Campbell, Brad Lee. et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jun 18, 2020

14107150 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jun. 18, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/107,150 12/16/2013 Brad Lee Campbell 170116-1010 4060
71247 7590 06/18/2020
Client 170101 c/o
THOMAS HORSTEMEYER, LLP
3200 WINDY HILL RD SE
SUITE 1600E
ATLANTA, GA 30339
EXAMINER
KEATON, SHERROD L
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2142
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
06/18/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@thomashorstemeyer.com
uspatents@tkhr.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte BRAD LEE CAMPBELL, DANIEL WADE HITCHCOCK, and
JOSHUA LEE DAVIS
Appeal 2019-000071
Application 14/107,150
Technology Center 2100
Before JENNIFER S. BISK, BARBARA A. BENOIT, and
MICHAEL M. BARRY, Administrative Patent Judges.
BISK, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL1

1 Throughout this Decision we have considered the Specification filed
December 16, 2013 (“Spec.”), the Final Rejection mailed November 1, 2017
(“Final Act.”), the Appeal Brief filed February 28, 2018 (“Appeal Br.”), the
Examiner’s Answer mailed August 1, 2018 (“Ans.”), and the Reply Brief
filed September 25, 2018 (“Reply Br.”).
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Application 14/107,150
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant2 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–19 and 22. See Final Act. 1. We
have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM IN PART.
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to a providing account information to
applications. Claims 1 and 3, reproduced below (with disputed limitations
emphasized), are illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A non-transitory computer-readable medium embodying a
program executable in a mobile computing device, wherein,
when executed, the program causes the mobile computing device
to at least:
render upon a touchscreen of the mobile computing device
a first user interface comprising a plurality of selectable indicia
corresponding to a plurality of applications;
launch a particular application of the plurality of
applications in response to receiving a user selection of at least
one of the plurality of selectable indicia via the touchscreen, the
user selection corresponding to a request to launch the particular
application;
determine a type of user selection based at least in part on
an elapsed time associated with the user selection;
identify particular stored sign-in information from a
repository that includes respective stored sign-in information for
a plurality of accounts based at least in part on the type of user
selection, the plurality of accounts being associated with at least
two of the plurality of applications; and

2 We use the term “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Amazon
Technologies, Inc. Appeal Br. 2.
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automatically initiate an operation to create a runtime
association between the particular application and the particular
stored sign-in information in response to the user selection to
launch the particular application.
Appeal Br. 38 (Claims App.).
3. A system, comprising:
a client computing device; and
an information manager executed in the client computing
device, wherein the information manager causes the client
computing device to at least:
store respective account information for individual ones of
a plurality of accounts;
render a first user interface that facilitates a first user
selection of a particular application from a plurality of
applications, the first user selection of the particular application
corresponding to a request to launch the particular application;
select particular account information from a plurality of
types of account information associated with a respective
account of the plurality of accounts in response to a second user
selection via a second user interface that is separate from a third
user interface of the particular application, the particular
account information being selected according to an elapsed time
associated with the second user selection; and
automatically initiate an operation to create a runtime
association between an instance of the particular application and
the particular account information.
Appeal Br. 40 (Claims App.).
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REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Name Reference Date
Torres US 2005/0177731 A1 Aug. 11, 2005
Lu US 2008/0307236 A1 Dec. 11, 2008
Tseng US 2009/0249247 A1 Oct. 1, 2009
Meyer US 2009/0300097 A1 Dec. 3, 2009
Song US 2011/0061016 A1 Mar. 10, 2011
Mahaffey US 2014/0189808 A1 July 3, 2014
Wan US 2014/0344907 A1 Nov. 20, 2014
REJECTIONS3
Claims 1–6, 8–11, and 22 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Song, Tseng, Wan, and Lu. Final Act. 3–11.
Claims 7, 12, and 13 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Song, Tseng, Wan, Lu, and Torres. Final Act. 11–13.
Claims 14–16 and 18 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Meyer, Tseng, and Lu.4 Final Act. 13–18.
Claim 17 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over
Meyer, Tseng, Lu, and Torres. Final Act. 18–19.
Claim 19 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over
Meyer, Tseng, Lu, and Mahaffey. Final Act. 19–20.

3 Claims 1, 3, and 14 were also rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to
ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 2–3. That rejection was withdrawn in
the Answer. Ans. 3.
4 The Final Action lists claim 21 as also being rejected by Meyer, Tseng, and
Lu. Final Act. 13, 17–18. However, claim 21 was canceled. Appeal Br. 45
(Claims App.).
