Cleveland Pressed Products Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board DecisionsApr 27, 1973

203 N.L.R.B. 290 (N.L.R.B. 1973)

290 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Cleveland Pressed Products Corporation and Interna- tional Union , Allied Industrial Workers of America, AFL-CIO. Cases 8-CA-6999 and 8-CA-7245 April 27, 1973 DECISION AND ORDER BY MEMBERS JENKINS, KENNEDY, AND PENELLO On February 15, 1973, Administrative Law Judge Melvin J. Welles issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au- thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the at- tached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,' and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Rela- tions Board adopts as its Order the recommended Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby orders that Respondent, Cleveland Pressed Products Corporation, Cleveland, Ohio, its officers, agents, suc- cessors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said recommended Order. ' We note the Administrative Law Judge 's inadvertent use of the word "defense" rather than "offense" in the last paragraph of his decision before "Conclusions of Law " The Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the Administrative Law Judge It is the Board 's established policy not to overrule an Administrative Law Judge 's resolutions with respect to credibility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us that the resolutions were incorrect Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc, 91 NLRB 544. enfd 188 F .2d 362 (C.A. 3) We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE MELVIN J. WELLES, Administrative Law Judge: This case was heard at Cleveland, Ohio, on November 13, 14, and 15, 1972, pursuant to charges filed May 12, and September 15, 1972, and complaints issued June 26, 1972, and October 17, 1972, which were consolidated on the latter date. The com- plaints allege violations of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act. Respondent denies any violations of the Act. Respondent and the General Counsel have filed briefs. Upon the entire record in the case ,' including my obser- vation of the witnesses , I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT I THE BUSINESS OF THE EMPLOYER AND THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED The Company, an Ohio corporation engaged in Cleve- land, Ohio, in the production of metal stampings, annually ships over $50,000 worth of its products directly to points outside the State of Ohio, and is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. The Charging Party, herein called the Union, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. II THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Introduction-The Issues The complaint alleges that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) by discriminatorily discharging employees Bogard and Camarda, and by assigning more difficult and arduous work to employees Masaveg and Camarda in repri- sal for their union activities, and 8(a)(1) by interrogating employees about their union activities, and by threatening reprisals and discharges because of them. Apart from two alleged threats by Les Gicei, Respondent's plant manager, all the other actions complained of were those of W. E. (Bill) Kramer, vice president and general manager of the Company, and its head for all practical purposes.2 B. The Discharge of Ulysses Bogard Ulysses Bogard , who had been hired in February and was still a probationary employee in April, had mentioned to Booker Evans, Jr., son of the Union's International Repre- sentative Booker Evans, Sr., that there was no union at the plant. The next day, or the day thereafter, Booker Evans, Sr., came to the plant and passed out union cards and leaflets outside the plant entrance. Bogard introduced him- self to Evans, and then got into Evans' car. The following day, according to Bogard, Plant Manager Les Gicei and Supervisor Casper "were asking questions around the plant .. . about the union," and asked Bogard about the Union. Bogard said nothing, he "just smiled at them." Casper was not asked about any such "conversation." Gicei testified that he had no conversation about the Union with employ- ees about the time the leaflets were passed out, but subse- quently had a number of conversations with employees about the Union. As Bogard's testimony in this respect was so vague that it is impossible to tell what was said, assuming some talk took place between Casper and Bogard or Gicei and Bogard, I can find no violation of the Act based on this testimony. Bogard was subsequently, at a union meeting, elected vice ' A stipulation to correct errors in the transcript was filed by the parties. The corrections are hereby ordered made. 2 The president of the Company , W. E. Kramer's father , has been inactive for some time because of illness 203 NLRB No. 58 CLEVELAND PRESSED PRODUCTS CORP. president of the "negotiating committee." About April 9, 1972, Bogard told Les Gicei that he wanted to see Bill Kramer. According to Bogard, he did not tell Gicei why he wished to see Kramer. Gicei testified that Bogard told him he wanted to see Kramer about the union situation (after Bogard began talking to Gicei about the Union, and Gicei responded that the one to talk to was Kramer), and Kramer testified that Gicei told him Bogard wanted to see him about "something personal, pertaining to the union." Again, ac- cording to Bogard, the meeting which ensued began with Kramer asking Bogard who had contacted the Union, and, when Bogard said he had, asking Bogard why he had done so, and commenting that they did not need a union around the plant, and that Board had a lot of nerve coming up there (to Kramer's office) to talk about it. Kramer and Gicei both testified (Kramer in more detail) that Bogard brought up the subject of the Union, and, in effect, disclaimed wanting a union in the shop, saying that he liked the people in the plant. Bogard's testimony that he asked for a meeting with Kramer, without telling Gicei what it was about, and that, without any preliminary discussion of why Bogard wanted the meeting, Kramer began by asking who contacted the Union, does not hang together. Kramer's version of what Bogard told him is much more in keeping with Bogard's having requested to see Kramer, than would be the latter seeking to find out if Bogard was the instigator of the Union, without even asking Bogard why he had requested the meeting. I credit Kramer and Gicei in this respect, and therefore find no violation of the Act in this conversation between Kramer and Bogard. I also credit Kramer's denial that he said to some uniden- tified people, while near Bogard's machine in the plant, "That's the one that's causing all the noise around here. He's the one that contacted the Union." Bogard, who seemed confused in his testimony respecting the meeting with Kramer earlier, also indicated some confusion in his testimony about events immediately preceding his dis- charge (see below), and I therefore do not credit his testimo- ny where in conflict with that of other witnesses. Bogard was discharged on May 3, 1972. Bogard had been having trouble with his teeth, and the previous Friday, April 28, according to Bogard, he told Supervisior Casper he would not be in on Monday, May 1, because he was going to see a dentist. He testified further that he called in after he left the plant and told a girl in the office he would not be in on Monday. He assertedly called the plant again on Monday, spoke to a girl there, and told her that the dentist he had gone to see on Monday was not there, so he was going to see another dentist on Tuesday, and would not be at work.3 On Wednesday morning, when Bogard came to work, his card was not in the rack, and he asked Casper about it. Casper told him that Gicei wanted to talk to him. Subse- 3 Bogard testified, with respect to his attempts to see a dentist , that he called a Dr Koal on Friday when he arrived at home, was told he could not see Koal Saturday, nor could Koal give him an appointment for Monday. that he nevertheless went to Koal's office Monday, where he saw a notice on the door that Koal would not be back until Thursday On Tuesday he again went to Koal 's office, but Koal was not there , so he went to another dentist in the same building, a Dr Kerber , who treated a tooth which had a cavity "to stop it from hurting" 291 quently, Kramer met with Bogard in Kramer's office. Ac- cording to Bogard, Kramer told him he was fired. Bogard asked why, and Kramer told him it was for having been off all this time. When Bogard said he had called in, Kramer called Gicei into the office, and Gicei said there had been no message from Bogard. Kramer added that if Bogard had called in, it would have been on the tape recorder. When Bogard asked Kramer to play back the tape, Kramer re- fused to do so, saying "No one can listen to this." Testimony of Respondent's witnesses controverts that of Bogard almost every step of the way. Thus, Casper testified that Bogard did not tell him on Friday that he would be out Monday. Linda Mullins, an office girl, testified that no calls came in from Bogard on Friday or Monday to the effect that he would not be in on Monday or Tuesday, that on Tuesday afternoon, about 3:45 p.m. (after plant closing time), Bogard called to say "he had some teeth pulled and that he had had some shock with the gas and he thought it would be dangerous to come in and that he would come in tomorrow." Before turning to Kramer's testimony concerning the meeting at which he terminated Bogard , I note the confu- sion and discrepancies in Bogard's own version. Thus, al- though he claimed he told Casper on Friday he would not be in on Monday, he attempted to see a dentist on Saturday, and could not have known on Friday that this attempt would prove unfruitful. His alleged call to the office on his way home from work hardly comports with his having al- ready told Casper he would not be in. In these circumstanc- es, I credit Casper's testimony that Bogard did not tell him he would not be in