Cellco Partnership d/b/a Verizon Wireless

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Feb 24, 2017

365 NLRB No. 38 (N.L.R.B. 2017)

365 NLRB No. 38
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
bound volumes of NLRB decisions. Readers are requested to notify the Ex-
ecutive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C.
20570, of any typographical or other formal errors so that corrections can
be included in the bound volumes.
Cellco Partnership d/b/a Verizon Wireless and Sara
Parrish. Cases 28–CA–145221
February 24, 2017
DECISION AND ORDER
BY ACTING CHAIRMAN MISCIMARRA AND MEMBERS
PEARCE AND MCFERRAN
On September 18, 2015, Administrative Law Judge
Mary Miller Cracraft issued the attached decision. The
General Counsel and the Respondent both filed excep-
tions, supporting briefs, and answering briefs. The
Charging Party filed cross-exceptions, a supporting brief,
and a reply brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has considered
the decision and the record in light of the exceptions,
cross-exceptions, and briefs and has decided to affirm the
judge’s rulings, findings, and conclusions in part,1 to
reverse them in part, and to adopt the judge’s recom-
mended Order as modified and set forth in full below.2
The General Counsel alleges that several rules in the
Respondent’s Code of Conduct are facially unlawful
because employees would reasonably construe them to
prohibit protected activity. The Code of Conduct, origi-
nally promulgated some time before August 2014, was
revised in April 2015. The parties stipulated that most of
the Respondent’s facilities now use the 2015 Code of

1 We have amended the judge’s conclusions of law consistent with
our findings herein.
2 We shall modify the judge’s recommended Order to conform to our
findings and to the Board’s standard remedial language. We shall
substitute a new notice that conforms to the Order as modified.
The Respondent contends that a nationwide posting of a notice to
employees, as well as mailing notices to employees of closed facilities
who were employed at those facilities at any time since August 2014,
are burdensome and inappropriate remedies. We disagree. Nationwide
postings are appropriate remedies for unlawful companywide policies,
see Guardsmark, LLC, 344 NLRB 809, 812 (2005) (“Concerning the
scope of notice posting, we have consistently held that, where an em-
ployer’s overbroad rule is maintained as a companywide policy, we
will generally order the employer to post an appropriate notice at all of
its facilities where the unlawful policy has been or is in effect.”), enfd.
in relevant part 475 F.3d 369 (D.C. Cir. 2007), and mailings to former
employees of closed facilities is a standard Board remedy.
On December 23, 2016, the Respondent filed a motion to stay these
proceedings. The Charging Party and the General Counsel filed oppo-
sitions, and the Respondent filed reply briefs. In its motion, the Re-
spondent notes that there are two other pending cases regarding the
lawfulness of the same Code of Conduct provisions, including one
currently before an administrative law judge, and that the Board should
decide all of the cases in one decision. We disagree and deny the Re-
spondent’s motion. We believe that the issuance of the decision in this
case will expedite the resolution of the two other cases.
Conduct, but some still use the 2014 Code of Conduct.
Except for Section 1.8 Employee Privacy, all of the rules
at issue here are identical in both the 2014 and 2015 ver-
sions. Thus, except for Section 1.8, our findings apply to
both the 2014 version and the 2015 version.
The judge found, and we agree, that the Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(1) by maintaining Section 1.6 So-
licitation and Fundraising, Section 3.4.1 Prohibited Ac-
tivities, and two bullet points in the Conclusion. For the
reasons stated by the judge, we also agree that the 2014
version of Section 1.8 Employee Privacy violates Section
8(a)(1) of the Act. 3
The 2014 version of Section 1.8 states,
Verizon Wireless acquires and retains personal infor-
mation about its employees in the normal course of op-
erations, such as for employee identification purposes
and provision of employee benefits. You must take
appropriate steps to protect all personal employee in-
formation, including social security numbers, identifi-
cation numbers, passwords, financial information and
residential telephone numbers and addresses.

3 In evaluating the lawfulness of the Respondent’s Code of Conduct
rules, we agree with the judge’s application of Lutheran Heritage Vil-
lage-Livonia, 343 NLRB 646 (2004). We note our dissenting col-
league’s view that the standard set forth in Lutheran Heritage should be
changed. We reject that view for the reasons stated in William Beau-
mont Hospital, 363 NLRB No. 162, slip op. at 2–6 (2016).
In evaluating the lawfulness of the Respondent’s Code of Conduct
rules restricting employees’ access to the Respondent’s email system,
the judge properly applied the standard set forth in Purple Communica-
tions, Inc., 361 NLRB No. 126, slip op. at 14 (2014). Our dissenting
colleague takes issue with that standard, as well. We reject his position
for the reasons stated in Purple Communications. Id., slip op. at 6 fn.
18, 14–15 fn. 71.
We also agree with the judge that Section 3.4.1 unlawfully chills
employees’ protected conduct in violation of Sec. 8(a)(1) of the Act.
The General Counsel excepts to the judge’s failure to find that Section
3.4.1 also unlawfully prohibits employees from using the Respondent’s
email, instant messaging, Intranet, or Internet systems to transmit “of-
fensive” or “harassing” content and “chain letters,” “unauthorized mass
distributions,” and “communications primarily directed to a group of
employees inside the company on behalf of an outside organization.”
We find merit in the General Counsel’s exception pertaining to the
rule’s prohibitions on “unauthorized mass distributions” and
“[c]ommunications primarily directed to a group of employees inside
the company on behalf of an outside organization.” Employees would
reasonably read those illustrations in the rule as restricting them from
using the Respondent’s systems to engage in protected activity. More-
over, the Respondent has not shown that those restrictions are neces-
sary to prevent interference with the efficient functioning of its sys-
tems. See Purple Communications, above, slip op. at 15 (2014). How-
ever, we find that the rule lawfully bars employees from transmitting
“offensive” or “harassing” content and “chain letters” because employ-
ees would not reasonably read those terms, as they are used in the rule,
to encompass protected communications.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD2
You should never access, obtain or disclose another
employee’s personal information to persons inside or
outside of Verizon Wireless unless you are acting for
legitimate business purposes and in accordance with
applicable laws, legal process and company policies,
including obtaining any approvals necessary under
these policies.
While recognizing that employers have a substantial and
legitimate interest in maintaining the privacy of certain
business information, the judge correctly found that the em-
ployees would reasonably read the Respondent’s broadly
worded rule to prohibit them from discussing their terms
and conditions of employment or disclosing personal em-
ployee information. Our dissenting colleague asserts that
this rule is lawful because it pertains only to the disclosure
of employee information acquired and retained by the Re-
spondent—not to personal employee information obtained
in any other way. We reject that argument. First, in certain
circumstances, employees have a Section 7 right to obtain
the names and telephone numbers of employees from their
employer’s records. See Rocky Mountain Eye Center, P.C.,
363 NLRB No. 34, slip op. at 1 fn. 1, 9–11 (2015).4 Sec-
ond, although the first paragraph of the rule notes that the
Respondent “acquires and retains personal information
about its employees” and that employees “must take appro-
priate steps to protect all personal employee information,”
the second paragraph does not reference the preceding para-
graph or use any other language that would indicate that the
first paragraph limits the broad reach of the second. The
second paragraph also does not include any qualifications of
the term, “employee’s personal information.” Lastly, alt-
hough our dissenting colleague notes some of the employee
privacy safeguards in the Board’s final rule on representa-
tion-case procedures, 79 Fed. Reg. 74308 (Dec. 15, 2014),
we find them inapposite to the Respondent’s rule. The rep-
resentation-case procedures ensure that a nonemployer party
to a representation proceeding does not abuse the voter list
that, under longstanding Board law, it is given to allow it to
communicate with employees regarding the election, inves-
tigate eligibility issues, and facilitate the parties’ entry into
election agreements. In contrast, the Respondent’s rule is
not directed at preventing the abuse of employee infor-
mation by any nonemployer party. Instead, it imposes a
prohibition on the employees themselves sharing other em-
ployees’ personal contact information, and therefore directly
interferes with the right to communicate and engage in or-

4 Our dissenting colleague asserts that Rocky Mountain is the “ex-
ception that proves the rule” that employees’ removal of information
from confidential employer files outside their normal course of work
activity is not protected by the Act. Without passing on our colleague’s
assertion that such a rule exists, we disagree with his claim that Section
1.8 is limited to such conduct.
ganizational activity that lies at the heart of Section 7. Ac-
cordingly, like the judge, we find that employees would
reasonably read this rule to prohibit their Section 7 right to
disclose certain personal information about other employ-
ees, including their residential telephone numbers and ad-
dresses.
We also agree with the judge that, when read in con-
text, the 2015 version of Section 1.8 is lawful, as is Sec-
tion 3.3 Proper Use of Verizon Wireless’ Property and
Property Owned by Others.5 However, we reverse the
judge and find that Section 2.1.3 Activities Outside of
Verizon Wireless is also unlawfully overbroad.
The relevant language in Section 2.1.3 provides:
Many employees participate in an individual capacity
in outside organizations (such as their local school
board or homeowners’ association). Memberships in
these associations can cause conflicts if they require
decisions regarding Verizon Wireless or its products. If
you are a member of an outside organization, you must
remove yourself from discussing or voting on any mat-
ter that involves the interests of Verizon Wireless or its
competitors. You must also disclose this conflict to
your outside organization without disclosing non-
public company information and you must disclose any
such potential conflict to the VZ Compliance Guide-
line. Participation in any outside organization should
not interfere with your work for Verizon Wireless. To
the extent that your participation infringes on company
time or involves the use of Verizon Wireless resources,
your supervisor’s approval is required.
The judge found that the language of the rule addresses
only the ethics of an employee’s business decision in-
volving the Respondent or its products made while par-
ticipating in an outside organization. We disagree for the
following reasons. First, the rule broadly pertains to any
matter that involves the interests of the Respondent or its
competitors. Although the rule mentions a local school
board or homeowners’ association as examples of “out-
side organizations,” it does not provide any qualifications
as to the type of organizations covered. Thus, employees
would reasonably construe the rule as also restricting

