Central Cartage Co.Download PDFNational Labor Relations Board - Board DecisionsOct 11, 1973206 N.L.R.B. 337 (N.L.R.B. 1973) Copy Citation CENTRAL CARTAGE COMPANY 337 Central Cartage Company and Mechanic Motor City Lodge No. 698, International Association of Machin- ists and Areospace Workers, AFL-CIO. Case 7- CA-9871 October 11, 1973 DECISION AND ORDER By CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS KENNEDY AND PENELLO On March 16, 1973, Administrative Law Judge Samuel Singer issued his Decision, attached hereto, in this proceeding, dismissing the complaint in its entire- ty. Jurisdiction, however, was retained for the purpose of entertaining an appropriate and timely motion for further consideration upon a proper showing that the dispute was not resolved in accordance with stan- dards established by the Board under the grievance- arbitration procedures of the pertinent collective-bar- gaining contracts. Thereafter, the General Counsel filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and the Re- spondent filed an answer to exceptions filed by the General Counsel and a supporting brief. This case was initiated by charges filed on October 12, 1972, by Mechanics Motor City Lodge No. 698, International Association of Machinists and Aero- space Workers, AFL-CIO, herein called the Charging Party. The complaint, issued on November 20, 1972, alleged that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act by "coercively inducing and encourag- ing its employees" to withdraw from the Charging Party and threatening them with discharge if they failed to do so, and by discharging and refusing to reinstate employee Stanley Dominiak because of his affiliation with the Charging Party. A hearing was held on January 31, 1973, before the Administrative Law Judge with all parties appearing. After the counsel for the General Counsel presented his case, the Administrative Law Judge, sua sponte, raised the issue of the appropriateness of deferring the issues involved to the arbitral process under the Board's Collyer doctrine' and the principles set forth in National Radio Company, Inc., 198 NLRB No. 1. After hearing arguments and receiving legal memo- randa from all parties, as discussed above, he dis- missed the complaint and deferred the issue, of the justification for Dominiak's layoff and the conduct in connection thereto for the parties to settle under the appropriate contract provisions. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- ' Collyer Insulated Wire, A Gulf and Western Systems Co, 192 NLRB 837. tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au- thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The record shows that the issues involved contain elements of a job assignment dispute between two unions. Dominiak was originally hired on June 1, 1971, as a casual worker performing functions of con- struction and general construction maintenance work, replacing an employee named Adkins. Prior to Adkins, an employee named Beanum performed the work. Dominiak worked in general maintenance and construction throughout the summer and fall of 1971 until December, at which time he was laid off until January 1972. During that period, he was not a mem- ber of either the Charging Party or Local Union No. 299, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, the two unions with which the Respondent has collective-bar- gaining contracts and which represent certain of the Respondent's employees. When Dominiak was rehired in January 1972, his work consisted of general maintenance and construc- tion with enlarged scope, performing maintenance work on projects throughout the plant. At the request of the business agent for the Charging Party, Domin- iak signed an IAM membership on February 16, 1972, and an authorization for checkoff of IAM dues and welfare fund contributions. According to Dominiak, soon thereafter he was told by his foreman, inter alia, that he had improperly joined the wrong union and if he were to belong to any union it should be Teamsters. The Respondent ignored bills for checkoff to be paid on behalf of Dominiak, contending that prior employees in Dominiak's job slot had belonged to Teamsters Local Union No. 299. Dominiak maintained his member- ship with the Charging Party. On July 28, 1972, Do- miniak wag--temporarily laid off. IAM Business Representative Daniel testified that on December 7, 1972, representatives of his Union and of the Teamsters met with Respondent to try to work out an understanding as to which union Domin- iak was required to join. Both unions have union- security clauses in their respective contracts. Accord- ing to the IAM, Dominiak was performing IAM "unit work." Respondent claimed that he was performing Teamsters work and should join the Teamsters. Daniel testified that Respondent relied largely upon a prior dispute involving an employee named Beanum, whose job Dominiak was allegedly filling, and over which job there had been a similar dispute. That dispute, involving the right of Beanum to rein- statement with backpay, was withdrawn "without prejudice" while pending before the Joint Arbitration Committee, the step prior to final and binding arbitra- tion in the IAM contract. No agreement was reached at the December 7 206 NLRB No. 89 338 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD meeting as to which union should represent Domin- ick. At the end of December, Dominiak was advised that the Respondent was ready to recall him to gener- al maintenance work throughout the garage and ter- minal, but nothing was said as to which union would represent him. However , soon thereafter Dominiak signed a Teamsters dues-checkoff authorization at the request of the Teamsters steward. At the close of the hearing, Dominiak was in the Respondent's employ- ment subject to_ the Teamsters contract. The parties stipulated at the hearing that the Re- spondent has recognized both the Teamsters and the Charging Party for approximately 30 years as the col- lective-bargaining representatives of certain of its em- ployees, and that during this period fruitful labor relations have resulted without any major incidents. On April 19, 1973, after the issuance of the Admin- istrative Law Judge's Decision, the Charging Party, the Teamsters, the Respondent, and Dominiak reached an amicable settlement of the disputed issues and signed a private agreement entitled "Agreement Between Lodge No. 698, Teamsters Local No. 299 and Central Cartage Company, Subject: Arbitration and Settlement of the Stanley Dominiak Matter." The agreement stated that Dominiak was not laid off for union activity and that his work is properly covered by the Teamsters contract; it also delineated the job duties covered under the IAM contract and the limi- tations on the work which Dominiak would be per- mitted to perform . The agreement was signed by Dominiak, the IAM, the Teamsters, and the Respon- dent and it was agreed that the settlement was "a full, final and complete settlement of the Stanley Domin- ick matter." The General Counsel filed a motion urging the Board to reject the settlement, alleging that he was a necessary party and rcquesting the Board to remand the case to the Administrative Law Judge for further hearing on the merits . Respondent filed an answer opposing the motion and moved that , as all the issues were resolved, the case should be dismissed in its en- tirety. Copies of the settlement were attached by the parties as appendixes to their respective motions. We have fully and carefully reviewed the excep- tions of the parties, the General Counsel's motion and the Respondent's answer thereto, the Administrative Law Judge's Decision, the settlement agreement, and the record as a whole, and agree with the conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge that under the spe- cial facts of this case the complaint should be dis- missed in its entirety . In arriving at this conclusion, however, we rely solely on the subsequent actions of all the parties , discussed below, and find it unneces- sary to, and do not, adopt the rationale set forth in the Administrative Law Judge's Decision. We do not find it crucial in the circumstances here- in involved that the General Counsel was not a party to the private settlement arrived at by the parties after the hearing and after the issuance of the Administra- tive Law Judge's Decision. The issues raised by the General Counsel in his motion do not find their an- swer in any inflexible rules of pleading or practice. The only relevant question is whether the settlement voluntarily arrived at by the parties covering all the pertinent issues effectuates the policies of the Act. We are satisfied that it does. The settlement clearly indicates that all issues in dispute were considered and appropriately resolved in a manner which dispos- es of not only the Dominiak matter but also similar issues involving related job assignments . Significantly in this regard, we note that none of the parties directly involved has raised any issues concerning the settle- ment, and all appear willing to abide by its terms. We also have considered that the parties by their action have avoided possible time-consuming and costly ad- ditional litigation or formal arbitration under their respective collective-bargaining agreements. Under all the circumstances , therefore , we are of the opinion that it will best effectuate the policies of the Act not to disturb the settlement or to involve the Board in further proceedings in this matter. Accord- ingly, we deny the General Counsel's motion to re- mand the case to the Administrative Law Judge and to reopen the hearing. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Rela- tions Board adopts as its Order the recommended Order of the Administrative Law Judge, with the spe- cial qualifications discussed above, and hereby orders that the complaint herein be, and it hereby is, dis- missed in its entirety. DECISION SAMUEL M. SINGER, Administrative Law Judge : This case, initiated by charges filed on October 12, 1972 , and a com- plaint issued on November 20, 1972, came on for hearing before me on January 31, 1973 , with all parties appearing. The trial was recessed on February 1 to permit the parties to file briefs on the question of whether the case should be deferred , pending resolution of the issues posed under the applicable contractual grievance-arbitration provisions, pursuant to Collyer Insulated Wire, A Gulf and Western Sys- tems Co., 192 NLRB 837 . Briefs were filed by General Counsel and Respondent on Febraury 23. Upon the pleadings, evidence adduced , and argument presented at the hearing, and in the briefs , I make the fol- lowing: CENTRAL CARTAGE COMPANY 339 FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS I BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT, LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED Respondent, a Michigan corporation with principal of- fice and place of business in Detroit, Michigan , is a com- mon carrier providing trucking services primarily as an intrastate transporter of freight . During the representative year 1971, it provided transportation services valued in ex- cess of $50 ,000 for employers within Michigan, each of which annually has a direct inflow into interstate commerce of goods and materials valued in excess of $50 ,000. I find that at all material times Respondent has been and is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. Charging Party (IAM) is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. II. BACKGROUND; THE ISSUES POSED The complaint alleges that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act by "coercively inducing and en- couraging its employees" to withdraw from Charging Party (IAM) and threatening them with discharge if they failed to do so; and by discharging and refusing to reinstate an em- ployee (Stanley Dominiak) because of his affiliation with IAM. In its answer, Respondent denied these allegations. As to the alleged discharge, it asserted that Dominiak was a "casual employee" laid off "due to general economic, business and work conditions." During the hearing prior to completion of General Counsel's case-it became evi- dent that the instant case could be one in which the Board might defer the question of propriety of the discharge to arbitration. See Collyer, supra. While the complaint also raised an 8(a)(1) issue, this appeared to be closely related to the 8(a)(3) allegation. Asked why the dispute had not been processed as a contract grievance, Respondent stated that it "has been our position from the beginning . . . that [the] dispute should have been taken through the grievance pro- cedure," but that neither Charging Party nor the affected employee saw fit to file a grievance. General Counsel, on the other hand, took the position that for various reasons the dispute was not susceptible to resolution under the contrac- tual grievance-arbitration machinery, including the ground that the dispute raised a "jurisdictional" question as to whether the dischargee was covered by Respondent's collec- tive agreement with Charging Party (IAM) or by its agree- ment with another union (Teamsters Local 299); that there was no way to compel Teamsters to participate in a griev- ance-arbitration proceeding; that Respondent did not in fact raise the Collyer issue prior to trial and, therefore, "waived" its right to raise that defense; and that no arbitra- tor would have the authority to remedy the alleged 8(a)(1) violation. Expressing the view that the Collyer doctrine, if here applicable, would obviate the need to litigate further the merits of the complaint allegations and to go into the Company's defenses (including its defense as to business conditions at the time of the affected employee's claimed discharge or layoff)-thereby saving considerable time and expense, I deemed it in the public interest to suspend the hearing in order to resolve that issue. Prior to such suspen- sion, all parties were afforded an opportunity to present evidence bearing on the deferral issue. For reasons to be stated (sec. IV, infra), I agree with Respondent 's contention that this proceeding should be de- ferred under the Collyer doctrine, pending arbitration. Be- fore stating the basis of my conclusion , it is necessary to summarize the relevant evidence heretofore presented- consisting of documents , stipulations , admissions , and testi- mony adduced through two General Counsel witnesses.' III THE EVIDENCE A. Contractual Relations Between Respondent and the Two Unions Involved Respondent has had contractual relations with Charging Party (IAM) and Teamsters for many years. The subsisting collective agreement with IAM covers various categories of employees, including automative mechanics and "general maintenance" men; the agreement with Teamsters covers other groups, including drivers. Both agreements contain union-security clauses requiring membership after 30 days of employment and dues-checkoff provisions. Both also contain clauses forbidding Respondent to discharge or dis- cipline employees "without