Capital One Services, LLC

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Nov 6, 2020

2020002222 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 6, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
16/119,040 08/31/2018 Ana PALAGHITA 0104-0175 8008
122571 7590 11/06/2020
Harrity & Harrity, LLP
11350 Random Hills Road Suite 600
Fairfax, VA 22030
EXAMINER
SHAIKH, MOHAMMAD Z
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3694
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
11/06/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docket@harrityllp.com
mpick@harrityllp.com
ptomail@harrityllp.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte ANA PALAGHITA, VINEET GOYAL, MEGAN EDDS,
BREKAN KOHLITZ, PHILIP HERTZLER, WILLIAM C. MOUNTJOY,
MARY WOLFE, and JASON FERRELL
____________

Appeal 2020-002222
Application 16/119,040
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before JAMES P. CALVE, NINA L. MEDLOCK, and
TARA L. HUTCHINGS, Administrative Patent Judges.

MEDLOCK, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

Appeal 2020-002222
Application 16/119,040
2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
final rejection of claims 1–20. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
CLAIMED INVENTION
The claimed invention generally relates to a method for implementing
a debt resolution plan for a delinquent account (Spec. ¶ 2).
Claims 1, 9, and 16 are the independent claims on appeal. Claim 1,
reproduced below with bracketed notations added, is illustrative of the
claimed subject matter:
1. A method, comprising:
[(a)] receiving, by a device, a request for information
regarding a debt resolution plan available for a delinquent
account,
wherein the request includes: first input indicating a
payment amount, a second input indicating a payment
frequency, and a third input indicating a payment start
date;
[(b)] obtaining, by the device, account data associated
with the delinquent account;
[(c)] determining, by the device and using a first machine
learning model, a score for the delinquent account based on the
first input, the second input, the third input, and the account data,
wherein the first machine learning model is trained
to receive the first input, the second input, the third input,
and the account data and produce, as output, the score, and

1 We use the term “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42. Our decision references Appellant’s Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.,”
filed October 25, 2019) and Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed January 27,
2020), and the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed November 29, 2019),
Advisory Action (“Adv. Act,” mailed August 1, 2019), and Final Office
Action (“Final Act.,” mailed May 30, 2019). Appellant identifies
Capital One Services, LLC as the real party in interest (Appeal Br. 3).
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wherein the score predicts an ability to convert the
delinquent account from a delinquent status to a current
status;
[(d)] determining, by the device and using a second
machine learning model, a plurality of debt resolution plan
parameters, for at least a first debt resolution plan and a second
debt resolution plan, based on the score,
wherein the second machine learning model is
trained, based on historical account data, to receive at least
a portion of the account data as input and produce, as
output, the plurality of debt resolution plan parameters,
and
wherein the plurality of debt resolution plan
parameters includes at least:
a first parameter indicating a repayment amount,
a second parameter indicating a repayment
frequency, and
a third parameter indicating a repayment start date;
[(e)] transmitting, by the device, the plurality of debt
resolution plan parameters associated with the first debt
resolution plan and the second debt resolution plan;
[(f)] receiving, by the device, an enrollment request
based on transmitting the plurality of debt resolution plan
parameters;
[(g)] enrolling, by the device, the delinquent account in a
selected debt resolution plan based on receiving the enrollment
request; and
[(h)] causing, by the device, an action to be performed
based on enrolling the delinquent account in the selected debt
resolution plan.
REJECTION
Claims 1–20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to a
judicial exception without significantly more.
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ANALYSIS
Appellant argues the pending claims as a group (Appeal Br. 9–23).
We select independent claim 1 as representative. The remaining claims
stand or fall with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. §41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, a claim is patent eligible if it claims a “new
and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.”
35 U.S.C. § 101. The Supreme Court, however, has long interpreted § 101
to include an implicit exception: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas” are not patentable. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S.
208, 216 (2014).
