Carsten Kohlmeier-Beckmann et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Sep 4, 2019

14570670 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Sep. 4, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/570,670 12/15/2014 Carsten KOHLMEIER-BECKMANN 052204-23127 1918
79297 7590 09/04/2019
James Edward Ledbetter
Dickinson Wright PLLC
1825 Eye Street, N.W., Suite 900
Washington, DC 20006
EXAMINER
TANG, SON M
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2685
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/04/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
JLedbetter@dickinsonwright.com
dwpatents@dickinsonwright.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte CARSTEN KOHLMEIER-BECKMANN, ANJA NIEMEYER,
AND FRED RASZPIR
Appeal 2018-002692
Application 14/570,670
Technology Center 2600
Before JOSEPH L. DIXON, JAMES R. HUGHES, AND ERIC S. FRAHM,
Administrative Patent Judges.
DIXON, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellants,1 AIRBUS OPERATIONS
GMBH, appeal from the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–12, which
constitute all the claims pending in this application. Final Act. 1. An oral
hearing was held on August 21, 2019. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).

1 We use the word “Appellants” to refer to “Applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellants identify the real party in interest as Airbus
Operations GMBH. Appeal Br. 1.
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We affirm.
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to a system for evacuating persons from a
vehicle provide emergency devices that indicate escape routes to the persons
in the vehicle. These escape routes are ideally characterized by a high flow
rate, at which the persons are evacuated via the escape route. (Spec. 1.)
Claims 1 and 3, reproduced below, are illustrative of the claimed subject
matter:
1. A system for evacuating persons in a vehicle, comprising
an emergency chute and a light signal generator structured to
emit at least one visual light signal that indicates at least one
preset escape route for at least one person to be evacuated,
wherein the light signal generator is structured to display a first
light signal that marks a region extending over a surface beyond
a bottom end of the emergency chute in a direction leading away
from the emergency chute,

wherein the emergency chute comprises at least one
slideway pointing in a direction of a first escape route, and

wherein the direction leading away from the emergency
chute is substantially counter to the direction of the first escape
route.

3. A system for evacuating persons in a vehicle,
comprising a light signal generator structured to emit at least one
visual light signal that indicates at least one preset escape route
for at least one person to be evacuated, wherein the light signal
generator is disposed on a dividing device, which is structured to
divide an emergency chute into a first slideway and a second
slideway and to extend substantially over the length of the
emergency chute;

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wherein the dividing device comprises a diffusely
reflecting coating and

wherein the light signal generating device is structured to
emit a light signal in the region of the dividing device such that
the diffusely reflecting coating is illuminated.2

REFERENCES

The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Day US 3,463,915 Aug. 26, 1969
Takahashi et al. US 5,335,180 Aug. 2, 1994
Sweeney US 5,572,183 Nov. 5, 1996
Lehman et al US 6,150,943 Nov. 21, 2000
Tassey et al US 6,237,266 B1 May 29, 2001
Zonneveld US 6,966,414 B2 Nov. 22, 2005
Franco-Vila et al. US 7,018,079 B1 Mar. 28, 2006
Hutchison et al. US 7,800,511 B1 Sept. 21, 2010

REJECTIONS
Claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, and 9–11 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Zonneveld in view of Lehman.

2 We note that in the language of independent claim 3 “the light signal
generating device” and “structured to emit a light signal in the region of the
dividing device” do not have proper antecedent bases. The Examiner should
further consider whether the “light signal” is the same or different from the
“at least one visual light signal” previously recited. We leave it to the
Examiner to further evaluate the claim language in any further prosecution
on the merits.
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Claim 6 stands rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Zonneveld in view of Lehman, and further in view of
Day.
Claim 12 stands rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Zonneveld in view of Lehman and further in view of
Sweeney.
Claim 8 stands rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Zonneveld in view of Lehman, and further in view of
Hutchison and Takahashi.
Claim 3 stands rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Zonneveld in view of Franco-Vila and further in view of
Tassey.
OPINION
With respect to the interpretation of the claimed inventions, we look
to Appellants’ Summary of the Claimed Subject Matter in the Appeal Brief
for guidance. With respect to independent claim 1, Appellants indicated that
As best illustrated in application Figs. l and 2 described at
specification page 14, line 19 et seq., independent claim l is
directed to a system l0 for evacuating persons in a vehicle,
comprising an emergency chute 14 and a light signal generator
16 structured to emit at least one visual light signal that indicates
at least one preset escape route 18, 20 for at least one person to
be evacuated.

(App. Br. 1.) We note that element 16 in Figures 1 and 2 essentially points
to the totality of the system inside and outside the vehicle without any
indication thereto. With this as a guidepost to interpreting the breath of
independent claim 1, we evaluate the Examiner’s factual findings and
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conclusion of obviousness. Moreover, we note that the light signal
generating device at 16 generates light signals 46 and 48 on the vehicle floor
indicating the escape routes 18 and 20 before the chute and light signals at
the bottom of the chute 80A–80C and 82A–82C.
When we further interpret the language of independent claim 1 in
combination with further dependent claims, it is evident that independent
claim 1 is directed to more than a single embodiment. We note that
dependent claim 9 states:
wherein the light signal generator is structured to display the first
light signal [referred to in claim 1 as “a first light signal that
marks a region extending over a surface beyond a bottom end of
the emergency chute”] further in a region of a lintel and/or a sill
of an evacuation door, through which the first escape route leads,
wherein the first light signal indicates a first direction that is
adjusted to the direction of the course of the first escape route.

Independent claim 1 requires the first light signal “to display a first light
signal that marks a region extending over a surface beyond a bottom end of
the emergency chute in a direction leading away from the emergency chute,”
but the first light signal further is required to be on the inside the vehicle at
the “floor region of a lintel and/or a sill of an evacuation door.” The claim
merely sets forth a single light signal and not an electrical signal that
generates the light. Moreover, the first light signal cannot necessarily be in
two physical locations. We limit our consideration to independent claims 1
and 3 and leave it to the Examiner to further consider the scope of the claims
in any further prosecution on the merits.
It is also apparent that Appellants attempt to read limitations into the
broad claim language of independent claim 1 from the Specification, but
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Appellants do not specifically identify any of the numerous variations of the
disclosed implementations of the disclosed invention.
With respect to independent claim 3, Appellants identified only page
21, line 9, et. seq., and page 21, line 17 to correspond to the claimed
invention.
As best illustrated in application Figs. 1, 3 and described at
specification page 21, line 9 et seq., independent claim 3 is
directed to a system 10 for evacuating persons in a vehicle,
comprising a light signal generator 16, 62 structured to emit at
least one visual light signal that indicates at least one preset
escape route for at least one person to be evacuated, wherein the
light signal generator 16 is disposed on a dividing device 66.

(App. Br. 1–2.)

