Cast Optics Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 30, 1970

184 N.L.R.B. 1 (N.L.R.B. 1970)

CAST OPTICS CORPORATION I
Cast Optics Corporation and Textile Workers of
America , AFL-CIO. Cases 22-CA-3879 and
22-CA-3932
June 30, 1970
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS FANNING, BROWN, AND JENKINS
On March 30, 1970, Trial Examiner Thomas F
Maher issued his Decision in the above-entitled
case, finding that the Respondent had engaged in
and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices
and recommending that it cease and desist
therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set
forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision.
Thereafter, Respondent and the Charging Party
filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision
and supporting briefs.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a three-
member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the
Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions, the
briefs, and the entire record in the case' and hereby
adopts the findings,2 conclusions, and recommenda-
tions of the Trial Examiner.3
2. Substitute for the sixth indented paragraph of
the Notice to Employees the following:
WE WILL offer to the employees whose
names appear on the attached list immediate
and full reinstatement to their former jobs or,
if those jobs no longer exist, to substantially
equivalent positions, without prejudice to their
seniority or other rights and privileges,
dismissing, if necessary, any individual hired
since the beginning of the strike on June 30,
1969.
' As the record , exceptions , and briefs in our opinion adequately present
the issues and the positions of the parties , Respondent 's request for oral ar-
gument is hereby denied
' The Charging Party notes that the Trial Examiner 's Decision , in sec IV,
A, I, states that Hernandez was discharged May 20 whereas this occurred
on May 22 This is an obvious inadvertence which does not affect his con-
clusion , and we hereby correct that date
' In agreeing with the Trial Examiner that Respondent violated Sec
8(a)(5), (3 ), and (I) of the Act, we deem it unnecessary to pass on the
Trial Examiner 's finding that the Union instigated and approved the illegal
work stoppage which occurred during the period of May 23 through 26,
1969 Whether or not the Union instigated that stoppage , when Respon-
dent hired back the strikers , they retained their right under the Act to be
represented by the Union as their bargaining representative There is
nothing in the record that demonstrates that Respondent had reasonable
cause to believe that the strikers had repudiated their bargaining represen-
tative , indeed the record , considered as a whole, points to the opposite con-
clusion Accordingly , Respondent 's withdrawal of recognition from the
Union and its refusal to deal with it violated Sec 8 ( a)( 5) of the Act
Member Brown would commence the backpay for the striking em-
ployees on July 3 , 1969, the date on which the Respondent sent to each
employee a letter informing him that he was discharged , rather than from
October 3 , 1969, the date on which the employees unconditionally applied
for reinstatement See his dissent in Sea - Way Distributing , Inc , 143 NLRB
460,461
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recom-
mended Order of the Trial Examiner and hereby
orders that the Respondent, Cast Optics Corpora-
tion, Hackensack, New Jersey, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall take the action set
forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order,
as herein modified.
1. Substitute for paragraph 2(b) of the Trial Ex-
aminer's Recommended Order the following:
"Offer to the employees whose names appear on
Appendix A attached to the Trial Examiner's Deci-
sion immediate and full reinstatement to their
former jobs or, if those jobs no longer exist, to sub-
stantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to
their seniority or other rights and privileges,
dismissing, if necessary, any individual hired since
June 30, 1969."
THOMAS F. MAHER , Trial Examiner: Upon
charges filed on August 14 and October 6, 1969, by
Textile Workers of America , AFL-CIO, against
Cast Optics Corporation , Respondent herein, the
Regional Director for Region 22 of the National
Labor Relations Board, herein called the Board, is-
sued complaints on behalf of the General Counsel
of the Board on September 22 and October 23,
1969, respectively , and an amended complaint on
October 23, 1969, alleging violations of Section
8(a)(1), (3), and ( 5) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, as amended (29 U.S.C., Sec. 151, et
seq.), herein called the Act.
Contemporaneously with the filing of charges in
this matter charges were filed in Cases
22-CB-1535 and 1577 -1 and 2 on July 28 and Oc-
tober 6 , 1969, respectively , by Cast Optics Cor-
poration , the Respondent herein , against Textile
Workers Union of America , AFL-CIO, Passaic-
Bergen Joint Board , and Local 656 , Textile Wor-
kers Union , AFL-CIO. A complaint was issued on
September 5, following the filing of the first charge
and an amended complaint was issued on October
184 NLRB No. 1
2 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
23, 1969. Previously, on September 23, Case
22-CB-1535 was consolidated with a complaint is-
sued on the previous day in the instant case, Case
22-CA-3879. Thereafter, on October 23, upon the
issuance of an amended complaint in the instant
proceeding, all cases were consolidated for hearing.
At the commencement of the trial of these cases
before me counsel for the General Counsel moved
to sever the amended complaint against Respon-
dent Union from the amended complaint against
Respondent Cast Optics for the reason that a settle-
ment agreement had been executed in Cases
22-CB-1535, and 1577-1 and 2. Upon considera-
tion of the diversity of issues in the cases con-
solidated for trial, the conflicting interests of the
parties joined as Respondents, and my view that an
excess of confusion would result I granted counsel
for General Counsel's motion and severed Cases
22-CB-1535, and 1577-1 and 2 over Respondent
Cast Optics' objection. I then refused to rule upon
General Counsel's motion to withdraw the
amended complaint in the case which I had ordered
severed, ruling that such a request would be proper
only when the case was before me. Upon Respon-
dent's request to the Board for permission to appeal
my severance of these cases the Board denied by
order of December 4, 1969 Subsequently, on
December 8, 1969, I heard the severed Cases
22-CB-1535, 1577-1 and 2 and after due con-
sideration of the settlement agreement which the
Charging Party, Cast Optics Corporation, had
refused to accept, I granted counsel for General
Counsel's motion to withdraw the complaint. Such
rulings as I have made in the severed Cases
22-CB-1535, and 1577-1 and 2 1 do not consider
to be before me as part of the instant case and will
make no further reference to them herein.
In the instant case Respondent duly filed its
answer wherein, while admitting certain allegations
of the amended complaint, it denied the commis-
sion of any unfair labor practice.
Pursuant to notice the trial referred to above was
held before me on various dates in November and
December 1969 in Newark, New Jersey, where all
parties were present, represented by counsel, and
afforded full opportunity to be heard, present oral
argument , and file briefs. All parties filed briefs.
Upon consideration of the entire record, includ-
ing the briefs filed with me, and specifically upon
my observation of each witness appearing before
me,' I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT
Cast Optics Corporation, Respondent herein, is a
New Jersey corporation with its principal office
' I have considered the testimony of all witnesses , including those whose
testimony 1 neither accept nor refer to In evaluating the testimony of each
witness I have relied specifically on his demeanor and have made my
findings accordingly and, while apart from consideration of demeanor I
located in Stamford, Connecticut, and a plant
located in Hackensack, New Jersey, where it is en-
gaged in the manufacture , sale, and distribution of
acrylic , plastic sheets, and related products . During
the 12 -month period immediately preceding the is-
suance of the amended complaint Respondent
manufactured, sold, and distributed at its Hacken-
sack plant goods, products , and materials valued in
excess of $50,000, of which goods, products, and
materials valued in excess of $50,000 were shipped
in interstate commerce to States of the United
States other than the State of New Jersey.
Upon the foregoing facts, stipulated to by all
parties, I conclude and find the Respondent to be
an employer engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
It is stipulated among the parties and I ac-
cordingly conclude and find that Textile Workers
of America, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE ISSUES
1. The employee status of individuals who strike
in violation of a no-strike contract provision.
2. The employee status of individuals who strike
in violation of the provisions of Section 8(d).
3. The continuing representative status of a
union authorizing a strike in violation of Section
8(d).
4. Condonation as an element is assessing the
employee status of returning strikers
5. Unilateral grant of wages and benefits.
6. The nature of an unfair labor practice strike.
7. The obligation to accede to strikers' uncondi-
tional request for reinstatement.
IV. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Sequence of Events
Bargaining relations between Cast Optics and the
Union have existed for a number of years, the
Union being recognized, by the terms of a contract
executed November 7, 1966, as the exclusive bar-
gaining representative in a bargaining unit consist-
ing of all Respondent's production and main-
tenance employees at its Hackensack plant and ex-
cluding office employees, salesmen, technical and
professional employees, watchmen, guards,
foremen, and all other supervisors. This I conclude
and find to be a unit of Respondent's employees ap-
propriate for the purposes of collective bargaining.
The Company' s assets were purchased by the
present management from its previous owners on
have taken into account inconsistencies and conflicting evidence, my
failure to detail each of these is not to be deemed a failure on my part to
have fully considered it Bishop and Maloc , Inc , d/b/a Walker's, 157 NLRB
1159,1161
CAST OPTICS CORPORATION 3
January 2, 1969. Included in this transfer of owner-
ship was the current bargaining agreement referred
to above, together with two adenda signed by the
parties prior to the transfer date, all of which were
thereafter assented to by the parties.
In the course of its development of a new
management policy the Company's officials in-
cluded Paul Daddona, the chief executive officer
and the Respondent's principal spokesman at the
trial , and B . Edwin Sackett, the newly appointed
president whose function appears to have been to
organize the operation. Sackett, an industrial con-
sultant , has since resigned his position as president
and continues his relation only in a consultive
capacity.
1. The May work stoppage
Upon the reorganization of the Company an in-
ventory was taken of its assets and a reevaluation
made of the duties and responsibilities of superviso-
ry and rank-and-file employees. In the course of
this study, and also based presumably upon
unidentified reports, the work performance of one
Gregorios Hernandez, an inspector in the plant, a
member of the Union and secretary-treasurer of its
Local 656,2 became the subject of special attention.
As a result it was determined on May 19 that Her-
nandez be transferred from his job of inspector in
the quality control department to inspector in glass
department. This transfer was executed on
Tuesday, May 20, by Director of Manufacturing
Chris Masterson at Daddona's direction. This did
not meet with Hernandez' approval and he refused
to accept the assignment. It was then decided that
on Wednesday, May 21, Hernandez would again be
directly assigned his new duties and if he again
refused them he would be discharged.3 He again
refused and on May 20, after consultation with
Union's business agent, Germinal (Tony) Vargas,
and subsequent official notification to him, Hernan-
dez was discharged for the stated reason of "his
refusal to obey or carry through orders."
The reaction of the employees, all members of
the Union, to Hernandez' discharge was unfavora-
ble.' On the following morning the employees re-
ported for work but upon reaching their work sta-
tions refused to perform their assigned duties. They
were all informed of the disasterous consequences
of their refusal to work, with particular reference to
the premature hardening of the liquid plastic
material, Monomer, used in the manufacture of the
Company's product. Nonetheless, all of them ada-
mantly refused to work but remained in the plant.
Meanwhile, to avoid the destruction of machinery
and equipment which would result from the
hardening of unpoured Monomer, the supervisory
staff performed the necessary production opera-
tions calculated to dispose of the prepared or
"cooked" material on hand for the day's production.
It appears that there was resulting damage but the
record does not reflect its extent.
On the next workday, Monday, May 26, the em-
ployees who had engaged in the Friday work stop-
page appeared for work at the usual starting time.
As the men appeared at the plant entrance each
was informed that he would be admitted to work
only if he agreed to perform his usual duties, and
failing to so perform their duties after having
agreed to do so they would be discharged. Only 2
or 3 of the plant's 200 employees agreed to work
and were admitted. The remainder milled around
outside the plant talking to union officials who were
present. Meetings were held between representa-
tives of management, employee officials of the
Union, and Business Agent Vargas for the purpose
of returning the men to work, the employees insist-
ing that Hernandez be reinstated and that the cer-
tain economic demands submitted to management
in early May be met. The Company, however, while
seeking to have the men return, rejected their de-
mands as a condition of ending the work stoppage
and finally designated Thursday, 7:30 a.m., May 29,
as the deadline by which they could return to their
work upon agreement to perform all their duties.
Failing to conform by this date the employees
would be discharged for participating in an illegal
work stoppage. All of the employees complied with
Respondent's conditions and returned to work be-
fore the Thursday deadline.'
There is conflicting testimony as to the Union's
connection with this work stoppage and as to
the inferences to be drawn from the Union's
earlier efforts to effect changes in wages, rates,
Local 656, TWU-AFL-CIO, is the local of the Charging Union which
services the contract Its headquarters, located in Union City, New Jersey,
are shared with Passiac - Bergen Joint Board , Textile Workers Union of
America, AFL-CIO
' The uncontradicted testimony of Paul Daddona Although for reasons
that will be set forth hereafter I do not rely on Daddona's testimony
generally, I do accept it of necessity in instances such as this where transac-
tions are peculiarly within his sphere of activity as executive officer of
Respondent
' The testimony of Respondent 's executive director , Paul Daddona, is
replete with factual details suggestive of pilferage , collusion , and a general
aura of unsavory behavior among the employees within the plant , particu-
larly as it affects their relationship with their union during this period
While I rely on Daddona 's testimony within the limitations noted above (fn
3), 1 do not do so generally , having had full opportunity to observe his
demeanor at the hearing , to consider his testimony in full, and to evaluate it
against gratuitous remarks and statements he volunteered throughout the
hearing Moreover , I have considered his frequent evasions, including a
studied effort to avoid identifying the stationery of his own corporation and
the signature of his associate , Masterson I accordingly reject his uncor-
roborated testimony concerning the widespread misfeasance among the
employees , and the inferences of wrongdoing which he attributes to union
officials and to public officials, specifically the personnel of the police de-
partment of Hackensack, New Jersey , and the staff personnel of the
Board's Regional Office
' The foregoing findings concerning the work stoppage is a summariza-
tion of the credited testimony of Edwin Sackett To the extent that union
officials have testified to the contrary concerning their knowledge of or
participation in these events, I do not credit them Elsewhere in this deci-
sion the Union 's responsibility for this stoppage will be considered further
At that time I shall have further comment on the testimony of these in-
dividuals
4 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
and other contract provisions. Because con-
sideration of these elements contribute little to
a detail of the sequence of events, insofar as
they constitute background for the alleged un-
fair labor practices, I shall refrain from further
consideration of the Union's conduct during
this period. I shall consider it hereafter in rela-
tion to Respondent's defense to the actions
which it took (infra, Sec. IV, B).
2. The exclusion of the Union
Following the employees' abandonment of the
work stoppage which Respondent claims to have
been of union instigation, a contention which
General Counsel and the Union dispute, Respon-
dent took a series of actions which it candidly ad-
mits to have been in derogation of the Union's ex-
clusive representative status
First it was determined by Executive Officer
Daddona that upon the men's return there were to
be no reprisals taken against any of them in the
form of harassment, bad assignments, transfers, or
discharge Furthermore, because of what he con-
sidered a complete failure of cooperation and a
breakdown of communications, he decided that "he
was not dealing with a labor organization in the
true sense of the word" and on June 7 resolved
Respondent's employees. Instead, he determined
that henceforth he would deal with them on a
"management-employee" basis.
Daddona's determination, as he explains it, was
immediately manifest by instructions he gave
Respondent's disbursement department on June 9
that the union dues were no longer to be deducted
from the employee's paycheck, as provided by the
contract, and that no checks were thereafter to be
issued to the Union to cover dues or welfare fund
payments. As part of the same determination Chris
Masterson, the director of manufacturing, was in-
structed by Daddona to have no further dealings or
communications with the Union.
Furthermore, according to Union Representative
Frank Cuccio's undenied testimony, 6 not only were
the dues not sent to the Union as required by the
contract but the payments to the Union's welfare
fund, also a contract obligation, were withheld, and
no payments have been made since this time. In-
deed, when Cuccio sought a meeting with Respon-
dent's management on this matter Gaudio refused
him stating that if Tony Vargas, the Union's
representative, came onto Respondent's property
he would have him arrested for trespassing and
concluded the conversation by stating, "Frank Cu-
cio, we don't recognize your union." It also appears
that the International 's office communicated with
" I rely on Cuccio's testimony only to the extent that it is undemed, is
contrary to the Union's interests herein or is corroborated by the testimony
of credible witnesses
' There is confhctung evidence as to whether the firemen and painters-
maintenance employees-joined in the strike 1 have already concluded,
the Respondent concerning the delinquent pay-
ments but received no reply.
Thereafter, on June 20, the then general
manager, Gaudio, posted on the company bulletin
boards and enclosed in each employee's pay en-
velope a notice reading as follows:
The new management of Cast Optics is pleased
to grant you a $ .05 an hour increase.
Gaudio testified that he took this action without
consulting with the Union or any of its officials.
Meanwhile, in mid-June, Respondent took per-
sonnel action with respect to maintenance em-
ployees, firemen, and painters, which, it is claimed,
was calculated to remove them from the bargaining
unit covered by the contract. Thus these people
who were by contract paid on an hourly scale were
placed on a regular salary. The distinction sought to
be drawn here between salaried and hourly em-
ployees evaporates upon analysis. Union Represen-
tative Cuccio simply testified that the changeover
occurred-which it did. General Manager Gaudio
testified he did not know if this group of employees
were salaried or hourly paid. But employee Ken-
neth Pereira, called as a witness by General Coun-
sel, would seem to have scuttled any suggestion of
impropriety in the action. He testified that he was
in fact notified by Supervisor Joe Ulato that he was
being placed on salary basis, and that he and the
other maintenance people thereafter received a
paycheck of a different color from the check
received by hourly paid employees. This they im-
mediately reported to the Union. The money he
received as salary was identical, however, to what
he received on the hourly basis, and under both
bases of compensation he was paid for the numbers
of hours he worked. Speaking for himself, Pereira
testified he joined the other employees in a strike
which followed shortly thereafter. Under the cir-
cumstances described by this witness, the only
maintenance employee called to testify concerning
his alleged change of status, it is doubtful that a
meaningful withdrawal of maintenance employees
from the bargaining unit was ever accomplished
3. The protest strike
On June 29 a meeting of the Local's membership
was called to consider Respondent's actions taken
against the Union. By a vote of the membership a
strike was called for the following day, June 30, in
protest of Respondent's action The employees
struck on the following morning and picket lines
were established at the plant ate .7 Thereafter, on
July 3, each striking employee was sent a letter by
Respondent informing him that he was being
discharged. The strike continued as of the date of
for lack of adequate proof, that these were not removed from the unit
Their participation in the strike is not a significant fact, particularly in view
of a stipulation of the parties to the names of the individuals who did par-
ticipate and in whose behalf reinstatement was later sought
" A list of these employees appears as Appendix A to this Decision
CAST OPTICS CORPORATION 5
the hearing. Interim activities on the picket line
bear further significance to the issues presented
here.
4. The assault on the pickets
On July 23, 1969, during the course of picketing,
it appears that 25 or 30 pickets were walking in
front of the plant premises on South Newman
Street, Hackensack, with a considerable additional
number of employees congregated on the opposite
side of the street. Patrolman Lewis Canestrino
credibly corroborates employee Ramon Bango's ac-
count of an outpouring of workers from the plant,
presumably replacements for the strikers, setting
upon the pickets with sticks, pieces of plastic, and
stones, under the amused and watchful eye of
Respondent's supervisors. Thus Canestrino testified
to what occurred during the afternoon of July 23:
Well, there were about twenty-five, thirty
picketers walking up and down in front of Cast
Optics on South Newman Street. On three-on
two or three different occasions all the em-
ployees of Cast Optics, which for the most part
were under twenty, all came out of the building
holding pipes and pieces of plastic and, all dif-
ferent objects, two by fours. And they came
out and they harassed the picketers by pushing
past them and making believe they were
picking up garbage and pushing them over.
Then they would go back in the building, we
would tell them to go back into the building
and ten or fifteen minutes later, they would
come out again and -do the same thing re-
peatedly over.
He also described two additional incidents occur-
ring on the same afternoon. One involved the push-
ing of a "dipsy dumpster [sic]"-a garbage con-
tainer-into the pickets and another was the driving
of a forklift down into the crowd. Canestrino could
not identify who was responsible for either "prank"
or who directed it.
I am not disposed to accept Respondent's dis-
avowal of responsibility or even knowledge of the
mass altercation described by the patrolman
Specifically I reject as incredible Gaudio's explana-
tion that an anonymous phone message generated a
bomb scare at the plant and that, after summoning
fire department officials, management was then in-
structed to evacuate the employees, thus account-
ing for the melee when the employees reached the
street. Gaudio did not impress me as a reliable wit-
ness, engaging as he frequently did throughout his
testimony in generalizations and exaggerations
when asked specific questions. This and his
penchant for avioding answers by protesting lack of
knowledge on subjects a general manager should be
expected to know" requires me to accept his
testimony only when it constitutes an admission
against Respondent's interest or is corroborated by
the testimony of credible witnesses. With respect to
employee Bango's account of this incident I reject
it as a highly emotional account which did not com-
port with the accurate testimony of the patrolman. I
do accept Bango's testimony as evidence that the
event did occur, however, and that an assault on
the pickets was perpetrated by the working em-
ployees in the presence of company officials and
supervisors.
5. Company-established benefits
Finally, in late August Respondent took one final
action to seal off its relationship from the Union.
Thus a document signed by George Faline, the
newly hired personnel manager, was posted at the
plant and sent to every employee. Described by
Gaudio at the hearing as "a statement for
grievances its a statement on hospital coverage that
I directed the personnel manager to make. And also
holidays," this document consisting of three typed
pages was introduced as an outline of company
benefits available to all employees after 30 days'
employment. It contained procedures for
hospitalization and medical insurance; it specified
the eight paid holidays and the criteria for vaca-
tions; and finally, it outlined a multistep grievance
procedure available to the individual employee.
Gaudio testified that in promulgating these benefits
he did not discuss them with the Union.
6. The striking employees' request for
reinstatement
In October the Union called a meeting of all the
striking employees and informed them of the futili-
ty of the strike so far and the Union's inability to
deal with the Company. Thus Business Representa-
tive Cuccio testified:
October we held a meeting of all the strikers
and we appraised [sic] them of the problem we
are faced with and we asked them if they were
willing to return to work unconditionally. That
would mean without the union, without any
rights to grievances, etcetera, and wages or any
other issues that may resolve around the con-
tract provisions, and they says we would agree
if we asked them to, and I do so accepted [sic]
a letter to the company offering our people to
return to work unconditionally. I think the date
of that letter went out around October the
third.
The letter sent by the Union on October 3, 1969,
on behalf of the striking employees requested of the
Respondent their unconditioned reinstatement, and
read as follows:
Textile Workers Union of America, the
" For example, he did not know if maintenance employees were salaried
or hourly paid
427-835 0 - 74 - 2
6 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
authorized representative of the employees
whose names are appended to this letter,
hereby, on their behalf, unconditionally offers
that they will immediately return to work at
their same of [sic] substantially similar jobs.
If you find that there are any mechanical
problems incident to their immediate reinstate-
ment, I am available at the above address to
meet with you for that purpose.
The list of employees whose reinstatement was
requested appears as Appendix A of this Decision.
Although Respondent admits to receiving the letter,
Gaudio, who by that time had become president of
Respondent, testified that he did not know whether
or not the letter was answered. Cuccio testified,
however, that there was no reply. There is no
evidence that any striker has been reinstated, the
men were still on strike as of the date of the hearing
in December 1969, and the pickets were still on ac-
tive patrol.
B. The Respondent's Defense
It is Respondent's position that the actions which
it admittedly took in derogation of the Union's
claimed majority status and the outstanding agree-
ment were completely justified by the terms of judi-
cial precedent and the provisions of Section 8(d) of
the Act." Specifically it is claimed that by the
Union's efforts in early May to obtain certain
changes in a contract that was not scheduled to ex-
pire until 6 months thereafter, in November 1969,
and by engaging in a strike in violation of an ex-
pressed no-strike provision of the contract for the
purpose of forcing these concessions, the Union
thereby forfeited its representative status and
thereby justified Respondent in conducting its af-
fairs with its employees in the manner in which it
did, without recourse to or interference from the
Union. Implicit in this contention is the more basic
one that the May 23-26 strike considered above
(supra, Sec. IV, A, I) was called at the direction of
the Union and for the dual purpose of obtaining
contract concessions and procuring the discharged
employee Herenandez' reinstatement. And further
that the strike was not, as claimed by General
Counsel and the Union, an unauthorized or "wild-
cat" strike engaged in by the employees solely for
the purpose of aiding Hernandez.
To properly evaluate the Respondent's defense to
its refusal to deal with the Union and to its July 3
discharge of the employees who went on strike a
second time (supra, sec. IV, A, 3), it becomes
necessary to make certain additional findings and
conclusions which are not necessarily relevant to
the allegations of the complaint, albeit they do re-
late to Respondent's defense, regardless of its ulti-
mate merits. These findings and conclusions follow.
1. The May work stoppage
On May 13, 1969,11 Tony Vargas of the Union
mailed a document entitled "Contract Proposals"
to director of manufacturing, Chris Masterson, with
a letter of transmittal stating:
Enclosed please find contract proposals for
Cast Optics Corp. When you are ready to com-
mence discussions, at your earliest possible
convenience, please let us know.
Included among the proposals were substantial
wage increases, improvements in vacations, sick
pay, and death and holiday benefits, the addition of
a dental plan to the existing health benefits, and the
institution of a profit-sharing plan.
A review of the contract between the parties dis-
closes that section XXVIII of that document
establishes November 7, 1969, as its expiration date
and that the only provision for modification is one
that permits of such action upon its expiration, fol-
lowing at least 60 days' notice of intention. Nothing
in the contract permits of modification at any other
time or under any other circumstance.
Upon the receipt of Vargas' proposals, Master-
son, who had dealt with the Union under the previ-
ous management, referred the matter to the then
president, Edwin Sackett, who thereafter had sig-
10 The following are portions of Sec 8 ( d) upon which Respondent relies
(d) For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the
performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the
representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and
confer in good faith with respect to wages , hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment , or the negotiation of an agreement, or any
question arising thereunder , and the execution of a written contract in-
corporating any agreement reached if requested by either party, but
such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or
require the making of a concession Provided , That where there is in ef-
fect a collective -bargaining contract covering employees in an indus-
try affecting commerce , the duty to bargain collectively shall also
mean that no party to such contract shall terminate or modify such
contract, unless the party desiring such termination or modification-
(4) continues in full force and effect without resorting to strike or
lockout , all the terms and conditions of the existing contract for a
period of sixty days after such notice is given or until the expiration
date of such contract, whchever occurs later
Any employee who engages in a strike within the sixty-day period
specified in this subsection shall lose his status as an employee of the
employer engaged in the particular labor dispute, for the purposes of
sections 8, 9, and 10 of this Act, as amended, but such loss of status for
such employees shall terminate if and when he is reemployed by such
employer
" The letter bore the date of April 13 but Vargas testified that this was a
clerical error and it should have been May 13 No one disputes this cor-
rection
CAST OPTICS CORPORATION 7
nificant conversations with union officials and
representatives. 12
It will be recalled from earlier findings that a
number of meetings were held between manage-
ment and the union officials in an effort to get the
men back to work (supra, sec. IV, A, 1). Sackett
represented the Company at these meetings and
testified at length concerning them . He also
produced notes of what transpired at the meetings
which were made contemporaneously with the
meetings by a member of his staff and verified by
him.t3 Throughout the meetings Vargas protested
that it was the men who were protesting the
discharge of Hernandez and the negotiation of
more favorable working conditions, but he agreed
that he would urge them to return to work. Indeed
at the May 26 meeting Vargas became most
specific, not only that the Union did not approve
the stoppage , but it was the employees who insisted
as a condition of their return that (I) Hernandez be
reinstated, (2) that they be "treated with respect
and fairness," and (3) that the contract be
reopened and the Company discuss the contract
proposals submitted by Vargas. Sackett was ada-
mant in his refusal to bargain with the employees,
or Vargas, in this manner and informed them that
they had to return to work first. He referred them
to the grievance procedures of the contract for set-
tling the Hernandez matter and any other com-
plaints they might have, and he informed them that
this was not the proper time to negotiate a new
contract. That time would be the fall.
Vargas said he would urge the men to return but
no one appeared on the following day. Respondent
then notified the men that unless they returned and
worked by May 29, they would be discharged.
Upon Vargas' instructions to them they then aban-
doned the strike and returned to work.
2. Conclusions concerning the May work stoppage
A reading of the several accounts of the strike of
the employees which began when the men refused
to work at their places on May 23 persuades me
that this was not a spontaneous action on the part
of the employees but something promulgated by
Union Representative Vargas who then made him-
self scarce and unavailable to management in its ef-
forts to settle the matter. Vargas in his testimony
was much too vague and "uninformed" about the
stoppage to give any other impression but that he
was manipulating the whole affair. Thus, all wit-
nesses testifying concerning the stoppage place him
at the scene on numerous occasions, telephone
calls were made to him and never returned by him,
and -he was present in meetings with management in
its efforts to settle the strike. These appearances of
a ranking union official at an explosive labor
dispute cannot be equated with the casual
bystander, and I refuse to so equate them. Vargas
initially made contract proposals, asked at a meet-
ing that they be discussed, and, as the work stop-
page drew to a close, was the one who stepped in
and ordered the men to return. I reject the conten-
tion that he was not otherwise involved in the stop-
page.
Upon facts less obvious than those presented
here the Board has held that a strike may be called
"informally in a manner which is understood by the
initiated," stating that "the critical question is not
how the [Union] gave the strike call but whether,
no matter how they did give it. 1114 I accordingly
conclude and find that the only reasonable in-
ference to be drawn from all the evidence that I
have relied on is that the strike is one approved by
the Union.15 As the contract under which the Union
and Company operated specifically forbids such a
strike I find that the work stoppage of May 23-26
was an illegal one and not an activity protected by
Section 7 of the Act.16
C. Analysis of Issues and Ultimate Conclusions
Basic to the issues presented in this case is the
representative status of the Union during the period
when Respondent admittedly refused to recognize
or bargain with it, and thereafter. Thus, if, as
Respondent claims, the Union 's conduct during and
after the May 23-26 strike and its failure to comply
with the provisions of Section 8(d) in the presenta-
tion of contract demands served to divest it of its
representative status, then Respondent 's dealings
" The account of the transactions between Respondent and the Union
during this period is based exclusively upon the testimony of Sackett whom
1 credit for this purpose
Vargas testified at length concerning the contract proposals, the
discharge of employee Hernandez , and the subsequent work stoppage
which began on May 23 1 do not credit him except where he has been cor-
roborated by credible witnesses A review of his testimony discloses nu-
merous contradictions , unexplained lacks of knowledge of what occurred
during the strike , and a continuing effort to evade answering questions put
to him For these reasons and upon my observation of him 1 do not accept
his testimony
Nor do I accept the testimony of Paul Daddona , Respondent's executive
officer, who testified at length concerning events in this area as well as in
other resepcts Consistent with reasons previously stated (fn 4) 1 have re-
lied on Daddona only to the extent that his testimony constitutes an admis-
sion against Respondent 's interest herein, or is within his own peculiar
knowledge , or where he has been corroborated by credible witnesses
i i 1 accept as a substantially accurate report of these meetings Sackett's
testimony and notes, and 1 reject as unreliable Vargas' testimony of the
same incidents , and, in particular, 1 reject his denial that he asked that the
contract proposals be considered
" Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America
(A F L ), Local No 421 (The Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company, 81
NLRB 1052, 1057 , citing United States v International Union, United Mine
Workers, 77 F Supp 563, 566 (D C D C ), affd 177 F 2d 29, 35
(C A D C ), cert denied 338 U S 871 , wherein the lower court stated
[Tlhese men, it is contended , did as individuals what they had a right
to do, work or not work, and they decided not to work
Now we have to consider the validity of that claim objectively If a
nod or wink or a code was used in place of the word "strike" there was
just as much a strike called as if the word "strike" had been used
" See also Deaton Truck Line, Inc , 152 NLRB 1531, 1546, enfd 389
F2d163(CA 5)
i" N L R B v Sands Manufacturing Co, 306 U S 332
8 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
would not be an unfair labor practice strike en-
titling them to reinstatement.['
1. The status of employees engaged in an illegal
strike
So that the facts may appear in their proper per-
spective, certain absolutes must be established.
First, the employees have at no time herein lost
their employee status. Respondent suggests the
contrary in its brief, relying on the provision of Sec-
tion 8(d) which states:
Any employee who engages in a strike within
the sixty-day period specified in this subsec-
tion shall lose his status as an employee of the
employer engaged in the particular labor
dispute, for the purposes of section 8, 9, and
10 of this Act, as amended, but such loss of
status for such employees shall terminate if and
when he is reemployed by such employer.
[Emphasis supplied.]
Clearly what occurred here was condoned by
Respondent, Daddona having testified that when
the men returned to work by May 29 it was then
determined that no reprisals of any kind would be
taken against them (supra, sec. IV, A, 2). As such
action comports with the Board's established stan-
dards of condonation,[' I would conclude and find
that within the terms of Section 8(d), quoted
above, any jeopardy to the employment status that
the employees may have suffered by virtue of the
May work stoppage, whether it be a union
authorized strike in violation of the contract, as I
have found, or a "wildcat" or unauthorized strike
as General Counsel and the Union claim, has been
vitiated by Respondent's forgiveness.
2. The legality of the May work stoppage
Having thus established that the employees have
retained their employee status throughout May and
June, it remains to be determined if and when the
Union ceased to represent them.
It is true, of course, as Respondent claims, that
one of the objectives of the May 23-26 strike,
which I have found to be union authorized, was to
force acceptance of the Union's demands submitted
on May 13. The evidence of this has been credited
(supra, sec. IV, B, 1). Clearly these demands were
not and could not be made in accordance with any
reopening or modification provision of the con-
tract. They were, therefore, highly improper. There
was no provision in the contract for midterm
modification. Consequently the 8(d) requirement
that notice of modification be given would apply
only to period approaching the November 7 expira-
tion date. Therefore on May 13, by anticipating by
4 months a demand for modification which Section
8(d) precluded the Union from making, the Union
clearly failed to comply with Section 8( d). But in
any event if a modification date prior to expiration
could possibly be read into the contract the May 23
strike was still illegal , for it did not, as Section
8(d)(4) requires, provide an interval of 60 days
between the notice of modification and the
beginning of the strike.
Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above I
conclude and find that the demand for or "notice"
of modification and the proposals submitted were
improper and the strike in support of them clearly
violated Section 8(d)(4).
3. The continuing representative status of the
Union
In the face of what I have found and concluded
to be improper contract demands supported by an
illegal work stoppage, the Union's disputed status
as representative of the employees now comes into
focus. Respondent then and now claims that
because of the strike the Union lost its representa-
tive status.
By a process of circuitous reasoning which
completely baffles me Respondent argues that
because the Respondent has violated Section 8(d)
by striking for modifications without following its
requirements (a conclusion with which I agree) and
because employees are divested of their employee
status by engaging in such strike (be it authorized
or "wildcat"), the Union thereby loses the right to
represent them. The argument, as I understood it,
places this moment of transition at the time when
the strike occurs, the employees' status not being
regained until the employee "is reemployed by such
employer." 19 Thus, in the period between May 23,
the date of the beginning of the work stoppage, and
May 27, the date upon which Respondent took
back the employees "without reprisal," it is claimed
that an "instant decertification" of the Union took
place.
In support of this distortion I am referred to
Graham v. Boeing Airplane Company,20 a decision
of the United States District Court for the Western
District of Washington. Therein the court held that
because a union failed to observe the contract
modification and strike notice procedure required
by Section 8(d) the employees who engaged in the
strike were, by the terms of the statute, no longer
employees. And, accordingly, in the absence of em-
ployees to be represented "the statute does not
require [the employer] to recognize [the union] as
their representative." The reliance upon this deci-
sion is misplaced. There, unlike here, the em-
ployees remained on strike even to the date of the
" Mastro Plastics Corp and French-American Reeds Mfg Co , Inc v
NLRB,350US 270
" "Condonation necessarily contains the elements of forgiveness and an
intention of treating employees as if their misconduct had not occurred "
Dubo Manufacturing Corporation , 148 NLRB 1114, 1119
"Sec 8(d)
20 22 LRRM 2243 ( 1948), 15 Labor Cases §64, 604
CAST OPTICS CORPORATION 9
court's decision, and it is understandable that those
whom the union claimed to represent were not em-
ployees by operation of Section 8(d). Here, how-
ever, except for a 3-day period the employees were
at work with the Company's blessing. So unless the
decision stands for the narrow proposition that an
immediate metamorphosis takes place it has no ap-
plication here.21
I am likewise referred to Boeing Airplane Com-
pany v. N.L.R.B.,22 an outgrowth of the dispute
which formed the basis of the earlier Boeing case
cited above and involving the same striking em-
ployees. The court stated (at 991):
The Company was not guilty of an unfair
labor practice in refusing to bargain with the
Union [after the calling of the strike]. The
Union had lost its standing as the collective-
bargaining agent and the Company was at
liberty to treat the employees as having severed
their relations with the Company because of
their breach of contract, and it was further at
liberty to consumate [sic] their separation
from the Company's employ by hiring others to
take their places. [Emphasis supplied.] In that
case, as previously considered, the employees
went on strike, as did the employees here, in
violation of Section 8(d). But there, unlike
here, they remained out, and the court simply
reiterated the District Court's view that illegal
strikers who during their strike lost their em-
ployee status were not individuals eligible for
representation, therefore the offending union
lost its representative status. That is not this
case. These employees resumed work at the
Company's invitation.
Here, unless it is to be held that any breach of
Section 8(d), or any strike in violation of it or any
"wildcat" strike, however brief, serves to decertify
a union , Respondent has no standing to renege on
its obligation to recognize and bargain. It would
seem that the converse of this proposition would
best illustrate its failing. Thus, if we are to say that
by the simple expedient of unprotected employee
misconduct their bargaining representative's status
is placed in jeopardy we are, by such a ruling,
providing a most expeditious vehicle for recal-
citrant, unscrupulous, or dissident employees, ob-
stinate union officials, or indeed a likeminded em-
ployer, to destroy an established bargaining rela-
tionship. I know of no law or policy of the Board or
decision of the courts that would provide such a
disorderly substitute for the statutory decertifica-
tion processes. On the contrary, based upon the
foregoing facts and considerations, I conclude and
find that at all times relevant herein the Union
represented the employees of the Respondent.
4. The unlawful rejection of the Union
Premised upon the foregoing conclusions the ac-
tions which Respondent took after June 6 are
clearly proscribed as being in derogation of its
obligation to bargain with the established bargain-
ing representative of its employees.23 Thus its posi-
tive statement that it no longer recognized the
Union conclusively establishes its refusal to bar-
gain. In addition, the unilateral action which it took
in raising wages, and its failure and refusal to
checkoff union dues and to remit them and em-
ployee welfare payments to the Union are classic
examples of refusals to bargain. Upon the foregoing
conduct, therefore, I conclude and find that
Respondent has refused to bargain with the
established bargaining representative of its em-
ployees thereby violating Section 8(a)(5) and (1)
of the Act. 14
5. The unfair labor practice strike
A review of the credited findings made above dis-
closes, and no one seriously disputes, that the June
30 strike of its employees called by the Union fol-
lowing the June 29 meeting was in protest of the
Respondent's stated refusal to bargain and its ac-
companying actions which it took to underline that
refusal-all of which I have found to constitute un-
fair labor practices. Such a strike is most certainly
an unfair labor strike whose participants are in-
sured unqualified reinstatement by their employer
upon their unconditional request for reinstate-
ment.25 Nor is it significant at this point in time that
the contract still outstanding, however repudiated
by Respondent, contained the very no-strike provi-
sion so vital to determinations elsewhere in this
matter (supra, sec. IV, C, 1). Here, unlike the May
23-26 strike, the employees were striking in protest
of employer conduct alleged and found to be viola-
tions of the Act. It is well established that em-
ployees' right to strike in protest of unfair labor
practices is not waived by a contractual agreement
to forego "any strike or work stoppage during the
term of this agreement."26 I accordingly reject the
21 Respondent mistakenly relies on the testimony of employees that they
returned from the strike "not as members of the Union ," thus suggesting
abandonment of the Union As the pertinent section of Sec 8 ( d) refers
only to the loss or acquisition of employee status, I do not see the relevance
of the employees ' union membership Nor am I disposed to view the in-
dividual decisions of union members not to remain union members suffi-
cient, of itself , to divest a union of its representative status Sec
9(c)(I)(A)(it ) of the Act provides all of the machinery necessary for such
a determination -
22174F2d988(CADC)
23 In the posture of the case wherein I have found the Union to have con-
tinued its representative status I find it unnecessary to consider the legal ef-
fect of notification to the Union by Respondent, through Masterson , during
June of certain discharges that had been effected
Y' In further defense of its action Respondent sought to establish by ab-
sentee records a slowdown campaign in June which it would attribute to
the Union I find it unnecessary to determine if such a condition existed
But if indeed it did exist Respondent 's remedy for such improper conduct,
either by the employees or by the Union, would not include resort on its
part to a violation of the Act
es Mastro Plastics Corp v N L R B, Supra , 278, N L R B v Samuel J
Kobritz, dlbla Star Beef Company, 193 F 2d 8, 16-17 (C A I )
t" Mastro Plastics Corp v N L R B , supra , 279-284
10 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
suggestion that the unfair labor practice strike
which began on June 30, 1969, was controlled in
any manner by the outstanding contract between
Respondent and the Union.
Respondent's unfair labor practices having pro-
vided adequate grounds for the employees' strike in
protest of them, "the striking employees do not lose
their status and are entitled to reinstatement with
backpay, even if replacements for them have been
made."27 Nor is it of consequence that other
causes, economic in nature, also contributed to the
calling of the strike, so long as it has been
established that the unfair labor practices "had
partly caused the strike." 28
6. The unconditioned request for reinstatement
As noted above, rights to reinstatement and
backpay are fixed upon the strikers' unconditional
request to be taken back 29 As the facts demon-
strate the Union, by letter of October 3, 1969,
requested unconditionally in their behalf the rein-
statement of all of the strikng employees, a list of
whom was sent to Respondent and a copy of which
appears as Appendix A of this Decision. Respond-
ent admits the receipt of this request but its pres-
ident, Gaudio, had no knowledge of what action
was taken with respect to it. There is no evidence
of any striker's reinstatement before or since, and
the strike still continues. It may thus be presumed
that the requests for unconditional reinstatement
have been rejected, and I so conclude and find.
Nor am I disposed to place any significance upon
Respondent's action of July 3, purporting to dis-
charge its striking employees. Whether the purpose
of the attempted discharge letter was to effectively
terminate the employees, or was a "tactical maneu-
ver" meant to "intimidate the strikers into return-
ing to work," 30 or that it was merely "applying pres-
sure"31 is really of no consequence. The status of
unfair labor practice strikers has long been held to
be absolute and impervious to employer assault .32 I
accordingly reject the suggestion that these em-
ployees have been terminated, and perhaps
replaced. On October 3, the date upon which rein-
statement was requested in their behalf, each
striker's right to immediate reinstatement vested,
regardless of whether or not he had been
replaced.33 Having then refused the strikers their
jobs Respondent thereby discriminated against
them in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the
Act, and I so conclude and find.
7. The illegal assault on the pickets
One more episode must necessarily be disposed
of-the violence on the picket line on July 23
(supra, Sec. IV, A, 4). The evidence which I have
credited discloses that on the afternoon in question
a group of replacement employees were loosed
upon the strike pickets and other nearby striking
employees and that in the process sticks, stones,
and fisticuffs were thrown about indiscriminately. It
is also clear from the evidence that this occurred
under the watchful eye, if not the outright approval,
of Respondent's officials and supervisors. As no
satisfactory explanation for this altercation has been
supplied me, the obvious inference is to be drawn. I
therefore conclude and find that Respondent, by
permitting its working employees to leave their
work stations and attack the strikers en masse,
thereby sought to harass and intimidate them. Cita-
tion of authority is hardly necessary to conclude
and find as I do that such conduct on Respondent's
part interferes with, restrains, and coerces em-
ployees in the exercise of rights guaranteed them by
the Act, and thereby violated Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act. I would also conclude and find that such
conduct by Respondent could not but solidify the
protest of the striking employees and serve to
further encourage their determination to continue
their strike.
V. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Company set forth in section
IV, above, occurring in connection with the opera-
tions described in section I, above, have a close, in-
timate, and substantial relationship to trade, traffic,
and commerce among the several States and tend
to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing
commerce and the free flow of commerce.
VI. THE REMEDY
I have found that Respondent by numerous acts
and statements has interfered with, restrained, and
coerced its employees, has refused to bargain with
their duly selected bargaining representative, has
sought to discharge them for striking in protest of
its unlawful conduct, has harassed and coerced
them as they continued their protest, and has failed
and refused to reinstate them to their jobs upon
their unconditional request therefor; such conduct
being in violation of Section 8(a)( 1), (3), and (5)
of the Act. I shall accordingly recommend that it
cease and desist therefrom, and because of the
gravity of Respondent's conduct shall also recom-
mend that it cease and desist from infringing in any
other manner upon the rights of the employees
guaranteed by the Act.34
" Supra, fn 25
N L R B v Samuel J Kobritz, dibla Star Beef Co , supra, 16-17,
General Drivers and Helpers Union , Local 662, Teamsters (Rice Lake
Creamery)v NLRB,302F2d908(CADC)
Ibid
Associated Wholesale Grocery of Dallas, Inc , 119 NLRB 41, 42
Englewood Lumber Company, 130 NLRB 394, 396
Mastro Plastics Corp v N L R B , supra
Park Edge Sheridan Meats, Inc , 139 NLRB 748, enfd 323 F 2d 956
(C A 2)
" N L R B v Express Publishing Company, 312 U S 426, 437
CAST OPTICS CORPORATION 11
I shall also recommend that certain affirmative
action be taken in order to effectuate the policies
of the Act. I shall recommend that Respondent be
ordered to continue recognition of the Union as the
exclusive bargaining representative of its em-
ployees; it continue in full force and effect the col-
lective agreement which was in effect in June 1969,
the date of the Respondent's refusal to recognize
and bargain with the Union; it continue bargaining
collectively with the Union concerning the terms
and conditions of any new contract to supercede
the existing one;35 if agreement be reached that it
embody such agreement in writing; and in the
meantime it be ordered not to vary or abandon
such benefits it may have given its employees since
the date of its initial refusal to recognize this
Union.36
I shall recommend that with respect to the em-
ployees whom Respondent sought to discharge
while they were engaged in a strike in protest of
Respondent's unlawful refusal to bargain, and
whose names appear as Appendix A of this Deci-
sion, that they be offered reinstatement to their
former or substantially equivalent positions,
without prejudice to seniority or any other rights
and privileges, terminating, if necessary, any person
hired since June 30, 1969, the date upon which the
unfair labor practice strike began, to make room
for them,37 and that they be made whole from Oc-
tober 3, 1969, the date on which unconditional
request for reinstatement was made in their be-
half.'3' The backpay to which they are entitled shall
be computed in the customary manner, with in-
terest at 6 percent per annum 39 It will also be
recommended that Respondent post appropriate
notice of compliance with the Board Order.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the entire record in this case, and pursuant
to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended, I recommend"' that Case Optics
Corporation, Respondent herein, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Unlawfully harassing, assaulting, and other-
wise restraining and coercing its employees while
they are engaged in concerted activities protected
by the Act.
(b) Discouraging membership in Textile Work-
ers of America, AFL-CIO, or in any of its subsidi-
ary or component organizations or in any other
labor organization by terminating the employment
of their employees and thereafter refusing their un-
conditional request for reinstatement because they
have engaged in the aforementioned concerted ac-
tivities.
(c) Refusing to bargain with Textile Workers of
America, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive bargaining
representative of its production and maintenance
employees, by withdrawing its recognition of said
Union, by the withholding of dues and welfare pay-
ments for employees as required by contractual
obligation, and by unilaterally granting employees
wage increases and related benefits.
(d) In any other manner interfering with,
restraining , or coercing its employees, or unlawfully
discriminating against them in the exercise of rights
guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which it
is found will effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer reinstatement to the employees whom
it terminated and to whom it thereafter failed and
refused to reinstate upon their unconditioned
request, dismissing , if necessary, any individual
hired since June 30, 1969; said employees to be of-
fered reinstatement being those whose names ap-
pear on Appendix A attached to this Decision and
Recommended Order.
(b) Make whole the aforesaid striking employees
for the period from October 3, 1969, until the date
of Respondent's offer of reinstatement , to be com-
puted in the manner set forth in "The Remedy."
(c) Continue to recognize Textile Workers
Union of America, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive bar-
gaining representative of all its production and
maintenance employees as designated in the con-
tract most recently in force.
(d) Upon request, continue to bargain collec-
tively with the aforesaid union concerning the
wages and working conditions of its employees and,
if an understanding is 'ached, embody such un-
derstanding in a new F ,red agreement.
(e) Continue in full force and effect such
benefits and emoluments as it may have granted its
employees during the period of its unfair labor
practices and the pendency of these proceedings.
(f) Post at its Hackensack, New Jersey, plant co-
pies of the attached notice marked "Appendix B."41
a Tidewater Express Lines , Inc, 142 NLRB 1 1 1 I, 1 122
' The Bassick Co , 127 NLRB 1552
" Hock and Mandel Jewelers , 145 NLRB 435, 444
`" N L R B v Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co , 304 U S 333, 346 Mastro
Plastics Corp v N L R B , supra
y F W Woolworth Company , 90 NLRB 289
40 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
the words " RECOMMENDED " shall be deleted from its caption and wher-
ever else it thereafter appears , and for the words "I recommend" there
shall be substituted , " the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders "
11 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Section 102 46 of
the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the
findings, conclusions , recommendations , and Recommended Order herein
shall, as provided in Section 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations, be
adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and order, and
all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes In the event
that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court
of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board " shall be changed to read "Posted Pursuant
to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of
the National Labor Relations Board "
12 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL
Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Re-
gional Director for Region 22, after being duly
signed by Respondent's representative, shall be
posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof, and
be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days
thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all
places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Re-
spondent to insure that said notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
(g) Notify the Regional Director for Region 22,
in writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this
Decision, what steps have been taken to comply
herewith.42
" In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
this provision shall be modified to read "Notify said Regional Director, in
writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent
has taken to comply herewith "
APPENDIX A
Felix Sanjurjo
Pablo Alejandro
Ramon Alejandro
Jose Alejandro
Armando Guzman
Fernando Llamas
Juan Riguelme
Francisco Quinones
Jaime Rivers
Eduardo Morales
Antonio Soto
Isaac Roduguez
Firmo Salvador
Felix Medina
Severo Merlo
Jose Acosta
Terdoro Villazon
Carmelo Flores
Angel M. Cruz
Federico Vasguez
Ramon P. Bango
Ciro Latre
Ernesto Diaz
Francisco Andrade
Felix Villalobos
Onofre Carrillo
Bernardino Banga
Enrigue Carmona
Pedro Rosado
Carlos Cupeles
Federico Caceres
Francisco Perez
Bernardo Soto
Rafael Estevez
Leonardo Valdivieso
Cruz Cruz
Milan Segarra
John Almodovar
Molme Gaona
Ruben Suinones
Salvador Justiniano
Rafael Justinano
Julio M. Rosello
Ramon Heinandez
Lutgardo Mova
Manuel Cangas
Francisco Arnero
Arnaldo Morales
Lucas Hernandez
Leonardo Morales
Angel Pastrana
Emilio Martinez
Ildefonso Flores
Luis Santana
Alfredo Ortiz
Manuel Diaz
Victura Peralta
Pedro Galan
Jose Cruz
Jose Hernandez
Ciro Lara
Ramon Espinal
Juan Estevez
Miguel Garcia
Juan Martinez
Gregorio Mendoza
Alfredo Garcia
Pedro Rodriguez
Alberto Rasonez
Cesar Mava
Galo Carrion
Emilio M. Acevedo
George Ramentol
Antonio Diaz
Juan A. Garcia
Ernesto Alisea
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
German Gomez
Benigno Mirando
Alverto Lopez
Oscar Fernandez
Nestor Pages
Manuel Benitez
Agustin Checo
Jose Estevez
Julio Martinez
Angel Rodriguez
Fortunato Garcia
Felipe Gonzalez
Jose Ugarte
Orestes Ugarte
Domingo Cabello
Juan Pagan
Cosine Suarez
Baldemiro Rodriguez
Guillesmo Estevez
Gonzalo Del Corral
Jose Santana
Jose Ramon Checo
Juan Prieto
Justa Negron
Berto A. Ale'
Carlos Estevez
Rafael Bisono
Jose A. Espinel
Serafin Echevarria
Idalberto Valdes
Gustavo Suarez
Yvon Mercier
Antolin Rodriguez
Angel S. Sanchez
Manuel Castellanos
Juan Nunez
Gilberto Valdes
Manuel A. Benitez
Jose Menendez
Jose Navarro
Francisco
Carballeira
William Green
Benigno Hernandez
Jorge Gustines
Hipolito Fontanez
Servio Pofanco
Kenneth Pereira
Wayne Davis
Serafin Eahevarria
Felipe Inoa
Jose Colombos
Jose Montes
Fionisio Cruz
Sanabria
Antonio Perez
Roberto Vazguez
Segundo Sales
Humberto Rojas
Francisco A. Garcia
Cesar Agular
Jose A. Munoz
Ramon Hernandez
Gerardo Estevez
Narciso Pena
Sam Kadish
Juan Silverio Matias
Roberto Colina
Santiago Cruz
Tomas Perez
Manuel Garcia
Claudio Crespo
Prudencio Vidal
Garcia
Maria Lopez
Rosario Rendon
Leora Ramirez
Rafael Encarnacion
Ramona
Encarnacion
Carmen Checo
Oscar Diaz
Adalio Gandara
Fausto Martinez
Miguel Villalabos
Jose Moran
Rogue Cruz
William A. Checo
Angel Martin
Saturnino Mederos
Francisco Perez
Jesus Perez
Jose Prieto
Marcos E. Torres
Andres Diaz
Moises Colon
Jose Suazo
Manuel Meilan
Luis Herrera
Gloria Arias
Alberto Faunde
Oscar Fernandez
Jose Lopez
Roberto Cardenas
Jose Pinzon
Mickey Villalobos
Silvio Volta
Michael Torres
Michael Acevedo
Ceferino Perez
Gustavo Rodriguez
Francisco Seisdedos
Oedio Mercado
German Espinosa
Amilkar Franco
Pablo Nunez
Baldomero
Rodriquez
Francisco Suarez
Mary Penton
CAST OPTICS CORPORATION 13
Romon Calrera Adolfo Tapis
Domingo Morell
Carlos Pena Miguel A. Gonzalez
Ramon Nunez Jose Martinez
Ambrosio Nevarres Jose Battle
Miguel Garcia
APPENDIX B
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT harrass, assault , or otherwise
restrain or coerce you when you are engag. d
in concerted activities protected by the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act.
WE WILL NOT discourage membership in the
Textile Workers of America, AFL-CIO, or in
any of its subsidiary locals, or in any other
labor organization by discharging you for en-
gaging in concerted activities protected by the
Act, and by refusing to reinstate you when you
have unconditionally requested to return to
work.
WE WILL continue to recognize Textile Work-
ers of America, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive
bargaining representative of our production
and maintenance employees, and upon its
request WE WILL bargain collectively with it,
and if we reach an agreement we will put it in
writing in the form of a signed contract.
WE WILL NOT, in the meantime, withhold the
payment to the Union of your dues or welfare
payments as required by our contract with it.
WE WILL continue in full force and effect the
pay raise and any other benefits we have
granted you since June 1, 1969.
WE offer to reinstate any and all of the em-
ployees whose names appear on the attached
list and , if necessary to find a job for any of
them , we will discharge any employee whom
we hired since the beginning of the strike on
June 30, 1969.
WE WILL make you whole for the period
beginning with the date on which you first un-
conditionally requested to be reinstated, Oc-
tober 3, 1969.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere
with, restrain , or coerce any of you or unlaw-
fully discriminate against any of you in your
exercise of your rights guaranteed by the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act.
All of you , our employees , are free to remain or
become, to withdraw from or to refrain from
becoming , members of the Textile Workers of
America , AFL-CIO, or any of its locals, or of any
other labor organization.
CAST OPTICS
CORPORATION
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative ) (Title)
This is an official notice and must not be defaced
by anyone.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecu-
tive days from the date of posting and must not be
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
Any questions concerning this notice or com-
pliance with its provisions may be directed to the
Board's Office, Federal Building, 16th Floor, 970
Broad Street, Newark, New Jersey 07102,
Telephone 201-645-2100.