on Monday, and Linda Mullins that no call came in from Bogard on Friday or Monday, only the call (to which Bogard did not refer in his testimony) on Tuesday afternoon .4 At the Wednesday "confrontation," according to Kram- er, he asked Bogard for an explanation of why he had not called in. When Bogard told him about having gone to a dentist and getting his teeth pulled, Kramer asked Bogard if he had proof, or a doctor's slip. Bogard replied "Well, what in the hell do I need that for? Everybody knows my teeth are bad. You know my teeth are bad." Kramer an- swered that he did not know, that if he (Bogard) had had his teeth pulled, "Let me see and let's be done with it and go back to work." Bogard said Kramer was not qualified to look in his mouth. During the conversation, Bogard told Kramer that he had advised Charley or Les (Casper or Gicei), Kramer did not remember which Bogard said, and that he had called in on Monday, spoken to a girl, but "possibly nobody answered the phone." Bogard then com- plained that Kramer was referring to him by his last name, and sitting, while Bogard referred to Kramer as "Mr. Kram- er," and remained standing and that Kramer was "doing this to get him because he got caught in the wrong car, and that he was black and I was white...." Kramer testified that Bogard "was caught in a lie and he couldn't get out. It was that simple. He tried to convince me that no one was ° It is true , as the General Counsel argues, that another girl in the office, Henrietta Nance , might have received a call, but Mullins' testimony about the way messages were recorded and passed on satisfies me, in conjunction with Bogard 's own confusing testimony , that no calls were made by him on Friday or Monday. 292 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD in the office that day and of course the final proof rested on his opening his mouth and showing me his teeth. It was that simple and he broke the rule. . . . It got to the point where I couldn't look the other way; I had to dismiss him." I credit, essentially, Kramer's version of the interview, and find that it occurred substantially as he testified, which actually is not very much different from what Bogard testi- fied. As noted above, Bogard was a probationary employee. His attendance record, as shown by his attendance record in evidence, was not good. Despite his union activities, which were actually not that extensive, Respondent could well have discharged him before his probationary period ran out without raising more than the suspicion that could come to mind as to the discharge of any union adherent during a union campaign, even absent the incident immedi- ately preceding the discharge. Kramer's testimony indicates that he had not decided to discharge Bogard before he met with him on May 3, but made that determination as a result of the meeting, being convinced by then that Bogard had no legitimate excuse for not calling in, that Bogard was lying, and, as Kramer put it, giving him "no other choice." Per- haps the firing seems somewhat out of line with the offense, particularly since a failure to call in is not an automatic ground for discharge, but it does appear that Bogard took a somewhat belligerent attitude, in effect refusing to con- firm his own statement, and that in fact he had not called in, although claiming to have done so. Although these latter conclusions rest, of course, on crediting Kramer's version of the meeting,5 and despite the fact that Kramer was admit- tedly antiunion, in weighing counsel's affirmative case as to Bogard against Respondent's defense, I cannot find that the General Counsel has proved a violation by a preponderance of the evidence. C. The Alleged Violations of Section 8(a)(1) I have already found that Respondent did not violate the Act, as alleged in the complaint, at the April meeting with Kramer that Bogard requested, or with respect to the al- leged interrogation of Bogard by Gicei. Kramer conceded that he asked Masaveg whether he was going to a union meeting. He also admitted having berated Masaveg, after the union meeting was held, because he had heard a rumor that Masaveg "was president or in charge of organizing it." He accused Masaveg of "stabbing him in the back," and called him an obscene name. Kramer denied that he told 5 There were some discrepancies between an affidavit Kramer gave to a Board agent and his testimony on the stand Thus, Kramer stated in his affidavit that "even if Bogard had called in it is doubtful I would have kept him on as a regular employee," but denied on the stand that he probably would not have kept Bogard absent the latter's failure to call in As the statement given to the Board agent would , in my opinion, have strengthened Respondent 's case, I do not regard this discrepancy as significant The confu- sion and discrepancies in Bogard's testimony were, as I have already indi- cated, of much greater magnitude 6 It is clear on the record that Kramer had a penchant for using obscene epithets Although the complaint alleged, in part that the use of "abusive language" to various employees was coercive, I see no necessity for delineat- ing such usage by Kramer, or anyone else, except in one instance where the language is of the essence of the threat I'o the extent that threats were made they may take on added flavor from the colorful language accompanying them, but they stand or fall as violations of the Act without regard to this kind of language I do find, and it will go without saying in this Decision, Masaveg that he would get even with him no matter what it cost (or if it cost $50,000), or that he would "beat him to the bone," as testified to, in general, by both Masaveg and Camarda.? Kramer was obviously extremely upset at Masaveg's "betrayal," and the statements attributed to him by Masaveg and Camarda fit the picture of an emotionally upset person, who was admittedly "cussing out" his "betray- er." For this reason , and based on my observation of Ca- marda and Masaveg, whose testimony I credit generally, I conclude that Kramer did make the alleged threat to Masa- veg, and thereby Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) by Kramer's asking Masaveg whether he was going to the meeting , and by similarly asking Camarda whether he was going to the meeting.8 I also credit Camarda, over Kramer's denial, that Kramer told Camarda, about a week after the election, that he "can get fired for being the president of the union," and find that Respondent, by this threat, violated Section 8(a)(l) of the Act. Louis Nims, who had left the Company dust before the hearing in this case , testified credibly to a conversation he had with Kramer in April, shortly after the union campaign began. Kramer had earlier lent Nims some money, when the latter's car was stolen. Nims complained to Gicei that Kramer had given him "a hard time" when he got the ad- vance. Kramer subsequently came to Nims, admittedly up- set at the accusation that he had given Nims a hard time, and Nims told Kramer that he meant what he had said, whereupon Kramer told Nims-in Kramer's word-"In the future, go to your union hall and get the money." Nims testified that Kramer said he should "go to the Allied Indus- trial Workers" the next time he needed any money," but added, and I credit him, that Kramer went on to say "You guys think you are going to fuck me but you're the ones that are going to get fucked." I find that by this threat, Respon- dent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. I do not base any violation on the other portions of this dialogue, however, as I am satisfied that Kramer was upset at what he thought was his generosity being characterized by Nims as "giving him a hard time." Employee Walter Karpinski testified that he overheard Les Gicei tell employee David Butler that he should have fired him when he had the chance. Gicei in effect conceded making this statement , but denied that it was made because of Butler's union activities or because Butler was wearing a union button. I cannot attribute an invidious purpose to the remark solely because, as the General Counsel contends, Butler happened to be wearing a union button at the time, particularly in view of the fact that almost everyone in the plant was wearing a union button at the time, and do not find a violation based on this remark. I find no merit in the General Counsel's contention that Respondent, by instituting a Saturday sign-in sheet, violat- ed the Act. The testimony of Kramer and Gicei to the effect that Kramer , in virtually every conversation with Camarda and Masaveg, used obscenities. and will not bother resolving whether or not he used a specific one-which he disclaimed was p .irt of his normal vocabulary 7 Early in Camarda's testimony he attributes a "stab in the back" state- ment to Les Gicei It is clear that this was in error, as subsequent testimony makes evident , and that he meant Kramer , not Gicei 8 Based on Camarda's testimony, which was not denied by Kramer CLEVELAND PRESSED PRODUCTS CORP. that the notice regarding Saturday signing in was put up to avoid favoritism or discrimination, "so nobody could say they weren't asked to work on a Saturday," and not to require employees to work who did not want to, was in effect confirmed by Bogard. Camarda did testify that some- one (it is not clear, as I read the testimony, whether he meant Kramer or Gicei), told him if he did not come in on a particular Saturday he would lose his job. This does not establish a change in the system, however. It most likely represented a need for a maintenance man that Saturday, or perhaps even personal animosity toward Camarda, but does not support a conclusion that the sign-in system itself was a change from a voluntary policy regarding Saturday work to requiring employees to work then. D. Camarda and Masaveg The complaint alleges that Camarda and Masaveg were assigned more arduous work, were "split up" as a team, and in general were given assignments that were not in the na- ture of the regular maintenance work they had been doing, in retaliation for their having been the two major supporters of the Union. Camarda's ultimate discharge, claims the General Counsel, culminated this campaign of harassment, and was effected because Camarda was chairman of the Union's negotiating committee. In his brief, the General Counsel virtually concedes that, as to Masaveg, there is little or no support for the allegation of discriminatory reassignment . The brief states that "Ca- marda bore the brunt of the discrimination," that Camarda "suffered the worst treatment," and goes on to point out various instances of Camarda's receiving such treatment. As to Masaveg, the General Counsel points only to vague testi- mony of two witnesses, one (Nims) testifying that both Ca- marda and Masaveg spent time washing machines that was not done before the election, and the other (Thompson) that he noticed a change in assignments to both men, but then referring only to a particular job assigned to Camarda. As the "washing" job was in fact not assigned to Masaveg, there remains assignments following the election. As to Camarda, it does appear that some of his work assignments after the election were more difficult than any- thing he had been assigned to do before the election, partic- ularly the assessment which immediately preceded his discharge. However, it is not clear that any of the new assignments was "make-work"; they rather appear to be work that did have to be done by someone, and to be "maintenance" work, or at least work of such a nature as to go to maintenance men rather than any other category in Respondent's employ. In connection with the last assign- ment, discussed more fully immediately hereafter, it appears that the Company did very little to make the assignment easier for Camarda to perform, and its motivation in not providing him with better tools for it may well have been Camarda's position in the Union, but this in and of itself is too thin a reed upon which to base a violation, with the basic assignment, as I have indicated, being necessary work, and work which would normally go to a maintenance man. Camarda's discharge, however, is a different matter. The job he was assigned to do in late August was putting 26 posts in place, and digging holes in thick concrete, placing a pipe 293 in each hole, and filling the pipe with concrete. Although Camarda had indicated at the start of this project, which Kramer discussed with him, that he thought an outside contractor should do it, he nevertheless embarked on the work. During the course of doing it, on and off for 2 weeks, he complained that the jackhammer he was given to do the job was inadequate, that its bit did not break up the con- crete, but only drilled a straight hole in it. Although he complained, and although the work of drilling the hole was going slowly, no one from management saw fit to provide better equipment (perhaps none was immediately avail- able), and, according to both Kramer and Gicei, Camarda had been doing a good job, and neither Kramer nor Gicei had criticized Camarda for being slow to complete it .9 After Camarda's discharge, the three posts that still had to be done were put in by a new employee, using the same tools. Les Gicei, when asked how long it took the new man to complete the work, said "I didn't pay much attention-it was just as long as the holes got done." On the morning of September 14, Camarda came to work, although he was not feeling well, because he had to take a rider, Masaveg, to the plant. He decided to try to perform the work, but felt miserable, getting all wet because it was raining,10 and came inside, where he helped Masaveg in work the latter was doing. He mentioned to Casper that he was sick and wanted to go home, but Casper said he would have to see Gicei, who was not around at the time.11 At that point, Kramer came on the scene. The testimony of Camarda and Kramer as to what ensued at that time is somewhat divergent, although not quite so differing as might appear at first blush. Camarda's version is that Kram- er told Camarda to come with him, after approaching him while he was working with Masaveg inside, and started questioning him why he was not working on drilling the holes. Camarda said he was sick, that although he could put in a routine 8-hour day on maintenance work in the shop, he was too sick to go outside and drill with the jackhammer that day. Kramer started to berate Camarda, called him a "f- liar," and a " . . . baby making excuses that you are sick," etc. Camarda told Kramer that he wanted to go home, and would do the drilling the next day. Kramer then said, "You know you think you have something going with the Union in this shop. I have news for you. You will never have a union in this shop." He added that Camarda would never have anything to say in this shop, that he would never sign a private contract for a "stupid a.. hole," and continued with "This is my shop. I will run this ... shop my way. I am the law. I am the . . . law in this place and you get that straight." At that point, Kramer called Gicei over and told him, in effect, to discharge Camarda. According to Kramer, he came to work and saw that Camarda was not outside digging the holes, and then saw It is plain that this was not Camarda's sole assignment during the 2 weeks prior to his discharge . As Kramer testified , "many times . Camarda wasn't on the job and I would go in and find out he was assigned to something else temporarily and he would return iU Supervisor Casper's testimony that it was not "raining at the time," in its context, refers to a later time, when Camarda was inside helping Masaveg, and Kramer looked for Camarda outside 11 Casper did not specifically deny this conversation To the extent that his brief testimony may be taken as a denial. I credit Camarda. 294 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Camarda working with Masaveg and another employee.12 He then told Camarda to go outside and do the drilling. Kamara came back later and got Casper to get Camarda off the machine and out to continue drilling Kramer remined Camarda he had to get the job done, and Camarda "advised me "that he had a triple, compound fracture of the head and he wasn't going to do it." After some discussion about it being a contractor's job, and the difficulty of the job, Ca- marda flatly refused to do it. Kramer then called Gicei, and asked Camarda to repeat to Gicei what he had said. Gicei asked Camarda "why don't you go and complete the job?" Camarda replied "No, I am not. I am going to go down- town." After some talk about a notice on the bulletin board dealing with negotiations with the Union (the record is not clear on this), Camarda made some reference to the effect that his "committee" will determine this, and Kramer re- plied "Frank, you don't have a committee here. I run the shop." Gicei testified that Kramer did say he wanted him (Gicei) to hear what Carnarda had to say-that Camarda had re- fused to drill the holes, and that Camarda said "if he has to drill the holes he is going home sick," and Kramer finally told him to ring Camarda out, that he was through. Gicei said "I don't recall," when asked "Did you ask Mr. Camar- da to drill the holes to avoid his departure from the plant?" As I indicated earlier, the testimony of Camarda and Kramer was not so markedly different as to the events of that morning . The only really significant difference, as I view it, is whether Camarda was refusing to do any further drilling work, or merely saying, as he testified he did, that he would be happy to continue the next day, but felt he was too sick to do that arduous work that day. Gicei's testimony is much more confirmatory of Camarda's than of Kramer's in that respect, for "He said if he has to drill the holes he is going home sick" suggests a refusal to continue that day, not forever. The history of the drilling job also strongly suggests that Camarda was not refusing ever to do the dull- ing work, but was only begging off that day, for he had been doing the work for 2 weeks, despite his grousing about the work not really being maintenance work, and about not having the proper tools to work with. With 23 of the 26 pipes already completed, it would be extremely odd for Camarda suddenly to decide he would not complete the job. The testimony demostrates, as I have stated, that there was no great rush to complete the drilling-it had to be done, but no deadline was placed on it, and neither Kramer nor Gicei was concerned enough to supply Camarda with tools that would hasten its completion. Furthermore, Ca- marda was not standing by idly, but was helping with nor- mal maintenance work at the time, and, indeed, had not spent the entire 2 weeks drilling, but had been doing normal maintenance work along with the pipe insertion job. In these circumstances, Kramer's failure to accept Camarda's explanation that he was too sick to work on the drill outside could hardly have stemmed from any urgency about the 12 Kramer testified he did not believe Camarda was working, he merely saw him "holding the end of a pipe, doing nothing." On cross-examination. Kramer did admit that he did not "know for a fact " that Camarda was not doing anything-and that he asked Camarda what he was doing , and Camar- da replied "Helping Leroy [ Masaveg] " work itself. Possibly Kramer was upset that Camarda did not, sick or not, immediately obey Kramer's telling him to go back outside. But the real reason for Kramer's action, in my view, was Camarda's continuing leadership in the Union. I recognize, of course, an employer's right to dis- charge an employee for failing to obey even an unreasona- ble order or request. But it is plainly relevant, in determining whether a discharge is effected because of the refusal to obey or because of union-related considerations, to examine the reasonableness and fairness of the action taken. The fact that Kramer, in the course of the final interview with Ca- marda, referred to the Union a number of times, stated he would never have a union in the shop and that he would run it his way,13 further demonstrates to me that Kramer's refus- al to permit Camarda to work indoors on September 