
collecting and analyzing information is ‘limited to particular content’ or a
particular ‘source,’ that limitation does not make the collection and analysis
other than abstract.” SAP Am., Inc. v. Investpic, LLC, 890 F.3d 1016, 1022
(Fed. Cir. 2018).
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Considered as an ordered combination, the computer components of
Appellant’s claims add nothing that is not already present when the steps are
considered separately.
The claims do not, for example, purport to improve the functioning of
the computer or network. As we stated above, the claims do not affect an
improvement in any other technology or technical field. The Specification
spells out different generic equipment and parameters that might be applied
using this concept and the particular steps such conventional processing
would entail based on the concept of information access under different
scenarios. (See, e.g., Spec. ¶ 53.) Thus, the claims at issue amount to
nothing significantly more than instructions to apply the abstract idea of
organizing information through mathematical correlations using some
unspecified, generic computer. Under our precedents, that is not enough to
transform an abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. See Alice, 573
U.S. at 226.
We have reviewed all the arguments (Appeal Br. 13–18; Reply Br. 3–
8) Appellant has submitted concerning the patent eligibility of the claims
before us that stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101. We find that our
analysis above substantially covers the substance of all the arguments, which
have been made. But, for purposes of completeness, we will address various
arguments in order to make individual rebuttals of same.
We are not persuaded of error on the part of the Examiner by
Appellant’s argument that the claims provide a technological solution to a
technological problem because the claims provide not only the transmission
of substantive information but also information that can be used to associate
and track reputational data with anonymous sources. (Appeal Br. 13–14.)
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We agree with the Examiner’s response to this argument found on page 4 of
the Answer and adopt the same as our own. Specifically, we agree that
given that the claims are for a mental process that merely aids in associating
and tracking reputational data with anonymous sources as opposed to
computer efficacy, there is no inventive concept that takes the claims beyond
their abstract idea. Also, as noted above, even if a process of collecting and
analyzing information is limited to particular content or a particular content,
that limitation does not make the collection and analysis other than abstract.
We are not persuaded of error on the part of the Examiner by
Appellant’s argument, relying on DDR, that the claims recite a solution that
is necessarily rooted in computer technology because the claims recite
specialized computer software/hardware connections to generate complex
one-way identifiers associated with source devices for transmission along
with substantive information that can be utilized to generate reputational
data. (Appeal Br. 14.)
This argument is not persuasive first because the Appellant has not
explained where these specialized computer connections are recited in
claim 1. In our view, claim 1 recites, and the Specification discloses,
specifically in regard to the server processor, that the server retrieves
instructions from memory and executes retrieved instructions in a
conventional manner.
Second, we do not agree that the claims are analogous to the claims in
DDR. In DDR, the Court evaluated the eligibility of claims “address[ing]
the problem of retaining website visitors that, if adhering to the routine,
conventional functioning of Internet hyperlink protocol, would be instantly
transported away from a host’s website after ‘clicking’ on an advertisement
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and activating a hyperlink.” DDR, 773 F.3d at 1257. There, the Court found
that the claims were patent eligible because they transformed the manner in
which a hyperlink typically functions to resolve a problem that had no “pre-
Internet analog.” Id. at 1258. The Court cautioned, however, “that not all
claims purporting to address Internet-centric challenges are eligible for
patent.” Id. For example, in DDR the Court distinguished the patent-
eligible claims at issue from claims found patent-ineligible in Ultramercial.
See DDR, 773 F.3d at 1258–59 (citing Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 715–16).
As noted there, the Ultramercial claims were “directed to a specific method
of advertising and content distribution that was previously unknown and
never employed on the Internet before.” Id. at 1258 (quoting Ultramercial,
772 F.3d at 715–16). Nevertheless, those claims were patent ineligible
because they “merely recite[d] the abstract idea of ‘offering media content in
exchange for viewing an advertisement,’ along with ‘routine additional steps
such as updating an activity log, requiring a request from the consumer to
view the ad, restrictions on public access, and use of the Internet.’” Id.
