Cintas Corporation

National Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge Opinions

Sep 20, 2006

04-CA-034160 (N.L.R.B. Sep. 20, 2006)

JD–65–06
Branford, CT
Charlotte, NC

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DIVISION OF JUDGES

CINTAS CORPORATION

and Cases: 4-CA-34160 (formerly 11-CA-19841)
4-CA-34161 (formerly 11-CA-20293)
4-CA-34345 (formerly 34-CA-11218)
UNITE HERE

Terri A. Craig, Rosetta B. Lane, & Lisa Shearin, Esqs.,
for the General Counsel.
Joel H. Kaplan, Brian M. Stolzenbach,
& Armanda Sonneborn, Esqs.,
(Seyfarth Shaw LLP), of Chicago, Illinois,
for the Respondent.
Judiann Chartier & Brent Garren, Esqs.,
of New York, New York,
for the Charging Party.

DECISION

Statement of the case

IRA SANDRON, Administrative Law Judge. The amended consolidated complaint1
stems from unfair labor practice (ULP) charges filed by UNITE HERE (the Union) against Cintas
Corporation (Respondent or the Company) for conduct that occurred at its Branford,
Connecticut (Branford) and Charlotte, North Carolina (Charlotte) facilities. Violations of Section
8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act) are alleged.

Pursuant to notice, I conducted a trial in Hartford, Connecticut, on March 13 – 15, 2006,
and at Concord, North Carolina, on March 27 – 31 and May 1 – 3, 2006, at which the parties
had full opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to introduce
evidence.2
1 GC Exh. 1(www), filed after the close of hearing. Respondent’s answer is received in
evidence as GC Exh. 1(xxx).
2 Respondent filed a motion to correct the transcript, dated August 3, 2006, which is
received in evidence as R. Exh. 50. The Union’s response, dated August 8, 2006, is received in
evidence as U. Exh. 10. To the extent that Respondent’s motion is unopposed, it is granted.
On the few proposed corrections to which the Union objects, I am unable to recall exactly what
was said on the record and therefore cannot resolve the disagreement.

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The General Counsel, Union, and Respondent filed helpful posthearing briefs that I have
duly considered. Respondent filed a motion to strike certain statements from the Union’s
posthearing brief, to which the Union filed a response and a motion to strike certain statements
from Respondent’s posthearing brief. Respondent, in turn, filed a response in opposition to the
Union’s motion to strike. They are received as R. Exh. 51, U. Exh. 11(a) & (b), and R. Exh. 52,
respectively.

Respondent contends that certain statements in the Union’s brief misrepresent the facts.
However, such statements are in the nature of legal argument as to the conclusions to be drawn
from certain facts of record, and striking legal argument serves no purpose.

Respondent also contends that that the last sentence of the first paragraph on page 6 of
the Union’s posthearing brief should be stricken as a misstatement of fact. The Union concedes
this was an error and does not oppose striking that sentence. I therefore grant Respondent’s
motion to strike it.

Respondent further asserts that the Union’s references in its brief to U. Exh. 6(b) should
be stricken because that document was only marked for identification and never offered or
admitted in evidence. The Union calls this another error and, again, does not oppose striking
such references. Accordingly, I also grant this part of Respondent’s motion.

Respondent’s response to the Union’s motion to strike does not address the Union’s
argument that references in Respondent’s brief to rejected exhibits (R. Exhs. 20 – 22) should be
stricken. It does defend references in its brief to a website article concerning a defamation suit
brought by an unrelated company against the Union. I grant the Union’s motion to strike
references to both rejected exhibits and the defamation suit. In sum, only documents of record
are appropriately cited in posthearing briefs to the trial judge. See Sec. 102.45(b) of the Board’s
Rules; King Soopers, Inc., 344 NLRB No. 104 slip op. at 1 fn. 1 (2005).

Issues

Since about January 2003, the Union has been engaged in an ongoing organizing
campaign to represent Respondent’s employees at numerous locations. Respondent argued
from the outset of this proceeding that the Union’s activity on a nationwide basis has been
unprotected and that it filed ULP’s for harassment and other illegitimate purposes, therefore
rendering unprotected the union activities of particular employees at Branford and Charlotte.
Accordingly, Respondent urged, I should expand the scope of inquiry at trial beyond the specific
allegations to include evidence of the Union’s conduct and motives throughout its over 3-year
organizing drive.

On the contrary, I deemed it appropriate to limit the scope of the issues litigated to the
events specified in the complaint.3 As I stated on the record, the question of whether particular
employees’ activities were protected must be determined from their activities and motives, not
what the Union intended and did at the national level. To have imputed the latter to the
employees, in the absence of evidence of specific knowledge, would have perverted common
law principles of agency and run contrary to the purposes of the Act. Respondent provided no
3The Board, on July 11, 2006, denied Respondent’s request for special permission to appeal
my rulings, without prejudice to its right to renew its contentions in any exceptions it might file to
my decision.

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evidence or offers of proof that any of the employees who were the subjects of alleged ULP’s at
either Branford or Charlotte were privy to the Union’s nationwide strategies.

Aside from the nexus issue, accepting Respondent’s contention would have required an
analysis of hundreds of ULP charges the Union has filed, many of which have been settled.4
Meaningfully evaluating them in an effort to decide the Union’s motives would have been an
impossible undertaking. Moreover, the result would have been a trial lasting for an
indeterminate number of months that would have imposed a crushing burden on the other
parties, as well as on the Agency’s hearing process.

The specific issues before me are as follows:

Branford - 20055

1) Did Daniel Bonelli, general manager, or Eric Pepe, plant manager, coerce
employees by soliciting them at a group meeting in mid-June to sign a letter against
the Union’s position opposing Respondent’s water discharge permit application? Did
that letter constitute a threat of plant relocation because of the Union’s/employees’
actions in opposition to the permit?

2) Did Respondent, prior to July 26, assist employee Milagros Rupert in preparing a
letter against the Union’s position on the permit and in soliciting employees to sign
it? If so, did Respondent thereby threaten to relocate the plant because of the
Union’s/employees’ actions opposing the application?

3) Did Pepe, in about late July, (a) interrogate Berta Campos concerning her union
activities; (b) solicit her to sign a letter prepared by Respondent disputing union
claims; (c) ask her to sign a letter renouncing her demand for material safety data
sheets (MSDS’) from Respondent’s customers; and (d) warn her to “be careful” about
engaging in union activities?

Charlotte

2003 allegations

1) On the morning of January 13, 2003, when nonemployee union organizers were
attempting to distribute union leaflets to Respondent’s employees, did Respondent’s
agents engage in unlawful surveillance or otherwise interfere with employees’
interactions with those organizers?

2) That afternoon, did Stephen Coleridge, production supervisor, summon the police to
interfere with organizers who were attempting to distribute union leaflets to
employees?
4 The Union has filed approximately 140 charges nationwide, of which at least 60 have been
settled.
5 All dates hereinafter for Branford occurred in 2005 unless otherwise indicated. The stated
allegations and dates are based on my evaluation of the evidence, not necessarily what is in the
complaint. The same holds true for the Charlotte allegations.

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3) Was the informal settlement agreement (SA) reached in Case 11-CA-19841,
approved on January 20, 2004, properly set aside with regard to settlement of the
above allegations because of Respondent’s further violations of the Act at Charlotte
in 2004?

2004 allegations

I. Relating to dress code policy

1) Did Coleridge, on about February 9, (a) announce to Maria Raquel Cruz aka Raquel
Cruz (Cruz) a policy prohibiting employees from wearing union buttons, stickers, or
pins on the shirts of their uniforms; and (b) require her to remove a union sticker
from her shirt?

2) Did Coleridge, on February 16, (a) advise Candy Galdamez of a policy prohibiting
employees from wearing anything in addition to Respondent’s standard uniform; (b)
tell her she could not wear a union hat inside the facility, including at her work
station; (c) tell her to remove the hat; and (d) issue her a verbal warning for
wearing it?

3) Did Coleridge, on March 1, (a) announce to Galdamez and Ana Callas a policy
prohibiting employees from wearing union stickers on their uniforms; and (b) require
them and Cruz to remove union stickers from the shirts of their uniforms?

4) Did Mark Stoy, plant manager, on March 1, implicitly threaten Galdamez with
discharge if she again wore a union hat or a union sticker?

5) Did Respondent, on March 1, issue verbal warnings to Callas, Cruz, Rosa Cruz, and
Emelinda Rivera because they wore union stickers? On the same day, did
Respondent issue Galdamez a written warning for the same reason?

II. Relating to solicitation and distribution

1) Did Coleridge, on about February 10, prohibit Cruz from showing a union leaflet to
other employees?

2) Did Coleridge, on about February 20, when employees were in the break room, (a)
announce a policy prohibiting them from distributing or possessing union leaflets
during nonwork time in nonwork areas; and (b) enforce the policy by confiscating
union flyers from them?

III. 8(a)(1) statements

1) Did Robbie Poole, general manager, on January 30, (a) interrogate Callas
concerning her union activity; (b) inform her that Respondent had a rule
prohibiting such activity; and (c) warn her not to violate the rule?

2) Did Poole, at a group meeting on February 19, (a) threaten employees that
Respondent would close the facility, that the employees would lose their jobs, and
that other employers would not hire them if they selected the Union as their
collective-bargaining representative; and (b) tell employees that their selecting the

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Union as their collective-bargaining representative would be futile because
Respondent would never allow the Union to represent them?

3) Did Stoy, on about February 23, (a) instruct Cruz not to speak at its meetings with
employees concerning information she received about the Union; and (b) solicit her
to report such information to him privately?

Facts

Based on the entire record, including the pleadings, testimony of witnesses and my
observations of their demeanor, documents, and stipulations of the parties, I find the facts as
follows.

Regarding credibility, I have found the testimony of many witnesses reliable on some
points but not on others. The Board has stated that witnesses may be found partially credible
because the mere fact that a witness is discredited in one instance does not automatically mean
that the witness must be discredited in all respects. Golden Hours Convalescent Hospitals, 182
NLRB 796, 799 (1970). Rather, it is appropriate to weigh the witness’ testimony for consistency
throughout with the evidence as a whole. Id. at 798-799; see also MEMC Electronic Materials,
342 NLRB 1172, 1200 fn. 13 (2004), quoting Americare Pine Lodge Nursing, 325 NLRB 98 fn. 1
(1997) (noting that when examining testimony, a trier of fact is not required “to accept the
entirety of a witness’ testimony, but may believe some and not all of what a witness says”);
Excel Container, 325 NLRB 17 fn. 1 (1997) (stating that it is quite common in all kinds of judicial
decisions to believe some, and not all, of a witness’ testimony). When there was conflicting
testimony and an absence of definitive extrinsic evidence, my credibility resolutions sometimes
turned on a determination of which witness’ version of events seemed more plausible.

Respondent, a Washington corporation headquartered in Cincinnati, Ohio, operates
numerous facilities throughout the United States and Canada and is engaged in providing
corporate identity uniforms and related services. Since about January 2003, the Union has
been engaged in an ongoing nationwide organizing campaign seeking to represent
Respondent’s employees. Respondent’s counsel stipulated to Respondent’s animus during the
time frame relevant to the allegations in the complaint.6

The majorities of employees at both Branford and Charlotte are of Hispanic origin and
have Spanish as their primary language. Respondent uses the term “partner” for an employee.

Facts—Branford

At its Branford facility, Respondent employs approximately 80 production workers, who
clean uniforms that that Respondent rents to customers. Two such employees testified: Berta
Campos, for the General Counsel; Milagros Rupert, for Respondent. Plant Manager Pepe and
Brian Cardozo, a supervisor, were also witnesses.

On April 22, 2004, Respondent signed a settlement agreement encompassing the
following conduct at Branford: engaging in unlawful surveillance of union organizers, soliciting
employees to revoke their union authorization cards, congratulating those who circulated anti-
union petitions in the presence of other employees who refused to sign them, interrogating
6 Tr. 12 (Charlotte). Hereinafter, transcript references for the Branford portions of the
decision refer to the Branford transcripts; for the Charlotte portions, the Charlotte transcripts

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employees concerning their union sympathies, threatening employees with discharge if they
discussed their work evaluations with other employees, and discharging employees because
they supported the Union.7 The General Counsel has not contended that Respondent violated
the terms of this agreement, which was never revoked, and no underlying facts were presented
as background evidence here.

I. Respondent’s water permit application

Many of the Branford allegations stem from Respondent’s application to the Connecticut
Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) for a permit to expand its water discharge
capacity at this facility.