5 Unlike the 2014 Code of Conduct, the scope of Section 1.8 Em-
ployee Privacy in the 2015 Code of Conduct is narrow. The 2015
version specifically lists the type of confidential information covered to
include social security numbers, identification numbers, passwords,
bank account information, and medical information. Significantly, in
contrast to the 2014 version, the 2015 rule does not address personal
employee contact information, such as residential telephone numbers
and addresses, or any personnel or other documents pertaining to em-
ployees’ terms and conditions of employment. Hence, we agree with
the judge that, when the 2015 rule is read in context, employees would
not reasonably read it to interfere with their Sec. 7 rights.
CELLCO PARTNERSHIP D/B/A VERIZON WIRELESS 3
their participation in labor unions, in clear contravention
of their rights under Section 7 of the Act. Second, em-
ployees would reasonably fear that the broad language in
the rule prohibits them from engaging in any conduct the
Respondent may consider detrimental to its image or
reputation or as presenting a “conflict” with its interests,
such as engaging in picketing, strikes, or other economic
pressure. See Sheraton Anchorage, 362 NLRB No. 123,
slip op. at 1 fn. 4 (2015) (employees would reasonably
read rule against having a “conflict of interest” with the
employer to encompass protected activities); First Trans-
it, 360 NLRB No. 72, slip op. at 2 fn. 5 (2014) (unlawful
rule prohibiting participation in outside activities where a
conflict of interest exists). Third, the rule is unlawfully
overbroad in barring employees, when reporting a “con-
flict” to an outside organization, from disclosing “non-
public company information,” which in the absence of
any limiting language clearly implicates terms and condi-
tions of employment. See Rio All-Suites Hotel & Casi-
no, 362 NLRB No. 190, slip op. at 1 (2015) (prohibition
on employees sharing any information about the employ-
er not shared with the general public clearly implicates
terms and conditions of employment). Finally, the rule’s
requirement that employees notify the Respondent about
any such potential “conflict” is unlawful because em-
ployees would reasonably read it as requiring them, in
certain circumstances, to inform the Respondent of their
union and other protected activity. See Casino San
Pablo, 361 NLRB No. 148, slip op. at 4 fn. 6 (2014) (un-
lawful to require employees to disclose their intent to
engage in protected activity). Accordingly, we find that
Section 2.1.3 Activities Outside of Verizon Wireless
violates Section 8(a)(1).
AMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Substitute the following as Conclusion of Law 4.
“4. The Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act
by maintaining Section 2.1.3 Activities Outside of Veri-
zon Wireless in its 2014 and 2015 Codes of Conduct, in
effect since August 2014 and April 29, 2015, respective-
ly.”
2. Substitute the following as Conclusion of Law 6.
“6. The Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act
by maintaining the following language in Section 3.4.1
Prohibited Activities in its 2014 and 2015 Codes of Con-
duct, in effect since August 2014 and April 29, 2015,
respectively: prohibitions against using company systems
(such as e-mail, instant messaging, the Intranet or Inter-
net) to engage in activities that result in the Respondent’s
‘embarrassment’ and for ‘unauthorized mass distribu-
tions’ and ‘communications primarily directed to a group
of employees inside the company on behalf of an outside
organization.’”
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board orders that the
Respondent, Cellco Partnership d/b/a Verizon Wireless,
Basking Ridge, New Jersey, its officers, agents, succes-
sors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Maintaining Section 1.6 Solicitation and Fundrais-
ing in the 2014 and 2015 Codes of Conduct prohibiting
employees from “the use of company resources at any
time (emails, fax machines, computers, telephones, etc.)
to solicit or distribute.”
(b) Maintaining Section 1.8 Employee Privacy in the
2014 Code of Conduct requiring employees to “take ap-
propriate steps to protect all personal employee infor-
mation, including . . . residential telephone numbers and
addresses,” and prohibiting employees from “ac-
cess[ing], obtain[ing] or disclos[ing] another employee’s
personal information to persons inside or outside of Ver-
izon Wireless unless you are acting for legitimate busi-
ness purposes and in accordance with applicable laws,
legal process and company policies, including obtaining
any approvals necessary under these policies.”
(c) Maintaining Section 2.1.3 Activities Outside of
Verizon Wireless in the 2014 and 2015 Codes of Con-
duct stating that memberships in outside organizations or
associations “can cause conflicts if they require decisions
regarding Verizon Wireless or its products” and requir-
ing employees who are members of an outside organiza-
tion to “remove yourself from discussing or voting on
any matter that involves the interests of Verizon Wireless
or its competitors,” “disclose this conflict to your outside
organization without disclosing non-public company
information,” and “disclose any such potential conflict to
the VZ Compliance Guideline.”
(d) Maintaining Section 3.4.1 Prohibited Activities in
the 2014 and 2015 Codes of Conduct prohibiting em-
ployees from “us[ing] company systems (such as e-mail,
instant messaging, the Intranet or Internet) to engage in
activities that . . . result in Verizon Wireless’ . . . embar-
rassment,” or a rule listing the following as some exam-
ples of inappropriate uses of the company systems:
“[U]nauthorized mass distributions”; and
“Communications primarily directed to a group of em-
ployees inside the company on behalf of an outside or-
ganization.”
(e) Maintaining the Conclusion in the 2014 and 2015
Codes of Conduct that states that the following are ex-
amples of actions considered illegal or unacceptable:
“Theft or unauthorized access, use or disclosure of
company, customer or employee records, data, funds,
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD4
property or information (whether or not it is proprie-
tary)”; and
“Disparaging or misrepresenting the company’s prod-
ucts or services or its employees.”
(f) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Rescind Section 1.6 Solicitation and Fundraising in
the 2014 and 2015 Codes of Conduct, Section 1.8 Em-
ployee Privacy in the 2014 Code of Conduct, Section
2.1.3 Activities Outside of Verizon Wireless in the 2014
and 2015 Codes of Conduct, Section 3.4.1 Prohibited
Activities in the 2014 and 2015 Codes of Conduct, and
the two unlawful bullet points in the Conclusion in the
2014 and 2015 Codes of Conduct at all of the Respond-
ent’s offices and places of business throughout the Unit-
ed States where they are in effect.
(b) Furnish all employees with inserts for the 2014 and
2015 Codes of Conduct presently in effect at their re-
spective offices and places of business that (1) advise
that the above rules have been rescinded, or (2) provide
the language of lawful rules; or publish and distribute
revised 2014 and 2015 Codes of Conduct that (1) do not
include the above rules, or (2) provide the language of
lawful rules.
(c) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
all of its facilities nationwide where the unlawful policies
have been in effect or are currently in effect copies of the
attached notice marked “Appendix.”6 Copies of the no-
tice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Re-
gion 28, after being signed by the Respondent’s author-
ized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent
and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous
places, including all places where notices to employees
are customarily posted. In addition to physical posting of
paper notices, notices shall be distributed electronically,
such as by email, posting on an intranet or an internet
site, and/or other electronic means, if the Respondent
customarily communicates with its employees by such
means. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respond-
ent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material. If the Respondent has
gone out of business or closed any of the facilities in-
volved in this proceeding, the Respondent shall duplicate
and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all

6 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
current employees and former employees employed by
the Respondent at those facilities at any time since Au-
gust 2014.
(d) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file
with the Regional Director for Region 28 a sworn certifi-
cation of a responsible official on a form provided by the
Region attesting to the steps that the Respondent has
taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C. February 24, 2017
______________________________________
Mark Gaston Pearce, Member
______________________________________
Lauren McFerran, Member
(SEAL) NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ACTING CHAIRMAN MISCIMARRA, concurring in part and
dissenting in part.
At issue in this case is whether the Respondent violat-
ed Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA or Act) by maintaining various provisions in the
2014 and 2015 versions of its Code of Conduct. To
make that determination for many of the provisions at
issue here, the judge and my colleagues apply prong one
of the standard set forth in Lutheran Heritage Village-
Livonia, 343 NLRB 646 (2004), under which the Board
asks whether employees “would reasonably construe the
language” of an employer’s rule, policy or handbook
provision “to prohibit Section 7 activity.” Id. at 647. For
other Code of Conduct provisions at issue here, the judge
and my colleagues apply Purple Communications, Inc.,
361 NLRB No. 126 (2014), in which a Board majority,
overruling in relevant part Register Guard, 351 NLRB
1110 (2007), held that if employees have been granted
access to their employer’s email system for work-related
purposes, they are rebuttably presumed to have a right to
use that system to engage in NLRA-protected communi-
cations on nonworking time.
I disagree with the Lutheran Heritage “reasonably
construe” standard. For the reasons I explained in my
separate opinion in William Beaumont Hospital, 363
NLRB No. 162, slip op. at 7–24 (2016), which are sum-
marized below, I believe the “reasonably construe”
standard should be overruled by the Board or repudiated
by the courts. In its place, I would adopt a standard un-
der which the Board evaluates an employer’s workplace
rule, policy, or handbook provision by striking a “proper
balance” that takes into account both (i) the legitimate
CELLCO PARTNERSHIP D/B/A VERIZON WIRELESS 5
justifications associated with the disputed rule and (ii)
any adverse impact the rule may have on NLRA-
protected activity,1 and a “facially neutral” policy, rule,
or handbook provision—defined as a rule that does not
expressly restrict NLRA-protected activity, was not
adopted in response to NLRA-protected activity, and has
not been applied to restrict NLRA-protected activity—
should be declared unlawful only if the legitimate justifi-
cations an employer may have for maintaining the rule
are outweighed by its potential adverse impact on Sec-
tion 7 activity.
I also disagree with the Board majority’s holding in
Purple Communications, a decision from which I dis-
sented for the reasons summarized below. See 361
NLRB No. 126, slip op. at 18–28 (Member Miscimarra,
dissenting). I believe the Board should overrule Purple
Communications and reinstate the holding of Register
Guard, supra, which recognized the right of employers to
control the uses of their own property, including their
email systems, provided they do not discriminate against
NLRA-protected communications by distinguishing be-
tween permitted and prohibited uses along Section 7
lines. Thus, I agree with the Board in Register Guard
that an employer “may lawfully bar employees’ non-
work-related use of its e-mail system, unless the [em-
ployer] acts in a manner that discriminates against Sec-
tion 7 activity.” 351 NLRB at 1116.
Applying my view of applicable legal requirements, I
concur with my colleagues’ findings as to a few of the
Code of Conduct provisions at issue in this case, and I
respectfully dissent as to others, as explained below.2
A. The Board’s Lutheran Heritage “Reasonably Con-
strue” Test Should Be Overruled by the Board or
Repudiated by the Courts
Although NLRA Section 8(a)(1) makes it unlawful for
an employer to “interfere with, restrain, or coerce em-

1 See NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 33–34 (1967)
(referring to the Board’s “duty to strike the proper balance between . . .
asserted business justifications and the invasion of employee rights in
light of the Act and its policy”). In performing the balancing discussed
in the text, I believe other considerations may be relevant to the
Board’s determination. These may include, depending on the case,
reasonable distinctions between types of rules and justifications, evi-
dence regarding the particular industry or work setting, specific events
that may bear on the lawfulness of the disputed rule, and the possibility
that the rule may be lawfully maintained even though application of the
rule against NLRA-protected conduct may be unlawful. See William
Beaumont, supra, slip op. at 15, 18–20 (Member Miscimarra, concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part).
2 I join my colleagues in denying the Respondent’s motion to stay
these proceedings. I also agree with my colleagues that posting the
notice to employees nationwide and mailing the notice to former em-
ployees of closed facilities are standard remedies under these circum-
stances.
ployees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section
7,” the disputed rules in the instant case do not expressly
restrict Section 7 activity, were not adopted in response
to NLRA-protected activity, and have not been applied to
restrict NLRA-protected activity. Nonetheless, as stated
above, the judge and my colleagues find the maintenance
of most of these rules unlawful. They do so applying
Lutheran Heritage, under which a facially neutral em-
ployment policy, work rule, or handbook provision vio-
lates Section 8(a)(1) if employees would “reasonably
construe the language” of the rule “to prohibit Section 7
activity.”3 For reasons described at length in my partial
dissenting opinion in William Beaumont,4 I believe that
the Lutheran Heritage “reasonably construe” test should
be overruled by the Board or repudiated by the courts.
The “reasonably construe” standard defies common
sense and is contrary to the Act in numerous respects. It
entails a single-minded consideration of NLRA-protected
rights—even though the risk of intruding on those rights
might be “comparatively slight”5—without taking into
account the many legitimate justifications associated
with particular policies, rules, and handbook provisions,
which may have as their purpose avoiding potentially
fatal accidents, reducing the risk of workplace violence,
or preventing unlawful harassment. As I explained in
William Beaumont:
 Lutheran Heritage is contrary to Supreme Court
precedent establishing that, whenever work require-
ments are alleged to violate the NLRA, the Board
must give substantial consideration to the justifica-
tions associated with the rule, rather than only con-
sidering a rule’s potential adverse effect on NLRA
rights.6

3 Lutheran Heritage, 343 NLRB at 647. This standard is sometimes
called Lutheran Heritage “prong one” because, in Lutheran Heritage,
the “reasonably construe” test is enumerated as the first item, or
“prong,” in a three-prong standard for determining whether a chal-
lenged policy, work rule, or handbook provision that does not explicitly
restrict Sec. 7 activity is nonetheless unlawful. See William Beaumont,
supra, slip op. at 7 fn. 3 (Member Miscimarra, concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
4 William Beaumont, supra, slip op. at 8–18 (Member Miscimarra,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
5 Great Dane, 388 U.S. at 34.
6 See Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 797–798
(1945) (describing the need to balance the “undisputed right of self-
organization assured to employees” with “the equally undisputed right
of employers to maintain discipline in their establishments,” rights that
“are not unlimited in the sense that they can be exercised without re-
gard to any duty which the existence of rights in others may place upon
employer or employee,” because the “[o]pportunity to organize and
proper discipline are both essential elements in a balanced society”);
NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 229 (1963) (referring to the
“delicate task” of “weighing the interests of employees in concerted
activity against the interest of the employer in operating his business in
a particular manner and of balancing . . . the intended consequences
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD6
 Lutheran Heritage is contradicted by the
NLRB’s own cases establishing that numerous work
requirements and restrictions are lawful—for exam-
ple, no-solicitation and no-distribution rules, off-
duty employee access rules, “just cause” provisions,
and attendance requirements—notwithstanding the
fact that each would fail the Lutheran Heritage “rea-
sonably construe” test.7
 The Board has engaged in a balancing of com-
peting interests—in the above cases and others
spanning more than six decades—without disregard-
ing the justifications associated with particular rules
and requirements.8
 Under Lutheran Heritage, the Board has invali-
dated many facially neutral work rules merely be-
cause they are ambiguous. However, the Board’s
requirement of linguistic precision when applying
Lutheran Heritage is contrary to the permissive
treatment that Congress, the Board, and the courts
have afforded to “just cause” provisions, benefit
plans, and other employment-related requirements
throughout the Act’s history.9 Moreover, given that
many ambiguities are inherent in the NLRA itself, it
is unreasonable to find that reasonable work re-
quirements violate the NLRA merely because em-
ployers cannot discharge the impossible task of an-
ticipating and carving out every possible overlap
with some potential NLRA-protected activity.
 The Lutheran Heritage “reasonably construe”
test stems from several false premises, the most im-
portant of which is a misguided belief that unless
employers formulate written policies, rules, and
handbooks that can never be construed in a manner
that conflicts with some type of hypothetical NLRA
protection, employees are best served by not having

upon employee rights against the business ends to be served by the
employer’s conduct”); Great Dane, 388 U.S. at 33–34 (referring to the
Board’s “duty to strike the proper balance between . . . asserted busi-
ness justifications and the invasion of employee rights in light of the
Act and its policy”); Southern Steamship Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31, 47
(1942) (“[T]he Board has not been commissioned to effectuate the
policies of the [Act] so single-mindedly that it may wholly ignore other
and equally important Congressional objectives.”). Cf. First National
Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 680–681 (1981) (“[T]he
Act is not intended to serve either party’s individual interest, but to
foster in a neutral manner a system in which the conflict between these
interests may be resolved.”). See generally William Beaumont, supra,
slip op. at 11–12 (Member Miscimarra, concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part).
7 See William Beaumont, supra, slip op. at 12 (Member Miscimarra,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
8 Id., slip op. at 12–13, 20–21 (Member Miscimarra, concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
9 Id., slip op. at 8, 13–14 & fns. 29–31 (Member Miscimarra, con-
curring in part and dissenting in part).
employment policies, rules, and handbooks at all. In
this respect, Lutheran Heritage requires perfection
that literally has become the enemy of the good.10
 The Lutheran Heritage “reasonably construe”
test improperly limits the Board’s discretion, contra-
ry to the Board’s responsibility to apply the “general
provisions of the Act to the complexities of industri-
al life.”11 It does not permit the Board to afford
greater protection to Section 7 activities that are cen-
tral to the Act (as compared to other types of activity
that may lie at the periphery of the Act or rarely if
ever occur), to make reasonable distinctions between
and among different types of justifications for par-
ticular rules, to differentiate between different indus-
tries or work settings, or to take into account discrete
events that, if considered, may demonstrate that the
justifications for certain work requirements out-
weigh their potential impact on some potential
NLRA-protected activity.12
 If a particular work rule exists for important
reasons that require the Board to conclude that “the
rule on its face is not unlawful,”13 Lutheran Heritage
fails to recognize that the Board subsequently may
find that the employer has violated Section 8(a)(1)
by applying the rule to restrict NLRA-protected ac-
tivity.14 Here as well, Lutheran Heritage prevents
the Board from discharging its duty to apply the

