EEOC Appeal No. 0120150453
04-05-2017
Corie E. v. U.S. Postal Serv.
U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Operations
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, DC 20013
Corie E.,1
Complainant,
v.
Megan J. Brennan,
Postmaster General,
United States Postal Service
(Southern Area),
Agency.
Appeal No. 0120150453
Hearing No. 430-20130-0292X
Agency No. 1K-276-0001-13
DECISION
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission) accepts Complainant's appeal, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.403(a), from the Agency's October 10, 2014 final order concerning an equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint claiming employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.
BACKGROUND
During the period at issue, Complainant worked the Agency's Processing and Distribution Center (P&DC) in Raleigh, North Carolina.
On January 31, 2013, Complainant filed a formal complaint alleging that the Agency discriminated against her on the bases of race (white) and sex (female) when:
1. on or about September 18, 2012, the Agency denied Complainant the opportunity to detail to one of three details offered for her Tour 2 hours.
After the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the report of investigation and notice of her right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant timely requested a hearing.
On November 6, 2013, the Agency submitted a Motion for a Decision Without a Hearing. The AJ determined that the record did not reflect a response from Complainant. On October 3, 2014, the AJ issued a decision by summary judgment in favor of the Agency.
In reaching her decision, the AJ determined the following undisputed:
At the time of the complaint, Complainant was assigned to work as a Mail Processing Clerk at the Agency's Processing and Distribution Center (P&DC) in Raleigh, North Carolina.
During the relevant period, Complainant moved to South Hill, Virginia to care for her mother. As a result, Complainant's commute time to work significantly increased. In August 2012, Complainant requested to be transferred to an area closer to her home. Complainant claimed that she was offered, by various supervisors, three details: 1) a 204b position at various locations in Henderson, and Greensboro North Carolina; 2) count/ride routes at another station; and, 3) a Retail Specialist in Customer Service position in Tour 2. Complainant asserted that she was willing to accept any of the three details. The Plant Manager, however, denied her requests for these details.
On September 18, 2012, Complainant met with the Plant Manager, who stated that she would not allow anyone to detail out of the facility unless the opportunity led to a "full-time, permanent position."
During the investigation, the Plant Manager stated that she did not approve of any details outside of the Raleigh P&DC because she needed the manpower at the Raliegh P&DC. The Plant Manager acknowledged that there were two individuals on details within the Raleigh P&DC: one female and one male employee, both black (hereinafter referred to as "CW1" and "CW2"). The Plant Manger noted that CW1 was detailed into a Secretary position prior to the Plant Manager's arrival and that she allowed CW1 to remain in the detail. CW2 was detailed to a Tour 3 position at the Raleigh P&DC.
Based on this evidence, the AJ determined that Agency management had articulated legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its actions. Specifically, the AJ determined that the Plant Manager did not approve of any details outside of the Raleigh P&DC, and that CW1 and CW2 had been detailed to positions within Raleigh P&DC by other supervisors. The AJ determined that Complainant failed to demonstrate how anything other than the Plant Manager's needs for manpower at the Raleigh P&DC motivated the Plant Manager to deny Complainant's details to other locations outside of the Raleigh P&DC. Thus, the AJ concluded that Complainant had failed to demonstrate that the Agency's reasoning was pretext for discrimination on the basis of her race or sex.
On October 10, 2014, the Agency issued a final order adopting the AJ's finding that Complainant failed to prove that the Agency subjected her to discrimination as alleged.
The instant appeal followed. On appeal, Complainant contends that there are genuine issues of material fact in dispute, and that a hearing is required to resolve the discrepancies. Complainant contends that the Plant Manager's reasons for denying her details fluctuated. Complainant went on to dispute several other "facts" determined by the AJ, including that contrary to what the AJ stated, she did submit an opposition brief to the Agency's Motion for a Decision Without a Hearing, and that the AJ incorrectly identified Complainant's start date.
The Agency responded and argues that even if various statements about Complainant's employment history or other events were incorrect, none of the errors identified made a material difference in the correctness of the AJ's decision. The Agency argued that the AJ's decision was carefully analyzed and that there is no reason to disturb the AJ's decision.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact. This regulation is patterned after the summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment is appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment a court does not sit as a fact finder. Id. The evidence of the nonmoving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the nonmoving party's favor. Id. A disputed issue of fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2D 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material" if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case. If a case can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, summary judgment is not appropriate. In the context of an administrative proceeding under Title VII, an AJ may properly consider summary judgment only upon a determination that the record has been adequately developed for summary disposition.
On appeal, Complainant argues that the AJ erred in issuing summary judgment because there are material facts at issue. However, in order to successfully oppose a decision by summary judgment, a complainant must identify, with specificity, facts in dispute either within the record or by producing further supporting evidence, and must further establish that such facts are material under applicable law. While Complainant has, in a very general sense, asserted that facts are in dispute, she has failed to point with any specificity to particular evidence in the investigative file or other evidence of record that indicates such a dispute.
For the reasons discussed below, we find that, even construing any inferences raised by the undisputed facts in favor of Complainant, a reasonable fact-finder could not find in her favor. Therefore, we find that the AJ properly issued a decision here by summary judgment.
A claim of disparate treatment is examined under the three-part analysis first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). For complainant to prevail, he must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained, reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that a prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment action. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). The burden then shifts to the agency to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. See Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). Once the agency has met its burden, the complainant bears the ultimate responsibility to persuade the fact finder by a preponderance of the evidence that the agency acted on the basis of a prohibited reason. See St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
This established order of analysis in discrimination cases, in which the first step normally consists of determining the existence of a prima facie case, need not be followed in all cases. Where the agency has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the personnel action at issue, the factual inquiry can proceed directly to the third step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the ultimate issue of whether complainant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the agency's actions were motivated by discrimination. See U.S. Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-714 (1983); Hernandez v. Department of Transportation, EEOC Request No. 05900159 (June 28, 1990); Peterson v. Department of Health and Human Services, EEOC Request No. 05900467 (June 8, 1990); Washington v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Petition No. 03900056 (May 31, 1990).
Here, the Plant Manager explained that she denied Complainant's requests for details because she refused to detail employees outside of the Raleigh P&DC because she needed the manpower for her own facility. There was no evidence presented that the Plant Manager deviated from this policy. The Plant Manager acknowledged that while CW1 and CW2 were on details at the P&DC, those details were approved by other supervisors before she became the plant manager, and they were still providing staffing within the plant, as opposed to being on a detail at another facility. Complainant, below and on appeal, did not provide any evidence to contradict these statements, or to reflect any inconsistency in the Plant Manager's need to have employees available within the facility where Complainant is employed..
The record supports the AJ's determination that the Agency's proffered reasons regarding the claim were legitimate and non-discriminatory. Complainant did not provide persuasive arguments, below or on appeal, that the Agency's actions were pretext for discrimination based on her race or sex.
CONCLUSION
Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal, we AFFIRM the Agency's final order implementing the AJ's final decision finding no discrimination.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0416)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the Agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 � VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The requests may be submitted via regular mail to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail to 131 M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815)
If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may request the court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant's Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time limits).
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________ Carlton M.
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
April 5, 2017
__________________
Date
1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant's name when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission's website.
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