Appellant’s asserted claims are analogous to claims found ineligible
in Ultramercial and distinct from claims found eligible in DDR. The
ineligible claims in Ultramercial recited “providing [a] media product for
sale at an Internet website;” “restricting general public access to said media
product;” “receiving from the consumer a request to view [a] sponsor
message;” and “if the sponsor message is an interactive message, presenting
at least one query to the consumer and allowing said consumer access to said
media product after receiving a response to said at least one query.”
Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 712. Similarly, Appellant’s asserted claims recite
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receiving, analyzing, modifying, and transmitting data. This is precisely the
type of Internet activity found ineligible in Ultramercial.
We are not persuaded of error on the part of the Examiner by
Appellant’s argument that the claims are like the claims in Amdocs (Israel)
Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2016). (Appeal
Br. 17; Reply Br. 7–8.) In Amdocs, the court held that “[claim 1] is eligible
under step two because it contains a sufficient ‘inventive concept.”’ Amdocs,
841 F.3d at 1300. The claim at issue recited “computer code for using the
accounting information with which the first network accounting record is
correlated to enhance the first network accounting record.” Id. The court
explained that the “claim entails an unconventional technological solution
(enhancing data in a distributed fashion) to a technological problem
(massive record flows [that] previously required massive databases).” Id.
The court noted that, although the solution requires generic computer
components, “the claim’s enhancing limitation necessarily requires that
these generic components operate in an unconventional manner to achieve
an improvement in computer functionality.” Id. at 1300–01. When
determining that the claim was patent eligible, the Federal Circuit explained
that the “enhancing limitation necessarily involves the arguably generic
gatherers, network devices, and other components working in an
unconventional distributed fashion to solve a particular technological
problem.” Id. at 1301. The court distinguished the claim from the claims
held unpatentable on the grounds that the “enhancing limitation . . .
necessarily incorporates the invention's distributed architecture—an
architecture providing a technological solution to a technological problem.”
Amdocs, 841 F.3d at 1301 (citations omitted).
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But unlike the generic components at issue in Amdocs, the generic
components recited in claim 1 here do not operate in an unconventional
manner to achieve an improvement in computer functionality. Rather, they
merely receive, process and display data, which are basic computer
functions. See Inventor Holdings, 876 F.3d at 1378 (citation omitted)
(holding that considering claims reciting data retrieval, analysis,
modification, generation, display, and transmission as an “ordered
combination” reveals that they “‘amount to “nothing significantly more”
than an instruction to apply [an] abstract idea’ using generic computer
technology”).
In view of the foregoing, we will sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
claim 1. We will also sustain the rejection as it is directed to the remaining
claims because Appellant has not argued the separate eligibility of these
claims.

REJECTION UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
We will not sustain this rejection because we agree with Appellant
that the prior art does not disclose deriving reputation data regarding a
remotely located source device that represents a measure of veracity of
information based on “information [previously] received from the remotely
located source device.” The Examiner relies on Schull at paragraphs 37–38,
50–52, and 72–77 for teaching this subject matter. (Final Act. 9.)
We find that Schull discloses that trust scores may be provided to
third parties to allow those third parties to make determinations about the
trustworthiness of the online entity based on information previously received
from the entity. (Schull ¶ 37.) The trust scores are calculated based on
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information stored in one or more databases that can be used to provide
records, experience and/or other information about the ownership,
relationship, historical, and/or behavior attributes of the entities. The
databases are used to determine associations between online entities and
illicit behaviors such as phishing, unwanted spam, fraudulent sales etc. (id. ¶
38). Schull, however, does not disclose that trust scores are a measure of
veracity. Rather, the trust scores in Schull are a measure of illicit activities
of the entity not on the veracity of information previously received from the
entity.
In view of the foregoing, we will not sustain the Examiner’s rejection
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) of claim 1 and claims 2–4 dependent therefrom.
We will also not sustain the rejection as it is directed to the remaining claims
for the same reason.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
We conclude the Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 1–10 under
35 U.S.C. § 101.
We conclude the Examiner did err in rejecting claims 1–10 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a).

DECISION
The decision of the Examiner to reject claims 1–10 is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED