Carriage Inn of Cadiz

National Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge Opinions

May 1, 2007

08-CA-036464 (N.L.R.B. May. 1, 2007)

JD–29–07
Cadiz, OH
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DIVISION OF JUDGES
CARRIAGE INN OF CADIZ
and Case 8–CA–36464
UNITED STEEL, PAPER AND FORESTRY,
RUBBER, MANUFACTURING, ENERGY
ALLIED INDUSTRIAL AND SERVICE
WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION, AFL–CIO,
CLC, and its LOCAL UNION NO. 13983-08
Iva Y. Choe, Esq., and Noelle Powell, Esq., for
the General Counsel.
Timothy Gallagher, Esq., and James G. Porcaro,
Esq. (Schwarzwald and McNair, LLP), of
Cleveland, Ohio, for the Charging Party.
Dennis D. Grant, Esq. (Bailey Cavalieri, LLC), of
Columbus, Ohio, for the Respondent.
DECISION
Statement of the Case
EARL E. SHAMWELL JR., Administrative Law Judge. This case was heard by me on
August 22–24, 2006, in Steubenville, Ohio, pursuant to an original charge filed on March 24,
2006, by United Steel, Paper, and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial
and Service Workers International Union, AFL–CIO, CLC, and its Local Union No. 13983-08
(the Union) against Carriage Inn of Cadiz (the Respondent). The Union filed amended charges
against the Respondent on April 11 and 28 and May 24, 2006.
On May 31, 2006, the Regional Director for Region 8 of the National Labor Relations
Board (the Board) issued a complaint against the Respondent alleging that it violated Section
8(a)(1) and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act). On June 13, 2006, the
Respondent timely filed its answer to the complaint essentially denying the commission of any
unfair labor practices.
At the hearing, the parties were represented by counsel and were afforded full
opportunity to be heard, examine and cross-examine witnesses, and introduce evidence. On
the entire record, including my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and after
considering the briefs filed by the General Counsel, the Charging Party, and the Respondent, I
make the following findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order.
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I. JURISDICTION
The Respondent, an Ohio corporation, maintains an office and place of business in
Cadiz, Ohio, and has been engaged in the operation of a nursing home facility. The
Respondent admits that annually in the course and conduct of its business, it derives gross
revenues in excess of $250,000 and purchases and receives products valued in excess of
$50,000 directly from points located outside of the State of Ohio. Accordingly, I would find and
conclude that the Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS AND THE APPROPRIATE UNIT OF EMPLOYEES
On November 12, 1992, the Board certified the United Steelworkers of America as the
exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the employees in the following appropriate unit
of the Respondent’s employees:
All full-time and regular part-time nonprofessional employees employed by the Employer
at its Cadiz, Ohio facility, including licensed practical nurses, nurses aides,
housekeeping employees, dietary employees, laundry employees, social and activity
service employees, orderlies, maintenance employees and office clerical employees, but
excluding department managers, confidential employees and professional employees,
guards and supervisors as defined in the Act.1
Local 13983-08 is an amalgamated local consisting of six bargaining units at six different
employers. I would find and conclude that based on the entire record herein and on the
foregoing certification that at all material times both Unions have been labor organizations within
the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.2 The two labor organizations will henceforth herein be
referred to in the singular.
III. BACKGROUND AND OTHER FACTUAL MATTERS NOT IN DISPUTE
As noted, the Respondent operates a nursing home facility in Cadiz, Ohio; its day-to-day
operations are performed under the auspices of a contract manager, Capital health Services,
Inc. (Capital Health), which also provides financial/payroll and legal services, including
negotiations for collective bargaining with the Union here.
Capital Health’s office is located in Dayton, Ohio, about a 3-1/2 hours’ drive from the
Respondent’s Cadiz facility.
As noted earlier, the Union was certified by the Board as the exclusive bargaining
representative of the Respondent’s employees in November 1992. The parties’ most recent
collective-bargaining agreement was negotiated effective November 10, 2002; this agreement
expired on November 10, 2005.3

1 See Ct. Exh. 1, a copy of the Board’s Decision and Certification in Case 8–RC–14725, of
which I took administrative notice at the hearing.
2 In its answer, the Respondent stated that it was without knowledge sufficient to admit or
deny the allegations regarding the Union’s labor organization status within the meaning of the
Act. The Respondent did not contest the Union’s status under the Act at the hearing or in its
brief. I conclude that the Respondent has conceded this point.
3 See GC Exh. 2, a copy of the labor agreement between Carriage inn of Cadiz and the
Continued
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On August 2, 2005, the Union through David McCall, its district director, notified the
Respondent by certified letter that the collective-bargaining agreement would terminate as of
November 10, 2005, and that the Union desired to negotiate a successor agreement to cover
wages, rate of pay, hours of work, insurance, pensions, and other conditions of employment.
The letter also requested that the Respondent provide to the lead union negotiator—the District
1 staff representative, Santo Santoro—the following information.4
In order to facilitate the matter of negotiable contractual provisions, I am
requesting that the following information be supplied to the responsible District 1 Staff
Representative in charge of negotiations:
1. Names, addresses, birth dates and seniority dates of all members of the
bargaining unit.
2. Names and addresses of all insurance program carriers.
3. Cost per $1,000.00 of life insurance.
4. Cost per $1,000.00 of S & A benefits.
5. Cost per $10.00 of S & A benefits.
6. Cost per monthly premium of hospitalization coverage for single and family
plans.
7. Name and address of pension carrier.
8. Premium cost of pension benefits.
9. Amount paid into pension program annually since previous negotiations.
10. Total amount of money presently held in pension fund.
11. What is the average straight time hourly rate and what is the average cost of
all benefit programs.
The Union’s letter also requested that the Respondent meet with the Union’s lead
negotiator (Santo Santoro) “at such early time and suitable place as may be mutually
convenient for purposes of such negotiations.”
The Union and the Respondent met for their initial bargaining session on October 13,
2005, whereat the respective negotiating team members were introduced. The Union was
represented by Santo Santoro, Jim Brookins, president of the local, and two Carriage Inn
employees and unit members, Patricia McAfee and Ila Hamilton. The Respondent’s team
_________________________
Steelworkers and Local Union 13983-08.
4 See GC Exh. 13, a copy of the letter. The letter was addressed to Ken Bernsen as
president of Carriage Inn of Cadiz. David R. McCall, the Union’s director of District 1, authored
this letter; copies were sent to Santo Santoro, the Union’s District 1 staff representative, and Jim
Brookins, president of Local Union 13983-08.
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consisted of Ken Bernsen, lead negotiator; Cassandra “Cassie” Koniski, facility administrator;
and Brad Conto, administrator for another nursing home facility operated by Capital Health,
Carriage Inn of Steubenville.
At the initial session, the parties discussed various issues including seniority, “short
staffing,” vacations, and personal days. However, the Respondent did not provide the Union
with any of the information requested in the August 2 letter at this initial meeting.
The parties next met on November 2, 2005, with Santoro, McAfee, and Hamilton
representing the Union and Bernsen and Koniski representing the Respondent. Brookins and
perhaps Conto were not present.5 The Respondent presented four noneconomic proposals
dealing with contract provisions on the definition of probationary employees, job bidding,
termination of seniority, and overtime at this session.6
At this session, the Union presented its first economic proposal which mainly called for a
40-cent-per-hour pay raise in each of the first 2 years of the contract and 45 cents in the third
year.7
In any event, the parties did come to some understanding on the noneconomic issues
but not so with respect to the wage or economic issues. They also verbally agreed to extend
the contract to November 18 and scheduled another session for November 17.
The parties resumed their negotiations on November 17 at the Cadiz library. The Union
was again represented by Brookins, McAfee, and Hamilton; Santoro arrived late for the meeting.
The Respondent was represented by Bernsen, Koniski, and Conto. Brookins essentially acted
as the Union’s lead negotiator in Santoro’s absence. However, since Brookins had not attended
the November 2 session, he was not altogether familiar with issues and that the parties had
reached “understandings” on some noneconomic issues. The Respondent’s management,
mainly Bernsen, was displeased over this, believing that the negotiations were not going
forward, that the parties were discussing matters the Respondent felt were resolved on
November 2. In any case, neither party made any additional economic proposals and the
meeting on a sour note ended abruptly. For his part, Santoro arrived at the meeting only to be
greeted with an irate Bernsen who was about to leave the meeting. However, at that time,
Bernsen and Santoro agreed later to resume the negotiations on December 7.
On December 7, the Union team (Santoro and Brookins) arrived at the appointed
meeting place—the Cadiz library. However, no one from management showed up (nor did the
employee representatives) because there was an emergency situation at the nursing facility.
Santoro called the nursing home and spoke to Bernsen who explained the nature of the

5 There is disagreement between the Respondent’s witnesses and the General Counsel’s
witnesses as to whether Conto was present at the second meeting. I do not find this
disagreement to be a material matter in the context of the case and issues presented.
6 See, respectively, GC Exh. 2, the expired collective-bargaining agreement. Secs. 5.2, 5.8,
5.6, and 6.9 of the agreement treat with these issues.
7 Santoro was not specifically asked when he made the first economic proposal but testified
that he made an economic proposal in November. Santoro also stated that the Union’s main
concern in the negotiations was for wages. As will be seen later, Santoro arrived late for the
parties’ next (third) meeting in November and did not participate. Bernsen, however, testified
that he recalled the Union’s initial economic proposal (as above stated) being made at the
second meeting on November 2.
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emergency at the facility and that he could not attend the session. Moreover, future
negotiations would be delayed somewhat by the problem.8 The Union and the Respondent later
in December agreed to resume their negotiations on January 17, 2006.
The parties met at the Cadiz library on January 17 as scheduled, and fairly quickly
disposed of an outstanding issue relating to one of the noneconomic proposals and turned to
the economic matters.
The Respondent raised three items of concern—replacing the employees’ vacation
benefit with paid time off; requiring employees with over 7 years of seniority to pay for their
health insurance; and an increase in the employees’ hourly wages by 10 cents in the first 2
years of the proposed contract and 15 cents for the third year.
In response, the Union requested a brief recess in the negotiations—a caucus—to
consider these proposals. When the parties resumed their negotiations, the Union presented its
economic counterproposals which included opposition to the Respondent’s proposal to require
employees to pay their own health insurance (they could not afford this) and a wage proposal of
35 cents increases in the first 2 years of the contract, and 40 cents in the third year.
The Respondent (Bernsen) questioned the Union’s (Brookins’) calculations. Brookins’
explanations of his calculations caused a heated discussion between the parties. The
Respondent at some point decided to caucus over the issues presented. When the parties
reconvened, Bernsen determined that there was an issue of whether the Union represented a
majority of the employees, and he wanted to investigate the matter further. The meeting ended
on this note.
On January 23, 2006, Bernsen wrote Santoro the following (excerpted letter):9
Dear Mr. Santoro:
We have been negotiating with you since October 13th, 2005 while under the
impression that the Steelworkers represented a majority of the employees in the
bargaining unit. During the negotiations held on January 17th, 2006, you admitted the
Steelworkers only represented 24 employees at the Carriage Inn of Cadiz. According to
our records, the collective bargaining unit consists of 82 employees. It appears from
your admission that the Steelworkers do not represent a majority of the workforce. If this
is true, pursuant to the National Labor Relations Act, we are prohibited from negotiating
with the Steelworkers Union.
We were scheduled to meet on Tuesday, January 24th. Unless you can produce
proof that the Steelworkers hold majority status, we will be forced to cancel further
negotiations and withdraw recognition of the union. If you can produce evidence of
majority status, please do so in advance of our scheduled meeting. I will need to inspect
any evidence before proceeding with negotiations. Alternatively, if you need more time
to gather documentation, I am available Friday, January 27th to receive the evidence. If