A number of organizations, labor or environmental, expressed positions opposing the
permit. The Union was one of them, voicing objections by letter dated March 3, to DEP.8 Its
thrust was environmental, as would logically be expected when addressing an environmental
agency, but there also were repeated references to Cintas employees. For example, on page 1:
“[W]e believe the draft permit still fails to adequately address spill prevention and control,
training of workers and supervisors on pre-treatment requirements and the handling of shop
rags;” and, on page 5: “The training should include methods of protecting the environment as
well as protection of employee[sic], who are the first line of defense for the environment and the
community.”

In its March notice of intervention,9 the Union continued to address matters pertaining to
Cintas employees; on page 2: “It is demonstrable that in-plant safety and health concerns are
intimately related to a laundry’s environmental impacts . . . ;” and on page 3, the Union
contended that the training procedures that Respondent proposed were (1) inadequate, in that
they were insufficiently detailed and there was no indication that training would be available in
the Spanish language, and (2) incomplete in that they failed to mandate training for all
employees in spill prevention and response.

DEP granted the Union’s petition to intervene. In subsequent filings, the Union
continued to raise, among its issues, employees’ training in the area of chemical spills and
environmental hazards.10 DEP issued a final decision on the permit on November 29, based on
an agreement between DEP staff, Respondent, and the Union as intervenor.11

During the course of DEP proceedings, the Union solicited employees to sign a petition
opposing the permit.12 This was never in fact filed with the DEP, as reflected by a certification
from DEP that the only correspondence it received purported from Cintas employees was a
letter supporting the permit, received July 26 (the July letter).13
7 U. Exh. 4.
8 U. Exh. 7.
9 R. Exh. 9.
10 See R. Exhs. 11 & 12.
11 U. Exh. 5.
12 GC Exh. 3, an undated petition from five individuals, including Campos, identifying
themselves as “Cintas worker[s].”
13 GC Exhs. 6 & 10.

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It is undisputed that on one occasion, management held a meeting of employees in the
cafeteria, solicited them to sign and send to the DEP hearing officer a letter in support of
Respondent’s application for the permit, and said that employees could sign it if they liked.

Campos gave the date of the meeting as July 26, identifying the July letter as the
document that was circulated that day. However, DEP stamped this undated letter as received
on July 26, and I credit Rupert’s testimony that she prepared it and solicited other employees to
sign it outside the context of a management meeting. Consistent with Rupert’s testimony was
Cardozo’s testimony that a proposed letter bearing a date of June 15 (the June letter),14 was
the one management showed to employees at the cafeteria meeting, the date of which he could
not recall. In the absence of reliable evidence as to the precise date, I find the best estimate is
in about mid-June.

Although Campos testified that Cardozo was the one who solicited employees to sign
the letter, I find more likely Cardozo’s testimony that either Pepe or Bonelli, managers over him
in the chain of command, conducted the meeting and that his role was to translate what they
said into Spanish.

Based on the above, I find that Respondent, through Bonelli and/or Pepe, in about mid-
June, solicited employees to sign a letter supporting Respondent’s water permit application.

This letter mentioned nothing about the Union or its opposition to the permit application.
Included in the letter was this language:

[F]urther restrictions on our water use and discharge could cause our company to
relocate to an area that has more reasonable permit standards. A relocation of our
facility would be an economic hardship that neither I nor any of the other partners here at
Cintas would want.

As with the employee petition opposing the permit, this letter was never filed with DEP.

The July letter that was filed with DEP was signed by a number of employees, including
Campos. Voicing support for the permit application, it stated that the Union was “on the wrong
side” of the issue. Rupert testified that, solely on her own initiative and with the aid of a
nonemployee, she drafted, produced, and distributed this letter and learned where to send it,
without any management assistance or involvement. Further, she asserted that after getting
some signatures, she gave it to her sister, also an employee, to distribute to other coworkers
and never saw it again before it was mailed to DEP from Respondent’s facility. Who actually
sent it from there remains a mystery.

Rupert’s testimony was somewhat implausible on its face. Nevertheless, she testified
consistently and without hesitation that the above occurred, and nothing in her testimony
contradicted this. Nor was there anything in her demeanor suggesting that she was not being
truthful. Although implausible, her testimony was not implausible to the point of being
improbable beyond the pale of believability. No witnesses contradicted her, and Pepe and

14 U. Exh. 6(a).

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Cardozo denied any role in this letter. Indeed, Campos testified that she told Respondent’s
attorneys that she understood that Rupert had written the July letter and that no company
representatives had been involved in its preparation or distribution. Mere suspicion that
Respondent’s management may have been involved cannot serve as a substitute for evidence.

Accordingly, I credit Rupert, Pepe, and Cardozo and find that Respondent’s agents were
not involved in the preparation of the July letter or its distribution to employees. Accordingly, I
need not address its contents.

II. Letters to Respondent’s customers/MSDS sheets

MSDS’ contain information about chemicals, pesticides, herbicides, or other toxins that
might be found on customer uniforms that Respondent cleans. By letter dated January 7,15
several employees, including Campos, requested that Respondent provide them with MSDS’ for
major customers Terminix and Trugreen Chemlawn (Trugreen).

On July 1, Pepe called Campos into his office. As per her earlier request, he gave her
MSDS’ for Terminix and Trugreen. He asked her to sign an acknowledgment that she had
received them, and she did so.16

During the water permit water application process, the Union also solicited employees to
sign letters to Terminix and TruGreen, contending Respondent was providing improper training,
denying requests that MSDS’ be provided, and not furnishing other information on toxic
chemicals on uniforms.17

Pepe, Cardozo, and Campos all testified about a meeting when Pepe called Campos
into his office and had Cardozo act as interpreter. The topic was whether Campos had in fact
signed one of those letters on which her signature appeared, or whether it was forged. The
genesis of the meeting was that Pepe had received information from corporate headquarters
that employee signatures were forged on some of the letters being circulated by the Union.

According to Pepe and Cardozo, they had only one meeting with Campos on the
subject, and on that day, July 26, she signed an affidavit.18 Campos, however, said there were
two meetings, the first in mid-June or early July, and that at the later meeting she was presented
with the proposed affidavit and asked to sign it.

Pepe testified that at the meeting, Campos signed a “form affidavit.” This suggests that
the detailed July 26 affidavit was prepared later. Further, the language of the July 26 affidavit
strongly implies there was a previous meeting. Whether there were two meetings or one, I
would expect the affidavit to have been presented to Campos fairly close in time to the
conversation regarding her signature. Accordingly, I find that in about late July is the best
approximation for when the meeting in question occurred.
15 U. Exh. 3. I take administrative notice that “Enero” is Spanish for January.
16 GC Exh. 2; R. Exh. 7.
17 See GC Exhs. 4 & 5(c), which are identical in text but different in the number and
placement of signatures, including where Campos’ name is located.
18 GC Exh. 5(a)(b) (Spanish original and English translation, with the date of July 26 on the
former).

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At trial, Campos was frequently equivocal and tentative and, at times, totally
contradictory, in testifying about what she signed and did not sign, and what exactly she told
Pepe. I realize that during the course of her testimony, she was shown numerous documents,
many of which were photocopies with her purported signature. Granted, also, Campos may
have been intimidated by management’s presence and the court process, as argued by the
General Counsel. Regardless, I can not find that she was a wholly reliable witness.

In one critical respect, her testimony fully comported with that of Pepe and Cardozo—
and with her affidavit to Respondent: she unequivocally told Pepe that her signature on a
Terminix/Trugreen letter (GC Exh. 5(c)) was forged.19

After Campos said this, Pepe asked if she would sign an affidavit confirming in writing
what she had said. He told her it would be completely voluntary, and there would no
repercussions regardless of what she decided to do. She signed such an affidavit within a short
time. Therein, Campos stated that when Pepe had shown her the letter:

[M]y immediate response was one of surprise and confusion. I was also very concerned
because I did not know what they were talking about and because I had never sent any
letter like this to any customer of Cintas. At that point, I was shown a copy of the letter
attached hereto, which is made to look like it was signed by me and has my name listed.
I never signed this letter and I did not authorize anyone to sign this letter on my behalf.
What’s more, it is clear that it is not my signature because among other things my name
is incorrectly written. I am very upset that someone would forge my signature on this
letter and I will provide whatever assistance I can to help uncover who did this terrible
thing.

I credit Pepe’s and Cardozo’s consistent testimony that, at the end of the meeting, Pepe
told Campos to be careful because her signature was being used on documents without her
authorization. I note that Campos’ version was not necessarily at odds with theirs; she testified,
that, “They just said to be careful, but I don’t know why.”20 Her reaction to the remark was “just
normal. I went back to work. I didn’t pay any attention to it.”21

Conclusions

Starting with the allegations pertaining to the water permit application, I have found no
evidence of management involvement in the July 2005 letter, and therefore no violation can be
attributed to Respondent based on its language, or otherwise.

As to the June 15, 2005 letter that Respondent solicited employees to sign in support of
the permit application, the following language is alleged to have been unlawfully threatening:

[F]urther restrictions on our water use and discharge could cause our company to
relocate to an area that has more reasonable permit standards. A relocation of our
facility would be an economic hardship that neither I nor any of the other partners here at
Cintas would want.

19 Tr. 136, 152–153, 171.
20 Tr. 106. See also her testimony at Tr. 111, where she stated that Cardozo made the
comment. I believe it more likely that he was translating for Pepe, who conducted the meeting.
21 Tr. 197.

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Initially, I reject Respondent’s contention that the Union’s opposition had nothing to do
with protected activity under the Act but rather was related to environmental concerns. Since
the sole focus of DEP was on environmental issues, the Union’s couching its opposition to the
permit on environmental grounds was only natural. In any event, throughout the process, the
Union voiced objections to the permit in part on the need for better employee training and
protections in dealing with hazardous wastes. This clearly impacted on employees’ health and
safety and, therefore, on their terms and conditions of employment.

Returning to the letter’s contents, NLRB v.Gisel Packing Co., 393 U.S. 575, 618 (1969)
is the benchmark case in the area of employer’s statements to employees about the
consequences of unionization. To be found lawful and noncoercive, predictions of adverse
effects must be based on objective facts or reference demonstrably probable consequences
beyond the employer’s control. Ibid; Dallas & Mavis Specialized Carrier Co., 346 NLRB No. 2,
slip op. at 2 (2006).

The language of the paragraph in question clearly conveyed that the operative body that
could cause a need for relocation “to an area that has more reasonable permit standards” was
the DEP, if that agency made the decision to deny the permit. Logically, had the agency denied
the permit, it would have been a decision contrary to Respondent’s desire for such and, hence,
beyond Respondent’s control.

Moreover, in order to establish a violation, the General Counsel must demonstrate a
connection between the Union’s presence and the outside factors that could result in adverse
consequences to employees. Chinese Daily News, 346 NLRB No. 81, slip op. at 3 (2006).
Neither the Union nor its opposition to the permit was mentioned in the letter. Even if that
opposition was implicitly referenced, It is difficult to see how employees could conclude that the
denial of the permit by DEP would be based on their union activities or the Union’s organizing
efforts.

In sum, the June 15, 2005, letter merely raised the prospect of plant relocation if the
state agency decided to deny Respondent’s application for an expansion of its water treatment
capacity. I conclude that this could not have reasonably been construed as a threat of reprisal
against employees for engaging in union activity and, hence, was not coercive of their Section 7
rights. Ergo, I similarly conclude that Respondent’s circulation of the letter could not reasonably
have been seen by employees as directed against the Union or their union activities.

I now turn to Pepe’s meeting with Campos in about late July 2005, when he questioned
her about her signature on a union-initiated letter to a customer of Respondent. Contrary to
Respondent’s position, I conclude that such letters had a sufficient nexus to employees’ health
and safety issues to afford protection under Section 7 of the Act to employees involved in them.

The employees did not lose that protection because of the fact that the letters were sent
to major customers of Respondent and accused Respondent of not providing its employees with
proper training, denying their requests that MSDS’ be provided, and not furnishing other
information on toxic chemicals. The letters limited their criticisms of Respondent to those
narrow subjects and did not “disparage” the Respondent’s products or integrity in general. I
note that even had the letters raised questions about services or products Respondent provided
to customers, they would still be found protected. See Professional Porter & Window Cleaning
Co., 263 NLRB 136, 138–139 (1982), enfd. sub nom. NLRB v. Professional Porter, 742 F.2d

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1438 (2nd Cir. 1983) (employee letter to employer’s main customer attacked quality of service
employer provided to customer); Aviation Service Co. of New Jersey, Inc., 248 NLRB 229
(1980), enfd. 636 F.2d 1210 (3rd Cir. 1980) (letter disseminated to employer’s customers raised
questions about the safety of employer’s maintenance procedures).

Similarly, inaccuracies or misstatements in the letters did not ipso facto render them
unprotected. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 339 NLRB 1012, 1017 (2003); Professional Porter &
Window Cleaning, supra at 139. Rather, it must be shown that any such inaccuracies or
misstatements rose to the egregiousness of “disloyal, reckless, or maliciously untrue.” See TNT
Logistics North America, Inc., 347 NLRB No. 55 (2006) (claim that management solicited
employees to falsify logs was bogus); Senior Citizens Coordinating Council, of Riverbay
Community, Inc., 330 NLRB 1100, 1107 fn. 17 (2000); Delta Health Center, 310 NLRB 26, 43
(1993), enfd. mem. 5 F.3rd 1494 (5th Cir. 1993). Nothing contained in the letters fit into any of
those categories.

For the above reasons, I conclude that Respondent’s interrogation concerned Campos’
protected activity.

Interrogations of employees are not per se violative of Section 8(a)(1); instead, the
Board uses a totality-of-circumstances test to determine whether an interrogation is coercive of
employees’ rights under the Act. Rossmore House, 269 NLRB 1176, 1177 (1984), enfd. sub
nom Hotel Employees Local 11 v. NLRB, 760 F.2d 1005 (9th Cir. 1985). See also Central
Valley Meat Co., 346 NLRB No. 94 (2006). Factors considered include any background ULP’s,
the nature of the information sought, the level of the questioner (how high in the supervisory
chain), the place and method of interrogation, and whether the employee is an open and active
union supporter. Sunnyvale Medical Clinic, 277 NLRB 1217, 1218 (1985).

In Foamex, Inc., 315 NLRB 858 (1994), the Board, reversing the judge, found coercive
a manager’s interrogation of individual employees concerning their signatures on a prounion
letter, in the context of numerous ULP’s. Aside from those reasons for finding the interrogations
violated the Act, the Board stated that “ascertaining the authenticity of the employees’
signatures” did not constitute a legitimate reason justifying interrogation concerning their
protected activities.” Ibid. The Board noted that the employer had other means of finding out
the information, such as comparing the signatures on the letter with those that were in the
employees’ personnel records. Respondent could have done that in this case rather than
interrogate Campos.

Following Foamex, I find that Respondent did not have a valid purpose for the
interrogation, and it possessed alternative ways of obtaining the information that were less
intrusive in Campos’ Section 7 rights. Additionally, the plant manager conducted the
interrogation in his office, with no one else but another supervisor present. These factors lead
me to conclude that, under all the circumstances, Respondent’s interrogation was coercive.
According, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) by interrogating Campos about the
genuineness of her signature appearing on a union-initiated document relating to employees’
health and safety.

However, I do not conclude that Pepe interrogated Campos about her union activity per
se, or “solicited” her to sign a letter disputing union claims or to “renounce” her demand for
MSDS’ from Respondent’s customers. He merely questioned her about whether the signature
on the letter was hers.

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Finally, I do not conclude that Pepe’s remark at the conclusion of the meeting, that she
“be careful” because her signature was being used on documents without her authorization, was
coercive. On the contrary, it was a reasonable caution based on her expressed anguish at
having had her name forged.

Facts – Charlotte

I. Handbilling on January 13, 2003

A brief description of the physical layout of the plant and its surroundings is helpful in
putting in context what occurred. The facility, located on Harris Technology Boulevard, is the
last building before the street dead-ends. On the other side of the street is a business park
entered into by a driveway on the boulevard, which is 40 feet wide from curb to curb. Two
driveways or entrances lead into the facility, which have been identified as Entrance A, the
further from the dead end, and Entrance B. See GC Exh. 18, an aerial view, and GC Exh. 19,
an annotated diagram.

I am cognizant of the hiatus of over 3 years between the events in question and when
witnesses testified about them before me, in March and May 2006. Diminution of recall,
especially when it comes to precise times and specific details, is inevitable, and discrepancies in
testimony between witnesses called by a party may lessen their reliability as witnesses but does
not necessarily mean lack of candor.

Three witnesses testified for the General Counsel: nonemployee handbillers Mary Ann
Logan (who was in charge), Gwendolyn Miller, and Eulacey Stephenson. Similarly, Respondent
called three witnesses on these allegations: Mark Stoy, general manager; Mike Roberts,
service manager under Stoy; and Stephen Coleridge, a supervisor.

The evidence contains two documents that were prepared close in time to January 13:
Logan’s action report, prepared within days of the handbilling, and Respondent’s counsel’s
position letter dated March 14, 2003.22 Because of their much greater proximity in time to the
events vis-à-vis the testimony, I am inclined to afford them some weight, even realizing their
following limitations. Logan’s notes were hearsay as far as what occurred in the afternoon, and
statements in a position letter, although binding on a respondent, are not quite up to the level of
evidence of statements to which a witness has sworn in an affidavit. Further, both documents
carried the potential of being self-serving.

A. Morning events

Witness testimony, the action report, and the position statement all agree that the five
female nonemployee handbillers first positioned themselves at a facility entranceway at about 5
a.m., and I so find that to be their time of arrival. It was dark outside, and the street lights were
still on. No cars were parked along the street at that hour, nor were any employees coming in
or out of the facility.
22 U. Exh. 8 & GC Exh. 30, respectively.

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The women shortly thereafter split up, with Logan and Miller going to Entrance B. About
10 -15 minutes later, Roberts came out of the building and walked up to within 10 or less feet of
them. There is no dispute over the gist of the ensuing conversation. He asked what they were
doing there, and Logan replied they were handbilling. Roberts told them not to go on company
property, and Logan responded they were not on it. He left.

Thereafter, Logan and Miller stood at either side of Entrance B and held out flyers as
trucks left or cars entered. In order to give the vehicle’s passenger a flyer, one of them had to
cross into the driveway. The same held true of the handbillers at Entrance A. At least 20 cars
entered and at least 15 trucks left, most at Entrance B. Between the five handbillers, they gave
out only two flyers total. They left at between about 6:30 and 6:45 a.m., when it was getting
lighter outside.

A no trespassing/no solicitation sign inside the premises was 66 – 69 feet from where
Logan and Miller engaged in handbilling activities at Entrance B (the distance to Entrance A was
much greater). At various times that morning, Stoy, Roberts, Coleridge, and another individual
who is no longer employed came out of the building and stood by that sign.

Consistent with Logan’s action report, Logan, Miller, and Stephenson, all testified that as
vehicles later entered or departed through the entrances, management representatives at
various times stood by that sign and either beckoned incoming vehicles to enter or outgoing
trucks to leave.

Respondent’s witnesses and position statement did not dispute that testimony.
According to the latter, in view of the darkness and reports of near accidents, Stoy and later
Roberts “assisted directing traffic” for about 30 – 45 minutes, to ensure that employees slowed
down and entered or departed the parking lot safely.23 Stoy testified there was much incoming
and outgoing vehicles at one point, leading him to decide that someone needed to “direct
traffic,” a role he said was performed by Roberts.

Roberts, however, did not support Stoy’s claim that the volume of traffic of entering and
departing vehicles created a problem. On the contrary, he testified that he gestured to “less
than a handful” of exiting trucks to stop, did not gesture to any incoming cars, and that at that
time of the morning, there was “not much traffic.”24

In agreement with Roberts but not Stoy, Coleridge recalled no time when a car was
coming in at the same time a truck was leaving. He further testified that the amount of time an
outgoing truck or incoming car would be delayed by the taking of a flyer was less than a minute,
comporting with Miller’s testimony that trucks left about 1 to 3 minutes apart. Finally, he testified
that he did not consider the handbillers to constitute a major traffic impediment problem in the
morning.

The testimony of Roberts and Coleridge supports the testimony of Logan, Miller, and
Stephenson that at no time was a truck leaving at the same time as a car was entering, and that
their presence created no traffic problems, and I so find. I note that this determination is
logically consistent with the fact that only two vehicles stopped to get flyers.

23 No witness testified about any near accidents.
24 Tr. 1278, 1296.

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Based on the above, I find that it was the dark outside during at least most of the time
the morning handbilling occurred; handing vehicle drivers flyers required a handbiller to cross
into the driveway; Stoy and Roberts, from a distance of at least 66 feet from the handbillers,
directed incoming cars to enter and outgoing trucks to leave; and the handbillers at no time
created any kind of traffic problem.

B. Afternoon events

The following facts are undisputed. The handbillers returned to the facility at about 1
p.m., soon after which Logan left for an appointment. Cars were parked on both sides of the
street, but there is no evidence that the handbillers interfered with any moving traffic or
damaged property in any way. At about 1:15 p.m., Respondent, through Coleridge, called the
police to speak to them. An unidentified police officer arrived at the facility and spoke with them
at Entrance B, after which he reported to Coleridge what he had told them. They left after that,
as per Logan’s earlier directive that they do so if the police came. No officer testified, and there
is no police report or other documentation in the record.

Coleridge testified that, on his own, he called the police department at 1:15 p.m. and
said there were handbillers outside the facility on the boulevard and traffic coming down the
street, and he thought it was unsafe for them.25 I find it difficult to believe that a supervisor
would have taken it upon himself to call the police without first checking with, and obtaining the
approval of, higher management authority present at the facility that day, to wit, Stoy.
Moreover, his professed concern for the safety of the handbillers rings false. In the morning,
they stood by the entrances in the dark and there was a potential safety hazard, yet no
representative of Cintas called the police department. Further, there is absolutely no evidence
that vehicular traffic posed any kind of safety threat to the handbillers in the 15-minute interval
between their arrival and his phone call.

Coleridge denied ever telling the police to instruct the handbillers to leave the facility. He
also testified that he did not speak to the police officer who arrived on the scene until after the
latter had spoken to the handbillers. However, I find to the contrary, based on Miller’s credited
testimony that a representative of the Company came out when the officer arrived and talked
with him, as well as the statement in Respondent’s position letter that, “When the police arrived,
Mr. Coleridge explained the situation.”26

Miller and Stephenson gave differing accounts of what the office told them. Miller
testified in considerably greater detail than Stephenson, both in regard to what he said and in
general. Miller also appeared to be quite candid. For example, when asked on cross-
examination about the police officer’s demeanor, she replied that she did not find him
intimidating. Accordingly, I credit Miller’s version that the officer came over and told them they
could get a citation if they blocked traffic, but it would be fine if they stayed on the concrete and
handed out flyers.

25 The position statement added “property risks” to “potential safety concerns” as his
reasons for summoning the police, but Coleridge said nothing about the former.
26 GC Exh. 30 at 3.

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Coleridge testified that after the officer spoke with the handbillers, he reported back to
Coleridge that he had instructed them to leave. As it is hearsay, I will not consider the
statement evidence of the truth of the matter asserted therein. Respondent’s position letter
states that officers reported back that they had asked the handbillers to leave because they
were obstructing traffic.

Coleridge’s testimony concerning what the officer reported back to him, as well as the
position letter, constitute circumstantial evidence that Coleridge had requested police action;
otherwise, there would have been no reason for the officer to report back to Coleridge what he
told them.

Based on the above, I do not credit Coleridge on his interaction with the officer or his
professed reasons for summoning the police. Accordingly, there is no reliable evidence on
exactly what, if anything, he requested they do.

Conclusions

With regard to what occurred in the morning, management may lawfully simply observe
the handbilling activities of nonemployees at its premises. See Partylite Worldwide, Inc., 344
NLRB No. 155 (2005); Milco, Inc., 159 NLRB 812, 814 (1966), enfd. 388 F.2d 133 (2nd Cir.
1968). However, surveillance can be deemed coercive, depending on the totality of facts and
circumstances. Partywide Worldwide, above; Brown Transportation Co., 294 NLRB 969, 971–
972 (1989).

Respondent raises the following justifications for its agents beckoning to vehicles: traffic
issues and safety concerns, more specifically the safety of the handbillers.

Having found that the handbillers created no traffic problems, I reject that first claim.
The second contention has more merit. It was dark outside during most of the time the
handbillers stood by the entrances that morning, and giving a flyer to a vehicle’s driver, whether
departing truck or entering car, required a handbiller to cross into the driveway. I conclude that
management had a reasonable concern that a handbiller could be injured by an incoming car or
outgoing truck, with the potential for personal injury and a lawsuit being filed against
Respondent.

As far as unlawful surveillance and interference with employees, as alleged by the
General CounseI, I find it significant that the management representatives were at least 66 feet
away from the closest handbiller and entering vehicles. See Brown Transportation, supra. This
was not a situation in which the representatives hovered near the handbillers or otherwise
engaged in any kind of menacing behavior. Contrast, Partylite Worldwide, supra. Indeed, in the
only conversation the handbillers had with a Cintas representative, Roberts merely told them to
stay off company property.

Further, in these circumstances, especially when it was dark outside, I doubt that
employees entering the facility would have been able to see management’s gestures when they
turned into the entrance and saw the handbillers. Accordingly, I cannot conclude that such
gestures would have discouraged entering employees from taking flyers had they otherwise
wished to do so.

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As to the outgoing drivers, none of them testified. Management’s mere act of gesturing
them to leave did not amount to telling them not to take a flyer or otherwise coerce them,
especially when a driver could have stopped to take one and been delayed only briefly before
continuing to drive out into the street.

Accordingly, I conclude that management’s conduct in the morning amounted to neither
unlawful surveillance nor interference with interaction between the nonemployee handbillers and
employees.

As to the afternoon’s events, it was light outside when Coleridge called the police, and
the record reveals no legitimate safety or property concerns. Nor has Respondent shown there
were any other conditions outside that created a bona fide reason for summoning the police to
talk to the handbillers. In the absence of such, the inference is, and I find, that Respondent,
through Coleridge, took that action simply to intimate or harass them. This amounted to an
effort to interfere with lawful union activity. See Venetian Casino Resort, LLD, 345 NLRB No. 82
(2005); Gainesville Mfg. Co., 271 NLRB 1186, 1188 (1984). In fact, this was exactly the effect,
since they left the facility immediately after their conversation with the policeman, as per
Logan’s prior directive.

Therefore, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) when Coleridge summoned the police to
interfere with nonemployees engaged in handbilling for the Union.

II. 2004 allegations

Credibility resolution is the key to deciding most of these allegations. I have already
addressed the principle that witnesses may be found believable on some matters but not others.

The following employee witnesses testified on behalf of the General Counsel: Ana
Callas, Raquel Cruz, Candy Galdamez, and Maria Martinez. All are production employees.

I find that Galdamez was the most reliable. Although defensive in demeanor, she
exhibited good recall, was consistent in her answers on both direct and cross-examination, and
readily responded to questions posed to her.

Callas and Cruz, the most active union supporters from this record, were not wholly
credible. Callas was frequently evasive, especially on cross-examination, and she tended to
stray from the question when answering, leading me to suspect that she was trying to think out
her answers rather than answering spontaneously based on recall. She was also impeached by
her NLRB affidavits on a couple of matters, as well as inconsistent at times in her testimony.

For example, Callas’ testimony was contradictory and confusing as to whether she had
been told that she could not wear noncompany hats, caps, pins, or badges prior to March 1,
2004, when she wore a union sticker at work. She testified that the statement in her March 25,
2004 affidavit that she was told this in early February 2004 was a “mistake” on her part,27
27 Tr. 359. See R. Exh. 17. She gave a second affidavit on June 16, 2004. R. Exh. 18.

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because she did not wear anything after receiving such a directive. Yet, she later testified that
on February 4, 2004, she started taking notes of events occurring at the plant and that she had
these notes at the time she gave both her affidavits but did not need them because she had
memorized relevant dates. I would expect in that circumstance that she would not have made
such a “mistake” in her March 25, 2004 affidavit.

She also testified that she gave her notes to the Union, which was not able to locate
them during the trial. I would also normally expect that such notes would have been retained in
light of the likelihood that they might be needed in later litigation. Indeed, Charlotte was but one
of Respondent’s facilities involved in the Union’s nationwide organizing campaign.

On another matter, Callas first testified on cross-examination that management in 2004
announced a prohibition against noncompany hats or caps, pins, buttons, and badges at a
meeting, not individually. After Respondent’s counsel read a statement in her second affidavit
that employees were told individually, she was equivocal and evasive as to what was said to her
on an individual basis.

Cruz, similarly, was impeached by statements made in an affidavit, portions of her
testimony were contradictory (especially regarding the February 23, 2004 meeting and what
Stoy said to her after its conclusion), and she seemed to confuse separate management
meetings. Cruz also took notes of what was taking place at the plant but averred that she
destroyed them after June or July 2004. My comments regarding Callas’ notes apply equally.
Further, on one matter, she stated she was refreshed by what she said in an affidavit, but on
others, said that she was not; and, on certain subjects, Cruz testified readily but on others was
much more hesitant.

Martinez appeared to be candid, but the reliability of her testimony was diminished by
her limited recall, limited language skills (she testified that she does not speak or understand
English and is essentially illiterate in her native language of Spanish), and her clear distress at
having to testify; at one point, she broke into tears. I note in this regard that she frequently
darted glances at management representatives, as if intimidated by their presence.

Turning to Respondent’s witnesses, Robbie Poole, Mark Stoy, Stephen Coleridge, Mike
Roberts, Nelson Santiago, and Francisco Colon testified as representatives of Respondent, and
Rosa Franco was called as an employee witness.

General Manager Poole was not a fully credible witness. He appeared ill at ease, a
demeanor I would not normally expect from someone in a high level management position.
Further, he did not always seem forthright. On the matter of what jewelry female employees
can wear, his testimony was shifting and evasive and contradicted by Stoy. He first testified on
cross-examination that earrings are “not okay,” then that, “I don’t recall the policy covering that,”
and, finally, “I do know that women wear earrings in the uniform policy, yes.”28 His failure to
give a straight answer to a simple question undermined his credibility, as did his other testimony
about employees wearing jewelry, as described below.
28 Tr. 1046–1048.

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I also find it odd that he did not generate or keep any records of the small-group
meetings he held with employees in February 2004 concerning the Company’s unionized Detroit
facility. Again, Respondent was in the midst of a nationwide union organizing campaign, with
future litigation a real possibility, and I would expect some documentation would have been
maintained.

Nor was Supervisor Coleridge fully reliable. As noted earlier, I have not credited his
testimony regarding his interaction with the police on January 13, 2003. Moreover, his recall of
events in 2004 was quite limited in scope.

As far as the 2004 events, Plant Manager Stoy was generally consistent, detailed, and
not always in agreement with the testimony of his superior, Poole. He was for the most part
credible, although he equivocated at times on the issue of female employees wearing scarves
and, as previously noted, some of his testimony regarding the traffic situation on the morning of
January 13, 2003, was not supported by other company representatives.

Employment Practices Manager Franco Colon testified solely about management’s
January 30 meeting with Callas, at which he served as a translator. His testimony was
consistent with Poole’s and Stoy’s, and I credit it.

Sales Representative Roberts, who served as a Spanish language interpreter at several
management meetings with employees in 2004, testified credibly that his sole role was to
translate for management and that he did not say anything to employees beyond that. I so find.
The same holds true of the role of Administrative Assistant Santiago. I do not believe that either
of them made substantive statements to employees at meetings other than to serve as conduits.
As such, both were agents, not only apparent but actual, for Respondent, and I so find
(Respondent’s answer denied Santiago’s agency status).

Franco is a production employee. She appeared candid, her testimony about what she
told Stoy was consistent with his account, she testified she is on friendly terms with Callas, and
she has no stake in the proceedings. These factors lead me to find her a credible witness.

The Charlotte facility, a rental division of Cintas, launders, sells, and distributes,
corporate uniforms. The production side of the plant has industrial equipment and processes
garments. In the relevant time frame, there were approximately 55 production employees on
the first shift (6 a.m. – 2:30 p.m.) and 35 on the second shift (2:30 – 11 p.m.), as well as 45
sales and service representatives (SSR’s) or truck drivers, whose working hours varied
depending on the locations of customers. Production employees were afforded a ½-hour lunch
break, and two 15-minute breaks. For first shift, the first break was from 9 – 9:15 a.m., and the
second break, from 1 – 1:15 p.m. Almost all first-shift employees used the break room aka
lunch room for their first break, and some also used it for the afternoon break.

Respondent at all times material has had a progressive discipline system: counseling or
verbal warning, formal (written) warning, probation, suspension, and discharge.29 Verbal
warnings are the lowest form of discipline placed in an employee’s personnel file and do not
require an employee to sign any acknowledgement.
29 See GC Exh. 29.

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A. Allegations relating to dress code

At all times material, Respondent has provided and replaced, free of charge, uniforms
for production employees, consisting of dark navy blue pants and a light blue v-neck short-
sleeved shirt. The employee’s name is on a patch on the right side of the shirt; on the left side
is a patch with the company logo. In cold weather, employees can wear long-sleeved white or
navy blue tee-shirts under the uniform shirt. Respondent provides no cleaning allowance, but
employees can get uniforms cleaned at the plant for no charge.

The two categories of items specifically involved in this case are: (1) headwear, including
hats/caps and other scarves; (2) items worn on clothing, including jewelry pins and stickers.

All policies in place at Charlotte are issued by corporate headquarters, none being
unique to the facility. In 2004, there were two written sources for dress code policies: the
corporate-wide policy, and rental division policies. All of the employees who engaged in union
activities were production employees, so only the policies and practices relating to production
partners are germane to this decision.

The rental division uniform/dress code policy dated July 27, 2000,30 incorporated an
“Exhibit B,” which specified that all visible garments worn by partners must be navy except for
normal white tee-shirts. The only specific mention of headwear in the policy was that SSR’s or
drivers must wear specified caps.

The corporate uniform/dress code dated November 26, 2003,31 stated that all production
partners were required to wear the official company uniform while on the job. As to jewelry,
females were permitted to wear earrings “in their ears only.” There was no mention of
headwear.

The Company issues two types of hats with the Cintas logo, one heavier duty for cold
weather.32 There was conflicting testimony as to when they first became available to production
employees and whether it was before or after Respondent became aware of the union
organizing campaign at the facility, in late 2003 or early 2004. In any event, for at least several
years, production employees have been offered a choice of ordering one Cintas hat or the
other.

In both of Callas’ affidavits,33 she stated that prior to start of the Union’s organizing
campaign in November 2003, employees could wear noncompany baseball caps, knit caps, and
lapel pins, but after that, they were told they could no longer wear noncompany hats or caps,
pins, buttons, or badges. On the other hand, Cruz, in her March 24, 2004, affidavit stated that,
“In the past, whenever anyone tried to wear a button, sticker or pin, the company made them
take it off. The company has a policy, which they have had for some time, that employees can’t
wear or display anything on their work clothes.” 34 It is not clear whether they were including the
30 GC Exh. 14. A superseding rental division uniform/dress code policy, dated November
17, 2005, continued to incorporate Exhibit B. See GC Exh. 16.
31 GC Exh. 15(a).
32 See GC Exhs. 17(a) & (b), the first a baseball style hat; the second, a winter toboggan-
type cap.
33 R. Exhs. 17 & 18.
34 R. Exh. 23 at 2. She gave another affidavit on May 11, 2004, R. Exh. 24.

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wearing of jewelry. Nevertheless, on cross-examination, Cruz stated that although prior to
2004, the Company stated employees had to comply with the dress policy at all times, this was
not enforced.

As far as head covering, Galdamez testified that prior to February 2004, Emelinda
Rivera and another employee wore bandanas in work areas two or three times a week. Rivera
continued to do so after that time and was warned about it. The last time Galdamez observed
her wearing a bandana was about 5 months ago. Galdamez further testified that Rivera and
another employee also wore non-Cintas hats before February 2004. Rivera has continued to
wear such hats and been told many times by supervisors to remove it. To her knowledge,
whenever a supervisor observes a production employee wearing a non-Cintas hat, the
supervisor tells the employee to remove it.

Stoy’s testimony supported Galdamez’. Thus, he testified that Rivera has worn a
“colorful” floral print scarf and, although he claimed that he has seen this “maybe three times at
most,” during the entire time he has been at the facility, he earlier testified that “[A] lot of times
we’ll make her tuck it into her shirt if it dangles. . . . ”35 Implicit in this testimony is that Rivera
continues to frequently wear a scarf. She has never been disciplined.

Stoy further testified that although employees are not required to wear hats, they must
wear one of the two Cintas hats if they do wear one, and are asked to remove non-Cintas hats.
This was consistent with Callas’ testimony that, when she wore a non-Cintas hat about a year-
and-a-half ago, a supervisor told her to take it off and went to get her a Cintas hat. She did not
receive any discipline. It also comported with Galdamez’ testimony, above.

As to jewelry, the official policy, set out in GC Exh. 15(a), is that female employees can
wear jewelry only in their ears. However, I credit the consistent testimony of Callas, Cruz, and
Galdamez that employees Patricia (Lay or Light) and her daughter Amanda have for years
regularly worn holiday and other types of pins on their uniform shirts.

