Chicago Mercantile Exchange Inc.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jun 17, 2020

2019001639 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 17, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/587,467 12/31/2014 Seo Wook Jang 004672-14485Z-US 6106
12684 7590 06/17/2020
Lempia Summerfield Katz LLC/CME
20 South Clark Street
Suite 600
Chicago, IL 60603
EXAMINER
JACOB, WILLIAM J
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3696
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
06/17/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docket-us@lsk-iplaw.com
mail@lsk-iplaw.com
pair_lsk@firsttofile.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte SEO WOOK JANG
Appeal 2019-001639
Application 14/587,467
Technology Center 3600
Before CAROLYN D. THOMAS, JOHN F. HORVATH,
and ADAM J. PYONIN, Administrative Patent Judges.
HORVATH, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 seeks review of the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 13, 15, 17, 18, 20, and 22. Appeal Br.
1–2. Claims 1–12, 14, 16, 19, and 21 have been cancelled. Id. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Chicago
Mercantile Exchange, Inc. Appeal Br. 1.
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Application 14/587,467
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The invention is directed to a computer method that “indicates prices
for a financial product at each of multiple times, generates data representing
changes in prices, and stores codes representing that generated price change
data.” Spec. ¶ 33.
Claim 13, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject
matter:
13. A method of compressing data associated with a financial
product, comprising:
(a) calculating a price change ∆P(q) by a computer system,
wherein the price change ∆P(q) corresponds to a time t(q) and
is based on a difference between a price for the financial
product corresponding to the time t(q) and a price for the
financial product corresponding to a previous time t(q–1);
(b) identifying, by the computer system, a price change
category for ∆P(q), wherein the identified category is a member
of a group of price change categories, wherein each of the price
change categories in the group corresponds to a different range
of price changes, and wherein the price change category
identified for ∆P(q) corresponds to a range of price changes that
includes ∆P(q);
(c) storing, by the computer system, a code corresponding to
the price change category identified for ∆P(q), wherein
each of the price change categories corresponds to a
range bounded by multiples of a standard deviation of price
changes corresponding to times in a time period prior to the
time t(q),
a center price change category code is a single digit and
is a 0 or a 1,
each of the remaining price change category codes has
the same number of digits, includes digits selected from 1 and
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0, and begins with a digit that is different from the single digit
of the center price change category code, and
the stored code corresponding to the price change
category identified for ∆P(q) requires less storage resources
than data representing the prices for the financial product; and
(d) repeating (a) through (c) for multiple iterations, each
iteration corresponding to a successively incremented value of q
and a successively later time.
REJECTIONS2
Claims 13, 15, 17, 18, 20, and 22 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101
as directed to non-patentable subject matter. Final Act. 3–6.3
OPINION
We review the appealed rejections for error based upon the issues
identified by Appellant. Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI
2010) (precedential). Appellant argues for the patent eligibility of claims 13,
15, 17, 18, 20, and 22 as a group. Appeal Br. 5–17. We select claim 13 as a
representative claim, and review the rejection of claims 13, 15, 17, 18, 20,
and 22 based on our analysis of the rejection of claim 13. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(iv). Any arguments not raised by Appellant are waived. Id.

2 The rejections of claims 1–12 under 35 U.S.C. § 103, and of claims 7–12
and 18–22 under 35 U.S.C. § 112 have been withdrawn. See Final Act. 2–3,
7–9; Ans. 6.
3 Although the Final Action identifies claim 15 as rejected, claim 15 is not
listed under the § 101 rejection. Compare Final Act. 1, with id. at 3.
Nonetheless, claim 15 is listed as a rejected claim in the Advisory Action in
which the only outstanding rejection is the § 101 rejection. See Advisory
Action 1–2. Therefore, we treat claim 15 as standing rejected under § 101.
We note Appellant has done the same. See Appeal Br. 5–17.
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We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejection of claims 13, 15, 17, 18,
20, and 22 in light of Appellant’s arguments that the Examiner has erred.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments, and sustain the Examiner’s
rejection for the reasons stated in the Final Action and Answer, which we
adopt as our own. We highlight the following for emphasis.
Rejection under 35 U.S.C. §101
The Examiner finds claim 13 is patent ineligible because it is
“directed to a judicial exception (e.g., an abstract idea, etc.) without
significantly more.” Final Act. 3.
Principles of law
Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, an invention is patent-eligible if it claims a
“new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.”
However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas” are not patentable. See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208,
216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within a judicially excluded
category, we are guided by the Supreme Court's two-step framework
described in Mayo and Alice. Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative
Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). Accordingly,
we first determine the concept to which the claim is directed. See Alice, 573
U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappas, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
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Concepts that have been determined to be patent ineligible abstract
ideas include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as
fundamental economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S.
at 611); mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95
(1978)); and mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67
(1972)). Concepts that have been determined to be patent eligible include
physical and chemical processes, such as “molding rubber products”
(Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191 (1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making
water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7
(quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 267–68 (1853))); and
manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94
U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
If a claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second step
of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the elements of
the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient
to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent eligible application.”
Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (internal citation omitted). “A claim that recites an
abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is
more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id.
(quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer
implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible
invention.” Id.
The PTO has published guidance on the application of § 101 to
patentability determinations. See 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter
Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“PEG”). Under step 1
of that guidance, we first determine whether the claim recites a statutory
class (i.e., a process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter). Id.
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at 53–54. If it does not, it is not patent eligible. If it does, we next
determine whether the claim recites:
Step 2A – Prong One: any judicial exceptions, including
certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts,
certain methods of organizing human activity, such as a
fundamental economic practice, or mental processes).
Id. at 52, 54. If the claim does not recite a judicial exception, it is patent
eligible. Id. at 54. If it does, we next determine whether the claim recites:
Step 2A – Prong Two: additional elements that integrate the
judicial exception into a practical application (see Manual of
Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)
(9th Ed., Rev. 08-2017 (Jan. 2018)).
84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55. If the claim integrates a judicial exception into a
practical application, it is patent eligible. Id. If it does not, we next
determine whether the claim recites:
Step 2B: additional elements beyond the judicial exception that
are more than “well-understood, routine, conventional”
elements in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)).
Id. at 56. If the claim adds more than well-understood, routine, and
convention additional elements, it is patent eligible. Id. If it does not, it is
not patent eligible. Id.
2019 PEG Step 1
Under step 1 of the subject matter eligibility guidance, we first
determine whether the claims recite a statutory class (i.e., a process,
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machine, manufacture, or composition of matter). Id. at 53–54. Claims 13,
15, and 17 recite a process (a method for compressing data) and claims 18,
20, and 22 recite a manufacture (a non-transitory computer-readable medium
storing computer executable instructions). See Appeal Br. 18–20 (Claims
Appx.). Thus, claims 13, 15, 17, 18, 20, and 22 recite patent-eligible
statutory classes. Accordingly, we next consider whether the claims recite
judicial exceptions under step 2A, prong one.
2019 PEG Step 2A, prong one
Under step 2A, prong one of the eligibility guidance, we determine
whether a claim recites a judicial exception such as an abstract idea, law of
nature, or natural phenomenon. 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. This involves
(1) identifying the limitations in the claim (either individually or in
combination) that recite an abstract idea, and (2) determining whether the
identified abstract idea falls within one of the subject matter groupings
consisting of (a) mathematical concepts (relationships, formulas, equations,
or calculations), (b) methods of organizing human activity (fundamental
economic practices, commercial or legal interactions, or managing behavior
or relationships), and (c) mental processes (concepts performed in the mind
such as observation, evaluation, judgment, and opinion). Id. at 52.
Claim 13 recites “calculating a price change ∆P(q)”, “identifying . . . a
price change category for ∆P(q)”, and “storing . . . a code corresponding to
the price change category identified for ∆P(q).” Appeal Br. 18 (Claims
Appx.). The Examiner finds these limitations recite the following court-
recognized abstract ideas:
i. “processing information through a clearinghouse” (see Spec.