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OPINION
We review the appealed rejections for error based upon the issues
identified by Appellant, and in light of the arguments and evidence produced
thereon. Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential).
To the extent Appellant has not advanced separate, substantive arguments
for particular claims, or other issues, such arguments are waived. 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
We have considered all of Appellant’s arguments and any evidence
presented. We highlight and address specific findings and arguments for
emphasis in our analysis below.
Claim 1
The Examiner rejects claim 1 as obvious over the combination of
Song, Tseng, Wan, and Lu. Final Act. 3–7. The Examiner cites to the
combination of Song and Lu as teaching or suggesting the determine5 and
identify6 limitations. Final Act. 6–7 (citing Lu ¶¶ 10, 13, 43). According to
the Examiner, Lu describes “an account access based on selections which
include a variation in type and time (i.e. dragging is a different type input
because it has movement and longer interaction than a click/tap).” Id.
Appellant argues that Lu does not teach or suggest the determine
limitation because “Lu merely discusses establishing a hotkey such as

5 The “determine limitation” recites “determine a type of user selection
based at least in part on an elapsed time associated with the user selection.”
Appeal Br. 38 (Claims App.).
6 The “identify limitation” recites “identify particular stored sign-in
information from a repository that includes respective stored sign-in
information for a plurality of accounts based at least in part on the type of
user selection, the plurality of accounts being associated with at least two of
the plurality of applications.” Appeal Br. 38 (Claims App.).
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‘clicking a mouse, moving a mouse, pressing a character key, pressing a
function key, or pressing a number key.’” Appeal Br. 21. Appellant adds
that “nothing in Lu even mentions dragging, much less an interaction time or
‘an elapsed time associated with the user selection,’ being used to
‘determine a type of user selection.’” Id. at 22. Instead, Appellant contends
that “Lu merely discusses being able to set a hotkey for an input event.” Id.
In the Answer, the Examiner explains that the language “based at least
in part” of the determine limitation is not specifically defined in the
Specification and Appellant has not provided further explanation of “how
the relationship between the input and a calculation of time must be
realized.” Ans. 3–4. The Examiner, therefore, interprets the determine
limitation broadly and that it encompasses processing mouse movements
such as dragging and clicking as input types that differ in duration, which
are therefore “based at least in part” on an elapsed time and are, therefore,
encompassed by the determine limitation. Id. at 4.
We are not persuaded of error in the Examiner’s finding that Lu at
least suggests the determine limitation. We agree with the Examiner that the
language “based at least in part on an elapsed time associated with the user
selection” is very broad and would encompass input actions, including
mouse events like clicking and dragging, that differ in the amounts of time
they encompass. The portion of Lu relied upon by the Examiner for this
disclosure explains that “a hotkey input event” includes “clicking a mouse,
moving a mouse,” and pressing keys on the keyboard. Lu ¶ 43. A person of
ordinary skill in the art would understand that Lu describes user selection
based on conventional mouse event, which is “based at least in part on” the
elapsed time associated with that event. We, therefore, are not persuaded
that this argument shows reversible error by the Examiner.
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Appellant also argues that the asserted combination of references does
not teach or suggest the identify limitation. Appeal Br. 22. According to
Appellant, neither Song nor Lu discuss a repository as claimed. Id. at 23–
24.
In the Answer, the Examiner explains that “[a] repository is defined as
a central location where data is stored and managed,” which “is the same
functionality found in the table that manages account/password datum
provided by Lu.” Ans. 4. In addition, according to the Examiner, “it is
obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art that the table disclosed in Lu holds
a plurality of account/password [data] otherwise the issue of remembering
multiple passwords would not be present.” Id. at 5 (citing Lu ¶¶ 5–6). The
Examiner also explains that Lu discloses that the table compares input
conditions “to determine if account and password information should be
transmitted.” Id. at 4 (citing Lu ¶¶ 36–38, 43, 51).
Appellant responds that, “even assuming for the sake of argument that
the account and/or password correspondence table of Lu corresponds to the
‘repository’ of claim 1, nothing in Lu appears to show or suggest” the
remaining requirements of the identify limitation, including “identify[ing]
particular stored sign-in information” from that repository and that the stored
sign-in information is “based at least in part on a type of user selection
[determined based at least in part on an elapsed time associated with the
user selection].” Reply Br. 7.
We are not persuaded of error in the Examiner’s finding that the
combination of Song and Lu at least suggests the identify limitation. We
agree with the Examiner that Lu’s disclosure of “an account and/or password
correspondence table registering correspondence relationship between an
input interface type as well as an input signal value and an account and/or
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password datum” teaches or suggests the recited “repository.” Lu ¶ 10. The
Specification uses the term “repository” only in the claims, and Appellant
does not disagree with the Examiner’s reasonable interpretation of the term.
Lu also discloses an “identification module” for identifying an input type
and a “processing module” that compares that input condition with data
registered in the correspondence table to determine whether “the input
condition exists” and if so, “transmit[s] the corresponding account and/or
password datum to a central processing unit.” Lu ¶¶ 36–37. Appellant does
not address these disclosures or explain why they do not teach or suggest
identifying stored sign-in information based at least in part on the type of
user selection. We, therefore, are not persuaded that this argument shows
reversible error by the Examiner.
Accordingly, we are not persuaded of error in the Examiner’s
rejection of claim 1 as obvious over the combination of Song, Tseng, Wan,
and Lu.
Claim 2
The Examiner rejects claim 2 as obvious over the combination of
Song, Tseng, Wan, and Lu. Final Act. 7–8. Claim 2 depends from claim 1
and recites the following:
wherein, when executed, the program further causes the mobile
computing device to at least:
render a second user interface configured to facilitate a
second user selection from among a subset of the plurality of
accounts based at least in part on the type of user selection, the
second user interface being separate from a third user interface
of the particular application; and
wherein the particular stored sign-in information is
identified based at least in part on the second user selection.
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Appeal Br. 39 (Claims App.).
The Examiner cites to Wan, Tseng, and Lu as teaching or suggesting
the limitations recited by claim 2. Final Act. 8. In Wan, the Examiner
points the disclosed drop down lists as an interface. Id. (citing Wan ¶49). In
Tseng, the Examiner points to “a drag down second interface that provides
access to different account[s].” Id. (citing Tseng Fig. 2b, ¶ 53). And in Lu,
the Examiner points to the different input types for user selection. Id. (citing
Lu ¶¶ 10, 13, 43).
Appellant argues that neither Lu nor Wan shows the type of user
selection is “based at least in part on an elapsed time associated with the
user selection.” Appeal Br. 26–28; Reply Br. 8–9. However, as discussed
above, we agree with the Examiner’s finding that Lu teaches or suggests this
limitation.
Appellant also argues, without further explanation, that “Tseng fails to
show or suggest “render[ing] a second user interface configured to facilitate
a second user selection from among a subset of the plurality of accounts
based at least in part on the type of user selection [determined by an elapsed
time associated with the user selection], the second user interface being
separate from a third user interface of the particular application.” Id. at
27; Reply Br. 8. The Examiner explains that Tseng “discloses a second
interface and the user interface does relate to accounts.” Ans. 5 (citing
Tseng Fig. 2b, ¶ 53). According to the Examiner, “[i]t is understood that as
a user navigates through an interface and a first selection (dragging
selection) is performed [and] the second selection is performed through
selection of the message itself (Tseng: Paragraph 53). Further the user
selection type functionality is established by the combination including Lu
elaborated on in claim 1 remarks above.” Id. In response to the Examiner’s
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explanation, Appellant states that it “respectfully disagrees” and reiterates,
without elaboration, that Tseng fails to show “the type of user selection
[determined by an elapsed time associated with the user selection], the
second user interface being separate from a third user interface of the
particular application.” Reply Br. 7–8.
The Board interprets Rule 41.37 “to require more substantive
arguments in an appeal brief than a mere recitation of the claim elements and
a naked assertion that the corresponding elements were not found in the
prior art.” In re Lovin, 652 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2011); In re Geisler,
116 F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997); In re De Blauwe, 736 F.2d 699, 705
(Fed. Cir. 1984). Here, Appellant merely summarizes Tseng’s purported
teachings and concludes that these teachings do not correspond to the
limitation at issue. This is not enough to qualify as a substantive argument.
Merely emphasizing certain claim language in some way is insufficient to
constitute an argument for patentability. Moreover, in looking at the
rejection, we find Examiner’s explanations reasonable. We are, therefore,
not persuaded of error in the rejection by Appellant’s conclusory assertions.
Finally, for the first time in the Reply Brief, Appellant argues that
“Tseng does not appear to show or suggest ‘a subset of the plurality of
accounts [associated with at least two of the applications].’” Reply Br. 8.
This argument was not presented in Appellant’s Appeal Brief and will not be
considered. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.41(b)(2) (“Any argument raised in the reply
brief which was not raised in the appeal brief, or is not responsive to an
argument raised in the examiner’s answer . . . will not be considered by the
Board for purposes of the present appeal, unless good cause is shown.”).
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Accordingly, we are not persuaded of error in the Examiner’s
rejection of claim 2 as obvious over the combination of Song, Tseng, Wan,
and Lu.
Claim 22
The Examiner rejects claim 22, which depends from claim 1, over
Song, Tseng, Wan, and Lu. Final Act. 10–11. Appellant does not make any
additional arguments for claim 22. Appeal Br. 25. Accordingly, we are not
persuaded of error in the Examiner’s rejection of claim 22 as obvious over
the combination of Song, Tseng, Wan, and Lu.
Claim 3
The Examiner rejects claim 3 as obvious over the combination of
Song, Tseng, Wan, and Lu, explaining that “[c]laim 3 is similar in scope to
claims 1–2 and therefore rejected under the same rationale.” Final Act. 8.
We do not sustain this rejection of claim 3. Appellant argues that
neither Song nor Lu discloses the selecting limitation7 as recited by claim 3.
Appeal Br. 31–32. The Examiner does not explicitly address these
arguments, but states that “the rationale set forth above in claims 1 and 2 that
similarly apply and the rejections are maintained with that consideration.”
Ans. 5. Claim 3, however, does not include the language relied upon by the
Examiner for the broad interpretation of claim 1. Specifically, instead of

7 The “selecting limitation” recites “select[ing] particular account
information from a plurality of types of account information associated with
a respective account of the plurality of accounts in response to a second user
selection via a second user interface that is separate from a third user
interface of the particular application, the particular account information
being selected according to an elapsed time associated with the second user
selection.” Appeals Br. 40 (Claims App.).
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“determine a type of user selection based at least in part on an elapsed time
associated with the user selection,” claim 3 recites “select particular account
information . . . according to an elapsed time associated with the second
user selection.” Appeal Br. 38, 40 (Claims App.) (emphases added). In
other words, the language of claim 3 defining the relationship of elapsed
time with the user selection is narrower than that used in claim 1—it is
“according to the elapsed time” as opposed to “based at least in part on an
elapsed time.” Given this difference in claim language and the Examiner’s
reliance of the broad interpretation of “based in part on,” for the rejection of
claim 1, the Examiner has not properly explained how mouse events that
differ in many ways, including elapsed time, are selected “according to an
elapsed time.” As pointed out by Appellant, Lu never discusses the time
differences between the various user selection types or indicates that they are
selected based on elapsed time, as opposed to, for example the type of
motion involved. See Appeal Br. 22; Reply Br. 4. Therefore, it is not clear
from the rejection that Lu’s disclosure of conventional mouse events as input
events teaches or suggests selection “according to an elapsed time associated
with the second user selection.”
Accordingly, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 3 as
obvious over the combination of Song, Tseng, Wan, and Lu.
Claims 4–13
The Examiner rejects claims 4–6 and 8–11 over Song, Tseng, Wan,
and Lu and claims 7, 12, and 13 over Song, Tseng, Wan, Lu, and Torres.
Final Act. 8–13. Because these claims depend from claim 3, these rejections
suffer from the same deficiency as that of claim 3. Accordingly, we do not
sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 4–13.
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Claims 14–19
Claim 14 is independent and, like claim 3, includes a selecting
limitation using language similar to that of claim 3—“selecting, via the
client computing device, a particular type of the account information
according to an elapsed time associated with a second user selection of the
component” (“the selecting limitation of claim 14”). Appeal Br. 43 (Claims
App.) (emphasis added). For the reasons discussed above with regard to
claim 3, it is not clear from the rejection that Lu’s disclosure of conventional
mouse events as input events teaches or suggests the selecting limitation of
claim 14. We, therefore, do not sustain the rejections of claim 14 or of
claims 15–19, which depend from claim 14.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1, 2, and 22. We
reverse the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 3–19.
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DECISION SUMMARY
Claims
Rejected
35
U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–6, 8–11,
22
103 Song, Tseng, Wan, Lu 1, 2, 22 3–6, 8–11
7, 12, 13 103 Song, Tseng, Wan, Lu,
Torres
7, 12, 13
14–16, 18 103 Meyer, Tseng, Lu 14–16, 18,
21
17 103 Meyer, Tseng, Lu, Torres 17
19 103 Meyer, Tseng, Lu,
Mahaffey
19
Overall
Outcome
1, 2, 22 3–19
TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED IN PART