Caribe General Electric, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Dec 10, 1964

149 N.L.R.B. 1541 (N.L.R.B. 1964)

CARIBE GENERAL ELECTRIC, .INC. 1541
The Union would like to substitute for our personal interest in each other a cold
piece of paper where everything is black and white and according to the book. They
would want us to give up our personal relationship with each other and deal with
some strange union representative who doesn 't know about and doesn 't care about
your personal problems.
This letter is probably too long now, but I want to say again that we are a com-
paratively new company, we have grown together , and we will continue to grow
together . Don't take a chance on your future . You are doing better all the time
without paying dues to the Union for the right to work.
Don't let the Union make you fight somebody else's battles.
We urge you to vote NO!
Sincerely,
(S) Milton H . Kantor
Caribe General Electric , Inc., and General Electric Switchgear,
Inc. and Aurelio Marquez Burgos. Case No. 24-CA-1859. De-
cember 10, 1964 '
DECISION AND ORDER
On August 18, 1964, Trial Examiner William Seagle issued his
Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respond-
ent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor prac-
tices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take
certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Decision.
Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief.'
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the Act, the Board
has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-
member panel [Members Leedom, Fanning, and Brown].
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed.
The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and brief, and the entire record
in this case, and hereby adopts the findings,2 conclusions, and recom-
mendations of the Trial Examiner, with the following modifications.3
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, the Board hereby adopts as its Order, the Order recom-
mended by the Trial Examiner and orders that Respondent Caribe
General Electric, Inc., and General Electric Switchgear, Inc., Palmer,
' The Respondent's request for oral argument is hereby denied, as , in our opinion, the
record, including the exceptions and brief , adequately presents the issues and positions of
the parties.
2 The Trial Examiner inadvertently at one point referred to the representation election
as having occurred on September 28, 1963 The correct date is September 28, 1962.
3 We find it unnecessary to pass upon the Trial Examiner 's 8(a)(1 ) finding based on
the wage increase which the Respondent granted its employees on or about Novem-
ber 3, 1963
149 NLRB No. 137.
1542 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Puerto Rico, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the
action set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order, with
the following modifications :
Delete paragraph 1(b) of the Recommended Order and the sec-
ond paragraph of the notice.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case was heard before Trial Examiner William Seagle , at Santurce , Puerto
Rico, on March 9, 10, and 11, 1964, on a complaint issued on February 4, 1964,
charging violations of Section 8(a) (1) and 8(a) (3) of the Act. ' The two principal
issues presented by the pleadings are (1 ) whether the Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act by its policies with respect to the granting of benefits , and (2)
whether the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) of the Act by discharging one of
its employees , Aurelio Marquez Burgos, because of his activities in behalf of an inde-
pendent union.
Counsel for the General Counsel briefly presented oral argument at the conclusion
of the hearing, and , subsequent to the hearing , counsel for the Respondent filed a
written brief , which I have considered.
Upon the record so made, and in view of my observation of the demeanor of the
witnesses , I hereby make the following findings of fact:
1. THE RESPONDENTS
Caribe General Electric, Inc., is and at all material times has been, a foreign cor-
poration whose home office is at Plainville, Connecticut , but which has been author-
ized to do business in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. General Electric Switch-
gear, Inc., is, and at all material times has been a Delaware corporation authorized
to do business in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Both Caribe and General
Electric Switchgear are engaged in the manufacture of electric products at a plant,
which is shared by them, in Palmer , Puerto Rico . The two corporations have, at all
material times , formulated , adopted , and applied a common labor relations policy
affecting their employees . It is admitted that for the purposes of the present pro-
ceeding the two corporations constitute a single employer of the employees working at
the plant located in Palmer, Puerto Rico, and I so find . The two corporations will
be referred to hereinafter as the Respondent or as Caribe G.E.
During the past 12 months, which is a representative period, the Respondent has
manufactured electrical products valued in excess of $50,000 at its plant in Palmer,
Puerto Rico , and it has shipped , transported , and delivered such products to customers
located outside the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED AND THEIR ORGANIZING CAMPAIGNS
International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO (here-
inafter referred to as the IUE), and Union de Empleados de la General Electric, Inc.
en Palmer ( hereinafter referred to as the U.E.G.E.P.), an unaffiliated union, are labor
organizations which have sought to organize the employees of the Respondent.
In the summer of 1962, the IUE and an independent union known as the Sindicato
Obrero Insular, were conducting organizing campaigns at the Respondent 's plant at
Palmer. This activity resulted , finally, in a Board -conducted election which was held
on September 28, 1962. Neither the IUE, nor the Sindicato received , however, a
majority of the votes cast in this election.
In the early summer of 1963, the IUE renewed its attempts to organize the Caribe
G.E. employees. Its organizers distributed leaflets in front of the plant and contacted
employees . John Otero, an international representative of the union , testified at the
hearing that the IUE campaign was still continuing but the record does not show
just how much success it was having.
' The complaint was based on a charge filed on December 12, 1963, and an amended
charge filed on February 4, 1964
CARIBE GENERAL ELECTRIC, INC. 1543
In the summer of 1963, the Sindicato Obrero Insular was no longer on the scene.
Although an unaffiliated union, its activities were, apparently, general.2 Its place had
been taken, however, by another independent union whose activities were confined to
the Caribe G.E. plant. This was the U.E.G.E.P., whose organizational activities
began toward the end of August or the beginning of September 1963. These activi-
ties consisted of the distribution of pink leaflets in front of the plant, and also of the
passing out of pink membership application cards. On October 31, 1963, there was
held an organizational meetings-referred to as a constituent assembly by its par-
ticipants-at which a constitution was adopted 3 and officers were chosen,4 who
informed Manuel Laborde Montaner, the personnel manager of the Respondent, of
their selection in a letter dated December 10, 1963.5 They closed this letter by
stating: "We take advantage of this letter to place ourselves at your service toward
the improvement of our mutual interests."
The Respondent has not admitted in its answer that the U.E.G.E.P. is a labor organi-
zation , and counsel for the Respondent contend that counsel for the General Counsel
has failed to prove that it is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5)
of the Act. This contention is plainly without merit. The evidence clearly shows
that the U.E.G.E.P. was organized to represent the employees of the Respondent in
dealing with it with respect to conditions of employment, and while its exact mem-
bership among the Respondent's employees is not established, it is evident that it has
some members. Far less formal organizations than the U.E.G.E.P. have been held
to be labor organizations. It is hardly reasonable to assume that a labor organization
which has not only adopted a written constitution but has also filed the same with
the Secretary of Labor of the United States is not a labor organization within the
meaning of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The antiunionism of the Respondent and its manifestations
There can be no doubt but that the Caribe G E. has always been opposed to the
unionization of its employees, and that it has made every effort in its power to
dissuade them from joining any labor union, whether affiliated or unaffiliated. The
opposition of Caribe G.E. to unionism is fully documented in the pages of a weekly
news bulletin called the Cagenel Reporter 6 issued to the employees on Friday of
every week. Of course, it is not the only purpose of Cagenel to dissuade the employ-
ees from accepting unionism . Cagenel is a sort of house organ, and it deals with
many subjects other than unionism; in many issues the subject of unionism is not even
mentioned. The fact remains, however, that in issuing Cagenel to the employees no
opportunity has been neglected by the management of Caribe G.E. to attack unions,
their leaders and their practices and to stress the futility of belonging to them. This
message comes to the employees, moreover, upon the highest authority, for the
column of Cagenel in which it is expressed is often the one entitled "The President's
Column."
Thus, in the issue of Cagenel for May 3, 1963, the president of the company,
Wallace A. Johnson, who had not been installed until April 15, 1963, told his employ-
ees, in part as follows
Today I wish to speak to you about a very important matter as to which I
want everyone to know my opinion and way of thinking.
We know that there are union organizers visiting your homes. They are
doing this for the purpose of trying to get you to sign the union cards....
The employees of Caribe and of Switchgear, without the need of a union, have
always enjoyed salaries, benefits, and working conditions that are among the
best in the factories of the Island.
2 General Counsel's Exhibit No 9 (b) shows that the Sindicato was conducting a strike
in August 1963 at the plants of the International Shoe Corporation in Manati. Respond-
ent's Exhibit No. 42 shows that the Sindicato was also ins olved in an election at Puerto
Rico Nu-Treads
3 The constitution was filed with the U S Secretary of Labor
4 These were Aurelio Marquez Burgos, president; Eulalio Fuentes, secretary, and
Heriberto Rosario, tieasuier -
This letter was not mailed but delivered peisonally by Marquez to Laborde in the
early morning of December 12, which was the very day of Marquez' discharge
Hereinafter referred to as Cagenel
1544 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Of course, you have the right to sign or not to sign the union cards. Neverthe-
less, I firmly believe that you have nothing to gain by joining a union. Why pay
close to $20,000 a year in dues to a union without having anything to gain?
[Emphasis supplied.]
In the issue of Cagenel for August 30, 1963, the president dwelt upon the strike
called by the Sindicato Obrero Insular at the factories of the International Shoe
Corporation in Manati. After reminding the employees that a majority of them had
"intelligently voted against this same union," he went on to tell them that the strike
started when the management had rejected the union's demand for the union shop,
which he declared , would have been no help at all to the employees, and was desired
by the union only to enable it to extract the maximum in dues from them.