10 Id., slip op. at 8, 13–15 (Member Miscimarra, concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
11 NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. at 236; see also NLRB v. J.
Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 266–267 (1975) (“The responsibility to
adapt the Act to changing patterns of industrial life is entrusted to the
Board.”).
12 See William Beaumont, supra, slip op. at 9, 15 (Member Misci-
marra, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
13 Aroostook County Regional Ophthalmology Center v. NLRB, 81
F.3d 209, 213 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (emphasis added).
14 In Aroostook County Regional Ophthalmology Center, supra, the
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit stated:
In the absence of any evidence that [the employer] is imposing an un-
reasonably broad interpretation of the rule upon employees, the
Board’s determination to the contrary is unjustified. If an occasion
arises where [the employer] is attempting to use the rule as the basis
for imposing questionable restrictions upon employees’ communica-
tions, the employees may seek review of the Company’s actions at
that time. However, the rule on its face is not unlawful.
Id.; see also Adtranz ABB Daimler-Benz Transportation v. NLRB, 253
F.3d 19, 28 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (stating that the Board cannot find a facial-
ly neutral policy unlawful based upon “fanciful” speculation, and the
Board must “consider the context in which the rule was applied and its
actual impact on employees”). See William Beaumont, supra, slip op.
at 19–20 & fn. 60 (Member Miscimarra, concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part).
CELLCO PARTNERSHIP D/B/A VERIZON WIRELESS 7
“general provisions of the Act to the complexities of
industrial life.”15
 The Lutheran Heritage “reasonably construe”
test has been exceptionally difficult to apply, many
Board decisions have disregarded important qualifi-
cations set forth in Lutheran Heritage itself,16 and
Lutheran Heritage has produced arbitrary results.17
As I stated in William Beaumont, the Board’s experi-
ence with the Lutheran Heritage “reasonably construe”
standard “has revealed its substantial limitations, as well
as its departure from the type of balancing required by
Supreme Court precedent and the Board’s own deci-
sions.”18 For the above reasons, Lutheran Heritage
should be overruled by the Board, and if the Board fails
to do so, it should be repudiated by the courts.
B. The Purple Communications Standard Is Incorrect
and Unworkable
As stated above, the judge and my colleagues also ap-
ply Purple Communications, supra, which held that when
an employer has granted employees access to its email
system for work-related purposes, the Board will pre-
sume that employees have a right to use that email sys-
tem during nonworking time to engage in communica-
tions protected by the Act, unless the employer demon-
strates that special circumstances warrant restricting that

15 NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. at 236; NLRB v. J.
Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. at 266–267. See generally William Beau-
mont, supra, slip op. at 12 (Member Miscimarra, concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
16 See William Beaumont, supra, slip op. at 13–14 fn. 29; id., slip op.
at 18 fn. 55 (Member Miscimarra, concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
17 Compare Adtranz ABB Daimler-Benz Transportation v. NLRB,
253 F.3d at 27 (finding it lawful to maintain rule prohibiting “abusive
or threatening language to anyone on company premises”) and Luther-
an Heritage, 343 NLRB at 646–647 (finding it lawful to maintain rule
prohibiting “abusive or profane language”) with Flamingo Hilton-
Laughlin, 330 NLRB 287 (1999) (finding it unlawful to maintain rule
prohibiting “loud, abusive or foul language”). Also, compare Palms
Hotel & Casino, 344 NLRB 1363, 1363 (2005) (finding it lawful to
maintain rule prohibiting “conduct which is . . . injurious, offensive,
threatening, intimidating, coercing, or interfering with” other employ-
ees) with Lafayette Park Hotel, 326 NLRB 824, 825 (1998) (finding it
unlawful to maintain rule prohibiting “false, vicious, profane or mali-
cious statements”), enfd. 203 F.3d 52 (D.C. Cir. 1999). See generally
William Beaumont, supra, slip op. at 15–18 (Member Miscimarra,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
In part, the arbitrary results associated with application of the Lu-
theran Heritage “reasonably construe” standard have resulted from
many Board decisions that have disregarded important qualifications
set forth in Lutheran Heritage itself. See William Beaumont, supra, slip
op. at 18 fn. 55 (Member Miscimarra, concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
18 William Beaumont, supra, slip op. at 18 (Member Miscimarra,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
presumptive right.19 As I explained in my dissenting
opinion, I believe the Purple Communications standard is
incorrect and unworkable.
 The Purple Communications standard improper-
ly presumes that when an employer reserves the use
of its email system for business purposes, this unrea-
sonably impedes employees’ NLRA-protected activ-
ities.20 Far from balancing the “undisputed right of
self-organization assured to employees” with “the
equally undisputed right of employers to maintain
discipline in their establishments,”21 the Board in
Purple Communications assumed that restricting an
employer’s email system to business-related uses
constitutes “an unreasonable impediment to self-
organization,”22 notwithstanding the widespread
availability of multiple digital platforms (e.g., social
media, text messaging, and personal email ac-
counts)—not to mention old-fashioned face-to-face
conversation—through which employees may en-
gage in NLRA-protected communications separate
and apart from their employer’s email system.
 The Purple Communications standard fails to
accommodate employers’ property rights in their in-
formation technology resources, which typically cost
a great deal to acquire, maintain, and secure.23
 The Purple Communications standard makes it
enormously difficult for employers to enforce a valid
rule prohibiting solicitation during working time,
where, by the very nature of emails, it is likely that
an email sent during one employee’s nonworking
time will be received and read by employees during
their working time. The Purple Communications
standard also makes it extremely difficult for em-
ployers to avoid unlawful surveillance of NLRA-
protected activities, even though employers often
have legitimate reasons to search and retrieve em-
ployee work emails.24
 The Purple Communications standard, which
gives employees a presumptive right to use their em-
ployer’s email system for NLRA-protected commu-
nications and places the burden on the employer to
demonstrate “special circumstances” warranting re-
stricting that right, fails to give employers and em-

19 Purple Communications, Inc., 361 NLRB No. 126, slip op. at 11–
16.
20 Id., slip op. at 20–22 (Member Miscimarra, dissenting).
21 Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. at 797–798.
22 Id. at 803 fn. 10.
23 Purple Communications, supra, slip op. at 22–24 (Member
Miscimarra, dissenting).
24 Id., slip op. at 24–26 (Member Miscimarra, dissenting).
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD8
ployees “certainty beforehand”25 concerning what
they may and may not do, since what qualifies as a
“special circumstance” will only be determined after
the fact and case by case, following potentially years
of Board and court litigation.26
For the above reasons, I believe Purple Communica-
tions was wrongly decided, and I would return to the rule
of Register Guard that employers may lawfully limit
employee use of their employer’s email system to busi-
ness purposes provided they do not discriminate against
NLRA-protected communications.27
C. Evaluation of the Respondent’s
Code-of-Conduct Provisions
1. Section 1.6—Solicitation and Fundraising
(2014 and 2015 Versions of the Code of Conduct)
Section 1.6 of both the 2014 and 2015 versions of the
Respondent’s Code of Conduct provides, in relevant part,
that “the use of company resources at any time (emails,
fax machines, computers, telephones, etc.) to solicit or
distribute, is prohibited.” I believe employers have the
right to control the uses to which their property is put so
long as they do not discriminate against NLRA-protected
activity. The facially neutral limitation on the use of the
Respondent’s property set forth in Section 1.6 does not
discriminate against NLRA-protected activity: the use of
company resources to solicit or distribute is comprehen-
sively prohibited, regardless of the nature or purpose of
the solicitation or distribution. Therefore, I would find
the maintenance of Section 1.6 lawful under the Act.
My colleagues find Section 1.6 unlawful on the basis
that the blanket prohibition against using the Respond-
ent’s email system to solicit or distribute is contrary to
the Purple Communications presumption that employees
have a right to use their employer’s email system during
nonworking time to engage in NLRA-protected commu-
nications. As explained above, I disagree with Purple
Communications and I would not apply it. I would in-
stead apply the standard set forth in Register Guard, and
under that standard Section 1.6 is plainly lawful. Ac-
cordingly, I would dismiss this allegation.
2. Section 1.8—Employee Privacy
(2014 Code of Conduct)
Section 1.8 of the Respondent’s 2014 Code of Conduct
contains the following “Employee Privacy” provision:

25 First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 679
(1981).
26 Purple Communications, supra, slip op. at 27–28 (Member
Miscimarra, dissenting).
27 See Register Guard, 351 NLRB at 1114–1116.
Verizon Wireless acquires and retains personal infor-
mation about its employees in the normal course of op-
erations, such as for employee identification purposes
and provision of employee benefits. You must take
appropriate steps to protect all personal employee in-
formation, including social security numbers, identifi-
cation numbers, passwords, financial information and
residential telephone numbers and addresses.
You should never access, obtain or disclose another
employee’s personal information to persons inside or
outside of Verizon Wireless unless you are acting for
legitimate business purposes and in accordance with
applicable laws, legal process and company policies,
including obtaining any approvals necessary under
these policies.
Under the balancing test described in William Beau-
mont, I believe the Respondent’s maintenance of the
above rule does not violate Section 8(a)(1). The Re-
spondent has a substantial business interest in safeguard-
ing employee information that it “acquires and retains . .
. in the normal course of operations.” The Respondent is
duty-bound to protect the confidentiality of its employ-
ees’ personal information to meet its legal obligations
and to avoid exposing its employees to fraud, extortion,
and identity theft. Nobody can reasonably question the
importance of maintaining the confidentiality of infor-
mation such as social security numbers, identification
numbers, passwords, and financial information. Con-
versely, I believe the adverse impact of the above lan-
guage on NLRA-protected activity is comparatively
slight. Certainly, employees have a protected right to
share certain types of information regarding their
coworkers when they engage in concerted activity for
mutual aid or protection. However, Section 1.8 leaves
employees free to share this type of information provided
that the information has not been obtained from Verizon
Wireless. Consequently, Section 1.8 only restricts the
disclosure of employee information—including residen-
tial telephone numbers and addresses—acquired and re-
tained by the Respondent. Disclosing information con-
tained in the Respondent’s confidential files would not
typically be protected by the Act.28 Moreover, at this

28 See, e.g., Asheville School, Inc., 347 NLRB 877, 877 fn. 2 (2006)
(finding unprotected an accounting employee’s disclosure of other
employees’ confidential salary and wage data); International Business
Machines Corp., 265 NLRB 638, 638 (1982) (finding unprotected an
employee’s distribution of wage information from a confidential docu-
ment). My colleagues cite Rocky Mountain Eye Care Center, P.C., 363
NLRB No. 34 (2015), which they characterize as standing for the prop-
osition that “in certain circumstances, employees have a Section 7 right
to obtain the names and telephone numbers of employees from their
employer’s records.” Rocky Mountain Eye Care Center is the excep-
CELLCO PARTNERSHIP D/B/A VERIZON WIRELESS 9
point, the Board is only evaluating the mere maintenance
of this Code of Conduct provision, and there is no evi-
dence that the Respondent has applied it to prohibit actu-
al NLRA-protected activity. To the extent a future case
presents a situation where Section 1.8 has actually been
applied to restrict the exercise of Section 7 rights or to
penalize employees who have engaged in NLRA-
protected activity, the Board would have the opportunity
to independently examine whether the Respondent’s reli-
ance on Section 1.8, as applied, violated Section 8(a)(1).
See fn. 14, supra and accompanying text.
I would reach the same result under the Lutheran Her-
itage “reasonably construe” standard. The language of

tion that proves the rule. In that case, the employer records at issue
were contained in a system called Centricity, and the evidence revealed
that (i) employees had access to Centricity and were taught how to
access it during orientation, (ii) employees accessed Centricity to obtain
employees’ phone numbers for scheduling and other purposes, and (iii)
employees testified that they were told to put their contact information
into Centricity in case anyone needed to contact them. Id., slip op. at
10. In that context, the judge found—and the Board adopted the
judge’s finding—that “the message conveyed to employees, both dur-
ing orientation and as a matter of practice, was that the [Centricity]
system was . . . the place to access employees’ contact information.”
Id. On this basis, the Board concluded that “the gathering of employee
first names and phone numbers” from Centricity and the “disclosure of
the information to the union agent for organizing purposes fall within
Section 7 protected conduct.” Id. In the same decision, however, the
judge—adopted by the Board—cited several cases (including Interna-
tional Business Machines, supra) holding that removing information
from confidential employer files and doing so outside the normal
course of work activity is not protected by the Act. This is clearly the
type of unprotected conduct that Section 1.8 addresses.
The Board’s final rule on representation-case procedures, 79 Fed.
Reg. 74308 (Dec. 15, 2014) (Election Rule), supports my view that
Section 1.8 is lawful. As revised by the Election Rule, Sections
102.62(d) and 102.67(l) of the Board’s Rules and Regulations require
the employer to provide the regional director and other relevant parties
a voter list containing employee contact information (including “home
addresses, available personal email addresses, and available home and
personal cellular (‘cell’) telephone numbers”) only at a specified time
after certain conditions have been met—i.e., within 2 business days
after the regional director approves an election agreement or issues a
direction of election. Importantly, the Board’s rules mandate that in-
formation contained in a voter list may not be used “for purposes other
than the representation proceeding, Board proceedings arising from it,
and related matters.” Although I dissented from the Election Rule
along with former Member Johnson, see 79 Fed. Reg. at 74430–
74460—including from the Board majority’s expansion of required
voter-list disclosures to include email addresses and home and personal
cellphone numbers, id. at 74452–74454—the limitations described
above regarding personal contact information contained in voter lists
reflect that the majority, although misguided in the scope of disclosures
they required, was nonetheless aware of the risks those disclosures pose
for employees and sought to mitigate those risks. Yet my colleagues
today anomalously find that an employer interferes with, restrains, or
coerces its employees in the exercise of their NLRA-protected rights in
violation of Sec. 8(a)(1) if it maintains a rule that limits the circum-
stances under which employees may obtain and disclose their cowork-
ers’ personal contact information—even though the Board itself has
imposed safeguards of its own.
Section 1.8 informs any reasonable employee that the
rule only pertains to personal information that the Re-
spondent “acquires and retains in the normal course of
operations.” That is, employees would understand they
are prohibited from “access[ing], obtain[ing], or dis-
clos[ing]” personal information from the Respondent’s
confidential records and would thus not interpret the rule
to prohibit Section 7 activity.29
3. Section 1.8—Employee Privacy
(2015 Code of Conduct)
For the 2015 Code of Conduct, the Respondent revised
Section 1.8 as follows:
You must take appropriate steps to protect confidential
personal employee information, including social securi-
ty numbers, identification numbers, passwords, bank
account information and medical information. You
should never access or obtain, and may not disclose
outside of Verizon, another employee’s personal in-
formation obtained from Verizon business records or
systems unless you are acting for legitimate business
purposes and in accordance with applicable laws, legal
process and company policies, including obtaining any
approvals necessary under those policies.
This version of Section 1.8, implemented at most but not all
of the Respondent’s facilities, is even more clearly lawful
than the 2014 version. The Respondent removed any possi-
ble adverse impact on NLRA-protected activity by omitting
the reference to “residential telephone numbers and ad-
dresses” and making even clearer that the rule prohibits
accessing, obtaining, and disclosing “confidential employee
information”—such as “social security numbers, identifica-
tion numbers, passwords, bank account information and
medical information,” information that is indisputably sensi-
tive—from its “business records or systems.” Without any
impact on NLRA-protected activity to balance against the
Respondent’s legitimate interests in maintaining the rule,
the 2015 revision of Section 1.8 does not violate Section
8(a)(1), and I would reach the same result under the Luther-
an Heritage “reasonably construe” standard. I therefore

29 See, e.g., Super K-Mart, 330 NLRB 263, 263–264 (1999) (finding
lawful employer’s rule providing that “[c]ompany business and docu-
ments are confidential. Disclosure of such information is prohibited.”).
Contrary to the proscription in Lutheran Heritage to “refrain from
reading particular phrases in isolation,” 343 NLRB at 646, my col-
leagues read the second paragraph of Section 1.8 in isolation from the
first paragraph. I believe employees would not do likewise. I think
they would reasonably understand that the phrase “another employee’s
personal information” in the second paragraph refers to the “personal
information about . . . employees” that the Respondent “acquires and
retains . . . in the normal course of operations” described immediately
above in the first paragraph.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD10
concur with my colleagues’ finding that the 2015 version of
Section 1.8 is lawful.
4. Section 2.1.3—Activities Outside of Verizon Wireless
(2014 and 2015 Versions of the Code of Conduct)
Section 2.1.3 of both the 2014 and 2015 versions of
the Code of Conduct contains the following language
(emphasis added):
Many employees participate in an individual capacity
in outside organizations (such as their local school
board or homeowners’ association). Memberships in
these associations can cause conflicts if they require
decisions regarding Verizon Wireless or its products. If
you are a member of an outside organization, you must
remove yourself from discussing or voting on any mat-
ter that involves the interests of Verizon Wireless or its
competitors. You must also disclose this conflict to
your outside organization without disclosing non-
public company information and you must disclose any
such potential conflict to the VZ Compliance Guide-
line. Participation in any outside organization should
not interfere with your work for Verizon Wireless. To
the extent that your participation infringes on company
time or involves the use of Verizon Wireless resources,
your supervisor’s approval is required.
Balancing respective rights and interests, I believe the
above language violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. It is
possible that Section 2.1.3 was merely intended to ad-
dress conflicts of interest that have nothing to do with the
NLRA—for example, as stated in the first sentence
above, where a Verizon employee participates on the
local school board. If the local school board decides
whether to contract for wireless service with Verizon
Wireless or one of its competitors, the Respondent clear-
ly has a substantial interest in ensuring that a Verizon
Wireless employee plays no role in that decision. Yet, a
central aspect of the NLRA is the possibility that em-
ployees may desire to have “outside organizations”—
specifically, unions—represent them regarding their
wages, hours and terms and conditions of employment.
Without a doubt, an employee’s participation in such an
“outside organization” may “interfere with” his or her
work. Specifically, employees have a protected right to
engage in a work stoppage, which may “interfere with”
their work, and employers cannot lawfully require em-
ployees to secure a “supervisor’s approval” before en-
gaging in an NLRA-protected strike. For these reasons, I
believe that Section 2.1.3—though it advances a legiti-
mate purpose unrelated to the NLRA—has an adverse
impact on NLRA-protected activity that outweighs the
legitimate interests served by the rule. On this basis, I
concur with my colleagues’ finding that the maintenance
of Section 2.1.3 violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
5. Section 3.3—Proper Use of Verizon Wireless Property
and Property Owned by Others
(2014 and 2015 Codes of Conduct)
Both versions of the Code of Conduct contain in Sec-
tion 3.3 the following provision: “Unless permitted by
written company policy, it is never appropriate to use
Verizon Wireless machinery, switching equipment or
vehicles for personal purposes, or any device or system
to obtain unauthorized free or discount services.” The
General Counsel contends that this rule limits the use of
the Respondent’s email system during nonworking time
for NLRA-protected communications in contravention of
Purple Communications, supra.
My colleagues dismiss this allegation on the basis that
Section 3.3 does not pertain to the Respondent’s email
system and thus does not implicate Purple Communica-
tions. I agree that this allegation warrants dismissal, but
for reasons different from those relied upon by my col-
leagues, As explained above, I disagree with Purple
Communications. Therefore, even assuming Section 3.3
limits the use of the Respondent’s email system, there is
nothing unlawful, in my view, in a policy that limits the
use of an employer’s email system to business purposes
where, as here, the employer does not discriminate
against NLRA-protected activity.
6. Section 3.4.1—Prohibited Activities (2014 and 2015
Versions of the Code of Conduct)
Section 3.4.1 of both the 2014 and 2015 versions of
the Code of Conduct contains the following prohibitions
regarding the use of the Respondent’s email and internet:
You may never use company systems (such as e-mail,
instant messaging, the Intranet or Internet) to engage in
activities that are unlawful, violate company policies or
result in Verizon Wireless’ liability or embarrassment.
Some examples of inappropriate uses of the Internet
and e-mail include: Pornographic, obscene, offensive,
harassing or discriminatory content; Chain letters, pyr-
amid schemes or unauthorized mass distributions;
Communications primarily directed to a group of em-
ployees inside the company on behalf of an outside or-
ganization.
Like Section 1.6 and possibly Section 3.3, Section 3.4.1
limits the use of the Respondent’s email system (and other
digital systems) for certain non-business purposes without
discriminating against NLRA-protected activity by distin-
guishing between permitted and prohibited uses along Sec-
tion 7 lines. Applying the standard set forth in Register
Guard, supra, I would find this rule lawful.
CELLCO PARTNERSHIP D/B/A VERIZON WIRELESS 11
My colleagues find Section 3.4.1 unlawful under Pur-
ple Communications to the extent that it prohibits the use
of the Respondent’s email system for “unauthorized
mass distributions” and “[c]ommunications primarily
directed to a group of employees inside the company on
behalf of an outside organization.” They find that em-
ployees would read Section 3.4.1 to limit the use of the
Respondent’s email system during nonworking time to
engage in NLRA-protected communications. As ex-
plained above, I disagree with Purple Communications,
and I believe employers may lawfully control the use of
their email and other digital systems so long as they do
not discriminate against NLRA-protected uses.
7. Conclusion—Theft or Unauthorized Access, Use,
or Disclosure
(2014 and 2015 Versions of the Code of Conduct)
The “Conclusion” of both the 2014 and 2015 versions
of the Code of Conduct begins by informing employees
that “[i]t is not possible to describe all unethical or illegal
business practices in detail. The best guidelines are indi-
vidual conscience, common sense and unwavering com-
pliance with all company policies, applicable laws, regu-
lations and contractual obligations.” The Conclusion
then lists some “examples of actions considered illegal or
unacceptable,” including “[t]heft or unauthorized access,
use or disclosure of company, customer or employee
records, data, funds, property or information (whether or
not it is proprietary).” The General Counsel contends
that the Conclusion is unlawful on the basis that it pro-
hibits “unauthorized access, use or disclosure of . . . em-
ployee records, data . . . or information.”
I believe this provision is lawful. “[E]mployee rec-
ords, data . . . or information” includes the types of per-
sonal information about employees referenced in Section
1.8, such as Social Security numbers, identification num-
bers, passwords, financial information, and medical in-
formation. As explained above in the discussion of Sec-
tion 1.8, the Respondent has substantial interests associ-
ated with preserving and protecting the confidentiality of
these types of information.
The Conclusion is phrased more generally and broadly
than Section 1.8. It prohibits any employee’s unauthor-
ized “use” or “disclosure” of employee “data” or em-
ployee “information.” Therefore, the prohibition against
using or disclosing “employee data . . . or information”
could potentially encompass an employee’s disclosure of
employment-related terms and conditions of employ-
ment, and our statute protects the right of employees to
discuss and engage in concerted activities for mutual aid
or protection regarding these matters. However, for sev-
eral reasons, I believe that Respondent’s mere inclusion
of this language in its Code of Conduct does not violate
the Act.
First, the Conclusion’s language—even if interpreted
broadly—has a comparatively slight adverse impact on
NLRA-protected activity, and I believe it is not reasona-
ble to interpret its language in isolation. The disputed
language is set forth in a “Conclusion,” which would
most reasonably be regarded as a general summary of
more detailed restrictions that have preceded it. There-
fore, I do not believe the “Conclusion” language can be
reasonably construed as an independent source of addi-
tional specific rules. This is implied by the Conclusion
itself, which states in the first sentence: “It is not possi-
ble to describe all unethical or illegal business practices
in detail.” The second sentence—”[t]he best guidelines
are individual conscience, common sense and unwaver-
ing compliance with all company policies, applicable
laws, regulations and contractual obligations”—
reinforces this view of the Conclusion as a general sum-
mary. Furthermore, its reference to “applicable laws”
would include the NLRA. To the extent that the lan-
guage of the Conclusion is given a broader interpretation,
I believe the Board should still find that it is lawful be-
cause (i) the vast majority of conduct potentially covered
by the language does not implicate the NLRA, and (ii)
the mere existence of ambiguity in an employment policy
that has self-evident lawful purposes should not result in
a Board finding that it violates the Act. See fns. 9–10,
supra and accompanying text. Again, a different situa-
tion may be presented if the Respondent applied the
Conclusion’s language against actual NLRA-protected
activity in the future,30 but the issue here is whether Re-
spondent’s mere maintenance of this Code of Conduct
language violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Applying
the William Beaumont standard, I would find it does not.
8. Conclusion—Disparagement or Misrepresentation
(2014 and 2015 Codes of Conduct)
The Conclusion of both the 2014 and 2015 versions of
the Code of Conduct also prohibits “[d]isparaging or
misrepresenting the company’s products or services or its
employees.” This language contains two distinct prohi-
bitions: (1) a prohibition on disparaging or misrepresent-
ing the Respondent’s products or services, and (2) a pro-
hibition on disparaging or misrepresenting the Respond-
ent’s employees. I believe the Board should find both
prohibitions lawful.
As to the first prohibition, a business’s success, even
its continued existence, depends to a great extent on its
reputation. Thus, substantial interests unrelated to the
NLRA warrant protecting the Respondent’s commercial

30 See fn. 14, supra and accompanying text.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD12
image from harm that might be inflicted on it by dispar-
agement or misrepresentation of its products or services.
Along similar lines, the Board has found that disparage-
ment by employees of an employer’s products or services
is unprotected by the Act31 unless the communication
“indicate[s] it is related to an ongoing dispute between
the employees and the employer and the communication
is not so disloyal, reckless, or maliciously untrue as to
lose the Act’s protection.”32 For this reason, I believe the
first prohibition has a potential adverse impact on
NLRA-protected activity that is comparatively slight and
outweighed by the Respondent’s substantial interests.
Second, the Respondent and its employees have a le-
gitimate interest in preventing employees from being
disparaged and misrepresented by their coworkers.
“Disparagement” and “misrepresentation” describe
statements that are not merely inaccurate, but that attack
the person or convey something untruthful about them.
To “disparage” means “to describe (someone or some-
thing) as unimportant, weak, bad, etc.” or “to lower in
rank or reputation,” and its synonyms include “bad-
mouth,” “belittle,” and “put down.”33 To “misrepresent”
means “to give a false or misleading representation of
usually with an intent to deceive or be unfair.”34 While
NLRA-protected activity may involve criticism of
coworkers, supervisors, and managers, employees are
capable of exercising their Section 7 rights without re-
sorting to disparagement and misrepresentation,35 and I
do not believe Congress intended that Federal law would
be violated when an employer advises its employees that
they should not disparage or misrepresent each other.
For these reasons, I believe the Board should conclude
that the Code of Conduct language regarding disparage-
ment and misrepresentation does not violate the Act.
CONCLUSION
Based on the considerations discussed above, I re-
spectfully dissent in part and concur in part in this case.

31 See NLRB v. Electrical Workers UE Local 1229 (Jefferson Stand-
ard), 346 U.S. 464 (1953) (holding that employees were not protected
by the Act in making “a sharp, public, disparaging attack upon the
quality of [their employer’s] product and its business policies, in a
manner reasonably calculated to harm the company’s reputation and
reduce its income”).
32 Mountain Shadows Golf Resort, 330 NLRB 1238, 1240 (2000).
33 See http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/disparage and
http://www.merriam-webster.com/thesaurus/disparage (last viewed
Feb. 24, 2017).
34 See http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/misrepresent
(last viewed Feb. 24, 2017).
35 See Adtranz ABB Daimler-Benz, 253 F.3d at 27 (an employer does
not violate the Act when it demands that its employees “comply with
generally accepted notions of civility”).
Dated, Washington, D.C. February 24, 2017
______________________________________
Philip A. Miscimarra, Acting Chairman
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and
obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on
your behalf
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.
WE WILL NOT maintain Section 1.6 Solicitation and
Fundraising in our 2014 and 2015 Codes of Conduct
prohibiting you from “the use of company resources at
any time (emails, fax machines, computers, telephones,
etc.) to solicit or distribute.”
WE WILL NOT maintain Section 1.8 Employee Privacy
in our 2014 Code of Conduct requiring you to “take ap-
propriate steps to protect all personal employee infor-
mation, including . . . residential telephone numbers and
addresses,” and prohibiting you from “access[ing], ob-
tain[ing] or disclos[ing] another employee’s personal
information to persons inside or outside of Verizon Wire-
less unless you are acting for legitimate business purpos-
es and in accordance with applicable laws, legal process
and company policies, including obtaining any approvals
necessary under these policies.”
WE WILL NOT maintain Section 2.1.3 Activities Out-
side of Verizon Wireless in our 2014 and 2015 Codes of
Conduct stating that membership in outside organizations
or associations “can cause conflicts if they require deci-
sions regarding Verizon Wireless or its products” and
requiring employees who are members of an outside or-
ganization to “remove yourself from discussing or voting
on any matter that involves the interests of Verizon
Wireless or its competitors,” “disclose this conflict to
your outside organization without disclosing non-public
CELLCO PARTNERSHIP D/B/A VERIZON WIRELESS 13
company information,” and “disclose any such potential
conflict to the VZ Compliance Guideline.”
WE WILL NOT maintain Section 3.4.1 Prohibited Activ-
ities in our 2014 and 2015 Codes of Conduct prohibiting
you from “us[ing] company systems (such as e-mail,
instant messaging, the Intranet or Internet) to engage in
activities that . . . result in Verizon Wireless’ . . . embar-
rassment,” or a rule listing the following as some exam-
ples of inappropriate uses of the company systems:
“[U]nauthorized mass distributions”; and
“Communications primarily directed to a group of em-
ployees inside the company on behalf of an outside or-
ganization.”
WE WILL NOT maintain the Conclusion in our 2014 and
2015 Codes of Conduct that states that the following are
examples of actions considered illegal or unacceptable:
“Theft or unauthorized access, use or disclosure of
company, customer or employee records, data, funds,
property or information (whether or not it is proprie-
tary)”; and
“Disparaging or misrepresenting the company’s prod-
ucts or services or its employees.”
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
listed above.
WE WILL rescind the above rules (Section 1.6 Solicita-
tion and Fundraising in the 2014 and 2015 Codes of
Conduct, Section 1.8 Employee Privacy in the 2014
Code of Conduct, Section 2.1.3 Activities Outside of
Verizon Wireless in the 2014 and 2015 Codes of Con-
duct, Section 3.4.1 Prohibited Activities in the 2014 and
2015 Codes of Conduct, and the two unlawful bullet
points in the Conclusion in the 2014 and 2015 Codes of
Conduct) at all of our offices and places of business
throughout the United States where they are in effect.
WE WILL furnish all of our employees with inserts for
the 2014 and 2015 Codes of Conduct presently in effect
at their respective offices and places of business that (1)
advise that the above rules have been rescinded, or (2)
provide the language of lawful rules; or WE WILL publish
and distribute revised 2014 and 2015 Codes of Conduct
that (1) do not include the above rules, or (2) provide the
language of lawful rules.
CELLCO PARTNERSHIP D/B/A VERIZON
WIRELESS
The Board’s decision can be found at
www.nlrb.gov/case/28-CA-145221 or by using the QR code
below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision
from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations
Board, 1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20570, or
by calling (202) 273–1940.
Alexander J. Gancayco, Esq., for the General Counsel.
E. Michael Rossman, Esq, for the Respondent.
DECISION
MARY MILLER CRACRAFT, Administrative Law Judge. This
case was submitted pursuant to the parties’ joint motion and
stipulation of facts, accepted and approved on August 4, 2015.1
The complaint, as amended, alleges that Cellco Partnership
d/b/a Verizon Wireless (Respondent or Verizon Wireless) vio-
lated Section 8(a)(1)2 of the National Labor Relations Act (the
Act) by maintaining certain handbook rules which interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of rights
guaranteed in Section 73 of the Act.
On the entire record and after considering the briefs filed by
counsel for the General Counsel and counsel for Respondent,
the following findings of fact and conclusions of law are made.
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent is a Delaware general partnership with a princi-
pal office and place of business located in Basking Ridge, New
Jersey. It has offices and places of business throughout the
United States where it is engaged in the business of providing
wireless telecommunications
services throughout the United States including an office and
place of business located in Chandler, Arizona. The parties
stipulate that Respondent is engaged in interstate commerce
pursuant to the Board’s retail jurisdictional standard. Thus, the
parties further stipulate and I find that Respondent is an em-
ployer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section
2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. Thus, this dispute affects com-
merce and the Board has jurisdiction of this case pursuant to
Section 10(a) of the Act.

1 Charging Party Sarah Parrish filed the underlying unfair labor prac-
tice charge on January 28, 2015. Complaint issued on April 30, 2015.
2 Sec. 8(a)(1) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. §158(a)(1), provides, “It shall be
an unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere with, restrain, or
coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7 of
the Act.”
3 Sec. 7 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. §157, provides inter alia that, “Em-
ployees shall have the right to self-organization . . . and to engage in
other concerted activities for the purposes of . . . mutual aid or protec-
tion. . . .”
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD14
II. UNLAWFUL RULES ALLEGATIONS
A. Facts in General
Respondent promulgated its 2014 Code of Conduct prior to
August 2014. Until April 29, 2015, Respondent maintained the
2014 Code of Conduct at all of its offices throughout the United
States. On or about April 29, 2015, Respondent promulgated
the 2015 Code of Conduct. Since that time, Respondent has
maintained the 2015 Code of Conduct at most of its other offic-
es and places of business throughout the United States. At a
handful of Respondent’s facilities, the 2014 Code of Conduct
remains in place.
Four of the five rules at issue in this proceeding were main-
tained in identical wording in the 2014 Code of Conduct and
the 2015 Code of Conduct. Thus, the 2015 Code of Conduct
retains without change the prior 2014 Code of Conduct provi-
sions Section 1.6 Solicitation and Fundraising, Section 2.1.3
Activities Outside of Verizon Wireless, Section 3.3 Proper Use
of Verizon Wireless’ Property and Property Owned by Others,
and Section 3.4.1 Prohibited Activities. However, a fifth rule,
Section 1.8 Employee Privacy, was altered in the 2015 Code of
Conduct. Both the 2014 and the 2015 versions of the Employee
Privacy provisions are alleged to be unlawful.
B. Standard of Review in General
By its literal terms, Section 7 provides employees with “the
right to self-organization” and the right to act together for their
“mutual aid or protection.” These words have been interpreted
to protect employees right to communicate with each other
regarding their workplace terms and conditions of employ-
ment.4 Thus, the guarantee of Section 7 rights includes not only
the right of employees to discuss organization but also the right
to discuss wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employ-
ment.5
If a work rule would reasonably tend to chill employees in
the exercise of their Section 7 rights, it will violate Section
8(a)(1) of the Act. Hyundai America Shipping Agency, 357
NLRB 860, 861 (2011); Lafayette Park Hotel, 326 NLRB 824,
825 (1998), enfd. 203 F.3d 52 (D.C. Cir. 1999). A violation
may occur merely by maintenance of such a rule—even in the
absence of enforcement. Lafayette Park Hotel, supra; see also,
Cintas Corp., 344 NLRB 943 (2005), enfd.482 F.3d 463 (D.C.
Cir. 2007).
A rule which explicitly restricts Section 7 rights is unlawful.
Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia, 343 NLRB 646 (2004). In
the absence of explicit restriction, a violation will nevertheless
be found if (1) employees would reasonably construe the lan-
guage to prohibit Section 7 activity; (2) the rule was promul-
gated in response to union activity; or (3) the rule has been
applied to restrict Section 7 rights. Id. at 646–647. There is no
allegation that any of these rules were promulgated in response
to union activity or to restrict Section 7 rights. Thus, the sole

4 Parexel International, LLC, 356 NLRB 516, 518 (2011), citing
Aroostook County Regional Ophthalmology Center, 317 NLRB 218,
220 (1995), enfd. in part 81 F.3d 209 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (discussions
regarding wages, the core of Section 7 rights, are the grist on which
concerted activity feeds).
5 Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539, 542, 543 (1972).
inquiry here is whether employees would reasonably construe
the language to prohibit Section 7 activity. In determining
whether a challenged rule is unlawful, the rule must be given a
reasonable reading and particular phrases may not be read in
isolation. Lafayette Park, supra, 326 NLRB at 825, 827. In
other words, there is no presumption of improper interference
with employee rights. Id.
C. 2014 and 2015 Code of Conduct Section 1.6 Solicitation
and Fundraising
Solicitation and fundraising distract from work time produc-
tivity, may be perceived as coercive and may be unlawful.
Solicitation during work time (defined as the work time of ei-
ther the employee making or receiving the solicitation), the
distribution of non-business literature in work areas at any
time or the use of company resources at any time (emails, fax
machines, computers, telephones, etc.) to solicit or distribute,
is prohibited. Non-employees may not engaged in solicitation
or distribution of literature on company premises. The only
exception to this policy is where the company has authorized
communications relating to benefits or services made availa-
ble to employees by the company, company-sponsored chari-
table organizations or other company-sponsored events or ac-
tivities. To determine whether a particular activity is author-
ized by the company, contact the VZ Compliance Guideline.6
In Purple Communications, Inc., 361 NLRB No. 126, slip
op. at 1 (2014), the Board held that “employee use of email for
statutorily protected communications on nonworking time must
presumptively be permitted by employers who have chosen to
give employees access to their email.” Thus, the Board over-
ruled Register Guard,7 which held employees have no right to
use their employer’s email system for Section 7 purposes, as
“clearly incorrect” because it focused too much on employer
property rights and “too little on the importance of email as a
means of workplace communications.” Id. The parties stipulat-
ed that Respondent customarily communicates with its employ-
ees by email and through an intranet system.
Respondent’s rule specifically prohibits use of company re-
sources (emails, fax machines, computers, telephones, etc.) to
solicit or distribute at any time. This rule is contrary to the Pur-