8 Santoro and Bernsen provided different versions of all that transpired in this conversation.
However, there is no dispute that the emergency at the facility prevented the meeting from
going forward.
9 See GC Exh. 9. Copies of this letter were also sent to the employee members of the
Union’s bargaining team, Hamilton and McAfee.
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evidence of majority status is not offered by the 27th, we will permanently cease further
negotiations and withdraw recognition. Be advised that evidence of current
representative status which we would find acceptable consists of representation
authorization cards or other writings signed by our current employees and dated prior to
your January 17, 2006 apparent admission of minority status. Thank you.
Bernsen, also on January 23, distributed the following letter to the Carriage Inn
employees:10
Dear Employee:
As you know, we have been in negotiations with the Steelworkers for the past several
months, attempting to work out a new contract. During our last bargaining session,
something happened that impacts you and you should know about. It has always been
our philosophy to keep you informed of any key events that are important to you.
In our last session, the Steelworkers Representative said that the union only represents
a small minority of the bargaining unit and is not representing the rest of the bargaining
unit—a majority.
Since this statement indicates that the union no longer represents a majority of the
employees at our Cadiz Facility, we are contacting the union and advising it that we are
now required to suspend negotiations. Absent proof to the contrary, we also will
withdraw recognition.
We want to let you know what may happen as a result of this action.
° First, the union may try to get many of you to sign membership cards to attempt
to regain majority status. If enough people sign cards, it might result in a secret
ballot election to determine if you want to be represented by the union.
° If you sign a card, and the union obtains majority status, you may have to pay
dues, which many of you do not pay now.
You should know that we have non-unionized facilities in our system, and we are able to
provide competitive wages and benefit packages.
This is an important event. It appears the Steelworkers do not care about the wages
and benefits of a majority of you, but we want to keep you fully informed about what has
happened and how it might impact you. We will be holding meetings with you to discuss
this matter and answer your questions. Please do not hesitate to come to any member
of management with your questions, and as we learn more, we will pass that information
on to you.
On January 25, 2006, in response to Bernsen’s letter of January 23, Santoro informed
him by letter as follows in pertinent part.11

10 See GC Exh. 3, a copy of this letter.
11 See GC Exh. 14.
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Dear Mr. Bernsen:
Thank you for expressing your concerns about the Carriage Inn Cadiz location. After our
phone conversation on Monday, January 23, 2006, I was expecting to receive a faxed
letter from you summarizing the concerns that you indicated. You expressed to me that
you were not going to continue negotiations with the United Steelworkers because you
felt that we did not represent the majority of the employees. Since I have yet to receive
the notice you said you would fax that afternoon, I will summarize our call for you.
As I indicated to you, our history has been to represent all employees within the
bargaining unit. Employees of the bargaining unit have been represented by us in the
past through contract negotiations as well as discipline issues or other needs of the
employees related to their employment. You have dealt with us on employment issues
for all members.
If there has been a misunderstanding in terms of the employees that we represent, I
hope this clarifies that our history is that we represent each employee both dues paying
and non-dues paying at your facility.
Further, please note that we have never received a response to our correspondence of
August 2, 2005. Not having access to this information for which we are entitled has
made it very difficult to bargain without adequate information from which to make our
decisions. Our extension of this contract was an act of good faith bargaining on our part.
Please see to it that you extend us the same courtesy by providing us with the requested
information and refraining from making what could be construed as “union busting”
statements to your employees.
We look forward to resuming negotiations in pursuit of a fair and equitable contract for all
the employees of Cadiz Inn of Cadiz.
Also, on January 25, Santoro and Brookins distributed an informative letter12 to the
Carriage Inn employees at the facility. This letter in pertinent part states the following:
January 25, 2006 — Notice to All Employees of Carriage Inn
of Cadiz [Raised Print in Original Document]
This notice is from your union, the United Steelworkers, in response to the January 23,
2006 correspondence from Mr. Ken Bernsen, President of Capital Health Services. WE
bargain for YOU – for your wages, your benefits, your working conditions, your
disciplinary procedure and your employment needs. As you know, we have always
represented all the employees in contract negotiations as well as assisted both dues
paying and non dues paying members in other employment issues.
Mr. Bernsen has never responded to our request for the information necessary to enter
into contract negotiations. On August 2, 2005 a certified copy of the request was sent to
Mr. Bernsen. This company has never met its obligations to provide the information
about the employees and their seniority dates, the cost of all benefits such as life

12 See GC Exh. 27. This letter was signed by Brookins and Santoro. Santoro testified that
he and Brookins may have missed some employees because of a shift change at the facility.
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insurance, hospitalization, sickness & accident benefits, pension contributions and
crucial information about the status of the pension fund and wage information.
In the company proposal, Mr. Bernsen offered a 10 cent an hour increase and also a
proposal to make employees with more than seven years seniority also begin paying
greatly increased ($62.06 MORE per payday) health care premiums. Additionally, the
company proposal is to do away with vacation time and replace it with a PTO (Paid Time
Off) system which you have previously rejected. We consider his contract proposal an
insult to you, the hardworking caregivers and lifeblood of his nursing home.
Is Mr. Bernsen trying to refuse to bargain with the Union so that he alone decides the
future of your employment conditions at Carriage Inn of Cadiz? Now that you know how
he misled you in his letter, do you trust him to do what is best for you and your family?
On or about January 25, in response to telephone messages left by Santoro, Bernsen
reaffirmed by letter that he and his bargaining committee heard the union representatives make
statements (regarding the representation issue) and that he (Bernsen) accurately reflected
those statements in the January 23 letter to the Union.
Bernsen also wrote as follows:
During your voice messages, you did not offer proof of majority status as I
requested in my letter dated January 23rd. If you have the necessary proof, please
contact me. If you do not have the necessary proof, I am prohibited from engaging in
any further negotiations with you. If there are other matters you would like to discuss,
please reduce those to writing so that I can respond to you accordingly. I am hesitant to
engage in an oral conversation with you given your denial of the statements made in
front of witnesses at our last negotiation session. I do not desire any further disputes
over what either of us may say or may have said, and I think it would be in our best
interests to communicate via written correspondence if needed. Thank you for your
understanding.13
On February 1, Bernsen distributed another letter to the Carriage Inn employees as part
of his efforts to keep them informed about the Company’s relations with the Union. This letter14
in pertinent part) informed the employees as follows:
Last week, I stated that we would keep you informed of events relating to the union
situation. Since then, several things have happened and many of you have asked some
good questions that we want to answer.
First, the Steelworkers filed an Unfair Labor Practice charge against the Carriage Inn
indicating that we were refusing to bargain because we felt that the union does not
represent a majority of the employees. Our position is clear. The Union does not have
authority to represent a majority of the employees in the bargaining unit at Carriage Inn
of Cadiz, and today the union withdrew the Unfair Labor Practice charge.
What does this mean? Well, it is very possible that the union may try to convince you
to sign membership cards, asking you to join the union, or authorization cards,

13 See GC Exh. 5.
14 See GC Exh. 6. The raised print was supplied in the original letter.
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authorizing the union to speak for you. If they get enough cards signed, we may have a
secret ballot election to determine if you want to be represented by the Steelworkers,
and if we have an election, any actions on wages and benefits may be delayed
until the election is held and that might take several weeks of months.
Frankly, I don’t feel that a union is really needed here. We are trying hard to create and
maintain a workplace where people are treated fairly and with respect. Our pay and
benefits are competitive. Union or no union, those things will not change.
Many of you have asked questions about what will happen to your pay and benefits.
Right now, we are restricted by law in what we can say about this, but at this point,
there will be no changes in pay and benefits. After this situation is resolved, we may
be able to adjust wages and benefits, but we do not know how long it might take to
resolve this issue.
You should understand, however, that none of our facilities pay minimum wages,
and it has never been our intention to reduce wages here regardless of union
representation. We have always tried to provide fair wages and benefits at all our
facilities—union or non-union. In fact, some of our non-union facilities have wage
programs that allow for better increases over time that are possible under the limitations
the union contract here included, and employees at our non-union facilities do not pay
dues.
On or about February 23, 2006, the Respondent, by Cassie Koniski, issued the following
directive15 to the Carriage Inn employees.
Attention Staff:
From this date forward, February 23, 2006, there is to be NO SOLICITATION OF
ANY KIND on the premises of the Carriage Inn of Cadiz. Fundraisers for the
facility and/or the residents will still be permitted but it is with regret that I am no
longer able to permit staff to sell items. If you have any questions, do not hesitate
to see me. Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.
/s/
Cassie
On March 21, 2006, Santoro wrote Bernsen and stated (in pertinent part):16
Dear Mr. Bernsen:
By means of this letter, the Union would like to notify you of our demand to
immediately reconvene negotiations for a successor contract covering the Carriage Inn
bargaining unit at Cadiz, Oho in which we have been certified by the NLRB IN Case No.
8-RC-14725. In light of the fact that those employees have now been without a

15 See GC Exh. 10. It should be noted that this no-solicitation directive was the subject of
the General Counsel’s motion to amend the complaint at the hearing. The raised print appears
in the exhibit adduced at the hearing.
16 See GC Exh. 21.
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collective bargaining agreement for almost five months, I am also faxing this demand for
your immediate attention.
The Union stands ready to permit you to view our showing of majority interest; or
in the alternative to permit a third pay neutral observer to check that showing if you so
desire.
We are also available to reconvene negotiations on March 27, 28, 29 and 30.
Please confirm your ability to meet and negotiate on at least two of those dates by noon
Friday, March 24, 2006. In the event you fail to do so the Union intends to promptly
undertake any and all actions appropriate to protect the interests of employees in this
bargaining unit.
On March 24, 2006, Bernsen responded by letter17 to Santoro’s March 21 letter, stating:
Dear Mr. Santoro:
I received your letter dated March 21st, 2006 claiming that the Steelworkers
Union now represents a majority of the bargaining unit at the Carriage Inn of Cadiz. As
you may recall, at our last bargaining session on January 17th, 2006, you stated that the
Steelworkers only represent a minority of the bargaining unit during negotiations. On
January 23rd, 2006, I sent a letter to you offering an opportunity to resume negotiations if
evidence of majority status was offered by the 27th of January. No evidence was
presented. On January 25th, the Steelworkers Union filed an unfair labor practice charge
with the National Labor Relations Board against the Carriage Inn claiming refusal to
bargain as well as claiming the company began a de-certification petition. On January
31st, the NLRB advised that the union withdrew the charge.
Now, over two (2) months after our last bargaining session, the Steelworkers
claim to hold majority status and want to resume negotiations. I am suspicious as to the
truthfulness of this assertion. In the past, some unions have been known to present
forged cards or cards that were procured under false pretenses as evidence that they
represent a majority of the employees. Whether that is the case here, I do not know.
However, I do not believe that the majority of the employees at the Carriage Inn of Cadiz
wish to be represented by the Steelworkers Union. Furthermore, I will not rely upon
purported evidence offered by the Steelworkers two months after it was requested to
prove otherwise. Thank you.
On March 27, Bernsen distributed the following letter18 to the Carriage Inn employees (in
pertinent part):
We are pleased to announce that we are implementing the following changes to your
wage program. These changes are in two parts:
First, effective on March 17, 2006 you saw a 4% increase in your pay.
Second, this wage increase will be retroactive to 11/10/05. You will see the
retroactive amount in a lump sum in your March 31, 2006 paychecks.

17 See GC Exh. 7.
18 See GC Exh. 8. The raised print was contained in the letter as distributed.
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This is the first step in a new working relationship, and we welcome this new
relationship. It is important for us to understand that we exist as a business for several
reasons: to provide the best possible care we can to your residents; to make a profit
and to provide jobs and a place to work that you enjoy. We feel that by working as a
team we will be able to achieve our goals more easily. Everyone will benefit.
In an effort to keep you informed, we have just received a letter from the Steelworkers
indicating that they feel they represent a majority of the employees at Cadiz—something
they denied during negotiations, causing us to withdraw recognition of the union. Now,
the Steelworkers have requested that we submit a to “card check” to determine if they do
represent a majority and “reconvene” negotiations. In short, the union wants us to
recognize them as your representative without giving you A CHOICE in the matter.
We told the union that we withdrew recognition because they no longer represented a
majority of the employees at Cadiz. If the union represents you in the future it should be
your choice, through a secret ballot election where you express your wishes—not the
wishes of the union.
On May 3, 2006, Santoro wrote to Bernsen for the last time before the hearing. The
letter19 stated as follows:
Dear Mr. Bernsen:
It has been brought to my attention that you are claiming that you have provided
the Union with the information requested by District 1 Director Dave McCall in his letter
dated August 2, 2005 (copy enclosed). Please be advised that the only information you
have provided to the Union is a list of 27 employees with the names marked through with
black marker.
We are still awaiting your response to the information requested in Director
McCall’s letter.
The parties had not engaged in further bargaining by the time of the hearing.
IV. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE ALLEGATIONS
The complaint essentially alleges that the Respondent has failed and refused to furnish
the Union with certain information it originally requested by letter on August 2, 2005, and
subsequently by letters dated January 25 and May 3, 2006, and verbally sometime in December
2005, and on January 17, 2006; that the requested information was necessary for and relevant
to the Union’s performance of its duties as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of
the Respondent’s employees, all in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. The complaint
also alleges that the Respondent also violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by withdrawing
recognition of the Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of its employees
on about January 23, 2006, and unilaterally granting employees a wage increase on March 27,
2006.

19 See GC Exh. 22. The letter also contained certain enclosures, mainly a copy of the
Union’s August 2, 2005 letter requesting enumerated categories of information.
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The Respondent is further charged with violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by
threatening employees in the February 1, 2006 letter that their wages and benefits would be
delayed if they engaged in union and/or protected activities; implying a promise of benefits if the
employees rejected the Union as their collective-bargaining representative; and threatening
employees that their wages and benefits would be delayed as long as they engaged in union
and/or protected activities.20
A. The Information Request Allegation
There is no controversy or dispute regarding the fact that the Union’s request by letter on
August 2, 2005, for certain information was made and received by the Respondent on or about
that date. It is also clear that the Union made the requests in question pursuant to its desire to
negotiate a new collective-bargaining agreement, as the current contract was due to expire on
November 10, 2005. The Respondent in point of fact does not dispute the relevancy of the
requested information to the negotiations the parties undertook beginning in October 2005 to
arrive at a successor agreement. While the Respondent, for other reasons to be discussed,
contends that it did not violate the Act regarding the information request, it does not contend
that the requested information was unclear or confusing as stated in the August letter. In short,
the Respondent does not claim that it did not understand the nature of the information sought,
that it called for confidential information, or that it was unavailable to the extent it existed.
I would note that the 11 enumerated requests appear to be straightforward and were
stated in plain language evidently easily understood by Bernsen as the Respondent’s lead
negotiator. The Respondent’s argument essentially goes to the point that it in fact timely
provided the information requested by the Union.
Thus, the main issue regarding the Union’s information request is whether the
Respondent provided the requested information.
1. The Union’s version of the Respondent’s compliance with its information request
Santoro testified that the Union never directly received from the Respondent any of the
information requested from the Respondent. Santoro stated that just before the November 2
session, around October 31, one of the bargaining unit chairpersons/representatives, either
McAfee or Hamilton, gave him a list of names of 27 unit employees with social security numbers
blacked out.21 Santoro emphatically denied ever receiving any copies of a list of unit employees

20 As noted in an earlier fn., the General Counsel at the hearing moved to amend the
complaint to include a charge that the Respondent on or about February 23, 2006, notified the
employees that it was prohibiting all solicitations and specifically that all staff would no longer be
able to sell items. She asserts that the notice constituted not only an impermissible unilateral
change in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) but also demonstrates the Respondent’s animus
against the Union. She further submits that the notice was a coercive attempt to prevent
employees from engaging in union activities in violation of Section 8(a)(1). Although the
General Counsel stated that she first became aware of this matter during witness preparation
for the hearing on August 11, I denied her motion but allowed the testimony and related
documents into the record. The General Counsel has renewed her motion to amend in her
brief. I will deny this motion once more for the reasons I stated on the record.
21 Santoro identified GC Exh. 18 as a copy of the list of unit employees he says were given
to him by McAfee or Hamilton. The list contains names (with blacked-out social security
numbers), addresses, birthdates, and service dates of 27 employees. However, McAfee
Continued
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from the Respondent. Santoro also denied that Bernsen himself ever gave him a listing of the
entire unit of employees in October 2005.
Upon being shown by the General Counsel a copy of a fax cover sheet and several
enclosures to him purporting to originate from Capital Health Services (Bernsen) on October 31,
2005,22 Santoro testified that he had not seen before the hearing the third page which included
the names and addresses of the Respondent’s insurance plan (dental, life, and medical)
providers and the costs associated with their plans—both part of the Union’s information
requests. Santoro stated that the Union never received from the Respondent a response to the
requests for pension related information.23
All in all, according to Santoro, he informed Bernsen in letters and verbally on several
occasions that the requested information was needed to arrive at a contract. Santoro testified
that he needed to know how many unit employees were involved and what their benefits
included to make a “decent’ wage and benefits proposal for the unit. Upon being shown an
undated document captioned “Cadiz Bargaining Unit” (GC Exh. 25) which lists the names of 94
persons evidently employed by the Respondent during 2006 as well as those terminated during
that year, Santoro testified that he had never seen this listing.
Santoro stated that around December 5, 2005, and on January 17, 2006, he verbally
asked Bernsen for information requested in the August 2 letter, but never received any
response. Aside from the Respondent’s economic and noneconomic proposals, according to
Santoro, the Union never received the requested information.24
Santoro testified that even after the Respondent’s withdrawal of recognition, he persisted
in his request for information culminating in his May 3, 2006 letter to Bernsen in which he again
stated that the only information received by the Union pursuant to the request was the listing of
27 employees. The Respondent, he asserts, never bothered to respond to these last missives.
2. The Respondent’s version
Bernsen testified regarding the Respondent’s handling of the Union’s information
request. Bernsen acknowledged receiving the August 2 letter from the Union and that Santoro
was the person designated by the Union as its lead negotiator. Bernsen stated that he provided
some of the requested information at the end of October 2005.25 According to Bernsen, he
_________________________
testified that she did not prepare the list. Hamilton did not testify at the hearing.
22 See G.C. Exh. 20. This exhibit purports to be a fax sent on October 31, 2005, from
Bernsen to Santoro and states “Information Request” in the subject part of the cover sheet. The
exhibit includes a listing of 27 unit employees with their social security numbers blacked out.
This document is very similar to GC Exh. 18, the listing Santoro stated that he received from
one of the bargaining unit employee representatives. GC Exh. 18 is dated October 17.
23 It should be noted that Santoro conceded that the August 2 letter was the customary or
form letter the Steelworkers International sent out to employees pursuant to impending contract
negotiations. Santoro acknowledged that he knew at the time that the Respondent provided no
pension benefits to unit employees.
24 In his affidavit (R. Exh. 1), Santoro stated that Bernsen did tell him on January 17 that
there were seven employees receiving the employer’s health insurance.
25 On examination by the General Counsel, Bernsen recalled (from his notes) that he did not
provide any of the requested information prior to the first negotiation session he attended on
October 13.
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provided the Union by fax an employee list and the requested benefits information. However,
Bernsen said he later realized that his office assistant (Tina) had merely sent a list of the dues-
paying members of the unit, that this was a failure of communication. According to Bernsen, he
provided a full list of the unit employees at a later bargaining session.
Bernsen examined the August 2 letter at the hearing and testified that as to item 1, he
provided in late October the aforesaid partial list (and later a full list) of the names, addresses,
birth dates, and seniority dates of all members of the bargaining unit. As to items 2, 3, and 4,
Bernsen said he provided a partial list. He conceded that he did not provide information
regarding the cost per $100 for life insurance (item 3) and cost per $10 of S and A benefits (item
5).
Bernsen said that he believed he may have given the Union a cost per $1000 of the S
and A benefits (item 4) but was not sure. Bernsen was not sure whether he provided
“something” on disability insurance but stated he provided the costs for hospitalization coverage
for single and family plans (item 6). Bernsen said that he did not respond to requested items 7,
name and address of the Carriage Inn pension carrier; 8, premium cost of pension benefits; 9,
amount paid into pension programs annually since previous negotiations; and 10, total amount
of money presently held in pension fund.
Regarding item 11—the average straight time hourly rate and what is the average cost
of all benefit programs—Bernsen said he provided the data the Union needed to do calculations
by virtue of his having provided ultimately the full listing of the unit employees. Bernsen was not
sure about having provided the average costs of all benefit programs but testified the Union,
nonetheless, had the cost of the benefits programs and could calculate the average costs with
the information he had provided. While not sure of the actual date he provided the information,
Bernsen recalled that it was done in the first bargaining session in November at which he
provided to Santoro directly a full listing of the bargaining unit members.26
3. The contentions of the parties
The General Counsel27 contends that the information requested by the Union on August
2 was necessary for it to prepare for negotiations for the impending contract negotiations, and in
that context the information in every particular was presumptively relevant. She argues that the
Union also repeatedly—by telephone in October and December 2005, and even verbally at the
January 17, 2006 bargaining session; and in final letters on January 25 and May 3, 2006—
requested the information it sought in August 2005. However, she avers that based on the

26 Refreshing his recollection with his notes, Bernsen stated that the second bargaining
session was November 2, 2005. Bernsen testified that Conto and Koniski witnessed his giving
the list to Santoro. Notably, Conto testified that he observed Bernsen hand Santoro some
papers on October 13 but Santoro did not review them. According to Conto, Santoro put the
papers in his brief case without reading them. Koniski also testified that she saw Bernsen hand
Santoro some information at the initial bargaining session. See, also, Koniski’s affidavit (GC
Exh. 23) dated May 1, 2006, wherein she avers that the exchange of information took place at
the initial session.
27 As noted, the Charging Party Union filed a brief in the matter. When I refer to the General
Counsel, it should be understood I have incorporated by reference the positions and contentions
of the Charging Party which also contends that the Respondent has violated the Act as set out
in the complaint.
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credible testimony of Santoro, the clearly necessary and relevant information he sought
throughout the negotiations was never provided by the Respondent.28
On the other hand, the General Counsel contends that the Respondent’s witnesses were
not credible regarding the information issue. She submits that Bernsen’s testimony at the
hearing is belied by his own affidavit, as well as the Respondent’s position statement, in that in
the former there is no mention of his having faxed information to the Union on October 31 and in
the latter he states that the information was provided at the initial bargaining session, which all
parties agree occurred on October 13. She further notes Koniski testified at the hearing that
she was present at the second negotiating session when the Union was provided information,
the nature of which she did not know. Yet, in her affidavit she swore that information (not
particularly described) was given to the Union at the initial session.
In likewise, the General Counsel contends that Conto was not credible and contradicted
Bernsen by his assertion that any information (he, too, did not know what it was) given the
Union was provided by Bernsen at the initial session. However, Bernsen himself admitted at the
hearing he provided no information to the Union at the initial session. Then, too, she notes
Bernsen in an affidavit (GC Exh. 17) swore that he “delivered the information the Union
requested” to Santoro at the initial bargaining session. The General Counsel contends the
Respondent’s witnesses are simply not credible.
The General Counsel submits that the testimony of the Respondent’s witnesses is
simply reflective of a coordinated but unsuccessfully executed defense to its unlawful conduct.29
She argues that the Respondent failed to provide the requested information timely and
completely and, consequently, has violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.30
The Respondent submits, first, that the refusal to provide information charge was a mere
“afterthought,” a “red herring” Brookins used to justify his statement at the January 17
bargaining session that the Union represented only 24 members of the bargaining unit, and to
direct the case from its main focus—the Union’s status as a minority union. I am not persuaded
by this argument and would reject it out of hand.
The Respondent next contends that on October 31, it successfully faxed to the Union a
four-page document that included such benefits information as existed and a two-page listing of
the unit employees by name, address, birth date, and service date (GC Exh. 20). The
Respondent contends that when Bernsen discovered the employee list contained only 27
employees , he directed that a full listing be prepared and hand-delivered to the Union at the

28 The General Counsel points out that Brookins corroborated Santoro’s testimony first in
testifying that the Union did not receive any of the requested information, and that he overheard
Santoro speaking with Bernsen on December 5 and reminding Bernsen that the Union had not
received any of the requested information. Brookins, she notes, also testified that on January
17 he told Bernsen that the Respondent had never given the Union the requested information
he needed to compute a wage proposal.
29 It is of note that the Respondent in its answer to the complaint states at paragraph 9(a)
that “the Respondent supplied the Union with the [August 2, 2005] requested information at an
initial bargaining session.”
30 The General Counsel also contends that even if for the sake of argument, one could
believe that the Respondent supplied the Union with any requested information on or about
October 31 or” late October” or at the November 2 bargaining session, this information was not
provided completely and timely. Accordingly, the violation of the Act is, nonetheless, made out.
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next scheduled bargaining session on November 2 whereat Santoro was given the complete
listing of unit employees. The Respondent contends that the only other “papers” the
Respondent presented at the bargaining session were the four noneconomic proposals
presented to the Union, according to Bernsen and Koniski, at the first session on October 13.
While conceding that the full listing of unit employees provided the Union on November 2
does not contain the employee’s birthdays or addresses (as requested by the Union), the
Respondent asserts that the Union never complained about those omissions and, in fact, never
explained the relevance of the sought-after information to the negotiations. The Respondent
submits that employee addresses and birthdates have nothing to do with the negotiations,
especially considering that the Union from the inception informed Bernsen that it was only or
mainly interested in a wage increase.31
The Respondent acknowledges that it did not provide the average wage rate at the
nursery facility or average costs of benefits, but that it was not obliged to undertake the
necessary computations since it had furnished the Union with both benefit cost and wage rate
information (as contained in GC Exh. 28) in late October 2005, along with the other information
provided at that time.
The Respondent submits that Santoro never complained on January 17, 2006, about the
Respondent’s failure to provide raw data on benefits, or the full list of employees and their
respective wage rates. Rather, because Brookins and Santoro were advocating for only 24 of
the unit members, the Respondent submits that Santoro assumed the 24 members received
those benefits and that the Respondent had some discretion as to how many employees could
receive these benefits.
The Respondent asserts that Santoro’s complaint was not related to the August 2
requests, but to the absence of employee supplied information relating to a supposed “union
member benefit package” that Santoro believed had been requested. The Respondent contends
that because it properly understood that the Union’s duty of fair representation required all unit
employees similarly classified to receive the same contractual benefits irrespective of their
membership in the Union, the information request charge was not bona fide; that this was an
“eleventh hour” attempt to divert attention from the principal issue relating to the Union’s
minority status and to give a plausible rationale for seeking a wage increase only for its
members.
4. Discussion and conclusions regarding the information request allegation
Regarding information requests, in the bargaining context, under Section 8(a)(5)a union
is entitled to request and receive information that is relevant and necessary for it to carry out its
responsibilities in representing bargaining unit employees. NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co., 385
U.S. 432 (1967). This includes information relevant to contract negotiations. Day Automotive
Group, 348 NLRB No. 90 (2006). CEC, Inc., 337 NLRB 516 (2002); Barnard Engineering Co.,
282 NLRB 617 (1987).
“Where the requested information concerns employees . . . within the bargaining unit,
this information is presumptively relevant and the employer has the burden of proving lack of
relevance. . . . Where the request is for information concerning employees outside the

31 The Respondent points to Brookins’ testimony that the Union was only proposing wage
increases during the negotiations (Tr. 573) in support of this contention.
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bargaining unit, the union must show that the information is relevant.” Brooklyn Union Gas Co.,
220 NLRB 189 (1975); Curtiss-Wright Corp., 145 NLRB 152 (1963), enfd. 347 F.2d 61, 69 (3d
Cir. 1965).
The Board uses a broad discovery-type standard in determining what is relevant in such
contexts. National Grid USA Service Co., 348 NLRB No. 88 (2006). Notably, the requested
information sought need not be dispositive of any issue between the parties, it need only have
some bearing on it.
Once the initial showing of relevance has been made, “the employer has the burden to
prove a lack of relevance . . . or to provide adequate reasons as to why he cannot, in good faith,
supply such information.” San Diego Newspaper Guild, supra at 863, 867. Where the
relevance of requested information has been established, an employer can meet its burden of
showing an adequate reason for refusing to supply the information by demonstrating a
“legitimate and substantial” concern for employee confidentiality interests which might be
compromised by disclosure. Detroit Edison v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301, 315, 318–320. In resolving
issues of asserted confidentiality, the Board first determines if the employer has established any
legitimate and substantial confidentiality interest and then balances that interest against the
union’s need for the information. Detroit Edison, Id. at 315, 318; Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co.,
261 NLRB 27, 30 (1982); Pfizer Inc., 268 NLRB 916 (1984). However, where the employer fails
to demonstrate a legitimate and substantial confidentiality interest, the union’s right to the
information is effectively unchallenged, and the employer is under a duty to furnish the
information. Oil Workers Local 6-418 v. NLRB, 711 F.2d 348, 360 (D.C. Cir. 1983); NLRB v.
Jaggars-Chiles-Stovall, Inc., 639 F.2d 1344, 1346–1347 (5th Cir. 1981); NLRB v. Associated
General Contractors of California, 633 F.2d 766 (9th Cir. 1980).
As the Board noted in North Star Steel Co., 347 NLRB No. 119 (2006), it is well
established that information relating to wages, hours, and working conditions of employees in
the bargaining unit is presumptively relevant, and an employer’s refusal to provide such
information may pose a violation of the Act unless there is a showing of privilege.
In the same vein, current lists of all bargaining unit employees, including their names,
addresses, and dates of employment, have been held by the Board to be presumptively relevant
and must be produced upon request by a union.32 Other employee “demographics,” such as
birth dates, telephone numbers, civil status, and gender, have been held producible upon
request by a union.33
An unreasonable delay in responding to an information request has been held by the
Board to pose a violation of the Act similar to an outright unjustified refusal to produce relevant
information. Control Services, 315 NLRB 431 (1994). Moreover, an employer’s refusal to
provide without undue delay requested information relevant to the union’s efforts at negotiating
a contract may be considered an indicium of surface bargaining. Bryant & Stratton Business
Institute, 321 NLRB 1007, 1044 (1996); Radisson Plaza Minneapolis, 307 NLRB 94, 95 (1992),
enfd. 987 F.2d 1376 (8th Cir. 1993).

32 Americold Logistics, Inc., 328 NLRB 443 (1999); Zeta Consumer Products Corp., 326
NLRB 293 (1998).
33 Pan American Grain, Inc., 346 NLRB No. 21 (2005); Illinois-American Water Co., 296
NLRB 715, 724, fn. 21 (1989).
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Turning to the Union’s August 2 letter, the Respondent admits that with respect to the
Union’s requests for pension related information--a clearly relevant and necessary matter for
contract negotiations—it not only did not provide any information but also made no response
whatsoever to these at the hearing. Santoro conceded that the letter in some respects was a
form letter sent by the International to employers in anticipation of contract talks. Santoro also
conceded that he knew at the time that the bargaining unit employees at Carriage Inn did not
have any pension benefits in the soon-to-expire contract and there was no pension plan there.
Furthermore, Santoro testified that as a practical matter the Union was mostly concerned with
wages, not pension benefits for the successor agreement, and the negotiations were to focus on
these. Accordingly, in some respects, the Respondent’s failure to respond to the pension
related requests—items 7 to 10 in the letter—seems harmless in a no harm, no foul sense.
However, the duty to provide information in my view, as buttressed by my study of
relevant Board authorities, does not allow of such an approach. The employer’s mandate at a
minimum seems clear that where the union makes a request for relevant information, the
employer must at the least respond in some fashion; that is either provide the information,
assert privilege where applicable for nonproduction, or assert the information is not made, kept,
or maintained by the employer.
Here the Respondent made absolutely no response to the request for pension
information and in my view a violation of Section 8(a)(5) is made out, if only in a technical and
perhaps de minimus fashion. I would so find and conclude.
Regarding the balance of the requests in the August 2 letter, the question is not whether
the information requested is relevant or whether the Respondent possessed it. On this record,
items 1–6 and 11 in my view are clearly presumptively relevant and the Respondent has not
offered any counter-argument to their relevance. Moreover, the Respondent does not contend
that the information does not exist in a manageable and producible form. The question here is
whether the Respondent produced the requested information timely, if at all. The union
representatives claim that the Union has never received a complete list of the names,
addresses, birth dates, and seniority dates of all members of the bargaining unit (item 1); the
names and addresses of all insurance program carriers (item 2); the cost per $1000 of life
insurance (item 3); the cost per $1000 of S and A benefits (item 4); cost per $10 of S and A
benefits (item 5); cost per monthly premium of hospitalization coverage for single and family
plans (item 6); and the average straight time hourly rate and the average cost of all benefit
programs (item 11).
The Respondent claims that it provided the information during the negotiations (in late
October or by November 2) in pure form or in such a way that the Union could obtain the
sought-after information by undertaking calculations based on the provided data.
I have considered the testimony (and affidavits where appropriate) of the participants
carefully, and the documentation adduced at trial as well and would find and conclude that the
Respondent did not, and had not at least until the hearing, provide fully and completely the
information requested in items 1 through 6; the Respondent has not provided any of the
information contained in item 11 of the August 2 letter.
In reaching this conclusion, first, I have credited the testimony of principally Santoro
regarding the Respondent’s failure to provide the requested information.
Santoro was not a model witness but he, nonetheless, impressed me as a straight
shooter, earnest and honest in relating what transpired during the Union’s negotiations with the
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Respondent.34 Regarding the information requests, he seemed to be in command of his facts
and his testimony was bolstered by his correspondence to the Respondent in which he repeated
his request for the August 2 information. Notably, the Respondent never responded to that
aspect of the Santoro’s letter. In likewise, Brookins credibly testified that as late as December
5, 2005, nearly 4 months after the August letter, Santoro verbally requested of Bernsen the
requested information over the telephone while being sympathetic to a crisis the Respondent
was experiencing at the time and offering extensions to the now-expired contract to the
Respondent.35
The Respondent asserts that it indeed provided the subject information. Of course,
based on the testimony of its witnesses, this information as best I can determine was provided
either at the initial session on October 13, late in October around October 31, or at the second
session on November 2. Regarding the list of bargaining unit employees, Bernsen says the first
list of 27 was provided by him but was later supplemented by a more complete list later in the
negotiations. The Union disputes this.
Granted there is some confusion as to who prepared the first incomplete list, Santoro
believed that since the list contains solely union members, a unit chairperson prepared it for his
use; the sole unit chairperson to testify—McAfee—denied that she prepared it. In its brief, the
Charging Party suggests she was mistaken or forgot what she had done.
The Respondent contends that it prepared the initial list and sent it to the Union in a fax
dated October 31, along with some of the requested information. Later, Bernsen discovered
that the list was not complete and claimed to hand-deliver a list of the entire unit to Santoro
around November 2.
The Union’s August 2 request sought certain information of all members of the
bargaining unit. This request (along with item 11), as later events will reveal, was very
significant and even integral to the parties’ negotiations on the economic proposals.
I do not believe that the Respondent provided the complete list of unit employees on or
about November 2 or at any time during the negotiations. First, if one is to believe that the
Respondent prepared the initial list which corresponds to the Union’s request in all particulars,
then why did Bernsen prepare another list of bargaining unit employees which did not? Notably,
the Union’s letter requested addresses and birth dates. The Respondent’s purportedly more
complete list does not contain this information. The question that goes a-begging is why
Bernsen would, in an attempt to correct or supplement the first disclosure, prepare a document
that was neither complete nor in compliance with the Union’s request. Then too, the more

34 Santoro was candid enough to admit on the record and in his affidavit that he may have
been uncivil with Bernsen in his telephone calls, especially after the negotiations were
suspended. Also, Santoro also was somewhat inconsistent, especially in his affidavit, in which
he says the Union did not realize that nonunion members had to receive the same contractual
benefit package as members. Santoro later says in the same affidavit, “Of course, we represent
more than 24 employees.” (See R. Exh. 1, Santoro’s affidavit to the Board agent.) I would note
that in my view these statements reflect more on Santoro’s understanding or lack thereof
regarding the Union’s role as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative than his
credibility on the information request issue.
35 It is here that as I observed Santoro, that his sincere interest in the well being of the unit
employees became evident. It seemed that at the time the crisis at hand could have affected
the continued employment of the workers at the facility.
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complete list contains the name of an employee—Mallernee—who was not hired until
November 3, 2005, a day after the November 2 bargaining session36 at which the Respondent
claims to have hand-delivered this list to Santoro.
Accordingly, I would find and conclude that the Respondent did not provide completely
and fully the information sought in item #1 of the August 2 letter. By not supplying the
information in item #1, the Respondent did not provide completely and fully the average straight-
time hourly rate or the average cost of all benefit programs.37
I would therefore find that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act in not
providing the information requested by the Union on August 2 fully, completely, and timely. I
would also conclude that this violation occurred during the negotiations and continues
thereafter.
I would also find and conclude that the Respondent failed to provide the information
requested in items 2–6 of the August 2 letter. I have credited Santoro’s denial of the receipt of
the October 31, 2005 fax from the Respondent which purports to have included the incomplete
listing of unit employees, the names and addresses of all insurance program carriers, costs per
$1000 of life insurance; cost per $1000 of S and A benefits; costs per $10 of S and A benefits;
and costs per monthly premiums of hospitalization coverage for single and family plans.
I note that the fax cover sheets (there are two) merely state: "Re: Information request";
they do not list what specifically was sent as an attachment. Accordingly, I am not convinced
that this information was indeed sent on October 31. I would find and conclude that the
Respondent violated the Act in this regard as well.
Turning to the issue of the effect of the Respondent’s failure to provide the information
requested by the Union on the withdrawal of recognition, in agreement with the General
Counsel, I, would find and conclude that the unfair labor practice placed the Union in an
untenable position—having to negotiate with incomplete and inaccurate information of an
integral and vital nature—and, in effect, allowed the Respondent to exploit its unlawful behavior
in justification of the withdrawal of recognition of the Union.
I would find and conclude that the failure to provide the requested information constitutes
an unremedied unfair labor practice that effectively and improperly “hamstrung” the Union in its
negotiations and tainted the Respondent’s subsequent withdrawal of recognition of the Union.
In my view, it was of the utmost importance to the Union as it made the calculations
which governed its economic proposals on January 17 to have in particular the critical and basic
information about the unit employees, their identities, seniority dates, addresses, and costs of
insurance. The Respondent did not provide this information and the Union was forced on a
disastrous course which was compounded by its own mistakes. Clearly, if the Union had the
requested information, it would not have utilized the erroneous 24 union members as the

36 Bernsen unconvincingly explained that the employees’ record hire date does not always
reflect the date the person actually was officially on board.
37 GC Exh. 28, the purported more complete listing of the bargaining unit employees
included their wage rates, paid time off, vacations, and other information. If the Respondent
had indeed provided the information during the negotiations, the Respondent may have been in
compliance with item 11. Since it was not provided, this requested information remains
unsatisfied.
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criterion for its cost (wages) analysis and the Respondent would not have had that number to
declare that the Union was a minority union with whom it did not have to recognize or negotiate.
B. The Withdrawal of Recognition Allegation
1. Applicable legal principles
In my view, it is always helpful to discuss the applicable legal principles associated with
an issue. The parties have well briefed the Board authorities on the issue of withdrawal of
recognition and, as supplemented by my own research, the following principles emerge.
As noted in the Board’s affirmance of the Administrative Law Judge’s decision in Park
Maintenance, et. al., 348 NLRB No. 98 (2006):
It is well established that “an employer may not withdraw recognition from a
union while there are unremedied unfair labor practices tending to cause employees to
become disaffected from the union.” Penn Tank Lines, Inc., 336 NLRB 1066, 1067
(2001). The Respondent may not avoid their duty to bargain where their own violations
of the Act caused the union’s loss of majority support. See, e.g., NLRB v. Williams
Enterprises, 50 F.3d 1280, 1288 (4th Cir. 1995).
The following factors are considered are considered in determining whether the
Respondent’s unfair labor practices caused the loss of support among the unit
employees: (a) the length of time between the unfair labor practices and the withdrawal
of recognition (b) the nature of the violations, including the possibility of a detrimental or
lasting effect on employees (c) the tendency of the violation to cause employee
disaffection and (d) the effect of the unlawful conduct on employees’ morale,
organizational activities and membership in the union. Master Slack Corp., 271 NLRB
78, 84 (1984).
In short, where there are unremedied unfair labor practices that have a material bearing on or
connection to the employer’s decision to withdraw recognition of a union, the employer is not
privileged to withdraw recognition.
The Board has also enunciated what has come to be known as the Levitz standard for
an employer’s withdrawal of recognition of a union. Administrative Law Judge Marion Ladwig
well capitulated this standard in Highlands Regional Medical Center.38 In pertinent part, Judge
Ladwig wrote:
In March 2001 the Board decided Levitz, 333 NLRB 717 (2002), taking into
account (1) Supreme Court’s holding in Allentown Mack Sales & Service v. NLRB, 522
U.S. 359 (1998), that the Board’s “good-faith doubt” standard (for an employer to
withdraw union recognition under Celanese Corp., 95 NLRB 664 (1951)) must be
interpreted to permit the employer to act where it has a “reasonable uncertainty” of the
union’s majority status, and (2 ) the Court’s indicating that the Board could impose a
more stringent requirement for withdrawal of recognition.
The Board held 33 NLRB 717:

38 347 NLRB No. 120 (2006).
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After careful consideration, we have concluded that there are compelling
legal and policy reasons why employers should not be allowed to withdraw
recognition merely because they harbor uncertainty or even disbelief concerning
unions’ majority status. We therefore hold that an employer may unilaterally
withdraw recognition from an incumbent union only where the union has actually
lost the support of the majority of the bargaining unit employees.
In this Levitz decision at (7–9), after stating that an employer must have “some
objective evidence that the representative the employees have designated no longer
enjoys majority support,” the Board repeatedly indicated that there must be a showing of
actual loss of majority support of the union before the employer may lawfully withdraw
recognition:
If a majority of the unit employees present evidence that they no longer support
their union, their employer may lawfully withdraw recognition . . . .
. . . .
We hold that an employer may unilaterally withdraw recognition, only on a
showing that the union has, in fact, lost the support of a majority of the
employees in the bargaining unit.
. . . .
[W]e anticipate that as a result of our decision today, employers will be likely to
withdraw recognition only if the evidence before them clearly indicates that the
unions have lost majority support.
The Board has indicated in the Levitz decision (at 7) that the standard was more
stringent for withdrawing recognition, but was more lenient for obtaining RM elections,
holding:
While adopting a more stringent standard for withdrawals of recognition,
we find it appropriate to adopt a different, more lenient standard for obtaining RM
elections . . . [W]e shall allow employers to obtain RM elections by
demonstrating reasonable good-faith uncertainty as to incumbent unions’
continued majority status.
I note that on another point related to the controversy here that the Board has held that
where the union continues (under a Board certification) to be the exclusive representative of an
appropriate unit of employees under Section 9(a) of the Act, the employer must advance or
allege circumstances that would warrant a refusal to honor the Board’s certification. Americold
Logistics, Inc., 328 NLRB 443 (1999) fn. 4, citing Ray Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96 (1954).
Thus, it would seem that where the Board has certified a union under Section 9(a) of the Act,
the Union, until further action by the Board, has a continuing authority to represent unit
employees as their exclusive bargaining representative, and an employer must as a practical
matter appeal to the Board through its procedures to abnegate or rescind the certification;
neither the union nor the employer is free to confer on annul Board certification of a union under
Section 9(a).
Thus, in a withdrawal case, under Levitz Furniture, the burden to show actual loss of
majority support is on the employer. Notably, the Board has held virtually axiomatically that
there is no necessary correlation between membership (in the union) and the number of union
supporters since no one could know how many employees who favor union bargaining do not
become or remain members thereof. Terrell Machine Co., 173 NLRB 1480, 1481 (1969).
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Accordingly, it is clear that membership in the union is not the equivalent of support for the
union.
2. The January 17 bargaining session
It is, of course, undisputed that the January 17 bargaining session was the last meeting
of the parties, and it was there that evidently the questions about the Union’s representation
status arose and led to the Respondent’s withdrawal of recognition of the Union.
Santoro and Brookins, the lead union participants in the negotiations, testified about the
course and conduct of the January 17 session.
Santoro stated that at the beginning of the meeting, the Respondent provided its
proposals for certain economic issues which included paid time off, insurance, and wage
increases of 10 cents for the first 2 years of the contract and 15 cents for the third year, a 10-10-
15 deal as he put it. According to Santoro, the Union counter-proposed wage increases of 35
cents for each year of the contract, which was a reduction of its initial proposal of an increase of
40 cents in the first and second year, and 45 cents in the third year. At some point, the parties
recessed to caucus over the respective offerings. Santoro stated that Brookins wanted to
perform some calculations during the break.
Santoro volunteered that at this juncture he was irate over the Respondent’s position.
Santoro testified that he believed Bernsen was stalling the negotiations. The contract had
expired, Bernsen had indicated the facility might close, and at the same time he had not signed
off on an extension that Santoro had requested in December. Santoro felt the Respondent’s
last offer during the January session was particularly galling to the Union, especially since the
Union’s latest offer (made in November) was to Santoro very reasonable. Santoro said that he
expressed these concerns to Bernsen, going so far as to tell Bernsen that not only had the
Union been considerate with the contract extension but had not gone out on strike. Santoro
conceded that the session was unpleasant and its tone was angry.
Santoro stated that when the session resumed, Brookins provided Bernsen with his
calculations for the wage proposal. According to Santoro, Bernsen said the figures were too
low, whereupon Brookins responded to Bernsen that his calculations were based on the 24–26
dues paying members (Brookins believed) Bernsen had provided.
According to Santoro, Bernsen repeatedly asked are you saying that you only represent
that many people. Santoro said that he and Brookins responded repeatedly that the
calculations were based on the 24–26 members, but that the Union represented all the unit
employees, that the Union receives telephone calls from members and nonmembers alike at
Carriage Inn. Santoro said he told Bernsen that this was simply another excuse to frustrate the
negotiations.
Santoro said the discussion went on in this fashion for some time, until Bernsen said that
he would have to do some research on this matter because the Union did not represent a
majority of the employees at Carriage Inn and he left the meeting.
Santoro conceded that Brookins was under the erroneous understanding that the
contract (presumably the expired one as well as the one being negotiated) covered only union
members but that he told Bernsen that Brookins was incorrect at that January 17 meeting.
However, Santoro admitted that Brookins did use the present complement—about 26—of dues
paying members provided by the Respondent in monthly reports to arrive at his calculations.
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Brookins testified that after the Company broached its economic proposals at the
January 17 session, the parties took a break during which he made an informal analysis of the
union and employer proposals to determine the costs associated with each. Brookins stated
that almost immediately, the Union determined that the Respondent’s proposal was
concessionary, that is the employees would be giving up benefits if accepted. For example,
Brookins said that he determined that the Respondent’s proposal required employees with 7 or
more years’ seniority to pay more for health coverage, which in effect resulted in a cut in their
wages.39
In any case, Brookins said that he completed his analysis and the parties returned to the
table, and he presented the calculations from his analysis to Bernsen. According to Brookins,
Bernsen said the Union’s numbers were “way off base,” that the Union was not using the correct
numbers because the costs were too low; Bernsen said his costs were actually a lot higher.
Brookins said that he told Bernsen that the Union was utilizing for its cost analysis the 24
members because these were the only numbers associated with the employees that the Union
was able to obtain. According to Brookins, the list of dues paying members had come from
McAfee who reduced the list of 27 to 24 because 3 had quit the Union, changed employers, or
had gotten fired.40 Brookins testified that he then reminded Bernsen that the Respondent had
never provided the requested information (about the number of bargaining unit members), so he
did not know what figures to use except the 24 members.
Brookins stated that a heated discussion ensued41 between Santoro, Bernsen, and
Conto about the numbers and figures. Then, according to Brookins, Bernsen at some point
announced that if the Union merely represented 24 unit employees, the Union did not represent
a majority of the unit, in which case Bernsen said he was not sure he was required to negotiate
with or even recognize the Union. Bernsen said that he would have to educate himself on the
matter and get back to the Union. Bernsen terminated the meeting and the negotiations ended.
Brookins stated that as of about May 2006, he no longer serves as the president of Local
13983-08, but that during the term he served, the Union had not had a majority of the Carriage
Inn unit as members for about 3-1/2 years. He noted that about 20 employees had resigned
from the Union in dissatisfaction with the wages negotiated by the Union in the last contract.
Brookins said that he knew that the Carriage Inn unit was composed of about 80 employees.
However, Brookins conceded that he did not realize that the “law” requires that all unit members
receive the same thing (benefits) as dues paying members. He noted that all employees did
receive the same—but he did not realize a specific law made this a requirement.42