Some of the issues of Cagenel have a question and answer box. In the issue for
September 27, 1963, the attempt was made to answer the question: "Why is Caribe
General in the habit of setting forth the disadvantages of the union and never men-
tions the advantages that the workers have in unionizing?" The answer supplied to
this suggestion was that there are no advantages to unionism and that only what are
denominated possible "calamities" result from it , these calamities being strikes and
the-losses in pay which they cause, the payment of dues, and the suffering of acts of
violence.
In another issue of Cagenel for October 4, 1963 , the attempt was made to answer
the question: "Why, if unions are so bad, is the President of the United States in
agreement with them and speaks well of them?" The answer given to this question
was as follows:
Everyone has the right to have his own opinion including the President of the
United States. The question is not necessarily whether the union is a good or a
bad one. In our factory the principal question is, what will our employees gain
by having a union here? We have already expressed our opinion on this matter
many times.
It turns out to be a coincidence that Robert F. Kennedy, brother of the Presi-
dent, who is the Attorney General of the United States, in February of this year
ordered a Federal Grand Jury to conduct a full investigation of possible viola-
tions of Federal laws by unions that operate in Puerto Rico. But it is still a
greater coincidence that several leaders of the I.U.E. union have charges pending
to be heard before this Federal Grand Judy. One of the charges against the
I U.E. leaders is having illegally appropriated, union funds in the amount of
about $4,500.
There was a question and answer in the issue of Cagenel for November 15, 1963,
that is particularly revealing of the Respondent's labor philosophy. The question,
which was put to Laborde, was answered by him as follows:
Question: Mr. Laborde: Is it that we the employees,of General Electric do
not wish to join a union to assert our rights or is it that we lack suitable infor-
mation about the benefits offered by honest unions to the working classes?
Answer. We believe that the real reason of why our employees have rejected
the unions in the past as well as in the present, is simply because our employees
know that they have nothing to gain by having a union here, on the other hand
they could have much to lose. Let's always remember that no union provides
the benefits our employees enjoy here. This can only be made by management,
as it has been done here throught [sic] the years. [Emphasis supplied.]''
The general philosophy reflected in this question and answer and in the Respond-
ent's propaganda as a whole is that no union could obtain benefits for the employees
beyond those which the Respondent itself would voluntarily give them, and, that they
could, moreover, lose those benefits and suffer untold calamities by resorting to union
organization.
So determined was the management of Caribe G.E. in its opposition to unionism
that it extended even to local or independent unions. Thus, in the issue of Cagenel
for October 11, 1963, the employees were told that "wherever there are unions, no
matter whether they be local, independent or international, there may be strikes and
dues must be paid." At this time, there were rumors current in the plant that the
7 There are a considerable number of other issues of Cagenel incorporated in the record-
counsel for the Respondent offered indeed the whole file of Cagenel for the year 1963-but
they are of the same tenor as the issues already summarized , and it would serve little
purpose to summarize these also.
CARIBE GENERAL ELECTRIC, INC. 1545
U.E.G.E.P. was acceptable to management . Indeed the TUE was charging the
leaflets which it was distributing that the U .E G.E.P . was a company union. In the
issue of Cagenel for October 18, 1963 , the employees were informed , therefore, that
"our employees don't have any need to be represented by any kind of union ." [Empha-
sis supplied .] In the issues of Cagenel the opportunity was rarely missed , appar-
ently, of commenting on the doings of the Sindicato Obrero Insular , although it was
an independent union , and in one issue it is reported that the employees of Proctor
Electric had recently ousted another independent union called the Federation Libre
del Trabajo . Indeed one gets the impression that PueftoVRico is the natural habitat
of independent unions.
Cagenel itself is part of what the Respondent calls its communications program
for its employees . In addition to the general indoctrination of its employees against
unionism , the Respondent seeks to keep constantly before them the benefits which
they are obtaining from the Respondent without paying dues to a union . This is
accomplished , however , not only by the distribution of Cagenel but by annual plant
informational meetings with the employees . When tangible benefits in the form of
pay increases have been granted-such increases have been granted in every year
except 1958-they have been announced to the employees in these informational
meetings.
Such informational meetings were held in 1963 during the last 2 weeks of October
in the conference room of the plant. As there were at this time some 800 production
and maintenance employees, it was, apparently , deemed impractical to hold a single
meeting for all of them . Instead, some 25 or 30 group meetings , attended in each-
instance by approximately 35 employees selected on the basis of their job classifica-
tions were held. Each meeting lasted from 11/a to 2 hours , and was in each instance
first addressed by Manuel Laborde Montaner, the company personnel manager and
then also by Wallace A. Johnson , the recently designated president of the company,
who would enter the meeting usually only after Laborde had completed his remarks.
During the meeting of each group , there was a question and answer period during
which Johnson undertook to answer employees ' questions. As Johnson did not speak
Spanish , Laborde acted as his interpreter.
The primary purpose of the group meetings in October 1963 was to announce to
the employees a pay raise which was to be made effective as of November 3, 1963.
The immediate occasion for the increase was the fact that the Federal minimum wage
was about to become $1 .25 an hour , and some of the employees were receiving less
than this. However, as the hourly rate of the employees in each wage classification
was to be increased 5 cents an hour or 3 percent , whichever was greater , some of the
employees would receive more than the minimum wage. In practical terms this
would work out to increases varying from 5 cents to 10 cents an hour. Before
announcing the wage increases , Laborde , with the assistance of a graph , would give
a resume of past wage increases and explain the wage policies of the company and
its future prospects. Laborde also reminded his listeners that improvements in the
medical and insurance programs had already been made effective the previous month.
One of the Respondent 's employees, Julio Juan Arnaldi Cruz, who was present at
one of the group meetings , testified that in commenting on the Company 's insurance
program in response to a question , Johnson made the statement that if there were
a union in the plant some of the benefits would be reduced . Laborde denied that
Johnson had made the statement attributed to Johnson , and Johnson himself denied
making the statement but I do not credit their denials.
In testifying concerning what was said on the subject of unionism at the group
meetings at which the November 3 wage increase was announced , Laborde was not
very candid . He denied that in his own presentation he said anything at all about
unions, and sought to create the impression that the only references to unions resulted
from questions asked by the employees . Thus he testified in response to questions
by counsel for the Respondent as follows:
Q. You state that approximately ten questions were asked during the course
of all these meetings that related to unions. In your presentation did you men-
tion unions at all?
A. No, sir.
Q. The only mention of unions came as the result of questions through em-
ployees, is that correct.
A. Correct.
Actually, the Respondent's position on unionism was made perfectly clear to the
employees before the question and answer period began. If Laborde neglected indeed
to dwell upon the subject himself, Johnson had a good deal to say about it in his
1546 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
opening remarks. Johnson testified that after referring to the picture Laborde had
presented relative to wage improvements over the years, and the present prospects
of the company, he continued as follows:
I told our people that I wanted to talk to them about a very serious matter
pertaining to this subject and I told them that I thought it was in order, since
I was relatively new at Caribe, that they should know how I personally felt about
this matter. I then gave them a little bit of background on my experience before
coming to Puerto Rico, which has consisted of 22 years of experience in a similar
type of work which brought me into many other plants in our company in the
States; and of all the plants I had been in I had recognized that Caribe General
Electric had the most friendly and family-type spirit of any of them I had seen
and from my own personal experience I knew that this was not achieved just
by luck but it was achieved as a result of the respect that the management and
employees had developed for each other; in other words the confidence that they
had developed over the years for each other.
I also made a statement, then, that very frankly the unions did not like to see
this type of spirit in a plant and from my own personal experience in most of
the unionized plants that I had seen, this friendly family-type spirit did not
exist; and I cited examples of the leaflets that were being passed out at the gate
as a good demonstration of the way the unions were attempting to develop
distrust between our employees and their management.
I also cited one other example where there was a leaflet passed out in which
the leaflet was aimed at our women that we employ at the plant and was a rather
nasty leaflet, making some remarks relative to the fact that they were not sign-
ing union cards, and I assured our women that were present at the meeting that
we felt that we had a very fine group of women.
Then I stated that the prime purpose of the organizing campaign that was
taking place was for the purpose of our people to sign union cards and that I
was not present to tell them whether they should sign them or whether they
shouldn't sign them, but this was a decision that they and only they could make.
I did tell them that I urged them to consider the various thoughts that both Mr.
Laborde and I had presented to them during the course of the day. [Emphasis
supplied]
And then, in closing, I told them that "I as your president and manager intend
to do everything in my power to preserve the friendly family-type spirit that we
have always enjoyed at Caribe and also to continue the progress that we have
enjoyed in over seven years of our existence." That was the portion of my
prepared presentation.
It is apparent from Johnson's testimony that not only he but Laborde referred to
the Respondent's position on unionism in their presentation. It is not clear from
the testimony of either Johnson or Laborde, to be sure, to what extent the union
situation was a factor in the granting and timing of wage increases but this lack is
made up in the issues of Cagenel itself.
In the issues of Cagenel for September 14, 1962, which appeared on the very eve
of the election that year involving the IUE and the Sindicato Obrero Insular, the
president of the company, who was then Robert W. Trickey, announced not only that
a wage increase of 5 cents an hour, or 3 percent, whichever would be higher, would
be made effective as of October 29, 1962, but also that another general wage increase
was scheduled for October 29, 1963, when the legal minimum wage would be raised!