6 The Compliance Guideline is referred to in the Code of Conduct as
an 800 number to call to report anonymous or confidential complaints
or inquiries; reports of discrimination or harassment; questions or con-
cerns about financial statements, reporting, accounting, internal ac-
counting controls or auditing; claims of harassment; workplace safety
and environment concerns; arrest for a felony or crime of dishonesty,
assault or battery, drug-related or alcohol-related offense; potential
conflicts of interest; request for approval of outside employment; mis-
leading, erroneous, or falsified financial records; improper disclosure of
nonpublic information; wage claims; unauthorized disclosure of cus-
tomer information; to seek approval of a gift worth more than $100,
entertainment worth more than $200, or a gift of travel; and for certain
issues regarding export and foreign transactions. An Office of Integrity
and Compliance is referred to in the introduction of the Code of Con-
duct. Use of the Compliance Guideline is suggested if a supervisor
refuses to modify a request that an employee violate the Code.
7 351 NLRB 1110 (2007), enfd. in relevant part and remanded sub
nom. Guard Publishing v. NLRB, 571 F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
CELLCO PARTNERSHIP D/B/A VERIZON WIRELESS 15
ple Communications presumption that employees have a right
to use Respondent’s email system to engage in Section 7 com-
munications during their nonworking time.8 No special circum-
stances are present nor does Respondent argue that special cir-
cumstances justify a restriction in order to maintain production
and discipline.
Respondent’s rule prohibits both solicitation and distribution.
In Purple Communications, the Board explained that email “is
fundamentally a forum for communication.”9 The Board found
it inappropriate to treat email as “solicitation” or “distribution”
per se,10 recognizing that as a forum of communication it con-
stituted solicitation, literature or information, distribution or
merely communication that is none of those but nevertheless
constitutes protected, concerted activity.11 Thus both the prohi-
bition on solicitation as well as the prohibition of distribution
contravene the holding of Purple Communications.
Accordingly, I find that since August 2014, Respondent has
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by maintenance its 2014 and
2015 Code of Conduct Section 1.6 Solicitation and Fundraising
policy that prohibits employees’ use of its email system to en-
gage in solicitation or distribution including Section 7-protected
communications during nonworking time.
D. 2014 Code of Conduct Section 1.8 Employee Privacy
Since at least August 2014, the Employee Privacy Code of
Conduct has provided:
Verizon Wireless acquires and retains personal information
about its employees in the normal course of operations, such
as for employee identification purposes and provision of em-
ployee benefits. You must take appropriate steps to protect all
personal employee information, including social security
numbers, identification numbers, passwords, financial infor-
mation and residential telephone numbers and addresses.
You should never access, obtain or disclose another employ-
ee’s personal information to persons inside or outside of Veri-
zon Wireless unless you are acting for legitimate business
purposes and in accordance with applicable laws, legal pro-
cess and company policies, including obtaining any approvals
necessary under these policies.
Relying on Cintas Corp v. NLRB., 482 F.3d 463, 468–469
(D.C. Cir. 2007) and Fresh & Easy Neighborhood Market, 361
NLRB No. 8, slip op. at 2–3 (2014), the General Counsel con-
tends that this rule interferes with employees’ right to com-
municate about their terms and conditions of employment and
would be reasonably understood to prohibit employees from
disclosing employee personal information as part of union or-
ganizing or for other protected, concerted activities. Respond-
ent, on the other hand, argues that the rule is lawful. Noting that
it extends to “financial information and residential telephone
numbers and addresses,” Respondent argues that this prohibi-

8 In a pre-Purple Communications decision, Administrative Law
Judge William Nelson Cates analyzed an identical rule and found that it
did not violate the Act. See Verizon Wireless, JD(ATL)–24–14 (July
25, 2014), pending on exceptions before the Board.
9 Purple Communications, supra, slip op. at 11.
10 Purple Communications, supra, slip op. at 12.
11 Purple Communications, supra, slip op. at 12–13.
tion was limited only to information that it acquired and re-
tained in the normal course of operations. Thus, Respondent
claims it may protect the information it has obtained and re-
tained in its own files.
Employers have a substantial and legitimate interest in main-
taining the privacy of certain business information. Super K-
Mart, 330 NLRB 263 (1999); Lafayette Park Hotel, 326 NLRB
824, 826 (1998), enfd 203 F3d 52 (D.C. Cir. 1992). Thus, pro-
hibitions on disclosing confidential information are lawful if,
viewed in context, employees would not reasonably understand
that Section 7-related activity was proscribed by the rule. Super
K-Mart, supra, (rule would be understood to protect employer’s
legitimate interest in confidentiality of its private information
such as guest information, trade secrets, and contracts with
suppliers); Lafayette Park Hotel, supra (rule prohibiting disclo-
sure of hotel-private information would not be reasonably un-
derstood to proscribe Section 7-related activity).
The 2014 Code of Conduct Employee Privacy rule is broadly
worded and, in my view, would be reasonably read to prohibit
employees from discussing wages, hours, and terms and condi-
tions of employment or disclosing employee information to a
labor organization or for other protected, concerted activity.
Similar rules have been held unlawful. For instance, in MCPc,
Inc., 360 NLRB No. 39, slip op. 1 (2014), the Board found a
rule prohibiting distribution of personal or financial infor-
mation, etc., would reasonably be construed to prohibit discus-
sion of wages or other terms and conditions of employment
with coworkers—activity protected by Section 7 of the Act.12
Further, I take administrative notice that in a prior case in-
volving the same rule, the administrative law judge found a
violation.13 Thus I find that since August 2014 until April 29,
2015 at all but a handful of facilities, Respondent violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) of the Act by maintaining the 2014 Code of Con-
duct Section 1.8 Employee Privacy. At the handful of facilities
where the 2014 Code of Conduct Section 1.8 Employee Privacy
is still in effect, the violation continues to date.
E. 2015 Code of Conduct Section 1.8 Employee Privacy
Since April 29, 2015, Respondent has maintained the follow-
ing employee privacy rule:
You must take appropriate steps to protect confidential per-
sonal employee information, including social security num-
bers, identification numbers, passwords, bank account infor-
mation and medical information. You should never access or
obtain, and may not disclose outside of Verizon, another em-

