Coppus Engineering Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 21, 1956

115 N.L.R.B. 1387 (N.L.R.B. 1956)

COPPUS ENGINEERING CORPORATION 1'3$7
revised tally indicates that Orr's ballot may be determinative of the
results of the election, the Board will, upon being so advised by the
Regional Director, give further consideration to the disposition, of
Orr's ballot.
[The Board directed that the Regional Director for the Sixteenth
Region shall, within ten (10) days from the date of this decision,
open and count the ballots of employees Scaperlanda, Everett, Nelson,
Remmers, Bullacher, Johnson, McFarland, and Holly and serve upon
the parties a revised tally of ballots. If the ballot of Margaret Orr
affects the results of the election, the Regional Director is. hereby
.directed to advise the Board in order that appropriate action may. be
taken.]
[The Board ordered the above-entitled matter referred to the
Regional Director for disposition as provided for herein.]
Coppus Engineering Corporation and United Steelworkers of
America, AFL-CIO. Case No. 1-CA-2010. May 21, 1956
DECISION AND ORDER
. On February 27, 1956, Trial Examiner Louis Libbin issued his In-
termediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the
Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor
practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and
take certain affirmative action, as. set forth in the Intermediate Re-
port attached hereto. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions
to the Intermediate Report and a supporting brief.'
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at
the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Inter-
.mediate Report, the Respondent's exceptions and brief, and the entire
record in this case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and
recommendations of the Trial Examiner.
ORDER
Upon the entire record in this case, and pursuant to Section 10 (c)
o6f 't'ie -National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondent, Coppus Engi-
neering Corporation, Worcester, Massachusetts, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall :
? The Respondent also requested ,oral argument: The request .is denied as the record,
Including the exceptions and brief, adequately presents the issues and the positions of
the parties.
115 NLRB No, 220.
1388 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
1. Cease and desist from :
(a) Assisting, dominating, contributing financial or other support
to, or interfering with the administration of, the Shop Committee,
or any other labor organization.
(b) Otherwise interfering with the representation of its employees
through a labor organization of their own choosing:
(c) Recognizing the Shop Committee, or• any successor thereto, as
the representative of any of its employees for the purpose of dealing
with the Respondent concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages,
rates of .pay, hours of employment, or other terms or conditions of
employment.
2. Take the following affirmative action which the Board fuids will
effectuate the policies of the Act :
(a) Withdraw and withhold all recognition from, and completely
disestablish, the Shop Committee, or any successor thereto, as the
representative of any of its employees for the purpose of dealing with
the -Respondent concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates
of pay, hours of employment, or other terms or conditions of 'em-
ployment.
(b) Post at its plant in Worcester, Massachusetts, copies of the
notice attached to the Intermediate Report marked "Appendix A." 2
Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for
the First Region, shall, after being duly signed by a representative
of the Respondent, be posted by the Respondent immediately upon
receipt thereof and be maintained by it for a period of sixty (60)
consecutive days thereafter in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps
shall be taken to insure that such notices are not altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for the First Region in writing,
within ten (10) days from the date of this Order, what steps the
Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
MEMBER BEAN took no part in the consideration of the above Decision
and Order.
2 This notice shall be amended , by substituting for the words "The Recommendations of
a Trial Examiner" In the caption thereof, the words "A Decision and Order " In the
event that this Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, there
shall be substituted for the words "Pursuant to a Decision and Order" the words "Pur-
suant to a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals , Enforcing an Order."
INTERMEDIATE REPORT AND RECOMMENDED ORDER
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon charges filed by United Steelworkers of America , AFL-CIO, herein called
the ,Union , the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, by the
Regional Director for the First Region (Boston , Massachusetts), issued his com-
plaint dated January 10 , 1956 , against Coppus Engineering Corporation , herein called
the Respondent . The complaint alleges, in substance , that the Respondent engaged
COPPUS ENGINEERING CORPORATION 1389
in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (2) and (1) and
Section 2 (6) and (7) of the National Labor Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136, herein
called the Act, by dominating, assisting, contributing to the support of, and inter-
fering with the administration of, a labor organization called the Shop Committee.
Copies of the complaint, charge, and notice of bearing were served upon the
Respondent, the Shop Committee, and the Union. In its duly filed answer the
Respondent specifically denied that the Shop Committee is a labor organization
within the meaning of the Act and generally denied the unfair labor practice allega-
tions. The Shop Committee did pot file an answer. -
Pursuant to due notice, a hearing was held on January 31, 1956, at Worcester,
Massachusetts. The Respondent, the Union, and the General Counsel were repre-
sented at the hearing by counsel. The Shop Committee did not enter an appearance
and was unrepresented at the hearing, although the current chairman of the .Shop.,
Committee testified as a witness for the Respondent and was present in the hearing
room when witnesses testified on behalf of the General Counsel and the Respondent.
All parties were afforded -full opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-
examine witnesses, to introduce relevant evidence, to present oral argument at the
close of the hearing, and thereafter to file briefs as well as proposed findings of
fact and conclusions of law. Respondent's motions to dismiss the allegations of
the complaint, made at the close of the hearing and upon which I reserved ruling,
are disposed of in accordance with the findings of fact and conclusions of law made
herein. After the close of the hearing, the General Counsel, the Respondent, and
the Union filed briefs which I have fully considered.
Upon the entire record in the case, and from my observation of the witnesses,
I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
The Respondent, a Massachusetts corporation, is engaged at Worcester, Massa-
chusetts, in the manufacture, sale, and distribution of steam turbines, blowers, air
filters, and related products. During the last calendar year, the Respondent shipped
finished products, valued in excess of $100,000, to points located outside the Com-
monwealth of Massachusetts. Upon the above-admitted facts, I find, as the Re-
spondent concedes, that the Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning
of the Act.
H. THE ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED
The complaint alleges, the Respondent has stipulated, and I find that United Steel-
workers of America, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of the
Act. The Respondent has denied in its answer , and refused to concede at the hearing,
that the Shop Committee is also a labor organization within the meaning of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
Respondent's Violations of the Act With Respect to the Shop Committee
The Shop Committee was established in 1952 and has continued to function until
its recent suspension pending the outcome of the hearing in this proceeding. There
is no serious-dispute concerning the formation and operation of the Shop Commit-
tee and the Respondent's relationship thereto. The issues in dispute are: (I) Whether
the Shop Committee is a labor organization within the meaning of the Act;
(2) whether the Respondent has rendered unlawful assistance and support to the
Shop, Committee; and (3) whether the Respondent has dominated and interfered
with the administration of the Shop Committee.
1. Formation and operation of the Shop Committee prior to April 21, 1955
On September 11, 1952, the Union filed with the Board a petition for certification as
collective-bargaining representative of the Respondent's production and maintenance
employees.' As the Respondent did not agree to recognize the Union as such repre-
sentative, an election was held on October 7, 1952. The Union failed to receive a
majority of the votes cast in this election.
Shortly thereafter, the Respondent's president, Jerome George, called a meeting
of the production and maintenance employees at the plant .2 Mr. George made a
11-RC-2947 (not reported in printed volumes of Board Decisions and Orders).
2 The official transcript of the hearing is hereby ordered corrected by substituting the
word "at" for the word "that" on line 3 of page 13. This is to correct an obvious typo-
graphical error in the stipulation of the parties.
1390 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS, BOARD
short speech and suggested to the employees "that they have a permanent grievance
committee , if that is what they wanted to call it , to handle grievances" with'manage-
ment . Mr. George then left the meeting and the employees proceeded to nominate'
members of the Shop Committee from among their number . A ballot was then,
drawn up and some days later an election was held at the plant . The five employees,
who received the largest number of votes constituted the original Shop Committee.
The Shop Committee decided that the employee who had received the largest number
of votes should serve as chairman.