In contrast, Poole testified that the first time he observed these employees wearing pins
was after the first week of this trial, although he has seen them once or twice a day during his
tenure at the facility (he arrived in January 2004). He further testified that he told them to
remove the pins. This testimony strikes me as contrived, self-serving, and unbelievable in the
absence of any explanation of why they suddenly would have started wearing such items, and I
do not credit it.

Further, Poole’s testimony that loose jewelry, including bracelets, are prohibited, was
contradicted by Stoy. Stoy testified that, despite the official policy that female employees can
wear only earrings, they are also allowed to wear necklaces, rings, and bracelets; in fact, he
stated that female employees can wear as much as jewelry as they wish, provided no safety
issue is presented.

35 Tr. 1222, Tr. 1195 (emphasis added).

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I now turn to discipline of other employees for violations of the dress code, including
wearing non-Cintas hats or stickers of any kind. There is no evidence that prior to February 9,
2004, any employees received verbal warnings for such.36 Respondent prior to that date issued
only one written warning for any kind of dress code violation, to Cruz in November 2001 for not
wearing a white shirt under her uniform.37

Stoy testified that there have been times when employees wore Dallas Cowboys or
skull-and-crossbones hats to work, but that he was not aware of any verbal or written warnings
issued to them. He also testified that he has occasion to tell employees about once a month, on
the average, to remove inappropriate items but has never issued a verbal or written warning to
any of them.

Based on the above, I find that female employees may wear “colorful” scarves/
bandanas, provided there is no safety issue; employees are asked to remove non-Cintas hats;
although employees on a regular basis are asked to remove items from their person, they do
not receive any kind of discipline; and only three employees have been disciplined for violations
of the dress code since at least as far back as November 2001, none of which involved the
wearing of hats or personal, non-clothing items.

In light of these findings, I need not address the matter of “casual days,” about which the
testimony of no two witnesses was the same. In any event, Respondent was free to set aside
certain days when adherence to its normal dress standards was relaxed, and there is no
allegation that Respondent made any changes in casual days in violation of the Act.

Nor, in view of my findings above, need I address any facts relating to arguments that
Respondent’s actions against the employees in question was justified by the image the
Company wished to present to customers and prospective customers who visited the plant. In
practice, Respondent clearly did not strictly follow its own official dress policy, and it allowed
other employees to wear “colorful” scarves and jewelry pins.

Finally, I need not rely in making any findings or conclusions in this area on R. Exh. 40,
which I conditionally admitted over the objections of the General Counsel and the Union that it
should have been rejected because it was not produced in compliance with subpoena. The
General Counsel’s and Union’s motions to strike Stoy’s related testimony is thus moot.

February 9, 2004

On this date, eight or so employees, including Callas and Cruz, wore union stickers to
work. Callas testified that the stickers were for a dollar-an-hour raise, in English or Spanish.38
On the other hand, Cruz testified that the stickers had the words “Uniform Justice” in English or
36 See GC Exh. 56, from Respondent’s position statement of May 21, 2004. Verbal
warnings were issued to two employees on April 13, 2004, for wearing jackets not in compliance
with the dress code. GC Exhs. 45 & 46.
37 Ibid; GC Exh. 44.
38 See GC Exhs. 33 – 35.

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Spanish. However, in her May 11, 2004 affidavit, she stated that the sticker had a dollar sign.39
When asked about this discrepancy on cross-examination, she testified that the dollar sign was
not on the sticker and that it could have been a “mistake” in the affidavit.40 Coleridge and Stoy
also testified that the stickers were for a dollar-an-hour raise, and I credit them and Callas and
so find.

In any event, Cruz testified that she wore a sticker above the Cintas logo on the left side
of the uniform blouse. Coleridge, her supervisor, passed by and told her to remove it and throw
it away. She took it off and put it on her forehead. He told her to take it off, and she put it on
her arm.

Coleridge denied this incident took place. As stated earlier, neither he nor Cruz were
fully credible witnesses on all matters on which they testified. Nevertheless, I do not believe
that, despite her confusion over which sticker she work, Cruz manufactured the incident. Her
recall of what took place was sufficiently detailed, and I credit her that it did occur. I note that
she described conduct on her part that was belligerent and could have been construed as
insubordination, inconsistent with a deliberate effort to make herself look good and Coleridge
bad and thereby malign Respondent.

Accordingly, I find that Coleridge told Cruz to remove a union sticker from her uniform on
February 9, 2004. There is no evidence that management or supervisors said anything to any
of the other employees who wore stickers that day. In fact, Stoy testified that he observed
employees wearing $1 raise stickers on that occasion but did not direct supervisors to do
anything.

On February 11, Calles and Cruz brought to management a petition from employees
requesting a $1-an-hour raise.41 It was forwarded to corporate headquarters.

February 16, 2004

I credit Galdamez’ account—not specifically denied by Coleridge—of what took place
between them on February 16, as follows.

On that date, Galdamez wore a UNITE hat after she come to work.42 She was hanging
shirts when Coleridge told her she had to take the hat off and put it away because it was not in
compliance with company policy. She placed it in her purse. She was not told anything about
receiving a verbal warning for wearing it.

Coleridge did not testify about his exact words to Galdamez. Consistent with Galdamez’
version, Stoy testified that Coleridge informed him that he (Coleridge) had told Galdamez that
wearing the hat in a work area violated the Company’s no solicitation rule and that he was going
to issue her a verbal warning for wearing the hat and placing it in her work area. I credit this
testimony inasmuch as the statement accorded with Coleridge’s other statements and conduct
during this same period. The warning Galdamez later received set forth a different reason:
“wearing a winter hat, black in color.”43
39 R. Exh. 24.
40 Tr. 694.
41 R. Exh. 43.
42 See GC Exh. 49.
43 GC Exh. 39.

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Stoy conceded that employees, who are not provided lockers, are free at their work
stations to keep personal belongs, including such items as lunchboxes, purses, jackets, and
books, as long as they do not interfere with work. Coleridge similarly testified that Respondent
does not impose restrictions on personal items employees can bring to work. I credit their
testimony and so find.

As opposed to the allegation in the complaint, Galdamez did not testify about any
contact with Stoy that day. Nor did her testimony reflect the allegation that Coleridge said she
could wear nothing in addition to the company’s standard uniform.

With the possible exception of Galdamez, Respondent has never issued any warnings to
employees for violating the no solicitation rule. Nor has Respondent, from 2001 to the present,
issued any warnings to employees for having any prohibited items in their work areas.

March 1, 2004

On March 1, a number of employees wore union (uniform justice) stickers to work,44
including Callas, Cruz, Rosa Cruz, Galdamez, and Rivera. All but Galdamez, who received a
written warning, were written up for verbal counselings or warnings.45 Stoy and Coleridge
offered differing testimony as to who made the decision to issue them: Stoy testified that he
and Coleridge together made the decision, but Coleridge testified that the decision was his
alone. Either way, Stoy was aware of the warnings at or near the time they were issued. Stoy
offered no explanation on the record as to why he deemed warnings were warranted on March
1, whereas he had seen no reason the previous month to issue warnings to the employees
whom he observed wearing $1-an-hour raise stickers.

Callas, Cruz, and Galdamez all testified about conversations they had with management
on the subject that morning. The testimony of Coleridge and Stoy was not inconsistent with
their testimony, which I credit.

Callas was in her work area when Coleridge told her to take off the sticker, saying she
could not wear it in the plant. She asked why. He responded that the rules of the Company did
not permit wearing it; that employees could only wear the company uniform. Callas did not
remove the sticker. Coleridge returned about 15 minutes later and said that Stoy wanted to see
her in the office.

She accompanied Coleridge there. Stoy told her he was calling her in because she
could not wear the sticker; Cintas policy was that employees could wear only a uniform. She
asked what was wrong with wearing the sticker, and he replied that she could not wear
something that was not the color of the uniform and could wear only a white or navy blue shirt
undershirt. She took the sticker off, put it on a flyer, and gave it to him. He said nothing about
her receiving a verbal warning. She was not aware of such until only a few weeks before trial.

44 See GC Exh. 31 & 32. Respondent has not contended that these stickers caused any
damage to the uniform shirts, which are of a Dacron-type of material.
45 GC Exhs. 40 – 43.

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Cruz wore a union sticker on the right side of her uniform shirt, over her name. As she
was working, Coleridge came over and asked her to take it off. She placed it on her arm. He
told her the uniform was not to put stickers on. He said nothing about her getting a verbal
warning. She was not aware of receiving such until being prepared for trial.

Galdamez wore a sticker on the left side of her shirt, not covering any letters on the
uniform. Coleridge approached her in her work area and asked her to take the sticker off. She
placed it on her forehead, and he told her to remove it. She replied that it was her body and not
part of company policy, but she took it off and put it in her pocket.

Later that morning, Coleridge called Galdamez to the office, where Stoy was also
present. Stoy stated this was her second warning, because she had been warned the first time
about wearing the union hat, and a third warning could result in her being fired. She was shown
a memo of a February 16, 2004 verbal warning, along with a written warning on March 1, 2004,
for “wearing stickers on the front and back of uniform blouse.”46

As noted above, contrary to Stoy, Coleridge testified that he made the decision to
discipline the employees on March 1, after determining that wearing the union stickers violated
company policy. He further testified that he told all of them (other than Galdamez) they had
received a verbal warning within a day or so of March 1. However, I do not believe that Callas
and Cruz were untruthful in testifying that management never told them they had received
verbal warnings, an important event I am certain they would have recalled had it happened.
Stoy testified that employees are normally advised orally they have received verbal warnings,
but he did not aver personal knowledge that the employees in question were so told.

Conclusions

Section 8(a)(3) and (1)

The framework for analyzing alleged violations of Section 8(a)(3) is Wright Line 251
NLRB 1083 (1980), enfd. 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 989 (1982). Under
Wright Line, the General Counsel must make a prima facie showing sufficient to support an
inference that the employee’s protected conduct motivated an employer’s adverse action. The
General Counsel must show, either by direct or circumstantial evidence, that the employee
engaged in protected conduct, the employer knew or suspected the employee engaged in such
conduct, the employer harbored animus, and the employer took action because of this animus.

Under Wright Line, if the General Counsel establishes a prima facie case of
discriminatory conduct, it meets its initial burden to persuade, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that protected activity was a motivating factor in the employer’s action. The burden
of persuasion then shifts to the employer to show that it would have taken the same adverse
action even in absence of such activity. NLRB v. Transportation Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 399−403
(1983) Kamtech, Inc. v. NLRB, 314 F.3d 800, 811 (6th Cir. 2002); Serrano Painting, 332 NLRB
1363, 1366 (2000); Best Plumbing Supply, 310 NLRB 143 (1993). To meet this burden, “an
employer cannot simply present a legitimate reason for its action but must persuade by a
preponderance of the evidence that the same action would have taken place even in the
absence of the protected conduct.” Serrano Painting, supra at 1366, citing Roure Bertrand
Dupont, Inc., 271 NLRB 443 (1984).
46 GC Exh. 39.

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Here, animus has been conceded, the employees in question wore union stickers,
management was aware of such activity, and management issued warnings to the employees.
Accordingly, the General Counsel has made out a prima facie case under Wright Line.

Respondent contends that its actions were based on valid application of its dress code
policy, designed to foster the image of the Company as a provider of uniforms services to
customers and potential customers who visit the facility.

Had Respondent’s conduct been consistent with established practice, this argument
might pass muster. On the contrary, Respondent, then and now, has allowed female
employees to wear jewelry pins on their uniforms, and “colorful scarves.” Moreover, employees
who wear non-Cintas hats and other items deemed in violation of the dress code policy are
asked to remove them but are not disciplined. Significantly, when Stoy observed employees
wearing union stickers on February 9, he did not conclude that such conduct warranted any kind
of supervisory action for violation of the dress code, and he did not instruct supervisors to either
issue discipline or even direct them to remove the stickers.

An employer may not prohibit the wearing of union insignia, absent special
circumstances. Airport 2000 Concessions, LLC, 346 NLRB No. 86 slip op. at 3 (2006). It
cannot rely on a promulgated dress code policy to establish such special circumstances when it
has permitted employees to wear other kinds of pins and buttons and disparately applied the
policy to target union supporters. Ibid; Waterbury Hotel Management LLC, 333 NLRB 482,
545–546 (2001), enfd. 314 F.3d 645 (DC Cir. 2003). Selectively applying a policy to discipline
employees who engage in protected activity is also prohibited. Carpenter Technologies Corp.,
346 NLRB No. 73 (2006).