12 See also, Hyundai, supra, 357 NLRB 860, 871 (prohibition of dis-
closure of any information exchanged on company email, instant mes-
sages, and phone systems would reasonably include wage and salary
information, disciplinary actions, performance evaluations and other
information of common concern to employees); and Cintas Corp., 344
NLRB 943, 943 (2005), enfd. in relevant part 482 F.3d 463 (D.C. Cir.
2007) (rule’s unqualified prohibition of the release of “any infor-
mation” regarding “its partners” could be reasonably construed by
employees to restrict discussion of wages and other terms and condi-
tions of employment).
13 Verizon Wireless, JD(ATL)–24–14 (July 25, 2014), Administra-
tive Law Judge William Nelson Cates, JD 9:33–10:43, pending on
exceptions to the Board.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD16
ployee’s personal information obtained from Verizon busi-
ness records or systems unless you are acting for legitimate
business purposes and in accordance with applicable laws, le-
gal process and company policies, including obtaining any
approvals necessary under those policies.
The General Counsel alleges that this rule is overbroad be-
cause it would be reasonably understood to require employees
to protect personal employee information noting there is no
limitation to make it clear that the rule does not restrict infor-
mation implicating Section 7 concerns. Thus, the General
Counsel argues, an employee would not understand whether
terms and conditions of employment were encompassed within
the rule. Further, the General Counsel contends that the re-
striction on disclosure of “personal information obtained from
Verizon business records” is overly broad because it would
reasonably be read to bar employees from obtaining time card
or schedule information, disciplinary information, and person-
nel records in furtherance of an organizing campaign or other
concerted activity.
Respondent argues that the 2015 rule is clearly aimed at pre-
serving the confidentiality of social security numbers, identifi-
cation numbers, passwords, bank account information and med-
ical information. Relying on Super K-Mart, supra, Respondent
asserts that employees would readily understand that the rule
was designed to protect the legitimate employer interest in con-
fidentiality of private information. Further Respondent notes
that the rule does not prohibit employees from discussing wag-
es or working conditions. Thus, Respondent claims that when
read in context, it is clear that the scope of the rule is narrow:
social security numbers, identification numbers, passwords,
bank account information and medical information. Thus, Re-
spondent concludes that it would be unreasonable to extend the
scope of the rule.
In Super K-Mart, supra, the employer’s rule provided,
“Company business and documents are confidential. Disclosure
of such information is prohibited.” In Lafayette Park, supra, the
employer’s rule precluded, “Divulging Hotel-private infor-
mation to employees or other individuals or entities that are not
authorized to receive that information.” In both instances, the
Board noted that the rules did not explicitly preclude discussion
of wages or working conditions. Thus, the Board held that
those rules were lawfully addressed to protecting the employ-
ers’ legitimate business interest and did not implicate employ-
ees’ Section 7 rights.
Similarly, I am convinced that when read in context, Re-
spondent’s 2015 Code of Conduct Section 1.8 Employee Priva-
cy would not be understood to implicate employees’ Section 7
rights. The rule has two sentences. In the first sentence, the
phrase “confidential personal employee information” specifi-
cally includes “social security number, identification numbers,
passwords, bank account information and medical infor-
mation.” This information is legitimately protected confidential
information. Possible ambiguity might have resulted if the first
sentence of the rule specifically recited typical expansive lan-
guage such as “including but not limited to.” But here the first
sentence uses the term “including.” A literal reading of the
second sentence might fault it for changing the first sentence’s
term “confidential personal employee information” to “em-
ployee’s personal information.” Redundancy of the first sen-
tence term in the second sentence would have provided a posi-
tive indication that the second sentence referred to the same
phrase and the same specific information used in the first sen-
tence. However, a reasonable reading of the first and second
sentences in context indicates that the same information is ref-
erenced in both sentences. That is, reasonable reading of the
second sentence in context is that employees should never ac-
cess, obtain, or disclose another employee’s social security
number, identification number, password, bank account infor-
mation, or medical information unless acting for legitimate
business purposes. Thus I find that Respondent’s 2015 Code of
Conduct Section 1.8 Employee Privacy does not tend to chill
Section 7 activity and does not violate Section 8(a)(1).
F. 2014 and 2015 Code of Conduct Section 2.1.3 Activities
Outside of Verizon Wireless
Section 2 of the Code of Conduct (2014 and 2015) is entitled
“Maintaining Integrity and Fairness in the Workplace. Section
2.1 “Avoiding Conflicts of Interest” states “You must disclose
any potential or actual conflict to the Compliance Guideline.
This chapter addresses some of the most common conflicts.” A
series of questions and answers is set forth in the left margin of
the section. One such question is “I need to make extra money
and I want to get a second job. Is this a problem?” The answer:
“This may create a conflict of interest if your second job pro-
vides any of the same types of services or products as Verizon
Wireless, compromises Verizon Wireless’ interests or adversely
affects your job performance.”
Section 2.1.1 sets forth personal conflicts of interest while
Section 2.1.2 sets forth conflicts which might arise from em-
ployment outside of Verizon Wireless. Section 2.1.3 (the first
paragraph of this section is at issue here) is entitled “Activities
Outside of Verizon Wireless.” The Code continues with Section
2.2 regarding political conflicts of interest, Section 2.2.1 re-
garding personal political interests, Section 2.2.2 dealing with
contributions of corporate assets, and Section 2.2.3 regarding
seeking public office. Section 2.3 deals with insider trading.
Situated midway in Section 2, the first paragraph of Section
2.1.3 provides,
Many employees participate in an individual capacity in out-
side organizations (such as their local school board or home-
owners’ association). Memberships in these associations can
cause conflicts if they require decisions regarding Verizon
Wireless or its products. If you are a member of an outside
organization, you must remove yourself from discussing or
voting on any matter that involves the interests of Verizon
Wireless or its competitors. You must also disclose this con-
flict to your outside organization without disclosing non-
public company information and you must disclose any such
potential conflict to the VZ Compliance Guideline. Participa-
tion in any outside organization should not interfere with your
work for Verizon Wireless. To the extent that your participa-
tion infringes on company time or involves the use of Verizon
Wireless resources, your supervisor’s approval is required.
The General Counsel argues that this rule is impermissibly
CELLCO PARTNERSHIP D/B/A VERIZON WIRELESS 17
overbroad because it can reasonably be read to indicate that a
conflict of interest is created by engaging in Section 7 activi-
ties. Second, the General Counsel asserts that the ban on dis-
closing non-public information is overly broad. Finally, the
General Counsel contends that rules requiring employees to
disclose their protected activities to their employer are unlaw-
ful.
Respondent contends that the clause is lawful and notes that
contextually it is in the Code of Conduct section on “Maintain-
ing Integrity and Fairness in the Workplace.” Other rules in this
section deal with supervision of an employee with whom the
supervisor shares a close personal friendship; maintaining sepa-
rate employment with a vendor, supplier, contractor, subcon-
tractor or competitor; violating campaign finance laws; insider
trading; and transacting business in securities or derivatives of a
company with which one conducts or supervises business on
Verizon’s behalf. Thus, Respondent asserts that in context em-
ployees would construe Section 2.1.3 as related to potential
negative impact on business judgments due to outside activities.
Further context is provided in Code Section 2.3.1 which deals
with legal and ethical conflicts and details the types of “outside
organizations” listed civic groups such as local school boards,
homeowners associations and public and non-public corpora-
tions. Based on this contextual setting, Respondent asserts that
no reasonable reading would include union membership or any
other Section 7 activity was prohibited. Respondent cites Cop-
per River of Boiling Springs, LLC, 360 NLRB No. 60, slip op.
at 13 (2014) (statement of purpose of rule as a whole suggests
contours of its application).
Read literally and in context, the rule does not tend to chill
Section 7 activities. First, the literal language of the rule clearly
indicates that the conflict of interest addressed is in making
decisions about Verizon Wireless or its products as a member
of an outside organization while being employed by Verizon
Wireless. Thus, the language is clearly addressed to the ethics
of a business decision. Second, the context of the rule clearly
indicates that the conflicts of interest it addresses are those
created by or related to commercial competition. The rule is not
linked to other rules prohibiting participation in outside activi-
ties that are detrimental to the employer’s image or reputation.
Thus, the rules held to be overly broad in The Sheraton An-
chorage, 362 NLRB No. 123, slip op. at 1 fn.4 (2015) and First
Transit, Inc., 360 NLRB No. 72, slip op. at 2, fn.5 (2014) are
distinguishable by their context and the overall circumstances.
In The Sheraton Anchorage, supra, the rule, “I understand that
conflict of interest with the hotel or company is not permitted,”
was applied to discharge employees engaged in Section 7 activ-
ity. The Board found it was overbroad particularly when con-
sidered with other overly broad rules prohibiting participation
in outside activities that are detrimental to the company’s image
or reputation.
Similarly, in First Transit, supra, the “disloyalty” rule was
situated with other rules regarding making false, vicious, or
malicious statements concerning the company or coworkers and
conduct during non-working hours detrimental to the interest or
reputation of the company. 360 NLRB No. 72, slip op. at 11.
The Board noted that the rule was overly broad and did not
focus on “uncooperative, improper, unlawful or otherwise un-
protected employee misconduct” which would be understood
not to include protected activity. Id, slip op. at 2, fn. 5.
Thus in both The Sheraton Anchorage and First Transit, the
focus of the rules was on stand-alone misbehavior rather than,
as here: supervising those with whom one has a close personal
relationship (2.1.1 Personal Conflicts of Interest), second jobs
(Section 2.1.2 Employment Outside Verizon Wireless), politi-
cal contributions and activities (Section 2.2 Personal Political
Interests), or insider trading (Section 2.3 Insider Trading and
Financial Interests).
In this respect, Section 2.1.3 is somewhat similar to the rule
examined in Tradesmen International, 338 NLRB 460, 460–
461 (2002). That rule prohibited employees from engaging in
any activity that conflicted with or appeared to conflict with the
interests of the company, prohibited any illegal restraints of
trade, and required employees to avoid conflicts of interest and
to refer questions and concerns about potential conflicts to the
employer. The Board held that employees would not reasonably
fear that they would be punished for engaging in Section 7
activities based on the language and context of the rule. Cf., Rio
All-Suites Hotel & Casino, 362 NLRB No. 190, slip op. at 1
(2015) (“extraordinarily broad” confidentiality rule prohibiting
sharing any information about the employer which has not al-
ready been shared with the public clearly implicated terms and
conditions of employment); Hills & Dales General Hospital,
360 NLRB No. 70, slip op. at 2 (2014) (distinguishing Trades-
men International which did not include closely related unlaw-
ful provisions).
The General Counsel also takes issue with Section 2.1.3’s
ban on disclosing non-public company information. The rele-
vant text:
If you are a member of an outside organization, you must [ap-
propriately recuse yourself]. You must also disclose this con-
flict to your outside organization without disclosing nonpublic
company information and you must disclose any such poten-
tial conflict to the Compliance Guideline.
According to the General Counsel, this language leaves em-
ployees with the impression that they cannot disclose non-
public information about Respondent, their coworkers, or their
terms and conditions of employment as part of an organizing
campaign or for other protected, concerted activity. The Gen-
eral Counsel asserts that rules broadly prohibiting disclosure of
non-public information are overly broad. relying on Rio All-
Suites Hotel & Casino, 362 NLRB No. 190, slip op. at 2–3
(“extraordinarily broad” confidentiality rule precluding sharing,
among other things, salary structures clearly implicates terms
and conditions of employment); and Flamingo Hilton-Laughlin,
330 NLRB 287, 288 fn.3, 291–292 (1999) (code of conduct
prohibiting employees from revealing confidential information
about customers, hotel business, or fellow employees violates
Sec. 8(a)(1)).
When read in context, the requirement in Section 2.1.3 that
an employee who is a member of an outside organization must
disclose to the outside organization his or her employment with
Verizon Wireless without disclosing nonpublic information
must be construed as a part of the business ethics policy. After
all, the rule has nothing to do with membership in a labor or-
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD18
ganization and it strains logic to read the rule as requiring that
an employee who joins a labor organization is constrained to
reveal that he or she is employed with Verizon Wireless. The
requirement that employment be revealed without disclosing
nonpublic information is clearly linked to discussing or voting
on a matter related to Verizon Wireless or its products. The
preclusion on disclosing nonpublic information must be con-
strued and understood in this context. And so observed, the
prohibition is not remotely linked to discussing wages, hours,
or terms and conditions with a labor organization or to further
protected, concerted activity.
Similarly, the General Counsel’s argument that the reporting
requirement to Compliance Guideline is unlawful must be re-
jected. The General Counsel cites Ivy Steel & Wire, Inc., 346
NLRB 404, 442 (2006); Saginaw Control & Engineering, Inc.,
339 NLRB 541, 552 (2003); and TeleTech Holdings, Inc., 333
NLRB 402, 403 (2001). Certainly, as is noted in these cases,
rules requiring that employees disclose their protected activities
to their employer are unlawful. However, a clear, contextual
reading of Section 2.1.3 reveals that it contains no such re-
quirement. A reasonable reading of the rule would not encom-
pass a requirement that protected activity be reported. The rule
requires that when an employee’s activity in an outside organi-
zation requires a vote on whether or not to purchase Verizon
Wireless products, the employee must announce the conflict of
interest between his/her employment and casting a vote on the
issue and then report this conflict of interest to Compliance
Guideline.14
Thus, I find that Section 2.1.3 does not chill Section 7 activi-
ty as it is not overly broad and would not be reasonably read to
preclude Section 7 activities. I find that the prohibition on dis-
closure of nonpublic company information does not relate to
wages, hours, or terms and conditions of employment and thus
does not infringe Section 7 activity. I further find that Section
2.1.3 does not require reporting protected activity to Respond-
ent.
G. 2014 and 2015 Code of Conduct Section 3.3 Proper Use of
Verizon Wireless’ Property and Property Owned by Others
Unless permitted by written company policy, it is never ap-
propriate to use Verizon Wireless machinery, switching
equipment or vehicles for personal purposes, or any device or
system to obtain unauthorized free or discount services.
The General Counsel contends that this rule runs afoul of
Purple Communication, supra, in that prohibiting use of em-
ployer machinery for personal use must include the employer
email system for Section 7-related purposes on nonwork time.
Respondent claims that the rule prohibits employees from ma-
nipulating the network to steal wireless service and, more gen-
erally, prohibits misappropriating switching equipment, ma-
chinery, and infrastructure. Respondent avers that the rule is
lawful because it applies to company property which employ-
ees do not have a right to use for reasons not related to work.
Respondent does not address the General Counsel’s concern

14 The General Counsel also argues that Section 2.1.3 infringes on
employee use of email on nonworking time. Further elucidation was
not set out. This argument is rejected as without basis.
about “machinery” being susceptible of meaning email sys-
tems.
Section 3 of the Code, Protecting Verizon Wireless’ Assets
and Reputation, contains provisions for accurate record keep-
ing; promotion of transparent and complete disclosure; retain-
ing company records; safeguarding company information; pro-
tecting non-public company information; company benefits,
property and funds; work time; protecting company communi-
cations and information systems; prohibited activities; security
of facilities, intellectual property, and handling external com-
munications.
Section 3.3 indicates that company switching equipment, ve-
hicles, and “machinery” cannot be used for personal purposes.
In the context of switching equipment and vehicles, it is not
reasonable to assume that machinery includes email systems.
This is especially true when Section 3.4.1 specifically deals
with use of email systems. Thus, I find that Section 3.3 does not
tend to chill Section 7 activity because it cannot be reasonably
read to prohibit use of email systems.
H. 2014 and 2015 Code of Conduct Section 3.4.1
Prohibited Activities
You may never use company systems (such as e-mail, instant
messaging, the Intranet or Internet) to engage in activities that
are unlawful, violate company policies or result in Verizon
Wireless’ liability or embarrassment. Some examples of inap-
propriate uses of the Internet and e-mail include: Pornograph-
ic, obscene, offensive, harassing or discriminatory content;
Chain letters, pyramid schemes or unauthorized mass distri-
butions; Communications primarily directed to a group of
employees inside the company on behalf of an outside organi-
zation.
As previously discussed, in Purple Communications, Inc.,
supra, the Board held that “employee use of email for statutori-
ly protected communications on nonworking time must pre-
sumptively be permitted by employers who have chosen to give
employees access to their email.” The parties stipulated that
Respondent customarily communicates with its employees by
email and through an intranet system. A reasonable reading of
Section 3.4.1 is that employees will be disciplined for using
company email to communicate with a group of employees
inside the company on behalf of a labor organization or em-
ployees engaged in protected, concerted activity if such use will
result in Verizon’s “embarrassment.” Not only does such lan-
guage contravene Purple Communications, it is also overly
broad in the use of embarrassment as a cause of discipline in
use of email, instant messaging, intranet or internet.15 Thus, on
its face, this language chills Section 7 activity and violates Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) of the Act.