¶ 22; Dealer-track, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir.
2012)),
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ii. “comparing new and stored information and using rules to
identify options” (see SmartGene, Inc. v. Advanced Bio. Labs.,
SA, 555 Fed. Appx. 950 (Fed. Cir. 2014)),
iii. “collecting and comparing known information” (see Classen
Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057 (Fed.
Cir. 2011)),
iv. “collection, manipulation, and display of data (see Elec. Power
Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016)),
v. “using categories to organize, store and transmit information”
(see Cyberfone Sys., LLC v. CNN Interactive Grp., Inc., 558
Fed. Appx. 988 (Fed. Cir. 2016)),
vi. “organizing and transforming information through
mathematical correlations” (see Digitech Image Techs., LLC v.
Elecs. for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2014)),
vii. “data recognition and storage” (see Content Extraction and
Transmission, LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 776 F.3d
1343 (Fed. Cir. 2017)), and
viii. “obtaining and comparing intangible data” (see CyberSource
Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2011)).
Final Act. 4.
Appellant argues the Examiner erred in determining claim 13 is
“directed to” an abstract idea by considering the claim language “at an
inappropriately high level of abstraction.” Appeal Br. 6–7. Appellant
further argues the Examiner erred by mischaracterizing the claims as being
directed to “a financial database that compiles financial transaction activity,
including manipulated (pricing) data, and the use of codes.” Reply Br. 2
(quoting Ans. 4). As a result, Appellant argues, the Examiner improperly
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found claim 13 recites a fundamental economic practice or method of
organizing human activity. Id. at 3–4.
As indicated above, the Examiner has identified numerous claim
limitations that fall under one or more abstract ideas, including collecting
information (obtaining pricing data), transforming information through
mathematical calculations (calculating price changes), and using rules and
categories to organize and store information (identifying a price change
category as a range of price changes that includes the calculated price
change and storing the price change by storing its price change category).
See Final Act. 4; Ans. 6–7.
For example, claim 13 recites calculating a price change for a
financial product between times t(q) and t(q–1). Appeal Br. 18 (Claims
Appx.). This involves collecting information (prices at t(q) and t(q–1)), and
generating additional information from the collected information
(calculating a price change), which, as recited, fall within the subject matter
groupings of (a) mathematical concepts (calculations), and (b) fundamental
economic practices (calculating and recording the change in value of a
financial asset). See Digitech, 758 F.3d at 1351 (finding a “process of
gathering and combining data” and of using “mathematical algorithms to
manipulate existing information to generate additional information” to be
patent ineligible); see also OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d
1359, 1362–63 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (concluding that “offer-based price
optimization” is an abstract idea “similar to other ‘fundamental economic
concepts’ found to be abstract ideas by the Supreme Court and this court”).
Accordingly, having determined that claim 13 recites at least
collecting, comparing, organizing, and storing information, which fall under
the subject matter groupings of mathematical concepts and fundamental
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economic practices, we next consider whether claim 13 is “directed to” those
abstract ideas or instead integrates them into a practical application. See 84
Fed. Reg. at 54–55.
2019 PEG Step 2A, prong two
Under step 2A, prong two, a claim that recites a judicial exception is
not “directed to” that judicial exception if the claim as a whole “integrates
the recited judicial exception into a practical application of the exception.”
Id. at 54. This involves (a) identifying whether the claim recites elements in
addition to the judicial exceptions, and (b) determining whether these
additional elements individually and in combination integrate the judicial
exceptions into a practical application. Id. at 54–55.