just cause." Additionally, each provides for the filing and processing of grievances, includ- ing those relating to discharges-the final step to culminate in "final and binding" arbitration awards. The IAM agreee- ment specifically provides that "in the event an employee or Union representative believes he has been unjustly dealt with or any provisions of this contract have been violated, he shall proceed" to resolve the dispute under the grievance- arbitration machinery. It also states that if "an injustice has been done an employee, he shall be reinstated with backpay for all time lost." 2 B. Discharge of Dominiak Stanley Dominiak testified that he was hired on June 1, 1971, as a "maintenance" man. Prior to Christmas 1971, he was laid off for a short period by his superior, Warehouse Foreman Richard Dominick, . because "business [was] slow;" he returned to work after New Year's 1972. At the behest of IAM Business Representative Daniel, Dominiak on February 16 signed an IAM membership application and authorized a checkoff of IAM dues and welfare fund contributions. Dominiak testified that, "a couple of days later," Foreman Dominick told him that the Company did not want him to "belong to the Union." According to Busi- ness Representative Daniel, shortly thereafter Dominick told hula that he had no right to sign up Dominiak and that his IAM affiliation would "cost him his job." In accordance i In view of suspension of the hearing in midst of General Counsel 's case, Respondent did not, of course, have the opportunity to rebut testimony given by General Counsel's witnesses (the alleged discriminatee, Dominiak, and IAM Business Representative Darnel). In considering the Collyer issue, it is unnecessary to pass upon credibility of the testimony adduced. 2It is unclear from the contractual wording whether the Employer (as opposed to Union and employee) may initiate a grievance under the subsist- ing agreement. 340 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD with Dominick's request, Daniel telephoned Personnel Di- rector Garavaglia who told him that Dominiak "had joined the wrong union" if he was to belong to any union at all. The documentary evidence shows that, although beginning with March it received billings for IAM dues and welfare fund deductions from Dominiak's wages, Respondent ig- nored these billings. Dominiak further testified that, on July 27, Personnel Director Garavaglia called him to his office, told him that he "belonged" or "preferred" that he belong to Teamsters, and asked him to sign a paper indicating that he was with- drawing from "the Union" (presumably IAM). Dominiak said he would "think this over." When on the next day (July 28) Dominiak informed Garavaglia that he "cannot sign" the paper, the latter told him to "dress up and go home." Later on the same day, Respondent dispatched a note to Dominiak's home, advising Dominiak that he was "laid off effective immediately." IAM Business Representative Daniel testified that, on December 7, representatives of his Union and of Teamsters met with Respondent "to reach an understanding" as to which union was to represent Dominiak. According to Dan- iel, IAM took the position that Dominiak was performing IAM "unit work," while Respondent claimed that he was performing Teamsters work and should join Teamsters. Daniel recalled Respondent referring to a prior (1969) simi- lar dispute between IAM and Respondent, relating to a porter (Beanum) which was the subject of a grievance insti- tuted by IAM. That grievance, involving the right of Bea- num to reinstatement with backpay, was withdrawn "without prejudice," while pending before the Joint Arbi- tration Committee (consisting of IAM representatives and Respondent), in the step preceding referral of disputes for "final and binding" determination by an "impartial arbitra- tor." No agreement was reached at the December 7 meeting as to which union should represent Dominiak. At the end of December, Personnel Director Garavaglia advised Daniel that the Company was ready to recall Do- miniak. Daniel gave him Dominiak's telephone number, but nothing was said as to which union would represent Domin- iak. When Dominiak later saw Garavaglia and Foreman Dominick (prior to Christmas), he was told to report to work as a porter after New Year's. According to Dominiak, Garavaglia at that time told him that he was to join the Teamsters. After reporting to work, Dominiak did sign a Teamsters dues-checkoff authorization at the request of the Teamsters steward. Dominiak is still in Respondent's em- ploy. C. Respondent's Request for Deferral to the GrievanceArbitration Machinery As previously noted (sec. II), at the hearing Respondent took the position that the dispute herein should be resolved through the applicable contractual grievance-arbitration procedure. Respondent asserted upon the record that if a grievance is hereafter filed (1) it would waive any contractu- al time limits for filing it; (2) in interest of expedition it would also waive preliminary steps leading to arbitration; (3) it would participate in the grievance-arbitration proce- dure irrespective of whether the grievance is instituted by the affected employee, IAM, or Teamsters; (4) if instituted by the first two, it would serve due notice of the pendency of the grievance-arbitration proceeding upon Teamsters to enable the latter to intervene if it so desired; (5) it would serve similar notice upon IAM if the grievance is instituted by Teamsters under its collective agreement with Respon- dent; and (6) it would accept and consider itself bound by the arbitrator's award irrespective of the contract under which the grievance is processed. IV CONCLUSIONS 1. In Collyer Insulated Wire, supra at 842-843, the Board majority announced the principle that "[w]hen the parties have contractually committed themselves to mutually agreeable procedures for resolvingtheir disputes during the period of the contract . . . those procedures should be af- forded full opportunity to function." While Collyer involved a claimed unilateral action in violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act, General Counsel in his brief properly notes that "the Board has broadened the type of dispute which might be deferred for prospective arbitration to include 8(a)(3) discharge cases." As the Board stated in National Radio Company, Inc., 198 NLRB No. 1: Much of what was said in Collyer is equally applica- ble here, although the issues presented are concededly different. Collyer was, at bottom, a dispute over the meaning of contractual terms and we placed great reli- ance upon the fact that the alleged statutory violation and the alleged contractual violation so coalesced that resolution of either dispute in an appropriate forum would, perforce, supply the resolution of the other dis- pute. In this case, however, Respondent's contention that our authority is improvidently invoked does not rest on any presumed primacy of an arbitrator to inter- pret an ambiguous or contested contract provision. Ab- stention is urged on the straightforward basis that the contract prohibits discipline for other than 'just cause' and provides a mechanism for the quick and fair vindi- cation of employee rights when that clause is violated. Implicit in Respondent's argument, as we apprehend it, is the assumption that the arbitration proceeding will lead to a resolution of the dispute which will not be "repugnant to purposes and policies of the Act." If, as we believe, that is a tenable assumption, the fundamental considerations are the same here as in Collyer. Here, as there, an asserted wrong is remediable in both a statutory and a contractual forum. Both juris- dictions exist by virtue ofcongressional action and our duty to serve the objectives of Congress requires that we seek a rational accommodation within that duality., [Footnotes omitted.]' In its subsequent Eastman Broadcasting decision,4 the Board laid down the general principle that it "will apply the Collyer 3 See also Appalachian Power Company, 198 NLRB No 7. Cf. Kansas Meat Packers, a Division of Arista Foods, Inc., 198 NLRB No. 2; Pauley Paving Company, Inc, 200 NLRB No 124. 4 Eastman Broadcasting Company, Inc., 199 NLRB No. 58 CENTRAL CARTAGE COMPANY 341 rule where two basic conditions have been met: (1) the disputed issues are, in fact, issues susceptible of resolution under the operation of the grievance machinery agreed to by the parties, and (2) there is no reason for us to believe that the- use of that machinery by the parties could not or would not resolve such issues in a manner compatible with the purposes of the Act." 2. Applying, as I must, the foregoing principles, I con- clude that both of the-enumerated conditions have been met here, and, accordingly, that this case is one in which deferral to arbitration is required. As in National Radio, supra, the collective agreement be- tween Respondent and Charging Party (lAM) contains a clause prohibiting discharge or discipline "without just cause." Also, as in National Radio, the agreement provides for grievance-arbitration machinery which can be (indeed under the contract here must be) invoked to resolve the discharge dispute. Contrary to General Counsel, I see no impediment to invoking the IAM contract machinery to settle the basic issue posed by the complaint, i.e., whether the affected employee (Dominiak) was terminated for IAM adherence or for cause (layoff for economic reasons). In any event, his contention that a `jurisdictional" issue is in- volved, in that it is not clear whether the dischargee is cov- ered by the IAM or Teamsters contract (supra, sec. II), is of no moment in light of Respondent' s concessions at the trial (supra, sec. III, C) that Respondent would participate in the grievance-arbitration procedure and would accept as bind- ing the arbitrator's award irrespective of whether the griev- ance is processed under the lAM or Teamsters contract. Cf. Eastman Broadcasting Company, Inc., 199 NLRB No. 58; Urban N. Patman, Inc., 197 NLRB 1222. For similar rea- sons, I see no justification in General Counsel's concern that Teamsters may refuse to "become a party to [an] arbi- tration" proceeding invoked by IAM. Assuming that Team- sters elects not to participate, even though Respondent (as it committed itself to do at the hearing) serves on Teamsters due notice of the pendency of the arbitration proceeding, any decision adverse to Teamsters would be a matter to be resolved between Teamsters and Respondent-since, as it must again be stressed, Respondent has agreed to be bound by any arbitral award rendered in a proceeding instituted by IAM. 3. To be sure, there are lurking in this case possible "rep- resentation" questions, including a unit replacement issue- i.e., whether Dominiak is properly in the unit represented by IAM or Teamsters and whether one or the other union has the contractual right to check off dues and pension contri- butions. But these issues are not before me in this proceed- ing-nor need they necessarily be before the arbitrator; the sole issue before me, and the one I would have to decide if I reached the merits, is whether or not Dominiak was dis- charged for IAM affiliation or for cause-an issue which under National Radio, supra, is cognizable before the arbi- trator. In any event, as my colleague, Administrative Law Judge Ohlbaum, recently observed in his Board-approved Decision in The Newspaper Guild of Brockton, AFL-CIO (Enterprise Publishing Company), 201 NLRB No. 118, it "is no answer or defense to the obligation to arbitrate" that in determining the basic issue submitted to him, the arbitrator may have to consider questions "ancillary to the primary inquiry." Furthermore, the most recent decision I could find on the question of Board policy respecting application of Collyer to representation cases indicates that the Board would not frown upon such application if the arbitrator's determination-as in nonrepresentation cases-"were con- sistent with Board law or policy." Champlin Petroleum Com- pany, 201 NLRB No. 9. Thus, the Board adopted the following statement by Administrative Law Judge Rogosin in Champlin Petroleum: The argument that . . . Respondent maintains that the issue is primarily whether the warehouse employees may be considered an accretion to the bargaining unit, a determination which the Board seeks to reserve to itself, may pose somewhat of a problem. The Board, however, has given no indication that it would not honor a unit determination arrived at by means of application or interpretation of the contract if such a determination were consistent with Board law or poli- cy. It cannot be assumed in advance that any such determination by an arbitrator in interpreting the con- tract would be in conflict with prevailing Board stan- dards.5 4. General Counsel's contention (supra, sec II; br, pp. 4-6) that Respondent's failure to raise the Collyer issue until the hearing "constitutes a waiver ... of its right to raise it" as a defense is unpersuasive. While raising the issue at an early stage in the proceeding (e.g., during investigation of the charges or at least in the answer to the complaint) would indeed have facilitated "quick and fair" resolution of the issues , General Counsel has pointed to no authority to sup- port his contention that pleading the "deferral defense" affirmatively in the answer is a mandatory requirement. The contrary is indicated in Tulsa-Whisenhunt Funeral Homes, Inc., 195 NLRB 106, where the Board entertained the Col- lyer defense even though raised for the first time in excep- tions to an adverse decision on the merits by the Administrative Law Judge. Moreover, although the Board has already passed upon the Collyer issue in differing con- texts, the Collyer policy has not yet been fully developed and is still in the process of refinement. Finally, if Charging Party and the affected employee had been seriously con- cerned about expeditious disposition of the dispute, they could have filed a grievance at the outset of the dispute, i.e., immediately after the discharge-a step they chose to ig- nore. Nor is there substance to General Counsel's claim (br., p. 6) that Respondent's failure to raise the Collyer defense until the hearing constitutes evidence of "bad faith to prevent a `quick and fair' means of resolving the dispute." On the contrary, Respondent's good faith is demonstrated by the 5 Cf. Collyer, supra. See also Eastman Broadcasting, supra, Urban N. Pat- man, supra, Combustion Engineering, Inc., 195 NLRB 909, relied on by Gener- al Counsel (br., p. 2) is not inconsistent. It should be noted that Charging Party (IAM) itself had invoked the grievance-arbitration clause in its con- tract with Respondent to resolve a unit placement question involving an employee (Beanum) in 1969 (supra, sec III, B). 342 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD many concessions it made at the trial ( sec. III , C) to relegate the dispute to arbitration for expeditious disposition by an impartial arbitrator. Thus, it has agreed to waive the con- tractual time limits for filing the grievance, to dispense with preliminary steps to bring the issue before an arbitrator, to participate in and be bound by an arbitration proceeding whether instituted under the IAM or Teamsters collective agreement , and, of course, to abide by any award rendered.6 Indeed, the very fact that Respondent has now "offered to proceed to final and binding arbitration, without qualifica- tion," removes any doubt as to its intentions. Champlin Petroleum, supra, 201 NLRB No. 9. 5. Finally, I reject General Counsel's contention (br.,p. 4) that the Board should not defer this proceeding to arbitra- tion because the complaint alleges an 8(a)(1) violation which an arbitrator "would not have authority" to consider or remedy. The evidence adduced by General Counsel (su- pra, sec. III, B) demonstrates that the complaint allegation, that Respondent "coercively" induced "employees" to with- draw from Charging Party (IAM) and threatened them with discharge if they failed to do so, is predicated on Respondent's interpretation of its agreements with IAM and Teamsters that Dominiak-the target of the alleged 8(a)(1) conduct-was covered by the Teamsters contract. That contract (like the IAM contract) contains a union- security clause requiring membership after 30 days of em- ployment. Assuming the correctness of Respondent's inter- pretation, Respondent's "threats" amounted to hardly more than expressions of opinion that Dominiak properly be- longed to Teamsters and, therefore, that he should not join IAM. It is this interpretation-similar to that Respondent took back in 1969 involving employee Beanum-that evi- dently prompted its officials' statements that joining IAM might "cost" Dominiak his job. As in Appalachian Power Company, 198 NLRB No. 7, "[w]hat emerges from all of the above is that, although the issue . . . is couched in unfair 6 Although Respondent has agreed to participate in a grievance filed on behalf of the alleged wronged employee (Dominiak) by either JAM or Team- sters, logic and fairness would dictate that JAM (not Teamsters) process the grievance under the lAM contract. To begin with , JAM filed the unfair labor practice charges on behalf of Dominiak because of claimed discrimination against him for affiliating with JAM. Moreover, since Dominiak had resisted Respondent 's efforts to require him to join Teamsters and he ultimately joined the latter ostensibly only to enable him to return to work , the interests of both Teamsters and Respondent are arrayed against those of Dominiak. See Kansas Meat Packers, supra. Pauley Paving Company, Inc., 200 NLRB No. 124. labor practice terms, that issue is essentially a dispute about the meaning of relevant contract terms." Moreover, also as in Appalachian Power, Respondent's conduct must be "viewed in the light of [its] long history of bargaining with the Union." Accordingly, "this case must be distinguished from those in which a history of such animus or pattern of action subversive of Section 7 rights has been alleged" that the Board would exercise its discretion not defer to arbitra- tion. National Radio, supra. See also Collyer, supra. In any event, it would appear that the peripheral issue in question, central to and derived from the issue to be arbitrated (i.e., the discharge), does not of itself justify perpetuation of this proceeding. I conclude that the disputed issues are properly resolvable under the grievance-arbitration procedures the parties themselves have contractually elected to establish. More- over, "it appears reasonably probable that arbitration will put the [alleged] statutory infringement finally at rest in a manner sufficient to effectuate the policies of the Act" (Ap- palachian Power, supra). In accordance with customary practice in cases of this type, jurisdiction should be retained, however, for purposes of assuring that the matters in dispute will be resolved in a fair and regular manner consistent with the standards set forth in Spielberg Manufacturing Company, 112 NLRB 1080. Upon the foregoing findings and conclusions, the record heretofore developed, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby recommend the following: ORDER' The complaint is dismissed in its entirety except that jurisdiction is hereby retained solely for the purpose of en- tertaining an appropriate and timely motion for further con- sideration upon a proper showing that (a) the dispute has not been resolved by the grievance-arbitration procedure, (b) the grievance or arbitration procedures have not been fair and regular or have reached a result which is repugnant to the Act, or (c) the decision of the arbitrator is not wholly dispositive of the issues in this case. r In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions , and recommended Order herein shall , as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the Board and become its findings , conclusions, and Order , and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes. 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