Since its establishment the Shop Committee has handled not only individtial,em.
ployee grievances but has also dealt with management on wages , hours, pensions,
holidays, and other working conditions. •
In February 1954, the Respondent published at its own expense and distributed'
to all employees an 11 -page booklet, with the cover containing the title, "Plant Rules
and Policies ," and the Respondent 's name at the bottom . This booklet sets forth
the Respondent 's rules and policies under 6 Roman numeraled topic headings, the
last 5 entitled "II SENIORITY," "III WORKING HOURS, OVERTIME PAY, AND-
ABSENCE FROM WORK," "IV VACATION," "V HOLIDAYS," and "VI SAFETY
AND HEALTH." The Respondent 's name and address appear again on the bottom'
of the last page . The first page contains the general heading in large, bold black type
!`PLANT RULES AND POLICIES." Directly under' that appears the first topic
heading and its contents as follows:
1. THE SHOP COMMITTEE
The Shop Committee is set up under the following rules:
1. The committee shall act as representatives of the employee and not as
sole bargaining agents.
2. The limitations of the powers vested in the committee shall be determined
by the majority of the shop employees.
3. In the event that a committee member is found guilty of negligence in the
performance of his duties, he shall, by a majority-vote of the employees, be
asked to relinquish his position as a committee member.
4. The initial or present committee shall serve for a period of one (1) year:
Upon the expiration date of the one year period, two of the present committee
members shall be retained for an additional period, of six months. The remain-'
ing three (3) positions of the committee shall be voted upon for a one year
period.
5. The committee shall be subject to report to the shop employees all matters
of discussion with the management, which pertains to the welfare of the shop
employees, excepting that information which in the opinion of the committees
may prove to be detrimental to the efficient operation of said committee.
6. In the event of employment termination, the unexpired term of a committee
member shall be filled by the losing candidate who received the largest number
of votes.
7. The committee shall report to the employees on the very next scheduled
working day following a meeting with management to convey to the employees
any information regarding the progress being made in connection with tenta-
tive agreements to be reached upon by management and the employees.
The Shop Committee will meet once a month at a regular time to be selected-
by management and committee.
Although the foregoing rules were drafted by the Shop Committee and approved
by the employees at a meeting held at the plant, a typewritten copy was submitted to
management without employee approval .3 Raymond Forkey, the Respondent's vice
president in charge of production who was a management representative at meetings.
with the Shop Committee, admitted that most of the matters contained in the booklet
were discussed with the Shop Committee and that some of the provisions set forth
therein as Respondent's plant rules and policies resulted from meetings with the
Shop Committee.
8 Employee Richard J Hannan, a witness for the General Counsel, testified that he
participated in the drafting of these rules, which he at one point designated as bylaws,
but could not remember the circumstances under which a copy was submitted to manage-
ment. The Respondent made no attempt to adduce testimony from any of its employee
or management witnesses in this respect.
COPPUS ENGINEERING CORPORATION 1391
The Shop -Committee has at all times functioned in accordance with the provisions
set forth in the booklet . And a copy of this booklet was also given to every new
employee hired by the Respondent. -
- Elections of Shop Committee members were held twice a year at the plant during
the lunch period , with the Respondent's knowledge . During 1 of these annual
periods, 3 members were elected ; during the other period , 2 were elected. The
Shop Committee members asked the employees for 12 volunteers ; the chairman-
then appointed a ballot committee of 3 employees who typed the ballots and distrib-J
uted them to each employee ; the election was then held at the plant during the lunch-
period on the following day; the ballot committee collected and counted the ballots;-' -
and the 3 employees receiving the highest number of votes were declared elected.-
Notice of the election results were posted by the committee on all plant bulletin-
boards. Sometimes the election meetings ran beyond the one-half hour lunch-
period . On those occasions -the employees in attendance received their regular pay,
for such time. All facilities and equipment involved in conducting elections , such as=
ballots and the use of typewriters , are obtained at the plant.