39 Brookins said that during the break or at some point Bernsen said that there were 18
employees with 7 or more years of seniority in the unit.
40 Brookins testified that he actually did not physically see the list of members. McAfee was
reading from the list across the table from him; she provided the number 24. When shown GC
Exh. 18 at the hearing, Brookins said that this appeared to be the list from which McAfee was
reading. Brookins said he did not know from whom or how she obtained the list.
41 Brookins said this “conversation” was heated with two to three persons all talking at one
time. Brookins said that he could not recall what Santoro might have said during these back
and forth conversations but that his own temper was rising and there were raised voices and
angry words exchanged.
42 As I observed and listened to Brookins, he did not seem to grasp or fully comprehend his
role as certified representative of the bargaining unit. Brookins, for instance, stated that he
Continued
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Brookins said that irrespective of his understanding, Bernsen stated during the
negotiations that he (Bernsen) had to give the (contract) package to all unit employees, not just
the 24 members. Brookins said he could not recall all of his responses to what was said
because everyone was talking at the same time.
The Respondent called Bernsen, Koniski, and Conto—the members of its negotiating
team who attended the January 17 bargaining session.
Bernsen testified that the January 17 session began as scheduled and the parties
initially resolved some of the outstanding noneconomic issues. The parties then addressed the
economic issues with the Respondent proposing wage increases of 10 cents-10 cents-15 cents,
a change in the company vacation (paid time off) policy, and a health insurance change which
would require that 7-year employees pay some of the premiums then totally paid by the
Company. Bernsen said that the parties decided to break to give the Union an opportunity to
consider these proposals.
According to Bernsen, when the parties reconvened, Brookins said the Company could
afford a much greater wage increase than was being offered and spoke of possible raises of 75
cents per hour. Bernsen testified that he did not agree with this and questioned Brookins’
calculations. According to Bernsen, Brookins said he spread the savings among 24-27
members of the Union, “dividing or multiplying” these savings based on the 27 members with
the resulting increase in wages as proposed by the Respondent, which included the savings to
be realized by the change in health benefits ($62 per month multiplied by 18 7-year employees).
Bernsen said he then told Brookins that he should be basing his calculations on about 80—not
24—employees. According to Bernsen, Brookins said that he was only using “24” because that
number reflected the only people he represented. Bernsen said that Brookins at some later
point in the discussion said he was only using the 24–27 (figure), what do you do with the rest of
those employees is your business, it is between you and the federal government. Bernsen said
that Santoro agreed with Brookins’ statement.
Bernsen stated that after further discussion with the Union and especially considering
this surprising new information, he decided to caucus with his team. Later, when the parties
reconvened, Bernsen said he informed the Union that in light of the Union’s surprising stance on
its representation of unit employees, he was unsure how to deal with the issue presented and
needed to do further research on what his duties and responsibilities were under the law.
Accordingly, he broke off the negotiations at that time but rescheduled another bargaining
session for January 24.
Bernsen acknowledged writing Santoro on about January 23, essentially giving the
Union until January 27 to show that it had majority status prior to January 17. Bernsen said that
he believed that he was negotiating with a minority union which is prohibited by the Act.
_________________________
knew (or came to know) the Union represented all 80 of the members of the unit for purposes of
bargaining but did not knew whether he had the authorization to represent more than 24
employees because he did not have documented authority to represent more than the 24. (Tr.
510–511.) (Emphasis supplied.)
Notably, also in his January 30, 2006 affidavit (R. Exh. 9) to the Board agent, Brookins
stated that we did not realize that all unit employees—regardless of union membership—must
receive the same wage and benefit package set forth in the contract (p. 11). Accordingly, his
calculations on January 17 were predicated on this notion (p. 15).
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Bernsen also acknowledged that Santoro tried to contact him but unsuccessfully a
couple of times on January 25 and left voice mails. Bernsen noted that ultimately he and
Santoro discussed the matter around the time but the discussions were a “little bit volatile” (as
Bernsen put it) and he instructed Santoro to henceforth communicate with him only in writing.
Bernsen stated that at this time Santoro never offered to prove the Union’s majority status in
any way.
Koniski said that she attended the January 17 session whereat the Company, among
other items, presented its economic proposals. Koniski noted that upon presentation of the
company proposal, the Union asked to caucus to discuss those issues. Upon their return,
according to Koniski, Santoro expressed his displeasure, saying that the Company expected the
employees to pay for their own wage increase as the Union viewed the Company’s economic
packages. Koniski stated that Brookins informed management that the employees did not want
to give up their current vacation package or the current health insurance deal. Brookins then
said the Union would settle for hourly pay increases of 35 cents for the first 2 years of the
contract and 40 cents for the third year.
While not absolutely sure, Koniski believed that Bernsen asked the union
representatives what their calculations were based on. According to Koniski, Brookins said that
his calculations revealed that if the unit employees gave up their vacation plan and the health
insurance changes were implemented, the Company would save around $87,000 and at that
rate, “you could give everyone a 78¢ per hour raise.”
According to Koniski, Brookins then said that he was only talking about 24 employees
(presumably with respect to the Union’s proposal of 35, 35, and 40 cents increases). Koniski
said this statement prompted Conto to remark by way of a question, “So you are telling me you
only represent 24 employees at Carriage Inn? According to Koniski, Brookins and Santoro
concurred with this.
Koniski said that at this point, Bernsen asked the union representatives what do you
want me to do with the other employees he felt were covered under the labor agreement.
According to Koniski, Brookins said, “Well, I don’t care what you do with them; that is between
you, them and the federal government.” According to Koniski, Brookins later said that if he were
to represent (the nonmembers), the Union could charge those employees for the representation.
Koniski stated that Bernsen remarked to the union representatives that this was “news”
to him and that he needed to take a break to discuss this information. Accordingly, Bernsen,
Conto, and she left the room and Bernsen made a telephone call, to whom she did not know.43
The management team later returned to the bargaining session whereupon Bernsen informed
the Union of his desire to determine his bargaining duties and responsibilities given the Union’s
stance; the session ended on this note.
Brad Conto44 testified about the January 17 meeting. Conto stated by way of
introduction that he was asked to participate in the contract negotiations for the Carriage Inn

43 Bernsen said he consulted with his attorney at the time.
44 Conto testified that he has been employed by Carriage Inn of Steubenville as its
administrator for about 3 years. Capital Health Services is also the management company for
the Steubenville nursing facility. Conto reports to Bernsen. Notably, the Steubenville facility’s
service and maintenance employees are represented by the Steelworkers Union, and Bernsen
Continued
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facility in Cadiz by Bernsen. Conto stated that he attended the negotiating sessions on October
13, November 2, November 18, and January 17, all of which were held in the Cadiz public
library.
Conto described the January 17 session as the fourth meeting between the parties and
noted that the noneconomic issues were resolved by the parties.
Conto stated that the Company made certain economic proposals covering a paid time-
off package; requiring employees with 7 or more years to pay the full portion of their health
insurance premiums which they were not then paying; and recommending a wage increase of
10 cents for the first two years of the contract and 15 cents in the third year for the hourly
employees. Conto recalled that these proposals were made in the context of the Company’s
concerns about taxes, and the Medicare and Medicaid cost reimbursement structures.
After management presented its proposals, the Union wanted to caucus according to
Conto, and the negotiations were recessed for a time.
When the negotiations resumed, Conto said that Santoro, referring to the Company’s
proposal that 18 (7 plus years) employees pay their own health insurance, complained that the
employees would be in effect paying for their own wage increases. According to Conto,
Brookins reckoned that these savings alone totaled around $87,000, which would be
tantamount to a 78-cents raise per hour. According to Conto, Brookins then announced that the
Union did not want to change the current paid time-off language or the health care package.
Brookins then came up with a figure of $33,600 which would be available for wages which,
under his calculations, translated into a 78-cent hourly wage increase. Brookins said that the
Union, based on these calculations, believed the Company could pay a 35-cent hourly increase
for the first 2 years of the new contract and 40 cents for the third year.
Conto testified that Bernsen then asked Brookins to explain how he was arriving at these
figures. According to Conto, Brookins responded that the Union represented the 24 dues
paying members. Conto stated that he (Conto) responded (incredulously) by asking rhetorically,
you represent 24 employees, to which both Santoro and Brookins assented.45 Moreover,
according to Conto, Brookins told Bernsen that with respect to the nonmembers what he did
with them is between you and the federal government. Also, according to Conto, Brookins said
that the nonmembers could be charged for the representation services provided by the Union.
Conto testified that as far as he knew, there was then no charge for nonmembers at the Cadiz
facility.
Conto confirmed that after the Union’s statement, Bernsen took a break from the
negotiations and upon his return informed the Union of his need to research the issue to
determine his legal obligations to the Union. The negotiations ended that day.
_________________________
and Conto participated in the negotiations for the latest contract for that facility in 2004,
according to Conto. (Tr. 661–662.)
45 Conto testified that Brookins did not ever say that the Union utilized the 24 members only
because the Respondent had not provided information regarding the total number of unit
employees.
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3. Contentions of the parties
The General Counsel asserts first that there is no controversy in terms of the date and
circumstances surrounding and leading to the Respondent’s withdrawal of recognition of the
Union. The date is January 23, 2006, as evidenced by the Respondent’s letter faxed to Santoro
on that date and the circumstances includes the Respondent’s view of verbal exchanges
between the parties at the bargaining table on January 17.
She notes that the Respondent relies upon essentially three factors to justify its
withdrawal of recognition of the Union: (1) Santoro and Brookins’ “admission” of the Union’s
minority status; (2) the Respondent’s review of its payroll record which disclosed only a minority
of bargaining unit employees had authorized a union dues check-off; and (3) the Union’s failure
to produce proof of its majority support by the Respondent’s self-imposed deadline of January
27, 2006.
The General Counsel submits the credible testimony principally of Santoro at the
January 17 session effectively refutes any claim that the Union “admitted” it was a minority
union. Santoro, she argues, clearly and emphatically made clear at the January 17 session that
he represented then and had in the past represented the Cadiz employees and was required
(by law) to represent the entire bargaining unit. Brookins, she further points out, credibly
testified that his calculations were based solely on the 24 union members because those were
the only numbers available to him; the Respondent had not provided the requested information
before January 17 that would have given him the total number of bargaining unit members.
The General Counsel submits that Bernsen simply seized upon the statements of the
union representatives and inferred therefrom that the Union was a minority union; that in no way
could any of the statements made by the union representatives be construed to be an
admission of minority status. She notes further that the Respondent did not adduce any
evidence that would be probative of the unit employees’ sentiments regarding their support or
lack thereof for the Union.
The General Counsel asserts that a showing that less than a majority of the unit
employees were dues paying members of the Union is not in any way probative of the issue of
whether they support the Union. Such a showing would only support a mere inference that the
majority of employees as of January 17 or 23 did not want to pay dues for reasons known only
to them. The General Counsel submits that this aspect of the Respondent’s defense is legally
insufficient and should be rejected.
Regarding the Respondent’s second line of defense—the Union’s failure to prove its
majority status by January 27—the General Counsel contends that the Respondent is simply
and impermissibly shifting the burden of proof to the Union. She notes further that not only was
this shifting unlawful, but because of a very short time frame it also merely reflects the
Respondent’s animus against the Union and, as later events disclosed, intention to rid itself of
the Union.
As to the Respondent’s third line of defense—the review of payroll records showing that
only a minority of unit employees had authorized a dues check-off—the General Counsel again
notes membership and union support are simply not the same thing. In short, the two are legal
apples and oranges under extant Board law. She submits that this line of defense is also legally
insufficient and should be in likewise rejected.
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The Respondent contends (at some length and with some complication) that essentially
because of Brookins’ and Santoro’s representations at the bargaining table, it became aware
that the Union actually lacked bargaining authorization from a majority of the unit employees
(the Respondent’s brief at 13). The Respondent argues that the Union’s representatives’ open
admission against interest of its minority status, coupled with the existence on file of a minimal
number of dues check-off cards along with the Union’s failure to provide evidence of majority
status within a reasonable time (as requested by the Respondent), is more than sufficient
objective evidence to justify withdrawal of recognition.
The Respondent points out that during the investigation of a charge later withdrawn by
the Union in Case 8–CA–36363—the original unfair labor practice charge regarding the
withdrawal of recognition—Brookins provided an affidavit to the Board.46 In this affidavit, the
Respondent quotes Brookins who stated, “We have not represented a majority of the unit there
for about 3-1/2 years -- since late 2002 when about 20 unit members resigned from the Union in
dissatisfaction over wage rate negotiations being conducted at the time” (at page 10).
Additionally, the Respondent asserts that in an affidavit to the Board on April 24, 2006,
Santoro stated, “[W]e were not in a position of strength in these negotiations because about
twenty employees resigned from union membership during negotiations in 2002. Therefore, we
had only maintained a membership of about 24 of 80 employees for about 3 years.”47
The Respondent contends based on these affidavits that regardless of whether the
union representatives made an open admission of minority status on January 17, 2006, or
whether Brookins simply used 24 as the multiplier for his calculations, the Union on January 27
had only minority status. The Respondent submits that being the case, and since Section
8(a)(2) of the Act prohibits an employer from negotiating with a minority union, the Respondent
acted lawfully in breaking off the negotiations and withdrawing recognition of the Union.
4. Discussion and conclusions
It bears pointing out by way of preface and reminder that the parties have, by virtue of
the Board’s certification, enjoyed a collective-bargaining relationship since 1992 and entered
into several collective-bargaining agreements over the years. In fact, the last agreement
covering the period November 11, 2002, though November 10, 2005, was negotiated by
Bernsen. The collective-bargaining agreement (in Section 1.3) states that no present or future
employees shall be required to become a member of the Union, and . . . that any employee may
withdraw from membership in the Union by written notice to the Union and Carriage Inn not
more than 30 days prior to the expiration of the agreement.48
Accordingly, in my view, the authority of the Union to represent the unit in question then
and now remains intact and inviolate. To the extent that the Respondent’s defense rests on any
claim that the Union lacked authority to represent the unit of employees in question during the
negotiations, that defense must fail. The Board certified the Union as the unit’s exclusive

46 See R. Exh. 9, Brookins' affidavit to the Board agent dated January 30, 2006.
47 See R. Exh. 1, Santoro’s affidavit to the Board agent dated April 24, 2006.
48 See GC Exh. 2, the collective-bargaining agreement between Carriage Inn of Cadiz and
the Union dated November 10, 2002. I have paraphrased the pertinent provisions of Section
1.3 – Maintenance of Membership in the Union.
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representative for collective bargaining, as noted, in 1992. Nothing on the part of the parties to
this cause has changed that administrative fact.49
Second, it is clear the parties implicitly agreed at least for their last contract that union
membership does not translate into or constitute support of the Union. Santoro acknowledged
that around 20 members resigned from the Union during negotiations for the last contract. In
my view, Bernsen must have or should have known about these resignations because, as he
testified and the Respondent contends, the Company had access to the dues check-off
authorizations and monthly forwarded dues payments to the Union. Accordingly, in my view,
the Respondent knew or should have known that there were only 24 or so dues paying union
members long before the parties began negotiating for the new contract and certainly during the
negotiations that ended on January 17.
However, in spite of this knowledge, the Respondent at no time prior to January 17, ever
raised a question of the Union’s majority status or claimed that the Union was a minority union
with which it could not negotiate or recognize.
Therefore to the extent the Respondent’s defense to the withdrawal charge rests on the
number of dues paying members contained in its payroll records, this defense also must fail.
Turning to the issue at hand, Levitz, the controlling legal authority requires that an
employer may unilaterally withdraw recognition from an incumbent union only where the union
has actually lost the support of the majority. It seems clear, although not articulated expressly
by the Board, that the actual showing that the union has in fact lost support of a majority of the
bargaining unit employees must be made at the time of the withdrawal action. The burden is on
the employer to prove that the showing has been made.
As I view the record testimony along with its correspondence, the Respondent
determined that based on comments allegedly made by Santoro and Brookins at the January 17
session, the Union as of January 23 did not represent a majority of the bargaining unit. The
Respondent characterizes this as a so-called admission against interest. Acting on its
interpretation of the alleged remarks, the Respondent required the Union to prove its majority
status by January 27, a mere 4 days after informing the Union of the Company’s position.
In agreement with the General Counsel, I would find and conclude that the Respondent’s
withdrawal of recognition on the strength of its interpretation of some of the comments of the
union representatives does not satisfy Levitz’ evidentiary standard that the showing clearly
indicates that a union has lost majority support of the unit employees. I would find and conclude
that the withdrawal was unlawful. My reasons are as follows:
I recognize that Brookins and Santoro held a mistaken and erroneous view that the
Union was negotiating for its members only but, as pointed out by the General Counsel, this
does not constitute an admission, let alone the fact that a majority of the unit employees did not
support the Union. Further, irrespective of their mistaken notion, Santoro, during the
negotiations and in correspondence, attempted to clarify the Union’s position that it represented
all of the unit employees pursuant to its role as their bargaining representative.50 Moreover,

49 See Atlantic Paratrans of N.Y.C., 349 NLRB No. 44 (2007), official notice may be taken of
the record in a representation proceeding as defined in the Board’s Rules and Regulations.
50 have credited Santoro’s testimony that he stated to Bernsen at the January session that
the Union represented all of the unit employees.
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irrespective of some of their ill-advised comments, neither Brookins nor Santoro ever indicated
that they did not have the support of the majority of the unit. So it cannot be said that they
made an “admission” that could have any legal consequence.
As pointed out by the Charging Party in his brief, the Union represents all the unit
employees. The support for the Union would of necessity come not from union representatives
but from the employees themselves. At the time of the Respondent’s withdrawal, I note there is
no evidence of any such sentiments from even a single unit employee on which the Respondent
could base its claim that it was dealing with a minority union.
It is also of note to me that it seems that both Bernsen and Conto were aware on
January 17 that Santoro and Brookins did not understand correctly to whom the contract
applied. Bernsen questioned Brookins’ calculations because on their face they did not seem to
apply to the total number of unit employees. Conto’s response to Brookins’ calculations based
on 24 unit members was one of incredulity. In short, both Bernsen and Conto, having recently
negotiated with the Union for contract with another nursing facility—Carriage Inn of
Steubenville—were to me fully aware that all negotiated contracts apply to the entire unit and
not solely to union members. In fact, Bernsen never questioned before January 17 whether the
expired 2005 contract applied to all of the unit employees.
In agreement with the General Counsel, I believe that the Respondent simply seized
upon Santoro and Brookins ignorance or mistaken view of the law to embark upon its plan to rid
itself of the Union. Therefore, I would find and conclude that the Respondent’s withdrawal of
recognition was unlawful.
C. The 8(a)(1) Allegations
As noted previously, the Respondent is alleged to have violated Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act on or about February 1, 2006; the violations as alleged emanate from the Respondent’s
letter of that date to all Carriage Inn of Cadiz Employees. Bernsen admitted that he prepared the
letter51 in question and distributed it to the Carriage Inn employees along with their paychecks
around this time.
The complaint in paragraph 8 alleges that through the medium of the letter, the
Respondent threatened its employees with a delay in implementation of wages and benefits if
they engaged in union and/or protected activities; implied a promise of benefits if the employees
rejected the Union as their collective-bargaining representative; and threatened that wages and
benefits would be delayed as long as the employees engaged in union and/or protected
activities; all in violation of Section 8(a)(1).

51 See G.C. Exh. 6. I would note that in this letter, the Respondent states, inter alia, that its
position was clear [that] “the Union does not have authority to represent a majority of the
employees in the bargaining unit at Carriage Inn of Cadiz.” This statement, as I have
determined, presents an incorrect statement of fact—the Union clearly had the authority. The
Respondent’s position at trial and in its brief essentially goes to the Union’s supposed lack of
support by the unit employees under Levitz Furniture. However, in my view, the Respondent’s
using “authority” and “support” synonymously is or could be at least confusing to the unit
employees, if not coercive of and interfering with their Section 7 rights. However, this statement
is not charged as a violation.
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The General Counsel contends that certain language employed in the letter constitutes
violations of the Act. First she points to the letter language “any action on wages and benefits
may be delayed until the election is held and that might take several weeks or months.” In this
instance, the General Counsel in essence argues that this statement was made in the context of
the Respondent’s having already unlawfully withdrawn recognition of the Union and the Union’s
having filed and later withdrawn an unfair labor practice charge. She submits this statement in
total context suggests to the employees that if they sign authorization cards or are asked by the
Union to join, their wages and other benefits will be delayed. Thus, the reasonable inference is
that if the employees do not engage in such action, then the Respondent would be free to grant
wage increases and benefits without delay. Thus, the General Counsel argues that couched in
terms designed to undermine support for the Union and clearly placing the probable delay in
granting merit increases on the Union, the letter language constituted an unlawful interference
with and coercion of the employees.
The General Counsel argues that after improperly placing the blame for any delays in
wages and benefits, the Respondent in the letter then offers the employees by implication that if
they refrain from supporting the Union, they will get their benefits. She points to the letter
language that proclaims that “[I]t has never been our intention to reduce wages here regardless
of union representation . . . and employees at our union facilities do not pay dues.” The General
Counsel also notes the letter states, “Right now, we are restricted by law in what we can say
about this, but at this point there will be no change in pay and benefits. . . . After this situation
is resolved, we may be able to adjust wages and benefits, but we do not know how long this
might take to resolve the issue.” She submits that this language, taken together with the
previous language, further implies a promise of benefits if the employees do not support the
Union, but a delay in those benefits if they support the Union.
The Respondent essentially argues that the letter in question merely contains
statements of what would or could lawfully happen during the give-and-take of bargaining with
the Union, and that an accurate statement of law and facts does not amount to an implied
threat. The Respondent asserts that the letter merely informed the employees that it would
keep them informed about developments regarding the Union, including a withdrawal by the unit
of a pending charge against the Respondent. In the succeeding paragraphs, the Respondent
maintains that the Company engaged in some speculation of what would happen, but based on
accurate statements of law and facts and not any unlawful implied threats or promises regarding
wages and benefits.
Section 7 of the Act (in pertinent part) provides that “[e]mployees shall have the right to
self-organization, to form, join, or assist any labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right
to refrain from any or all such activities.” Thus, in short, employees have statutory rights to,
inter alia, support or oppose union representation, and in concert take action for better job
conditions.
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act provides: “It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in
Section 7.” The test under Section 8(a)(1) does not turn on the employer’s motive or whether
the coercion succeeded or failed. The test is whether the employer engaged in conduct, which
it may be reasonably said, tends to interfere with the free exercise of employee rights under the
Act. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969); Almet, Inc., 305 NLRB 626 (1991); and
American Freightways Co., 124 NLRB 146, 147 (1959). Thus, it is violative of the Act for the
employer or its supervisors and agents to engage in conduct, including speech, which is
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specifically intended to impede or discourage union involvement. F. W. Woolworth Co., 310
NLRB 1197 (1993); Williamhouse of California, Inc., 317 NLRB 699 (1995).
The test of whether a statement or conduct would reasonably tend to coerce is an
objective one, requiring an assessment of all the surrounding circumstances in which the
statement is made as the conduct occurs. Electrical Workers Local 6 (San Francisco Electrical
Contractors), 318 NLRB 109 (1995). Rossmore House, 269 NLRB 1176 (1984). enfd. sub nom.
Hotel & Restaurant Employees Local 11 v. NLRB, 760 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1985). The Board
has noted in this regard that the context of statements can supply meaning to the otherwise
ambiguous or misleading expressions if considered in isolation. Debbie Reynolds Hotel, 332
NLRB 466 (2000).
I have previously determined that the Respondent’s withdrawal of recognition was
unlawful and this withdrawal, specifically the way it was executed by the Company, leads me to
believe that it was executed as part of a scheme or design to get rid of the Union. Accordingly, I
have looked at the February 1 letter in this context. It is my considered view that the February 1
letter was but another step in furtherance of this plan to undermine the Union in the minds of the
unit employees and to thwart any attempt by the Union to recover from the unlawful withdrawal.
The initial paragraphs of the letter make this intent plain. The Respondent first informs
the unit that in the Company’s mind the Union did not represent the majority; in fact, it had no
authority to do so. The unit is then informed that the Union withdrew an unfair labor practice
charge filed, suggesting its case was without merit and the Union was feckless. The letter then
proceeds to suggest with an ominous tone that the Union may try to convince the unit
employees to join the Union, that an election may ensue, and that in such case their wages and
benefits may be delayed. The letter goes on to state the Respondent’s view that the Union was
not necessary and that the unit employees would be better off without a union in place.
I will not go into a chapter and verse recitation of the balance of the letter, but suffice it to
say in my view the clear thrust of the letter’s message is that the unit employees’ wages and
benefits hang in the balance with the Union’s presence at the facility and they would be better
off without it.
I would find and conclude that letter as a whole under the circumstances constituted an
unlawful and coercive interference with the Section 7 rights of the Respondent’s employees. I
would further find and conclude, in agreement with the General Counsel, that the letter in
pertinent part unlawfully implied a promise of benefits if the employees were to reject the Union
as their collective-bargaining representative, and a threat that their wages and benefits would be
delayed if they choose to sign authorization cards or otherwise were asked to join the Union, all
in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
I note in passing that my findings of a violation of the Act with respect to the February 1
letter do not entirely correspond to the complaint which essentially alleges that the letter
included threats and implied promises with regard to the employees’ wages and benefits in
connection with the Union. However, as I have stated, the letter as a whole cannot be divorced
from the entire context surrounding its genesis and ultimate distribution to the employees.
I further note that while I disallowed the amendment of the complaint regarding the
Respondent’s February 23 notice to employees prohibiting solicitation, I would agree with the
General Counsel that this action also demonstrated animus toward the Union and moreover,
like the February 1 letter, was but another step by the Respondent to rid itself of the Union.
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D. The Unilateral Change Allegation
The complaint alleges that on or about March 27, 2006, the Respondent unilaterally
granted the unit employees a wage increase, a mandatory subject for purposes of collective
bargaining, without giving the Union an opportunity to bargain with the Respondent over the
increase and its effect, in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
The Respondent admits that it granted the wage increase in question but asserts that it
had no bargaining obligation with the Union at the time because the Union then lacked majority
status. Accordingly, the Respondent submits that its action was lawful.
As correctly pointed out by the General Counsel, employers may not institute changes in
the terms and conditions of its employees without affording their lawful representative for
collective bargaining an opportunity before implementation to bargain over the changes or its
effects. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962). There is no dispute that the Respondent
implemented a wage increase without so affording the Union an opportunity to bargain. I have
determined that the Respondent’s withdrawal of recognition was unlawful. Accordingly, the
unilateral wage increase implemented on or about March 27, 2006, retroactive to November 10,
2005, was unlawful. I would find and conclude the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1)
of the Act by this conduct. Highlands Hospital Corp., 347 NLRB No. 120 (August 2006).
Conclusions of Law
1. The Respondent, Carriage Inn of Cadiz of Cadiz, Ohio, is an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union, United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy Allied
Industrial and Service Workers International Union, AFL–CIO, CLC and its Local 13983-08 is a
labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. At all times material, Local Union No. 13983-08 has been the exclusive collective-
bargaining representative of the Respondent’s employees in the following unit appropriate for
the purposes of collective bargaining:
All full-time and regular part-time nonprofessional employees employed by the Employer
at its Cadiz, Ohio facility, including licensed practical nurses, nurses aides,
housekeeping employees, dietary employees, laundry employees, social and activity
service employees, orderlies, maintenance employees and office clerical employees, but
excluding department managers, confidential employees and professional employees,
guards and supervisors as defined in the Act.
4. By refusing to provide relevant and material information to the Union in a timely
fashion, the Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act.
5. By withdrawing recognition of and refusing to bargain with the Union from January 27
to the present as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the employees in the
contractual bargaining unit, the Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act.
6. By unilaterally increasing the wages for employees in the bargaining unit on or about
March 27, 2006, without affording the Union an opportunity to bargain, the Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act.
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7. By making an implied promise of benefits to the bargaining unit employees if they
refrain from supporting the Union, the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
8. By implying in a written communication that the bargaining unit employees’ wages
and benefits would be delayed or suspended by their signing union authorization cards or
supporting the Union, the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
9. The Respondent has not violated the Act in any other manner and respect.
10. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning of Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act.
In view of my finding that the Respondent, on or about January 27, 2006, unlawfully
withdrew recognition of the Union, I shall recommend that it be ordered to recognize the Union
forthwith, and cease and desist in such conduct and bargain with the Union in the bargaining
unit described hereinbefore with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and condition of
employment and, if an agreement is reached, embody it in a signed document.52

52 I have concluded under the circumstances of this case that an affirmative bargaining
order is recommended for the unlawful withdrawal of recognition. Here, an affirmative
bargaining order in this case vindicates the Sec. 7 rights of the unit employees who were denied
the benefits of collective bargaining by the Respondent’s unlawful withdrawal of recognition and
its refusal to bargain with the Union for the employees’ very important initial contract. An
affirmative bargaining order here, while acting as a bar to any question concerning the Union’s
majority status for a reasonable time, will not unduly prejudice the Sec. 7 rights of employees
who may oppose continued union representation, since the duration of the order is no longer
than is reasonably necessary to remedy any ill effects of the violations. In my view, the Union,
during material parts of calendar year 2005 and calendar year 2006, was not given a fair
opportunity to reach an agreement with the Respondent. By restoring the status quo ante and
requiring the Respondent to bargain with the Union for a reasonable period of time, the
employees will be able to fairly assess for themselves the Union’s effectiveness.
I note also that while the law did not require the Union to prove its majority status, the Union,
nonetheless, decided to collect authorization cards from the Carriage Inn employees out of an
effort to demonstrate to the Respondent that the employees still wanted to Union to represent
them. The collected cards clearly demonstrate that a majority of the employees still support the
Union.
An affirmative bargaining order in this case will also serve the policies of the Act by fostering
meaningful collective bargaining and industrial peace. Here, the Respondent and even the
Union will have no incentive to delay bargaining. The Union will want to prove its effectiveness,
and the Respondent will have no incentive to discourage support for the Union by delay.
Notably, with the resolution of the unfair labor practices and an order to cease and desist in this
regard, the Union will not be pressured to achieve immediate results, with the withdrawal issue
resolved. A temporary period of insulated bargaining will afford employees a fair opportunity in
an atmosphere free of unlawful conduct to assess the Union’s performance.
A cease-and-desist order alone in my view would be inadequate to remedy the
Respondent’s unlawful withdrawal of recognition and refusal to bargain with the Union because
as was clear on this record, another challenge to the Union’s majority status would ensue due to
the taint of the Respondent’s successful but unlawful attempt to oust the Union. An affirmative
bargaining order here would allow sufficient time allowing such taint to dissipate. At this
juncture, the instant litigation has taken over a year and in my view the Union needs a fair
opportunity to reestablish its representative status with the unit employees. The Respondent
Continued
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In view of my having found that the Respondent unlawfully unilaterally made changes in
wages, benefits, and conditions of employment since the withdrawal of recognition , the
Respondent shall, if requested by the Union, rescind any unilateral changes implemented
before and after the withdrawal of recognition on January 27, 2006. Nothing in this Order to
follow, however, shall be construed to require the Respondent to withdraw any benefit
previously granted unless requested by the Union.
I shall also recommend that the Respondent be ordered to make bargaining unit
employees whole for all losses suffered during the period beginning November 10, 2005, up to
and including the date of this decision, where such losses are attributable to the unlawful
conduct as determined by me.53
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the
following recommended54
ORDER
The Respondent, Carriage Inn of Cadiz, Cadiz, Ohio, its officers, agents, successors,
and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Refusing and failing to provide relevant and necessary information to the Union in
a timely fashion, including but not limited to such information requested by the Union in the letter
dated August 2, 2005.55
(b) Refusing to recognize and bargain in good faith with Local Union No. 13983-08 as
the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the employees in the following appropriate
unit.
All full-time and regular part-time nonprofessional employees employed by the Employer
at its Cadiz, Ohio facility, including licensed practical nurses, nurses aides,
housekeeping employees, dietary employees, laundry employees, social and activity
_________________________
should not be allowed to profit by its unlawful conduct, a result certainly possible if it is allowed
to petition for decertification of the Union immediately. I would for these reasons and reasons
stated in this opinion recommend that an affirmative bargaining order with its temporary
decertification ban be imposed as necessary to remedy full the violation in this case. See
Parkwood Development Center, 347 NLRB No. 95 (2006).
53 I would leave the ascertainment of these losses, if any, to the compliance stage of these
proceedings.
54 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and
Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec.
102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
55 I will leave to the compliance stage of the proceedings a determination whether and to
what extent the Respondent has provided the Union with the information in question. I have
examined the letter in question which is of record herein, and the requested information in my
view is both relevant and necessary for the Union to carry out its representation obligations to
the membership.
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service employees, orderlies, maintenance employees and office clerical employees, but
excluding department managers, confidential employees and professional employees,
guards and supervisors as defined in the Act.
(c) Unilaterally granting pay increases, or making other changes to hours, or other
terms and conditions of employment, without notifying the Union and providing it an opportunity
to bargain about these changes or their effects.
(d) Implying in written communications that the bargaining unit employees’ wages and
benefits would be delayed or suspended if they sign union authorization cards or support the
Union.
(e) Making implied promises in written communications that bargaining unit
employees would receive benefits if they refrain from supporting the Union.
(f) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) On request, recognize and bargain with the Union as the exclusive representative
of the employees in the following appropriate unit concerning terms and conditions of
employment and, if an understanding is reached, embody the understanding in a signed
agreement:
All full-time and regular part-time nonprofessional employees employed by the Employer
at its Cadiz, Ohio facility, including licensed practical nurses, nurses aides,
housekeeping employees, dietary employees, laundry employees, social and activity
service employees, orderlies, maintenance employees and office clerical employees, but
excluding department managers, confidential employees and professional employees,
guards and supervisors as defined in the Act.
(b) On request of the Union, restore to unit employees the terms and conditions of
employment that were applicable prior to November 10, 2005, and continue them in effect until
the parties either reach an agreement or a good-faith impasse in bargaining and make them
whole for any losses suffered by reason of the unilateral changes in terms and conditions of
employment on and after November 10, 2005, plus interest.
(c) Upon request, furnish the Union in a timely fashion with any information that is
relevant for purposes of collective bargaining, including but not limited to that information
requested by the Union by letter of August 2, 2005.
(d) If the Union requests (but only upon its request), cancel the pay increase
unlawfully granted to unit employees through the Respondent’s unilateral action on March 27,
2006, and any other unilateral changes made to wages, hours, or other terms and conditions of
employment since its withdrawal of recognition of the Union on January 27, 2006; provided,
however, that nothing in this Order shall be construed as requiring the Respondent to rescind
the pay increase or other benefits granted unless the Union requests such action.
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(e) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its Cadiz, Ohio facility, copies
of the attached notice marked “Appendix.”56 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the
Regional Director for Region 8, after being signed by the Respondent’s authorized
representative, shall be posted by the Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in
conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event that during the pendency of these
proceedings the Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facility involved in these
proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice
to all current employees and former employees employed by the Respondent at any time since
November 10, 2005.
(f) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a sworn
certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that
the Respondent has taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C. May 1, 2007
______________________
Earl E. Shamwell Jr.
Administrative Law Judge

56 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in
the notice reading “Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted
Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
JD–29–07
Cadiz, OH
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has
ordered us to post and obey this Notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain on your behalf with your employer
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities
WE WILL NOT fail to recognize and bargain with Steelworkers Local Union No. 13983-08 as the
exclusive bargaining representative of our employees in the following appropriate bargaining
unit:
All full-time and regular part-time nonprofessional employees employed by the Employer
at its Cadiz, Ohio facility, including licensed practical nurses, nurses aides,
housekeeping employees, dietary employees, laundry employees, social and activity
service employees, orderlies, maintenance employees and office clerical employees, but
excluding department managers, confidential employees and professional employees,
guards and supervisors as defined in the Act.
WE WILL NOT make any unilateral changes in contracts or wages and benefits and other terms
and conditions of employment without affording the Union an opportunity to bargain.
WE WILL NOT implement other changes in your terms and conditions of employment before we
have reached an agreement or we have reached an impasse in negotiations with the Union.
WE WILL NOT refuse to provide to Steelworkers Local Union No. 13983-08 SEIU District 1199
requested information necessary for the performance of its function as collective-bargaining
representative of our employees in the bargaining unit stated in this notice.
WE WILL NOT, in writing or otherwise, communicate with our employees in such a manner as
to imply that their wages and benefits will be delayed or suspended if they sign union
authorization cards or otherwise support the Union.
WE WILL NOT in writing or otherwise make implied promises to our employees that they will
receive any benefits if they refrain from supporting the Union.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL promptly provide the Union with the information it requested in its letter of August 2,
2005.
JD–29–07
Cadiz, OH
WE WILL, only on the Union’s request, cancel and rescind the pay increase unilaterally
implemented on or after March 27, 2006, and any other unilateral changes made to wages,
hours, or other terms and conditions of employment since our withdrawal of recognition of the
Union on or about January 27, 2006.
WE WILL recognize and, on request, bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive
representative of our employees in the above unit with respect to wages, hours, and other terms
and conditions of employment and, if an agreement is reached, embody it in a signed
document.
CARRIAGE INN OF CADIZ
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to enforce the National Labor
Relations Act. It conducts secret-ballot elections to determine whether employees want union representation and it
investigates and remedies unfair labor practices by employers and unions. To find out more about your rights under
the Act and how to file a charge or election petition, you may speak confidentially to any agent with the Board’s
Regional Office set forth below. You may also obtain information from the Board’s website: www.nlrb.gov.
1240 East 9th Street, Federal Building, Room 1695
Cleveland, Ohio 44199-2086
Hours: 8:15 a.m. to 4:45 p.m.
216-522-3716.
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING AND MUST
NOT BE ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY OTHER MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS
NOTICE OR COMPLIANCE WITH ITS PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE REGIONAL OFFICE’S
COMPLIANCE OFFICER, 216-522-3723.