Cooper Alloy Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Apr 25, 1958

120 N.L.R.B. 586 (N.L.R.B. 1958)

586 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
and a truckdriver, constitute the department. Hendrickson and the
truckdriver work together and deliver petroleum products. - He also
solicits new business when making deliveries, and spends the greater
part of his time in such activity. In addition, he solicits new business
during his free time. He receives a salary but no commissions on
sales; apparently, his salary is substantially greater than the wages
received by the other two employees in the department. Although
Hendrickson is frequently referred to as the manager of the bulk oil
department, there is no evidence that he regularly has or exercises
any of the specific powers of a supervisor as set forth in Section 2
)(11) of the Act, and we therefore find that he is not a supervisor.
As Hendrickson appears to be primarily a salesman, we find that he
is ;excluded from the unit. Accordingly, we find Hendrickson ineli-
gible to vote and sustain the challenge to his ballot. As the tally of
ballots now discloses that the Joint Petitioners won the election, we
shall certify the Joint Petitioners as the exclusive, bargaining
representative of the employees in the agreed appropriate unit.
[The Board certified Local 977, International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America, and
Local 758, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen & Helpers of America as the designated collective-
bargaining representative of the Employees of Anderson's Super
Service, Inc., Montevideo, Minnesota, in the agreed appropriate unit.]
Cooper Alloy Corporation (Aircraft Division ) and John F.
Shallcross
Local 5250, United Steelworkers of America , AFL-CIO and
John F. Shallcross. Cases Nos. 22-CA42 and 22-CB-27. April
25,1958
DECISION AND ORDER
On July 19,1957, Trial Examiner Lloyd Buchanan issued his Inter-
mediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the
Respondent Company and the Respondent Union had engaged in and
were engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending
that they cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative ac-
tion, as set forth in the copy of the Intermediate Report attached
hereto. Thereafter, the Respondent Company filed exceptions to the
Intermediate Report with a supporting brief.'
"The Respondent Company's request for oral argument is hereby denied as , in our opin-
ion, the record, exceptions, and brief adequately present the issues and positions of the
parties.
120 NLRB No. 82.
COOPER ALLOY CORPORATION 587
Pursuant to the provsions of Section 3 (b) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the Board has delegated its powers in con-
nection with these cases to a three-member panel [Members Rodgers,
Jenkins, and Fanning].
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Inter-
mediate report, the exceptions and brief of the Respondent Company,
and the entire record in these cases, and hereby adopts the findings,
conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner.2
We agree with the Trial Examiner that the Respondent Company
violated Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act by discharging John Shallcross
for engaging in protected, concerted activities and not, as the Com-
pany contends, because Shallcross engaged in excessive talking dur-
ing working hours which interfered with production.
The events leading to Shallcross' discharge are briefly as follows :
Shallcross was employed on November 26, 1956, as a millwright at a
time when these skills were in scare supply. On his employment ap-
plication, Shallcross noted that he had quit his last job because of
differences which he had with a sister local of the Respondent Union
at his last employer's plant. After an appropriate period, Shallcross
joined the Union which had for some time represented the Company's
employees. Toward the end of 1956, Shallcross spoke with his fore-
man after work and suggested that an independent union might afford
the employees better representation than the Union was then offering.
He also expressed his belief that the Union might be ousted. How-
ever, the foreman cautioned that the Union was too strong and that
"things would happen if someone tried to disrupt this particular
local." On January 8, 1957, Shallcross attended a union meeting
and nominated an employee for union office to oppose a candidate
favored by the union president. A few days later, Shallcross com-
plained to fellow-employees during lunchtime that he was being as-
signed duties which he was not required to perform under his job
description. The union president overheard this and remarked that
he would not care what job he was asked to perform provided he
drew his pay. Shallcross replied that, if this was the Union's atti-
tude on the subject, there was no reason for having the Union in the
plant. Shallcross then announced that he would call upon the union
officers to resign if they did not get tougher with the Company. A
few days before his discharge on January 21, 1957, Shallcross was
questioned by union officers about his role concerning a petition pur-
2 In the absence of exceptions, we adopt pro forma the Trial Examiner' s findings that
the Respondent Company violated Section 8 (a) (1), (2), and (3), and that the Re-
spondent Union violated Section 8 ( b) (2) and (1) (A) of the Act, by enforcing and main-
taining a clause in their contract requiring that new employees execute checkoff cards
when they are hired.
588 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
portedly circulated in the plant calling for the removal of the Union,
and was accused of instigating the petition . Although it does. not
appear that such a petition in fact existed, Shallcross ' foreman testi-
fied that he had heard rumors that Shallcross was seeking to oust the
Union and that the company officials were aware of them. The union
president also testified that he had learned from the Company , shortly
before Shallcross ' discharge , that Shallcross ' attempt to unseat the
Union was disturbing the employees ; that Shallcross believed the
Union was not strict enough with the Company; that Shallcross had
been in difficulties with a sister local at his last place of employment;
and that the Company did not want any such trouble with the Union.
On January 21 Shallcross was notified by his foreman that he was
being discharged because the Company had checked on his union
difficulties at his former job and did not want a recurrence of these
difficulties at its plant.
In its exceptions , the Company contends that Shallcross was dis-
charged solely for the reason that he talked excessively on the job.
To support this contention , the Company states that Shallcross was
repeatedly reprimanded by company officials for talking during
working hours and that his initial 30-day probationary was extended
for a like period because of this misconduct . The credited testimony
in this proceeding discloses that Shallcross was told by his foreman
on only one occasion shortly after he was hired that he had been
observed by a company official talking on the job. However, despite
the fact that millwrights were difficult to come by and Shallcross was
concededly performing those duties in a satisfactory manner, no other
complaint was made or communicated to Shallcross for the remaining
4 or 5 weeks before his discharge and no attempt was ever made to
alert Shallcross to the possibility of discharge if, as the Company
insists he did, Shallcross continued to talk on the job. Moreover,
while the Company asserts that Shallcross ' initial probationary period
was extended on or about December 21 because of excessive talking,
it is significant that neither Shallcross nor his foreman , who is cus-
tomarily told when employees in his department have had their pro-
bation extended , was informed of this extension until the day on which
Shallcross was actually discharged . In this connection, we note that
the company official who allegedly ordered the extension in December
felt constrained to check Shallcross ' personnel file on January 18 to
ascertain whether any extension had in fact been ordered.