The rules make no provisions for general employee meetings to canvass their-
grievances and to formulate their demands in common . Such meetings were
usually held whenever the chairman "tells the committee members that it was about
time" for a meeting. The employees are informed of such meetings by a notice
typed by the committee chairman and posted by him on the plant bulletin boards.
These meetings are held in the Respondent 's machine shop during the one-half
hour lunch period . At these meetings the employees bring up the subject matters
which they would like to have the Shop Committee discuss with management.
The Shop Committee then draws up an agenda which is submitted to Mr . Forkey,,
the Respondent 's vice president . Mr. Forkey then notifies the Shop Committee by
a notice posted on the plant bulletin boards of the time set for a meeting with
management . Meetings with management are held in the president 's office during-
working hours and frequently last beyond the normal workday. The following-
day the Shop Committee reports the results of its meeting with management at a
meeting of the employees held at the machine shop during the lunch period.
When employee meetings last beyond the regular lunch period , as they frequently
do, all employees in attendance continue to be paid their regular wages for that
period . The committee members are paid their regular wages for time spent at
management meetings during working hours and are paid time and a half for the-
period beyond the normal workday .4 A committee member, who acts as secretary,
types the minutes of the employee meetings and of meetings with management,-
using plant facilities . Vice-President Forkey also types the minutes of the Shop
Committee meetings with management and furnishes a copy to the Shop Committee.
The Shop Committee has no constitution or bylaws other than what appears in
the booklet as the Respondent 's plant rules and policies . There are no dues re-
quirements , no provisions or requirements for employee membership, and no
indicia of membership for the employees . No elections or employee meetings have
ever been held off the plant premises . The Shop Committee has no source of funds
and uses whatever plant facilities are necessary for its operation and functioning.
2. Operations of the Shop Committee since April 21, 1955
The Shop Committee has continued to exist and function in all respects in the
same manner as previously described , until its recent suspension pending the outcome
of this proceeding .5 The Respondent has continued to furnish to each new em-
ployee a copy of the booklet setting forth the structure and operations of the Shop,
Committee as the Respondent 's plant rules and policies ; Vice-President Forkey has
continued to supply the Shop Committee with a typewritten copy of his prepared
minutes of meetings with management.
Elections , employee meetings , and management meetings continued to be held
at the plant in the same manner . Employees in attendance continued to be paid
their regular wages when elections and meetings ran beyond the one-half hour lunch
period, and committee members continued to be paid their regular wages for time
spent during working hours at meetings with management and time and a half
when the meetings lasted beyond the normal workday , as they frequently did. The
Shop Committee continues to exist without any provisions for membership of the
4 When the addition of the period beyond the normal workday does not bring the total
regular working time above 40 hours a week for any individual member, he is only paid-
the regular time for that excess period.'
The record does not disclose the manner in which the Shop Committee was suspended.
1392 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
employees generally and without any source of revenue, making use of all plant
facilities needed for its operations. To date, no elections or meetings of any kind
have ever been held off the plant premises.
The record shows that the Shop Committee met and dealt with management on
the following subjects: On June 7, 1955, there was a discussion of a pension plan,
pay coverage for prolonged illness, and a vacation pay rule; on June 21, overtime;
on June 30, method of figuring vacation pay for laid-off employees; August 10, a
pension plan, a wage increase, and compassionate leave, that is, leave for 2 or 3
days when a death occurred in the family; on September 7, a wage increase, pensions,
and holidays; and on or about November 21, a pension plan. At the meeting on
August 10, the Shop Committee asked for a 15-cent an hour wage increase. Man-
agement representatives offered an 8-cent an hour increase on condition that no
further requests for an increase would be made for a period of 1 year. On September
7, the Shop Committee notified the Respondent of its acceptance of the 8-cent an
hour increase.