Additional elements integrate judicial exceptions into a practical
application when they (i) improve the functioning of a computer or some
other technology, (ii) effect a particular treatment or prophylaxis for a
disease or medical condition, (iii) implement or use the judicial exceptions
in conjunction with particular machines or manufactures that are integral to
the claim, (iv) transform or reduce a particular article to a different state or
thing, or (v) do more than merely link the judicial exceptions to a particular
technological environment. Id. at 55. Additional elements do not integrate
judicial exceptions into a practical application when they (i) merely include
instructions to implement the judicial exceptions on a computer, (ii) add
insignificant pre- or post-solution activity, or (iii) do no more than link the
judicial exceptions to a particular technological environment. Id.
The Examiner finds the limitations of claim 13, when “taken
individually and as a whole, do not amount to significantly more than the
abstract idea itself” because “the claims do not effect an improvement to
another technology or technical field” and “do not amount to an
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improvement to the functioning of a computer itself.” Final Act. 5. The
Examiner further finds that the additional limitations of claim 13 “fail to
offer significantly more than the abstract idea” and its “application . . . in the
specific field of financial trade data.” Ans. 7. The Examiner also finds that
although the limitations of “using standard deviation[s] to determine
category boundaries for price change codes” and “using a ‘0’ or ‘1’ as a
price change code may not be taught in the prior art,” these claim limitations
do not add significantly more to the abstract ideas identified above, which
we conclude are mathematical calculations and/or fundamental economic
practices. Id.
Appellant argues that claim 13 is patentable because it “recites a
specific, technological solution to a technological problem.” Appeal Br. 6.
Appellant argues that because “financial data[] is voluminous and the data
storage requirements are technically onerous,” claim 13 is patentable
because “innovations that reduce memory requirement problems are a real
world technological solution that qualify as patent eligible subject matter.”
Id. at 7. Appellant further argues that claim 13 is patent eligible because it
“recites a specific way to compress data,” one that “applies rules of selection
in a manner different from those humans used before its invention” as
evidenced by the fact that the Office “cites no prior art to reject the pending
claims.” Id. at 9; see also Reply Br. 4–6. Finally, Appellant argues claim 13
is patent eligible because “preemption . . . is the underlying primary concern
driving § 101 jurisprudence,” and claim 13 recites “specific rules [that] are
limited to specific steps” to compress data, and “other compress data
techniques can include[] many other possible approaches.” Appeal Br. 10.
We agree with the Examiner that the claims are directed to the
aforementioned abstract ideas because the claims, as a whole, are directed to
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the implementation of these abstract ideas on a computer, limited only to the
financial price analysis field of use. See Final Act. 5; Ans. 7; see also 84
Fed. Reg. at 55. We are not persuaded by Appellant’s contention that the
claims are patent eligible because they recite a specific way to compress
financial data that has never been done by humans before. To the contrary,
the claims recite little more than sorting an object (a price change) into one
of a plurality of categories, and storing the category into which the object
has been sorted as a digitally encoded binary number. Moreover, as the
Examiner found, Appellant’s arguments that claim 13 is patentable because
it doesn’t “preempt” other ways of encoding the price change categories are
inapposite because “questions on preemption are inherent in and resolved by
the § 101 analysis.” Ans. 7 (citing Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom,
Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
Accordingly, having determined that claim 13 is “directed to”
collecting, comparing, organizing, and storing information, we next consider
whether claim 13 contains additional elements that, both individually and as
an ordered combination, are more than well-understood, routine, or
conventional. See 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
2019 PEG Step 2B
Under step 2B, a claim that is “directed to” a judicial exception may
nonetheless be patent eligible if it recites additional elements that, when
considered both individually and as an ordered combination, provide an
inventive concept. Id. An inventive concept may be present if the claim
adds an additional limitation that is not a well-understood, routine, or
conventional element in the field of endeavor. Id. However, an inventive
concept is not present if the claim adds an additional limitation that is well-
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understood, routine, or conventional in the field of endeavor, specified at a
high level of generality. Id.