In our opinion , the credited testimony in the record before us
establishes that Shallcross was discharged , not for the reason that lie
talked excessively on company time, but because of his activities with
and within the Union . Like the Trial Examiner , we find that Shall-
cross had a statutory right to pursue those activities and that the
Company's discharge of Shallcross for engaging in them constituted
COOPER ALLOY CORPORATION 589
a violation of Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act. The Company's excep-
tions to the Trial Examiner's finding in this regard are therefore
overruled.
ORDER
Upon the entire record in these cases , and pursuant to Section 10
(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National
Labor Relations Board hereby orders that :
1. Respondent Company, Cooper Alloy Corporation (Aircraft Di-
vision ), Clark Township, New Jersey, its officers, agents, successors,
and assigns, shall:
(a) Cease and desist from :
(1) Encouraging membership in any labor organization by dis-
charging any of its employees, by maintaining or enforcing the clauses
of any agreement with any labor organization which require its em-
ployees to fill out checkoff authorizations, or by discriminating in
any other manner in regard to their hire and tenure of employment
or any term or condition of employment, except as authorized in
Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act.
(2) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the
Act.
(b) Take the following affirmative action, which the Board finds
will effectuate the policies of the Act :
(1) Offer to John F. Shallcross immediate and full reinstatement
to his former or substantially equivalent position, without prejudice
to his seniority or other rights and privileges.
(2) Make the said John Shallcross whole for any loss of pay he may
have suffered by reason of the discrimination against him.
(3) Post at its plant in Clark Township, New Jersey, copies of
the notices attached to the Intermediate Report marked "Appendixes
A and B." 3 Copies of said notices, to be furnished by the Regional
Director for the Twenty-second Region, shall, after being duly signed
by the respective representatives, be posted by Respondent Company
immediately after receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for sixty
(60) consecutive days thereafter, in conspicious places, including all
places where notices to its employees are customarily posted. Rea-
sonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent Company to insure
that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material.
3 These notices, however , shall be , and they hereby aie amended by striking from the
first paragraph thereof the words "Recommendations of a Trial Examiner" and substi-
tuting in lieu thereof the woi ds "A Decision and Ordei " In the event that this Ordei
is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, there shall be substituted
for the words "Pursuant to a Decision and Order" the words "Pursuant to a Decree of
the United States Court of Appeals, Enforcing an Order."
590 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
(4) Mail to the Regional Director for the Twenty-second Region
signed copies of the notice attached to the Intermediate Report marked
"Appendix A," for posting by the Respondent Union. Copies of
said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for the Twenty-
second Region, shall, after being duly signed by representatives of
Respondent Company, be forthwith returned to said Regional Director
for such posting by Respondent Union.
(5) Notify the Regional Director for the Twenty-second Region
in writing, within ten (10) days from the date of this Order, what
steps it has taken to comply herewith.
II. The Respondent Union, Local 5250, United Steelworkers of
America, AFL-CIO, its officers, representatives, agents, successors,
and assigns, shall:
(a) Cease and desist from :
(1) Maintaining or enforcing the clauses of any agreement with
any employer which require employees to fill out checkoff
authorizations.
(2) In any other manner causing or attempting to cause any
employer to discriminate against any employee in violation of Section
8 (a) (3) of the Act.
(3) In any other manner restraining or coercing employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
(b) Take the following affirmative action, which the Board finds
will effectuate the policies of the Act :
(1) Post at its offices in Westfield and Irvington, New Jersey,
copies of the notices attached to the Intermediate Report and marked
"Appendixes A and B." Copies of said notices, to be furnished by
the Regional Director for the Twenty-second Region, shall, after
being duly signed by the respective representatives, be posted by the
Respondent Union immediately after receipt thereof, and be main-
tained by it for sixty (60) consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous
places, including all places where notices to its members are cus-
tomarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent
Union to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered
by any other material.
(2) Mail to the Regional Director for the Twenty-second Region
signed copies of the notice attached to the Intermediate Report marked
"Appendix B," for posting by the Respondent Company. Copies
of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for the
Twenty-second Region, shall, after being duly signed by Respondent
Union's representative, be forthwith returned to said Regional
Director for posting by the Respondent Company.
(3) Notify the Regional Director for the Twenty-second Region
in writing, within ten (10) days from the date of this Order, what
steps it has taken to comply herew-,Tith.
COOPER ALLOY CORPORATION 591
INTERMEDIATE REPORT AND RECOMMENDED ORDER
The consolidated complaint herein alleges that the Company and the Union have
violated Section 8 (a) (1), .(2), and (3) and Section 8 (b) (1) (A) and (2) respec-
tively of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 61 Stat. 136, by executing,
maintaining, and enforcing a collective-bargaining agreement which requires newly
hired employees to sign a checkoff card; and that the Company has further violated
Section 8 (a) (1) and (3) by discharging and failing and refusing to reinstate
Shallcross because of his activity within the Union and because he engaged in other
protected concerted activities. The answers admit the collective-bargaining agree-
ment, but deny that the Act has thereby been violated. The Company further admits
the discharge and failure and refusal to reinstate Shallcross but, denying that it was
because of his union and other concerted activities, alleges that it was for just cause.
A hearing was held before me at New York, New York, on June 3, 5, and 6, 1957.
Pursuant to leave granted to all parties, a brief was thereafter filed by the Union.
Upon the entire record in the case, and from my observation of the witnesses,
I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT (WITH REASONS THEREFOR)
1. THE COMPANY'S BUSINESS AND THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
It was stipulated and I find that the Company, a New Jersey corporation with
principal office and place of business in Hillside, New Jersey, and a plant in the
Township of Clark, New Jersey, is engaged in the manufacture, sale, and distribution
of stainless steel rings and related products; that during the past year it purchased
goods and materials of which more than $500,000 in value was transported to the
Clark plant from places outside the State of New Jersey; and that during said period
it manufactured, sold, and distributed at said plant products valued at more than
$500,000, of which products valued at more than $250,000 were shipped therefrom
to points outside the State; and that the Company is engaged in commerce within
the meaning of the Act.
It was stipulated and I find that the Union is a labor organization within the
meaning of the Act.
H. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
The record is replete with inconsistencies and contradictions. Assistance in find-
ing the facts is to be found in several admissions against apparent interest and by
testimony which was not contradicted.
A. The collective-bargaining agreement
The Company and the Union entered into a collective-bargaining agreement on
December 1, 1955 (with a retroactive provision to August 15, 1955), to expire on
August 14, 1957. Article III of the agreement provides inter alia:
2. All new employees when hired shall fill out a union membership and
check-off authorization card on Form No. 530 as provided by the Financial
Secretary of the Local Union. The Company's copy shall be retained by it and
the Union's copy shall be given to the Local Union's Financial Secretary.
3. Thirty-one (31) days from the date of hire, all such new employees shall
become and remain members of the Union in good standing for the duration of
this agreement. Until further notice from the International Secretary-Treasurer
of the Union, initiation fees of $5.00 shall be deducted, and Union dues of
$3.00 per month shall be deducted and will continue to be deducted thereafter
at the same time as for all other employees. . . .
We cannot find violation in the execution of the agreement since the charges
herein were filed more than 6 months thereafter. On the question of maintenance
and enforcement, Bouton, the Company's assistant industrial relations director,
testified that, after interviewing new employees, he requires them to sign tax with-
holding statements, hospital-surgical and life insurance applications, and union mem-
bership and checkoff authorization forms. He then added that employees are at
that time told that there is a union in the shop, and that membership in the union
requires that the authorization-checkoff card be completed; if membership is desired,
the card must be signed. This latter almost parenthetical reference to a practice
contrary to the requirements of the agreement between the Company and the Union
is nowhere else supported. (Bouton's alleged statement to new employees suggests
that membership in the Union is optional, whereas it is required even under section 3,
592 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
supra. ) Shallcross , on the other hand , testified that Bouton at the employment inter-
view handed him a few cards which he was required to fill out, including the
authorization -checkoff card , and told him that everyone is a member of the Union.
While the Union 's answer admits only the execution of the agreement , the Company
admits that the agreement is in effect. The evidence falls far short of showing that
the agreement , while maintained , was not also enforced . I find that, as called for by
the agreement , Shallcross was required , when he was hired , to sign the union-
authorization and checkoff card, and that as McQueen, the Union's president, testi-
fied, his card , like others , was promptly forwarded to the Union . The agreement has
been both maintained and enforced.
The requirement that the membership-checkoff card be filled out by new em-
ployees at the time of hiring is coercive and constitutes unlawful interference, sup-
port, and discrimination . It is, as to the Company , in violation of Section 8 (a)
(1), (2), and ( 3); and as to the Union, in violation of Section 8 (b) (1) (A)
and (2). If, as argued by counsel for the Union, such violation was inadvertent,
and will not be repeated in a new contract between the Company and the Union,
it is still a violation.' On this point, counsel for the Company declared, "The com-
pany will take no position in regard to the allegations of the complaint affecting
the union contract . . . (or) with regard to the proof adduced in that connec-
tion." (The allegations of violation do not embrace the membership provisions,
section 3, quoted supra , being itself lawful . The authorizations for membership
and checkoff are separate and require separate signatures.)
B. The discharge of Shallcross
Shallcross was employed by the Company as a millwright or maintenance man
on November 26, 1956. His immediate supervisor, Maintenance Foreman Grant,
did not discuss plant rules with him, but questioned him concerning his work back-
ground. Shallcross was assigned to checking and repairing machinery.
Shallcross attended a union meeting about January 8, 1957. He nominated for
recording secretary Marr, a friend on the job; the president of the local nominated
the acting recording secretary for the post. Marr was defeated in a close vote.
Quite unrestrained although he was a new employee and despite the fact that he
had never before attended a meeting of this union local, Shallcross also seconded
another's request or motion that wages be paid on Thursday instead of on Friday.
(The record does not favor us with the Union's reaction to this proposal.)
Shortly thereafter, during lunch period in the locker room at the plant, Shallcross
pointed out to Marr, who was an electrician, that under their job classifications they
were not required to perform certain work. Shallcross was here referring to an
assignment to clean some turret lathes, which he had performed under protest, point-
ing out that it classified as laborers ' work; Grant had insisted that Shallcross do it
at the time, and assured him that another man would be on hand to do it there-
after. McQueen, the union president, heard Shallcross' remark to Marr and de-
clared that he would not care what he did so long as he got his 8 hours ' pay. In
response to this, Shallcross asked what, then, was the use of having a union. Shall-
cross later announced that he would at a union meeting call on the officers to resign
if they did not get more strict or tough with the Company. If, as Marr testified,
there was criticism of union officers all over the plant , there is no evidence that any
employee's activity in this connection approached Shallcross', which was clearly
delineated at the hearing. Grant testified that rumor had spread, and that he had
heard it from various sources, that Shallcross was trying to install a new set of
officers in the Union, and that his superiors in the Company received this informa-
tion. Regardless of the validity of such a rumor, the Company's, as the Union's,
impression of Shallcross' attitude toward the Union's officials is clear. One may
infer that Shallcross no more endeared himself to the Union, despite his rights in
this connection , when he several times asked Choffa, the union steward, for a
copy of his own job classification, which was given to him.