The Shop Committee has never had, nor requested the Respondent to negotiate,
a written collective-bargaining agreement binding on both parties .6
3. Conclusions
The foregoing facts amply demonstrate, and the Respondent makes no contrary
assertions in its brief, that the Shop Committee falls within the statutory definition 'l
of a labor organization. I accordingly find that the Shop Committee is a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act.8
It is also sufficiently clear so as to warrant no further elaboration, and I find, that
since April 21, 1955, within the 6-month statutory period, the Respondent has con-
tributed financial and other unlawful support and assistance to the Shop Committee in
violation of Section 8 (a) (2) of the Act,9 thereby interfering with, restraining,
and coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed by the Act
in violation of Section 8 (a) (1). There remains for consideration the question of
whether the Respondent has dominated and interfered with the administration of
the Shop Committee after April 21, 1955.
The Board in a recent decision set forth some, standards and guide posts for
determining when an employer's unlawful conduct amounts to domination and
when it amounts only to assistance and support. Ben Corson Manufacturing Co.,
et al., 112 NLRB 323 (I. R.). In that decision, the Board stated that:
. The basic criterion for the latter would seem to be whether despite the il-
legal assistance thus given, the organization is shown to have an independent
origin, life and functioning of its own, apart from any advantage it may have
derived from the assistance wrongfully given it.
By negative implication, it would seem that where the proposal for the
formation of the organization comes not from the employees but the em-
ployer, and further where the impetus for the formation likewise comes from
a During the month of September 1955, the Union began to solicit employee memberships
by distributing leaflets and booklets to the employees at the Respondent's plant entrances.
On October 6, the Union filed with the Board a petition for certification as collective-bar-
gaining representative of the Respondent's production and maintenance employees.
(1-RC-4246) On October 20, the Union filed the original charge in this proceeding, and
the following day withdrew its petition, without prejudice, in order to permit the process-
ing of its charge in this unfair labor practice proceeding.
7 Section 2 (5) of the Act defines a labor organization as "any organization of any kind,
in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of
dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours
of employment, or conditions of work."
a See, e g., Standard Coil Products v. N. L. R. B., 224 F. 2d 465 (C A. 1) ; Northeastern
Engineering, Inc., 112 NLRB 743; Texas City Chemicals, Inc., 112 NLRB 218; Ed TaUs81g,
Inc., 108 NLRB 470.
9In view of the provtieo to Section 8 (a) (2) of the Act, my finding in this respect is
not based on any payments to members of the Shop Committee for time spent during regu-
lar working hours in meetings with management. However, the proviso restricts allow-
able payments to conferences held with management only during working hours of the
employee conferees. Aaelson Manufacturing Company, 88 NLRB 761, 776; Stow Manu-
facturing Co., 103 NLRB 1280, 1297, enfd. 217 F. 2d 900 (C. A. 2), cert. denied 348
U. S. 964.
COPPUS ENGINEERING CORPORATION 1393
the employer, and when in addition, the organization has no discernible
resources except the one which the employer has illegally given it, the picture
is one of domination rather than mere illegal assistance.
* * * * * *
No two cases are altogether alike, and each must be judged by the totality
of its own facts.
In finding that a labor organization is employer dominated rather than merely
assisted, the Board has noted such familiar factors as the employer's having proposed
its formation; having recognized it without requiring proof of majority status while
requiring such proof from an outside union; the employer being in a position to
control the organization through its power to unseat the representatives or com-
mittee members; that the employees initially never had a free choice in choosing
this form of representation; that the employees had no way of choosing whether
to continue to be represented by this type of organization; the absence of any pro-
vision for membership of the employees in the organization; the absence of a
written constitution, bylaws, dues, or other form of self-financing; and that the
organization does not have and never attempted to negotiate a written contract
with the employer. Where a number of the foregoing factors are present in a case,
the Board has found the organization to be employer dominated.10 I now turn
to a consideration of the evidence in this case in the light of the foregoing established
principles.
In this case it is admitted that the proposal and impetus for the formation of the
Shop Committee came from Respondent President George at a meeting of the
employees called by him at the plant. Inherent in the Respondent's suggestion was
a promise to recognize and deal with the Shop Committee upon its formation, as
in fact it did. No secret election was held among the employees to determine
whether a majority wished to have this form of representation. The only ballot-
ing was for members to serve on the Shop Committee. In contrast to the treat-
ment accorded the Union which was forced to prove its majority status in a Board-
conducted election before the Respondent would deal with it, the Respondent dealt
with the Shop Committee as the representative of the production and maintenance
employees without even asking for proof of its representative status. Under such
circumstances, it can hardly be said that the Shop Committee was the freely chosen
bargaining agent of the employees.ii
The Respondent subsequently incorporated the Shop Committee into its personnel
program and published its bylaws as its own plant rules and policies. The Re-
spondent's distribution of its booklet, containing its plant rules and policies, to all
employees, old and new, was tantamount to a public announcement by the Respond-
ent to all employees, committee members, and potential candidates for membership
on the Shop Committee, that the existence and operation of the Shop Committee
were governed by plant rules and policies of the Respondent. The Shop Committee
at no time voiced any objection to the publication of its structure and functions as
plant rules and policies of the Respondent. The existence and operations of the
Shop Committee have now become firmly entrenched as management-sponsored
functions by the Respondent's uninterrupted practice, continued to the date of the
hearing herein, of giving this booklet to all new employees without taking any steps
10 See , e g , Ben Corson Manufacturing Co , et al , 112 NLRB 323 and cases cited therein ;
Standard Coil Products Co , Inc., 110 NLRB 412, 420, enfd. 224 F 2d 465 (C. A 1) ; Ed
Taussig. Inc, 108 NLRB 470, 476; Sharple8 -Chemicals , Inc., 100 NLRB 20, 32-34, enfd.
209 F. 2d 645 (C. A 6) ; Axelson Manufacturing Company, 88 NLRB 761, 772-774 ; Ameri-
can Thread Co , 84 NLRB 593, 603-604, enfd. 188 F. 2d 161 (C. A. 5) ; The Carpenter
Steel Company, 76 NLRB 670, 687-690.
11 While I am precluded by Section 10 (b) of the Act from basing findings of unfair
labor practices upon events occurring prior to April 21, 1955, the 6-month statutory pe.
riod, it is now well settled that that section does not bar the use of such evidence as
background shedding light on the character of the Shop Committee and of the Respond-
ent's conduct after April 21, 1955. See, e. g, Florida Telephone Corporation , 88 NLRB
1429, 1430; Sharpies Chemicals, Inc., 100 NLRB 20, 30, enfd. 209 F . 2d 645 (C. A. 6).
As the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit so aptly stated in the Sharple8 Chemicals
decision (at p. 653),
. .. The original inception of the different organizations , together with the testi-
mony that they were still functioning , without much attempt on the part of respond-
ent to show any basic change, had a material bearing upon the question of how they
were functioning on and after April 20, 1950 [ the 10 ( b) period].
390609-56-vol. 115-89
1394 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
to dissipate the inference which could reasonably be drawn, at least by committee
members and employees hired since the adoption of these rules, that the Shop Com-
mittee was and is a creature of the Respondent.
The structure and governing rules of the Shop Committee also contain elements of
employer control. In the first place, the Respondent is in a position to control the
Shop Committee through its inherent power to unseat any elected committee mem-
ber by terminating his employment. The mere existence of such power, whether
exercised or not, the Board has repeatedly held, places the employer in a dominant
position over the organization.12 Furthermore, the rules make employee representa-
tion by the Shop Committee mandatory but specifically withhold the Respondent's
recognition of the Shop Committee as the exclusive bargaining agent of the employees
so represented. The employees are given no choice as to whether to continue this
form of representation; their only choice is to vote for employee members to serve
on the Shop Committee. Thus, the Shop Committee is foisted upon the employees
as their bargaining agent but is denied the exclusive recognition which is "a matter
guaranteed to the employees as of right." 13 An organization which yields such an
important matter, without so much as a protest, may not be regarded as a truly inde-
pendent spokesman for the employees.