The Examiner finds the additional limitations in claim 13 (e.g.,
“storing a code for a price change . . . wherein the stored code requires less
storage resources”) fail to offer significantly more than the abstract ideas
recited in the claim because “they are well-known, conventional, and routine
in the art” and because “[i]t has long been known that short hand or codes
save time and space.” Final Act. 5. The Examiner further finds the courts
have long recognized that the computer functions recited in claim 13,
including “performing repetitive calculations, receiving, processing, and
storing data; [and] automating mental tasks” are “well-understood, routine,
and conventional when they are claimed in a merely generic manner.” Id. at
6. As evidence, the Examiner points to the Specification’s disclosure that
these functions can be performed by generic computer systems executing
instructions that are stored on generic computer-readable media. Id. at 5
(citing Spec. ¶¶ 24–27); Ans. 8–9 (citing Spec. ¶¶ 16–17).
Appellant argues the Examiner has failed to establish the
unpatentability of claim 13 by failing “to present objective evidence to
support the allegations of patent ineligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101.”
Appeal Br. 13. Specifically, Appellant argues, the Examiner “has failed to
satisfy the Office’s burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that
the claimed features are ‘well-known, routine, and conventional.’” Id.
(citing Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2018)).
Appellant further argues the Examiner’s “failure to present any supporting
evidence and simple reliance on . . . mere opinion as an adequate finding of
fact is in violation of the substantial evidence standard” set forth in the
Administrative Procedure Act. Id. at 16.
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We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments. To reject claim 13
as patent ineligible, the Examiner’s burden is one of establishing a “prima
facie” case of ineligibility, not one of proving ineligibility by “clear and
convincing” evidence as Appellant contends. See 35 U.S.C. § 132(a)
(“Whenever, on examination, any claim for a patent is rejected . . . the
Director shall notify the applicant thereof, stating the reasons for such
rejection . . . together with such information and references as may be useful
in judging of the propriety of continuing the prosecution of his
application.”); see also Hyatt v. Dudas, 492 F.3d 1365, 1369 (Fed. Cir.
2007) (during “the prosecution of a patent, the initial burden . . . on the PTO
[is] to set forth the bases for any rejection, i.e., a prima facie case”).
Here, as discussed supra, the Examiner has sufficiently stated the
reasons why claim 13 is rejected as patent ineligible, including why the
claims as a whole are “directed to” one or more abstract ideas, and why the
limitations that do not specifically recite an abstract idea are merely routine,
conventional, or well-understood. See Final Act. 5–6 (citing Spec. ¶¶ 24–
27) (finding “system 100 may be implemented across generic computing
technology”); Ans. 8–9 (citing Spec. ¶¶ 16–17) (finding “generic computing
technology may be utilized to execute the method steps of the instant
invention”).
We agree with the Examiner’s findings. Claim 13 requires calculating
the price change, identifying the price change category, and encoding and
storing the price change category using a “computer system.” See Appeal
Br. 18 (Claims Appx.). The Specification describes the computer system
that performs these operations generically, e.g., as a system that “could be a
single computer or could comprise multiple computers,” and as “one or
more mainframe, desktop, or other computers.” Spec. ¶¶ 17, 20. Claim 18
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recites a non-transitory computer-readable medium storing instructions that
cause the computer system to execute the method of claim 13. See Appeal
Br. 19 (Claims Appx.). The Specification describes this medium in generic
terms, e.g., as “a single medium” or “a combination of one or more media
and/or types of media,” including “hard disks, CD-ROMs, optical storage
devices, magnetic storage devices, FLASH memory, and/or any combination
thereof.” Spec. ¶ 16. For these reasons, when the additional limitations
recited in claim 13 are considered both individually and as an ordered
combination, they fail to “‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-
eligible application.’” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 78).
Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, we agree with the
Examiner that claim 13 is patent ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101, and
sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 13, and of claims 15, 17, 18, 20,
and 22, which are not separately argued.
CONCLUSION
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 13, 15, 17, 18, 20, and 22 as
directed to unpatentable subject matter is sustained.

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DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § References / Basis Affirmed Reversed
13, 15, 17,
18, 20, 22
101 Unpatentable
subject matter
13, 15, 17,
18, 20, 22

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED