Comcast Cable Communications, LLC

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Apr 12, 2021

2019006810 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 12, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/719,652 05/22/2015 Geetu Ambwani 007412.02960 7292
71867 7590 04/12/2021
BANNER & WITCOFF , LTD
ATTORNEYS FOR CLIENT NUMBER 007412
1100 13th STREET, N.W.
SUITE 1200
WASHINGTON, DC 20005-4051
EXAMINER
KRASNIC, BERNARD
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2661
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
04/12/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
PTO-71867@bannerwitcoff.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte GEETU AMBWANI and ROBERT RUBINOFF
____________

Appeal 2019-006810
Application 14/719,652
Technology Center 2600
____________

Before KARA L. SZPONDOWSKI, SCOTT B. HOWARD, and
STEVEN M. AMUNDSON, Administrative Patent Judges.

AMUNDSON, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final
rejection of claims 2, 4, 6–10, 22, 24, 26–30, 35, 36, and 38. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42 (2018). Appellant identifies the real party in interest
as Comcast Cable Communications, LLC. Appeal Br. 2.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Invention
The Specification indicates that the invention concerns improving
“a user’s ability to quickly find content of interest.” Spec. ¶ 3.2 The
Specification explains that “it may be difficult for a user to distinguish
videos” when searching for “videos . . . of interest.” Id. According to the
Specification, “tags are frequently inaccurate, and uploaders often choose
ambiguous terms to describe videos.” Id. As a result, “a user looking for a
video on a particular topic or subject of interest may have to sift through, or
watch, a large number of videos that are not of interest.” Id.
The invention endeavors to improve “a user’s ability to quickly find
content of interest” with two actions. First, divide a content item, e.g., a
video, “into one or more segments” or “time-based portions of a program,”
e.g., portions between commercial breaks. Spec. ¶ 5, Fig. 3. Second,
generate descriptors for the segments. See id. ¶¶ 6–9, Fig. 3. A “descriptor
may be generated based at least in part on”: (1) “an identification of a
teaser,” e.g., “material in a first segment that is representative of material in
a second segment”; (2) “an optical character recognition (OCR) technique”;
or (3) “the use of a salient text detection.” Id. ¶¶ 7–9, 81.

2 This decision uses the following abbreviations: “Spec.” for the
Specification, filed May 22, 2015 (and filed as a continuation of an
application filed in 2011); “Final Act.” for the Final Office Action, mailed
September 13, 2018; “Appeal Br.” for the Appeal Brief, filed April 18,
2019; “Ans.” for the Examiner’s Answer, mailed July 18, 2019; and
“Reply Br.” for the Reply Brief, filed September 18, 2019.
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Exemplary Claim
Independent claim 2 exemplifies the claims at issue and reads as
follows:
2. A method comprising:
receiving, by a computing device, descriptive data
associated with:
a first segment of a content item, and
a second segment of the content item;
comparing, by the computing device and based at least in
part on the descriptive data, first segment words with second
segment words, wherein the first segment words comprise a
plurality of words from the first segment and the second
segment words comprise one or more words from the second
segment;
determining, by the computing device, that a commercial
portion, prior to the second segment, satisfies a threshold
distance with respect to the first segment words;
determining, by the computing device, and based at least
in part on the comparing and the commercial portion satisfying
the threshold distance, that the first segment words are
descriptive of the second segment;
determining, by the computing device and based on the
determining that the first segment words are descriptive of the
second segment, the first segment words as a candidate
descriptor of the second segment; and
storing, in memory, an indication of an association
between the candidate descriptor and the second segment.
Appeal Br. 13 (Claims App.).
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The Prior Art Supporting the Rejections on Appeal
As evidence of unpatentability under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a),3 the
Examiner relies on the following prior art:
The Rejections on Appeal
Claims 2, 4, 6–10, 22, 24, 26–30, 35, 36, and 38 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 1 for failing to comply with the written-description
requirement. Final Act. 6.
Claims 2, 4, 6–10, 22, 24, 26–30, 35, 36, and 38 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 2 as indefinite for failing to particularly point out and
distinctly claim the subject matter regarded as the invention. Final Act. 5–6.
Claims 2, 4, 6–10, 22, 24, 26–30, 35, 36, and 38 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Lau and Agnihotri. Final Act.
7–17.
ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the rejections in light of Appellant’s arguments
that the Examiner erred. For the reasons explained below, we disagree with
the Examiner’s determinations under § 112 ¶ 1 and § 103(a), but we agree

3 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 112-29,
125 Stat. 284 (2011), amended 35 U.S.C. § 103 and § 112. Because the
effective filing date for Application 14/719,652 predates the AIA’s effective
dates for § 103 and § 112, this decision refers to the pre-AIA versions of
§ 103 and § 112.
Name Reference Date
Agnihotri et al. (“Agnihotri”) US 2003/0050926 A1 Mar. 13, 2003
Lau US 2012/0303643 A1 Nov. 29, 2012
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with the Examiner’s determination under § 112 ¶ 2. We provide the
following to address and emphasize specific findings and arguments.
The § 112 ¶ 1 Rejection
Section 112’s first paragraph requires that the specification “contain
a written description of the invention.” 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 1. The written-
description requirement serves to “clearly allow persons of ordinary skill
in the art to recognize that [the inventor] invented what is claimed.” Ariad
Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(en banc) (alteration in original) (quoting Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar,
935 F.2d 1555, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1991)); see also Blue Calypso, LLC v.
Groupon, Inc., 815 F.3d 1331, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
“[T]he test for sufficiency is whether the disclosure of the application
relied upon reasonably conveys to those skilled in the art that the inventor
had possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date.” Ariad,
598 F.3d at 1351; Mentor Graphics Corp. v. EVE-USA, Inc., 851 F.3d 1275,
1296 (Fed. Cir. 2017). The “test requires an objective inquiry into the four
corners of the specification from the perspective of a person of ordinary skill
in the art.” Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351. While the written-description
requirement “does not demand any particular form of disclosure” or “that the
specification recite the claimed invention in haec verba, a description that
merely renders the invention obvious does not satisfy the requirement.” Id.
at 1352. The analysis for disclosure sufficiency may consider “such
descriptive means as words, structures, figures, diagrams, formulas, etc.”
Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
Independent claims 2 and 22 each include the following limitation
reciting a “commercial portion” and a “threshold distance”: “determining,
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by the computing device, that a commercial portion, prior to the second
segment, satisfies a threshold distance with respect to the first segment
words.” Appeal Br. 13, 15. In rejecting the claims under § 112 ¶ 1, the
Examiner explains that the “limitation ‘determining . . . that a commercial
portion, prior to’ covers all ways of determining that a commercial portion
satisfies a threshold distance and the specification does not provide support/
possession for such a broad genus limitation of such a particular
embodiment.” Final Act. 6 (alteration by Examiner) (emphases by
Examiner); Ans. 11.
Appellant contends that claims 2 and 22 comply with the written-
description requirement. See Appeal Br. 4–5; Reply Br. 2–3. In particular,
Appellant argues that the Specification includes “adequate, non-limiting
support” for the disputed limitation, e.g., in paragraph 33. Appeal Br. 5
(emphasis by Appellant); see also Reply Br. 3. Appellant quotes the
following portion of paragraph 33:
Teaser detection 310 may be used to determine whether an
earlier program segment contains a teaser or a trailer that
describes a later segment. An example teaser can be found
in some news programs, when a news anchor gives a short
summary, prior to a commercial break, of a news item that
will be addressed following the commercial break . . . .
Appeal Br. 5 (quoting Spec. ¶ 33); see also Reply Br. 3. Appellant asserts
that paragraph 33 “clearly states as a non-limiting ‘example’ that ‘[t]easer
detection 310 may be used to determine whether an earlier program segment
contains a teaser or a trailer that describes a later segment.’” Appeal Br. 5
(alteration by Appellant) (quoting Spec. ¶ 33).
We agree with Appellant that claims 2 and 22 comply with the
written-description requirement. See Appeal Br. 4–5; Reply Br. 2–3; Spec.
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¶¶ 7, 33–36, Abstract. In particular, the Specification explains that an
“example teaser can be found in some news programs, when a news anchor
gives a short summary, prior to a commercial break, of a news item that will
be addressed following the commercial break,” such as “Stay tuned after the
break, and we will tell you about something in your house that may be
killing you.” Spec. ¶ 33. The Specification also explains that to determine
“whether an earlier segment contains a teaser for a later segment,” the
“words, terms, or phrases included in an earlier segment of video may be
