Christina W. Garland, Complainant,v.Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services, (Indian Health Service) Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJul 27, 2010
0120101310 (E.E.O.C. Jul. 27, 2010)

0120101310

07-27-2010

Christina W. Garland, Complainant, v. Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services, (Indian Health Service) Agency.


Christina W. Garland,

Complainant,

v.

Kathleen Sebelius,

Secretary,

Department of Health and Human Services,

(Indian Health Service)

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120101310

Hearing No. 560-2008-00227X

Agency No. HHS-HIS-074-06

DECISION

On February 17, 2010, Complainant filed an appeal from the Agency's

December 18, 2009, final order concerning her equal employment opportunity

(EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Section

501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended,

29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq. and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of

1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 621 et seq. The Commission deems

the appeal timely and accepts it pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a).

For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the Agency's final

order.

BACKGROUND

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked

as a Staff Nurse, GS 9/5, at the Agency's Claremore Indian Hospital

facility in Claremore, OK. On August 30, 2006, Complainant filed an

EEO complaint alleging that the Agency discriminated against her on

the bases of disability (previous spinal surgery, lifting restrictions)

and age (62) when:

1. From April 24, 2006 to May 2, 2006 Complainant was denied a reasonable

accommodation; and,

2. On or about May 31, 2006 Complainant was constructively discharged

when she was forced to apply for disability retirement.

Complainant underwent two spinal surgeries in 2005. In early 2006,

Complainant provided the Agency with a statement from her physician

limiting Complainant to paperwork-only duties for a brief period.

Complainant provided a second statement to the same effect approximately

one month later; this statement was effective through March 1, 2006, and

cleared Complainant for "full time, no restrictions" after that date.

At some point, Complainant returned to regular nursing duty. On April

19, 2006 Complainant requested that she be exempt from rotations; these

rotations were implemented so nurses in the facility would be trained in

different areas. Complainant asked to be moved to Pediatric Dentistry,

a position which apparently involved lighter duties. Complainant's

supervisor testified that in order to accommodate Complainant's

request, another nurse would have to be pulled from rotations to cover

Complainant's position. Complainant requested the accommodation because

she stated she could not lift heavy legs and put them in stirrups, but

could work with children in the pediatric dental area. Complainant's

supervisor denied the request, but informed Complainant that, should

she need help with heavy lifting, assistance would be available.

Complainant testified that assistance was indeed provided, as a scrub

technician helped Complainant with the lifting.

The Agency ordered Complainant to provide medical documentation to

clarify the extent of her workplace limitations. Complainant provided

two statements from her physician; the first statement informed the

Agency that a search of Complainant's records was underway, while the

second limited Complainant to lifting no more than 30 pounds. On May 2,

2006, Complainant was sent home for failing to comply with the Agency's

requests to provide medical documentation. On June 5, 2006, Complainant

provided the Agency with a third physician statement; the statement

limited Complainant to sedentary work with a lifting restriction of no

more than 15 pounds. At this point, the Agency concluded that Complainant

was unable to perform the essential functions of her position. The Agency

informed Complainant of two non-nursing positions in the facility.

Complainant responded that she was not interested in another position.

On June 9, 2006 Complainant applied for disability retirement.

At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant

with a copy of the report of investigation and notice of her right to

request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant

timely requested a hearing and the AJ held a hearing on November 12,

2009, and issued a decision on December 7, 2009. The Agency subsequently

issued a final order adopting the AJ's finding that Complainant failed

to prove that the Agency subjected her to discrimination as alleged.

CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL

Complainant maintains that she was denied a reasonable accommodation, and

insists that paperwork-only positions were available for nurses in the

Claremore facility. Additionally, Complainant continues to insist that

the conditions in the Claremore facility were intolerable and hostile.

The Agency did not submit any briefs in support of its argument.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a), all post-hearing factual findings by

an AJ will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence in the record.

Substantial evidence is defined as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Universal

Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951)

(citation omitted). A finding regarding whether or not discriminatory

intent existed is a factual finding. See Pullman-Standard Co. v. Swint,

456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982). An AJ's conclusions of law are subject to a

de novo standard of review, whether or not a hearing was held.

An AJ's credibility determination based on the demeanor of a witness or

on the tone of voice of a witness will be accepted unless documents or

other objective evidence so contradicts the testimony or the testimony so

lacks in credibility that a reasonable fact finder would not credit it.

See EEOC Management Directive 110, Chapter 9, at � VI.B. (November 9,

1999).

Denial of Reasonable Accommodation

Under the Commission's regulations, an Agency is required to make

reasonable accommodation to the known physical and mental limitations of

an otherwise qualified individual with a disability unless the Agency

can show that accommodation would cause an undue hardship. 29 C.F.R. �

1630.9. For the purposes of analysis, we assume Complainant is an

individual with a disability. 29 C.F.R. � 1630.2(g)(1).

Complainant must show that she is a "qualified" individual with a

disability within the meaning of 29 C.F.R. � 1630.2(m). We note that the

discussion of "qualified" does not end at Complainant's position. The term

"qualified individual with a disability," with respect to employment,

is defined as a disabled person who, with or without a reasonable

accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the position held

or desired. 29 C.F.R. � 1630.2(m). The term "position" is not limited

to the position held by the employee, but also includes positions that

the employee could have held as a result of reassignment. Therefore,

in determining whether an employee is "qualified," an agency must look

beyond the position which the employee presently encumbers. Accordingly,

an agency should consider reassignment. EEOC Enforcement Guidance on

Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship Under the Americans With

Disabilities Act (Enforcement Guidance - Reasonable Accommodation),

No. 915.002 (revised October 17, 2002); see also Interpretive Guidance

on Title I of the Americans With Disabilities Act, Appendix, to 29

C.F.R. Part 1630.2(o).

Upon review of the record, we find that Complainant could not perform

the essential functions of Staff Nurse. The Clinical Nurse position

description explicitly states that the job entails "considerable walking

in moving from bed to bed, bending and lifting, often in excess of 50

pounds, when helping patients in and out of bed and positioning patients

in bed." Complainant's supervisor testified to the same effect, viz.,

that nurses in the Agency are required to "lift and transport patients"

and lift up to 50 pounds. Though Complainant's physician provided a

statement limiting Complainant to 30 pounds at one point, the Commission

finds that this limitation was provisional. The 30 pound restriction was

merely temporary; the limitation was ordered while Complainant's physician

went about compiling the medical documentation requested by the Agency.

Once this was accomplished, the physician put Complainant on a 15 pound

weight restriction. Complainant's April 21 request for reassignment to

Pediatric Dentistry was not, therefore, a reasonable accommodation that

would allow Complainant to otherwise perform the essential functions

of Staff Nurse. Further, the Agency made Complainant aware of other

non-nursing positions within the facility once it became clear that

Complainant could not perform the essential functions of her position;

however, Complainant did not consider moving into either position.1

Thus, the Commission finds that the Agency did not deny Complainant a

reasonable accommodation which would have allowed Complainant to perform

the essential functions of Staff Nurse. The Commission also agrees with

the AJ's conclusion that Complainant failed to prove a prima facie case

of age discrimination.

Constructive Discharge

A discriminatory constructive discharge occurs when the employer,

motivated by discriminatory animus, creates working conditions that are

so difficult, unpleasant, or intolerable that a reasonable person in

complainant's position would feel compelled to resign. Doe v. Social

Security Admin., EEOC Appeal No. 01A114791 (Feb. 21, 2003). In other

words, the employee is essentially forced to resign under circumstances

where the resignation is tantamount to the employer's termination or

discharge of the employee. Kimzey v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 107 F.3d

568, 574 (8th Cir. 1997). The Commission has adopted a three-pronged

test for establishing a constructive discharge. Complainant must

show that:(1) a reasonable person in his position would have found the

working conditions intolerable; (2) conduct which constituted prohibited

discriminatory treatment created the intolerable working conditions; and

(3) complainant's involuntary resignation resulted from the intolerable

working conditions. Greer v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal

Nos. 01976756, 01976792 (Dec. 29, 2000) (citing Taylor v. Department of

Defense, EEOC Request No. 05900630 (July 20, 1990)).

In this case, we find that even assuming that Complainant's version of

events is accurate, no reasonable fact-finder could conclude that the

alleged actions created intolerable working conditions or constituted

unlawful disability or age discrimination. The Agency requests for

additional medical documentation were reasonable and appropriate.

The Agency had a duty to discover the full extent of Complainant's

limitations, given the nature of the Agency's work. The record clearly

supports the notion that Complainant's supervisors were interested

in protecting the health and welfare both of Complainant and of the

facility's patients. The Commission does not find that working conditions

at the Agency were so intolerable that a reasonable person would have

been compelled to retire.

CONCLUSION

Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal,

including those not specifically addressed herein, we AFFIRM.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0610)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the Agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive

for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at 9-18 (November 9, 1999).

All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

77960, Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the

defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0610)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that

the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also

permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other

security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,

29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within

the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with

the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action.

Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time

limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

July 27, 2010

__________________

Date

1 The Commission notes that it was improper for the Agency to insist that

Complainant apply for these positions; however, because Complainant did

not wish to be considered for either position, the Commission views this

as a harmless error.

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0120101310

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P.O. Box 77960

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