Comcast Cable Communications, LLC

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Mar 11, 2021

2019006317 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 11, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/154,409 05/13/2016 Christopher Lintz 26141.0255U1 5718
16000 7590 03/11/2021
Comcast
c/o Ballard Spahr LLP
999 Peachtree Street, Suite 1600
Atlanta, GA 30309-4421
EXAMINER
HANG, VU B
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2672
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/11/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
USpatentmail@ballardspahr.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte CHRISTOPHER LINTZ
Appeal 2019-006317
Application 15/154,409
Technology Center 2600
Before ST. JOHN COURTENAY III, LARRY J. HUME, and
PHILLIP A. BENNETT, Administrative Patent Judges.
HUME, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–20, all of the pending claims in the
application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 “Appellant” refers to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant
identifies the real party in interest as Comcast Cable Communications, LLC.
Appeal Br. 1.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE2
The claims are directed to a system and methods for matching user
interests with content and enabling users to access the matched content to
improve the content viewing experience for a user. See Spec. ¶¶ 1, 15.
Exemplary Claim
Claim 1, reproduced below, is representative of the subject matter on
appeal (emphases added to contested prior art limitations):
1. A method comprising:
receiving video content comprising a text component;
parsing, from the video content, the text component;
determining, based on the parsed text component, one or
more topics associated with the content;
determining, based on the one or more topics, a topic of
interest to a user;
determining, based on the topic of interest, a relevant
portion of the video content that is relevant to the topic of
interest;
causing the relevant portion of the video content to be
stored for subsequent viewing; and
transmitting, to a user device associated with the user, an
indication that the relevant portion of the video content is stored.

2 Our decision relies upon Appellant’s Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.,” filed
Mar. 11, 2019); Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed Aug. 26, 2019); Examiner’s
Answer (“Ans.,” mailed June 25, 2019); Final Office Action (“Final Act.,”
mailed Aug. 9, 2018); and the original Specification (“Spec.,” filed
May 13, 2016).
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REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner as evidence is:
Name Reference Date
Begeja et al. (“Begeja”) US 2003/0088687 A1 May 8, 2003
Houh et al. (“Houh”) US 2007/0112837 Al May 17, 2007
Sahni et al. (“Sahni”) US 2010/0023506 Al Jan. 28, 2010
Shah et al. (“Shah”) US 2014/0074866 Al Mar. 13, 2014
REJECTIONS
Rejection Claim(s) Rejected
35
U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis
R1
(Final Act. 2) 1–4, 11–15 103
Obviousness
Sahni, Begeja
R2
(Final Act. 5) 5–9, 16–18, 20 103
Obviousness
Sahni, Begeja, Houh
R3
(Final Act. 9) 10, 19 103
Obviousness
Sahni, Begeja, Shah
CLAIM GROUPING
Based on Appellant’s arguments (Appeal Br. 4–8) and our discretion
under 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv), we decide the appeal of obviousness
Rejection R1 of claims 1–4 and 11–15 on the basis of representative claim 1;
and we decide the appeal of obviousness Rejection R2 of claims 5–9, 16–18,
and 20 on the basis of representative claim 20. Remaining claims 10 and 19
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in obviousness Rejection R3, not argued separately, fall with the respective
independent claim from which they depend.3
ISSUES AND ANALYSIS
In reaching this decision, we consider all evidence presented and all
arguments actually made by Appellant. To the extent Appellant has not
advanced separate, substantive arguments for particular claims, or other
issues, such arguments are waived. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
We are not persuaded of Examiner error by Appellant’s arguments
with respect to obviousness Rejections R1 through R3 of claims 1–20 and,
unless otherwise noted, we incorporate by reference herein and adopt as our
own: (1) the findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner in the action
from which this appeal is taken, and (2) the reasons and rebuttals set forth in
the Examiner’s Answer in response to Appellant’s arguments. We highlight
and address specific findings and arguments regarding Rejection R1 of
claim 1 for emphases as follows.
1. § 103 Rejection R1: Claims 1–4 and 11–15
Issue 1
Appellant argues (Appeal Br. 4–8; Reply Br. 2–3) the Examiner’s
rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over the combined

3 “Notwithstanding any other provision of this paragraph, the failure of
appellant to separately argue claims which appellant has grouped together
shall constitute a waiver of any argument that the Board must consider the
patentability of any grouped claim separately.” 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
In addition, when Appellant does not separately argue the patentability of
dependent claims, the claims stand or fall with the claims from which they
depend. In re King, 801 F.2d 1324, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
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teachings of Sahni and Begeja is in error. These contentions present us with
the following issue:
Did the Examiner err in finding the cited prior art combination teaches
or suggests a method that includes, inter alia, “determining, based on the
topic of interest, a relevant portion of the video content that is relevant to the
topic of interest; [and] causing the relevant portion of the video content to be
stored for subsequent viewing,” as recited in claim 1?
Principles of Law
“[O]ne cannot show non-obviousness by attacking references
individually where . . . the rejections are based on combinations of
references.” In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 426 (CCPA 1981). “The test for
obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be
bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference . . . . Rather,
the test is what the combined teachings of th[ose] references would have
suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art.” Id. at 425.
Further, the relevant inquiry is whether the Examiner has set forth
“some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the
legal conclusion of obviousness.” In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed.
Cir. 2006) (cited with approval in KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S.
398, 418 (2007)).
Finally, during prosecution, claims must be given their broadest
reasonable interpretation when reading claim language in light of the
specification as it would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art. In
re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Under
this standard, we interpret claim terms using “the broadest reasonable
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meaning of the words in their ordinary usage as they would be understood
by one of ordinary skill in the art, taking into account whatever
enlightenment by way of definitions or otherwise that may be afforded by
the written description contained in the applicant’s specification.” In re
Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
Analysis
The Examiner finds Sahni teaches most of the limitations of claim 1
(Final Act. 3–4 (citing Sahni ¶¶ 29, 32, 34, 54, 64, 66, Figs. 1, 2, 5, 6)); and
Begeja teaches storing a relevant portion of a video content for subsequent
viewing (Final Act. 4 (citing Begeja ¶¶ 101, 107, Figs. 8, 10)).
The Examiner further finds “[t]he motivation would be to enable the
user device to display specific portions or clips of a video content based on
identified user interests.” Final Act. 4.
In response to the Examiner’s findings, Appellant contends Begeja,
rather than teaching storing a relevant portion of the video content, instead
teaches storing all of the video streams, and specifically does not teach or
suggest “causing the relevant portion of the video content to be stored for
subsequent viewing,” as recited in claim 1. Appeal Br. 5.
We disagree with Appellant’s argument because, under the broadest
reasonable interpretation standard, we conclude, as a matter of claim
construction, storing all of the video streams necessarily includes storing
relevant portions.4

4 We note claim 1 does not recite “storing only a relevant portion. . . .”
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The Examiner further finds:
Sahni teaches retrieving the relevant portions of a video content
based on user interest information (see Fig.5 (506), paragraph
[0032], paragraph [0034] and paragraph [0064]). Begeja
teaches identifying relevant portions of a video and storing the
portions in an e-mail as an attachment (see Fig.8 (810, 820),
Fig.10 (1035, 1045, 1050), paragraph [0101] and paragraphs
[0107-0108]). Begeja also teaches that the relevant portions or
clips of the video content can be stored at a local computer for
later use (see paragraph [0038]).
Ans. 4.
We also are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments because the test
for obviousness is what the combined teachings of the prior art would have
suggested to the hypothetical person of ordinary skill in the art. See Keller,
642 F.2d at 425. While Appellant focuses on the Sahni reference in the
Reply (Reply Br. 2–3), the Examiner finds Begeja teaches “the relevant
portions or clips of the video content can be stored at a local computer for
later use.” Ans. 4. We are not persuaded the Examiner erred because
Begeja’s selecting of “some or all of the video clips for long-term storage” at
least suggests the disputed limitation “causing the relevant portion of the
video content to be stored for subsequent viewing.” See Begeja ¶ 38.
In reviewing the record, we are not persuaded the Examiner’s claim
interpretation is overly broad, unreasonable, or inconsistent with the
Specification, because Appellant does not point to any limiting definition, in
the claim or in the Specification, that would preclude the Examiner’s broad
but reasonable construction of the term “portion of the video content,” and
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the reading of the disputed limitation onto the cited references.5 We
conclude the scope of the construed and contested limitation broadly reads
on the teachings in Sahni’s Figure 5, paragraphs 32, 34, 64, and Begeja’s
paragraphs 38, 101, 107, 108. Ans. 4.
Appellant also argues a lack of motivation to combine the references.
Appeal Br. 7–8. We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments because
the Examiner (Final Act. 4, Ans. 4–5) provides sufficient “articulated
reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of
obviousness.”
Kahn, 441 F.3d at 988. See also 35 U.S.C. § 132. We are not
persuaded of error with the Examiner’s finding that one of ordinary skill in
the art would have been motivated to modify Sahni’s method to include
Begeja’s storing relevant portions or clips of a video content at a local
computer for subsequent viewing. Final Act. 4, Ans. 4–5.
We are guided by the Supreme Court’s view of the prior art as a
combination of teachings from different sources and the use of those
teachings by a practitioner in the art. See KSR, 550 U.S at 401:
To determine whether there was an apparent reason to combine
the known elements in the way a patent claims, it will often be
necessary to look to interrelated teachings of multiple patents;
to the effects of demands known to the design community or
present in the marketplace; and to the background knowledge
possessed by a person having ordinary skill in the art.

