Carl E. Watkins, Complainant,v.Anthony J. Principi, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionAug 15, 2002
01991145 (E.E.O.C. Aug. 15, 2002)

01991145

08-15-2002

Carl E. Watkins, Complainant, v. Anthony J. Principi, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency.


Carl E. Watkins v. Department of Veterans Affairs

01991145

August 15, 2002

.

Carl E. Watkins,

Complainant,

v.

Anthony J. Principi,

Secretary,

Department of Veterans Affairs,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01991145

Agency Nos. 98-0822, 98-0918

DECISION

Carl E. Watkins (complainant) timely initiated an appeal from a final

agency decision (FAD) concerning his complaint of unlawful employment

discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. The appeal is

accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405. Complainant alleged that he

was discriminated against and harassed on the basis of sex (male) when:

(1) signs pejorative of males were displayed in the workplace;

(2) he was counseled in writing for an infraction on August 20, 1996,

while a female employee was not counseled for a similar infraction on

October 3, 1997;

he was treated disparately with respect to the use of the telephone;

he was treated disparately with respect to leave requests;

he was treated disparately with respect to lunch periods and breaks; and

he was treated disparately and harassed on January 8, 1998.<1>

BACKGROUND

The record reveals that during the relevant time, complainant was

employed as a Pharmacy Technician (PT) in the Outpatient Pharmacy at the

agency's Decatur, Georgia Medical Center. Believing he was a victim

of discrimination, complainant sought EEO counseling and subsequently

filed formal complaints on November 25, 1997 and February 5, 1998.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was informed of

his right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge or,

alternatively, to receive a final decision by the agency. Complainant

initially requested a hearing, but subsequently withdrew that request.

The agency therefore issued a final decision.

In its FAD, the agency first addressed complainant's claim of sex-based

harassment and concluded that the actions at issue were not based on

sex. The agency also found that the conduct at issue was not sufficiently

severe or pervasive to constitute an objectively hostile work environment.

Finally, the agency noted that even if a hostile work environment based

on sex was created, the agency was not liable because it took immediate

corrective action as soon as complainant complained.

Turning to complainant's disparate treatment claim, the agency

acknowledged that complainant established a prima facie case, but

concluded that he failed to establish that management's articulation

was a pretext for discrimination. Specifically, the agency noted that

management explained that its actions were based on the need to service

customers, which includes a need to have employees come to work on

time, serve at the prescription window and keep the telephone free for

incoming calls.

On appeal, complainant raises no new arguments relating to the subject

complaint. He does, however, claim that the discrimination and harassment

he endured led him to accept disability retirement. The agency requests

that we affirm its FAD.

FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

Turning first to complainant's claim that the agency's actions led him

to accept disability retirement and assuming that he intended by this

statement to allege that he was subjected to constructive discharge, we

find that the record establishes that complainant filed an application for

disability retirement on or about January 22, 1998, prior to the filing

of his February 5, 1998. In the February 1998 complaint he did not make

mention of the constructive discharge allegation, instead raising it for

the first time on appeal. Complainant is advised that if he wishes to

pursue, through the EEO process, the additional allegation raised for the

first time on appeal, he shall initiate contact with an EEO counselor

within fifteen days after he receives this decision. The Commission

advises the agency that if complainant seeks EEO counseling regarding the

new allegations within the above fifteen day period, the date complainant

filed the appeal statement in which he raised these allegations with

the agency shall be deemed to be the date of the initial EEO contact,

unless he previously contacted a counselor regarding these matters,

in which case the earlier date would serve as the EEO counselor contact

date. Cf. Qatsha v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Request No. 05970201

(January 16, 1998).

Disparate Treatment

Turning next to complainant's claims that he was subjected to disparate

treatment and applying the standards set forth in McDonnell Douglas

Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), the Commission finds, for the most

part, that complainant failed to establish that the agency's explanations

for its actions were a pretext for sex discrimination.

Complainant failed to establish a prima facie case with respect to Issues

3, 4 and 5. Complainant alleged that he was not given the same leeway as

his female co-workers regarding telephone usage, leave requests (including

using leave to cover for late arrivals to work) and breaks. The testimony

of complainant's co-workers and supervisors establishes that complainant

used the phone for personal calls more frequently than other employees.

Moreover, several female co-workers testified that they too were verbally

counseled on occasions for using the phone for personal reasons when

their services were needed. Similarly, the record establishes that all

employees supervised by S1 were subject to the same leave, lunch and break

rules. S1 testified that when she noticed an employee arriving to work

or returning from lunch late on a habitual basis, she counseled them.

Female co-workers of complainant testified that they, like complainant,

had to use leave when they arrived more than a few minutes late to work

and certain female co-workers noted that S1 verbally counseled them when

they were late too often. In sum, complainant failed to come forward

with any evidence that raises an inference of discrimination in regard to

Issues 3, 4 and 5. The agency's finding of no discrimination in regard

to Issues 3-5 is therefore AFFIRMED.

Turning to Issue 6, we find that complainant established a prima facie

case of sex discrimination, in that he was assigned to work the window,

one of a Pharmacy Technician's more stressful duties, more than female

co-workers. S1 acknowledged that one of complainant's female co-workers

(CW1) did not work the window as often as complainant. S1 explained

that she assigned employees to window duties on a rotating schedule,

but also considered their skill in the area. She noted that complainant

was very good at working with veterans, while she received numerous

complaints from veterans when CW1 was assigned to the window. Co-workers'

testimony establishes that certain female co-workers were also assigned

to this duty more than others and the general perception was that those

who were more skilled at the assignment were assigned more often.

In arguing that the agency's explanation was a pretext for discrimination,

complainant noted that S1 sent him a �threatening letter� after

he brought in a letter from his doctor requesting that he not be

assigned to the window and contended that this established that S1's

action was motivated by his sex. The record establishes, however,

that complainant was excused from window duty for four weeks based on

the doctor's request. Subsequently, S1 informed complainant that she

would begin assigning him to the window again, but noted that if felt

he was still not capable of the duty, he should bring in an updated

doctor's note. S1's action was not improper and does not establish

that she was motivated by complainant's sex in assigning him to work

the window. Complainant failed to establish by a preponderance of the

evidence that his sex motivated the agency's action, rather than S1's

belief that he and certain female co-workers were better at working the

window than other female co-workers. Accordingly, the agency's finding

of no discrimination in regard to Issue 6 is AFFIRMED.

Complainant also established a prima facie case of sex discrimination

in regard to Issue 2. Complainant was counseled in writing by his

second-line supervisor (S2) when he picked up more than six prescriptions

at one time, a violation of Pharmacy policy. The record establishes that

all female PTs engaged in the same behavior, but that only complainant

was counseled in writing.

S2 testified that she counseled complainant in writing after she observed

him picking up more than six prescriptions at once. She noted that this

was against Pharmacy policy and that complainant had already received

a verbal warning about this practice. She noted that her policy was to

issue a letter of counseling to any employee engaging in this practice

who had already been verbally counseled, but that she never observed

anyone else doing so.

We find that this explanation is not true and is a pretext for sex

discrimination. The letter of counseling received by complainant

indicates that he, like all PTs, received an electronic message (e-mail)

in February of 1996 and again in May of 1996, informing them that

the policy on filling prescriptions was to be followed. In August of

1996, all PTs were verbally informed that if they did not follow the

policy, they would receive instructions in writing. The letter makes

no mention of any other verbal counseling received by complainant, nor

does S2 provide any specifics relating to when she verbally counseled

complainant. We find, therefore, that the verbal counseling referred

to by S2 in justifying her actions consisted of the counseling that all

PTs received in February, May and August of 1996.

The record establishes, however, that S2 observed at least one of

complainant's female co-workers (CW2) violating this policy after she

issued the verbal warnings, but did not issue a letter of counseling.

CW2 noted that on one occasion S2 observed her picking up prescriptions

and asked if she had more than six. CW2 admitted that she did and S2

spoke to her about abiding by the policy, but did not issue her a letter

of counseling. Other female co-workers testified that the policy is

constantly violated in the presence of S2 and S1, but that no one other

than complainant has ever received a letter of counseling. We find,

therefore, that complainant has established by a preponderance of the

evidence that he was subjected to sex discrimination when he was issued

a letter of counseling on August 20, 1996. The agency's finding to the

contrary is REVERSED.

Harassment<2>

Complainant also claimed that he was subjected to sex-based harassment.

Harassment of an employee that would not occur but for the employee's

race, color, sex, national origin, age, disability, religion or prior

EEO activity is unlawful, if it is sufficiently patterned or pervasive.

See Wibstab v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01972699

(August 14, 1998) (citing McKinney v. Dole, 765 F.2d 1129, 1138-39

(D.C. Cir. 1985); see also Wild v. Department of Defense, EEOC Appeal

No. 01984101 (September 12, 2000), req. to recon. denied, EEOC Request

No. 05A10058 (March 16, 2001).

To establish a prima facie case of sex-based harassment a complainant

must show that: (1) he belongs to a statutorily protected group; (2) he

was subjected to unwelcome conduct related to his sex; (3) the harassment

complained of was based on sex; (4) the harassment had the purpose or

effect of unreasonably interfering with his work performance and/or

creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive work environment; and

(5) there is a basis for imputing liability to the agency. See McCleod

v. Social Security Administration, EEOC Appeal No. 01963810 (August 5,

1999); Wild, supra.

In the case at hand, complainant established that S1 showed CW1 a

book or internet site which listed a number of pejorative sentiments

concerning the character and ability of men<3> and that CW1 subsequently

posted these sentiments on pieces of paper in her work environment.<4>

Complainant also established that he complained about these signs to

co-workers and to his third-line supervisor within days of their posting.

Furthermore, numerous witnesses, including S2, testified that S1 had

occasionally made negative comments about men in general. As such,

complainant has established elements 1, 2 and 3 of the prima facie

case. We find, however, that the conduct did not have the purpose or

effect of unreasonably interfering with complainant's work performance

and that it did not create a hostile or offensive work environment.

In order to establish that conduct unreasonably interfered with work

performance or created a hostile work environment, complainant must

establish that the harassment was severe or pervasive. See McCleod,

supra. Federal law does not prohibit simple teasing, offhand comments and

isolated incidents that are not extremely serious. See Faragher v. City

of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998). While the signs are unquestionably

inappropriate for the workplace, the record establishes that the signs

were only posted for a few days and that they were taken down immediately

when complainant expressed his displeasure with them. Even considering

the signs in combination with S1's occasional negative references towards

men in general, we find that they are not sufficiently severe or pervasive

to establish that complainant was subjected to harassment.

The Commission recognizes that a �mere utterance of an ethnic or racial

epithet which engenders offensive feelings in an employee would not

affect the conditions of employment to a sufficiently significant degree

to violate Title VII.� Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67

(1986). While Commission precedent holds that a limited number of highly

offensive slurs or comments may support a finding of discrimination,

these cases involve highly inflammatory comments which were directed

towards the complainants themselves. See, e.g., Yabuki v. Department of

the Army, EEOC Request No. 05920778 (June 4, 1993)(single incident of

verbal abuse and negative comment concerning Japanese people directed

towards complainant specifically sufficient to constitute race and

national origin discrimination); Brooks v. Department of the Navy,

EEOC Request No. 05950484 (June 25, 1996)(three racially derogatory

comments made directly to complainant over a two-month period, including

pointing to him and calling him a �n- - ger� and comparing a dead black

rat to complainant's relatives, made by an individual with a history of

making such statements, including frequent use of the word �n- - ger,�

was sufficient to state a claim); McAllister v. Department of Defense,

EEOC Request No. 05960416 (May 22, 1997)(a supervisor's disparaging and

racist comments to complainant, in conjunction with prior comments by

the supervisor demeaning to other protected classes, was sufficient to

justify an AJ's finding of discrimination).

The case in hand involves negative comments relating to the character of

men in general which were not directed towards complainant specifically

and did not involve any inflammatory language. In this situation,

we find that the comments were not sufficiently severe or pervasive

to create a hostile work environment. Even considering the comments

together with the isolated discriminatory letter of counseling issued by

S2, we find that complainant was not subjected to a severe or pervasive

hostile work environment.

Therefore, after a careful review of the record, including complainant's

contentions on appeal, the agency's response, and arguments and evidence

not specifically addressed in this decision, we AFFIRM the FAD in regard

to Issue 1 and Issues 3-6. We find, however, that complainant was

subjected to discrimination on the basis of his sex when he was issued

a letter of counseling and we therefore REVERSE the FAD in regard to

Issue 2. The matter is REMANDED to the agency for further processing

in accordance with this decision and the ORDER below.

ORDER

The agency is ORDERED to take the following remedial actions:

1. Within thirty (30) calendar days of the date this decision becomes

final, the agency shall remove the letter of counseling from any and

all agency files, including complainant's official personnel file.

2. The agency shall post a notice, as provided below.

3. The issues of compensatory damages and attorney's fees and costs

are REMANDED to the agency. The agency shall conduct a supplemental

investigation of the compensatory damages issue. Complainant,

through counsel, shall submit a request for attorney's fees and costs

in accordance with the Attorney's Fees paragraph set forth below.

No later than sixty (60) days after the agency's receipt of the

attorney's fees statement and supporting affidavit, the agency shall

issue a final agency decision addressing the issues of attorney's fees,

costs, and compensatory damages. The agency shall submit a copy of the

final decision to the Compliance Officer at the address set forth below.

POSTING ORDER (G0900)

The agency is ordered to post at its Decatur, Georgia facility copies of

the attached notice. Copies of the notice, after being signed by the

agency's duly authorized representative, shall be posted by the agency

within thirty (30) calendar days of the date this decision becomes final,

and shall remain posted for sixty (60) consecutive days, in conspicuous

places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily

posted. The agency shall take reasonable steps to ensure that said

notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.

The original signed notice is to be submitted to the Compliance Officer

at the address cited in the paragraph entitled "Implementation of the

Commission's Decision," within ten (10) calendar days of the expiration

of the posting period.

ATTORNEY'S FEES (H0900)

If complainant has been represented by an attorney (as defined by

29 C.F.R. � 1614.501(e)(1)(iii)), he/she is entitled to an award of

reasonable attorney's fees incurred in the processing of the complaint.

29 C.F.R. � 1614.501(e). The award of attorney's fees shall be paid

by the agency. The attorney shall submit a verified statement of fees

to the agency -- not to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,

Office of Federal Operations -- within thirty (30) calendar days of this

decision becoming final. The agency shall then process the claim for

attorney's fees in accordance with 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0501)

Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.

The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30)

calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The

report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. The agency's report must contain supporting

documentation, and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to

the complainant. If the agency does not comply with the Commission's

order, the complainant may petition the Commission for enforcement

of the order. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(a). The complainant also has the

right to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's

order prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement.

See 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407, 1614.408, and 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(g).

Alternatively, the complainant has the right to file a civil action on

the underlying complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled

"Right to File A Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407 and 1614.408.

A civil action for enforcement or a civil action on the underlying

complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c)

(1994 & Supp. IV 1999). If the complainant files a civil action, the

administrative processing of the complaint, including any petition for

enforcement, will be terminated. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.409.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (T0900)

This decision affirms the agency's final decision in part, but it also

requires the agency to continue its administrative processing of a

portion of your complaint. You have the right to file a civil action in

an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar

days from the date that you receive this decision on both that portion

of your complaint which the Commission has affirmed and that portion

of the complaint which has been remanded for continued administrative

processing. In the alternative, you may file a civil action after

one hundred and eighty (180) calendar days of the date you filed your

complaint with the agency, or your appeal with the Commission, until

such time as the agency issues its final decision on your complaint.

If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the

complaint the person who is the official agency head or department head,

identifying that person by his or her full name and official title.

Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court.

"Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the

local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file

a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

August 15, 2002

Date

NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES

POSTED BY ORDER OF THE

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

An Agency of the United States Government

This Notice is posted pursuant to an Order by the United States Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission dated which found that

a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq., has occurred at the Department of Veterans

Affairs Medical Center in Decatur, Georgia (facility).

Federal law requires that there be no discrimination against any

employee or applicant for employment because of the person's RACE,

COLOR, RELIGION, SEX, NATIONAL ORIGIN, AGE, or DISABILITY with respect

to hiring, firing, promotion, compensation, or other terms, conditions

or privileges of employment.

The facility supports and will comply with such federal law and will

not take action against individuals because they have exercised their

rights under law.

The facility was found to have discriminated on the basis of sex when an

employee was issued a letter of counseling. The facility was ordered

to: (1) remove the letter of counseling from any and all agency files;

(2) post this notice; and (3) award complainant compensatory damages

and attorney's fees, if appropriate.

The facility will not in any manner restrain, interfere, coerce, or

retaliate against any individual who exercises his or her right to

oppose practices made unlawful by, or who participates in proceedings

pursuant to, federal equal employment opportunity law.

Date Posted:

Posting Expires:

29 C.F.R. Part 1614

1 Although the complaint filed on February 5, 1998 mentioned race

as a basis for discrimination, complainant subsequently clarified

that he was only alleging sex discrimination and sex-based harassment.

2 To the extent complainant intended to claim that he was subjected

to harassment based on all of his allegations taken together, we

have already determined that actions described in Issues 3-6 were

not motivated by complainant's sex, but rather by the legitimate

business needs of the agency. Accordingly, these issues will not be

considered part of complainant's sex-based harassment claim. However,

complainant alleged that Issue 1, in and of itself, created a hostile work

environment and that claim, as well as the action described in Issue 2,

will be considered.

3 It is undisputed that S1 brought the sentiments to CW1's attention,

although it is not clear in what form they first appeared.

4 The sayings posted on the signs including comments such as, �Giving a

man space is like giving a dog a computer: Chances are he will not use

it wisely� and �Don't accept rides from strange men, and remember all

men are strange as h-ll.