Having made this announcement, Trickey proceeded to explain his motives for making
it as follows:
We are making the announcement of the new increase somewhat earlier than
we would normally announce it because we are fearful that if we delayed the
announcement the current union organizing campaign might jeopardize your
chances of getting it at the present time. If we waited until after a date is set for
a NLRB election the union might claim that we did so to influence your vote in
the election, that of course, would be untrue. We don't want the increase to have
any effect on the election if there is one
This increase has been planned for some time. We feel that it would be unfair
to you if we defer it simply because a union happens to be carrying on a campaign
at this time.
Periodic general increases have been a pattern in our plant since it was opened.
Our wage minimum was increased in November of 1956 shortly after the plant
was opened. Other increases were made in 1957, March 1959, June 1960 and in
CARIBE GENERAL ELECTRIC, INC. 1547
October 1961. Some of the minimum increases have been required by law, but
as in 1961, we have voluntarily increased the job rate for all jobs, not those just
affected by the minimum.
The 1960 increase, of course, was made completely voluntarily as in this newly
announced increase.
We can anticipate that the union organizers will have something to say about
this announcement . They may claim that they somehow forced the company to
give it; that it is done to influence the employees, and so forth and so on. The
employees know from experience, however, and the records show that regular
increases are a pattern in our Company.
Johnson in 1963 was no less candid than Trickey in explaining also in Cagenel the
strategy and motive that underlay the action of the company in granting the wage
increase which Trickey had announced so long in advance. This Johnson did in two
issues of Cagenel. The first of these two issues appeared as early as July 26, 1963. In
this issue Johnson not only announced that there would be a wage increase in Novem-
ber of that year but also explained why he was making the announcement as early as
July. Thus, he stated:
As you may remember, last year two unions participated without any success
in an election for the purpose of trying to organize our employees. The law
requires that at least during one year no other election may be held. We are
close to the termination of that year.
You very well know the rumors that have circulated lately that the S.O.I., the
I.U.E. and other unions are roaming about our factory again. We would not be
surprised if these unions started another of their useless campaigns. However, if
we waited to announce our plans for voluntary salary increases during a union
campaign, then possibly we might be accused of committing unfair labor prac-
tices; should this happen, this might mean that we would have to postpone these
salary increases.
As long as we can, we will not permit this to happen.
It is for these reasons that we announce these salary increases at this early date.
In the second issue of Cagenel, which appeared on September 30, 1963, Johnson
definitely announced that there would be a wage increase on November 3, and how
large this increase would be. In addition, he announced a number of improvements
in the insurance program which were being put into effect. These announcements
were followed by a series of propaganda paragraphs under the general heading "357
DAYS OF PROGRESS":
Three-hundred fifty-seven days ago today the employees of Caribe and Switch-
gear General Electric told the I.U.E. and S.O.I. unions NO, THANK YOU,
WE DON'T NEED YOU!!! This was not said by a small group of employees.
A great majority of 447 said the same thing.
During these 357 days our companies have continued their progress. Let's
review some of the things that have happened during this period of 357 days.
After enumerating no less than 10 items of progress, including the wage increase being
announced that day, and the improvements in the benefits program, Johnson concluded
as follows:
These are some of the good things that our employees have benefitted from
during the past 357 days.
We have only question to make: WHAT HAS THE I.U.E. UNION OR
ANY OTHER UNION DONE FOR YOU DURING THESE 357 DAYS?
It is charged in the complaint as amended that the Respondent violated Section
8 (a) (1) of the Act in three specific respects, as follows:
1. It promised its employees a wage increase and other benefits.
2. It repeatedly reminded its employees of the benefits that they had received
and were receiving, warning them at the same time that if they selected a union
to present them they would "lose much."
3. On or about November 3, 1963 it granted its employees a wage increase
and other benefits.
It is apparent that these three allegations are closely related. They represent indeed
only different facets of the Respondent's basic policy against unionism . I consider
first the second allegation because it represents an expression of this basic policy.
1548 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
This allegation is based, obviously, on Johnson's declaration at one of the informa-
tional meetings that if there were a union in-the plant some of the existing benefits
would be reduced. The same thought is expressed-and in even more general terms-
in the issue of Cagenel for November 15, 1963, in which the employees were told not
only that they had nothing to gain by having a union to represent them but also that
"they could have much to lose."
Notwithstanding the free speech proviso contained in Section 8(c) of the Act an
employer violates Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act by engaging during a union campaign
in propaganda which conveys to employees the message that a union could not obtain
for them benefits beyond those which the employer himself would give them, and that
they might even lose these benefits by resorting to union organization.8
As for the promise of benefits in the form of a wage increase, it is clear that the
promise was made in the announcement of the wage increase in the issue of Cagenel
for July 26, 1964, and in the group informational meetings held in the last 2 weeks of
October 1963. These events thus occurred within the 6-month period of limitation
specified in Section 10(b) of the Act. Nevertheless, the announcement made in the
issue of Cagenel for September 14, 1962, may be considered as background. As for
the implementation of the promises, this occurred clearly on November 3, 1963. Since
the wage increase then granted by the Respondent went beyond the requirements of
the minimum wage law, it represented, obviously, the conferral of a voluntary benefit.
Counsel for the Respondent rely on N.L.R.B. v. Exchange Parts Company, 375
U.S. 405, in contending that the Respondent did not violate the Act either by promis-
ing the benefits or granting them. Counsel misconceives the issue in this case to have
been "whether the conferral of economic irrespective of motive, is a violation of
Section 8(a)(1) when carried out shortly before a representation election." It is true
that in the Exchange Parts case the benefits were conferred during the pendency of a
Board election but the motive of the employer in conferring them was very much in
issue. "The precise issue is," declared the Court, "whether that Section (i e. Section
8(a)(1) of the Act) prohibits the conferral of such benefits, without more, where
the employer's purpose is to affect the outcome of the election." [Emphasis supplied.]
The crux of the case was whether a violation could be found where the conferral of
the benefits was not part of an overall program of interference and restraint but stood
in isolation. What the Court held in effect was that the unlawful motive of the
employer could be otherwise established. The decision of the Court was certainly
not to the effect that an employer is free to promise or confer benefits or to withhold
benefits so long as a representation election is not pending. An employer may violate
Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act by promising or conferring benefits or by withholding
benefits during the pendency of a union campaign in which no election has yet been
scheduled. The true issue in every case turns on the employer's purpose. If it is his
purpose in promising or conferring or in withholding benefits at a particular time to
infringe upon the freedom of choice of his employees, or to thwart their desire for
self-organization, he has violated Section 8 (a)( I) of the Act. Moreover, while the
pendency of an election is a strong indication of an unlawful purpose, it is not per se
conclusive evidence of such a purpose.9 Thus, all the circumstances surrounding the
promise and grant of the benefits in the present case must be considered in determining
whether the Respondent harbored an unlawful purpose.
While it is established that the Respondent has granted wage increases in every year
except 1958 since the plant was opened in 1956, the amount of the increase in any
particular year is not known except for the years 1962 and 1963, when the increases
were identical. Except for these 2 years, the timing of the increases represents another
lacuna in the record, as do the immediate occasions of the wage increases, and the
specific motives of the Respondent's executives in granting them. From the fact that
wages were not increased in one of the 7 years during which the Caribe G.E. plant has
been in operation, it may be inferred, however, that wage increases were not made
annually, and hence that they were not automatic. If the amounts also varied, the
increases would also not be automatic in this sense.
It is true that in announcing the increase in 1962 and 1963 the Respondent's execu-
tives explained that there was a policy of periodic review of the wage rates prevailing
in the plant in order to determine whether they were fairly competitive in the com-
pany's area of operation. It is not to be doubted at all that the Respondent in deter-
mining its wage policies had to take into consideration competitive conditions. It is a
8 See, for Instance , N.L R.B. v. Gate City Cotton Mills, 167 F. 2d 647 (C A. 5) ;
N.L.R.B. v. Electric City Dyeing Company, 178 F. 2d 980 (C.A. 3).
9 Hudson Hosiery Company, 72 NLRB 1434 ; Bata Shoe Company, Inc, 116 NLRB
1239, 1241.
CARIBE GENERAL ELECTRIC, INC. 1549
fair inference, however, that the Respondent's executives also took into consideration
the possibility, if not the probability, if wage increases were not granted from time to
time, that they would not be able to forestall the union organization of their employees.
Of course, the Respondent's executives were always declaring that their employees
were free to join or not to join any labor organization, and that none of their actions,
including wage increases, were intended to influence them in deciding what to do but
this was, evidently, no more than lipservice to the ideal of neutrality. It is true, too,
that an employer does not violate the Act merely because in granting a wage increase,
he is motivated in part by the hope that his action will tend to discourage his employees
from ever listening to the siren voices of union organizers. This motive is harbored no
doubt by all nonunion employers, and is bound to exist in any industrial society which
is at least partly organized. The employer's motives become subject to scrutiny only
when a union has actually appeared on the scene, and is making an active effort to
organize his employees. In this situation the employer must steer between the Scylla
of granting benefits and the Charybdis of,withholding them.
Extreme reticence characterizes employers, as a rule, when they are granting or
withholding benefits. The rather unusual feature of the present case is that the
Respondent's executives explained to their employees why they were announcing and
conferring the benefits. But, while the present case is unusual, it is not unique. In
Standard Coil Products, Inc., 99 NLRB 899, the employer, too, failed to maintain a
discreet silence, although the situation was the reverse of that in the present case, for
the employer was there charged with withholding rather than granting a wage increase
during the pendency of a union campaign. In Standard Coil Products, the company
operated plants in Bangor, Michigan, and Chicago, Illinois. During the pendency of a
union campaign at Bangor in which, as in the present case, two unions were competing
for the favor of the employees, the company's executives granted a 10 cents an hour
wage increase to the employees of the Chicago plant but decided to defer a like
increase to the employees at the Bangor plant until after the representation election
there had been held. Following this action, the employees at the Bangor plant, having
learned of the wage increase at Chicago, inquired from the plant manager at the
Bangor plant why they were not receiving a wage increase. Thereupon, the plant
manager at Bangor assembled the employees, and explained to them in a speech just
why the wage increase was being withheld, although one had been put into effect in
Chicago. This explanation was that the company had been advised by counsel that
it could not grant a wage increase at the Bangor plant while a union organizational
campaign was under way without incurring the risk of being charged with an unfair
labor practice.
The Board held that neither the action taken by the company in deferring the wage
increase at Bangor, nor the explanation given to its employees by its plant manager in
his speech constituted unfair labor practices. A variety of reasons was advanced for
these conclusions: (1) there was nothing to show that the increase was deferred
because of the union activity; (2) the motive of the respondent, which had acted on
the advice of counsel, was to avoid violating the Act rather than to penalize the
employees for engaging in union activities; (3) the employees were assured that the
deferred increase would be granted regardless of the result of the election; (4) the
respondent's fear of violating the Act was a real one; (5) the deferred increase was
not one periodically or regularly granted; (6) it was not, therefore, the necessary
effect of the deferment to discourage union activity; (7) if the necessary effect of the
deferment, standing alone, would have been to discourage union- activity, the
respondent's plant manager, by explaining the deferment of the increase and by assur-
ing the employees, that it would be eventually granted, effectively abated such an
effect; and (8) the explanation of the contemplated wage increase and of its defer-
ment, as distinguished from the deferment itself, was proper because it had been made
in response to inquiries by the employees themselves, and hence could not have been
timed to influence the result of the pending election.
It is apparent that Standard Coil Products is clearly distinguishable from the present
case. The most salient points of distinction between the two cases are that Caribe
G.E. was not engaged in any multiple plant operation in Puerto Rico; that it had no
differences in wage scales to justify or to explain; and that, despite the fact that there
had been an announcement, as early as the month of September 1962, of an intention
to grant a wage increase in 1963, there is nothing to show that any of its employees
were clamoring for any announcements or explanations. The announcements and
explanations made were, therefore, purely voluntary acts on the part of the respond-
ent's executives.
1550 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
I have no doubt that if the wage increase of November 3, 1963, had been put into
effect without the fanfare of the prior announcements and explanations there would
have been no basis for charging the Respondent with any unfair labor practice.
While the wage increases at the Caribe G.E. plant were not regular and periodic;
it is true that there were regular and periodic reviews of the wage rates to deter-
mine whether they were competitive, and'that there is little doubt that there would
have been a wage increase in 1963, and probably at about the time that it was
actually instituted. But the fact that neither the wage increase nor the timing of
the wage increase in 1963 may have been violative of the Act does not dispose of
the additional question whether the announcements and explanations were violative
of the Act, since anything done with the purpose of thwarting the self-organization
of employees violates Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act.
The announcement and explanation of the forthcoming wage increase in the issue of
Cagenel for July 26, 1963, was neither very accurate, not necessarily based on a
sound legal assumption. These were more than mere rumors that unions were "roam-
ing" about the factory again, for the IUE campaign had already been renewed and
the Respondent's executives were perfectly aware of this activity. So far as the
possibility of the filing of unfair labor practice charges is concerned, while it is always
possible, of course, for charges to be filed, the Respondent's executives were laboring
under a misapprehension in assuming that every wage increase during a union cam-
paign is an unfair labor practice. Actually, the withholding of a wage increase during
a union campaign could just as readily amount to an unfair labor practice.
But, all such considerations aside, it seems clear that the announcement and
explanation in the July 26, 1963, issue of Cagenel were part of the Respondent's con-
stant strategy to forestall the success of any union in organizing its employees. The
explanations immediately connected the wage increase to be granted with the existence
of the campaign, and had the necessary effect of leading the employees to believe
that the wage increase might be postponed if the union were successful enough to
gain sufficient adherents to be able to petition for an election, and that it would, there-
fore, be safer for them to refrain from supporting the union at least until they had
received the impending wage increases. Moreover, the announcement was made close
to the termination of the year during which no election could be held, and attention
was called to this fact in the announcement itself.
Thus it was both the timing of the announcement, as well as its character, that made
it an unfair labor practice. But, once it is held that the announcement was an unfair
labor practice, it must follow that the implementation of the announcement, by the
actual grant of the wage increase, was also an unfair labor practice. The same is
necessarily true of the improvements in the insurance benefits which were put into
effect even before the wage increase, for it was not only expressly listed in the
announcement made in the issue of Cagenel for September 20, 1963, under the heading
357 Days of Progress" but was also directly coupled with the inability of the IUE or
any other union to deliver any benefits whatsoever
B. The discharge of Aurelio Marquez Burgos
Aurelio Marquez Burgos was one of the original complement of employees who
were hired when the Respondent opened its plant at Palmer. He was hired on April
25, 1956, as a carpenter in the maintenance department. Although carpentry was
Marquez' main job, he also did some painting and acted as custodian of tools and
parts. When he was discharged by the Respondent on December 12, 1963, he had
been in its employ for almost 8 years.
The early years of Marquez' employment appear to have been uneventful except
for a considerable degree of absenteeism But on January 12, 1962, he had a work-
connected accident. In raising a box containing four cans of paint, he injured his
spinal cord, and a disc hernia occurred. He was treated by the doctors of the State
insurance fund (Fondo del Seguro del Estado), and was absent from work until late
in April of 1962. Marquez never worked continuously again after he had returned to
work because his injury had to some extent impaired his working capacity and he
suffered a number of relapses. Thus, he was absent from work from late in September
until early in October 1962, and from sometime in October 1962 until January 18,
1963. He was absent from work again for a period of time during the month of May
1963 but returned to work and worked until June 3, 1963. But he was forced to give
up working on this date, and did not return to request reinstatement until Decem-
ber 11, 1963. This constituted his longest absence-an absence of more than
6 months.
CARIBE GENERAL ELECTRIC, INC. 1551
Marquez became a problem to the Respondent, moreover, not only because of the
repeated absences resulting from his injury but also because of other reasons.
Although he was not working at the time, and was undergoing treatment by the
doctors of the State insurance fund, he became very active in the union campaign
being conducted by the Sindicato Obrero Insular. He not only solicited membership
in the Sindicato but in the election of September 28, 1963, he acted as an observer for
the Union. During this campaign, Guillermo Gonzalez, Marquez' immediate super-
visor, called him into his office on a Friday, and asked him whether he was actively
participating in the campaign. When Marquez admitted it, Gonzalez told him that
the relations between him and the Company would never be the same. As events
proved they never were the same. Indeed, a personal antagonism seems to have
developed between Gonzalez and Marquez
After the election, Gonzalez put Marquez on a type of work which was not his
customary work. Indeed, it was work that would normally be classified as common
labor. On occasion, Marquez was given a pick and shovel and directed to repair
streets and to make a concrete cover for the septic well Marquez considered that
this sort of work contributed to his relapse.
The testimony of Marquez and Gonzalez does not agree either with respect to the
conversation between them after the election, or with respect to the burdensome work
assignments. To the extent that there are inconsistencies in the testimony, I credit
the testimony of Marquez rather than that of Gonzalez. The latter struck me as both
evasive and untruthful, considering his testimony as a whole.
Gonzalez admitted that he observed Marquez meeting with a group in the plant;
that he had heard rumors that he was the leader of the group; and that he decided to
call him into his office and speak to him as a friend Gonzalez contended, however,
that he merely told Marquez not to carry on his activities during working hours
because production was suffering. Yet Gonzalez also testified that the trouble with
Marquez was that he had "separatist ideals"-he meant by this that he was an
individual who always wanted things to be different-and that after Marquez had
admitted to him that "he was the one organizing the group," he told Marquez:
"Aurelio, if you feel something against the plant, why don't you communicate that to
us or to Mr. Laborde?" It seems apparent that what Gonzalez was actually doing was
seeking to obtain for Laborde an opportunity to attempt to dissuade Marquez from
continuing his agitation
Gonzalez involved himself in even greater testimonial difficulties when he sought to
explain away the heavy work the injured Marquez was required to do after the elec-
tion. Although he had contended that he spoke to Maiquez only for the purpose of
maintaining production, he now sought to create the impression that Marquez had
little to do. "The carpentry work that we have," he testified, "the amount is so small
that it would be difficult to calculate the same," and that Marquez, therefore, had to
do other work, such as helping the mechanics or the electricians Indeed, Gonzalez
also testified that Marquez had been put on work with pick and shovel from the very
beginning of his employment, although Gonzalez was not in a very good position to
know this, since he had been a supervisor only since Christmas 1959, and he could
remember only one occasion, when according to him, Marquez cleaned a waste well-
the occasion being the same Christmas that Gonzalez became a supervisor.lo
Actually, Marquez always had plenty to do when he was working. We have it on the
authority of Laborde himself that when Marquez was hired it was decided that his
"main job" would be carpentry work. From 25 to 30 percent of his time at least was
taken up as tool caretaker, as Gonzalez himself admitted. In fact, Marquez had so
much to do that for special carpentry work additional help would be hired, and when
he was absent from work temporary help to replace him had to be hired. Far from
being unable to find enough work for Marquez to do, Gonzalez was complaining that
Marquez was a slacker who did not work hard enough, and took too long to do the
carpentry work assigned to him.