5 Because “applicants may amend claims to narrow their scope, a broad
construction during prosecution creates no unfairness to the applicant or
patentee.” In re ICON Health and Fitness, Inc., 496 F.3d 1374, 1379 (Fed.
Cir. 2007).
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Id.
The Supreme Court further guides: an improved product in the art is
obvious if that “product [is] not [one] of innovation but of ordinary skill and
common sense.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 421. We find this reasoning is applicable
here. Thus, we find the Examiner's proffered combination of Sahni and
Begeja would have merely been a “predictable use of prior art elements
according to their established functions.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 417.
Moreover, Appellant has not provided any evidence that combining
the familiar elements and/or methods described in the Examiner’s proffered
combination of Sahni and Begeja would have been “uniquely challenging or
difficult for one of ordinary skill in the art” (Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-
Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2007)), or would have yielded
unexpected results.
Based upon the findings above, on this record, we are not persuaded
of error in the Examiner’s reliance on the cited prior art combination to teach
or suggest the disputed limitations of claim 1, nor do we find error in the
Examiner’s resulting legal conclusion of obviousness. Therefore, we sustain
the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of independent claim 1, and grouped
claims 2–4 and 11–15, which fall therewith. See Claim Grouping, supra.
2. § 103 Rejections R2, R3: Claims 5–10 and 16–20
With respect to the rejections of the dependent claims 5–10 and 16–
19, Appellant does not present substantive arguments. Appeal Br. 8–9.
Although Appellant appears to separately argue independent claim 20
in Rejection R2 (id.), the argument is limited to the additionally cited Houh
reference, by alleging that Houh also does not teach or suggest storing a
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portion of video content or even a relevant portion of video content, as in
claim 1. Appeal Br. 9.
This argument is essentially the same as made in Issue 1, with respect
to independent claims 1 and 12, above. Therefore, we are not persuaded the
Examiner erred in rejecting claim 20 under Rejection R2, and claims 5–9
and 16–18, which fall with claim 20. See Claim Grouping, supra.
With respect to Rejection R3 of claims 10 and 19, Appellant merely
argues “Shah fails to cure the deficiencies of Sahni and Begeja . . . [such
that] the combination of Sahni, Begeja, and Shah fails to teach the
recitations of claims 10 and 19.” Appeal Br. 9.
Therefore, in view of the lack of any substantive or truly separate
arguments directed to obviousness Rejections R2, R3: Claims 5–10 and 16–
20 under § 103, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of these claims. See 37
C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
REPLY BRIEF
To the extent Appellant may advance new arguments in the Reply
Brief (Reply Br. 2–3) not in response to a shift in the Examiner’s position in
the Answer, arguments raised in a Reply Brief that were not raised in the
Appeal Brief or are not responsive to arguments raised in the Examiner’s
Answer will not be considered except for good cause, which we find
Appellant has not shown here. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.41(b)(2).
CONCLUSIONS
Appellant has not shown that the Examiner erred with respect to
obviousness Rejections R1 through R3 of claims 1–20 under 35 U.S.C.
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§ 103 over the combinations of the teachings of the applied references, and
we sustain those rejections.
DECISION SUMMARY
Claim(s)
Rejected
35
U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/
Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–4, 11–15 103 Sahni, Begeja 1–4, 11–15
5–9, 16–
18, 20
103 Sahni, Begeja Houh 5–9, 16–18, 20
10, 19 103 Sahni, Begeja, Shah 10, 19
Overall
Outcome 1–20
FINALITY AND RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f).
AFFIRMED