A few days before his discharge on January 21, while Shallcross and others were
getting dressed in the locker room at the end of the day, McQueen and Choffa
came in and asked where the so-called petition was , apparently under the impression
that Shallcross was connected with a petition for disavowal or ouster of the Union.
Shallcross replied that he did not know what they were talking about, and Choffa
then declared that, if Shallcross wanted to start ousting, he should do it at once and
see who got hurt. (The record does not include such a petition or proof that it was
1 L Ronney & Sons Furniture Manufacturing Co, 93 NLRB 1049, 1 053 ; Jandel Furs,
100 NLRB 1390, 1392
COOPER ALLOY CORPORATION 593
in fact circulated.) Again, whether or not Shalicross sponsored or supported such
a petition, the Union's impression is clear.
Shalicross described an incident when McQueen, Choffa, and Costa, the Union's
former president, were in an automobile in front of the plant. To the extent, if
any, that it is material to the issues the implication of threatened violence is with-
out proof. But Shallcross did tell Grant of his fear of union violence.
A short time before this, about a week before his discharge, Shallcross had told
a member of the job evaluation committee that men were working beyond their
classification while others were not up to theirs, and that wages should be in ac-
cordance with the work actually done. These several instances might explain
union animus or antipathy toward Shallcross. But it has been neither alleged nor
shown that the Union caused the Company to take action against him, and the
Company's defense is to the contrary. No more is it claimed that Shallcross' re-
marks concerning variance between employees' classifications and their actual work
were unprotected or disruptive.
More direct for its bearing on the reason for Shalicross' discharge is the testimony
concerning a conversation between Shallcross and Grant in a tavern during the
latter part of December. Shallcross suggested the desirability of an independent
union, and Grant replied that the Company would like it but could not do it. When
Shallcross persisted that it could be done if handled right, Grant said that the Steel-
workers Union is too powerful and that things would happen if someone tried to
disrupt this local.
Shallcross, whose ability on the job is not questioned, testified that Grant never
criticized him but did once relay a criticism: Shortly before or after the end of
the year, Grant told him that Grossenbacher, the shop superintendent, had said that
he had seen Shallcross standing by a machine and told Grant to tell him to stop
loitering on the job. Shallcross explained to Grant that he had been thinking about
the job and was waiting for tools, and Grant allegedly replied that he understood
but Grossenbacher did not. I accept the uncontradicted testimony concerning this
incident and that this criticism was thus relayed although Shallcross later stated
that Grant did not speak to him concerning complaints concerning his activities.
The point was not explored to determine whether Shallcross had in mind the dis-
tinction that Grossenbacher's alleged criticism here was that Shallcross was not
working, not that he was talking to and interfering with other employees.
Concerning talking on the job, Shallcross testified that he never spoke to other
employees during working hours concerning union matters or work assignments; he
did speak to them concerning machine operation, this in connection with his ma-
chine maintenance work. On one occasion, when a forklift brushed his leg, he
asked the operator whether he was qualified to operate the lift; when the man replied
that he did not know, Shallcross suggested that he check: if he was, he could prob-
ably get more money.
Grant testified that he spoke to Shallcross several times about talking to others
on the job, but that Shallcross' talking increased. Without proof that Grant reported
this or any incidents to his superiors, there is no support here for the action taken
against Shallcross for, as we shall see, Grant was neither consulted nor advised
about the discharge except for the last-minute direction that he tell Shallcross. But
further, I do not consider this testimony to be reliable or as supporting that which we
shall soon note concerning observance of Shallcross by others. For it is clear that,
despite his testimony that there were various instances of talking and progressive
deterioration, and his dissatisfaction with Shallcross' conduct, Grant did not ask for
an extension of Shallcross' probation although he testified that he would normally
ask for an extension if he were dissatisfied with an employee. (All parties appeared
agreed that, as a new employee, Shallcross could have been discharged within the
first 30 days of his employment without recourse by the Union, and that such
probationary period could be extended by the Company.) After testifying that
Grossenbacher "very often" extended employees' probation without Grant's knowing
about it, the latter could add only, "Well, I think it has been done before," and
that Grossenbacher had never before extended the probationary period of an employee
in Grant's department, as he did with Shallcross.
Grossenbacher testified that early in December he told Grant that Shallcross was
in places in the plant where he should not be and was talking to employees, that
about December 18 or 19 McCarroll, the plant manager, made a similar report to
him and he again spoke to Grant; that he then decided to extend Shallcross' pro-
bation; and that he thereafter watched Shallcross more closely. Although good mill-
483142-59-vol. 120-39
594 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
wrights are scarce and hard to find, Grossenbacher did not notify either Grant or
Shallcross of the extension so that the latter might correct his alleged fault.
From Grant's testimony, it does not appear that Grossenbacher spoke to him
more than once about Shallcross' talking, this was after McCarroll had allegedly
spoken to Grossenbacher about it; and Grant had allegedly seen Shallcross engaged
in such talking before Grossenbacher spoke to him about it. The time sequence here
is hopelessly confused. We can but further wonder why, if Grossenbacher spoke to
Grant about Shallcross early in December and Grant had himself earlier seen Shall-
cross talking, Grant waited until the end of the month or the early part of January
to speak to Shallcross, as the latter testified, or, as counsel for the Company argued,
until the end of December Grossenbacher's explanation of his failure to advise
Grant of the extension of Shallcross' probation, and his testimony that he may have
told Grant were casual to say the least.