15 See cases cited by the General Counsel including The Sheraton
Anchorage, supra, 362 NLRB No. 123, slip op. at 1 (rule prohibiting
behavior that publicly embarrasses employer unlawful); Triple Play
Sports Bar& Grille, 361 NLRB No. 31 (2014) (rule prohibiting inap-
propriate discussion on social media overly broad). Judge Cates exam-
ined a portion of this rule and found it lawful under pre-Purple Com-
munications authority. Verizon Wireless, JD(ATL)–24–14 (July 25,
2014), Administrative Law Judge William Nelson Cates, JD 13:2–36,
pending on exceptions to the Board.
CELLCO PARTNERSHIP D/B/A VERIZON WIRELESS 19
I. 2014 and 2015 Code of Conduct: Conclusion:
Two portions of the Code of Conduct Conclusion are alleged
to be overly broad. The entire Conclusion is set forth below.
The two portions alleged to be overly broad are underlined.
CONCLUSION
It is not possible to describe all unethical or illegal business
practices in detail. The best guidelines are individual con-
science, common sense and unwavering compliance with all
company policies, applicable laws, regulations and contractual
obligations. Seek guidance if you are unsure of what to do, ask
questions and report wrongdoing. Company policy strictly for-
bids any retaliation against an employee who reports suspected
wrongdoing.
Violations of the law, the Code and other company policies,
procedures, instructions, practices and the like can lead to dis-
ciplinary action up to and including termination of employ-
ment. Such disciplinary action may also be taken against super-
visors or executives who condone, permit or have knowledge of
improper conduct or fail to take action to prevent and detect
violations, such as failure to provide training and failure to
supervise subordinates’ work. No one may justify an illegal or
improper act by claiming it was ordered by someone in higher
management. The following are examples of action considered
illegal or unacceptable.
 Theft or unauthorized access, use or disclosure
of company, customer or employee records, da-
ta, funds, property or information (whether or
not it is proprietary);
 Working under the influence of alcohol or illegal
substances or abusing legal substances;
 Improperly operating a vehicle for company
business, or driving while on company business
with a suspended or revoked license, or while
under the influence of drugs or alcohol;
 Using any program or promotion in an unauthor-
ized manner;
 Engaging in any form of workplace violence, in-
cluding, but not limited to, any act of physical
intimidation or assault, including threats of vio-
lence;
 Soliciting or giving the impression that you
would expect gifts or gratuities from suppliers or
customers;
 Disparaging or misrepresenting the company’s
products or services or its employees;
 Falsifying a company record such as a time re-
port; and
 Misrepresenting your health status or other rea-
sons for absence, such as misrepresenting your-
self as disabled and receiving disability benefits.
The General Counsel alleges the two underlined portions of
the Conclusion are overly broad because they would reasonably
be understood to prohibit Section 7 communications. Regarding
unauthorized disclosure of employee information, the General
Counsel contends the language would reasonably be understood
to preclude discussion of wages, hours, and terms and condi-
tions of employment relying on Fresh & Easy Neighborhood
Market, supra, 361 NLRB No. 8, slip op. at 2–3 (employees
would reasonably construe admonition to keep employee in-
formation secure to prohibit discussion and disclosure of in-
formation about other employees, such as wages and terms and
conditions of employment), among other cases. Regarding dis-
paraging company products, services, or employees, the Gen-
eral Counsel asserts the rule is overbroad relying on Lily
Transp. Corp., 362 NLRB No. 54 (2015) (rule prohibiting post-
ing of “disparaging, negative, false, or misleading information
or comments” about the employer or its employees unlawful)
and other similar cases.
Respondent argues that each of the bulleted items, read in
context, is informed by confidentiality rules contained else-
where in the Code and that these items should not be construed
in isolation. Respondent, citing NLRB v. Eletrical Workers
Local 1229, 346 U.S. 464, 475–477 (1953), asserts that the Act
does not preclude rules prohibiting disparagement of products
and services. Respondent claims that a reasonable employee
reading the disparagement language would understand it to
apply to products and services and the term “employees” in the
context of products and services interactions and would also be
understood contextually to relate to unlawful discrimination.
In agreement with the General Counsel, the underlined por-
tions of the Conclusion are overly broad. When read in context,
the rule prohibiting “disclosure of company, customer or em-
ployee records, data, funds, property or information (whether or
not it is proprietary)” would reasonably be understood to pre-
clude discussion of wages, hours, and terms and conditions of
employment. Similarly, the rule prohibiting “disparaging or
misrepresenting the company’s products or services or its em-
ployees” is too broad and would reasonably be read to mean
that employees could not speak to their coworkers and voice
criticism of managers. Thus, it tends to chill legitimate Section
7 activity and violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Since August 2014, by maintenance of its 2014 and 2015
Code of Conduct Section 1.6 Solicitation and Fundraising rule
which prohibits employees’ use of its email system to engage in
solicitation or distribution including Section 7-protected com-
munications during nonworking time, Respondent has engaged
in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the mean-
ing of Section 8(a)(1) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. Since August 2014 until April 29, 2015, and at a handful
of locations continuing to date, by maintenance of its 2014
Code of Conduct Section 1.8 Employee Privacy which would
be reasonably read to prohibit employee discussion of wages,
hours, and terms and conditions of employment, Respondent
has engaged in unfair labor practices affecting commerce with-
in the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and Section 2(6) and (7) of
the Act.
3. Respondent’s 2015 Code of Conduct Section 1.8 Em-
ployee Privacy in effect since April 29, 2015 at all but a hand-
ful of locations does not tend to chill employees in the exercise
of their Section 7 rights because employees would not reasona-
bly construe the language to prohibit Section 7 activity.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD20
4. Respondent’s 2014 and 2015 Code of Conduct Section
2.1.3 Activities Outside of Verizon Wireless in effect since
August 2014 and April 29, 2015, respectively, does not tend to
chill employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights because
employees would not reasonably construe the language to pro-
hibit Section 7 activity.
5. Respondent’s 2014 and 2015 Code of Conduct Section
3.3 Proper Use of Verizon Wireless’ Property and Property
Owned by Others in effect since August 2014 and April 29,
2015, respectively, does not tend to chill Section 7 activity
because it cannot be reasonably read to prohibit use of email
systems.
6. Respondent’s 2014 and 2015 Code of Conduct Section
3.4.1 Prohibited Activities in effect since August 2014 and
April 29, 2015, respectively, contravenes Purple Communica-
tions and it is also overly broad in the use of “embarrassment”
as a cause for discipline in use of email, instant messaging,
intranet, and internet. Thus, on its face, this language chills
Section 7 activity and violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act
7. Respondent’s 2014 and 2015 Code of Conduct Conclu-
sion rule in effect since August 2014 and April 29, 2015, re-
spectively, prohibiting “disclosure of company, customer or
employee records, data, funds, property, or information (wheth-
er or not it is proprietary)” would reasonably be understood to
preclude discussion of wages, hours, and terms and conditions
of employment. Similarly, the rule prohibiting “disparaging or
misrepresenting the company’s products or services or its em-
ployees” is too broad and would reasonably be read to mean
that employees could not speak to their coworkers and voice
criticism of managers. Thus, these two items in the Conclusion
violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain un-
fair labor practices, I shall order it to cease and desist therefrom
and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the
policies of the Act. Respondents shall further be ordered to
refrain from in any like or related manner abridging any of the
rights guaranteed to employees by Section 7 of the Act.
Within 14 days, at all of its facilities where the unlawful pol-
icies are or have been in effect,16 Respondent shall rescind the
portions of 2014 (where it is still in effect) and 2015 Code of
Conduct Sections 1.6, 1.8, 3.4.1, and the Conclusion to the
extent these sections have been found unlawful. See, e.g.,
Guardsmark, LLC, 344 NLRB 809, 812 (2005), and cases cited
therein. Respondent may comply with the Order by rescinding
the unlawful provisions and republishing its employee hand-
book without them. The Board recognizes, however, that repub-
lishing the handbook could entail significant costs. According-
ly, the Respondent may supply the employees either with hand-
book inserts stating that the unlawful rules have been rescinded,
or with new and lawfully worded rules on adhesive backing
which will cover the old and unlawfully broad rules, until it
republishes the handbook without the unlawful provisions.

16 See, e.g., Albertson’s, Inc., 300 NLRRB 1013, fn. 2 (1990), cited
in Guardsmark, supra, 344 NLRB at 812 (where unlawful rule main-
tained as a companywide policy, generally employer must post appro-
priate notice at all facilities where policy has been or is in effect).
Thereafter, any copies of the handbook that are printed with the
unlawful rules must include the new inserts before being dis-
tributed to employees.” Guardsmark, 344 NLRB at 812, fn. 8.
As part of the remedy in this case, Respondent shall post an
appropriate informational notice, as described in the attached
Appendix. This notice shall be posted nationwide in all Re-
spondents’ facilities or wherever the notices to employees are
regularly posted for 60 days without anything covering it up or
defacing its contents. In addition to physical posting of paper
notices, notices shall be distributed electronically, such as by
email, posting on an intranet or an internet site, and/or other
electronic means, if Respondent customarily communicate with
their employees by such means. In the event that, during the
pendency of these proceedings, Respondent has gone out of
business or closed a facility involved in these proceedings,
Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy
of the notice to all current employees and former employees
employed by Respondent at any time since August 2014. When
the notice is issued to Respondent, it shall sign it or otherwise
notify Region 28 of the Board what action they will take with
respect to this decision.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended17
ORDER
Respondent, Cellco Partnership d/b/a Verizon Wireless,
Basking Ridge, New Jersey, at all of its facilities nationwide, its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Maintaining its 2014 and 2015 Code of Conduct Section
1.6 Solicitation and Fundraising rule which prohibits employ-
ees’ use of its email system to engage in solicitation or distribu-
tion including Section 7-protected communications during
nonworking time.
(b) Maintaining its 2014 Code of Conduct Section 1.8 Em-
ployee Privacy which would be reasonably read to prohibit
employee discussion of wages, hours, and terms and conditions
of employment.
(c) Maintaining its 2014 and 2015 Code of Conduct Section
3.4.1 Prohibited Activities which contravenes Purple Commu-
nications and is also overly broad in the use of “embarrass-
ment” as a cause for discipline in use of email, instant messag-
ing, intranet, and internet.
(d) Maintaining its 2014 and 2015 Code of Conduct Conclu-
sion rule (1) prohibiting “disclosure of company, customer or
employee records, data, funds, property or information (wheth-
er or not it is proprietary),” which would reasonably be under-
stood to preclude discussion of wages, hours, and terms and
conditions of employment and (2) prohibiting comments which
are “disparaging or misrepresenting the company’s products or
services or its employees” which would reasonably be read to
mean that employees could not speak to their coworkers and
voice criticism of managers.

17 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopt-
ed by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for
all purposes.
CELLCO PARTNERSHIP D/B/A VERIZON WIRELESS 21
(e) In any like or related manner interfering with, coercing,
or restraining employees in the exercise of the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Rescind the 2014 and 2015 Code of Conduct Section 1.6
Solicitation and Fundraising that prohibits employees’ use of
Respondent’s email system to engage in electronic solicitation
or electronic distribution.
(b) Rescind its 2014 Code of Conduct Section 1.8 Employee
Privacy at the handful of locations where it is still in effect
which would be reasonably read to prohibit employee discus-
sion of wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment.
(c) Rescind the 2014 and 2015 Code of Conduct Section
3.4.1 Prohibited Activities to the extent it contravenes Purple
Communications and is also overly broad in the use of “embar-
rassment” as a cause for discipline in use of email, instant mes-
saging, intranet, and internet.
(d) Rescind the 2014 and 2015 Code of Conduct Conclusion
rule (1) prohibiting “disclosure of company, customer or em-
ployee records, data, funds, property or information (whether or
not it is proprietary),” which would reasonably be understood
to preclude discussion of wages, hours, and terms and condi-
tions of employment and (2) prohibiting comments which are
“disparaging or misrepresenting the company’s products or
services or its employees” which would reasonably be read to
mean that employees could not speak to their coworkers and
voice criticism of managers.
(e) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at all of
its facilities nationwide where the unlawful policies have been
in effect or are currently in effect the attached notice marked
“Appendix.”18 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the
Regional Director for Region 28, after being signed by the Re-
spondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by Re-
spondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicu-
ous places including where notices to employees are customari-
ly posted. In addition to physical posting of paper notices, no-
tices shall be distributed electronically, such as by email, post-
ing on an intranet or an internet site, and/or other electronic
means. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to
ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by
any other material. If the Respondent has gone out of business
or closed any of its facilities involved in this proceeding, the
Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy
of the notice to all current employees and former employees
employed by Respondent at any time since August 2014.
(f) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Region Director for Region 28 a sworn certification of a re-
sponsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to
the steps that Respondent has taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C. September 18, 2015

18 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated
Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this no-
tice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your be-
half
Act together with other employees for your benefit and
protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activi-
ties.
WE WILL NOT maintain the 2014 and 2015 Code of Conduct
Section 1.6 Solicitation and Fundraising that prohibits employ-
ees’ use of Verizon’s email system to engage in electronic so-
licitation or electronic distribution.
At a handful of locations where the 2015 Code of Conduct is
not yet in effect, WE WILL NOT maintain the 2014 Code of Con-
duct Section 1.8 Employee Privacy which would be reasonably
read to prohibit employee discussion of wages, hours, and
terms and conditions of employment.
WE WILL NOT maintain the 2014 and 2015 Code of Conduct
Section 3.4.1 Prohibited Activities which does not allow em-
ployees to access the Verizon email system for Section 7-
protected communications on nonworking time and is also
overly broad in the use of “embarrassment” as a cause for dis-
cipline in use of email, instant messaging, intranet, and internet.
WE WILL NOT maintain the 2014 and 2015 Code of Conduct
Conclusion rule (1) prohibiting “disclosure of company, cus-
tomer or employee records, data, funds, property or information
(whether or not it is proprietary),” which would reasonably be
understood to preclude you from discussing your wages, hours,
and terms and conditions of employment and (2) prohibiting
comments which are “disparaging or misrepresenting the com-
pany’s products or services or its employees” which would
reasonably be read to mean that you could not speak to your
coworkers and voice criticism of managers.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce you in the exercise of rights guaranteed you by
Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL within 14 days rescind the 2014 and 2015 Code of
Conduct Section 1.6 Solicitation and Fundraising; where it is
still in effect, WE WILL rescind 2014 Code of Conduct Section
1.8 Employee Privacy; WE WILL rescind the 2014 and 2015
Code of Conduct Section 3.4.1 Prohibited Activities; and WE
WILL rescind the 2014 and 2015 Code of Conduct Conclusion
rule (1) prohibiting “disclosure of company, customer or em-
ployee records, data, funds, property or information (whether or
not it is proprietary),” and (2) prohibiting comments which are
“disparaging or misrepresenting the company’s products or
services or its employees.”
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD22
WE WILL notify all employees at all of our facilities within
the United States and its territories where the 2014 and 2015
Code of Conduct Section 1.6 Solicitation and Fundraising, were
in existence, that such policies have been rescinded and will no
longer be enforced.
CELLCO PARTNERSHIP D/B/A VERIZON
WIRELESS
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at
www.nlrb.gov/case/28-CA-145221 or by using the QR code
below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision
from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board,
1099 14th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling
(202) 273–1940.