These complaints were only further manifestations of the mounting antagonism
between Gonzalez and Marquez. Although Marquez was not working in November
of 1962, he anticipated that he would soon be released by the State insurance fund
and that he would be able to return to work. However, he feared that he would not
be able to do any kind of work. He therefore paid a visit to the plant, and had an
interview with Gonzalez in the latter's office to request his special consideration It is
established precisely that this interview occurred on November 28, for Gonzalez, at
10 Actually , Marquez only dnected the work on this occasion
1552 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the suggestion of Laborde , recorded the substance of the conversation that same day
in a memorandum for the files . It is apparent from Gonzalez ' memorandum that the
interview was not a very friendly one . Marquez complained that working for Gon=
zalez had been like hell because of the latter's coldness and treatment of him, which
included watching him and not allowing him to talk to anyone . Gonzalez responded
by complaining that Marquez had left the parts room in a disorganized state and
dirty. It is, therefore, not very surprising that when Marquez declared that when he
came back to work, he would not be able to squat or bend too much that he did not
find Gonzalez very sympathetic. The latter suggested only that Marquez see Laborde
about his problem.
Marquez adopted this suggestion , and in midafternoon of the very next day he had
an interview with Laborde, who, like Gonzalez, recorded the substance of his conver-
sation with Marquez in a memorandum . According to the summary contained in this
memorandum , Marquez told Laborde that he expected to come back to work in a few
days but he also explained that he had been thinking of resigning because of Gonzalez'
enmity toward him. However, he also declared that he was satisfied after talking to
Gonzalez that the latter's attitude had improved, and that he had, therefore, decided
to stay. He then proceeded to show Laborde a letter which he had written in English
about Gonzalez-the letter was dated November 26 and was addressed to David
Esperson , the plant manager-but explained that the letter had been written in the
expectation that he would resign , and that , therefore , he had not signed the letter, and
was not presenting it officially . Laborde commented that the letter contained a
serious accusation against Gonzalez. Marquez replied that he realized this but that he
was not going ahead with it. He then left.
Laborde's comment that Marquez' letter about Gonzalez contained a serious accusa-
tion against the latter was a good deal of an understatement . The letter was indeed a
bombshell. In the letter, Marquez stated that since there was a possibility that he
would not return to his present position, and since he was in charge of the property in
his section, he wished to bring to the attention of the Company that Gonzalez had been
taking home a considerable number of tools on a "loan basis" (it was Marquez who
used the quotation marks) and to inquire whether these tools had been returned.
Marquez then continued as follows:
The other ways and means, of which I know, that Mr. Gonzalez defraud the
Company that you represent are not of my direct concern at this moment, that is
why I have decided to mention only those aspects which are closely related to me
because of the confidence entrusted to me for so many years by the Company.
The deeds and actions of people like Mr. Gonzalez are the ones to be blame
directly and indirectly for many employees to look for protection under the
Union, when management overlook such situation.
Despite the fact that Marquez had told Laborde that he would not send the letter
of accusation, he signed the original of the letter and delivered it personally to
Esperson about a week after his interview with Laborde. He mailed a copy of the
letter, moreover, to the home office of General Electric in Plainville, Connecticut.
Furthermore, he talked about the letter and its contents to his fellow employees.
Thus, soon everybody in the plant knew of Marquez' accusations against Gonzalez,
including of course, Gonzalez himself.
There is reason to doubt the sincerity of Marquez in maintaining that his motive in
writing the letter of accusation was to clear his own record as custodian of tools prior
to quitting his employment. If he really believed that he had phenomenal powers of
self-deception. His release of the letter after declaring to Laborde that he would not
do so also seems an act of duplicity, although, so far as this is concerned, Marquez had
some basis for justifying his conduct, at least in his own mind. When he came to the
plant to see Laborde on November 29, he intended to show the letter to Gonzalez
himself, strange as this may seem . But, as Gonzalez himself testified , he happened to
be absent from the plant because he had to take his son to a doctor. It was only after
Marquez learned that Gonzalez was not at the plant that he decided to show the letter
to Laborde. He changed his mind about releasing the letter, moreover, only after he
had learned that Laborde had sent a letter to the State insurance fund to inquire
whether Marquez was still under treatment . This Marquez himself regarded as an act
of'duplicity on Laborde's part.
Despite the conduct of Marquez in accusing Gonzalez of dishonesty and despite
his seeming duplicity , Laborde, Esperson , and Johnson decided not to discharge him.
Instead, they investigated the accusation against Gonzalez and found it to be unjusti-
fied. They had Marquez ' English letter translated into Spanish and had it posted on
CARIBE GENERAL ELECTRIC, INC. 1553
the plant bulletin board together with a statement to the effect that the charges against
Golzalez were baseless." A written warning against repetition of his misconduct was
issued to Marquez, and a similar warning was given to him orally in an interview with
Laborde which took place on December 10, 1962. Laborde also recorded the sub-
stance of this interview in a memorandum. In view of Marquez' subsequent dis-
charge, the most interesting passage in the memorandum is a comment that Laborde
made to Marquez when the latter indicated how insecure he felt in his job "I immedi-
ately told him," Laborde recorded, "that if there was one employee who should not
express himself in that manner was him because he very well knew that he had been
absent for long periods of time in different occasions and that we had always kept his
job open." [Emphasis supplied.] But, when at the hearing, Laborde was asked
directly why Marquez had not been discharged at this time for impugning the honesty
of his supervisor, he gave as the main reason that Marquez had been a union observer
in the election of September 28, 1962, and that the Respondent's executives feared that
if he were discharged he would file an unfair labor practice charge
When Marquez returned to work on January 18, 1963, Laborde spoke to him, and
told him that he must understand that it would be without any conditions. At the
same time Gonzalez retaliated against Marquez by relieving him of his responsibilities
for the custody of tools. Gonzalez also sent Laborde a number of memorandums
calling the latter's attention to the shortcomings or deficiencies of Marquez as an
employee but there is nothing to show that Laborde took any action with respect to
Gonzalez' complaints.
On his part, Marquez, under date of February 1, 1963, sent a letter to Laborde com-
plaining that Gonzalez was mistreating him. In this letter Marquez declared:
This is to inform you that Mr. Guillermo Gonzalez, my immediate supervisor,
persists in his threats and coercion.
Inasmuch as the latter commenced immediately after my name had been
reported as organizer of a union at the factory, I consider this behavior of Mr.
Gonzalez to be an illegal practice.
I would like not to have to refer this matter to the National Labor Relations
Board, considering, above all, the good name of our factory which should not be
let down because temerities of a personal nature.
When the campaign of the U.E.G.E.P. was launched in the late summer of 1963,
there can be no doubt that the Respondent's executives immediately became aware of
it. Laborde and Johnson witnessed the distribution of the pink leaflets of the
U.E.G.E.P. Indeed, Laborde admitted that the company officials received copies of
all the leaflets that were distributed in front of the plant.12 Most of the leaflets so
distributed appeared in October.
There is equally no doubt that the Respondent's executives had full knowledge of
Marquez' personal activities on behalf of the U.E G.E.P., and that they realized that
Marquez was not only the leader of this union but that he had been responsible for its
organization , and that he was doing everything in his power to push it. Since Marquez
was not working a good deal of the time, he doubtless had more time than anyone else
to engage in union activities, and he spent several afternoons a week personally
distributing the U.E.G.E P. leaflets. He was also making personal contacts with the
employees and distributing membership application cards. So notorious were the
activities of Marquez that at one of the group informational meetings one of the
employees asked the question whether it was proper for him to engage in union activi-
ties while he was under the jurisdiction of the State insurance fund.
All the leaflets distributed in the name of the U.E G.E.P. were, moreover, written by
Marquez personally, and he signed each one of them. Ten of the leaflets are in evi-
ii The credibility of Marquez as a witness is attacked on two grounds. The first is his
alleged lack of sincerity in attempting to justify his accusation against Gonzalez because
he had to clear his own record before resigning The second is that he supposedly,
attempted to discredit Gonzalez as a witness by attempting-to make it appear that his
letter to Esperson was written in English after Gonzalez has testified that he had read
it in Spanish Marquez' alleged lack of sincerity does not impeach his credibility as a
witness. As for the second ground, it has no factual foundation whatsoever While
Marquez did testify that his letter to Esperson was written in English-as indeed it
was-there is absolutely nothing to show that the purpose of this testimony was to dis-
credit Gonzalez The latter is discredited by his own testimony.
a Altogether 10 of the leaflets are in evidence ; 5 of them were offered by counsel for the
General Counsel and 5 by the Respondent
770-076-65-vol. 149-99
1554 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
dence, and it is easy to see how both in their content and in their style they were
calculated to annoy the Respondent's executives. Marquez was planning indeed a
rival to Cagenel, a bulletin to be called Martillando ( meaning "Hammering").
Toward the end of the month of October when the campaign of Marquez and the
U.E.G.E.P. was really getting under way, Laborde, Esperson, and Johnson began
discussing the case of Marquez, and what to do about him. To understand their
discussion, it is necessary to know the requirements of Puerto Rican law with respect
to injured employees. An injured employee must be reinstated if he applies for rein-
statement within 6 months, and is in such a physical condition that he is capable of
performing his job. However, an employer is not required to reinstate an injured
employee who applies for reinstatement after he has been absent from work for a
period of more than 6 months. Of course, when the Respondent's executives were
discussing the case of Marquez, they did not know whether he would return before or
after the 6-month period, and this period had not yet lapsed. They prepared, there-
fore, for both eventualities. If Marquez returned to work before the 6-month period
had elapsed, they would have him examined by a Dr. Andreas Salazar to determine
whether he was physically fit for work. If he returned after the 6-month period had
elapsed, on the other hand, no physical examination would be necessary, and they
would simply terminate his employment.
So meticulous was the planning that sometime during the month of November
Laborde prepared a draft of a letter of termination which would be sent to Marquez
if he returned to work after the 6-month period had elapsed. The draft of this letter
was even submitted to the Respondent's labor counsel to make sure that it was in
accordance with the Puerto Rican law governing the State insurance fund. The
reason given in the draft of the letter for terminating Marquez was that since he had
been hired on April 25, 1956, he had been absent from work for "a total period of
approximately two years," and that these absences had affected the efficiency of the
maintenance department. The actual date of Marquez' termination was, of course,
left blank in the draft of the letter. When asked to explain why it was never actually
used, Laborde testified first: "We were concerned with the fact that he was distribut-
ing flyers outside the gate and we realized that if we sent him this letter he was going
to publish it in his flyers." Laborde then further elaborated this explanation as
follows:
As I said before we were very much concerned that he would publish this letter
in these leaflets and we thought that in this letter we were not explaining all the
reasons why we were letting him go as an employee and inasmuch as the rest of
the employees in the plant were going to read this, very probably, we were con-
templating making the letter more complete. [Emphasis supplied.]
As for the motives of the Respondent's executives in reaching the decision, finally,
to terminate Marquez' employment, one cannot do better than quote the testimony of
Laborde himself on this subject, for it is very illuminating. Thus, Laborde testified:
Q. From the 3rd of June, 1963, until the date upon which the company refused
to reinstate Aurelio Marquez, did you have any other discussions concerning
Aurelio Marquez?
A. Yes, we did.
Q. With whom?
A. With the president of the company; with the manager of manufacturing-
engineering operations.
Q. Who is that?
A. Mr. David Esperson.
Q. Do you recall when this discussion took place?
A. I think this was in the latter part of October.
Q. What year?
A. 1963.
Q. What was discussed at that time?
A. We discussed the case in general of Aurelio Marquez. We discussed his
absenteeism , his problem with his supervisor, his physical limitations. We
discussed also the fact that some employees were asking questions: Why is it that
this employee while being referred to the State Insurance Fund can be distributing
flyers out at the gates? [Emphasis supplied.]
Q. During the period of time that Aurelio Marquez was under the jurisdiction
of the State Insurance Fund he was appearing outside the gates of the plant?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What was he doing?
A. He was distributing flyers.
CARIBE GENERAL ELECTRIC, INC. 1555
Q. Very well At that particular time was any decision made by the company
in connection with Aurelio Marquez?
A. Yes, we made a decision in regard to what we would do with him if he
would return back to work prior to the completion of the six-month period we
were going to submit him to a complete physical checkup with a qualified
physician.
Q. And if he returned after the six-month period what were you going to do?
A. If we would terminate him.
Q. You would not reinstate him?
A. Correct.
Of particular significance is Marquez' leaflet of December 9, 1963, since it con-
stituted not only the first issue of Hammering but also appeared only 2 days before he
applied for reinstatement. In the opening paragraphs of this issue, under the sub-
heading "Sledgehammer Information," Marquez dwelt upon a subject which, so far
as the Respondent's executives were concerned, must have been a sore one indeed.
This subject was a wage suit which a considerable number of the Respondent's
employees, including Marquez, had filed to test the validity of the one-half hour lunch
period which had been allowed in the Caribe G.E. plant since its establishment.
Puerto Rican law requires that meal periods be 1 hour long but, apparently, gives the
Secretary of Labor the power to allow a shorter period in certain circumstances. The
penalty for violation of the law is the payment of double wages. The Secretary of
Labor had approved, apparently, the shorter lunch period but the validity of his
approval was being challenged in the suit When the December issue of Hammering
appeared the suit was still pending but the Respondent was already making settlements
with those of the employees who were not parties to the suit. Marquez opened his
comment on the litigation by declaring- "While the I.U.E. continues dozing on the
brink of nightmares, seeing ghosts, the hammer and sickle, the clawed octopus, calling
itself a dangerous raticide; the U.E.G.E.P. which has already passed through our gates,
struggles for the justice of the workers." After noting that more and more of his
coworkers were joining in the suit, Marquez concluded: "If this isn't more than a
hammering without a sickle, a tremendous sledgehammer blow for the LU.E. and the
management of the General Electric in Palmer, let someone else come along and say
so...."
It is apparent that the style of Marquez was pungent and sarcastic. He dealt, more-
over, not only with concrete subjects but also supplied puns, little jokes and parables,
or fables, as for example:
Once upon a time there was a supervisor who believed in fairy tales, and when
he was a child some warts appeared on his body; and taking counsel from his
elders, he cried to the moon, saying: "Little moon, little moon, take away this
wart." It is said that on nights when the full moon appears, he can be seen
imploring: "Oh you shining, shining moon, if you take away the union, I'll dance
real soon ... real soon."
Marquez reported in the issue of December 9 also all the concrete steps which the
U E.G.E.P. had taken to perfect its organization-the holding of the constituent
assembly, the election of the board of directors, the approval of the constitution, and
its submission to the Secretary of Labor. The report of these developments was made
under the heading: "THE U.E.G.E.P. ON THE MARCH." And concluded
Marquez, rather ominously:
Our work has been done without haste, but with great insistence. It's true that
we can't boast of having 100,000 affiliates across the seas, but we can say that we
have sufficient forces inside the factories of General Electric in Palmer, to request
recognition. We don't think we're mistaken in affirming that should the time
come, and we pray to God that it doesn't, according to the provisions of our con-
stitution, WE CAN STOP two or three of the most important sections in the
factory.
When Marquez applied for reinstatement on December 11, 1963, he followed the
customary procedure, which required an injured employee when reporting back to
work to present himself in the infirmary to the plant nurse, who was at this time a
Mrs. Robles, and give her his medical certificate from the State insurance fund
Marquez had followed this procedure each time he had reported back for work, and
he had never encountered any difficulty. He also encountered no difficulty when he
first reported to Robles about 2 p.m. on December 11. She merely asked him
1556 DECISIONS OF, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
whether he wished to go to work immediately, and he told her that he would prefer
to come in the next day with his tools. After leaving the infirmary, he proceeded to
the plant cafeteria to wait for some fellow employees with whom he wished to talk.
After he had been in the cafeteria for about a half hour, either Robles came to him
there and told him that he was to see Herminio Gonzalez, a member of the personnel
staff, before leaving, or Herminio Gonzalez himself went in search of Marquez after
looking for him in the infirmary, and finding that he had already left. In any event,
when Herminio Gonzalez finally talked to Marquez in the plant cafeteria, he told
Marquez that he had orders from Laborde that he was to see Laborde the following
morning before reporting for work the next day. Herminio Gonzalez had received
this order from Laborde several days previously, and in searching foi Marquez was
merely carrying out this order. However, Herminio Gonzalez did not rest content
with transmitting the order to Marquez. Although Laborde was attending a meeting
at the International General Electric plant in Rio Piedras, which was about 20 miles
from Palmer, Herminio Gonzalez telephoned him there to tell him that he had
carried out his order to tell Marquez to report to him the next morning. Moreover,
after receiving Herminio Gonzalez' telephone call, Laborde in turn telephoned
Johnson, whose home was in Rio Piedras, to tell him that Marquez had reported
back to work.
That same evening, namely the evening of December 11, Esperson and his wife
were having dinner at Johnson's home in Rio Piedras and later in the evening Laborde
joined them. Although the Respondent's executives had already decided what action
they would take in Marquez' case, Laborde had neglected to tell Johnson and Esperson
that he had not mailed the letter to Marquez in which he would have been informed
of his dismissal. Further discussion of Marquez' case was therefore necessary, and
Johnson, Esperson, and Laborde spent about a half-hour that evening in discussing it.
Marquez reported for work at 8 o'clock on the morning of December 12 and
punched the timeclock. Before starting to work, however, he went to Laborde's office
as Herminio Gonzalez had instructed him to do. Before entering Laborde's office,
Marquez delivered to the latter's secretary the letter prepared on September 10 inform-
ing him that Marquez, Fuentes, and Rosario had been selected as officers of the
U.E.G.E.P. Laborde read the letter right away, and. while he was doing so, he was
joined by Esperson whom Laborde had asked to be present at his interview with
Marquez. The latter was kept waiting for about 15 minutes while his letter of
dismissal was being prepared. When he finally entered Laborde's office, the latter
told Marquez that he was being dismissed because of his poor attendance record, and
his physical disabilities, which put limitations on the performance of his work. How-
ever, in the official notice of dismissal which Laborde handed to Marquez at the
same time there was only one reason given for his dismissal, namely, "excessive
absences."
Characteristically, Marquez commented on his dismissal in a leaflet , which he
distributed on December 20, as follows:
Mr. Manolo [referring to Laborde] read the sentence, there were jokes, smiles,
from ear to ear, handshakes . . . everything, in a family spirit, that with Mr.
Esperson as the only witness, made the condemned feel as if he were between
Dagwood and Blondie.
Let's steal, let's kill, immorality does not matter, but to talk about unions, for
that there is no forgiveness ... for that there is the wall [el paredon].
In view of the evidence, I am constrained to find that Auerlio Marquez Burgos'
employment was terminated by the Respondent's executives because of his activities
on behalf of the U.E.G.E.P., as is alleged in the complaint. I believe this to be estab-
lished by more than a fair preponderance of the evidence.
The Respondent's executives had already demonstrated their union animus in their
management policies. It is logical to expect that if they felt the threat of unionism
was sufficiently great they would also demonstrate it in their personnel policies. They
had shown an extreme degree of tolerance toward Marquez' absenteeism and other
faults in the past. The action which they finally took in the case of Marquez is in
marked contrast to this past tolerance. Marquez was, after all, one of their oldest
employees-indeed one of the original complement of employees.
So far as Marquez' absenteeism is concerned , it is important to realize that it ante-
dated his injury on January 12, 1962. This is established in general by Laborde's
remark to Marquez in the interview of December 10, 1962, that his job had always
been kept open despite the fact that he had been absent for long periods of time in
the past. The extent of Marquez' absences is indicated with some particularity in
the letter of dismissal which Laborde prepared in November 1963 but never sent to
Marquez. Since Laborde asserted in this letter that Marquez in the course of his
CARIBE GENERAL ELECTRIC, INC. 1557
employment had been absent from work for a total period of approximately 2 years,
and since at this point Marquez had been absent only for a period of approximately
1 year due to his injury, it is apparent that Marquez had been absent from work for a
total period of approximately 1 year in the period of approximately 5 years and 8
months preceding his injury. Yet there is not the slightest indication that Marquez
was even threatened with discharge because of his absenteeism.
Indeed, the Respondent's executives seem to have been very tolerant in general
toward the absenteeism of their employees. They manifested this tolerance in the
cases of at least five other employees named Jaime Concepcion, Marta Rosado, Ger-
man Cruz Ayala, Roberto Maldonado, and Anibal Colon. In the case of the first
three employees named, moreover, the injury or illness from which they suffered was
in no way connected with their work. Furthermore, Jaime Concepcion was not
terminated until he had been absent for more than a year from his job, German
Cruz Ayala was reinstated after he had been absent for a period of more than 6
months. Finally, in the case of Marquez, it could be said that Gonzalez contributed
to his absenteeism by assigning him to such heavy work that he suffered a relapse.
The tolerance of the Respondent's executives is even more remarkable in not dis-
charging Marquez because of his behavior toward his supervisor, Gonzalez. Laborde's
explanation of this tolerance, which was that if Marquez were discharged he would
file an unfair labor practice against the Respondent, is not very convincing. Apart
from the facts that the explanation itself shows an acute awareness of Marquez'
union activities, and that the Respondent's executives were rather calculating in these
terms, it is difficult to believe that they had any doubts that they could at this time
discharge Marquez with impunity. One could hardly imagine a better case for dis-
charging an employee than an unjustified accusation of dishonesty against *a super-
visor. If the Respondent's executives really believed that such a case would not
stand up, it is apparent that they would also believe that they could not safely dis-
charge Marquez merely because of his absenteeism Yet they took the decisive step
in the second instance, although they had feared, supposedly, to do so in the first
instance. It seems more reasonable to suppose that Marquez was not discharged
after the election toward the end of September 1962 because, after all, both of the
contending unions had been defeated in that election, and the Respondent's executives
no longer had anything to fear from any of their adherents including Marquez. At
this time they could well afford to be relatively charitable and magnanimous. I use
the qualifying adverb because, after all, Marquez did not escape without some pun-
ishment, as is shown by his assignment to do the heavier work. However, recidivism,
so to speak, is not to be so easily endured or so lightly treated. When Marquez'
activities were renewed and were carried to the point where they constituted a threat,
the Respondent's executives were, apparently, ready to act, despite the greater danger
that such action might provoke charges
Indeed the timing of Marquez' discharge is very revealing of the true motive
behind it The official reason given for his discharge was "excessive absences,"
namely his absenteeism. This absenteeism was already great before Marquez had
even been injured After he was injured, the Respondent's endured no less than five
absences on his part, despite the facts that at least two of them were of long duration;
that it was evident that Marquez' injury had impaired, to some extent, his ability to
work; and that Marquez' supervisor, Gonzalez, was highly dissatisfied with his work
Although Marquez' last absence commenced on June 3, 1963, the Respondent's execu-
tives did nothing about Marquez during the months of June, July, August, September,
and most of October 1963. It was only toward the end of the month of October
1963 that they began to bestir themselves and to make plans. The making of these
plans coincided, however, almost precisely with the gathering momentum of Mar-
quez' campaign, and his discharge came precisely when this campaign had reached
its culminating point, or peak
It is also a rather notable feature of the present case that it contains plain indica-
tions that the Respondent's executives themselves had no confidence in the official
reason given by them for Marquez' termination. To repeat, this reason was "exces-
sive absences." Yet, in his interview with Marquez, Laborde gave Marquez two
reasons: not only his excessive absences but his physical incapacity, and when Laborde
attempted to explain Marquez discharge at the hearing, he gave no less than three
reasons, for, to the two reasons given to Marquez, he added a third, namely, Marquez'
behavior toward his supervisor, Gonzalez, although this had occurred more than a
year previously. But the best indication of the uncertainty of the Respondents
executives is the fact that they hesitated to use the draft of the letter which had been
prepared in connection with Marquez' dismissal because it was too incomplete to
explain why he was being dismissed, and they feared that Marquez would make short
1558 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
work of it in one of his leaflets. In effect , the Respondent 's executives confessed
that the official reason given for the termination of Marquez' employment, could not
withstand public scrutiny.
Finally, the very circumstances of Marquez' dismissal are suspicious. There is,
in the first place, the long planning which preceded the actual dismissal . There is,
in the second place, the elaborate arrangements which were made by Laborde to
prevent Marquez, almost at all costs, from starting to work before he could be dis-
missed. These arrangements went so far as to set a watch for Marquez, and to
require an immediate report on his arrival. There is, in the third place, the final
parley on the case of Marquez, which occurred despite all the previous planning.
The fact that this parley occurred at a dinner party and that it involved the three top
officials of the Respondent, indicates that the subject under discussion at the parley
was one of high urgency and high policy. The question of high policy was, appar-
ently, whether Marquez' dismissal could successfully be made to look as if it were a
dismissal for just cause.
That the discharge of Marquez was discriminatory I believe to be established by
strong circumstantial evidence. But, to the extent that this evidence leaves any room
for doubt, I believe it is removed by Laborde's direct testimony that when he dis-
cussed Marquez' dismissal with Johnson and Esperson, and they decided on their
course of action, they discussed also the fact that some employees were asking why
Marquez, who had been referred to the State insurance fund, "can be distributing
flyers out at the gates." This testimony of Laborde must be regarded as virtually a
confession on his part that Marquez' activity in this regard was a factor in his
dismissal.
Counsel for the Respondent argue that it has no responsibility for the discharge
of Marquez which, they assert, was absolutely automatic. Thus they declare: "If
he had returned on or before December 3, 1963, he would have been rehired. Any
motive for Aurelio Marquez Burgos' discharge was provided not by the Company
but by Aurelio Marquez Burgos himself. His failure to return by December 3, 1963,
triggered the discharge automatically. It is submitted that any employer bent on
ridding itself of an employee would not have conditioned the discharge upon a factor
which was controlled in its entirety by other people-Aurelio Marquez Burgos and
the State insurance fund. This would be particularly true where the employee
involved had such frequent working relationships with the State insurance fund that
it can almost be assumed that he knew his employer was under no obligation to hold
his job open for longer than six months." Apart from the fact that there is actually
nothing to show affirmatively that Marquez was aware of the legal possibilities or
requirements, the argument that Marquez automatically brought about his own dis-
charge embodies both misconstructions of the record and some rather obvious logical
fallacies. It is not true at all that if Marquez had returned to work on or before
December 3, 1963, that he would have been rehired. In that event he would have
been subjected to a physical checkup in an effort to show that he was unfit to perform
his job. To be sure, Marquez made it easier for the Respondent's executives by not
returning to work until December 11, 1963, and to this limited extent he contributed
to his own downfall. But even though the 6-month period of limitation had elapsed
the Respondent's executives were not requiu ed to dismiss Marquez. They could have
retained him despite the fact that he was returning more than 6 months after his last
injury. The choice, obviously, was theirs to make. At all times during their con-
sideration of what to do about Marquez they had two alternatives. to reinstate him
when he came back or to dismiss him. The fact that the choice between the alterna-
tives may have been made in advance does not make the discharge of Marquez
automatic.
Counsel for the Respondent also point to a number of indications in the record,
apart from those already discussed, which, according to them indicate that the
Respondent's executives were particularly well disposed toward Marquez. Thus, they
point to the fact that in April 1962 when Marquez told his supervisor, Gonzalez, that
he was not feeling well that Gonzalez suggested that Marquez "take a week off and
get himself squared away." Gonzalez did make this suggestion to Marquez but it
was prior to the commencement of the latter's union activity, and it is, therefore, of
no significance. After Marquez had engaged in his own union activities Gonzalez
showed no sympathy toward him whatsoever. Thus, when in November 1962, which
was after the union election, Marquez sought to get permission to limit the type of
work that he would do Gonzalez told him that he would have to see Laborde. I am
equally unable to understand the significance of the fact that sometime in 1963 the
Respondent's personnel department undertook "to obtain more money for Aurelio
Marquez Burgos from the State Insurance Fund." What happened on this occasion
was that someone in the personnel department discovered that the workmen's com-
CARIBE GENERAL ELECTRIC, INC. 1559
pensation checks which Marquez was receiving from the State insurance fund were in
error and called the fact to the attention of the fund.13 The correction of this error
was hardly an act of beneficience on the part of the Respondent's executives (if indeed
they were aware of it at the time), for the money did not come out of the Respondent's
treasury but out of the State insurance fund. Finally, I am even less able to under-
stand how it can be seriously contended that the Respondent's executives should
receive credit for deciding that if Marquez returned to work in less than 6 months
"they would obtain medical aid for him." I presume that this refers to the physical
checkup which Marquez would receive if he reported for work before the expiration
of the 6-month period. The purpose of this medical examination was, however, to,
establish a basis for getting rid of Marquez.
IV. THE REMEDY
Since the Respondent has not only violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by its
benefits policy but has also discriminatorily discharged one of its employees, Aurelio
Marquez Burgos, I recommend a broad form of cease-and -desist order restraining the
Respondent from infringing any of the rights guaranteed to employees by Section 7 of
the Act.
To remedy the discriminatory discharge of Aurelio Marquez Burgos, I also recom-
mend, by way of affirmative relief, that the Respondent offer him immediate and full
reinstatement to his former or substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to
his seniority or other rights and privileges previously enjoyed by him, discharging, if
necessary, any new employee hired subsequent to the date of his discharge in order to
replace him. I also recommend that the Respondent make whole the said Aurelio
Marquez Burgos for any loss of pay he may have suffered by reason of his discrimi-
natory discharge by payment to him of a sum of money equal to the amount which he
would normally have earned as wages from the date of his discharge to the date of the
Respondent's offer of reinstatement less his net earnings during the said period. The
amount of backpay is to be determined in accordance with the formula prescribed in
F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, and interest is to be computed on the
amount so determined in accordance with Isis Plumbing & Heating Co, 138 NLRB
716.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent, Caribe General Electric, Inc., and General Electric Switchgear,
Inc., are employers engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO and
Union de Empleados de la General Electric, Inc., en Palmer are labor organizations
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By reminding their employees of past benefits and by warning them at the same
time that if they selected a union to represent them they would lose much; by promis-
ing their employees wage increases; and by granting their employees wage increases
and other benefits in order to thwart their self-organization the Respondent committed
unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) of
the Act.
4. By discriminating with respect to the tenure of employment of Aurelio Marquez
Burgos, the Respondent has committed an unfair labor practice affecting commerce
within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (3) and (1) of the Act.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and upon
the entire record in the case, I recommend that the Respondent, Caribe General
Electric, Inc., and General Electric Switchgear, Inc., their officers, agents, successors,
and assigns , shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Reminding their employees of past benefits and warning them at the same time,
either in so many words or in effect, that if they select a union to represent them they
would lose much.
(b) Promising their employees wage increases, or granting their employees wage
increases or other benefits in order to thwart their self-organization.
13 Although the checks were payable to Marquez they were transmitted through the
Respondent.
1560 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
(c) Discouraging membership in International Union of Electrical , Radio and
Machine Workers, AFL-CIO, or in Union de Empleados de la General Electric, Inc,
en Palmer, or in any other labor organization of their employees , by discharging, or in
any other manner discriminating against employees with respect to their hire or
tenure of employment or any term or condition of their employment.
(d) In any other manner interfering with, restraining , or coercing their employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action in order to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer to Aurelio Marquez Burgos immediate and full reinstatement to his
former or substantially equivalent position without prejudice to his seniority or other
rights and privileges and make him whole for any loss of pay he may have suffered
by reason of the Respondents ' discrimination against him in the manner and to the
extent set forth in section IV of this Decision entitled "The Remedy." 14
(b) Upon request make available to the Board and its agents for examination and
copying all payroll records and other data necessary to give effect to the backpay
requirement.
(c) Post at their plant in Palmer, Puerto Rico, copies of the attached notice
marked "Appendix ." 15 Copies of said notice , to be furnished by the Regional
Director for Region 24,. after being duly signed by authorized representatives of the
Respondents , shall be posted by them immediately on receipt thereof, and maintained
by them for a period of 60 consecutive days thereafter , in conspicuous places, including
all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall
be taken by the Respondents to insure that said notices are not altered , defaced, or
covered by any other material
(d) Notify the Regional Director of Region 24, in writing, within 20 days from
receipt thereof ,16 what steps they have taken to comply with the foregoing provisions.
14 As the discriininatee in this case is shown by the recoid to be the father of grown
children and very probably is a giandfather , I ani not including the Armed Forces
provision
151n the event that this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board , the words "a
Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a
Trial Examiner " in the notice In the further event that the Board ' s Order be enforced by
a decree of a United States Court of Appeals , the words "a Decree of the United States
Court of Appeals , Enforcing an Order " shall be substituted for the words "a Decision
and Order "
11 In the event that this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board , this provision
shall be modified to read "Notify said Regional Director for Region 24, in writing, within
10 days from the date of this Order , what steps the Respondents have taken to comply
herewith "
APPENDIX
To ALL OUR EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Decision and Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the
National Labor Relations Board and in order to bring our actions in line with the
policies of the National Labor Relations Act, we hereby notify you that:
WE WILL NOT remind our employees of past benefits and warn them at the
same time, either in so many words or in effect, that if they select a union to
represent them they would lose much.
WE WILL NOT promise our employees wage increases or grant our employees
wage increases or other benefits in order to thwart their self-organization.
WE WILL NOT discourage membership in International Union of Electrical,
Radio and Machine Workers , AFL-CIO, or in Union de Empleados de la General
Electric, Inc., en Palmer, or in any other labor organization of our employees,
by discharging or in any other manner discriminating against employees with
respect to their hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of their
employment
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain , or coerce our
employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization , to form labor organi-
zations, to join or assist the above-named labor organizations , or any other labor
organization , to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choos-
THE 1 LINTKO 'rE, COMPANY 1561
ing, and to engage in any other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any or all such
activities.
WE WILL offer to Aurelio Marquez Burgos immediate reinstatement to his
former or substantially equivalent position without prejudice to his seniority or
other rights and privileges and make him whole for any loss of pay he may have
suffered by reason of our discrimination against him.
All our employees are free to become, remain, or refrain from becoming or remain-
ing, members of any labor organization, except to the extent that such right may be
affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition
of employment, as authorized by Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act.
CARIBE GENERAL EELCTRIC, INC., AND
GENERAL ELECTRIC SWITCHGEAR, INC.,
Employers.
Dated------------------- By--------------------------------------------
(President)
Dated------------------- By-------------------------------------------
(President)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting,
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
Any employees having a question concerning the meaning of the above notice or
concerning compliance with its requirements may inquire by mail, telephone, or in
person at the Board's Regional Office, 1506 Ponce de Leon Avenue, Santurce, Puerto
Rico, Telephone No. 724-7171.
The Flintkote Company and International Woodworkers of
America, AFL-CIO, Local 5-50. Case No. 15-CA-2281. Decem-
ber 10, 1964
DECISION AND ORDER
On March 10, 1964, Trial Examiner Thomas F. Maher issued his
Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respond-
ent had not engaged in the unfair labor practices alleged in the com-
plaint and recommending that the complaint be dismissed in its
entirety, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision.
Thereafter, the General Counsel filed exceptions to the Trial Exam-
iner's Decision and a supporting brief, and the Respondent filed a
brief in support of the Trial Examiner's Decision.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor
Relations Act, the Board has delegated its powers in connection with
this case to a three-member panel [Members Leedom, Brown, and
Jenkins].
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at
the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record
in this case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mendations of the Trial Examiner to the extent consistent herewith.
149 NLRB No. 136.