Claim 1
With respect to claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, and 9–11, Appellants argue the
claims together. Therefore we select independent claim 1 as the
representative claim for the group and address Appellants’ arguments
thereto. See 37 CFR 41.37 (c)(1)(iv).
In rejecting claims under 35 U.S.C. § 103, it is incumbent upon the
Examiner to establish a factual basis to support the legal conclusion of
obviousness. See In re Fine, 837 F.2d 1071, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 1988). In so
doing, the Examiner must make the factual determinations set forth in
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966). “[T]he Examiner bears
the initial burden, on review of the prior art or on any other ground, of
presenting a prima facie case of unpatentability.” In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d
1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Furthermore, “‘there must be some articulated
reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of
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obviousness’ . . . [H]owever, the analysis need not seek out precise teachings
directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court
can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of
ordinary skill in the art would employ.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127
S. Ct. 1727, 1741 (2007)(quoting In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir.
2006)).
Appellants contend that the proffered combination of the Zonneveld
and Lehman references does not teach or suggest the claimed “wherein the
light signal generator is structured to display a first light signal that marks a
region extending over a surface beyond a bottom end of the emergency
chute in a direction leading away from the emergency chute,” and “wherein
the direction leading away from the emergency chute is substantially counter
to the direction of the first escape route.” (App. Br. 6.)
We find the Examiner has applied the Zonneveld and Lehman
references as a combination which would teach or suggest the claimed
invention. The Examiner relies upon the Zonneveld reference to teach and
suggest a system containing a chute and light signal generator structure to
emit visual signals that indicate at least one preset escape route for at least
one per season to be evacuated from a vehicle where the route in Zonneveld
is down the chute. (Final Act. 2–3.) The Examiner has further framed the
obviousness determination relying upon the design of the Zonneveld
reference to teach the emergency evacuation chute which is illuminated, but
the Zonneveld reference does not explicitly show a first light signal that
marks a region extending over a surface beyond a bottom end of the
emergency chute in a direction leading away from the emergency chute is
substantially counter to the direction of the first escape route. (Final Act. 2.)
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The Examiner relied upon the Lehman reference which discloses a
system for evacuating persons in using an escape route, comprising a light
signal generating device (11), which is configured to emit a plurality of
visual light signals (e.g., 201–203) that marks a direction leading away from
danger along an escape route [see Figs. 1–2 and 9–11]. (Final Act. 3.) The
Lehman reference further teaches in FIG. 11 a device 11 wall-mounted
above a door 211 of a room 212 that is adjusted angularly so that the arrow
indicators projected from the device 11 define a path extending obliquely
across the floor of the room toward the door 211. (Final Act. 3.)
Finally, the Examiner maintains:
In the same field of evacuating art, it would be obvious to one
having ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was
made, to modify the light signal generating device (11) taught by
Lehman to the light generator mounted on the stanchions at the
bottom of the chute of Zonneveld, so that the light generator can
be adjusted to any appropriate direction that leads to escape
route, including the direction leading away from the emergency
chute, which is substantially counter the first escape route.
(Final Act. 3.) In the Examiner’s statement of the grounds of rejection, the
Examiner modifies the stanchions of Zonneveld reference to include a light
generation to any appropriate direction as taught and suggested by the
Lehman reference for egress from a dangerous location. (Ans. 3.) We agree
with the Examiner’s line of reasoning.
“The test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary
reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary
reference . . . .” In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981). Instead, the
relevant issue is “what the combined teachings of the references would have
suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art.” Id. “Combining the
teachings of references does not involve an ability to combine their specific
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structures.” In re Nievelt, 482 F.2d 965, 968 (CCPA 1973); see also In re
Mouttet, 686 F.3d 1322, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“It is well-established that a
determination of obviousness based on teachings from multiple references
does not require an actual, physical substitution of elements.”).
Accordingly, we are not persuaded by Appellants’ argument directed
to the bodily incorporation of the references as opposed to the combination
of teachings as proposed by the Examiner.
We determine that Examiner’s finding provides a “rational
underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” In re Kahn,
441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cited with approval in KSR Int’l Co. v.
Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007). Accordingly, the Examiner made
sufficient findings to combine the teachings of the Zonneveld and Lehman
references.
The U.S. Supreme Court has held “[t]he combination of familiar
elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does
no more than yield predictable results.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550
U.S. 398, 416 (2007). “If the claim extends to what is obvious, it is invalid
under § 103” and “the analysis need not seek out precise teachings directed
to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court can take
account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in
the art would employ.” Id. at 418–19.
Contrary to Appellants’ argument, the Examiner has considered the
claim as a whole, and provided articulated reasoning with a rational
underpinning as to why one skilled in the art would have found it obvious to
combine the teachings of the Zonneveld and Lehman references. Appellants
do not persuasively show why such reasoning is incorrect.
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The Examiner’s findings and conclusion are reasonable because the
skilled artisan would “be able to fit the teachings of multiple patents together
like pieces of a puzzle” since the skilled artisan is “a person of ordinary
creativity, not an automaton.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 420–21. Appellants do not
present adequate evidence that the resulting arrangements would have been
“uniquely challenging or difficult for one of ordinary skill in the art” or
“represented an unobvious step over the prior art.” Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v.
Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing KSR, 550
U.S. at 418–19).
We find Appellant’s arguments are directed to the references
individually and does not address the combination of teachings as proffered
by the Examiner. Appellants argue that
Zonneveld and Lehman teach at most illuminating a path leading up to
the foot end of the emergency chute or up to an exit door. Neither
reference teaches or suggests anything about directing the evacuee
beyond the end of the chute or up to and the exit door. In other words,
the instant claims are distinguished both by (l) the location where the
light is projected i.e. ., the surface beyond the chute - and (2) the
direction at which the signal is pointed - i.e. ., substantially counter to
the direction of the first escape route.

(App. Br. 7.) (Emphases omitted.) Appellants further contend that there is
no teaching to illuminate the location extending past the chute, as claimed
“wherein the light signal generator is structured to display a first light signal
that marks a region extending over a surface beyond a bottom end of the
emergency chute in a direction leading away from the emergency chute.”
(App. Br. 8.) Appellants also contend that the claim sets forth “a solution
for what to do after the egress is important and advantagous because the
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aircraft passengers need to be led away from the bottom of the chute so that
they will avoid blocking later evacuees from exiting the chute.” (App. Br. 8.)
We note that the language of independent claim 1 in the preamble
merely recites “evacuating persons in a vehicle” in the preamble rather than
egress from the bottom of a chute. Appellants’ argument fails because it is
not commensurate with the scope of the claim. See In re Self, 671 F.2d
1344, 1348 (CCPA 1982) (“[A]ppellant’s arguments fail from the outset
because . . . they are not based on limitations appearing in the claims.”); In
re Hiniker Co., 150 F.3d 1362, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“[The] proffered facts
. . . are not commensurate with the claim scope and are therefore
unpersuasive.”).
Appellants contend that in combining the teachings of the Lehman
light generator into the last stanchion of Zonneveld:
there is nevertheless no teaching of which way would to point
Lehman’s apparatus. In fact, such modification of Zonneveld in
view of Lehman would be useless because Lehman merely deals
with directing an evacuee to the exit door or the end of the chute,
but is silent as to directing an evacuee to anything beyond that
point . . . the claimed direction may not be parallel to the first
escape route as designated by the direction of the emergency
chute.