McCarroll testified that he observed Shallcross not working and engaged in con-
versation a couple of dozen times. McCarroll declared that he did not know what
the conversations were about, but he had a pretty good idea of what was going on
and knew that Shallcross was not where he should have been He doubted that the
conversations were about the machines near which Shallcross was standing. He then
testified that he asked Grossenbacher and Grant to find out what Shallcross was
doing, and they reported several days later. He did not say what they reported, nor
did they testify of this. McCarroll did not know the names of those with whom
Shallcross talked. He only hoped that they were reprimanded. He could not give the
date of Shallcross' conversations. One can only surmise that they occurred prior
to the extension of Shallcross' probation for, when McCarroll spoke to Grossen-
bacher about them, the latter said that he would correct or curb the situation; he did
not apparently tell McCarroll that he had already extended Shallcross' probationary
period. Neither did Grossenbacher before that time complain to McCarroll about
Shallcross. Although within 10 days prior to Shallcross' discharge, he and Marr went
to McCarroll's office with an idea which they had to impiove the Company's oper-
ations, McCarroll, despite his appreciation of their interest, neither warned Shall-
cross nor mentioned his allegedly so frequent talking and loitering
McCarroll described an unieal procedure in which maintenance men, receiving
assignments from their foreman, are not supposed to and do not talk to the operator
of the machine which is to be or has been repaired. (There is no evidence of any
rule against talking generally.) The picture which he painted is so extreme as to be
unbelievable. Grossenbacher gave somewhat similar testimony, but said that he had
never objected to a millwright talking to an operator while repairing a machine, point-
ing out that the operator is seldom present. He testified further that the nature of
Shallcross' job called for his presence in various places in areas where he was sup-
posed to work. While he also declared that Shallcross did not have the right to walk
from machine to machine to see if repairs were needed, he admitted that he never had
seen Shallcross do that, talking to operators.
Blum, who as industrial relations director passed on Shallcross' discharge, was
consulted by McCarroll and Grossenbacher on Friday, January 18, checked Shall-
cross' file (and, as infra, he had his references checked) and found that his pro-
bation had been extended, and told them that he could be discharged. It appeared
from Blum's early testimony that, when he was thus consulted, he evidently had for-
gotten that the probation extension had been sent to him; and Grossenbacher did not
mention that he had himself issued such extension, allegedly asking Blum to check on
it since that was at least one of the reasons for consulting Blum on the discharge
Blum later testified that he had not recalled the extension, but that Grossenbacher
mentioned it. (Grossenbacher testified to the latter effect.) This presents another
unanswered question: Why, then, did Blum check Shallcross' folder "to see whether
he had been extended for the extra 30 days"?
Apparently corroborating the defense that Shallcross was discharged because of
his talking in the plant, McQueen, the union president, testified that, at a grievance
meeting involving two other employees a short time before January 21, Blum declared
that Shallcross was going around talking too much and holding up production. But
McQueen was hardly reliable, and the reason was apparent as he first denied and
then, his recollection refreshed, recalled that Blum had said that Shallcross' conver-
sations upset the men because of his efforts to unseat the union officers He also
recalled that Blum reported that Shallcross had said that the Union was too soft on
the Company Blum also told the union representatives that Shallcross had trouble
with the union at his prior place of employment, and the Company did not want any
upset with the Union here. These references by the Company's industrial relations
director to Shallcross' union activities, even if declared not to be the reason for the
COOPER ALLOY CORPORATION 595
discharge, indicate that those activities were in the forefront of the Company's
attention
According to Shallcross, Grant sent for him a few minutes before the end of the
work day on January 21, and told him that he was sorry but he had to discharge him.
He explained that Bouton, the assistant industrial relations director, had gotten in
touch with Shallcross' former employer and learned that he had had union trouble
there, and the Company did not want any here. Grant testified similarly that Blum
had said that Shallcross was being discharged because he had previously engaged in
union activities and the Company did not want any reoccurrence. Recalled near the
close of the hearing, Grant testified that he had not discussed with Shallcross on
January 21 the latter's union activities at the Company or at his prior place of employ-
ment. Grant then added that, contrary to a statement which he had previously issued,
he had also been told that McCarroll had been watching Shallcross continually in a
huddle and off the job, and that this had to stop
Having been given this "unofficial" reason, Shallcross asked what the reason was
for the discharge. Grant did not reply to this, but he did advise (this is not denied)
that, if Shallcross ever needed a recommendation, he should come to him, not to
Blum; and he further allegedly declared, "If I were you, I'd fight it." The unem-
ployment compensation slip given Shallcross did not set forth the reason for the
discharge; he was told that the reason would be inserted when the Unemployment
Division returned it to the Company. The next day, McQueen told Shallcross that
the Union could not do anything about his discharge since the Company had ex-
tended his probationary period. (McQueen testified to his belief that it is up to the
department foreman to notify the employee. Explaining or failing to explain the
Union's failure to notify Shallcross of the extension, McQueen testified that the
Union, "on occasions, but not all the time" informs the employee involved.) In this
connection, Shallcross testified that Grant told him about the first of the year that he
could work overtime since his probationary period had expired without extension.
Grant himself testified that he first learned on January 21, when he was told to
discharge Shallcross, that the probation had been extended. From this there arose
the question what the company practice is with respect to overtime. While the
practice may have been to allow overtime according to seniority and regardless of
completion of probation, it does not appear that Grant recognized it despite his
testimony. I am unable otherwise to understand his admittedly combining reference
to Shallcross' completion of his probationary period with a promise to try to get him
some overtime. But aside from the reflection on Grant's credibility, this appears to
show that Grant did not know of an extension of Shallcross' probation; and he ad-
mitted that. The practice or rule concerning overtime work and probationers does
not in fact concern us. The question developed over the claim that Shallcross' pro-
bation had been extended on December 21.
Having testified that he inquired on January 21 about Shallcross' probation, Grant
later thought that he recalled that this had been discussed on January 18. At that
time, Grant testified, McCarroll went to the files and showed him the extension,
declaring that he wanted Shallcross discharged because of his walking around the
shop and bothering others. (He had previously testified that he discharged Shallcross
at Grossenbacher's direction.) During the course of subsequent recollection, Grant
testified that he had not been present at the meetings on January 18. I do not credit
Grant's testimony concerning these additional reasons which he thus uncertainly
recalled and which he did not mention to Shallcross on January 21.