Accordingly, I conclude that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) by issuing
verbal warnings to Calles, Cruz, Rosa Cruz, and Rivera, and a written warning to Galdamez, on
March 1, 2004, because they wore union stickers.

As to the union hat Galdamez wore on February 16, 2004, Respondent acted in
conformity with established practice when Coleridge asked her to remove it. However,
Respondent has never issued any other employee a warning for wearing a non-Cintas hat, even
though the record reflects that they have been worn on occasion. Therefore, I conclude that her
verbal warning also violated 8(a)(3) and (1).

Related Section 8(a)(1) violations

For reasons stated above, I conclude that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) by telling
Cruz on February 9 and March 1, 2004, to remove her union sticker, and telling the same to
Callas and Galdamez on March 1, 2004.

As to Galdamez, Coleridge acted in accordance with the Company’s dress code policy
on February 16, when he told her to remove the non-Cintas union hat. Here, Respondent can
rely on the “special circumstance” exception described above.

However, Coleridge went beyond telling her to take off the hat; he told her to put it away
so that it was not in public view. This was contrary to the practice of allowing employees to
keep all kinds of personal items out at their work areas, as long as there was no safety issue.
Therefore, the hat was targeted for disparate treatment because it reflected Galdamez’ support
for the Union. I thus conclude that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) on February 16, 2004,

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when Coleridge told Galdamez that she could not display a union hat in her work area. In view
of this conclusion, I need not address whether Coleridge also violated Section 8(a)(1) by
articulating an overly broad no solicitation rule.

Stoy told Galdamez on March 1, that she could be discharged if she received “another
warning.” The first two warnings were based on her having worn a union hat on February 16
and a union sticker on March 1. I have found both warnings unlawful. But for them, Stoy would
not have had occasion to warn her of the consequences of a third warning under the
progressive discipline system.

Accordingly, I conclude that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) on March 1, 2004,
when Stoy implicitly threatened Galdamez with discharge if she again displayed a union sticker
or wore a union hat.

B. Solicitation/distribution

The actual language contained in Respondent’s no solicitation/distribution rule is not at
issue. Rather, the alleged violations go toward conduct alleged to violate employees’ rights to
distribute under the Act.

February 10, 2004

Cruz testified that she brought a union flyer to work. Coleridge observed her with it in
her work area, and he asked her to put it inside her wallet (or pocketbook), take it home, and not
show it to anybody. Coleridge testified that he did tell Cruz to put a flyer in her wallet but that
this occurred in the break room (see below).

As with the February 9, 2004 incident involving Cruz and Coleridge, I credit Cruz’s
account because I do not believe she manufactured it, and I think that what occurred would
stand out more in her memory. I again note that Coleridge’s testimony on many 2004 events
was quite circumscribed.

February 20, 2004

Callas testified without controversion that prior to February 20, 2004, employees were
free to read books, magazines, and newspapers in the break room, testimony corroborated by
Martinez, and I so find. Moreover, Stoy conceded that employees have shown Avon catalogues
and sold Avon products in the break room.

On the morning of Feb. 20, Callas went into the break room, where she set out about 20
each of two different union flyers, which were English on one side and Spanish on the other.47
One flyer spoke about how Cintas was spending against the Union, and the other about some
plants (including Cintas Detroit) that already had a union and were providing free medical
insurance and better salaries.

47 GC Exhs. 50 & 51.

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When first-shift production employees went into the break room on their morning (9 a.m.)
break, the flyers were there. Coleridge and Andy Coffaro, a supervisor, reported to Poole that
flyers were being handed out in the break room, and he directed them to confiscate them
because they violated the no solicitation policy. It undisputed that Coleridge, with Coffaro,
returned to the break room, and did so.

Based on the credited, similar testimony of Callas and Cruz, which Coleridge did not
specifically rebut, I find the following. When Coleridge tried to take the flyer Cruz had, she
resisted and said she wanted to read it. He then told Cruz to put it in her purse and to read it at
home because no one could read it in the plant. Martinez was in the room but did not hear
Coleridge say anything. There was no testimony that Coffaro took any flyers from employees or
spoke to them.

Poole testified that he later sua sponte reviewed the no solicitation/distribution policy and
concluded he had made an error. He offered no explanation of what prompted him to decide to
review the policy after the fact, and I suspect he sought guidance from corporate headquarters
or the Company’s attorneys. In any event, Respondent has admitted that confiscating the flyers
from employees who were on nonwork time in a nonwork area was a mistake.

Respondent contends, though, that after realizing a mistake had been made, it “cured”
any violation of the Act by retraction. Any such retraction was verbal since Respondent did not
post anything in writing.

Coleridge was not involved in any such activity. According to Poole, he raised the
matter at three or four general production meetings on the same day, within 2 weeks of
February 20. He stated that the leaflets had been improperly gathered and that the Union was
allowed to leaflet in nonwork areas. He also apologized, and said it would not happen again.
Respondent provided no documentation corroborating his testimony.

Callas recalled that the same week of the incident, Stoy met with small groups of 8 – 10
employees in the conference room. He apologized for what had occurred and said it would not
happen again. Stoy, however, did not testify about holding any such meetings.

On the other hand, Callas, Galdamez, and Martinez did not recall attending any
meetings in which the February 20 break room incident was mentioned.

Conclusions

In the February 10, 2004 incident, Respondent, through Coleridge, treated Cruz’s flyer
differently than it has treated employees’ other personal items, which they are allowed to keep
in the vicinity of their work areas. By telling her to put it away, not show it to anyone, and take it
home, he coerced her in the exercise of her Section 7 rights, both because of this disparate
treatment and also because she had the right to distribute it to other employees on nonwork
time in nonwork areas. See Biggs Foods, 347 NLRB No. 39 (2006); Gayfers Department Store,
324 NLRB 1246 (1997). Therefore, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1).

Respondent admittedly violated the Act through Coleridge’s conduct on February 20, in
taking union flyers from employees during nonwork time in a nonwork area. I also conclude that

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his statements that employees could not read the flyers there or in the plant were overly
restrictive of their rights to distribute or possesss such flyers in nonwork areas during nonwork
time. See Biggs Foods, above; MTD Products, Inc., 310 NLRB 733 (1993); Our Way, Inc., 268
NLRB 204 (1983).

I do not, however, agree with the General Counsel that his statements amounted to
announcing a “policy.” In this regard, they were made specifically to Cruz, when she resisted
his effort to take away her flyer, and not addressed to the employees there as a group.
Significantly, Martinez did not hear Coleridge say anything. Having concluded that he did not
announce a “policy,” it follows that his actions did not constitute enforcement of that policy

The remaining issue here is whether Respondent “cured” the above violation by
subsequent conduct, more precisely, by valid retraction.

By meeting certain requirements, an employer can avoid liability for commission of a
ULP by a retraction. Passavant Memorial Area Hospital, 237 NLRB 138 (1978), remains the
lead case in this area, although recent decisions reflect that some Board Members do not
necessarily agree with all of its precepts. See, e.g., Chinese Daily News, supra at slip op. 1 fn.
4. Under Passavant, the repudiation must be timely, unambiguous, and specific in nature to the
illegal conduct; it must contain assurances to employees that, in the future, the employer will not
interfere with their Section 7 rights; there must be adequate publication to the employees
involved; and the employer cannot engage in other proscribed conduct.

Here, at least two employees who were present in the break room when the flyers were
confiscated—Cruz and Martinez—never heard any kind of retraction. Thus, the scope of the
repudiation was not coextensive with the scope of the violation. See Chinese Daily News, ibid.
Moreover, even crediting Poole, he did not include a statement that in the future, Respondent
would not interfere with employees’ Section 7 rights. Most significantly, I have determined that
during this period of time, Respondent committed other ULP’s, including issuance of warnings in
violation of 8(a)(3) to Callas and Cruz, who were present when Coleridge unlawfully took the
flyers. Any assurances Poole might have made to employees concerning their Section 7 rights
to distribute union literature were vitiated by Respondent’s other unlawful conduct.

Accordingly, whether Passavant is strictly applied or a totality-of-circumstances approach
is used, I conclude that Respondent did not effectively repudiate its unlawful conduct on
February 20, 2004, and that the violations I have determined remained viable.

C. Other 8(a)(1) statements

January 30, 2004

The event in question was a meeting between Callas, Poole, Stoy, and Colon, who
served as the interpreter. Callas gave its date as February 4, 2004, but Stoy’s notes show a
January 30, 2004 date, and Stoy, Poole, and Colon all provided documents establishing that
they were not at the facility on February 4.48 Callas was unable to produce the notes she took
at the time or to provide any other documents. Accordingly, I find that the meeting occurred on
January 30, 2004, as averred by Respondent’s witnesses.
48 GC Exh. 48; R. Exhs. 28–30, 32, 45 & 46.

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This meeting concerned Callas’ conduct in December 2003, when, on 2 or 3 days, she
solicited addresses and phone numbers from coworkers, saying that she wanted to send them
Christmas cards. Callas testified that she did this at breaks and lunch times and that she later
provided to the Union such information only from coworkers who authorized her to do so.
However, as described below, on at least one occasion she did it on work time and provided the
Union with the address of a coworker who did not authorize her to disclose it.

Crediting employee Rosa Franco, I find the following. In late 2003, Franco (a second-
shift employee) had punched in and was at her work station when Callas (a first-shift employee)
approached her. Franco could not recall whether it was before or after 2:30 p.m., because she
normally punched in 1 – 7 minutes before the start of her shift at 2:30 p.m. Either way,
however, one of them was on work time because there was no gap between shifts (if before
2:30 p.m., Callas was still on her shift; if after 2:30 p.m., Franco had started hers). Callas said
she wanted Franco’s address to send her a Christmas card, and Franco furnished it.

Later, a union representative came to Franco’s home. On a date uncertain thereafter,
Franco went to Stoy’s office. Through an interpreter, she told him that a union representative
had arrived at her home; she did not know why but suspected that Callas had provided the
Union with her address because Callas had asked for her address to send her a Christmas
card. Franco also told him that she did not want the Union bothering her.

In addition to Franco’s complaint, Stoy heard from a supervisor that another employee,
Wendy Aguilar (who is no longer employed at the facility) had similarly complained. He reported
these complaints to Poole, who initiated the January 30 meeting.

There is no dispute over certain statements that were made at the meeting. Poole
started off by referencing Callas’ status as a long-term employee and her good performance.
He then told her that some of her coworkers had complained that after collecting their
addresses, presumably for Christmas cards, she had shared that information with the Union,
and this violated the confidentiality of employees. She responded that she had gathered the
information to send Christmas cards and not to disclose to the Union. I note that Callas testified
that she told him that she had known her coworkers “for a while,”49 and it was just natural that
they exchanged Christmas cards. Were this so, I would expect she already would have had
their addresses. Both Callas and Franco had worked there for approximately 5 years at the
time.

It is further undisputed that Poole talked about Callas soliciting the addresses. Callas
testified that Poole stated she could not engage in such activity “in the plant” but could not recall
if he said anything about work time or work hours. On the other hand, Poole and Colon, as well
as Stoy’s memorandum of the meeting, state that he did so. This comported with Franco’s
description of when Callas solicited her address. Accordingly, I find that Poole, as he testified,
referenced the Company’s no solicitation policy and said she could not solicit on work time.
This diminishes the reliability of Callas’ testimony about what was said at the meeting and
affects my evaluation of the following.

Callas also testified that Poole asked her if she had gathered the signatures to give to
the Union, and she said no. She went on to testify that he then said that “he just wanted to
49 Tr. 253.

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make sure.”50 Poole denied asking her that. I credit Poole, both because of the above and
because I find his testimony more plausible. From the start of the meeting, he told her that
employees had complained that she had provided their addresses to the Union, so he had no
logical reason to question her on the subject. Nor would he have had any reason to want to
“make sure” she had not given signatures to the Union. Accordingly, as a factual matter, I find
that Poole did not interrogate Callas concerning her union activities.

Management speeches to employees in February 2004

Of all facets of this case, testimony on the subject of management speeches to
employees in February 2004, even as how many meetings there were and what was said at
particular meetings, was subject to the most variation and confusion.

General Counsel’s witnesses (Callas, Cruz, and Martinez) each testified about attending
one meeting management held with all first-shift production employees in February 2004.
However, Respondent provided documentation supporting its witness’ testimony that
management held two separate meetings with all first-shift production employees that month,
the first on February 9 (the “union spies” speech); the second on about February 19, (the
“Pillowtex” speech.) Callas and Cruz did not have their contemporaneous notes of meetings in
February 2004. Accordingly, I credit Respondent’s witnesses and find that management held
two separate large-group meetings. The allegations of the complaint relate only to statements
made at the second of these.

The date of the first meeting is based on the consistent testimony of witnesses, as well
as Stoy’s credited testimony that management sent a fax to corporate headquarters that day,
after union leaflets had been distributed outside the facility.51 As to the date of the second
meeting, I credit Poole that the meeting took place about a week after February 12, when he
received “talking points” for it from corporate headquarters.

Management later that month also held several smaller-group meetings on the same
day, concerning Respondent’s unionized Detroit facility. Cruz attended one of them. She gave
the date as February 23. Respondent’s witnesses did not provide a specific date for such
meeting, and I credit Cruz.

For the February 9 union spies speech, Poole used talking points that corporate
headquarters had provided to him as reference points. He testified that he followed them and
so instructed translator Roberts, who testified similarly. Stoy was also present. This was after
management became aware that a petition for a $1-an-hour raise was being circulated among
the employees. At this meeting, neither he nor any other member of management mentioned
Pillowtex. The talking points, entitled “Beware of Union Spies,” accused “a few people at some
Cintas locations” of being union spies, secreting collecting information and giving it to the
union.52 The talking points went on to propagandize against unionization.
50 Tr. 254.
51 R. Exh. 42.
52 There is no allegation that this speech created the impression of surveillance. I note that
it followed very closely in time Poole’s meeting with Callas on January 30.

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Poole conducted the second meeting after Calles and Cruz presented management with
the first petition for a $1-an-hour raise. Stoy and Roberts, again translating, were also present.
Poole once more used speaking points provided by headquarters53 and instructed Roberts to
do the same.

Stoy could not recall Poole’s exact words but testified that Poole mentioned unprofitable
companies and bankruptcy; stated that Pillowtex (a large company in the Charlotte area) had
filed for bankruptcy in July 2003, resulting in job loss to thousands; and told employees that the
Company would continue to give them reviews and pay increases according to performance.
Poole testified that he stated that 8,000 people had lost their jobs when Pillowtex went bankrupt.

Their testimony was consistent with the speaking points, which started off referring to the
letter from employees requesting a pay raise of $1 an hour and then went on to talk about what
happens to companies like Pillowtex and the 8,000 employees who lost their jobs when the
company went bankrupt, to discuss what Cintas offered in the way of profit sharing, and to
assure employees that its wages were competitive in the marketplace. Nothing was said about
unions or unionization, other than at one point, “Did you know, for instance, that our starting
wages are 65 cents an hour higher than a competitor’s unionized facility right here in town?”
(emphasis in original). The speaking points concluded with, “If you have any questions, you can
ask them now? Or, of course, my door is always open and you can ask me anything in private,
if you have a particular question.”

General Counsel’s witnesses provided differing accounts of one large-group meeting
they recalled attending that month, and some of what they said was not reconcilable even
between themselves.

Martinez testified about a meeting, on February 9, where Stoy spoke and Roberts
translated, but she apparently mixed the union spies and Pillowtex meetings. Stoy stated that
someone had called the Union, and he wanted to know who that person was. He did not want
the Union to get in because he did not want to fall into bankruptcy; if the Company went into
bankruptcy, the employees would be without jobs and later on would not be able to get a job,
and it would be a bad record for them. Martinez did not remember anyone asking questions.
On cross-examination, Martinez testified that Stoy said he could not give the $1-an-hour
increase the Union was seeking because the Company wanted to be profitable; if it were not
profitable, it could go bankrupt like Pillowtex (this was the only time she heard Pillowtex
mentioned in management meetings). He explained employee profit sharing. On cross-
examination, she reiterated that Stoy said that if the Union came, the Company was going to go
bankrupt and that he said she was going find out who called the Union, and he was not going to
allow the Union to get in because it was telling employees lies. However, she then testified that
Stoy said Respondent could go bankrupt and we would not be able to get jobs elsewhere.
Afterward, though, she again testified that Stoy said Respondent would go bankrupt. Callas
was at this meeting.

Cruz also testified about a February 9, 2004 meeting. As with Martinez, she testified
that Stoy made certain statements. One of them was that he was figuring out that someone had
called the Union and someone was collecting signatures. He said that employees did not need
the Union, that the Union was going to offer false promises, and that the Company was going
into bankruptcy, that the plant was going to be closed, and that employees were going to lose

53 R. Exh. 31.

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their jobs. According to Cruz, Callas stated that her brother had left because of an emergency
but that the Company did not take him back. Cruz did not recall Callas saying anything else.
On cross-examination, she also testified that Stoy and Poole, through Roberts, stated that
employees were giving personal information to the Union and they understood that the Union
had been making promises to people to turn over such information. In contradiction to Martinez,
Cruz said there was no mention of Pillowtex or the $1-an-hour raise petition at this meeting.

Callas gave February 9 as the date of the meeting she attended, but it apparently was
the second (Pillowtex meeting) rather than the first, based on what she related was said. After
Coleridge spoke about work-related matters, Stoy stated that Cintas did not want the Union, it
wanted all its employees to be completely satisfied, and that’s why it was not going to allow the
Union to get in. Because of the Union, other companies had gone through bankruptcy and a lot
of workers had been without work. The Union was looking for employees’ money and giving
false promises, offering checks and trips if employees signed cards. He specifically mentioned
Pillowtex was going bankrupt and over 7,000 employees were going to be without a job
because of the Union Poole stated he would have an “open door” communications policy.
Nothing was said about “Union spies” (consistent with the conclusion that there were two
separate large-group meetings). Callas further testified that she raised certain questions, none
having to do with her brother.

Stoy denied making any of the statements attributed to him alleged to have violated
Section 8(a)(1). I note that none of the General Counsel’s witnesses testified that Stoy (or
Poole) said it would be futile for employees to select the Union as their collective-bargaining
representative.

From the above, it is evident that the testimony of General Counsel’s witnesses was not
fully consistent and, on important certain points, contradictory. It is not entirely clear whether
they were even referring to the same meeting. Their credibility on the meetings is therefore
questionable, even taking into account the lapse of time and the fact that rarely, if ever, are any
two versions of a meeting exactly the same. I take note that all three of these witnesses had
given affidavits to the NLRB close in time to the events and that all three prepared for trial with
the General Counsel, thereby affording them the opportunity to refresh their recollections by
reviewing those statements.

In the absence of uniform testimony from General Counsel’s witnesses, I credit the
testimony of Respondent’s witnesses that Poole stuck to the speaking points provided by
corporate headquarters when he spoke at both large-group meetings.54 If the corporate
headquarters considered the presentations important enough that it provided directives of what
should be said, I doubt that he (even less so, Stoy or Roberts) would have deviated far from, or
elaborated much, on the “script.” Because of language and translation issues, the employees
who testified might have read certain meanings into management’s statements. I note in this
regard Martinez’ interchange of the words “would go” and “could go” into bankruptcy.
54 I find it more plausible that Poole, not Stoy, conducted the meetings. I consider it unlikely
that Stoy would have directed them when Poole, his superior, was present and had called them.
Since the employees who testified were much more familiar with Stoy than Poole (who had
arrived at the plant only the previous month), they may have naturally assumed that Roberts
was translating for Stoy rather than Poole.

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On February 23, Poole conducted several meetings with smaller groups of employees
because an employee had said there was a Cintas location (Detroit) where employees were
getting free medical benefits. Poole used no speaking points and kept no notes of these
meetings.

The General Counsel does not allege that anything Poole said at these meetings
contravened the Act. Rather, it contends that statements Stoy allegedly made to Cruz after the
conclusion of the formal meeting violated Section 8(a)(1). Although Coleridge is also named in
the relevant paragraph of the complaint, Cruz’s testimony attributed no statements to him.

Poole, Stoy, and Santiago Nelson, who served as a translator, were present at the
small-group meeting that Cruz attended, along with about 15 to 20 other employees. Cruz
testified that she stated at this meeting that she had a friend at National Linen, a unionized
company, and employees there were getting free medical insurance, and it was good to have a
union. At or shortly after the conclusion of the meeting, Stoy asked her where her friend worked
(inconsistent with her testimony that she had already spoken the name of the company during
the meeting, I credit Stoy and Nelson that she did not name National Linen during the meeting
itself). He wrote it down and said he would find out if it were true and would call her. He told
her not to tell anybody and that his office was always open and she could talk to him privately.
On direct examination, Cruz said nothing about Stoy mentioning the Union in any way.

Only on redirect examination, after being refreshed by her affidavit, did Cruz testify that
he told her that if she found out new information about the Union, not to talk to him in the
meetings but to tell him privately in his office. Then, on recross-examination, she averred that
he said that if she had any questions about the Union, to go to him directly and not go and talk
to anyone else. Thus, Cruz’s version of what he said about the Union, if anything, varied
throughout the course of her testimony.

Stoy testified that Cruz voluntarily stayed after the meeting, and he then asked her for
the name of the company, saying he would investigate and get back to her. He denied telling
her if she had any questions about the Union to go directly to him, not to talk to anyone else
about the Union, or to report privately to him.

Because Cruz was inconsistent in relating what Stoy said about the Union, I cannot find
that he tied any remarks he made to the Union or her union activity.

Conclusions

Poole’s meeting with Callas on January 30 was based on a bona fide complaint from at
least one of her coworkers that she had solicited addresses to provide to the Union, and this
occurred on work time. Poole did not tell Callas that there was a company rule prohibiting union
activity and that she could not violate it. Rather, aside from any issue of “confidentiality,” he
referenced company policy that she could solicit only on nonwork time. His doing so was not a
violation of the Act. See Lutheran Heritage Village—Livonia, 343 NLRB No. 75 slip op. at 5 fn. 5
(2004); Stodard-Quirk Mfg. Co., 138 NLRB 615 (1962)..

As to meeting on about February 19, I have found management’s account of what was
said more credible than the inconsistent testimony of General Counsel’s witnesses. I therefore
conclude that the General Counsel has not sustained its burden of showing that Respondent
committed any violations of Section 8(a)(1) at that meeting. Respondent was engaging in
legitimate anti-union propaganda. At most, management hinted or implied that if the Union were

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selected, company profits might be affected, and this could impact employees’ job security. In
the absence of other coercive circumstances, mere statements of possible consequences of
unionization do not constitute threats in violation of Section 8(a)(1). See Benjamin Coal Co.,
294 NLRB 572, 573 fn. 1 (1989); Uarco, Inc., 286 NLRB 55, 58 (1987).

Similarly, since I have found that Cruz was not a credible witness in relating what Stoy
said to her after the February 23 meeting, the conclusion follows that the General Counsel has
failed to establish the violations Stoy allegedly committed.

III. Setting aside of the 2004 settlement agreement

Documents pertaining to this settlement agreement (SA) are contained in the formal
papers. At times relevant, Region 4 served as the coordinating region for the General Counsel
in handling charges the Union filed against Respondent for alleged misconduct at various
locations, including Charlotte.

The Regional Director of Region 4 (RD) reached agreement with Respondent on a
global SA. As to Charlotte, it encompassed management’s conduct toward nonemployees who
handbilled for the Union on January 13, 2003. A representative of Cintas signed the SA on
January 7, 2004, and the RD approved it on January 20, 2004. The Union later declined to
exercise its right to appeal from the RD’s decision to approve the SA, and the RD, by letter
dated April 5, 2004, advised Respondent to “now take the necessary steps to affect compliance
with the settlement agreement.” It is undisputed that Respondent subsequently fully complied
with the terms of the SA, including notice posting.

Respondent seeks dismissal of paragraphs 9 – 11 (and derivative 23) of the complaint,
relating to the alleged violations that were the subject of the SA. Respondent does not,
however, contend that the remaining portions of the complaint concerning the Charlotte facility
(paragraphs 12 – 22) should be dismissed because of the SA.

During the pendency of the settlement process, the Union filed charges with Region 11,
concerning the Charlotte facility on March 2, 2004. These charges were amended to include
additional allegations, on April 16 and August 31, 2004, and February 9, 2005.

Based on those charges, I have found that Respondent committed the following
violations in 2004:

1) On February 9, Coleridge told Cruz she could not wear a union sticker on her
uniform.
2) On February 10, Coleridge told Cruz she could not have a union flyer in her work
area and had to take it home.
3) On February 16, Coleridge told Galdamez she could not display a union hat in her
work area.
4) On February 16, Respondent issued Galdamez a verbal warning for wearing that
hat.
5) On February 20, Coleridge confiscated union flyers from employees on nonwork time
in a nonwork area and told them they could not read such flyers there.
6) On March 1, Coleridge and/or Stoy told Callas, Cruz, and Galdamez that they had to
remove union stickers from their uniforms.