The Respondent's dominant position over the Shop Committee and the latter's
subservience to the Respondent are also revealed in the bargaining relationship.
Thus, the Shop Committee is not treated by the Respondent as an equal partner to any
bargain resulting from conferences between the Shop Committee and management.
Terms agreed upon at such conferences have subsequently been published in the
booklet as a unilateral action of the Respondent in the form of a management plant
rule or policy. Not only has the Shop Committee never attempted to negotiate a
written agreement, but it has never even sought to have agreed terms reduced to a
signed contract, long recognized as the "final step in the bargaining process" and
"the absence of which, experience has shown, tends to frustrate the end sought by
the requirement for collective bargaining." 14
Finally, the Shop Committee does not exhibit the characteristics of an existence in-
dependent of the Respondent. It has no discernible resources except the ones which
the Respondent has illegally given it. There are no dues, no membership require-
ments, no indicia of employee designation of the Shop Committee as bargaining rep-
resentative, no constitution, and no bylaws outside of those adopted as plant rules
and policies of the Respondent. The rules make no provisions for general meetings
of the employees for the formulation of demands in common, prior to meetings of
the Shop Committee with management.15 While such meetings have been held,
their calling depends on the whim and willingness of the committee members. The
Respondent is the only source of income, which is received by Shop Committee mem-
bers for time spent after working hours in conference with management. Such pay-
ments to employee representatives have long been regarded as "an aspect of con-
trol." 16 "For the Congressional policy underlying Section 8 (a) (2) is that in the
formulation of the terms of the job, those who purport to speak for the employees,
may not, for that purpose be made the hirelings of the employer." 17 The Respond-
ent has also paid employees their regular wages for time spent in conducting the
affairs of the Shop Committee during working hours. In sum, the Respondent has
made the functions of the Shop Committee possible by enabling them to take place
on its property, with the use of such facilities as are needed, and by payments for
time spent both during and after working hours. By such subsidies, the Respondent
remains in a position to assure its domination over the Shop Committee.
Upon full consideration of the entire record as a whole, in the light of the prin-
ciples and criteria enunciated in prior Board decisions, I am convinced that the pic-
ture here is one of employer domination and interference with the administration of
the Shop Committee. Accordingly, I find that since April 21, 1955, the'Respondent
has dominated and interfered with the administration of the Shop Committee in vio-
lation of Section 8 (a) (2) of the Act, thereby interfering with, restraining, and co-
ercing the employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by the Act in violation of
Section 8 (a) (1).
la See cases cited in footnote 10, supra
18 McQuap-Norria Mfg. Co. v. N. L. R. B , 116 F. 2d 748, 751 (C. A. 7).
14 H. J. Heinz Co. v. N. L. R. B., 311 U. S. 514, 524, 526.
15 The rules provide only for reporting to the employees all matters discussed with man-
agement.
16 N. L. R. B. v. H. E Fletcher Co., 108 F. 2d 459, 465 (C. A. 1).
17 Northeastern Engineering, Inc., 112 NLRB 743 (I. R.).
COPPUS ENGINEERING CORPORATION 1395
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
I find that the activities of the Respondent set forth in section III, above, occurring
in connection with the operations of the Respondent described in section I, above,
have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among
the several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing
commerce and the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has assisted, supported, and dominated the
Shop Committee, I will recommend that the Respondent cease and desist from such
conduct and, as a corollary of the finding of domination,'8 that it withdraw recogni-
tion from and completely disestablish the Shop Committee as the representative of
any of its employees for the purpose of dealing with it concerning grievances, labor
disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or other terms or conditions of
employment, and that the Respondent refrain from recognizing the Shop Committee,
or any successor thereto, for any of the foregoing purposes. "This will not prevent
the employees, after the unfair labor practices have been remedied and the conditions
for a free choice established, from adopting representation from their own ranks or
any other kind of representation, if such is their genuine desire, unfettered by
employer domination, interference, assistance, or support." 19
My findings of interference, restraint, and coercion are based entirely upon, and
derive from, the Respondent's conduct in dominating and interfering with the
administration of the Shop Committee and in contributing financial and other assist-
ance and support to it. Except for the unlawful conduct flowing out of the Re-
spondent's relations to the Shop Committee, the record does not disclose that the
Respondent engaged in any other unfair labor practices. Nor am I persuaded from
the record in this case, that a danger exists that the Respondent in the future may
commit other unfair labor practices proscribed by the Act which are not directly
related in kind to the unfair labor practices which the Respondent has been found
to have committed in the past. Under the circumstances, I will not recommend the
issuance of the usual broad cease and desist order used where the commission of
such other unfair labor practices is reasonably apprehended. I will, however, rec-
ommend that the Respondent cease and desist from engaging in like or related
conduct by otherwise interfering with the representation of its employees through a'
labor organization of their own choosing.