14 was motivated by Camarda's status in the Union. I do not find convincing Respondent 's argument that Camarda had giv- en the Company good cause for discharging him a number of times before the actual discharge, and probably would have disciplined Camarda severely, or discharged him, but for the pendency of the election or its having just been completed, on the occasion of Camarda's derelictions. I need not resolve the conflicts in the testimony as to whether Camarda did misconduct himself earlier, for assuming Respondent' s assertion that he did to be true, then the actu- al discharge was for an obviously lesser defense than the previous derelictions . In all these circumstances , I conclude that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by discharging Frank Camarda. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. By discharging Frank Camarda because of his union activity, the Company engaged in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. By interrogating its employees about their union activ- ities, and by threatening them with reprisals because of their union activities, the Company engaged in unfair labor prac- tices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sections 8(a)(1) and 2(6) and (7) of the Act. THE REMEDY I shall recommend that Respondent cease and desist from its unfair labor practices, that it offer reinstatement to Frank Camarda, with backpay, computed as provided in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, and Isis Plumb- ing & Heating Company, 138 NLRB 716. Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended:14 ii Based on Camarda's credible testimony , in part corroborated by witness Napoleon Thompson Kramer himself , as noted above, admitted to saying. "Frank , you don' t have a committee here I run this shop" 14 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board , the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations , he adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions , and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes CLEVELAND PRESSED PRODUCTS CORP. ORDER Respondent, Cleveland Pressed Products Corporation, Cleveland, Ohio, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Interrogating its employees about their union activi- ties. (b) Threatening its employees with reprisals because of their union activities. (c) Discouraging membership in International Union, Allied Industrial Workers of America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, by discharging or in any other manner discriminating against employees in regard to their hire or tenure of employment or condition of employment. (d) In any like or related manner interfering with, re- straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their rights under Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to ef- fectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Offer Frank Camarda immediate and full reinstate- ment to his former job or, if that job no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to his seniority or other rights and privileges, and make him whole for any loss of earnings he may have suffered, in the manner set forth in the section hereof entitled "The Remedy." (b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, person- nel records and reports, and all records necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this recom- mended Order. (c) Post at its plant in Cleveland, Ohio, and any other locations where notices to its employees are customarily posted, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 15 Copies of the notice on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 8, shall be signed by an authorized representative of the Company and posted immediately upon receipt thereof and maintained for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places at all locations where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Company to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. 15 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board " 295 (d) Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith. APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government WE WILL NOT question employees about their union activities. WE WILL NOT threaten our employees because of their union activities. WE WILL offer reemployment to Frank Camarda and WE WILL pay him for losses he suffered as a result of our having discharged him in September 1972. WE WILL NOT discharge or otherwise discriminate against any employee because of his activity on behalf of Allied Industrial Workers of America, AFL-CIO. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to join or assist that Union or any other union. Dated By CLEVELAND PRESSED PRODUCTS CORPORATION (Employer) (Representative) (Title) This is an official notice and must not be defaced by anyone. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions may be direct- ed to the Board's Office, 1695 Federal Office Building, 1240 East Ninth Street, Cleveland, Ohio 44199, Telephone 216- 522-3715.