In passing on Grant's credibility, we must note that the accuracy of a document
which contained statements allegedly made by him to a Board representative was not
in issue. The document allegedly refreshed Grant's recollection; later he testified
that it had not in fact earlier refreshed his recollection, but that it contained erroneous
statements and had led him to testify incorrectly; and he now repudiated some of
his earlier testimony. The General Counsel on the one hand had an opportunity
to and did question him, and used the document to refresh his recollection when
Grant appeared to give answers contrary to statements in the document. On the
other hand, the Company's counsel had full opportunity to and did question Grant
concerning the issues involved. It is therefore unnecessary to consider the document
further as either containing admissions by Grant against the Company's interest or
as reciting facts which he could otherwise orally declare.
In connection with the matter of union trouble at his former place of employ-
ment, Shallcross testified that at his employment interview (he placed it on November
20; the application is dated November 16) he told Bouton that he had quit his prior
job, where the men were represented by another Steelworkers local, because of
union disturbances, the Union there having gotten "out of hand" and prevented him
from doing his work, and that Bouton replied that the Company here has union
596 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
trouble also . Bouton's recollection of this conversation was vague . On his em-
ployment application , Shallcross stated as his reason for leaving his prior place of
employment : "Plant Relocated Caused Union Difficulties Therefore I Resigned "
Questioned concerning this, he testified that the union disturbances , which were
caused by the relocation , had prompted him to resign , not the relocation itself.
Bouton 's testimony was that in January he checked some of Shallcross ' references and
was informed by the last employer that Shallcross had resigned because of difficulty
he had had with and within the union there, and that such difficulty was no concern
to that company.
The circumstances surrounding Shallcross ' resignation elsewhere are not included
in the specific reasons listed by the Company in its answer ; nor are they embraced
in the catch-all reference to "other acts and conduct which in the Company's opinion
was detrimental to the proper and efficient operation of its business ." Shallcross'
earlier acts might be deemed undesirable aside from any question of law in that
connection ; but such earlier acts could not be detrimental to current efficient opera-
tion . In any event , the evidence concerning Shallcross' previous employment and
his earlier union activities are not relied upon by the Company to support the dis-
charge, and it has a limited bearing here. Considering this in connection with an
evaluation of Shallcross ' credibility , he was not broken down despite lengthy and
extensive cross-examination . The cross-examination on collateral matters, including
his employment application and its references to prior employment , failing to impair
his testimony , served to bolster his reliability . I have not overlooked variance or
possible variance in his testimony . For example , although he declared that he never
spoke to employees in the plant about getting rid of officers of the Union, he did tell
a committeeman in the locker room that he would like to see Marr run for office;
and he testified that he may have mentioned others for other offices. If there be a
variance between his testimony that he had earlier stated that he would like to see
Marr and one or more others run for union office , and his testimony that just before
the union meeting he suggested to Marr that he should be the recording secretary, I
find that he was nevertheless a credible and reliable witness.
One aspect of the reference to Shallcross ' previous employment appears to shed
light on the Company's attitude or motive here. Bouton testified that he would not
and did not check Shallcross' employment history until sometime during the first
half of January, when he did at Blum 's direction . Blum's explanation for this be-
lated check is that he ordered it after he was consulted concerning the proposed dis-
charge. (This parallels his alleged check for the probation extension , supra.) The
facts which had allegedly led to the extension of probation did not prompt a check
of Shallcross ' references in December . With the decision to discharge , subject only
to Blum 's administrative approval, no reason appears for the check in January despite
Blum's statement that in some cases he checks references before discharging an em-
ployee. Here it is claimed that Shallcross ' conduct called for his discharge; the
reference check did not contribute to it. If a check might in some cases clinch a
discharge , it did not here, as Blum testified , for he did not receive any bad report.
The alleged belated check would thus have been without reason , and also without
effect . Made earlier , it may have been prompted by a desire to find a lawful reason
for discharging Shallcross ; when the check proved fruitless , another reason was cited.
We have seen from Bouton 's testimony that the reference check was made during
the first half of the month, not on January 21, when it was allegedly decided to dis-
charge Shallcross for talking and loitering on the job. We have seen also that, before
that date, Blum mentioned Shallcross ' activities at the other job to the union
representatives.
The reasons cited in the Company 's answer to support Shallcross ' discharge may
be summarized as insubordination and talking , the latter excessive , away from his
work , and interfering with the work of other employees . Bearing in mind the testi-
mony concerning the cleaning of the turret lathes, there is no evidence of insubordi-
nation . As for Shallcross ' talking, I find from all of the testimony that he did talk
during working hours and was spoken to about it. Depending on one's point of
view , Shallcross ' activities and remarks during and outside of working hours concern-
ing the Union , classifications , and work being done , on matters which were not di-
rectly his concern , and on some which did directly concern him as, for example, his
own work assignments , might lead one to attribute to him a decent concern for the
welfare of others; or on the other hand , to charge him with being a busybody or a
firebrand . Our function is neither to praise nor to censure as we determine the issues
before us.
Talking by Shallcross during working hours might have warranted his discharge.
But we have seen that his concerted activities at a prior place of employment were
pointed out to Grant when the latter was told to discharge him, as they had been
pointed out to union representatives ; and that his efforts to unseat union officers and
COOPER ALLOY CORPORATION 597
to stiffen the Union's attitude toward the Company had also been pointed out to those
officers.