compared” to the “words, terms, or phrases from the later segment of the
video” to analyze whether the words, terms, or phrases in the earlier segment
“are contextually related to, or descriptive of,” the words, terms, or phrases
in the later segment. Id.
In addition, Specification paragraph 36 explains how a “threshold
distance” may assist in detecting a teaser. Paragraph 36 reads as follows:
As another factor, the position of the earlier sentences
within their own segments may be taken into consideration in
determining whether they are possible teaser sentences. For
example, if an earlier sentence is close to the end of its
respective segment, then it is more likely to be a teaser for the
following segment. To make this determination, the teaser
detection 310 may establish a distance value from the end of the
segment (e.g., 2 sentences from the end of the earlier segment),
and possible teaser sentences that are within that distance value
of the end of the segment may be deemed more likely to be a
teaser sentence. In some embodiments, the various factors
above can serve to increase or decrease a value indicating the
likelihood that a particular earlier sentence is a teaser for a later
segment. For example, and as described above, in some
embodiments it may be more likely for a teaser to be located
just before (or within a threshold distance in terms of number
of words, terms, or phrases before) a commercial break (e.g.,
in order to capture a viewing audience’s interest or prompt
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the audience to continue watching the program after the
commercial break has ended). For example, if a first segment is
being examined as a potential or candidate teaser for a second
segment, and a commercial break resides in between the first
and second segments, the last ‘n’ sentences of the first segment
may be examined or the last ‘z’ seconds of the first segment
may be examined, where ‘n’ and ‘z’ are numbers, such as 2
and 10, respectively. A word, term, or phrase from the first
segment located towards the end of the first segment and just
prior to a commercial break may receive added weight as a
candidate teaser relative to another word, term, or phrase from
the first segment located towards the beginning or middle of
the first segment and further from the commercial break.
Spec. ¶ 36.
The above-quoted portions of the Specification reasonably convey to
those skilled in the art that the inventors had possession of the claimed
subject matter as of the filing date. For instance, from above-quoted
portions of the Specification those skilled in the art would recognize that
teaser detection includes determining whether a word, term, or phrase from a
first segment “satisfies a threshold distance with respect to the first segment
words,” e.g., a “threshold distance” equal to “the last ‘n’ sentences of the
first segment” or “the last ‘z’ seconds of the first segment.” See Spec. ¶ 36.
Hence, we do not sustain the § 112 ¶ 1 rejection of claims 2, 4, 6–10, 22, 24,
26–30, 35, 36, and 38.
The § 112 ¶ 2 Rejection
Section 112’s second paragraph requires that the specification
“conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly
claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.”
35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 2. The definiteness requirement “strikes a ‘delicate
balance’ between ‘the inherent limitations of language’ and providing ‘clear
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notice of what is claimed.’” Sonix Tech. Co. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 844 F.3d
1370, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments,
Inc., 572 U.S. 898, 909 (2014)).
Due to the need for “particular[ity]” and “distinct[ness],” claim
language that “is ambiguous, vague, incoherent, opaque, or otherwise
unclear in describing and defining the claimed invention” warrants a
rejection under § 112 ¶ 2. In re Packard, 751 F.3d 1307, 1311, 1313
(Fed. Cir. 2014); see also Ex parte McAward, Appeal 2015-006416,
2017 WL 3669566, at *5 (PTAB Aug. 25, 2017) (precedential) (applying
Packard to ex parte appeals); In re Warmerdam, 33 F.3d 1354, 1361
(Fed. Cir. 1994) (explaining that “[t]he legal standard for definiteness is
whether a claim reasonably apprises those of skill in the art of its scope”);
In re Moore, 439 F.2d 1232, 1235 (CCPA 1971) (requiring “a reasonable
degree of precision and particularity” in claims).
For the limitation “determining, by the computing device, that a
commercial portion, prior to the second segment, satisfies a threshold
distance with respect to the first segment words” in claims 2 and 22, the
Examiner concludes that “it is unclear from the claims what is meant by a
commercial portion.” Final Act. 5–6; Ans. 9. The Examiner explains that
the “indefiniteness issue arises from the inconsistency between” the claim
language and the Specification because the Specification “clearly establishes
that the first segment” is “separate from and different than a commercial
break.” Ans. 9–10 (emphasis omitted) (citing Spec. ¶¶ 28, 33, 36; Appeal
Br. 2–3).
Appellant contends that claims 2 and 22 comply with the definiteness
requirement. See Appeal Br. 4; Reply Br. 2. Specifically, Appellant asserts
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that the term “commercial portion” is “broad, not indefinite,” and that the
Examiner “improperly confuses breadth and definiteness.” Appeal Br. 4;
Reply Br. 2. Appellant also asserts that the “claim language is already clear”
that “the commercial portion need only be prior to the second segment.”
Reply Br. 2.
We agree with the Examiner that claims 2 and 22 do not comply with
the definiteness requirement. See Final Act. 5–6; Ans. 9–10. The
Specification does not use the term “commercial portion.” A “commercial
portion” could correspond to a teaser, a commercial break, or something
else. See Spec. ¶¶ 5, 7, 28, 30, 33–38, 74. For instance, as support for a
“commercial portion” Appellant cites the Specification’s disclosure of a
teaser. Appeal Br. 4–5; Reply Br. 2–3. In contrast, the Examiner notes that
a “commercial portion” could correspond to a commercial break. See Final
Act. 6–7; Ans. 10. Thus, the Examiner correctly concludes that those skilled
in the art would not understand claim scope when viewed in light of the
Specification. See Final Act. 5–6; Ans. 9–10; Spec. ¶¶ 5, 7, 28, 30, 33–38,
74.
For example, if a “commercial portion” corresponds to a commercial
break, claims 2 and 22 are “unclear in describing and defining the claimed
invention” like the claims in Packard. See Packard, 751 F.3d at 1311,
1313–14. In particular, the Specification indicates that a commercial break
(1) differs from a content item’s segments and (2) occurs between a content
item’s segments. See Spec. ¶¶ 5, 28, 33, 36, 74; Ans. 9–10. Among other
things, the Specification explains that a “program may have commercial
breaks, and the start and end times of the program between commercial
breaks can define a segment.” Spec. ¶ 74. Further, the Specification
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describes a program “broken down into time-based segments” separated
by “commercial breaks.” Id. ¶ 28; see also id. ¶ 5.
Claims 2 and 22 require “determining . . . that a commercial portion
. . . satisfies a threshold distance with respect to the first segment words.”
Appeal Br. 13, 15. But if a “commercial portion” corresponds to a
commercial break, there is no “threshold distance” for a commercial break
“with respect to the first segment words” other than zero because a
commercial break occurs between a content item’s segments. See Ans.
9–10. According to the Specification, however, a nonzero value must serve
as a “threshold distance.” See Spec. ¶ 36.
A nonzero “threshold distance” may exist for a teaser “with respect to
the first segment words,” e.g., a “threshold distance” equal to “the last ‘n’
sentences of the first segment” or “the last ‘z’ seconds of the first segment.”
See Spec. ¶ 36. Also, with an infomercial as the content item, claims 2
and 22 do not unambiguously indicate what portion or portions would
correspond to a “commercial portion.”
For the reasons discussed above, a “commercial portion” could
correspond to a teaser, a commercial break, or something else. If “a claim is
amenable to two or more plausible claim constructions,” the PTO properly
requires “the applicant to more precisely define the metes and bounds of the
claimed invention by holding the claim unpatentable” under § 112 ¶ 2.
Ex parte Miyazaki, 89 USPQ2d 1207, 1211–12 (BPAI Nov. 19, 2008)
(precedential). Hence, we sustain the § 112 ¶ 2 rejection of claims 2 and 22.
Claims 4, 6–10, 35, and 38 depend directly or indirectly from claim 2;
and claims 24, 26–30, and 36 depend directly from claim 22. Appeal Br.
13–18. These dependent claims do not clarify the ambiguity in claims 2
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and 22. See Ans. 12. Hence, we sustain the § 112 ¶ 2 rejection of these
dependent claims for the same reasons as claims 2 and 22.
The § 103(a) Rejection
INDEPENDENT CLAIMS 2 AND 22
As noted above, the § 103(a) rejection of claims 2 and 22 rests on Lau
and Agnihotri. See Final Act. 7–17. Appellant argues that the Examiner
erred in rejecting claims 2 and 22 because the references fail to teach or
suggest the following limitation in each claim: “determining, by the
computing device, that a commercial portion, prior to the second segment,
satisfies a threshold distance with respect to the first segment words.” See
Appeal Br. 7–8, 10; Reply Br. 4–6.
The Examiner cites Agnihotri as teaching or suggesting the disputed
limitation in claims 2 and 22. See Final Act. 9, 14; Ans. 13–15.
Specifically, the Examiner finds that Agnihotri discloses “comparing and
matching the transcript text of a commercial video segment itself with [the]
transcript text of another previous commercial video segment, [and]
