Calgary Scientific Inc.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Mar 2, 2021

2019004364 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 2, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/011,183 01/29/2016 Matthew James Stephure 10172-083US1 8821
96039 7590 03/02/2021
Meunier Carlin & Curfman LLC
999 Peachtree Street NE
Suite 1300
Atlanta, GA 30309
EXAMINER
TRAN, ELLEN C
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2433
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/02/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@mcciplaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
________________

Ex parte MATTHEW JAMES STEPHURE, CHRISTOPHER JAMES
JARABEK, CAMERON KIDDLE, JONATHAN CHRISTOPHER NEITZ,
CHRISTOPHER JAMES GARRETT, and KEVIN GLEN ROBINSON
________________

Appeal 2019-004364
Application 15/011,183
Technology Center 2400
________________

Before JASON J. CHUNG, STEVEN M. AMUNDSON, and
MICHAEL T. CYGAN, Administrative Patent Judges.

CHUNG, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals the Final Rejection
of claims 1–23. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. According to Appellant, Calgary Scientific, Inc. is the real
party in interest. Appeal Br. 4.
Appeal 2019-004364
Application 15/011,183

2
INVENTION
The invention relates to providing a remote access to a service in a
client-server remote access system. Spec. ¶ 4. Claim 1 is illustrative of the
invention and is reproduced below:
1. A method for providing remote access to a service
in a client-server remote access system, comprising:
selecting, by a scheduler, an application server hosting the
service, the selecting being performed in accordance with a
utilization of resources in the client-server remote access system;
creating a session uniform resource locator (URL) that
includes a URL payload that uniquely identifies the service and
being used to establish the remote access to the service by a
client; and
using the session URL and URL payload to establish a
session between the client and the service to communicate
application data and state information between the client and the
service.
Appeal Br. 19 (Claims Appendix) (emphases added).

REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:

Name Reference Date
Ahuja et al. (“Ahuja”) US 6,175,869 B1 Jan. 16, 2001
Barry et al. (“Barry”) US 2005/0216421 A1 Sept. 29, 2005
Farber et al. (“Farber”) US 2007/0233706 A1 Oct. 4, 2007
Agarwal et al. (“Agarwal”) US 2011/0154464 A1 June 23, 2011
Kavantzas et al. (“Kavatzas”) US 2013/0086652 A1 Apr. 4, 2013
Certain et al. (“Certain”) US 8,533,103 B1 Sept. 10, 2013
Appeal 2019-004364
Application 15/011,183

3
REJECTIONS
The Examiner rejects claims 1–23 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being
directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 6–7.
The Examiner rejects claims 1, 4, 9–13, 16, 19, 22, and 23 under
35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over the combination of Ahuja and
Agarwal. Final Act. 8–11.
The Examiner rejects claims 2 and 3 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over the combination of Ahuja, Agarwal, and Farber. Final
Act. 11–12.
The Examiner rejects claim 5 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over the combination of Ahuja, Agarwal, and Barry. Final Act.
12–13.
The Examiner rejects claims 6–8, 17, 18, 20, and 21 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 as being unpatentable over the combination of Ahuja, Agarwal, Barry,
and Kavantzas. Final Act. 13–15.
The Examiner rejects claims 14 and 15 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
being unpatentable over the combination of Ahuja, Agarwal, and Certain.
Final Act. 15–16.
ANALYSIS
I. Claims 1–23 Rejected Under 35 U.S.C. § 101
A. Principles of Law
Inventions for a “new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter” generally constitute patent-eligible subject matter.
35 U.S.C. § 101. However, the U.S. Supreme Court has long interpreted
35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural
Appeal 2019-004364
Application 15/011,183

4
phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank
Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66
(2012), and Alice. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 75–
77). In accordance with that framework, we first determine what concept
the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the
claims before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e.,
the use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v.
Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’
application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting against
risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not
Appeal 2019-004364
Application 15/011,183

5
become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.”
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as
nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an
attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Court
also indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that formula in the
abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, and this
principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the
formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. at 191 (citing
Benson and Flook); see also, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that an
application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure
or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (internal quotation marks
omitted). “A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional
features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo,
566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[]
fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
B. USPTO Section 101 Guidance
In January 2019, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”)
published revised guidance on the application of 35 U.S.C. § 101. See
2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50
(Jan. 7, 2019) (“2019 Guidance”), updated by USPTO, October 2019
Appeal 2019-004364
Application 15/011,183

6
Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.pdf) (“Update”); see also
October 2019 Patent Eligibility Guidance Update, 84 Fed. Reg. 55,942 (Oct.
18, 2019) (notifying the public of the availability of the Update). “All
USPTO personnel are, as a matter of internal agency management, expected
to follow the guidance.” 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51; see also
October 2019 Guidance Update at 1. The Manual of Patent Examining
Procedure (“MPEP”) now incorporates this revised guidance and subsequent
updates at Section 2106 (9th ed. rev. 10.2019 June 2020).2
Under MPEP § 2106, we first look to whether the claim recites the
following:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract
ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing
human activities such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental
processes); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application.3
MPEP §§ 2106.04(a), (d).
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to

2 All references to the MPEP are to the Ninth Edition, Revision 10.2019
(Last Revised June 2020), unless otherwise indicated.
3 “Examiners evaluate integration into a practical application by
(a) identifying whether there are any additional elements recited in the claim
beyond the judicial exception, and (b) evaluating those additional elements
individually and in combination to determine whether the claim as a whole
integrates the exception into a practical application.” MPEP § 2106.04(d)II.
Appeal 2019-004364
Application 15/011,183

7
whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not
“well-understood, routine, [and] conventional activity” in the field; or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of
generality, to the judicial exception.
MPEP § 2106.05(d).
C. The Examiner’s Rejection and Appellant’s Arguments
The Examiner concludes the present claims are analogous to the
claims in Intellectual Ventures I, LLC v. Erie Indemnity Co., 850 F.3d 1315
(Fed. Cir. 2017), which held that claims drawn to “creating an index and
using that index to search for and retrieve data” (i.e., a mental process) were
ineligible under § 101. Ans. 11.
Appellant argues that the present claims recite an improvement in the
relevant technology. Appeal Br. 9 (citing McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco
Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). Appellant argues the
present claims do not preempt any abstract idea. Appeal Br. 11. Appellant
argues the Examiner does not provide the evidence required by Berkheimer
to support a determination that the additional elements are well understood,
routine, or conventional. Id. at 11–12 (citing Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881
F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018)). We disagree with Appellant.
D. Step 2A, Prong 1
Patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is a question that we resolve
pursuant to the MPEP §§ 2106.04(a), (d). The emphasized portions of
claim 1, reproduced above (see supra at 2–3), recite “selecting . . . an
application server hosting the service, the selecting being performed in
Appeal 2019-004364
Application 15/011,183

8
accordance with a utilization of resources in the client-server remote access
system” and “creating a session uniform resource locator (URL) that
includes a URL payload that uniquely identifies the service and being used
to establish the remote access to the service by a client,” which are concepts
performed in the human mind (including an observation, evaluation,
judgment, opinion). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(a), (d). Concepts performed in
the human mind (including an observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion)
fall into the category of mental processes. Id. Mental processes are a type
of abstract idea. Id.
We must still determine whether the abstract idea is integrated into a
practical application, namely whether the claim applies, relies on, or uses the
abstract idea in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the abstract
idea, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the abstract idea. See MPEP §§ 2106.04(a), (d). We, therefore,
(1) identify whether there are any additional recited elements beyond the
abstract idea, and (2) evaluate those elements both individually and
collectively to determine whether they integrate the exception into a
practical application. See id.
Accordingly, we proceed to Prong 2.
E. Step 2A, Prong 2
Here, the elements in the present claims used to implement the
abstract idea are the “scheduler,” “client-server remote access system,”4
“proxy server,”5 “client,” and “authentication component.”6 See MPEP

4 This feature is recited in claim 1, but not recited in claim 16.
5 This feature is recited in claim 16, but not recited in claim 1.
6 This feature is recited in claim 16, but not recited in claim 1.
Appeal 2019-004364
Application 15/011,183

9
§§ 2106.04(a), (d). The independent claims further recite the limitation
“using the [URL] to establish a session between the client and the service to
communicate application data and state information between the client and
the service” (claim 1) or a service manager for performing that task (claim
16). The additional elements of the present claims do not integrate the
abstract idea into a practical application because they do not impose any
meaningful limits on practicing the abstract idea for the following reasons.
Appellant does not identify persuasively how the Specification sets
forth an improvement in technology. Appeal Br. 9 (citing McRO, 837 F.3d
1299). The MPEP, which incorporates the Update, addresses how we
consider evidence of improvement that is presented to us. The Update
states:
[T]he evaluation of Prong Two requires the use of the
considerations (e.g. improving technology, effecting a particular
treatment or prophylaxis, implementing with a particular
machine, etc.) identified by the Supreme Court and the Federal
Circuit, to ensure that the claim as a whole integrates [the]
judicial exception into a practical application [that] will apply,
rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a
meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is
more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial
exception.
Update 11 (emphases added). The Update further states:
During examination, the examiner should analyze the
“improvements” consideration by evaluating the specification
and the claims to ensure that a technical explanation of the
asserted improvement is present in the specification, and that the
claim reflects the asserted improvement. Generally, examiners
are not expected to make a qualitative judgment on the merits of
the asserted improvement. If the examiner concludes the
disclosed invention does not improve technology, the burden
shifts to applicant to provide persuasive arguments supported by
Appeal 2019-004364
Application 15/011,183