It is also significant that when Grant referred to Shallcross' technical competence
to do the work assigned to him, he added that Shallcross may have taken more time
than he should have; but this, according to Grant, was because he was not familiar
with the Company's machines and was still learning; not because he was talking and
not performing his work. (Grant, in his last version, did say that Shallcross was dis-
charged for talking and not being on the job.) This explanation by Grant, Shall-
cross' immediate supervisor who assigned his work, scarcely supports Grossenbacher's
statement that Shallcross was discharged because he talked too much and took too
much time to get to and do his jobs. Grossenbacher admitted that Grant told him
that Shallcross was a good technical man and that Grant had never complained that
Shallcross had failed to carry out an assignment. Like Bouton, Grossenbacher testi-
fied that competent millwrights were hard to find. There is no evidence of. even one
specific instance or occasion when Shallcross was in fact talking and away from his
work; this in contrast to the several occasions specifically described when he talked
in the locker room on nonworking time. Aside from the implausible elements in the
testimony concerning Shallcross' alleged talking, the absolvement of others with
whom he talked, the failure to take action against him during his regular probationary
period, the extension of his probation, and the failure to give him early or serious
warning (I do not credit Grant's testimony concerning repeated notice) despite the
need for such men, the versions submitted by company witnesses are mutually con-
tradictory, and I do not credit them.
Beyond the matter of credibility, it is settled that, even if nondiscriminatory reasons
existed and were sufficient to warrent discharge, the discharge was violative if it was
based on discriminatory reasons. Various uncontradicted statements by company
representatives, which we have noted, and the circumstance of the alleged earlier ex-
tension of Shallcross' probationary period without Grant's knowledge for so long a
time indicate that Shallcross' union activities weighed more heavily in the decision
to discharge him than did dissatisfaction with his conduct as described.2 Shallcross
was not discharged for a lawful reason even if the facts would have supported such
a reason.
The extent to which the Whitin and other cases are in point depends on the simi-
larity of the facts; the principles are clear. The motivation found in the Deep Freeze
Appliance case 3 cited by counsel for the Company, was quite different from that
found here. The factual conflict in the testimony in the instant case centers on two
points: The time when Shallcross' probation was extended (as reflecting on the reason
for it), and the reason for his discharge, the latter being the salient issue. As
I evaluate the testimony, I conclude that, as Grant told Shallcross, the Company re-
garded the Union as too powerful and did not want any trouble; that Shallcross' criti-
cism of the Union here, as his activities at his prior place of employment, which
Grant and Blum indicated concerned the Company, promised such trouble, and his
various remarks to other employees that their work should be according to their clas-
sification and their wage rate according to their work, promised trouble more
directly; and that for all of these reasons the Company decided to discharge Shall-
cross. Company counsel's argument to the contrary notwithstanding as he strove
earnestly to justify the discharge, the existence of disputes, grievances, and arbitration
proceedings between the Company and the Union does not bar a conclusion that the
Company desired to discharge Shallcross because of his concerted activities. Other
disputes might at least as readily lead to a desire to avoid a dispute under the circum-
stances which here developed as it might indicate a willingness to fight the Union.
With respect to the probationary period, it is true that had there been a valid ex-
tension, it would be unnecessary to give Shallcross a reason for his discharge. But
a reason was given, and that was stated to be his concerted activity elsewhere. Fur-
ther, whether or not a reason was given or had to be given to Shallcross, the Com-
pany could not lawfully discharge him because of his concerted activities here or
elsewhere. Certainly there is no proof that such concerted activities were illegal
or outside the protection of the Act, nor are they claimed to have been so. As for
the effect of the extension of the probationary period, even if not discriminatory, the
evidence indicates that the discharge was discriminatory; and the probation extension,
affecting the mechanics or method of discharge, did not remove the element of dis-
crimination when Shallcross was discharged. On the other hand the extension of a
maintenance man's probation by Grossenbacher was unique, as we have seen, and
8 N. L. R. B. v. Whitin Machine Works , 204 F. 2d 883 , 885 (C. A. 1). Cf. United States
Rubber Company, 115 NLRB 1707, 1711, 1720.
8 Deepfreeze Appliance Division, Motors Products Corp . v. N. L. R . B., 211 F. 2d 458
(C. A. 7).
598 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the departure from the Company's practice itself suggests discrimination although
discrimination was not alleged in that connection and is not being found. The fur-
ther fact that Grant was not even told about the extension may lead to doubt that it
was timely and proper, and to the suspicion that it was collusive. The Company's
testimony concerning the extension, offered to support its alleged nondiscriminatory
reasons for the discharge, is not credited. This rejection supports the finding of dis-
crimination. Here it may be noted that Grossenbacher, who effected the extension,
testified only that Shallcross' alleged talking continued. Despite his own observa-
tion of Shallcross since at least the early part of December and the alleged complaints
by McCarroll, he did not before the original probationary period expired discharge
Shallcross for talking; he did during the extension. Probationary employees, we are
told, were discharged without warning; yet Shallcross' probation was allegedly ex-
tended, and he was only later discharged. Further, like McCarroll, Grossenbacher
could not say which employees Shallcross had talked to, nor could he recall that any
of them had been reprimanded. Even if timely and made in a manner and under
circumstances which would warrent its acceptance as at least in accordance with
company practice, the extension of probation would not overcome the weight of the
other evidence of Shallcross' activities and the Company's reaction to them, on which
the finding of discrimination is based.
III. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondents set forth in section II, above, occurring in con-
nection with the operations described in section 1, above, have a close, intimate, and
substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States, and
tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free
flow of commerce.
IV. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondents have engaged in and are engaging in certain
unfair labor practices affecting commerce, I shall recommend that they cease and
desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action to effectuate the policies of
the Act.
It has been found that the Respondents respectively violated Section 8 (a) (1),
(2), and (3) and Section 8 (b) (1) (A) and (2) of the Act by maintaining and
enforcing an illegal checkoff provision in their collective-bargaining agreement.