(App. Br. 9.) We find Appellants’ argument to be unavailing because there
are only a limited number of basic directions (left, right, or straight) and any
selected direction would direct evacuees away from the chute where a left or
right would be a fastest choice to clear the bottom of the chute.
Appellants further argue that
Appellant’s claimed subject matter is concerned with preventing
congestion after the evacuee has reached safety, Nothing in the
prior art even hints at this problem much less solves it. The
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claimed location and direction of the light signal in claim l cannot
reasonably be deemed obvious, given that there is no reason
whatsoever presented in the prior art to dispose the light signal
in the way recited in the Appellants[’] claims . . .
The Examiner’s position is that, by Lehman applying to an
outdoor environment or without a door, suddenly every possible
configuration of the apparatus becomes obvious.

(App. Br. 10.) We disagree with Appellants, as discussed above, and do not
find the argument to be commensurate in scope with the claim language.
The Examiner provides a line of reasoning for the combination and
Appellants do not show error in the Examiner’s factual findings or
conclusion of obviousness. Moreover, Appellants’ argument is that there is
“no reason whatsoever presented in the prior art to dispose the light signal in
the way recited in the Appellants[’] claims,” but the claim is directed to a
system with a light generator, and Appellants proffer the intended use of the
light signal on the surface differentiates the claimed system. We find
Appellants’ argument unavailing.
Regarding apparatus claims generally, our reviewing court guides the
patentability of an apparatus claim “depends on the claimed structure, not on
the use or purpose of that structure.” Catalina Marketing Int’l., Inc. v.
Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 809 (Fed. Cir. 2002). “It is well
settled that the recitation of a new intended use for an old product does not
make a claim to that old product patentable.” In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d
1473, 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (citations omitted). As addressed by the court
in Paragon Solutions, LLC v. Timex Corp., 566 F.3d 1075, 1090 (2009),
“[A]pparatus claims cover what a device is, not what a device
does.” Hewlett–Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 909 F.2d
1464, 1468 (Fed.Cir.1990).
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. . .
Absent an express limitation to the contrary, any use of a device
that meets all of the limitations of an apparatus claim written in
structural terms infringes that apparatus claim . . . see also
Roberts v. Ryer, 91 U.S. 150, 157, 23 L.Ed. 267 (1875) (“The
inventor of a machine is entitled to the benefit of all the uses to
which it can be put, no matter whether he had conceived the idea
of the use or not.”). Construing a non-functional term in an
apparatus claim in a way that makes direct infringement turn on
the use to which an accused apparatus is later put confuses rather
than clarifies, frustrates the ability of both the patentee and
potential infringers to ascertain the propriety of particular
activities, and is inconsistent with the notice function central to
the patent system.

Id. at 1091.

We further note that the Lehman reference discloses laser diode
projectors 46–48 and the Zonneveld reference discloses the use of light
emitting diodes. We recognize there is a difference between both lights and
the means of generating the light between the Lehman and the Zonneveld
reference, but the claim is directed to the light direction and the
informational content conveyed rather than the specific generating circuitry
for providing the light signal. We agree with the Examiner that the Lehman
reference teaches and suggests using a light signal to convey a direction of
movement to evacuee’s from one location to another location in an egress
system. We find the Zonneveld reference discloses and suggests similarly
conveying information to evacuee’s by illuminating the slide and arguably
illuminating a portion of the surface beyond the slide due to the ultimate
placement of the last stanchions with their lights.
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We find both applied references teach and suggest the use of light
signals to convey an escape route information from a vehicle or location of
danger to a safer location. Although both references disclose different
environments and different methodologies, we agree with the Examiner that
one of ordinary skill in the art would have readily appreciated the two
methods and provided a combination as set forth by the Examiner in the
grounds of the rejection. We further find that the Appellants’ general
arguments address the totality of the claimed invention with respect to each
of the separate references, and Appellants do not substantively address the
Examiner’s proffered line of reasoning and combination for mounting the
light generator of Lehman on the stanchion at the bottom of the chute of
Zonneveld, so that the light generator can be adjusted to any appropriate
direction that leads to an escape route, including the direction leading away
from the emergency chute, which is substantially counter the first escape
route.
Therefore, we find Appellants’ arguments do not show error in the
Examiner’s factual findings or conclusion of obviousness of independent
claim 1, and we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of representative
independent claim 1, and dependent claims 2 and 4–12 not separately
argued.

Claim 3
With respect to independent claim 3, we note that the Examiner relies
upon a different combination of prior art references to teach and suggest the
claimed limitations, namely, the combination of the Zonneveld, Franco-Vila
and Tassey references. (Final Act. 7.)
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Appellants contend that:
[n]owhere in the applied Zonneveld and Tassey references,
considered alone or together, is there any teaching or suggestion
of an emergency chute dividing device disclosed which also
comprises a diffusely reflecting coating. Zonneveld merely
discloses a dividing device 58, and Tassey merely teaches photo
luminescent indicators 40 arranged along an escape route but not
part of any divider. The applicants submit that it is new and
unobvious to use a diffusely reflecting coating in conjunction
with light signal generators disposed in situ on a dividing device
itself.

(App. Br. 11.) We find Appellants’ argument above to be a general
argument for patentability and further does not address the Franco-Vila
reference in the combination. Additionally, we note that the lights on the
periphery of the chute in Franco-Vila contain lights at the toe end of the
chute and “toe-end lights. Here, it can be seen that the assemblies provide
light around the landing area of the slide” and “specialty configurations
based upon specific end uses desired by the customer. This is significant, as
different lighting patterns can be extremely important when placed about
different positions of the slide or slide/raft unit, indicating appropriate
directions, boundaries, and the like.” (See Ans. 8; citing Franco-Vila 7:10–
15, 30–34.)
In the Reply Brief, Appellants present the similar arguments made in
the Appeal Brief and further detail their arguments with respect to
independent claim 3 regarding the divider.3

3 Although not applied in the rejection, we note that the Day reference from
1969 discloses a chemical light indicator for emergency light elimination
which is similar to the Zonneveld reference and discloses “Preferably, the
chute also includes a central divider tube 18 which is used in larger aircraft
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We further note that the Franco-Vila reference discloses that the LED
lighting where “it is an object of the present invention to provide an aircraft
evacuation slide illumination system that can be secured to any conventional
evacuation slide.” (Franco-Vila 3:55–58). We note that Appellants
provided no argument to the Franco-Vila reference in the principal Appeal
Brief and contends in the Reply Brief that the Franco-Vila reference only
provides lighting for the perimeter of the chute. (See generally Reply Br. 9.)
Finally, Appellants contend that “the lighting apparatus is disclosed in
Franco-Vila are intended to project light on to a different surface. They
accordingly fail to read on the arrangement in claim 3, in which a light on a
dividing device illuminates the reflecting coating, which is also on the
dividing device.” (Reply Br. 9.)
We disagree with Appellants and find that Examiner relied upon the
Tassey reference for teaching and suggesting of the use of a reflective
coating in an evacuation chute. Furthermore, the Franco-Vila reference
teaches placing the LED lighting on the periphery as shown in the Figures
5A and 5B which is a single slide, but column 5 of the Franco-Vila reference
further discloses the prior art previously provided inadequate illumination
and, “the evacuation slide and the evacuation area may not be adequately
illuminated, thereby compromising the safety of the aircraft evacuees.”
(Franco-Vila 5:20–22). Although column 3, lines 21–24 of the Franco-Vila
reference discloses “illumination assemblies described above disposed along
the substantial outer edge of said slide,” the Franco-Vila reference further

to convert the slide into a double escape chute and greatly increase the
possible evacuation rate.” (Day 2: 55–58.)

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discloses that “an object of the present invention to provide an aircraft
evacuation slide illumination system that can be secured to any conventional
evacuation slide and does not include a plastic housing to cover the light
source.” (Franco-Vila 3:56–58.) We find one such conventional evacuation
slide to be the double slide as disclosed by the Zonneveld reference. With
the specific teaching that the prior art lighting was insufficient for safety
reasons, we agree with the Examiner’s line of reasoning in the combination
that it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time
of the invention to have additionally included the LED lighting of the
Franco-Vila reference on the divider of the Zonneveld reference in place of
the lighting on the stanchions. With the reduced height of the lighting
elements than on the stanchions, it would have been readily apparent to
skilled artisans that additional light may be needed from the divider.
As a result, we find Appellants’ arguments do not show error in the
Examiner’s factual findings or conclusion of obviousness of independent
claim 3.
DECISION
We sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejections of claims 1–12.
DECISION SUMMARY
Claims
Rejected
Basis  Affirmed Reversed
1–12 § 103  1–12 None
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FINALITY AND RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED