Communications Workers Local 13000 (Verizon Communications)

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Sep 30, 2004

343 N.L.R.B. 134 (N.L.R.B. 2004)

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
343 NLRB No. 21
134
Communications Workers of America, Local 13000,
AFL–CIO, CLC (Verizon Communications,
Inc.) and Michael San Augustin. Case 6–CB–
10992
September 30, 2004
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS LIEBMAN, SCHAUMBER, AND WALSH
On June 18, 2004, Administrative Law Judge Arthur J.
Amchan issued the attached decision. The General Coun-
sel filed exceptions and a supporting brief. The Respon-
dent filed an answering brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,1 and conclusions and
to adopt the recommended Order.
ORDER
The recommended Order of the administrative law
judge is adopted and the complaint is dismissed.
Barton Myers, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Richard H. Markowitz, Esq. (Markowitz & Richman), Philadel-
phia, Pennsylvania, for the Respondent.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
ARTHUR J. AMCHAN, Administrative Law Judge. This case
was tried in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, on April 13 and 14,
2004. The charge was filed September 29, 2003, and the com-
plaint was issued January 23, 2004.
The General Counsel alleges that Respondent, Local 13000
of the Communications Workers of America (the Union) vio-
lated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by initiating internal union
disciplinary proceedings against four employee/members who
continued to park their company-owned vehicles at Verizon
Communication’s remote facilities. Representatives of the
Union told these employees that they were violating the Un-
ion’s “non-participation policy” with respect to all Verizon’s
voluntary programs. The General Counsel alleges that Verizon
supervisors required these employees to continue parking at the
remote facilities. Thus, the primary issue in this matter is
whether the four employees were voluntarily parking at these
locations or whether they were required to do so by Verizon.

1 The General Counsel has excepted to some of the judge’s credibil-
ity findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an ad-
ministrative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear prepon-
derance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect.
Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362
(3d. Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no
basis for reversing the findings.
Member Schaumber finds it unnecessary to pass on Longshoremen
ILA Local 1575 (Navieras, NPR), 332 NLRB 1336 (2000), relied on in
part by the judge.
On the entire record, including my observation of the de-
meanor of the witnesses, and after considering the briefs filed
by the General Counsel and Respondent, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Verizon Communications, Inc, a corporation, provides tele-
communications services throughout the State of Pennsylvania.
It annually derives revenues in excess of $100,000 and pur-
chases and receives goods valued in excess of $5000 from
points outside the State of Pennsylvania. Verizon is an em-
ployer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section
2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act and the Union, the Communica-
tions Workers of America, Local 13000, which represents Ver-
izon employees in most of Pennsylvania, is a labor organization
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
The Union has instituted a “non-participation policy” on
several occasions during collective-bargaining negotiations
with Verizon. Generally this policy requires all union members
to cease participation in any of the Employer’s voluntary pro-
grams, such as blood drives, charitable activities, and certain
training activities.
On December 13, 2002, in response to layoffs by Verizon,
the Union announced the commencement of another such pro-
gram.1 The Union’s executive board informed its members
that:
Local 1300 members will not voluntarily participate in any
company sponsored initiative, committee or program of any
kind.
This means that you come into work, do your job, go home at
the end of your respective workday. Once a week you accept,
sign, and cash your paycheck.
There are no exceptions.
Any member violating this Executive Board policy will be
subject to charges under the CWA Constitution and Local
13000 Bylaws and Rules.
[GC Exh. 4.]
In the late 1990s, Verizon implemented a remote garaging
program. Pursuant to this program, some field technicians are
encouraged and allowed to park their company-owned vehicles
at a location other than the main garage or work center to which
they are assigned. Many of these locations are “central of-
fices” which contain switching equipment that generates the
dial tone for customer’s telephones. The central offices are
often unmanned. Verizon installed desks, telephones, and
computer terminals at the central offices to accommodate re-
mote garaging employees. These employees commute to the
central office by privately owned vehicle, where they pick up
their company vehicle and their work assignments via com-
puter. At the end of their workday in the field, these employees

1 The policy was rescinded in November 2003, after the successful
conclusion of collective-bargaining negotiations.
COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS LOCAL 13000 (VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS) 135
return to the central office, where they park their company-
owned vehicles overnight.
The remote garaging program was beneficial to both Verizon
and the employees involved. The employees participating in
the program generally, if not always, lived closer to the remote
locations than to their work center. Verizon benefited because
the employees were generally closer to their work assignments
at the beginning of each workday.
In December 2002, the president of Local 13000’s unit 59,
Charles “Buzz” Meddings, informed members of the unit that,
pursuant to the Union’s nonparticipation policy, those members
who were parking at remote locations were to cease doing so
and park at the work center to which they were assigned. Unit
59 is part Local 13000’s western region and has approximately
300 members. It encompasses several work centers south of
Pittsburgh: Uniontown, Washington, and McKeesport, as well
as a technical center in Monroeville, Pennsylvania.
By February 2003, 10 of the 15 employee/members assigned
to the Uniontown work center, that had been parking company
vehicles at remote locations, had ceased to do so and were
parking the vehicles at Uniontown. Verizon did not discipline
or threaten to discipline any of the ten employee/members who
complied with the Union’s nonparticipation policy. At some
time prior to February 25, 2003, the Union notified em-
ployee/members Martin Hancock, Gary Spence, Michael San
Augustin, David Cutwright, and Sam Rice, that they were re-
quired to park their vehicles at Uniontown, pursuant to the non-
participation policy.2
On February 25, 2003, the Union sent a letter to each of the
five informing these members that they were violating the Un-
ion’s nonparticipation policy by continuing to park at the re-
mote central offices and that they would be subject to internal
union discipline if they continued to do. Sam Rice apparently
began parking his company vehicle at Uniontown shortly there-
after. However, Hancock, Spence, and San Augustin continued
to park at the Donora, Pennsylvania central office. David Cut-
wright continued to park at the Masontown, Pennsylvania cen-
tral office.
On April 10, 2003, unit 59’s steward, Brad Stowers, filed
charges against the four with Local 13000’s secretary-treasurer.
Apparently, only unit 59 attempted to enforce Local 13000’s
nonparticipation policy in this manner.3 On April 14, the secre-
tary-treasurer of Local 13000 informed Stowers by letter that
his charges were properly filed and that the Local’s president
would be appointing someone to prosecute the charges. A copy
of this letter was sent to Hancock, San Augustin, Cutwright,
and Spence.

2 Hancock and San Augustin were initially told that they could con-
tinue to park at the Donora central office. However, sometime before
February 25, 2003, Meddings informed them that to do so would vio-
late the nonparticipation policy.
3 The Union did not take disciplinary action or even threaten disci-
plinary action against employee/members of other units of Local
13000, who continued to park at remote locations. This was true even
in the case of Keith Wesoloski, a member of unit 57, who parked his
vehicle at Scottsdale, Pennsylvania. This is the same remote location at
which unit 59 Steward Brad Stowers parked, prior to complying with
the nonparticipation policy, by parking in Uniontown.
On April 24, 2003, Stowers and the four employee/members
were informed by letter that Jean Ryer, unit secretary for unit
41, had been appointed to prosecute the charges filed by Stow-
ers. Sometime in April or May 2003, Michael San Augustin
filed an unfair labor practice charge against the Union. This
charge was eventually withdrawn.
At about the same time, Hancock, Spence, and San Augustin
solicited their supervisors for written documentation that the
supervisor was requiring them to continue parking their com-
pany vehicle at the Donora central office. The supervisors,
sympathetic with their plight and understanding that remote
garaging was in Verizon’s best interests as well as the employ-
ees, were very willing to oblige them.
The testimony of Gary Spence and his supervisor, James
Feick, makes it clear that he, San Augustin, Hancock, and Cut-
wright continued to park at the remote locations voluntarily.
Spence testified that after he received the letter from the Union
threatening him with discipline, he approached Feick. Spence
testified, “he [Fieck] flat-out told me that he doesn’t want me in
Uniontown, he wants me to stay in Donora” (Tr. 48). Thus, by
Spence’s account there was no indication that he was being
required to continue parking at Donora, or that Verizon would
discipline him if he ceased to do so. Moreover, Feick’s testi-
mony at transcript pages 150–151 establishes that what he said
to Spence was no different than what he said to the other em-
ployees who were parking at remote locations, and that there is
nothing to distinguish Spence’s situation from other employees
who worked for Feick.
A. [I]n approximately February of 2003, I received phone
calls from my remote technicians, telling me they were being
pressured to come back to the Uniontown work center. I told
them I did not want them coming back, but most of them did
return.
Q. And did you take any action concerning this?
A. No.
Q. [Why] did you take no action against the ones who did re-
turn?
A. We [Feick and Area Manager Lynn O’Bradovich] decided
not to. They requested to come back, and they volunteered to
come back, and we honored that request.
A few days later, Feick told Spence he would honor his re-
quest to park at Uniontown. Then, Feick purported to reassign
Spence permanently to Donora—apparently in violation of the
collective-bargaining agreement.4 It is thus perfectly clear that
Spence could have parked at Uniontown, without being disci-
plined by Verizon, had he desired to do so. I infer also that this
was true with regard to Hancock, San Augustin, and Cutwright.

4 Both the General Counsel and the Union contend that the collec-
tive-bargaining agreement supports their position as to whether remote
garaging was voluntary or mandatory. I find that the contract is at best
ambiguous. Moreover, Verizon understood that it was problematic as
to whether it could require employees to continue remote garaging;
otherwise, it would have done so with regard to all the employees who
complied with the “non-participation” policy by returning to the work
centers.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD136
The testimony of Michael San Augustin and his supervisor,
Frank Moyer, also leads me to infer that Moyer would not have
“ordered” San Augustin to continue parking at Donora had San
Augustin not asked him to do so. Indeed, San Augustin was
quite candid in testifying that he solicited written “orders” to
this effect:
I asked Frank [Moyer, his supervisor] . . . . “Frank can I have
something in writing, telling me that you require me to be in
Uniontown” (Tr. 108).5
Hancock also solicited written “orders” from his supervisor,
Jay Lieb, in May 2003, after both were aware that the Union
was pursuing internal discipline against Hancock (Tr. 142). I
infer that all the verbal “orders” issued to Hancock, San Au-
gustin, Spence, and Cutwright were similarly solicited or were
in response to inquiries that were either rhetorical or strongly
suggested a desired response. 6
I infer that Hancock, San Augustin, Spence, and Cutwright
knew that Verizon would not discipline them if they complied
with the nonparticipation policy. By the time they solicited
their “orders,” all four were aware that other employees had
complied with the Union’s nonparticipation policy by parking
at Uniontown without any threat from Verizon of disciplinary
action. There is nothing in this record that suggests that any of
these four employees had a situation distinguishable from their
coworkers who had complied with the Union policy. I assume
that it was beneficial to Verizon and personally advantageous to
every employee who was remote garaging to continue doing so.
On September 18, the Union advised Hancock, San Au-
gustin, Cutwright, and Spence that Prosecutor Ryer recom-
mended going forward with a trial on the charge filed against
them by Stowers. On September 24, a trial was scheduled for
October 28, 2003. Apparently, in response, Michael San Au-
gustin filed the charge in this matter alleging that the Union
was violating the Act by pursuing disciplinary action against
himself, Spence, Hancock, and Cutwright. The trial was post-
poned on October 2 and no further action with regard to the
charges has been taken by the Union.
Analysis
Internal union discipline, such as fining and expelling mem-
bers, that affects only an employee’s relationship with the un-
ion, is governed by the test set forth in Scofield v. NLRB, 394
U. S. 423, 430 (1969):

5 San Augustin meant to say, “that you require me to be in Donora,”
as evidenced by Moyer’s undated memo, Exh. GC 14.
6 None of this written documentation was shared with the Union. If
I thought the General Counsel’s case had merit in other respects, I
would address the issue of whether the Union could reasonably be
expected to know that the four employees were being required to con-
tinue remote garaging when neither Verizon nor the four em-
ployee/members shared the “written orders” with the Union. I doubt I
would find that the Union violated Sec. 8(b)(1)(A) when all it had was
verbal assertions that supervisors were requiring the four to continue to
park at the remote central offices. So far as the Union knew, the four
were continuing to park at the central offices simply because they de-
sired to do so.
Section 8(b)(1) leaves a union free to enforce a properly
adopted rule which reflects a legitimate union interest, impairs
no policy Congress has imbedded in the labor laws, and is
reasonably enforced against union members who are free to
leave the union and escape the rule.
The Supreme Court later held in Pattern Makers v. NLRB,
473 U.S. 95 (1985), that members are free to escape union dis-
cipline by resigning their union membership. Further, where
the collective-bargaining agreement contains a union security
clause, employees can seek financial core membership to avoid
any possibility of union discipline.
In interpreting Section 8(b)(1)(A), the Board has drawn a
clear distinction between instances in which a union seeks to
discipline its members for complying with an employer’s man-
datory requirements, i.e., those which put the member at risk of
discipline or discharge, and those which are voluntary. For
instance, this Respondent has been found to violate the Act in
disciplining its members for working mandatory overtime,
Communications Workers Local 13000 (Verizon Communica-
tions), 340 NLRB 18 (2003).
In the instant case, the record makes it perfectly clear that
employee/members Hancock, San Augustin, Cutwright, and
Spence could have complied with unit 59’s insistence that they
cease remote garaging had they desired to so do—without risk-
ing discipline from Verizon. They were able to solicit “orders”
from supervision sympathetic with their situation, who recog-
nized that it was advantageous to Verizon for the four to con-
tinue to park at the remote central offices. By the time these
“orders” were solicited, the four employee/members and their
supervisors were aware that many other unit 59 members had
ceased remote garaging without being threatened with disci-
pline by Verizon. The four did not have any reasonable basis
for fearing disciplinary action against them in that there is noth-
ing in their situations that is distinguishable from those em-
ployee/members who complied with the Union’s directives.7
In that I find that the four employee/members voluntarily
continued to park at the remote locations, I conclude that the
Union did not violate Section 8(b)(1)(A) in threatening them
with internal union discipline or in commencing the process for
such discipline. I offer no opinion as to the wisdom of the Un-
ion’s policy or its enforcement only against members who be-
longed to unit 59. However, the record suggests no illegal or
improper reason as to why the Union sought discipline only
against unit 59 members, as opposed to members of other units.
Moreover, the Board has held (reversing the undersigned judge)
that Section 7 gives employees the right to be free from unfair

7 I discredit the testimony of Richard Heimberger, a former Verizon
labor relations department employee, at Tr. 82–83. Heimberger sug-
gested that it was more necessary to Verizon’s business interests that
Hancock, San Augustin, Cutwright, and Spence continue remote garag-
ing than it was that other employees continue to do so. Heimberger
offered no specifics to support this contention. I find that the only
distinction between the four and other remote garaging employees is
that they resisted the Union’s directive and sought help from their su-
pervisors in avoiding a return to the Uniontown garage. Finally, I
would note that supervisor James Feick’s testimony at Tr. 152, as to his
conversation with Heimberger, provides no corroboration for Heimber-
ger’s testimony.
COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS LOCAL 13000 (VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS) 137
or irrelevant or invidious treatment by their bargaining agent
only with regard to matters affecting their employment, Inter-
national ILA Local 1575 (Navieras, NPR), 332 NLRB 1336
(2000). I therefore dismiss the complaint.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended8

8 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s
Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended
ORDER
The complaint is dismissed.

Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the
Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur-
poses.