stor[ing] the transcript text which is common to both segments.” Final Act.
9, 14 (citing Agnihotri ¶ 12); Ans. 13–15 (citing Agnihotri ¶ 12). The
Examiner interprets a “threshold distance” as “a difference between text and
not [a] difference between time periods.” Ans. 14 (emphasis omitted).
According to the Examiner, “comparative matching in itself is checking for
differences e.g. if the comparative text differences / distances between the
texts meets a match threshold vs. non-match threshold.” Id. (emphasis
omitted). The Examiner reasons that “when a comparative text match is
determined to be met,” thus satisfying a “distance threshold,” then “such text
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that is determined to be common to both segments is stored.” Id. (emphasis
omitted).
Appellant contends that Agnihotri lacks “any disclosure that the
alleged ‘threshold distance’ is considered when matching commercial video
segments.” Appeal Br. 8. Further, Appellant asserts that “[t]he specification
recites ‘a threshold distance in terms of number of words, terms, or phrases
before.’” Reply Br. 4–5 (quoting Spec. ¶ 36). Appellant also asserts that
“it is unreasonable to allege that any mere difference with respect to first
segment words, as alleged by the Office with nothing more, would constitute
a distance with respect to first segment words.” Id. at 5 (emphases by
Appellant).
Based on the record before us, we agree with Appellant that the
Examiner has not adequately explained how the cited portion of Agnihotri
teaches or suggests the disputed limitation in claims 2 and 22. See Appeal
Br. 7–8; Reply Br. 4–5. In the cited portion, Agnihotri discloses “a method
of learning and storing commercial segments” occurring “during a program”
that includes the following steps:
(1) “identifying a possible commercial segment which
occurs during the program”;
(2) “comparing ‘non-stop’ words [words other than “an,”
“the,” “of,” etc.] of the possible commercial segment
with ‘non-stop’ words of each of a list of found
commercial segments previously identified to determine
at least one matching found commercial segment”;
(3) “comparing the transcript text of the possible commercial
segment with transcript text of the at least one matching
found commercial segment”;
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(4) “storing the transcript text which is common to both the
possible commercial segment and the at least one
matching found commercial segment”; and
(5) “incrementing a counter which indicates the frequency
of occurrence of the at least one matching found
commercial segment.”
Agnihotri ¶ 12.
The Specification describes a “threshold distance” as a distance value,
e.g., a “threshold distance” equal to “the last ‘n’ sentences of the first
segment” or “the last ‘z’ seconds of the first segment.” Spec. ¶ 36.
Agnihotri’s disclosure about comparing words and text generally does not
teach or suggest “determining . . . that a commercial portion . . . satisfies
a threshold distance with respect to the first segment words” according to
the disputed limitation in claims 2 and 22. Hence, we do not sustain the
§ 103(a) rejection of claims 2 and 22.
DEPENDENT CLAIMS 4, 6–10, 24, 26–30, 35, 36, AND 38
Claims 4, 6–10, 35, and 38 depend directly or indirectly from claim 2;
and claims 24, 26–30, and 36 depend directly from claim 22. Appeal Br.
13–18. For the reasons discussed for claims 2 and 22, we do not sustain the
§ 103(a) rejection of these dependent claims.
Because the preceding determinations resolve the § 103(a) rejection,
we need not address Appellant’s other arguments regarding Examiner error.
See, e.g., Beloit Corp. v. Valmet Oy, 742 F.2d 1421, 1423 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(explaining that an administrative agency may render a decision based on
“a single dispositive issue”).
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CONCLUSION
We reverse the § 112 ¶ 1 rejection of claims 2, 4, 6–10, 22, 24, 26–30,
35, 36, and 38.
We affirm the § 112 ¶ 2 rejection of claims 2, 4, 6–10, 22, 24, 26–30,
35, 36, and 38.
We reverse the § 103(a) rejection of claims 2, 4, 6–10, 22, 24, 26–30,
35, 36, and 38.
Because we affirm at least one ground of rejection for each claim
on appeal, we affirm the Examiner’s decision to reject all of the claims
on appeal. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(a)(1).
In summary:
Claim(s)
Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
2, 4, 6–10,
22, 24,
26–30, 35,
36, 38
112 ¶ 1 Written Description
2, 4, 6–10,
22, 24,
26–30, 35,
36, 38
2, 4, 6–10,
22, 24,
26–30, 35,
36, 38
112 ¶ 2 Indefiniteness
2, 4, 6–10,
22, 24,
26–30, 35,
36, 38

2, 4, 6–10,
22, 24,
26–30, 35,
36, 38
103(a) Lau, Agnihotri
2, 4, 6–10,
22, 24,
26–30, 35,
36, 38
Overall
Outcome
2, 4, 6–10,
22, 24,
26–30, 35,
36, 38

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TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f).
AFFIRMED