The Supreme Court, in Alice, reiterated the two-step framework
previously set forth in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus
Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012), “for distinguishing patents that claim
laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim
patent-eligible applications of those concepts.” Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 217.
The first step in that analysis is to “determine whether the claims at issue are
directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts.” Id. If the claims are not
directed to a patent-ineligible concept, e.g., an abstract idea, the inquiry
ends. Otherwise, the inquiry proceeds to the second step where the elements
of the claims are considered “individually and ‘as an ordered combination’”
to determine whether there are additional elements that “‘transform the
nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” Id. (quoting Mayo,
566 U.S. at 79, 78). This is “a search for an ‘inventive concept’ — i.e., an
element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the
patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the
[ineligible concept] itself.’” Id. at 217–18 (alteration in original).
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The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (the “USPTO”) published
revised guidance on January 7, 2019 for use by USPTO personnel in
evaluating subject matter eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101. 2019 REVISED
PATENT SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY GUIDANCE, 84 Fed. Reg. 50, 57
(Jan. 7, 2019) (the “2019 Revised Guidance”).2 That guidance revised the
USPTO’s examination procedure with respect to the first step of the
Mayo/Alice framework by (1) “[p]roviding groupings of subject matter that
[are] considered an abstract idea”; and (2) clarifying that a claim is not
“directed to” a judicial exception if the judicial exception is integrated into a
practical application of that exception. Id. at 50.
The first step, as set forth in the 2019 Revised Guidance (i.e.,
Step 2A), is, thus, a two-prong test. In Step 2A, Prong One, we look to
whether the claim recites a judicial exception, e.g., one of the following
three groupings of abstract ideas: (1) mathematical concepts; (2) certain
methods of organizing human activity, e.g., fundamental economic
principles or practices, commercial or legal interactions; and (3) mental
processes. 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. If so, we next
determine, in Step 2A, Prong Two, whether the claim as a whole integrates
the recited judicial exception into a practical application, i.e., whether the
additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, apply,
rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful
limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting
effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception. Id. at 54–55. Only if

2 The USPTO issued an update on October 17, 2019 (the “October 2019
Update: Subject Matter Eligibility,” available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.pdf) clarifying the
2019 Revised Guidance in response to public comments.
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the claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that
exception into a practical application do we conclude that the claim is
“directed to” the judicial exception, e.g., an abstract idea. Id.
If the claim is determined to be directed to a judicial exception under
revised Step 2A, we next evaluate the additional elements, individually and
in combination, in Step 2B, to determine whether they provide an inventive
concept, i.e., whether the additional elements or combination of elements
amounts to significantly more than the judicial exception itself; only then, is
the claim patent eligible. 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
Here, in rejecting the pending claims under § 101, the Examiner
determined that independent claims 1, 9, and 16 recite “a fundamental
economic practice (mitigating transaction risk), specifically providing a debt
resolution plan to a user who has a delinquent account” and, therefore, an
abstract idea, and that the recited abstract idea, is not integrated into a
practical application (Final Act. 13–16; see also Adv. Act. 2–4). The
Examiner also determined that the claims 1, 9, and 16 do not include
additional elements sufficient to amount to significantly more than the
abstract idea itself (Final Act. 16–17). And the Examiner determined that
dependent claims 2–8, 10–15, and 17–20 are patent ineligible for
substantially similar reasons (id. at 17).
Step One of the Mayo/Alice Framework (2019 Revised Guidance, Step 2A)
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that the Examiner
erred in determining that claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea (Appeal
Br. 10–20). The Federal Circuit has explained that “the ‘directed to’ inquiry
applies a stage-one filter to claims, considered in light of the specification,
based on whether ‘their character as a whole is directed to excluded subject
matter.’” Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir.
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2016) (quoting Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d
1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). It asks whether the focus of the claims is on a
specific improvement in relevant technology or on a process that itself
qualifies as an “abstract idea” for which computers are invoked merely as a
tool. See id. at 1335–36. Here, it clear from the Specification (including the
claim language) that claim 1 focuses on an abstract idea and not on any
improvement to technology or a technical field.
The Specification is titled “DEBT RESOLUTION PLANNING
PLATFORM,” and describes, in the Background section, that implementing
a debt management plan typically entails generating a formal agreement
between a user, a third-party credit counseling firm acting as an intermediary
on the user’s behalf, and one or more creditors (Spec. ¶ 1). During
formation of the debt management plan, the third-party credit counseling
firm and the one or more creditors may establish a payment amount and a
payment schedule, which are presented to the user for acceptance; upon
acceptance, the user agrees to make payments to the third-party credit
counseling firm, which then allocates the payments among the one or more
creditors (id.).
The Specification describes that because existing debt management
plans include terms set by third-party credit counseling firms and creditors,
these plans “lack insight, intelligence, and/or user input” and also “lack
efficiency in terms of planning, enrolling, and/or allocating payments”
(Spec. ¶ 13). For example, according to the Specification, a user often must
endure an undue wait time and incur unnecessary fees, before enrolling in a
debt management plan, to allow the third-party credit counseling firm time
to negotiate a payment, an interest rate, and/or a payment schedule with a
creditor; payments to a creditor also may be delayed, inasmuch as the user
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Application 16/119,040
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must make payments directly to the third-party credit counseling firm, and
then wait for the third-party credit counseling firm to disburse the payments
to the creditor (id.).
The claimed invention is intended to improve on these existing
practices by providing an interactive debt resolution planning platform,
which “obtains user inputs, obtains data for a user account, simulates future
behavior associated with the user account, and intelligently matches the user
and/or the user account to a plurality of debt resolution plans that the user
may review and optionally enroll in” (Spec. ¶ 14). Claim 1, thus, recites a
method comprising: (1) receiving a user request for information regarding a
debt resolution plan available for a delinquent account, i.e., “receiving, by a
device, a request for information regarding a debt resolution plan available
for a delinquent account, wherein the request includes: first input indicating
a payment amount, a second input indicating a payment frequency, and a
third input indicating a payment start date” (step (a)); (2) obtaining account
data associated with the delinquent account and determining a score that
predicts the ability to convert the delinquent account from a delinquent
status to a current status, i.e.,
obtaining, by the device, account data associated with the
delinquent account;
determining, by the device and using a first machine
learning model, a score for the delinquent account based on the
first input, the second input, the third input, and the account data,
wherein the first machine learning model is trained
to receive the first input, the second input, the third input,
and the account data and produce, as output, the score, and
wherein the score predicts an ability to convert the
delinquent account from a delinquent status to a current
status
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Application 16/119,040
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(steps (b) and (c)); (3) determining a first debt resolution plan and a second
debt resolution plan based on the score, and transmitting, to the user,
repayment amounts, repayment frequencies, and repayment start dates
associated with the first and second debt resolution plans, i.e.,
determining, by the device and using a second machine
learning model, a plurality of debt resolution plan parameters, for
at least a first debt resolution plan and a second debt resolution
plan, based on the score,
wherein the second machine learning model is
trained, based on historical account data, to receive at least
a portion of the account data as input and produce, as
output, the plurality of debt resolution plan parameters,
and
wherein the plurality of debt resolution plan
parameters includes at least:
a first parameter indicating a repayment amount,
a second parameter indicating a repayment
frequency, and
a third parameter indicating a repayment start date;
[and]
transmitting, by the device, the plurality of debt resolution
plan parameters associated with the first debt resolution plan and
the second debt resolution plan
(steps (d) and (e)); (4) receiving an enrollment request and enrolling the
delinquent account in a selected debt resolution plan, i.e., “receiving, by the
device, an enrollment request based on transmitting the plurality of debt
resolution plan parameters” and “enrolling, by the device, the delinquent
account in a selected debt resolution plan based on receiving the enrollment
request” (steps (f) and (g)); and (5) “causing, by the device, an action to be
performed based on enrolling the delinquent account in the selected debt
resolution plan” (step (h)).
Appellant argues that independent claim 1 is not directed to an
abstract idea at least because the claim does not recite subject matter that
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falls within one of the enumerated groupings of abstract ideas (Appeal
Br. 10–12). Appellant asserts although claim 1 recites features related to
“enrolling, by the device, the delinquent account in a selected debt resolution
plan,” claim 1 “does not recite the fundamental economic practice of
mitigating transaction risk” (id. at 11). Appellant maintains that this is so “at
least because representative claim 1 recites a variety of non-fundamental
features designed to apply machine learning models to take action regarding
a debt resolution plan” (id.).
Even accepting Appellant’s argument that claim 1 does not recite a
fundamental economic practice, by Appellant’s own admission, claim 1
recites enrolling a delinquent account in a debt resolution plan, which is a
commercial interaction, i.e., a method of organizing human activity and,
therefore, an abstract idea. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52.
We also are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments that claim 1
integrates the recited abstract idea into a practical application (Appeal
Br. 13–20).3

3 The 2019 Revised Guidance references MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE, Ninth Edition (rev. Jan 2018) (available at
https://mpep.uspto.gov/RDMS/MPEP/E9_R-08.2017.) § 2106.05(a)–(c) and
(e) in non-exhaustively listing considerations indicative that an additional
element or combination of elements may have integrated the recited judicial
exception into a practical application. 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg.
at 55. For example, an additional element may have integrated the judicial
exception into a practice application if the additional element (1) reflects an
improvement in the functioning of a computer or an improvement to other
technology or technical field; (2) implements the judicial exception with, or
uses the judicial exception with, a particular machine or manufacture
integral to the claim; or (3) effects a transformation or reduction of an article
to a different state or thing. Id. However, merely using a computer to
perform an abstract idea, adding insignificant extra-solution activity, or only
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Appellant notes that one example indicating integration of a judicial
exception into a practical application is that “an additional element applies
or uses the judicial exception in some other meaningful way beyond
generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular
technological environment, such that the claim as a whole is more than a
drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception” (Appeal Br. 13–14).
Specifically referencing steps (c) and (d), as recited in claim 1, Appellant
argues that these “additional elements apply or use the alleged judicial
exception, ‘mitigating transaction risk,’ in a meaningful way, beyond
generally linking ‘mitigating transaction risk’ to a particular technological
environment” (id. at 14). Yet, that argument is not persuasive at least
because “determining . . . a score for the delinquent account” and
“determining . . . a plurality of debt resolution plan parameters,” as recited in
steps (c) and (d), are not “additional elements”; instead, these steps are part
of the abstract idea itself.
Claim 1 recites that steps (c) and (d) are performed “using a first
machine learning model” (step (c)) and “using a second machine learning
model” (step (d)). But, as the Examiner observes, the machine learning
models are recited at a high level of generality and similarly described in
generic terms in Appellant’s Specification (see Ans. 11 (citing Spec. ¶¶ 38,
53)). We find no indication in the Specification, nor does Appellant direct
us to any indication, that the claimed use of machine learning models
involves anything other than the application of a known technique in its
normal, routine, and ordinary capacity.

generally linking to a particular technological environment or field are not
sufficient for a practical application. Id.
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We also note for the record, to the extent Appellant maintains claim 1
is patent eligible because it “recites a variety of specific features” (Appeal
Br. 17–18), that a specific abstract idea is still an abstract idea. Mayo,
566 U.S. at 88–89 (noting that “cases have not distinguished among different
laws of nature according to whether or not the principles they embody are
sufficiently narrow”) (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978) (holding
narrow mathematical formula unpatentable)).
Appellant also misapprehends the controlling precedent to the extent
Appellant maintains that claim 1 is patent eligible because there is no risk of
preemption (Appeal Br. 15–16 (arguing that the “‘practical application’
integrated within representative claim 1 would also be a meaningful limit at
least because representative claim 1 would not monopolize taking action
with respect to delinquent accounts and debt resolution plans in a manner
that does not involve” performing steps (c) through (h), as recited in
claim 1)). Although the Supreme Court has described “the concern that
drives [the exclusion of abstract ideas from patent-eligible subject matter] as
one of pre-emption,” Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 216, characterizing
preemption as a driving concern for patent eligibility is not the same as
characterizing preemption as the sole test for patent eligibility. “The
Supreme Court has made clear that the principle of preemption is the basis
for the judicial exceptions to patentability” and “[f]or this reason, questions
on preemption are inherent in and resolved by the § 101 analysis.” Ariosa
Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(citing Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 216). “[P]reemption may signal patent
ineligible subject matter, [but] the absence of complete preemption does not
demonstrate patent eligibility.” Id.
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Appellant’s further argument that claim 1 “reflect[s] an improvement
in the functioning of a computer, or an improvement to other technology or
technical field” is similarly unavailing (App. Br. 18–20). Citing
paragraphs 15 and 16 of Appellant’s Specification, Appellant argues that the
“first machine learning model” recited in claim 1 reflects an improvement
that “‘conserves computing resources . . . that would otherwise be wasted in
attempting to negotiate and enroll a user in a debt management plan that may
ultimately fail, due to a lack of intelligence, insight, and/or the like’” by
“determining a score that ‘predicts an ability to convert the delinquent
account from a delinquent status to a current status,’ as described in
paragraph [0015]” and that the use of the “second machine learning model”
further reflects an improvement that “‘conserves computing resources
associated with a creditor’ and ‘a user device,’ as described in
paragraph [0016], by determining the ‘plurality of debt resolution plan
parameters’ which are used to enroll a delinquent account in a debt
resolution plan” (id. at 19–20). Yet, this, at best, establishes that the claimed
invention provides an improved method for determining suitable debt
resolution plans and enrolling a delinquent account in a debt resolution plan,
i.e., an improved abstract idea, which is not enough for patent eligibility.
See SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1170 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
(“[P]atent law does not protect such claims[, i.e., claims to an asserted
advance in the realm of abstract ideas], without more, no matter how
groundbreaking the advance.”).
We conclude, for the reasons outlined above, that claim 1 recites a
method of organizing human activity, i.e., an abstract idea, and that the
additional elements recited in the claim, i.e., a “device”; “a first learning
model”; and “a second learning model,” are no more than generic computer
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components and known techniques and/or algorithms used as tools to
perform the recited abstract idea (see, e.g., Spec. ¶¶ 3, 64, 66 (disclosing that
“a device may include one or more memories, and one or more processors,
communicatively coupled to the one or more memories” and generally
describing that the user device and debt resolution platform may be
implemented using devices, such as a laptop computer, tablet computer,
handheld computer); id. ¶¶ 30, 37, 38 (generally describes that “the
simulating module of the debt resolution planning platform may simulate the
user account behavior using a model (e.g., a first model), such as an account
simulating model or algorithm”; that “one or more debt resolution plan
parameters” may be determined “using a model (e.g., a second model), such
as intelligent plan determining and matching model or algorithm”; and that
“the debt resolution planning platform may use a machine learning
technique to generate the debt resolution plan parameters using the model”).
As such, they do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application.
See Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 223–24 (“[W]holly generic computer
implementation is not generally the sort of ‘additional featur[e]’ that
provides any ‘practical assurance that the process is more than a drafting
effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea] itself.’” (quoting Mayo,
566 U.S. at 77)). Accordingly, we agree with the Examiner that claim 1 is
directed to an abstract idea.
