Cambridge Taxi Company

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Mar 15, 1982

260 N.L.R.B. 931 (N.L.R.B. 1982)

CAMBRIDGE TAXI COMPANY
Cambridge Taxi Company and Peter S. Lowber.
Case I1-CA-17487
March 15, 1982
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBI RS FANNING, JENKINS, ANI)
ZIMMERMAN
Upon a charge filed on May 13, 1980, by Peter
S. Lowber, herein called the Charging Party, and
duly served on Cambridge Taxi Company, herein
called Respondent, the General Counsel of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board, by the Regional Di-
rector for Region I, issued a complaint and notice
of hearing on January 22, 1981, alleging that Re-
spondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, as amended, by refus-
ing to honor the Charging Party's request for a
work shift change, thus causing his termination,
and by failing and refusing to reinstate the Charg-
ing Party to his former position upon his request,
because of his activity on behalf of the Cambridge
Cab Drivers Association and Local Union 496 a/w
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauf-
feurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America,
herein called the Union.
On July 6, 1981, Respondent filed with the
Board in Washington, D.C., a Motion for Summary
Judgment and memorandum in support thereof.
Subsequently, on July 16, 1981, the General Coun-
sel filed a response and opposition to Respondent's
motion. Thereafter, on September 18, 1981, the
Board issued an order transferring proceeding to
the Board and a Notice To Show Cause why Re-
spondent's motion should not be granted. Thereaf-
ter, the General Counsel filed a response to the
Notice To Show Cause.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
Upon the entire record in this proceeding, the
Board makes the following:
Ruling on the Motion for Summary Judgment
On April 13, 1979, the Charging Party filed a
charge against Respondent in Case I1-CA-15931,
alleging that he was suspended for engaging in
union activities. Following investigation of this
charge, on January 10, 1980, the Regional Director
for Region I issued a complaint. Thereafter, this
case was consolidated with Cases I-CA-15838 and
--CA-17030, which involved separate charges filed
by the Union against Respondent. After negotia-
tions between the parties, on June 9, 1980, the Re-
gional Director approved a settlement agreement
260 NLRB No. 119
for those consolidated cases.' Previously, on May
13, 1980, the Charging Party had filed the charge
involved herein.
Respondent asserts in its Motion for Summary
Judgment that the settlement agreement embraced
all outstanding disputes between the parties, and
that the General Counsel is precluded from litigat-
ing the instant charge since the charge was filed
prior to execution of the settlement agreement. Re-
spondent contends accordingly that there are no
issues of fact or law requiring a hearing. The Gen-
eral Counsel argues in opposition that the settle-
ment agreement does not in any way refer to the
charge involved herein and that the parties did not
intend to settle this charge but only to settle the
charges specifically listed in the agreement. The
General Counsel urges that the Charging Party
should not be barred from pursuing this charge
since he never intended to settle it.
We agree with Respondent. We have consistent-
ly held that a settlement agreement disposes of all
issues involving presettlement conduct of the par-
ties, unless prior violations of the Act were either
unknown to the General Counsel and not readily
discoverable by investigation, or specifically re-
served from the settlement agreement by the
mutual understanding of the parties.2 Our previous
decisions also indicate that, in order to prove that a
charge has been specifically reserved from a settle-
ment agreement, a party must establish this fact by
affirmative evidence. The General Counsel does
not deny that he was aware at the time of the set-
tlement agreement that the Charging Party had
filed the charge involved herein. Further, the Gen-
eral Counsel provides us with no evidence whatso-
ever that this charge was specifically reserved for
future resolution.3 Accordingly, we find that the
settlement agreement approved by the Regional
Director on June 9, 1980, embraced the charge in-
volved in the instant case, and we grant Respond-
ent's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Thet agreement ,i asl signed h! Respondenrt onr Mlay 8. 1980, h) the
harging Party on May 22. Iq8. and hy the Ulnion on June 4, 1980 It
prosided, inle,r i aa, lar backpay to the Charging Pa;rty "for all monies
]tt, a, a restIlt of lits su spentsion"
Sec. e g . (Chltatf/urs, rca,,tter and lhklpcrs Local ( ntitot 215 at,' In-
itrntional HBrotlrheood o lC arnorert Chauj h rlt ' ar housemenn and Help-
,r, I/ lInmctl 1 & t'nttructrrio n (Cotnpartv. a dirvisin of BuaN'ro, &
Xi 'tcot (omp;anort 251 NI RHI 1234 (8119): L.amtntlh , / '[ll g k Corp
218 NI RH 12t4 (It718): IO/ll.ood Roteteith llto l ('. 2 t5 NI RH 1 37
I 19t78): ,c .Suasht & )Dor C( otn pany, It,4 Nl.RH 468, 473 (1W4h1
I' he (;Cllt, {tAil tl sI a1s, us to) nfter Irtlll he fi.ll that the charge
~ I n omt l 11lsted ill n he lsetnl lJl agre'nmell t thial ii %as ,pet'ificallk re-
r..e l for fittire r¢esoutlion Our Lis.clCting elle.etlg e as1. uontentn its ht
did it I/tI/tll '.-r. Root o/ lle / ()t. suprrl. thil an ait or tmnussion rna,
,tml111tAc spt-Tfi r-xc.r\.allwn 'rt
'
c'Onl 10 IO rlec 12llS c1o11 tt'1cill
931
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re-
lations Board grants Respondent's Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment and hereby orders that the com-
plaint herein be, and it hereby is, dismissed in its
entirety.
MEMBER JENKINS, dissenting:
Contrary to my colleagues, I would deny Re-
spondent's Motion for Summary Judgment. My
colleagues find that a settlement agreement ap-
proved by the Regional Director on June 9, 1980,
embraced the charge involved in the instant case. I
disagree.
Case 1-CA-15931 was filed on April 13, 1979,
by the Charging Party, and alleged that he was
suspended for engaging in union activities. Case 1-
CA-15838 was filed by Teamsters Local No. 496,
alleging the discriminatory discharge of Anthony
Violonto. A complaint was issued, the two cases
being consolidated for hearing. On January 10,
1980, the Union filed a charge in Case 1-CA-17030
alleging certain unilateral actions in violation of
Section 8(a)(l) and (5). An amended charge was
filed and that proceeding was consolidated for
hearing with the earlier cases.
Efforts were made to settle the cases and on
May 8, 1980, Respondent's attorney signed a settle-
ment agreement. The Charging Party signed the
agreement on May 22, and the Union signed it on
June 4. The agreement was approved by the Re-
gional Director on June 9. The agreement listed
the three charge numbers and specifically remedied
the conduct alleged therein.
On May 13, 1980, the Charging Party filed the
instant charge, alleging that he had been construc-
tively discharged on March 28, 1980, when Re-
spondent refused to honor his request for a shift
change. Following an investigation, a complaint
issued on January 22, 1981.
Respondent contends, and my colleagues agree,
that the settlement agreement in the Cases I-CA-
15931, 1-CA-15838, and 1-CA-17030 embraced
the charge in the instant case and the General
Counsel is precluded from litigating the instant
charge. My colleagues correctly state the general
principle that "a settlement agreement disposes of
all issues involving presettlement conduct of the
parties, unless prior violations of the Act were
either unknown to the General Counsel and not
readily discoverable by investigation, or specifical-
ly reserved from the settlement agreement by the
mutual understanding of the parties."
Applying that general principle to the instant
case, there is not the slightest indication that the
parties had the allegations of Case 1-CA-17487 in
contemplation when they entered into the settle-
ment agreement. That settlement agreement re-
ferred only to the three case numbers involved
therein and provided a remedy limited to the alle-
gations contained in those cases. The instant case
contains an allegation unrelated to the consolidated
settled case, and indeed the charge was not filed
until after Respondent had signed the settlement
agreement. At no point during the investigation of
the instant case, did Respondent claim that the
then-pending settlement agreement settled the pres-
ent issue. Therefore, I am unwilling to stretch my
imagination to find that the parties contemplated
inclusion of the instant charge in their settlement of
the earlier charges.
Neverthelesss, my colleagues state that the in-
stant charge was not "specifically reserved" for
future resolution and therefore must have been dis-
posed of by the settlement agreement. The general
principle relied on by the majority is intended to
have all alleged violations litigated in one proceed-
ing whenever practicable. However, this policy
was not intended to be applied rigidly and without
regard to the circumstances of each case. The cases
relied on by the majority are, save one, quite dis-
tinguishable from the instant case.4
Steves Sash & Door Company, 164 NLRB 468
(1967), relied on by the majority is almost directly
on point. There, as here, an earlier settlement
agreement set forth specific charges and the notice
remedied only those charges. There, as here, the
settlement agreement recites that it is "in settlement
of the above matter," i.e., Cases 1-CA-15931, 1-
CA-15838, and 1-CA-17030. The settlement agree-
ment here further provides "that approval of the
Settlement Agreement by the Regional Director
shall constitute withdrawal of any Complaint(s)
. . in this case," and that, upon compliance, "no
further action shall be taken in this case [emphasis
supplied]." In the present case, it is reasonable to
assume, as the Board did in Steves Sash, that, had
the parties intended to resolve all differences be-
tween them, they would have provided for the
withdrawal of the instant charge. No such provi-
sion was made in the settlement agreement and I
find that the instant charge was indeed "specifical-
ly reserved" from the settlement agreement.
Based on the foregoing, I would find that the
settlement agreement in Cases l-CA-15931, I-CA-
15838, and I-CA-17030 does not preclude litiga-
tion of the unrelated charge in the instant case. I
dissent from my colleagues' decision to find other-
wise.
' iowccr %c nlm dlssenl I11 I,lilwod Rovwvelr Hotl C;o., 235 NLRB
1 197 1398 (1978)
932