Consolidated Printers

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jan 8, 1992

305 N.L.R.B. 1061 (N.L.R.B. 1992)

1061
305 NLRB No. 165
CONSOLIDATED PRINTERS
1 The parties have excepted to some of the judge’s credibility find-
ings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an administra-
tive law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear preponder-
ance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect.
Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d
362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find
no basis for reversing the findings.
No exceptions were filed to the judge’s dismissal of allegations
that the Respondent violated Sec. 8(a)(3) of the Act by laying off
employees after the election.
2 In adopting the judge’s conclusion that the Respondent did not
violate Sec. 8(a)(5) when it laid off employees during the week of
the election, we do not interpret the decision as requiring the Gen-
eral Counsel to establish the precise date the Respondent made its
decision to lay off the employees. Rather, based on the facts pre-
sented, the judge reasonably concluded that the decision was made
prior to the time the Respondent was obligated to bargain with the
Union. We find that the record supports that inference.
1 As a result of the pleadings and the stipulations of counsel at
trial, there were few disputes of fact regarding collateral matters.
Where not otherwise noted, the findings herein are based on the
pleadings, the stipulations of counsel, or unchallenged credible evi-
dence.
Consolidated Printers, Inc. and Graphic Commu-
nications Union, Local No. 583, Graphic Com-
munications International Union, AFL–CIO.
Case 32–CA–11202
January 8, 1992
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN STEPHENS AND MEMBERS OVIATT
AND RAUDABAUGH
On January 30, 1991, Administrative Law Judge
Clifford H. Anderson issued the attached decision. The
General Counsel filed exceptions and a supporting
brief, and the Respondent filed cross-exceptions and a
supporting brief and an answering brief to the General
Counsel’s exceptions.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated
its authority in this proceeding to a three-member
panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the
record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has de-
cided to affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,1 and con-
clusions2 and to adopt the recommended Order.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge and
orders that the Respondent, Consolidated Printers, Inc.,
Berkeley, California, its officers, agents, successors,
and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Order.
Gary M. Connaughton, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Samuel L. Holmes, Esq. (Holmes, Rochester, & Lea), of San
Francisco, California, for the Respondent.
William Sokol, Esq. (Van Bourg, Weinberg, Roger &
Rosenfeld), of San Francisco, California, for the Charging
Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
CLIFFORD H. ANDERSON, Administrative Law Judge. I
heard this case in trial on October 29 and 30, 1990, in Oak-
land, California, pursuant to a complaint and notice of hear-
ing issued by the Regional Director for Region 32 of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board (Board) on July 19, 1990,
based on a charge filed on June 15, 1990, and docketed as
Case 32–CA–11202 by the Graphic Communications Union,
Local No. 583, Graphic Communications International
Union, AFL–CIO (the Charging Party or the Union) against
Consolidated Printers, Inc. (Respondent or the Employer).
Posthearing briefs from the General Counsel and Respondent
were submitted on December 18, 1990.
The complaint alleges that Respondent’s agent Garrison
made various statements to employees in early 1990 vio-
lating Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act
(Act). The complaint further alleges that Respondent in May
1990 ‘‘began a series of employment layoffs and recalls’’ of
employees. The complaint alleges that Respondent took this
action because of employees’ union and other protected ac-
tivities in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. The
complaint further alleges that these actions were taken with-
out Respondent giving the Union notice of or an opportunity
to negotiate and bargain respecting either the actions or their
effects in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
Respondent in its answer denies that it engaged in the con-
duct alleged to independently violate Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act. Further Respondent avers that it initiated the relevant
employee layoffs and recalls in response to economic condi-
tions and for reasons independent of employees’ union or
other protected activities and therefore did not violate Sec-
tion 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. Respondent further contends
it had no obligation to notify and bargain with the Union re-
specting these actions and therefore did not violate Section
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
All parties were given full opportunity to participate at the
hearing, to introduce relevant evidence, to call, examine and
cross-examine witnesses, to argue orally, and to file
posthearing briefs.
On the entire record, including briefs from the General
Counsel and Respondent, and from my observation of the
witnesses and their demeanor, I make the following1
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent is a California corporation, with an office and
place of business in Berkeley, California, where it is engaged
in the business of nonretail production printing and binding.
Respondent during the 12 months preceding the issuance of
the complaint herein, a representative period, in the course
and conduct of its business operations, purchased and re-
ceived at its Berkeley facility goods and materials valued in
excess of $50,000 directly from sources outside California.
1062 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
2 Administrative notice is taken of the filing date of the petition. 3 At the time, Avalos’ wage rate was $6.69 per hour.
There is no dispute and I find that Respondent at all material
times has been an employer engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
II. LABOR ORGANIZATION
The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background
Respondent produces books and other printed material in
Berkeley, California. It has two departments, a print shop
and a bindery. Respondent admitted the supervisor and agent
status of Robert Prouse, owner, Alex McGuire, plant man-
ager, and Jim Garrison, bindery department supervisor. Bind-
ery department employees had not recently been represented
by a labor organization. In early 1990 the Union commenced
an organizing campaign among Respondent’s bindery em-
ployees.
The Union filed a representation petition docketed as Case
32–RC–3244 on March 26, 1990.2 An election in the rep-
resentation case was held on May 23, 1990, in which a ma-
jority of votes were cast for the Union. The Union was sub-
sequently certified by the Regional Director as the exclusive
representative of employees in the unit set forth below. The
complaint alleges and the answer admits that the Union, by
virtue of Section 9(a) of the Act, has been at all times since
May 23, 1990, the exclusive representative of employees in
the following unit (the unit):
All bindery department employees, including mainte-
nance mechanics, truckdrivers, bailers, shipping clerks,
janitors, and all other production employees not covered
by a collective bargaining agreement, employed by Re-
spondent at its Berkeley, California facility; excluding
all employees covered by a collective bargaining agree-
ment, office clerical employees, guards and supervisors
as defined in the Act.
B. Allegations of Independent Violations of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act
The General Counsel’s complaint at paragraph 6, as
amended at the hearing to add and delete certain allegations,
attributes to Respondent’s bindery department supervisor Jim
Garrison statements to employees during the months of Feb-
ruary, March, and May 1990 which are alleged to violate
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
1. The evidence
Michael Fitzgerald, a former employee of Respondent
hired in the bindery department in August 1988, testified that
he had several conversations with Bindery Department Su-
pervisor Jim Garrison respecting the Union in the shipping
department area in February or March 1990. Fitzgerald testi-
fied:
Usually [Garrison] asked if I had heard about anybody
passing out union cards, that the union was—someone
was trying to get the union in, and if I had signed a
card or heard rumors about people signing cards.
. . . .
I said no, that I haven’t signed a card, but I hadn’t
heard rumors—I had heard rumors about it.
Fitzgerald also testified that on May 15, 1990, Garrison
approached him and employees McLark, Glomski, and
Ashby as they were sitting at a lunchroom table. Fitzgerald
described the event as follows:
Jim [Garrison] . . . said that if the union got in, people
were going to be hurting and they were going to need
jobs, and that the union did not guarantee anything,
they couldn’t guarantee jobs and they couldn’t guar-
antee anything. They made promises but couldn’t guar-
antee anything.
To which I don’t believe anybody else said anything
except Randy Ashby, after [Garrison] said that people
need jobs, Randy said that he would go sell homes, see-
ing as he was getting his real estate license or had it
at that time.
Fitzgerald testified that he was present at a conversation
between Garrison and employee Salvador Avalos on May 17,
1990. Fitzgerald testified:
I heard Jim Garrison tell Salvador that if the union got
in, all the Mexicans would be making [$]5.50 like they
were at—he mentioned another specific bindery that I
can’t recall the name of.
Fitzgerald also testified that after the balloting on May 23,
1990, which ended at 3 p.m., he walked up to fellow em-
ployees Carol Miranda and Yolanda Pronio who were talking
with Garrison outside Garrison’s office and asked about the
results of the election. Miranda told Fitzgerald that the Union
had won the election. Garrison then said, in Fitzgerald’s
recollection, ‘‘well, I hope these people have jobs lined up.’’
Salvador Avalos, a former bindery employee of Respond-
ent, testified he was supervised by Garrison who directed
him in English. Avalos testified that he and other Hispanic
employees had numerous lunchroom conversations with Gar-
rison about the Union before the May 23, 1990 election.
Avalos was unable to distinguish each conversation in his
testimony, but rather characterized them as follows:
Jim said that if the union came in, if the union won,
we were going to earn less than five [dollars] or
[$]5.50, and perhaps a lot of people would be laid off.3
Avalos testified that on one occasion Fitzgerald was present
when Garrison talked to them. Avalos recalled:
He was telling us that if the union won, they would pay
us less, and perhaps a lot of people would be laid off.
McLark, Glomski, Ashby, Miranda, and Pronio did not tes-
tify.
James Garrison testified that he held ‘‘little group’’ em-
ployee meetings in which the union was discussed. He re-
called talking to Avalos and other employees but denied tell-
1063CONSOLIDATED PRINTERS
ing them that they would be laid off if the Union became
their representative or that their pay would be reduced. He
testified he told employees that, if the Union got in, ‘‘they’d
be hurting because they’d have to pay union dues.’’ He also
recalled showing or discussing with employees, including
Avalos and Fitzgerald, contracts between the Union and
other area employers which included a starting wage rate of
$5.50 per hour. Garrison recalled talking to employees Mi-
randa and Pronio following the election but denied that Fitz-
gerald asked about the results of the election or that he ever
responded that he hoped employees had jobs lined up.
2. Preliminary arguments
The General Counsel argues that the statements attributed
to Garrison, if credited, constitute independent violations of
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Respondent argues on brief that
there is no evidence that Garrison’s alleged remarks were
ever repeated to others or ‘‘reported to higher management
so that there could be an opportunity to affirm or repudiate
them.’’ Respondent also contends that there is no evidence
that ‘‘Garrison reflected the views of management or was au-
thorized to make the statements attributed to him.’’
Respondent’s arguments do not support a defense to the
violations alleged. Garrison, an admitted supervisor and
agent of Respondent, was in charge of the bindery depart-
ment which is the focus of the violations alleged. The record
reveals his direct role in hiring and firing employees in that
department and his additional role in supporting Respondent
in the union election campaign. His conduct need not be
shown to have been authorized or approved by Respondent’s
higher management to be held violative of the Act. On this
record Respondent is responsible for Garrison’s statements to
employees.
Respondent argues that the statements attributed to Garri-
son are protected under Section 8(c) of the Act. The Board
has long held, however, that Section 8(c) gives no protection
to threats or interrogations concerning union activity. An em-
ployer may make predictions of adverse consequences to em-
ployees related to union organization, if the basis for the
consequences are explained as resulting from objective cir-
cumstances and not the employer’s unfettered discretion.
Thus, if Garrison told employees that the Union had nego-
tiated a lower starting rate with other employers and that it
might do so with Respondent resulting in a drop in employee
wages, no violation of the Act would have occurred. Where
an employer’s agent tells employees, without more, that, if
the union is selected by employees, wages will be reduced,
there is no aspect of prediction rather the statement is a vio-
lative threat outside the ambit of Section 8(c). NLRB v.
Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
Respondent cites the Board’s decision in Webb Furniture
Enterprises, 275 NLRB 1305 (1985), for the proposition that
a supervisor’s statements: ‘‘if they got that thing in here all
the employees would see it ‘rough’’’ and people who had
union shirts would ‘‘dread it,’’ were not violations of the
Act. Respondent’s cited case does not support the propo-
sitions asserted. First the Board in an earlier Webb decision
reported at 272 NLRB 312 (1984), had remanded the ‘‘dread
it’’ allegation to the judge to determine if the statement had
in fact been made. The judge in Respondent’s cited case
found the statement had not been made and on that basis rec-
ommended dismissal of the allegation (275 NLRB 1305,
318), which recommendation the Board adopted in the ab-
sence of exceptions. The ‘‘rough’’ statement was found
vague and ambiguous by the judge whose dismissal of the
allegation was adopted only in the absence of exceptions by
the Board, ibid. 1305. Such an adoption is not binding au-
thority. Further the situations discussed are factually dis-
similar from the circumstances at issue herein.
3. Credibility resolutions and conclusions regarding
the 8(a)(1) allegations
I have considered the arguments of the parties on brief as
well as the inherent probabilities respecting the events in
contention. I find nothing advanced by the parties or present
on this record sufficient to overcome my conclusions and
credibility resolutions based on the demeanor of the wit-
nesses during their testimony. The General Counsel bears the
burden of proof on all aspects of his case. Here the testi-
mony of witnesses Fitzgerald and Avalos concerning the
contested conversations, compared and contrasted with Garri-
son’s version of events, more than meets that burden.
I found Fitzgerald to be a forthright witness with a persua-
sive demeanor. I hold the same view as to Avalos. Garrison,
however, struck me as an individual seeking to deny conduct
which he believed to be embarrassing both to himself person-
ally and his employer. I was not persuaded by his testimony.
Accordingly, I specifically credit Fitzgerald and Avalos over
Garrison with respect to the conversations at issue herein.
Having made this factual finding, I further find that Garri-
son’s interrogations of Fitzgerald about his union activities
and the union activities of others, violate Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act. Rossmore House, 269 NLRB 1176 (1984). I further
find that Garrison’s statements to employees that union ad-
herents would be ‘‘hurting’’ and ‘‘need jobs’’ constitute
threats which violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. I also find
that Garrison’s statements to employees that they would re-
ceive a lower wage, if the Union represented them, are
threats which violate Section 8(a)(1). NLRB v. Gissel Pack-
ing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969). Accordingly, I sustain the alle-
gations of complaint paragraph 6 as amended.
C. Allegations of Violations of Section 8(a)(3)
of the Act
1. Reconsideration of refusal to amend complaint
at trial’s end
Following the conclusion of the presentation of evidence
at the hearing in this case, counsel for the General Counsel
moved to amend the complaint to, in effect, allege that a por-
tion of Respondent’s presented defense, i.e., that it had de-
layed implementation of layoffs until the Board election bal-
loting was concluded, was a violation of Section 8(a)(3) of
the Act. Respondent opposed the motion. I denied it. The
General Counsel renews his motion on brief.
The General Counsel argues that his motion to amend was
‘‘hardly untimely since General Counsel first learned of this
‘postponement’ defense at the hearing.’’ He further argues
that the motion is ‘‘merely an attempt to conform the plead-
ings to the evidence which Respondent purposely put on the
record,’’ that the matter was fully litigated and that no statute
of limitations issues exist.
One of the cases cited by the General Counsel, New York
Post Corp., 283 NLRB 430 (1987), deals with a last-minute
1064 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
amendment to a complaint. The Board in New York Post re-
versed an administrative law judge who had allowed a last-
day amendment to the complaint over the objection of re-
spondent. The Board noted that Section 102.17 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations permit amendments ‘‘upon
such terms as may be deemed just.’’ The Board particularly
noted that the General Counsel had without explanation wait-
ed until the last minute to add the allegation, 283 NLRB at
431.
In the instant case counsel for the General Counsel con-
tends that he learned of Respondent’s defense only at the
trial. Counsel for the General Counsel does not explain how-
ever the delay between the time he learned of the nature and
theory of Respondent’s defense and the time he first made
his motion after the entire trial record had been made and
the hearing was to be closed. That delay is of consequence
because during that interim period counsel for Respondent
cross-examined the General Counsel’s witnesses and pre-
sented his defense in its entirely without any knowledge that
the General Counsel was intending to move to amend the
complaint to allege that portions of Respondent’s defense
were independently violative of the Act. Respondent at the
very least was entitled to know of the General Counsel’s in-
tentions at the soonest possible opportunity. I find that this
did not occur.
It may not be glibly assumed that Respondent counsel’s
handling of Respondent’s case would have been unchanged
had he been aware of the potential new allegations. Nor may
it fairly be assumed that the provision of an opportunity to
defend against the allegation by simply granting the amend-
ment at the conclusion of the record and giving Respondent
additional time to prepare and thereafter to submit evidence
to meet the new allegations would suffice. A trial record, like
life itself, proceeds in one direction only. One may regret but
cannot change what is past. An evidentiary record may be
augmented but augmentation is an addition to and not a sub-
stitution for what has gone before.
In making my findings in this regard, I also reject the cor-
ollary arguments of the General Counsel that the matter was
fully litigated, that the amendment was ‘‘in essence a motion
to conform the pleadings to the evidence,’’ and that the
amendment ‘‘involves only a legal conclusion based on facts
already in evidence.’’ The substantive law respecting the pro-
priety of delays in announcing and/or initiating changes in
unit employees’ working conditions due to a pending elec-
tion is subtle and considers many variables. A respondent
employer counsel could well have various and significant de-
cisions to make in presenting the defense involved herein, if
that defense were under independent attack as a violation of
Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
Given the costs to respondents of postevidentiary amend-
ments to complaints of the type at issue here, the Board both
in decisional law and in the portion of Section 102.17 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, cited supra, admonishes its
administrative law judges to grant amendments to complaints
only upon such terms as may be deemed just. Therefore last
minute amendments must be justified by the General Coun-
sel. For such an amendment to be just there can be no doubt
that delay on the part of the government in proposing its
amendments to the complaint was used to gain an advantage
over Respondent. Where no or an insufficient explanation is
made to explain a prosecutorial delay in proposing an
amendment to the complaint or in informing Respondent that
such an amendment will be proposed, the motion to amend
the complaint should be denied. Here counsel for the General
Counsel has not justified the delay occurring between the
time he knew or should have known of the nature of Re-
spondent’s defense and the time he put Respondent’s counsel
on notice of his intention to move to amend the complaint
to allege that a portion of Respondent’s defense violated the
Act. I find that unexplained delay herein precludes granting
the amendment sought by the General Counsel. I therefore
reaffirm my ruling at the hearing.
2. Evidence respecting Respondent’s staffing
pattern in 1990
Respondent’s bindery department serves the commercial
book publishing trade. Various specialized equipment is uti-
lized in the bindery to fulfill particular production needs. The
various machines used require differing degrees of skill to
operate. Some utilize a specially trained or skilled operators
and crews of varying sizes dependent on the particular re-
quirements of the type and size of the order being run. The
unit includes highly skilled machine operators, less skilled
operators, and other production employees and support staff.
Respondent introduced uncontroverted evidence of a de-
cline of economic activity in the bindery over the calendar
year 1990 to the time of the hearing in October. The volume
and size of orders received and filled generally fell over
time. No evidence was offered to suggest that Respondent re-
fused or diverted bindery department business or sought it
less assiduously over the period at issue. There was no sug-
gestion that such work was contracted out or undertaken with
other staff or at other facilities. Simply put, business in the
bindery was down.
Bindery unit staff, defined as employees actually at work
for some part of a given week, numbered from 33 to 34 in
early 1990 to mid-March, from 29 to 30 from mid-March to
early April, from 25 to 27 from early April to the week of
May 23 and, finally, from 16 to 18 thereafter to October
1990. Four employees were terminated and one transferred
out of the bindery unit in mid-March. Four employees went
on disability: one each in March and April, two in May. One
employee resigned in July and a disabled employee returned
to work in August. Respondent discontinued its second shift
in or about the first week of May. At about that same time
Respondent was informed by the company that purchased its
scrap paper that it no longer would derive economic benefit
from continued sorting and separation of the scrap paper. Re-
spondent accordingly discontinued these tasks eliminating
what had heretofore been a regular task occupying four unit
employees.
In the early part of 1990, although there were some excep-
tional weeks where virtually no short days or layoffs oc-
curred, Respondent with regularity sent employees home
early (short days) or put individual employees on layoff for
a few days at a time. Thus 9 of the 14 weeks in the period
beginning in January 1990 and ending the week of April 4
involved partial week layoffs and/or short days affecting the
majority of the unit. During this same period no employees
were laid off permanently or even for periods extending to
full weeks. The following weeks of April 11, 18, and 25 in-
volved virtually no layoffs or short days of any kind al-
though, as noted supra, four unit employees had been dis-
1065CONSOLIDATED PRINTERS
charged, one transferred and three had gone on disability by
this time. The weeks of May 2 and 9 included widespread
short days, the week of May 16 was limited to about one
short day per two employees.
Alex McGuire, Respondent’s plant manager, testified that
Respondent made a policy decision in early May to avoid
unit employee layoffs before the election. Accordingly, testi-
fied McGuire, as ‘‘billable’’ work declined, employees were
assigned ad hoc maintenance and clean up tasks such as re-
placing broken windows at the facility until, in the final days
before the election, some employees were reduced to repet-
itive sweeping of the shop floor to occupy their time.
The Board election in Case 32–RC–3244 was held at Re-
spondent’s premises from 2 to 3 p.m. on Wednesday, May
23, 1990. The end of Respondent’s normal business day in
the bindery is 3:30 p.m. Contrary to usual procedure, which
was to give earlier notification to employees of upcoming
layoffs, numerous employees were told as they left the facil-
ity or later that evening by telephone that they were to be
laid off effective immediately. A significant number of em-
ployees were laid off that week, many of whom had not been
recalled as of the hearing date.
Respondent’s pattern of employment after the election dif-
fered from the earlier part of the year. The employees laid
off following the election were not recalled. The employees
not laid off experienced fewer short days. The previous pat-
tern of more frequent but less than full week layoffs was
substantially reduced. Thus after May, layoffs were not
spread over the unit but rather some employees were placed
on uninterrupted layoff and those who remained employed
generally enjoyed continuous or at least less interrupted em-
ployment.
James Garrison testified that he had earlier consciously
tried to spread work among unit members, but that the prac-
tice was not satisfactory and was discontinued. Garrison tes-
tified he had conversations with employees Carol Miranda
and Yolanda Pronio about Respondent’s allocation of avail-
able work and layoffs. At the time of the cessation of the
night shift, Miranda asked Garrison to lay off the night shift
permanently so that the employees could draw unemploy-
ment compensation. Garrison testified that both Miranda and
Pronio complained that frequent layoffs of a few days at a
time spread among all employees served to diminish pay-
checks for everyone without making any employees eligible
for state unemployment compensation. Garrison testified that
‘‘a couple of employees even got second jobs because the
first job didn’t pay enough. They weren’t getting enough
hours.’’ Miranda and Pronio did not testify.
3. Arguments of the parties
The General Counsel argues that Respondent threatened
employees with layoffs if they selected the Union, told em-
ployees after the election that they had better ‘‘have jobs
lined up,’’ thereafter laid off various employees and changed
its practice of placing unit employees on frequent short term
layoffs as opposed to placing a few employees on long term
layoffs—all in retaliation for the employees’ selection of the
Union as their representative. The General Counsel argues
that the bindery supervisor’s threats to lay off employees, the
precipitate timing of the commencement of numerous and
long-term layoffs immediately after the election balloting, the
variation from previous practice in announcing the layoffs
and the change in Respondent’s postelection practices re-
specting the sharing of layoffs generally, all support the Gen-
eral Counsel’s retaliation theory.
Respondent argues that the record is essentially
uncontradicted that economic factors determined Respond-
ent’s bindery business volume and unit personnel require-
ments. Respondent argues further that bindery staffing pat-
terns and related unit layoffs and recalls were objectively de-
termined by production needs and that employees’ union ac-
tivities were irrelevant to and not a part of Respondent’s per-
sonnel actions with a single exception. Respondent concedes
that it did not lay off unit employees in the face of a declin-
ing volume of business in the weeks immediately prior to the
election. Rather Respondent argues it carried some unit em-
ployees on the payroll and occupied them in make-work
tasks so that unit layoffs immediately preceding the election
would not generate election blocking unfair labor practice
charges filed by the Union or generate hostility to Respond-
ent on the part of voting employees as the election ap-
proached.
Respecting the General Counsel’s contention that Re-
spondent changed the pattern and duration of unit layoffs in
retaliation against employees, Respondent denies the extent
of the change alleged. Further Respondent contends that, to
the extent a change in the pattern of layoffs occurred, Re-
spondent’s decision to abandon the practice of spreading the
available work among all unit employees by having frequent
short period layoffs for many employees was both made and
implemented at the time of the close of the second shift. Re-
spondent contends this change came about as a result of re-
quests from employees that work not be so intermittent that
employees could neither work enough hours to earn a fair in-
come nor claim unemployment compensation based on
longer term layoffs.
4. Analysis and conclusions respecting the
8(a)(3) allegations
The layoffs following hard after the balloting on May 23
were different from previous layoffs both in the timing of
their announcement to employees and in their duration. The
layoffs were announced unusually late in the day on May 23
or were announced to employees after hours by telephone.
Rather than the pattern of widespread short week layoffs ex-
isting in early 1990, the May 23 layoffs and those that fol-
lowed soon after were far longer in duration. The layoffs ini-
tiated the week of May 23 continued for many laid-off em-
ployees to the time of the hearing. The number of hours
worked per working employee increased. As noted, the com-
plement of working unit employees was reduced from some
25 employees in the weeks before the postelection layoffs to
16 or 17 by the week of May 30 and remained at this level
thereafter.
I have considered the economic arguments made by both
Respondent and the General Counsel based on the records in-
troduced into evidence respecting Respondent’s business vol-
ume, production requirements and personnel statistics for the
year 1990 to the time of the hearing. In agreement with Re-
spondent, I am persuaded that Respondent’s business volume
and bindery department staffing requirements had declined
over the relevant period so that a reduction in total unit
weekly working hours was necessary in May 1990. In reach-
ing this decision I have considered and rejected the General
1066 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
4 Similarly, I have not drawn adverse inferences, supra, respecting
the failure of any party to call employees McLark, Glomski and
Ashby, Miranda or Pronio, all of whom who were identified by Fitz-
gerald as parties to conversations with Garrison in which Garrison
violated Sec. 8(a)(1) of the Act.
Counsel’s various arguments that the records were inad-
equate to support such a conclusion.
Having concluded there was a business necessity to reduce
bindery hours, I further find Respondent’s decision to initiate
postelection layoffs was not taken as an act of retaliation
against the unit for selecting the Union. Rather, consistent
with Respondent’s argument, I find the timing of the layoffs
themselves as well as their delayed announcement following
the election was a result of Respondent’s preelection decision
to avoid laying off employees or notifying them that they
would later be laid off until the balloting was concluded. The
evidence shows and I find that Respondent made its decision
to keep employees on the payroll as part of its electoral strat-
egy. That determination to delay necessary layoffs did not
extend to the period after the election. I have found that the
declining work available militated for layoffs earlier in May.
It is clear and I also find that the economic conditions requir-
ing layoffs continued up to and after the election. Given all
the above, and on the record as a whole, I find Respondent
would have been forced to substantially reduce unit payroll
when it did irrespective of the outcome of the balloting.
I have found that Respondent’s substantial reduction in
payroll was required in May by economic circumstances
independent of employees’ union activities. This finding does
not conclude the necessary analysis of the 8(a)(3) allegations
of the complaint however. The General Counsel also chal-
lenges the form and pattern of the postballoting layoffs and
argues that the previous standard of sharing work and layoffs
was discontinued in order to punish unit employees for se-
lecting the Union. This is an argument which stands largely
independent of the earlier argument that the layoffs were ini-
tiated to punish employees. The issue here is not the number
of hours worked but rather their distribution among unit em-
ployees. Given that I have found Respondent’s reduction in
hours worked after the election justified, was Respondent’s
distribution of those reduced hours among unit employees
changed so as to punish unit employees for their union ac-
tivities?
This latter argument turns on different facts. For the Gen-
eral Counsel to prevail, he must demonstrate that there was
motivating animus on Respondent’s part in changing layoff
practice. The General Counsel argues that, rather than con-
tinuing to share the burden of reduced hours among the en-
tire unit, Respondent concentrated the postelection reduction
in hours in a group of employees in essence laying them off
permanently and employing the remaining employees on an
essentially full-time basis so that they did not experience the
earlier pattern of recurring short work weeks or short days.
It seems clear that, to at least some degree, the General
Counsel’s argued redistribution of work hours did occur. It
is not obvious however how this redistribution may be held
to be a punishment to particular employees who engaged in
union activities. Thus, there is no evidence whatever that the
employees laid off after the election were more active in sup-
port of the Union than the employees who, rather than being
laid off, enjoyed longer and more regular working hours.
Further, as noted above, Respondent’s bindery supervisor
Garrison testified that at the time the second shift was dis-
continued he was made aware of employee dissatisfaction
with Respondent’s then applicable practice of sharing out
layoffs among Respondent’s unit employees and that he
thereafter attempted to provide more hours to some employ-
ees and to make longer rather than shorter layoffs. Garrison
also testified that he was aware that employees were having
financial difficulty surviving on their reduced paychecks the
reduced hours produced. He testified that some employees
had had to obtain a second job to make ends meet. Thus, to
the extent a change in work hour distribution occurred, Re-
spondent argues the change was undertaken benignly at em-
ployees’ request and at a time well before the union bal-
loting.
The General Counsel argues the evidence respecting the
asserted basis and timing of Respondent’s decision to redis-
tribute unit work hours is unbelievable. First, the General
Counsel notes that Respondent contends it consulted only a
few employees before implementing this significant policy
change, a proposition the General Counsel argues is implau-
sible. Second, the General Counsel attacks Garrison’s credi-
bility generally. Further, the General Counsel attacks Garri-
son’s testimony about conversations with employees Carol
Miranda and Yolanda Pronio as uncorroborated and seeks an
adverse inference that, had these two employees been called
to testify, they would not have corroborated Garrison.
In support of his argument Counsel for the General coun-
sel on brief cites the Board’s decision in International Auto-
mated Machines, 285 NLRB 1122 (1987). That case however
stands for the proposition noted at 1123 that:
[W]hen a party fails to call a witness who may reason-
ably be assumed to be favorably disposed to the party,
an adverse inference may be drawn regarding any fac-
tual question on which the witness is likely to have
knowledge. (2 Wigmore, Evidence § 286 (2d ed.
1940). . . . See Greg Construction Co., 277 NLRB
1411 (1985); Hadbar, 211 NLRB 333, 337 (1974)).
In International Automated Machines as well as each of the
cases cited in the quotation immediately above, the class of
witnesses reasonably assumed to be favorably disposed to a
party was limited to fellow agents of the involved employers
or unions, i.e., individuals aligned in interest with the party
who did not call them. Neither the Board’s decisional hold-
ings nor common sense suggest that an employee may prop-
erly assumed to favor either an employer or a union in the
typical Board unfair labor practice proceeding or in the in-
stant case in particular. I therefore decline to draw any ad-
verse inference respecting this testimony.4
I disagree with the General Counsel that the evidence re-
specting Respondent’s asserted timing of and basis for its
change in distribution of unit work hours is unpersuasive.
Even though I have discredited Garrison’s denials respecting
the statements attributed to him by other witnesses in the
portion of this decision dealing with allegations of 8(a)(1)
violations, supra, I credit his testimony here. I make this
finding not only on demeanor grounds but also because I am
convinced that employees would have brought to Garrison
their views that regularly shortened hours and concomittant
reduced paychecks were not satisfactory. I also find plausible
the further proposition that this financial truism would have
1067CONSOLIDATED PRINTERS
5 Respondent argues that the change in assigning work and days
off after the election was not as significant as contended by the Gen-
eral Counsel. I agree. Respondent had previously terminated several
employees in 1990 as noted supra. While the post-May 23 layoffs
which continued without interruption to the time of the hearing were
not recorded as terminations, the practical effect of these employees’
continued absence was the same in terms of distribution of hours
worked among the other employees as if they had been terminated.
6 Placing my analysis in terms of the approach set forth in Wright
Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980), see also NLRB v. Transportation
Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983), assuming the General
Counsel’s arguments based on the threats of Garrison, the initiation
of the layoffs simultaneously with the conclusion of the balloting,
and the change in the distribution of the reduction in hours among
unit employees have sustained his prima facie case, and specifically
assigning the burden of proof to Respondent, I find that Respondent
would have taken the action it did in the absence of any union or
protected concerted activity by Respondent’s employees.
become obvious to Garrison on his own. Thus I find it both
reasonable and foreseeable that Garrison, as he testified,
would have learned of employee dissatisfaction with the re-
duced hours and reduced income and would have acted to
change the distribution without feeling the need to consult
with other employees. I further find it reasonable that Garri-
son and Respondent would have not attempted to spread out
the reduced hours necessary after May 23, but would have
rather have laid off some employees and kept others on the
payroll without continuing to impose regular short days or
short layoffs.5
In conclusion I have found that the reduction in total unit
hours initiated on and after May 23, 1990, by Respondent
did not occur because of unit employees’ union or other pro-
tected activities as alleged in the complaint and that Re-
spondent would have undertaken the reduction irrespective of
the outcome of the election and even if the employees had
not engaged in union or other protected activities. I have fur-
ther found Respondent adjusted the distribution, pattern, du-
ration and extent of individual employee’s reduction in hours
required on and after May 23, 1990, based on management
decisions made before the May 23 election. Finally I have
found Respondent made these determinations free of any
consideration of employees’ union or other protected con-
certed activity.6 Having so concluded, I further find that the
General Counsel has not established a violation of Section
8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act as alleged in paragraphs 10 and
11 of the complaint. Accordingly, I shall recommend that the
8(a)(3) allegations of the complaint be dismissed.
D. Allegations of Violations of Section 8(a)(5)
and (1) of the Act
The General Counsel alleges that the layoffs described in
paragraph 10 of the complaint as amended were undertaken
by Respondent without providing the Union with notice of
nor an opportunity to bargain respecting either the layoffs
themselves or the effects of the layoffs. The General Counsel
contends that the Union as the exclusive representative of the
unit for purposes of collective bargaining at all times after
the election was entitled to such notice and opportunity to
bargain and that Respondent’s failure to provide it violates
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
Respondent does not challenge the Union’s postelection
representative status, the fact that layoffs are a mandatory
subject of bargaining or the fact that it did not provide the
Union with notice of the layoffs or an opportunity to bargain
respecting the layoffs or their effects. Rather Respondent ar-
gues that it had no obligation under Section 8(a)(5) of the
Act to do so since it had simply continued its past practice
of laying off employees who were objectively determined not
to be necessary to undertake the work contemplated by the
bindery orders received.
There is no doubt that an employer’s obligation under Sec-
tion 8(a)(5) of the Act to refrain from making unilateral
changes in working conditions commences at the time of an
apparent ballot victory for a labor organization rather than at
the time of its official certification. NLRB v. Carbonex Coal
Co., 679 F.2d 200 (10th Cir. 1982); Lawrence Textile Shrink-
ing Co., 235 NLRB 1178 (1978). The layoff of unit employ-
ees is clearly a mandatory subject of bargaining. U.S. Gyp-
sum Co., 94 NLRB 112, 114 (1951), enfd. as modified on
other grounds 206 F.2d 410 (5th Cir. 1953).
The timing of a decision to lay off a particular group of
employees at a particular time is critical to determining if the
employer was obligated to notify and bargain about the deci-
sion or its effects. In Valley Iron Co., 224 NLRB 866 (1976),
the Board adopted the decision of an administrative law
judge who found the employer violated Section 8(a)(5) and
(1) of the Act when it laid off employees for a few days
commencing immediately after the close of balloting in an
election won by a union. The judge specifically found in that
case that the decision to lay off the employees ‘‘was made
at a time when the Union had the demonstrated support of
a preponderant majority of the employees in the bargaining
unit.’’ Id. at 877. The Board in Embossing Printers, 268
NLRB 710 (1984), dismissed a unilateral change 8(a)(5) alle-
gation that an employer had unilaterally canceled employees’
Christmas bonus after a union had been certified as rep-
resentative of employees. The Board decision turned on its
finding that the employer’s decision to cancel the Christmas
bonus was made before it became obligated to bargain with
the union, i.e., before the Board-conducted election.
Turning to the instant case, I have found in my consider-
ation of the 8(a)(3) allegations, supra, that Respondent had
determined well before the election to work unit employees
through the election irrespective of actual work requirements
and then to effect substantial and long term as opposed to
short term or shortened week layoffs to bring staffing levels
in the bindery into conformity with production needs. The
record does not isolate the particular date and time of Re-
spondent’s specific determination of who would be laid off.
On this record, given the close timing of the end of the bal-
loting and the announcements of the layoffs to the employees
as well as the burden of proof the General Counsel bears on
each aspect of his prima facie case, it cannot be said that
these decisions were made at a time when Respondent was
obligated to bargain with the Union. Accordingly, I find that
the layoffs initiated the week of the election were decided on
by Respondent before it was obligated to bargain with the
Union even though the employees were told of the layoffs
and even though the layoffs did not actually begin until after
the election. There being no obligation by Respondent to bar-
gain respecting these layoffs, its failure to notify the Union
respecting them does not violate Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of
the Act. Accordingly, I shall dismiss the complaint allega-
tions dealing with these changes.
1068 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
7 Thus all layoffs initiated after the week of May 23, 1990, were
improper. Layoffs which commenced in the week of May 23 were
not improper irrespective of how long they continued without inter-
ruption. Once an employee returned to work for any period, how-
ever, any subsequent layoff was a new layoff and was improper if
no notification and opportunity to bargain was provided the Union.
Difficulties in classification of particular layoffs under these findings
may be resolved in the compliance stage of these proceedings, if
necessary.
Layoffs also occurred after the week of the election
through the date of the hearing. The decision to initiate each
such layoff may fairly be inferred to have occurred after the
election. Respondent contends that these layoffs were but a
continuation of its previous practice and therefore it was not
obligated by Section 8(a)(5) of the Act to notify or bargain
with the Union concerning either the layoffs or their effects.
The Board in the General Counsel’s cited case, Adair Stand-
ish Corp., 292 NLRB 890 (1989), conclusively addresses this
defense at fn. 1:
The Respondent argues that because of its past practice
of instituting economic layoffs due to lack of work, it
had no obligation to bargain with the Union over such
layoffs. However, because of the intervention of the
bargaining representative, the Respondent could no
longer continue unilaterally to exercise its discretion
with respect to layoffs. See, e.g., Ladies Garment
Workers Local 512 v. NLRB, 795 F.2d 705 (9th Cir.
1986). Instead, the Respondent was obligated to bargain
with the Union over the layoffs, which are mandatory
subjects of bargaining. Lapeer Foundry & Machine,
289 NLRB [952] (1988). Accordingly, we agree with
the judge that the Respondent violated Sec. 8(a)(5) and
(1) of the Act by failing to bargain with the Union over
the layoffs.
I find this recent Board decision controlling of the result
herein and therefore conclude that Respondent violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act when it undertook layoffs of
unit employees which layoffs comenced after the week of
May 23, 1990, without notifying the Union or providing it
an opportunity to bargain over the layoffs or their effects.
See also Gulf States Mfrs., 261 NLRB 852 (1982). Accord-
ingly, I sustain the complaint allegations with respect to
them.7
E. Summary
Crediting the General Counsel’s witnesses over Respond-
ent’s bindery supervisor, I found that he interrogated employ-
ees concerning their and other employees’ union activities
and threatened employees with reduction in wages, layoff
and discharge if they selected the Union to represent them,
all in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act as alleged in
the complaint as amended.
Crediting Respondent’s economic defense, I found that its
decisions to lay off employees following the election and its
decision to change the pattern and distribution of hours of
work and frequency and duration of layoffs among the unit
employees were not made in retaliation for employees’ union
activities. Thus I found the General Counsel did not sustain
his burden of proof with respect to these allegations. Accord-
ingly, I shall dismiss the General Counsel’s complaint allega-
tions that such conduct violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of
the Act.
I found that employee layoffs are a mandatory subject of
bargaining and that Respondent had not notified the Union
of nor offered to bargain respecting layoffs. I found that Re-
spondent was not obligated to bargain with the Union re-
specting layoff decisions made before the election irrespec-
tive of the date of the implementation of the layoffs. I found
Respondent was obligated to notify the Union and bargain
respecting all unit employee layoffs decided on after the
election. I found that Respondent decided on the layoffs oc-
curring in the week of May 23 before the election and that
all layoffs initiated after the week of May 23 were decided
on by Respondent after the election. Finding no obligation to
bargain respecting the layoffs effected the week of May 23,
1990, I find Respondent’s failure to bargain respecting them
did not violate Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. Therefore,
I shall dismiss all allegations in the complaint respecting
them. Having found an obligation to bargain over the layoffs
undertaken after the week of May 23, 1990, and a failure by
Respondent to fulfill that obligation, I further found Re-
spondent’s failure to bargain in good faith with respect to
these layoffs violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. Ac-
cordingly, I sustained the General Counsel’s allegations in
the complaint with respect to them.
IV. REMEDY
Having found Respondent engaged in certain unfair labor
practices, I shall recommend that it be ordered to cease and
desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative action nec-
essary to effectuate the purposes and policies of the Act in-
cluding the posting of a remedial notice and the mailing of
that notice to employees on layoff.
The remedy for Respondent’s failure to notify the Union
and give it an opportunity to bargain respecting the layoffs
initiated after the week of May 23, 1990, shall be that di-
rected in Adair Standish Corp., supra, which included, inter
alia, the following. Respondent shall be obligated to offer
employees unilaterally laid off after the week of May 23,
1990, immediate and full reinstatement to their former jobs
or, if those jobs no longer exist, to substantially equivalent
positions, without prejudice to their seniority or any other
rights and privileges. Respondent shall also make all such
employees whole for any and all loss of earnings and other
benefits suffered as a result of the unilateral layoffs. Backpay
shall be computed as prescribed in F. W. Woolworth Co., 90
NLRB 289 (1950), with interest as provided in New Hori-
zons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987); see also
Florida Steel Corp., 231 NLRB 651 (1977), and Isis Plumb-
ing Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962). Respondent shall further be
directed to remove from its files any reference to the layoffs
initiated after the week of May 23, 1990, and shall notify the
employees involved, in writing, that this has been done.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union has been at all relevant times a labor organi-
zation within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. At all times since the balloting on May 23, 1990, the
Union has been the exclusive representative for purposes of
1069CONSOLIDATED PRINTERS
8 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and rec-
ommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be
adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
9 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court
of appeals, the words in the notice reading ‘‘Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board’’ shall read ‘‘Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order
of the National Labor Relations Board.’’
collective bargaining of Respondent’s employees in the fol-
lowing unit which is appropriate for collective bargaining
within the meaning of Section 9 of the Act:
All bindery department employees, including mainte-
nance mechanics, truckdrivers, bailers, shipping clerks,
janitors, and all other production employees not covered
by a collective bargaining agreement, employed by Re-
spondent at its Berkeley, California facility; excluding
all employees covered by a collective bargaining agree-
ment, office clerical employees, guards and supervisors
as defined in the Act.
4. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by en-
gaging in the following acts and conduct:
(a) Interrogating employees about their and other employ-
ees’ union activities.
(b) Threatening employees with discharge, if they selected
the Union to represent them.
(c) Threatening employees with wage reductions, if they
selected the Union to represent them.
(d) Threatening employees with layoffs, if they selected or
because they had selected the Union to represent them.
5. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act
by failing and refusing to notify the Union or provide it an
opportunity to bargain with respect to layoffs of unit employ-
ees decided on by the Employer after the election on May
23, 1990, or the effects of those layoffs.
6. The above unfair labor practices constitute unfair labor
practices effecting commerce within the meaning of Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act.
7. Respondent has not otherwise violated the Act as al-
leged in the complaint as amended.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on
the entire record, I issue the following recommended8
ORDER
The Respondent, Consolidated Printers, Inc., Berkeley,
California, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Interrogating employees concerning their union activi-
ties and the union activities of other employees.
(b) Threatening employees with discharge, if they select
the Union to represent them.
(c) Threatening employees with wage reductions, if they
select the Union to represent them.
(d) Threatening employees with layoff, if they select or
because they have selected the Union to represent them.
(e) Failing to bargain with the Union with respect to Re-
spondent’s employees in the unit described below by failing
and refusing to notify and provide the Union with an oppor-
tunity to bargain over the decisions to lay off unit employees
made after the election on May 23, 1990, and effects of
those decisions.
(f) In any like or related manner interfering with, restrain-
ing, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guar-
anteed them in Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to ef-
fectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) On request, bargain in good faith with the Union as
the exclusive representative of employees in the unit de-
scribed below with respect to wages, hours and other terms
and conditions of employment.
(b) Offer employees unilaterally laid off after the week of
May 23, 1990, immediate and full reinstatement to their
former jobs or, if those jobs no longer exist, to substantially
equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority or
any other rights and privileges.
(c) Make all such laid-off employees whole for any and
all loss of earnings and other benefits suffered as a result of
the unilateral layoffs initiated by the Employer after the week
of May 23, 1990. Backpay shall be computed as prescribed
in F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950), with interest
as provided in New Horizons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB
1173 (1987); see also Florida Steel Corp., 231 NLRB 651
(1977), and Isis Plumbing Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962).
(d) Remove from its files any references to layoffs initi-
ated after the week of May 23, 1990, and notify the employ-
ees involved, in writing, that this has been done.
(e) Preserve and, on request, make available to the Board
or its agents, for examination and copying, all payroll
records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel
records and all other records and reports necessary to cal-
culate the amount of money or other remedial aspects due
under the terms of this Order and to insure that the Order
has been fully complied with.
(f) Post at its Berkeley, California facility copies of the at-
tached notice marked ‘‘Appendix.’’9 Copies of the notice, on
forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 32, in
English and such other languages as the Regional Director
determines are necessary to fully communicate with employ-
ees, after being signed by Respondent’s authorized represent-
ative, shall be posted for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous
places, including all places where notices to employees are
customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Re-
spondent to ensure the notices are not altered, defaced or
covered by other material. Copies of the notice shall also be
mailed to all unit employees on layoff at the time this notice
is posted.
(g) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days
from the date of the Order what steps Respondent has taken
to comply.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us
to post and abide by this notice.
1070 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
WE WILL NOT interrogate our employees about their union
activities or the union activities of other employees.
WE WILL NOT threaten employees with wage reductions,
layoff or discharge because they select or have selected the
Union to represent them.
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain in good faith with Graphic
Communications Union, Local No. 583, Graphic Commu-
nications International Union, AFL–CIO as the exclusive rep-
resentative of our employees in the unit set forth below for
purposes of collective bargaining concerning wages, hours,
and working conditions of unit employees.
WE WILL NOT lay off unit employees or make any changes
in their wages, hours or other terms or conditions of employ-
ment, without first giving the Union adequate and timely no-
tice and affording it an opportunity to engage in collective
bargaining with respect thereto.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaran-
teed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL, on request, bargain in good faith with the Union
as the exclusive representative of all employees in the unit
described below with respect to wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment.
WE WILL offer all employees who were unilaterally laid
off after the week of May 23, 1990, immediate and full rein-
statement to their former jobs or, if those jobs no longer
exist, to substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice
to their seniority and any other rights and privileges pre-
viously enjoyed.
WE WILL make whole our employees who suffered layoffs
which began after the week of May 23, 1990, for any and
all loss of earning and other benefits suffered as a result of
our unilateral implementation of those layoffs, with interest,
as more fully set forth in the decision in this matter.
WE WILL remove from our files any and all references to
the layoffs described above and notify the employees in writ-
ing, that this has been done.
The collective-bargaining unit represented by Graphic
Communications Union, Local No. 583, Graphic Commu-
nications International Union, AFL–CIO is:
All bindery department employees, including mainte-
nance mechanics, truckdrivers, bailers, shipping clerks,
janitors, and all other production employees not covered
by a collective bargaining agreement, employed by
Consolidated Printers, Inc. at its Berkeley, California
facility; excluding all employees covered by a collec-
tive bargaining agreement, office clerical employees,
guards and supervisors as defined in the Act.
CONSOLIDATED PRINTERS, INC.