10
any necessary evidence to demonstrate that one of ordinary skill
in the art would understand that the disclosed invention improves
technology. Any such evidence submitted under 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.132 must establish what the specification would convey to
one of ordinary skill in the art and cannot be used to supplement
the specification. For example, in response to a rejection under
35 U.S.C. § 101, an applicant could submit a declaration under
§ 1.132 providing testimony on how one of ordinary skill in the
art would interpret the disclosed invention as improving
technology and the underlying factual basis for that conclusion.
Update 13 (emphasis added).
We, therefore, focus on any evidence Appellant cites in its briefs, as
discussed in the Update. Appellant does not refer us to any paragraphs of
the Specification or other persuasive evidence. Appeal Br. 9 (citing McRO,
837 F.3d 1299).
At best, the present claims recite an improvement to mental processes
(i.e., an abstract idea as discussed supra in § I.D). See, e.g., Synopsys, Inc. v.
Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1151 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[A] claim
for a new abstract idea is still an abstract idea.”). “[U]nder the Mayo/Alice
framework, a claim directed to a newly discovered law of nature (or natural
phenomenon or abstract idea) cannot rely on the novelty of that discovery
for the inventive concept necessary for patent eligibility . . . .” Genetic
Techs. Ltd. v. Merial L.L.C., 818 F.3d 1369, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citations
omitted).
We determine the limitation “using the session URL and URL
payload to establish a session between the client and the service to
communicate application data and state information between the client and
the service” is the type of basic data transmission functionality that has been
determined to be insignificant post-solution activity. See buySafe, Inc. v.
Appeal 2019-004364
Application 15/011,183

11
Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2014)(stating “That a computer
receives and sends information over a network – with no further
specification – is not even arguably inventive”).
Furthermore, the remaining additional elements in the present claims,
namely “scheduler,” “client-server remote access system,” “proxy server,”
“client,” and “authentication component” do not, either individually or in
combination, integrate the abstract idea into a practical application. In
particular, Appellant’s Specification discloses that these elements
encompass generic computer components. See Spec. ¶¶ 2, 19–21, 23–24, 32
(describing these elements each as a class of devices, using open ended
terms such as “may,” “e.g.,” “an example,” etc.). Merely adding generic
computer components to perform abstract ideas does not integrate those
ideas into a practical application. See MPEP §§ 2106.04(a), (d) (citing 2019
Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 (identifying “merely includ[ing]
instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer” as an example of
when an abstract idea has not been integrated into a practical application)).
We disagree with Appellant’s argument that the present claims recite
an improvement in the functioning of the computer or an improvement in the
relevant technology by providing rules analogous to the rules in McRO.
Appeal Br. 9 (citing McRO, at 1299).
The subject claims considered by the McRO court concerned a method
for automatically animating lip synchronization and facial expressions.
McRO, 837 F.3d. at 1303. The McRO court concluded the subject claims
were not directed to an abstract idea because the computer animation
improved the prior art through the use of rules, rather than artists, to set
morph weights and transitions between phonemes. Id. at 1308. Thus, the
Appeal 2019-004364
Application 15/011,183

12
claimed invention in McRO allowed for computer performance of animation
steps that previously had to be performed by human animators. Id. at
1313. Notably, the court in McRO determined that the process required by
the claims was not a process previously used by human animators. Id. at
1314. As such, the court determined that the present claims were “unlike
Flook, Bilski, and Alice, where the claimed computer-automated process and
the prior art method were carried out in the same way.” Id. at 1314–15
(emphasis added). Therefore, the subject claims in McRO used “limited
rules in a process specifically designed to achieve an improved technological
result” over “existing, manual 3–D animation techniques.” Id. at
1316. Here, in contrast to McRO, the present claims do not recite a
computer-automated process that uses rules for animators unlike those
previously employed by humans or a similar type of improvement. Nor does
Appellant specify which claimed rules allegedly improve the relevant
technology, and how, rather than being “directed to a result or effect that
itself is the abstract idea and merely invoke[s] generic processes and
machinery.” Id. at 1314.
Appellant’s arguments that the present claims do not preempt any
abstract idea (Appeal Br. 11) do not persuade us that the claims are patent
eligible. Although preemption may denote patent ineligibility, its absence
does not demonstrate patent eligibility. See FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric
Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1098 (Fed. Cir. 2016). For claims covering a
patent-ineligible concept, preemption concerns “are fully addressed and
made moot” by an analysis under the Mayo/Alice framework. Ariosa
Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
We, therefore, conclude that the additional elements, whether
Appeal 2019-004364
Application 15/011,183

13
considered individually or as an ordered combination, do not integrate the
abstract idea into a practical application because the additional elements are
generic computer components that do not impose meaningful limits on
practicing the abstract idea.
Appellant does not make any other arguments pertaining to Step 2A,
Prong 2. Because we determine that the present claims recite an abstract
idea that is not integrated into a practical application, we proceed to Step 2B.
F. Step 2B
We disagree with Appellant’s argument that the Examiner does not
provide the evidence required by Berkheimer to support a determination that
the additional elements are well understood, routine, or conventional.
Appeal Br. 11–12 (citing Berkheimer, 881 F.3d 1360). The Examiner does
not make a specific finding that the additional elements implementing the
abstract idea are well understood, routine, and conventional. See generally
Final Act. (lacking any well-understood, routine, or conventional finding);
Ans. (lacking any well-understood, routine, or conventional finding). To the
extent that Appellant is arguing that the Specification does not support a
finding that the additional elements implementing the abstract idea are well
understood, routine, and conventional, we disagree because the Specification
indicates that the additional elements (i.e., “scheduler,” “client-server remote
access system,” “proxy server,” “client,” and “authentication component”)
are nothing more than generic computer components. Spec. ¶¶ 2, 19–21,
23–24, 32. Appellant’s Specification indicates these additional elements
were well-understood, routine, and conventional components because it
describes them at a high level of generality and in a manner that indicates
that they are sufficiently well known.
Appeal 2019-004364
Application 15/011,183

14
We further note that the courts have further described some of the
additional elements as well-known, routine, conventional activity.
Establishing a connection via a computer and transferring data over that
connection via a link over a computer network is the type of activity the
courts have found well-understood, routine, and conventional. See DDR
Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1258 (Fed. Cir.
2014)(noting the “routine and conventional sequence of events ordinarily
triggered by the click of a hyperlink”); Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 226 (stating
“Nearly every computer will include a ‘communications controller’ . . .
capable of performing the basic . . . transmission functions required” to
obtain and transmit data to other entities). Likewise, a “server” performing
its function of sending and receiving data has been described as performing
functions that are “well-understood, routine, activit[ies] previously known to
the industry.” In re TLI Communications LLC Patent Litigation, 823 F.3d
607, 614 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
Furthermore, we determine that the additional elements, either
individually or in combination, do not amount to an inventive concept. An
inventive concept “cannot be furnished by the unpatentable law of nature (or
natural phenomenon or abstract idea) itself.” Genetic, 818 F.3d at 1376; see
also 2019 Revised Guidance; Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (explaining that, after
determining a claim is directed to a judicial exception, “we then ask, ‘[w]hat
else is there in the claims before us?”’ (alteration in original) (quoting Mayo,
566 U.S. at 78)). Instead, an “inventive concept” is furnished by an element
or combination of elements that is recited in the claim in addition to the
judicial exception and sufficient to ensure the claim, as a whole, amounts to
significantly more than the judicial exception itself. Alice, 573 U.S. at 218–
Appeal 2019-004364
Application 15/011,183

15
19 (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–73); see BSG Tech LLC v. BuySeasons, Inc.,
899 F.3d 1281, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (explaining that the Supreme Court in
Alice “only assessed whether the claim limitations other than the invention’s
use of the ineligible concept to which it was directed were well-understood,
routine and conventional” (emphasis added)).
Appellant does not argue that the dependent claims recite any
additional features that would transform the abstract idea embodied in
independent claims 1 and 16 into an inventive concept. For at least the
above reasons, we conclude, under the 2019 Revised Guidance, that each of
the present claims, considered as a whole, is directed to a patent-ineligible
abstract idea that is not integrated into a practical application, and does not
include an inventive concept. We, therefore, sustain the Examiner’s
rejection of: (1) independent claims 1 and 16; and (2) dependent claims 2–
15 and 17–23 under § 101.
II. Claims 1–23 Rejected Under 35 U.S.C. § 103
The Examiner finds Agarwal teaches a login URL associated with a
login form and a cookie in a response received from a server responsive to a
client’s request for a service provided by the server, which the Examiner
maps to the limitation “creating a session uniform resource locator (URL)
that includes a URL payload that uniquely identifies the service and being
used to establish the remote access to the service by a client” recited in
claim 1 (and similarly recited in claim 16). Ans. 13 (citing Agarwal ¶¶ 6,
242); Final Act. 8 (citing Agarwal ¶ 6). The Examiner concludes it would
have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art at the time of
the invention (“PHOSITA”) to combine Ahuja’s web server allocation with
Agarwal’s creation of a session URL that includes a URL payload uniquely
Appeal 2019-004364
Application 15/011,183

16
identifying a service provided because some services on a network are
protected and access to such services can become time consuming for the
user. Final Act. 8 (citing Agarwal ¶ 3).
Appellant argues Agarwal merely teaches a cookie associated with the
login form rather than a cookie associated with the login URL. Appeal
Br. 13; Reply Br. 3. Appellant argues the claimed “session URL” is created
before the remote access session with the service is created, whereas
Agarwal teaches scanning responses from the server for certain URLs that
are generated after a client requests the service. Appeal Br. 14 (citing
Agarwal ¶ 231). Appellant argues combining Ahuja’s teaching of
intercepting client requests with Agarwal’s teaching of scanning server
responses would be inoperable for the intended purposes. Appeal Br. 14–15
(citing Ahuja, 2:21–25; Agarwal ¶¶ 225–227, 235). We disagree with
Appellant, as explained in more detail below.
We disagree with Appellant’s argument that Agarwal merely teaches
a cookie associated with the login form rather than a cookie associated with
the login URL. Appeal Br. 13; Reply Br. 3. Agarwal teaches a login URL
(i.e., URL payload that uniquely identifies the service being used to establish
remote access) associated with a login form (i.e., creating a session URL)
and a cookie in a response received from a server responsive to a client’s
request for a service provided by the server, which teaches the limitation
“creating a session uniform resource locator (URL) that includes a URL
payload that uniquely identifies the service and being used to establish the
remote access to the service by a client” recited in claim 1 (and similarly
recited in claim 16). Ans. 13 (citing Agarwal ¶¶ 6, 242); Final Act. 8 (citing
Agarwal ¶ 6). Moreover, Agarwal’s paragraph 6 teaches the disputed
Appeal 2019-004364
Application 15/011,183

17
limitation because Agarwal has the same functionality as the disputed claim
limitation.
Appellant’s argument that the claimed “session URL” is created
before the remote access session with the service is created, whereas
Agarwal teaches scanning responses from the server for certain URLs that
are generated after a client requests the service, is unavailing. Appeal Br. 14
(citing Agarwal ¶ 231). As noted in the preceding paragraph, Agarwal’s
login form (i.e., creating a session URL) is created prior to establishing the
remote access session. Ans. 13 (citing Agarwal ¶¶ 6, 242); Final Act. 8
(citing Agarwal ¶ 6).
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that combining
Ahuja’s teaching of intercepting client requests with Agarwal’s teaching of
scanning server responses would be inoperable for the intended purposes.
Appeal Br. 14–15 (citing Ahuja, 2:21–25; Agarwal ¶¶ 225–227, 235). Both
Agarwal and Aruja teach communicating the client requests with the server.
Ahuja, 2:21–25; Agarwal ¶¶ 225–227, 235. Consequently, we agree with
the Examiner’s conclusion that it would have been obvious to a PHOSITA
to combine Ahuja’s web server allocation with Agarwal’s creation of a
session URL that includes a URL payload uniquely identifying a service
provided because some services on a network are protected and access to
such services can become time consuming for the user. Final Act. 8 (citing
Agarwal ¶ 3).
Appellant does not argue claims 2–23 separately with particularity.
Appeal Br. 12–18. We, therefore, sustain the Examiner’s rejection of:
(1) independent claims 1 and 16; and (2) dependent claims 2–15 and 17–23
under § 103.
Appeal 2019-004364
Application 15/011,183

18
We have only considered those arguments that Appellant actually
raised in the Briefs. Arguments Appellant could have made, but chose not to
make, in the Briefs have not been considered and are deemed to be waived.
See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).

CONCLUSION
TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See
37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED

Claim(s)
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–23 101 Eligibility 1–23
1, 4, 9–13,
16, 19, 22,
23
103 Ahuja, Agarwal 1, 4, 9–13,
16, 19, 22,
23

2, 3 103 Ahuja, Agarwal,
Farber
2, 3
5 103 Ahuja, Agarwal,
Barry
5
6–8, 17, 18,
20, 21
103 Ahuja, Agarwal,
Barry, Kavantzas
6–8, 17, 18,
20, 21

14, 15 103 Ahuja, Agarwal,
Certain
14, 15
Overall
Outcome
1–23