I shall therefore recommend that they cease and desist therefrom 4
It has been further found that the Company, by discharging Shallcross, discrim-
inated against him in regard to his hire and tenure of employment in violation of
Section 8 (a) (3) and (1) of the Act 1 shall therefore further recommend that
the Company offer to Shallcross immediate reinstatement, and make him whole
for loss of pay, computation to be made in the customary manner 5
Although, as found, the agreement between the Company and the Union con-
tains an unlawful provision, it is not questioned that a majority of the employees
had designated the Union, and that the agreement contains a separate and lawful
union-security clause which required Shallcross to become a member and pay dues
31 days from the date of his employment. Aside from the prior illegal clause which
requires new employees to execute a membership and checkoff authorization card,
the agreement quoted, supra, suggests that payments must in fact be made to the
Union after 30 days. (As for Shallcross' discharge, we have seen that it is not even
claimed that the Union caused the Company to take that action.6 I shall not rec-
ommend that dues checked off be returned to the employees.?
The violations of the Act found herein are persuasively related to other unfair
labor practices proscribed by the Act, and the danger of their commission in the
future is to be anticipated from the conduct of the Respondents in the past. The
preventive purposes of the Act will be thwarted unless the order is coextensive
with the threat. In order, therefore, to make more effective the interdependent
guarantees of Section 7, to prevent a recurrence of unfair labor practices, and
4 There is neither allegation not evidence attacking the majority status of the Union.
It will therefore not be ieconi,mended that the agreement be set aside in its entirety
5 The Chase National Bank of the City of Alen, York, San Joan. Puerto Rico, Branch,
65 NLRB 827; Ci ossett Lumber Company, 8 NLRB 440; Republic Steel Corporation v.
N. L If. B , 311 U S 7 , F TI'. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289
61n-mentioning this, I note only what might be ai gued under different circumstances.
I do not suggest that I would consider such an argument valid. The distinction between
.the.two concepts should be apparent. Cf. J. I Case Company, 118 NLRB 520, foot-
note 10.
I Cf. Bowman Transportation, Inc., 112 NLRB 387, 388 , 398-399.
COOPER ALLOY CORPORATION 599
thereby minimize industrial strife which burdens and obstructs commerce, and thus
effectuate the policies of the Act, I shall further recommend that the Respondents
be ordered to cease and desist from infringing in any other manner upon the rights
guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact, and upon the entire record in the
case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Local 5250, United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization
within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act.
2. By discriminating in regard to the hire and tenure of employment and terms
and conditions of employment of its employees, thereby encouraging membership
in labor organizations, Cooper Alloy Corporation (Aircraft Division) has engaged
in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (3)
of the Act
3. By contributing support to the Union, the Company has engaged in and is
engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (2) of
the Act.
4. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, the Company has engaged in and is
engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) of
the Act.
5. By causing the Company to discriminate in regard to hire and tenure of
employment and terms and conditions of employment in violation of Section 8
(a) (3) of the Act, the Union has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor prac-
tices within the meaning of Section 8 (b) (2) of the Act.
6. By restraining and coercing employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed
in Section 7 of the Act, the Union has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8 (b) (1) (A) of the Act.
7 The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting com-
merce, within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
[Recommendations omitted from publication 1
APPENDIX A
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the recommendations of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the Labor Management
Relations Act, we hereby notify our employees that:
WE WILL NOT encourage membership in Local 5250, United Steelworkers of
America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization by discharging any of
our employees, by maintaining or enforcing the clauses of any agreement with
the said or any other labor organization which require our employees to fill
out checkoff authorizations, or by discriminating in any other manner in regard
to their hire or tenure of employment, except as authorized in Section 8 (a)
(3) of the Act
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our
employees in the exercise of the right to self-organization, to form labor organi-
zations, to join or assist Local 5250, United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO,
or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain
from any or all of such activities, except to the extent that such right may be
affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a
condition of employment, as authorized in Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act.
WE WILL offer to John F. Shallcross immediate and full reinstatement to his
former or substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to his seniority or
other rights and privileges, and make him whole for any loss of pay suffered
as a result of the discrimination against him.
COOPER ALLOY CORPORATION (AIRCRAFT DIVISION),
Employer.
Dated------------------- By-------------------------------------------
(Representative) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof, and must not be
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
600 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
APPENDIX B
NOTICE TO MEMBERS AND ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the recommendations of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the Labor Management
Relations Act, we hereby notify our employees that:
WE WILL NOT maintain or enforce the clauses of any agreement with Cooper
Alloy Corporation (Aircraft Division), or any other employer, which require
employees to fill out checkoff authorizations.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner cause or attempt to cause Cooper Alloy
Corporation (Aircraft Division), or any other employer, to discriminate against
an employee in violation of Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner restrain or coerce employees in the-
exercise of the right to self-organization, to form labor organizations, to join,
or assist any labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from
any or all of such activities, except to the extent that such right may be affected
by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization, as a condition.
of employment, as authorized in Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act.
LOCAL 5250, UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO,
Labor Organization.
Dated------------------- By-------------------------------------------
(Representative) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof, and must not be-
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
Springfield Building and Construction Trades Council; Car-
penters' District Council of Springfield, Massachusetts, and
Walter J. LaFrancis, and Local Union No. 1 of the Brick-
layers, Masons and Plasterers International Union of America,.
AFL-CIO, and James M. Leonard and Leo Spear Construe--
tion Co., Inc.
Springfield Building and Construction Trades Council; Carpen-
ters' District Council of Springfield, Massachusetts, and Wal-
ter J. LaFrancis and James F. Rogers, d/b/a Rogers Heating-
and Engineering Company. Cases Nos. I-CC-180 and 1-CC-184. .
A pril 25,1958
DECISION AND ORDER
On December 9, 1957, Trial Examiner Sidney Lindner issued his-
Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that
the Respondents had engaged in and were engaging in certain unfair,
labor practices , and recommending that they be required to cease and
desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative action, as set fortk
in the Intermediate Report , a copy of which is attached hereto..
Thereafter, the Respondents filed exceptions to the Intermediate
Report and supporting briefs; the General Counsel also filed a brief
with the Board.
120 NLRB No. 87.