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact, and upon the entire record in the
case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Shop Committee is a labor organization within the meaning of Section
2 (5) of the Act.
2. By assisting, supporting, dominating, and interfering with the administration of
the Shop Committee, as heretofore described, the Respondent has engaged in and
is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (2) of the
Act.
3. By such conduct the Respondent has interfered with, restrained, and coerced
its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act and thereby
has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of
Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
[Recommendations omitted from publication.]
APPENDIX A
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the recommendations of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Rela-
tions Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations
Act, we hereby notify our employees that:
WE WILL NOT assist, dominate, contribute financial or other support to, or
interfere with the administration of the Shop Committee, or any other labor
organization.
28 The Carpenter Steel Co., 76 NLRB 670, 673.
29 Ben Corson Manufacturing Co., et al., 112 NLRB 323 (I. R.).
1396 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
WE WILL NOT otherwise interfere with the representation of our- employees
through a labor organization of their own choosing.
WE HEREBY DISESTABLISH the Shop Committee as the representative of any of
our employees for the purpose of dealing with us concerning grievances, labor
disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or other terms or conditions
of employment, and WE WILL NOT recognize it or any successor thereto for any
of the foregoing purposes.
Corpus ENGINEERING CORPORATION,
Employer.
Dated---------------- By----------------------------------------------
(Representative). (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof, and must not be
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. and Oil, Chemical and Atomic
Workers International Union , AFL-CIO, Petitioner. Case No.
19-RC-1796. May 21, 1956
DECISION AND DIRECTION OF ELECTION
Upon a petition duly filed under Section 9 (c) of the National
Labor Relations Act, a hearing was held before Dan E. Boyd, hearing
officer. The hearing officer's rulings made at the hearing are free
from prejudicial error and are hereby affirmed.
Upon the entire record in this case, the Board finds:
1. The Employer 1 is engaged in commerce within the-meaning of
the Act.
2. The labor organization involved claims to represent certain em-
ployees of the Employer.
3. A question affecting commerce exists concerning the representa-
tion of employees of the Employer within the meaning of Section 9
(c) (1) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
4. The Employer is engaged in the production, transmission, and
distribution of natural gas and electricity, and the sale and installa-
tion of gas and electrical appliances, in North Dakota; South Dakota,
Montana, Wyoming, and Minnesota. The Employer's operations are
divided for administrative purposes into several geographic divisions
and one functional department. The Billings division, with which
we are here concerned, encompasses the Employer's operations in Bil-
lings. Montana, where the division headquarters is also located, and
8 other southern Montana communities, as well as operations in 4
northern Wyoming communities 2
The Petitioner requests an election among all distribution, installa-
tion, and maintenance employess in the area of the city of Billings,
which comprises part of the Billings division. In the alternative, the
I The name of the Employer appears as corrected at the hearing.
s Included in the division are the Employer's operations in Billings, Belfry, Bridger,
Edgar, Fromberg, Joliet, Laurel, Park City, and Silesia, Montana; and Cowley, Lovell,
Powell , and Elk Basin , Wyoming.
115 NLRB No. 221.