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7) On March 1, Respondent issued verbal warnings to Callas, Cruz, Rosa Cruz, and
Emelinda Rivera for wearing union stickers on their uniforms.
8) On March 1, Respondent issued a written warning to Galdamez for wearing a union
sticker on her uniform.
9) On March 1, Stoy implied to Galdamez that she would be discharged if she again
wore a union hat or a union sticker.

Conclusions

A SA may be set aside and ULP’s found on presettlement conduct if there has been a
failure to comply with the provisions of the SA or if postsettlement ULP’s are committed.
Scripps Memorial Hospital Encinitas, 347 NLRB No. 4 slip op. at 2 (2006); Nations Rents, Inc.,
339 NLRB 830, 831 (2003); Twin City Concrete, Inc., 317 NLRB 1313 (1995). The General
Counsel relies on the latter ground.

Some of the violations I have found are based on allegations in the amended charges
filed on and after April 16, 2004, following the RD’s April 5, 2004 letter to Respondent regarding
commencement of compliance. Pigeonholing violations as “presettlement” or “postsettlement”
is an illusive task in light of the hiatus between when Respondent signed the SA and when it
was directed to begin compliance, and the on-going nature of the Union’s filing of charges in
2004 and 2005.

These violations were not isolated or minor. They were intensive considering that they
all occurred within less than a month’s time (February 9 – March 1), they affected a number of
employees, and they resulted in the imposition of discipline on five of them, including a written
warning to one. See Foodarama, 260 NLRB 298, 299 fn. 2 (1982); Porto Mills, Inc., 149 NLRB
1454, 1470 (1964). Moreover, the first were committed just over a month after Respondent
signed the SA and even before Respondent commenced compliance with the terms of the SA.

Whether to give effect to, or to revoke, a SA, must be determined by an evaluation of all
of the circumstances presented in a case, and not by the application of rigid rules. Nations
Rents, ibid; Deister Concentrator Co., 253 NLRB 358, 359 (1980). Considering all of the above
circumstances, I conclude that the RD properly set aside the terms of the SA and that such
result best effectuates the purposes of the Act.

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Conclusions of Law

1. The Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section
2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.

2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.

3. By the following conduct at its Branford, Connecticut facility, Respondent has
engaged in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7)
of the Act and violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act:

(a) Interrogated an employee concerning whether her signature appearing on a union-
initiated letter relating to employees’ health and safety was genuine.

4. By the following conduct at its Charlotte, North Carolina facility, Respondent has
engaged in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7)
of the Act and violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act:

(a) Summoned the police to interfere with nonemployees engaged in handbilling for
the Union.
(b) Told employees to remove union stickers from the shirts of their uniforms.
(c) Told an employee she could not have a union flyer in her work area and must take
it home.
(d) Told an employee she could not display a union hat in her work area.
(e) Confiscated union flyers from employees on nonwork time in a nonwork area and
told them they could not read such flyers there.
(f) Implied to an employee that she would discharged if she again wore a union hat or
a union sticker.

5. By the following conduct at its Charlotte, North Carolina facility, Respondent has
engaged in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7)
of the Act and violated Section 8(a) (3) and (1) of the Act:
.
(a) Issued to Candy Galdamez a verbal warning for wearing a union hat, and a written
warning for wearing a union sticker on the shirt of her uniform.
(b) Issued to Ana Callas, Raquel Cruz, Rosa Cruz, and Emelinda Rivera verbal
warnings for wearing union stickers on the shirts of their uniforms.

Remedy

Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I find that it
must be ordered to cease and desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act.

Both the General Counsel and the Union seek extraordinary remedies. The General
Counsel urges that Respondent at Charlotte be required to read the notice to all employees and
to grant the Union and its representatives access to bulletin boards and other posting areas in
Respondent’s facilities. The Union requests, at both Charlotte and Branford, not only these
extraordinary remedies but also that Respondent be ordered to provide to the Union a list of the
names and addresses of employees, to be updated periodically, as well as imposition of a broad
cease-and-desist order. I stated earlier my reasons for rejecting Respondent’s effort to expand

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the scope of the trial to union activity occurring at facilities other than Branford and Charlotte.
For those same reasons, I deem it inappropriate, in evaluating the Union’s request for
extraordinary remedies, to consider conduct of Respondent not specifically litigated before me.

Extraordinary remedies may be appropriate when a respondent’s ULP’s are “so
numerous, pervasive, and outrageous” that such remedies are necessary to “dissipate fully the
coercive effects of the unfair labor practices found.” Federated Logistics & Operations, 340
NLRB 255, 256 (2003), quoting Fieldcrest Cannon, Inc., 318 NLRB 470, 473 (1995). This may
include a public reading of the notice or supplying updated names and addresses of employees
to a union. Federated Logistics, ibid. A broad cease-and-desist order may be appropriate
where a respondent has shown a proclivity to violate the Act. Hickman Foods, 242 NLRB 1357
(1979).

As to Branford, I have found only one violation of Section 8(a)(1), and the prior SA at
that facility was never revoked. I therefore see no justification for special remedies at Branford.

Turning to Charlotte, I have found but a single violation in 2003—Coleridge’s summoning
the police to interfere with nonemployee handbillers. In contrast, the 2004 ULP’s were
substantial. Nevertheless, they all occurred in a narrow time frame, a 3-week period from
February 9 – March 1—hardly demonstrating an on-going pattern of interfering with employees’
organizational rights under the Act. Contrast Florida Steel Corp., 245 NLRB 1333 (1979).
Moreover, most involved only supervisor Coleridge, rather than higher-level management, a
factor militating against extraordinary remedies. Contrast Federated Logistics, above at 257.
Although Poole directed the confiscation of union flyers from the break room, he did make
efforts to undo that unlawful conduct, albeit they did not amount to retraction as a matter of law.
As to Stoy, any role he played in the unlawful disciplinary actions issued to employees who
demonstrated union support, and his one 8(a)(1) violation, were based on actions initiated by
Coleridge. Finally, aside from the incident involving confiscation of union flyers in the break
room, only five production employees out of approximately 90 were subjected to ULP’s.
Therefore, the ULP’s did not “pervade” the unit. Contrast Federated Logistics, ibid.

In these circumstances, I conclude that the ULP’s at Charlotte were not “so numerous,
pervasive, and outrageous” as to require the imposition of extraordinary remedies, and I
therefore deny the General Counsel’s and Union’s requests for such.

The General Counsel also seeks expungement from Respondent’s records of any
references to the verbal warning issued to Candy Galdamez on February 16, 2004; to the
written warning issued to her on March 1, 2004; and to the verbal warnings issued to Ana
Callas, Maria Raquel Cruz, Rosa Cruz, and Emelinda Rivera on March 1, 2004. This is a
standard remedy. Finding it appropriate, I will so order.

On these findings of fact and conclusions of law, and on the entire record, I issue the
following recommended55
55 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Section 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and
Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in
Section 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall
be deemed waived for all purposes.

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ORDER

The Respondent, Cintas Corporation, Cincinnati, Ohio, its officers, agents, successors,
and assigns, shall

1. Cease and desist from

(a) Interrogating employees concerning whether their signatures appearing on letters
initiated by UNITE HERE (the Union), and relating to employees’ health and safety, are
genuine.

(b) Interfering with nonemployees engaged in handbilling for the Union by summoning
the police.

(c) Issuing verbal or written warnings to employees because they have demonstrated
support for the Union.

(d) Implying to employees that they will be discharged if they demonstrate support for the
Union.

(e) Confiscating union flyers from employees on nonwork time in a nonwork area and
telling them they cannot read such flyers there.

(f) Telling employees they cannot have union flyers in their work areas and must take
them home.

(g) Telling employees they cannot display union hats in their work areas.

(h) Telling employees they must remove union stickers from the shirts of their uniforms.

(i) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.

2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.

(a ) Within 14 days of the Board’s Order, remove from its files any references to the
February 16, 2004 verbal warning and the March 1, 2004 written warning issued to Candy
Galdamez; and the March 1, 2004 verbal warnings issued to Ana Callas, Maria Raquel Cruz,
Rosa Cruz, and Emelinda Rodriguez, and within 3 days thereafter, notify them in writing that this
has been done and that the warnings will not be used in any way against them.

(b) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its facility in Charlotte, North
Carolina, copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix A,”56 in English and Spanish. Copies
of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 11 after being signed by the
Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent and maintained for
56 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words
in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board” shall read
“Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order
of the National Labor Relations Board.”

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60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees are
customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the
notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event that, during the
pendency of these proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facility
involved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a
copy of the notice to all current employees and former employees employed by the Respondent
at any time since January 13, 2003.

(c) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director for Region
11 a sworn certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to
the steps that the Respondent has taken to comply.

(d) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its facility in Branford,
Connecticut, copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix B,”57 in English and Spanish.
Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 34 after being
signed by the Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent and
maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to
employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to
ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event
that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of business or
closed the facility involved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its
own expense, a copy of the notice to all current employees and former employees employed by
the Respondent at any time since July 2004.

(e) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director for Region
34 a sworn certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to
the steps that the Respondent has taken to comply.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint is dismissed insofar as it alleges
violations of the Act not specifically found.

Dated, Washington, D.C. September 20, 2006.

____________________
Ira Sandron
Administrative Law Judge
57 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words
in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board” shall read
“Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order
of the National Labor Relations Board.”

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APPENDIX A

NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES

Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has
ordered us to post and obey this notice.

FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO

Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities

WE WILL NOT issue you verbal or written warnings because you have demonstrated
support for UNITE HERE (the Union).

WE WILL NOT imply to you that you will be discharged for demonstrating your support
for the Union.

WE WILL NOT confiscate union flyers from you on your nonwork time in a nonwork area
and tell you not to read such flyers there.

WE WILL NOT tell you not to have union flyers in your work area and that you must take
them home.

WE WILL NOT tell you not to display union hats in your work area.

WE WILL NOT tell you to remove union stickers from the shirt of your uniform.

WE WILL NOT summon police officers to interfere with nonemployees engaged in
handbilling you on behalf of the Union.

WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, as set
forth at the top of this notice.

WE WILL within 14 days of the Board’s Order, remove from our files any references to
the February 16, 2004 verbal warning and the March 1, 2004 written warning issued to Candy
Galdamez; and the March 1, 2004 verbal warnings issued to Ana Callas, Maria Raquel Cruz,
Rosa Cruz, and Emelinda Rodriguez, and within 3 days thereafter, notify them in writing that this
has been done and that the warnings will not be used in any way against them.

CINTAS CORPORATION

(Employer)

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Dated By
(Representative) (Title)

The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to enforce the National Labor
Relations Act. It conducts secret-ballot elections to determine whether employees want union representation and it
investigates and remedies unfair labor practices by employers and unions. To find out more about your rights under
the Act and how to file a charge or election petition, you may speak confidentially to any agent with the Board’s
Regional Office set forth below. You may also obtain information from the Board’s website: www.nlrb.gov.
4035 University Parkway, Republic Square, Suite 200
Winston-Salem, North Carolina 27106-3323
Hours: 8 a.m. to 4:30 p.m.
336-631-5201.
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING AND MUST
NOT BE ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY OTHER MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS
NOTICE OR COMPLIANCE WITH ITS PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE REGIONAL OFFICE’S
COMPLIANCE OFFICER, 336-631-5244.

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APPENDIX B

NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES

Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has
ordered us to post and obey this notice.

FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO

Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities

WE WILL NOT interrogate you concerning whether your signature appearing on letters
initiated by UNITE HERE, and relating to your health and safety, is genuine.

WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, as set
forth at the top of this notice.

CINTAS CORPORATION

(Employer)

Dated By
(Representative) (Title)

The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to enforce the National Labor
Relations Act. It conducts secret-ballot elections to determine whether employees want union representation and it
investigates and remedies unfair labor practices by employers and unions. To find out more about your rights under
the Act and how to file a charge or election petition, you may speak confidentially to any agent with the Board’s
Regional Office set forth below. You may also obtain information from the Board’s website: www.nlrb.gov.
280 Trumbull Street, 21st Floor
Hartford, Connecticut 06103-3503
Hours: 8:30 a.m. to 5 p.m.
860-240-3522.
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING AND MUST
NOT BE ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY OTHER MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS
NOTICE OR COMPLIANCE WITH ITS PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE REGIONAL OFFICE’S
COMPLIANCE OFFICER, 860-240-3528.

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