Cantor Bros., Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board DecisionsMar 6, 1974

209 N.L.R.B. 433 (N.L.R.B. 1974)

CANTOR BROS., INC. Cantor Bros., Inc. and Automotive and Allied Indus- tries Employees of San Diego County, Local Union No. 481 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs , Warehousemen and Help- ers of America . Case 21-CA-11968 March 6, 1974 DECISION AND ORDER By CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS JENKINS AND KENNEDY On November 21, 1973, Administrative Law Judge Jerrold H. Shapiro issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter. Respondent filed excep- tions and a supporting brief, and the General Counsel filed an answering brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the attached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order.' ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend- ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby orders that Cantor Bros., Inc., San Diego, California, its officers, agents, successors, and as- signs, shall take the action set forth in the said recommended Order. 1 The Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the Administrative Law Judge . It is the Board's established policy not to overrule an Administrative Law Judge's resolutions with respect to credibihty unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us that the resolutions are incorrect . Standard Div Wall Products, Inc; 91 NLRB 544, enfd 188 F.2d 362 (C A 3) We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE. CASE JERROLD H. SHAPIRO, Administrative Law Judge: The hearing in this case held on November 6, 1973,1 based upon charges filed by the Automotive and Allied Indus- tries Employees of San Diego County, Local Union No. 481 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, on July 19 and a complaint issued on September 7, on behalf of the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, herein called the Board, by the Regional Director 433 of the Board, Region 21, alleging that Cantor Bros., Inc., herein called the Respondent, has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act, herein called the Act. The Respondent filed an answer denying the commission of the alleged unfair labor practices. Upon the entire record and from my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT Respondent, Cantor Bros., Inc., is a corporation located in San Diego, California, where it manufactures and distributes recapped automobile and truck tires and related products. Its annual gross revenue is in excess of $500,000 and it annually purchases goods valued in excess of $50,000 directly from suppliers located outside of Califor- nia. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED Automotive and Allied Industries Employees of San Diego County, Local Union No. 481 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, herein called the Union, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE QUESTION PRESENTED The ultimate question presented in this proceeding is the motive of the Respondent in discharging Manuel Cerecero. The General Counsel contends that the discharge was motivated by reason of Cerecero's union activities and sympathies. Respondent urges that the discharge was motivated by bona fide business considerations. IV. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Background In about 1950, the Respondent recognized the Union as its employees' collective-bargaining representative. Since that time, the Respondent and the Union have been parties to successive collective-bargaining agreements, the last of which expired on July 31, 1972. Negotiations for a new contract began in June 1972. The Respondent was represented at the negotiations by Bernard Sosna, its vice president and secretary. An impasse in negotiations was reached, and on August 2, 1972, the Union supported by about 26 employees struck the Respondent. On or about September 28, 1972, the Respondent refused to continue to meet and bargain with the Union for the reason that it questioned the Union's majority status. In response, the Union filed unfair labor practice charges alleging that the Respondent by its conduct had violated the Act. The Board's General Counsel issued a complaint, and the Board, after a hearing, on May 21 issued a Decision and Order concluding that the Respondent, 1 All dates, unless otherwise specified , refer to 1973 209 NLRB No. 81 434 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD acting through its vice president, Bernard Sosna, violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act by soliciting striking employees to abandon the strike and the Union, thereby undermining the Union, and by withdrawing recognition from the Union and refusing to bargain with it on and after September 28, 1972.2 Manuel Cerecero, the alleged discnminatee, was a unit employee employed as a molderman since October 1971. On or about July 31, 1972, Cerecero, with five other unit employees, left work for about 2-1/2 hours to attend a union ratification meeting. The next day the six employees were discharged by Sosna. According to the undenied and credible testimony of Cerecero, on or about August 1, using Foreman Jesus Ledesma as an interpreter,3 Sosna asked the six employees why they had left work the previous day. The employees, through Ledesma, replied that at the request of the Union, they had attended a union meeting. Sosna informed them they were discharged. The Union protested the discharge by filing a grievance against the Respondent pursuant to the contractual grievance arbitration procedure. The grievance was heard by an arbitrator who, on February 22, issued his "Findings and Award." The arbitrator set aside the discharge, finding it "was not for cause within the meaning of the collective bargaining agreement." Cerecero actively supported the Union during the strike. Until reinstated, as described below, he picketed the Respondent's premises carrying a sign protesting the Respondent's refusal to bargain with the Union. Respon- dent's officials observed him on the picket line and it is undisputed that the Respondent believed he was a union adherent. On or about April 2 at the request of Sosna, Cerecero reported to the company's office. Foreman Gilberto Sanchez acted as an interpreter, and Sosna offered to reinstate Cerecero. Cerecero's reemployment, however, was conditioned upon his repudiation of the Union. Sosna told him that he was being reinstated, as Cerecero credibly testified, "with the conditions that I would not be in anymore Union." Cerecero, in substance, answered that he had a right to belong to the Union. Sosna did not pursue the matter. He told Cerecero to report for work the next day.4 B. The Discharge of Manuel Cerecero Cerecero returned to work on April 3 and was employed continuously until his discharge on July 17. During his first period of employment, October 1971 to July 31, 1972, Cerecero worked as a molderman on automobile tires. On April 3 he was reinstated to the same 2 Cantor Bros, Inc, 203 NLRB No 116. 3 A number of the Respondent 's employees, including Cerecero, speak Spanish and have only a limited understanding of English On the other hand , Sosna speaks only English 4 Sosna did not give his version of this conversation but simply denied having a conversation with Cerecero on or about April 3 on the subject of not engaging in union activities if he was reinstated I do not credit his dental . In bearing and demeanor Cerecero impressed me as more reliable and trustworthy than Sosna Also, the Respondent, for an unexplained reason did not call Foreman Sanchez to refute Cerecero's testimony that Sanchez acted as an interpreter and that Sosna conditioned Cerecero's reemployment upon his repudiation of the Union I presume, in these job classification but was assigned to mold truck tires. One month before his discharge he was reassigned to automo- bile tires. It is undisputed, however, that for a penod of about 15 days immediately before his discharge Cerecero was not doing the work of a molderman. Along with employee Ramos, he spent almost all of his working time salvaging tires which had been damaged by a fire on the Company' s premises. On Monday, July 16, Cerecero was absent from work. On Tuesday, July 17, Cerecero was warned by employee Ramos that it looked like he was going to be discharged. Cerecero, who has only a limited command and under- standing of English, sought out a bilingual employee, Ernesto Tanabe, and asked him as a favor to go with Cerecero to the Company's office where, using Tanabe as an interpreter, Cerecero spoke to Sosna. Cerecero asked whether the Company intended to discharge him. Sosna replied in the affirmative, spoke to a secretary, and told Cerecero that his final paycheck was ready. Cerecero asked for the reason he was discharged. Sosna, in response, asked why he had been absent from work on "many Mondays." Cerecero explained that he was absent because he had gone to the doctor. When Sosna indicated that he thought the absences had been caused by a hangover, Cerecero offered to prove that he had gone to the doctor by showing Sosna certain papers. Also, Cerecero gave the location of the doctor's office. Sosna stated he was not interested in looking at the papers which would prove that Cerecero was telling the truth, and changed the subject from absenteeism to work performance. Sosna asked why Cerecero was working so slow and stated that the foreman had spoken to Cerecero about this matter. Cerecero denied that he was working slow, stating that throughout his employment his speed had remained the same and pointed out that for the past several days he had not been doing his normal work but had been salvaging burned tires. At this point Sosna terminated the conversation by handing Cerecero his final check, stating that he hoped things went well with Cerecero, but at the same time commenting that Cerecero thought too much about the Union.5 At the hearing, the Respondent, through its attorney, stated that "the reason [for Cerecero's discharge] is both poor performance and a pattern of Monday and Friday absenteeism" Sosna, the person who decided to discharge Cerecero, testified he discharged Cerecero for the reason "he was not performing his duties properly. He was extremely slow as if deliberately, and in addition to that he was consistently absent or tardy", and testified that the incident that tnggered the discharge was the fact that Cerecero was absent without permission on July 16. I shall circumstances, that Sanchez' testimony would have been unfavorable to the Respondent. 5 The discharge interview described above is based upon Cerecero's credible testimony which was given with conviction and in a straightforward manner . Sosna testified that he spoke to Cerecero , in English , without an interpreter and that , in substance , told him he was discharged because he was not performing his duties and that despite a prior warning , had been absent without notifying the company Cerecero, according to Sosna, did not protest but simply said "okay or thank you " I do not believe Sosna. Cerecero impressed me in bearing and demeanor as the more honest witness CANTOR BROS., INC. now examine the reasons advanced by the Respondent to justify its decision to discharge Cerecero. C. The Reasons Advanced by the Respondent for Discharging Manuel Cerecero During the 15 weeks from his reinstatement to his discharge, the record establishes that Cerecero was absent or tardy on the following occasions. On Friday, May 11, without notifying anyone in the Company, he left work about 1/2 to 1 1/2 hours before quitting time. On Monday, June 18, and Monday, July 16, he was absent from work without notifying anyone. And, on Wednesday, June 25, he punched in late and after working about I hour punched out for the rest of the day without permission .6 Cerecero credibly testified that his absence on Monday, June 18, and Monday, July 16, were caused by illnesses necessitating doctor's appointments, and further credibly testified that the only time anyone complained or voiced dissatisfaction to him about his absenteeism was when Sosna, as described above, notified him he was discharged. Prior to this, no one from the Company, including Sosna, had voiced dissatisfaction to Cerecero about his absences.? Based on the foregoing, I find that Cerecero was not, as contended by the Respondent, "consistently absent or tardy," nor does the record establish "a pattern of Monday and Friday absenteeism." I further find that the failure of the Respondent to warn or criticize Cerecero about his absenteeism prior to his discharge indicates that the Respondent was not disturbed by his record of absentee- ism or the fact that he did not notify the Company about his absences. Regarding Cerecero's work performance, Sosna testified his work as a molderman on truck tires was unsatisfactory, the supervisory personnel unsuccessfully tried to train him to do this type of work, and that since he was unable to satisfactorily perform this work he was reassigned to his old job, molderman on automobile tires. Cerecero's performance on automobile tires, according to Sosna, was unsatisfactory inasmuch as he was "extremely slow and careless," not because of a lack of ability, but it seemed to Sosna, that he was deliberately engaging in this type of work. Jesus Ledesma, the department foreman, Sosna testified, on several occasions warned Cerecero about his unsatisfactory work and subsequently notified Sosna that he, Ledesma, did not believe Cerecero was going to work out, whereupon Sosna personally told Cerecero he had to work faster and do a better job. Cerecero said he would do the best he could, but Sosna testified "[Cerecero] contin- ued to do sloppy work and continued to not show up." Sosna, as I have previously observed, in bearing and demeanor, was not a convincing witness. In addition, his testimony about Cerecero's work performance was general and vague and wholly without corroboration on matters 6 Cerecero admittedly did not notify the Company of his absence on July 16 and had no recollection of whether he gave such notice on June 18 He did not testify about leaving work early on May I 1 and June 25 In general, his testimony on the subject of whether he notified the Company about his absences or lateness was confusing and inconsistent In these circumstances, as Sosna testified , I find that all of his absences from work were without notice to the Company. I I did not believe Sosna when he testified that on June 19 or 20 Sosna and Foreman Jesus Ledesma told Cerecero if he was absent from work he 435 where such corroboration should have been available. Foreman Ledesma, for some unexplained reason, was not called by the Respondent to corroborate Sosna's assertion that Cerecero's work performance was unsatisfactory or that Ledesma had warned Cerecero about his work or that Ledesma had complained to Sosna about Cerecero's work. I presume that Ledesma instead of corroborating Sosna would have given testimony not favorable to the Respon- dent and would have corroborated the credible testimony of Cerecero, to the effect that the only remarks made about his work were when Ledesma on occasion from a distance would yell to him "faster" and laugh. Considering the circumstances, this is hardly the type of comment that can be viewed as either a warning or as an expression of dissatisfaction with Cerecero's work. Also, in this regard, Cerecero credibly testified without contradiction that working on truck tires compared to automobile tires, "is a little harder work and slower because truck tires need a little more time to cook," than car tires. Finally, circuni- stances make me skeptical of Sosna's assertion that Cerecero suddenly became an unsatisfactory employee. There is no contention that Cerecero's work was not satisfactory during his initial period of employment prior to his discharge on August 1, 1972. Upon reinstatement, and after the Respondent had learned of his union sympathies, Cerecero allegedly became an unsatisfactory employee incapable of performing molderman work on truck tires and when transferred to his old job on automobile tires deliberately did unsatisfactory work. This uncorroborated story, told by Sosna, rings false. Based on the foregoing, I am of the opinion and find that the evidence does not establish that Respondent regarded Cerecero as an unsatisfactory employee or that prior to his discharge had warned or criticized Cerecero about his work performance. Ultimate FindingsD. I reach the conclusion that in discharging Cerecero the Respondent was not motivated by the reasons advanced at the hearing by its attorney, "poor performance and a pattern of Monday and Friday absenteeism" or by its Vice President Bernard Sosna- "[Cerecero] was not perform- ing his duties properly. He was extremely slow as if deliberately, and in addition to that he was consistently absent or tardy." The record, for the reasons previously set forth, does not establish that Cerecero's work performance was unsatisfac- tory or that the Respondent believed that this was the case. Regarding Cerecero's record of absenteeism and tardiness, the record simply does not show a "pattern of Monday and Friday absenteeism" or that "[Cerecero] was consistently absent or tardy", as contended by the Respondent. Also relevant in evaluating Respondent's reasons is the must telephone the Company Nor, did I believe Sosna's further testimony that at some unspecified time he told Cerecero he would have to give up playing music on the weekends if it was going to interfere with his work. He was not a convincing witness, and his bearing and demeanor was not that of a trustworthy witness Also, the Respondent did not explain its failure to produce Foreman Ledesma to corroborate Sosna's testimony that they warned Cerecero I presume Ledesma's testimony would have been unfavorable to the Respondent 436 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD failure of the Respondent to issue a preliminary warning or warnings to Cerecero about his alleged unsatisfactory work or his absenteeism or tardiness. This indicates that the Respondent was not disturbed by these matters. For, "if the employer had really been disturbed by the circum- stances it assigned as reasons for [the discharge], and had no other circumstances in mind, some word of admonition, some caution that the offending lapse be not repeated, or some opportunity for correction of objectionable practice,- would be almost inevitable." E. Anthony & Sons, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 163 F.2d 22, 26-27 (C.A.D.C.). Likewise, the unexplained refusal of Sosna, at the time he notified Cerecero about his discharge, to look at the papers which Cerecero claimed would have justified his absences, indicates that Sosna was not really concerned about Cerecero's absenteeism. In evaluating the reasons advanced by the Respondent to justify its discharge of Cerecero, I have carefully considered the contention, advanced by the Respondent through its attorney at the end of the hearing, that it was Cerecero's failure to notify the Company that he was going to be absent and not the absences, as such, which triggered the discharge. This representation, however, is not support- ed by the record and is at odds with the testimony of Sosna, the person who decided to discharge Cerecero. Sosna testified that, in part, his reason for discharging Cerecero was "he was consistently absent or tardy" and later during the hearing in referring to Respondent's dissatisfaction with Cerecero's absenteeism testified that Cerecero "continued to not show up." And, in notifying Cerecero of his discharge, as described previously, Sosna did not refer to Cerecero's failure to notify the Company of his absence, but justified the discharge on the grounds that he was "absent many Mondays." Also, as previously described, Cerecero three times prior to July 17 had absented himself from work without notifying the Compa- ny, yet had not been reprimanded for this conduct which further indicates that Sosna was not concerned about this conduct. Based on the foregoing, I find that Sosna's decision to discharge Cerecero was not motivated by his absenteeism and tardiness, nor his failure to notify the Company when absent from work, nor his alleged unsatisfactory work performance. Does the false motive advanced by the Respondent for discharging Cerecero establish that a motivating force in Respondent's action was its desire to eliminate a union adherent?8 In the circumstances of this case such an inference seems appropriate under the rationale of the court in Shattuck Denn Mining Corp. v. N.L.R.L., 362 F.2d 466, 470 (C.A. 9, 1966): 8 In this regard, "the cases are legion that the existence of a justifiable ground for discharge will not prevent such discharge from being an unfair labor practice if partially motivated by the employee's protected activity, a business reason cannot be used as a pretext for a discriminatory firing [Cases cited]" NLRB v Ayer Lar Sanitarium, 436 F 2d 45, 50 (CA 9, 1970) 9 Cerecero's reinstatement by the Respondent, even though it knew he was a union adherent, in the circumstances of this case is not sufficient to neutralize the evidence which establishes that Cerecero's subsequent discharge was discriminatonly motivated For, Cerecero's reinstatement can hardly be characterized as a voluntary act where, as here, an arbitrator had issued an award voiding the initial discharge and, in effect, had ordered the Nor is the trier of fact . . . required to be any more nail than is the judge. If he finds the stated motive for a discharge is false, he certainly can infer that there is another motive. More than that, he can info- that the motive is one that the employer desires to conceal-an unlawful motive-at least where . . . the surrounding facts tend to reinforce that inference ... . Here, the "surrounding facts" preponderate in favor of a finding that the Respondent in discharging Cerecero was motivated by its belief that he was a union adherent. Respondent knew Cerecero was an active union adherent who had picketed the Respondent on behalf of the Union. Respondent also knew that Cerecero was steadfast in his devotion to the Union. He had refused to succumb to Sosna's threat that his reinstatement was conditioned upon his repudiation of the Union. instead, Cerecero reaffirmed his loyalty to the Union.9 That Sosna was antagonistic toward Cerecero because of his refusal to repudiate the Union and that Sosna considered his refusal in arriving at the decision to discharge Cerecero is established by Sosna's comment made to Cerecero at the time of the discharge, to the effect that Cerecero thought too much about the Union. When these surrounding circumstances are juxta- posed with the false reasons advanced by the Respondent as its motive for discharging Cerecero, I am convinced that they establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that in discharging Cerecero the Respondent was motivated by his union activities and sympat; iies .10 Accordingly, by engag- ing in such conduct the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and the entire record, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Cantor Bros., Inc., the Respondent, is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. Automotive and Allied Industries Employees of San Diego County, Local Union No. 481 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, the Union, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. By discharging Manuel Cerecero Reyna on July 17, 1973, because of his union activities and sympathies, the Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. 4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. Respondent to reinstate Cerecero io The recent unfair labor practices engaged in by the Respondent as found by the Board in Cantor Bros, Inc, 203 NLRB No. 116, are relevant in evaluating the Respondent' s motive for discharging Cerecero . See, e.g., Tonkin Corp of California d/b/a Seven-Up Bottling Co of Sacramento v. N L R B, 420 F.2d 495 (C.A. 9, 1969), N L.R.B. v. Clinton Packing Co, Inc, 468 F.2d 953, 954 (C A 8, 1972). In my opinion , the nature and proximity of these unfair labor practices in relation to Cerecero's discharge lend support to the General Counsel's contention that Cerecero's discharge was discriminatorily motivated But, even absent these recent unfair labor practices, for the reasons set out previously, the evidence preponderates in favor of a finding that Cerecero's discharge was discnminatonly motivated. CANTOR BROS ., INC. 437 THE REMEDY Having found that the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices violative of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act, I shall recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action in order to effectuate the policies of the Act. Having found that the Respondent discriminatorily discharge employee Manuel Cerecero Reyna, I shall recommend that the Respondent offer him immediate and full reinstatement to his former job or, if that job no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to his seniority and other rights and privileges and make him whole for any loss of earnings he may have suffered by reason of such discrimination, by payment of a sum of money equal to that which he normally would have earned as wages from the date of discharge to the date of said offer of reinstatement, less his net earnings during such period with backpay computed on a quarterly basis in the manner established by the Board in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, and with interest thereon as prescribed by the Board in Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716. As the unfair labor practice committed by the Respon- dent is of a character which goes to the very heart of the Act, I shall recommend that an order requiring the Respondent to cease and desist therefrom and to cease and desist from infringing in any other manner upon the rights of employees guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act. Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended: necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due and the right of reinstatement under the terms of this Order. (d) Post at its place of business in San Diego, California, in English and Spanish, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 12 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 21, after being duly signed by Respondent's representative, shall be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 21, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order what steps have been taken to comply herewith. i i In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions , and recommended Order herein shall , as provided by Sec 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions and order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes. 12 In the event that the Board 's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board " APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government ORDER 11 Respondent, Cantor Bros., Inc., San Diego, California, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Discouraging membership in Automotive and Allied Industries Employees of San Diego County, Local Union No. 481 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, or any other labor organization of its employees, by discharg- ing employees or by otherwise discriminating in regard to the hire or tenure of employment of employees or any term or condition of employment. (b) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of their rights under Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action which is necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Make Manuel Cerecero Reyna whole for any loss of earnings suffered by reason of his discharge, in the manner set forth in the section herein entitled "The Remedy." (b) Offer Manuel Cerecero Reyna immediate and full reinstatement to his former position or, if this position no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to seniority or other rights and privileges. (c) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records After a trial at which all sides had the chance to give evidence, the National Labor Relations Board found that we, Cantor Bros., Inc., violated the National Labor Relations Act, and ordered us to post this notice and to keep our word about what we say in this notice. The Law gives you the right: To form, join or help unions; To choose a union to represent you in bargaining with us; To act together for your common interest or protection; and To refuse to participate in any or all of these things. The Board has ordered us to promise you that: WE WILL NOT discharge you or otherwise discrimi- nate against you because you are a member of, or have supported Automotive and Allied Industries Employ- ees of San Diego County, Local Union No. 481 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, or any other union. WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in exercising the rights guaran- teed to you by the National Labor Relations Act. The National Labor Relations Board found that we violated the law by discharging Manuel Cerecero Reyna. WE WILL offer to reinstate Manuel Cerecero Reyna 438 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD to his former job , or if that job is not available , to a This is an official notice and must not be defaced by substantially equal one without any loss of seniority or anyone. other rights and WE WILL reimburse him for any loss of This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days earnings he may have suffered because we discharged from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, him, together with six percent interest . or covered by any other material. Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with CANTOR BROS ., INC. its provisions may be directed to the Board 's Office, (Employer) Eastern Columbia Building, 849 South Broadway, Los Angeles, California 90014 , Telephone 213-688-5229. Dated By (Representative) (Title)