Step Two of the Mayo/Alice Framework (2019 Revised Guidance, Step 2B)
Having determined under step one of the Mayo/Alice framework that
claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea, we next consider under Step 2B of the
2019 Revised Guidance, the second step of the Mayo/Alice framework,
whether claim 1 includes additional elements or a combination of elements
that provides an “inventive concept,” i.e., whether an additional element or
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combination of elements adds specific limitations beyond the judicial
exception that are not “well-understood, routine, conventional activity” in
the field (which is indicative that an inventive concept is present) or simply
appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known
to the industry to the judicial exception. 2019 Revised Guidance,
84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
Appellant argues that the present rejection cannot be sustained
because claim 1 recites features, i.e., steps (c) and (d), other than features
that are well-understood, routine, and conventional in the field (Appeal
Br. 21–22). But, that argument is not persuasive at least because the
limitations that Appellant identifies, i.e., steps (c) and (d), are part of the
abstract idea; they are not additional elements to be considered in
determining whether claim 1 includes additional elements or a combination
of elements sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial
exception.
It could not be clearer from Alice, that under step two of the
Mayo/Alice framework, the elements of each claim are considered both
individually and “as an ordered combination” to determine whether the
additional elements, i.e., the elements other than the abstract idea itself,
“transform the nature of the claim” into a patent-eligible application. Alice
Corp., 573 U.S. at 217 (citation omitted); see Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–73
(requiring that “a process that focuses upon the use of a natural law also
contain other elements or a combination of elements, sometimes referred to
as an ‘inventive concept,’ sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice
amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the natural law itself”
(emphasis added) (citation omitted)). In other words, the inventive concept
under step two of the Mayo/Alice test cannot be the abstract idea itself:
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It is clear from Mayo that the “inventive concept” cannot be the
abstract idea itself, and Berkheimer . . . leave[s] untouched the
numerous cases from this court which have held claims ineligible
because the only alleged “inventive concept” is the abstract idea.
Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 890 F.3d 1369, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (Moore, J.,
concurring); see also BSG Tech LLC v. BuySeasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281,
1290 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“It has been clear since Alice that a claimed
invention’s use of the ineligible concept to which it is directed cannot supply
the inventive concept that renders the invention ‘significantly more’ than
that ineligible concept.”).
Here, the Examiner determined and we agree, that the only additional
elements recited in claim 1 beyond the abstract idea are a “device”; “a first
learning model”; and “a second learning model,” i.e., generic computer
components and known techniques and/or algorithms used as tools to
perform the recited abstract idea — a determination amply supported by and
fully consistent with the Specification (see, e.g., Spec. ¶¶ 3, 30, 37, 38, 64,
66). Appellant cannot reasonably maintain that there is insufficient factual
support for the Examiner’s determination that the operation of these
components is well-understood, routine, or conventional, where, as here,
there is nothing in the Specification to indicate that the operations recited in
claim 1 require any specialized hardware or inventive computer components,
invoke any allegedly inventive programming, or that the claimed invention
is implemented using other than generic computer components to perform
generic computer functions and other than known techniques and/or
algorithms for their conventional purpose. See Berkheimer v. HP Inc.,
890 F.3d 1369, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (Moore, J., concurring) (noting that
the Federal Circuit, in accordance with Alice, has “repeatedly recognized the
absence of a genuine dispute as to eligibility” where claims have been
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defended as involving an inventive concept based “merely on the idea of
using existing computers or the Internet to carry out conventional processes,
with no alteration of computer functionality”) (internal citations omitted);
see also BSG Tech LLC, 899 F.3d at 1291 (“BSG Tech does not argue that
other, non-abstract features of the claimed inventions, alone or in
combination, are not well-understood, routine and conventional database
structures and activities. Accordingly, the district court did not err in
determining that the asserted claims lack an inventive concept.”).
We are not persuaded, on the present record, that the Examiner erred
in rejecting independent claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Therefore, we
sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1, and claims 2–20, which fall with
claim 1.
CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–20 101 Eligibility 1–20
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED