Calay Venture S.à r.l.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Aug 30, 2021

2020003254 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 30, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/047,556 02/18/2016 Cevat Yerli BOEHCA155345 5731
26389 7590 08/30/2021
CHRISTENSEN O'CONNOR JOHNSON KINDNESS PLLC
1201 Third Avenue
Suite 3600
Seattle, WA 98101
EXAMINER
PRINGLE-PARKER, JASON A
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2616
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
08/30/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
efiling@cojk.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte CEVAT YERLI
___________

Appeal 2020-003254
Application 15/047,556
Technology Center 2600
____________

Before MICHAEL J. STRAUSS, JAMES B. ARPIN, and
ADAM J. PYONIN, Administrative Patent Judges.

ARPIN, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
decision rejecting claims 1, 6–8, 10–15, and 25–37. Final Act. 1.2
Appellant cancels claims 2, 3, 5, 9, and 16–24; and the Examiner objects to
claim 4 as depending from a rejected base claim. Appeal Br. 23–24 (Claims

1 “Appellant” refers to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42.
Appellant identifies the real party-in-interest as TMRW Foundation IP
SARL. Appeal Br. 3.
2 In this Decision, we refer to Appellant’s Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.,” filed
October 4, 2019) and Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed March 27, 2020); the
Final Office Action (“Final Act.,” mailed January 3, 2019) and the
Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed January 27, 2020); and the
Specification (“Spec.,” filed October 17, 2017). Rather than repeat the
Examiner’s findings and Appellant’s contentions in their entirety, we refer to
these documents.
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App.); Final Act. 4. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The claimed chips and cores “relate[] to an electronic chip or chip
assembly. In particular, the present disclosure relates to a game engine
implemented on an electronic chip or chip assembly in hardware. The
present disclosure may also relate to a system on chip or system in package.”
Spec., 1:9–12.
As noted above, claims 1, 4, 6–8, 10–15, and 25–37 are pending.
Claims 1, 25, and 35 are independent. Appeal Br. 23 (claim 1), 24–25
(claim 25), 26 (claim 35) (Claims App.). Claims 4, 6–8, 10–15, 36, and 37
depend directly or indirectly from claim 1; and claims 26–34 depend directly
or indirectly from claim 25. Id. at 23–26.
Claims 1 and 25, reproduced below with the disputed limitations
emphasized, are representative.
1. An electronic chip comprising:
a plurality of processing cores; and
at least one hardware interface coupled to the plurality of
processing cores,
wherein the plurality of processing cores implement a
plurality of hardware game engines configured to govern
behavior of 3D objects of a 3D scene and interaction with and
between the 3D objects of the 3D scene, wherein at least one of
the plurality of processing cores implements an associated ray
trace engine, wherein a game engine implemented by the at least
one processing core is coupled to the associated ray trace engine,
the associated ray trace engine being configured to augment
functionality of the game engine.
Id. at 23 (emphasis added).
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25. An electronic chip comprising:
a plurality of processing cores; and
at least one hardware interface coupled to the plurality of
processing cores, wherein at least one of the plurality of
processing cores implements one or more hardware game
engines configured to govern behavior of 3D objects of a 3D
scene and interaction with and between the 3D objects of the 3D
scene, and wherein the implementations are on-chip game
engines.
Id. at 24–25 (emphasis added). Independent claim 35 recites limitations
corresponding to the disputed limitations of claim 25. Id. at 26.
REFERENCES AND REJECTIONS
The Examiner relies upon the following references:
Name3 Reference Publ’d/Issued Filed
Sowizral US 6,570,564 B1 May 27, 2003 Sept. 22, 2000
Huang US 2005/0128203 A1 June 16, 2005 Dec. 11, 2003
Keefe US 2014/0168236 A1 June 19, 2014 Dec. 19, 2012
Chu US 2015/0251092 A1 Sept. 10, 2015 Mar. 7, 2014
Carr The Ray Engine,
Graphics Hardware,
pp. 1–10
2002 NA
Crassin Interactive Indirect
Illumination Using
Voxel Cone Tracing,
30 Pacific Graphics
2011 NA

3 All reference citations are to the first named inventor or author only.
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The Examiner rejects:
a. claims 1, 6, 10–15, 33, and 37 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious
over the combined teachings of Keefe, Carr, and Chu (Final
Act. 5–17);4
b. claim 7 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over the combined
teachings of Keefe, Carr, Chu, and Sowizral (id. at 17–18);
c. claim 8 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over the combined
teachings of Keefe, Carr, Chu, and Huang (id. at 18–20);
d. claims 25–27, 30–32, 34, and 35 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious
over the combined teachings of Keefe and Chu (id. at 22–31);
e. claim 28 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over the combined
teachings of Keefe, Chu, and Sowizral (id. at 32);
f. claim 29 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over the combined
teachings of Keefe, Chu, and Huang (id. at 33–34); and
g. claim 36 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over the combined
teachings of Keefe, Carr, Chu, and Crassin (id. at 34–35).5

4 Because the Examiner objects to, but does not reject, claim 4, we do not
consider the patentability of claim 4. MPEP § 706.01 (9th ed., Rev.
10.2019, Last Revised June 2020). Nevertheless, if prosecution resumes, the
Examiner and Appellant should consider whether claim 4 satisfies the
requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112(d).
5 The Examiner indicates that claims 20–22 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 as obvious over the combined teachings of Keefe, Carr, Chu, and U.S.
Patent Application Publication No. US 2015/0255131 A1 to Byeon et al.
Final Act. 20–22. Nevertheless, as noted above, Appellant cancels
claims 20–22. Appeal Br. 24 (Claims App.). We do not discuss claims 20–
22 further in the decision.
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We review the appealed rejections for error based upon the issues
identified by Appellant, and in light of the contentions and evidence
produced thereon. Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010)
(precedential). The Examiner and Appellant focus their findings and
contentions, respectively, on claims 1 and 25 (see Appeal Br. 9, 16;
Ans. 27); so we do as well. Arguments not made are forfeited.6 Unless
otherwise indicated, we adopt the Examiner’s findings in the Final Office
Action and the Answer as our own and add any additional findings of fact
for emphasis. We address the rejections below.
ANALYSIS
A. Obviousness over Keefe, Carr, and Chu
As noted above, the Examiner rejects claims 1, 6, 10–15, 33, and 37
under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over the combined teachings of Keefe,
Carr, and Chu. Final Act. 5–17. In particular, the Examiner finds Keefe
teaches or suggests the majority of the limitations recited in representative
claim 1. Id. at 5–7 (citing Keefe ¶¶ 12, 16, 30, 41–43, 50–53, 57, 58).
Specifically, Keefe discloses:
In one example, a system is provided to make application
image specific brightness and/or contrast adjustments.[7] The

6 See In re Google Tech. Holdings LLC, 980 F.3d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 2020)
(“We interpret the Patent Office to be arguing that Google’s failure to raise
its lexicography arguments, inadvertent or not, compels a finding of
forfeiture.”); 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2019) (“Except as provided for in
§§ 41.41, 41.47 and 41.52, any arguments or authorities not included in the
appeal brief will be refused consideration by the Board for purposes of the
present appeal.”).
7 Appellant’s claim 14 similarly limits the scope of claim 1 and recites, “the
one or more tasks include one or more of determining how the 3D objects
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system may include a light controller and an application. The
light controller may be implemented in software, such as a
component of an operating system, or be implemented in
hardware, such as a 3D graphics engine or a graphics
accelerator.
Keefe ¶ 12 (emphasis added). Further, Keefe discloses:
The processor 106 may be any component that includes
hardware and/or a combination of hardware and software that
performs logic and accesses memory. The memory may include
the memory 108 illustrated in FIG. 1 or any other memory. The
processor 106 may include a central processing unit (CPU), a two
dimensional (2D) engine, a graphics processing unit (GPU), a
general processor, a multicore processor, an application specific
integrated circuit (ASIC), a digital signal processor, a field
programmable gate array (FPGA), a digital circuit, an analog
circuit, a microcontroller, any other type of processor.
Id. ¶ 16 (emphases added); see id. ¶ 43 (“Because application images 124
may be completely rendered with the GPU—including a Graphical
User Interface—the application image specific adjustments may be
performed during the rendering stage with much lower computational
overhead than may be required in other configurations.” (emphases added)).
Keefe also discloses, “Application 1 may be a video game, for
example. The video game may use a relatively dark palette compared with
other types of applications. If the video game is played in a darkroom, then

cast shadows over other objects, determining how the 3D objects are
reflected in other objects, and determining how light falling on one 3D
object illuminates other surrounding objects.” Appeal Br. 24 (Claims App.);
see Final Act. 3 (“However Keefe teaches a 3D graphics engine, which by
definition is responsible for all functions pertaining to 3D graphics,
including governing behavior of the 3D objects. Applicant has not defined
specific behaviors, nor indicated that the behaviors are actually performed,
merely that the engine is configured to govern behaviors.”).
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the backlight level 138 may be higher in order to compensate for the dark
room.” Id. ¶ 30. Keefe’s GPU may execute shading programs. Id. ¶¶ 42,
43; see also id. ¶ 44 (“The above-described application image specific
adjustments may be performed with shading programs executed on the
GPU.”). Keefe further explains:
In some examples, the application 116 may own two or
more of the application images 124. The light adjustment
controller 128 of the application 116 may control the brightness
and/or the contrast of the application images 124 owned by the
application 116 individually. Alternatively, the light adjustment
controller 128 of the application 116 may control the brightness
and/or the contrast of the application images 124 as a group.
Id. ¶ 45; see supra note 7. Thus, the Examiner finds Keefe teaches or
suggests, “[a]n electronic chip comprising: a plurality of processing cores,”
and “at least one hardware interface coupled to the plurality of processing
cores, wherein the plurality of processing cores implement a plurality of
hardware game engines8 configured to govern behavior of 3D objects of a
3D scene and interaction with and between the 3D objects of the 3D scene,”
as recited in claim 1. Final Act. 5–7.
The Examiner finds, however, “Keefe does not expressly disclose a
ray trace engine.” Id. at 7. Thus, Keefe does not teach or suggest:
wherein at least one of the plurality of processing cores
implements an associated ray trace engine, wherein a game
engine implemented by the at least one processing core is

8 To the extent that Keefe does not expressly teach or suggest, “the plurality
of processing cores implement a plurality of hardware game engines” (but
see Keefe ¶¶ 12, 16 (quoted above)), the Examiner finds that the duplication
of components, without an accompanying change in function, is well known
and not a patentable distinction (Final Act. 6; Ans. 30–31). But see also
Ans. 36 (finding Chu teaches or suggests this limitation).
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coupled to the associated ray trace engine, the associated ray
trace engine being configured to augment functionality of the
game engine,
as recited in claim 1. Appeal Br. 23 (emphases added).
Nevertheless, the Examiner finds Carr teaches or suggests these
limitations that are missing from Keefe and a person of ordinary skill in the
relevant art would have had reason to combine Carr’s teachings with Keefe’s
to achieve these limitations of claim 1. Final Act. 7–8. In particular, Carr
discloses, “The core of any ray tracer is the intersection of rays with
geometry.” Carr, Sec. 3.1. Further, in Section 4, Carr provides an example
of performing ray triangle intersection on a GPU. Specifically, Carr
explains:
The pixel shader implementation of ray-triangle intersection
treats the GPU as a SIMD parallel processor. In this model, the
framebuffer is treated as an accumulator data array of 5-vectors
(r,g,b,α,z), and texture maps are used as data arrays for input and
variables. Pixel shaders perform sequences of operations that
combine the textures and the framebuffer. While compilers exist
for multipass programming, the current limitations of pixel
shaders required complete knowledge and control of the
available instructions and registers to implement ray intersection.
Carr, Sec. 4 (footnotes omitted); see Final Act. 7. The Examiner further
finds,
At the time of the invention, it would have been obvious
to a person of ordinary skill in the art to use ray tracing as taught
by Carr. The rationale for doing so would have been that ray
tracing provides a very high degree of visual realism. Further,
the motivation to do so would have been that Keefe teaches
multiple processors including a GPU, which is specifically for
graphics processing, and Carr teaches using the GPU for ray
tracing, which is a known technique used to improve a GPU, and
will yield predictable results of generating graphics data.
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Therefore it would have been obvious to combine Carr with
Keefe to obtain the invention.
Final Act. 7–8 (emphases added); see Ans. 34–35; see also Spec., 17:15–24
(“As will be acknowledged by those skilled in the art, the typical
functionality of a ray trace engine is known.”).
Although the Examiner finds Keefe teaches or suggests, “a plurality
of processors and engines, where the engine governs 3D behavior,” the
Examiner further finds Chu teaches these limitations and a person of
ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to combine Chu’s teachings
with those of Keefe and Carr. Final Act. 8–9. In particular,
Chu discloses:
The server 106 may include one or more processors 114 and one
or more computer readable media 116. The processors 114 may
include one or more central processing units (CPUs), graphics
processing units (GPUs), arithmetic processing units (APUs),
other types of processing units, and/or any combination thereof.
Chu ¶ 22 (emphases added). Further, Chu discloses:
For example, the game engine may include a rendering engine
for 2D or 3D graphics, a physics engine, collision detection (and
collision response), sound, scripting, animation, artificial
intelligence, networking, streaming, memory management,
threading, etc. In FIG. 1, the first game module 118 is based on
a first game engine 122 and the Mth game module 120 is based
on an Mth game engine 124. In some implementations, the game
engines 122 to 124 may be the same game engine while in other
implementations, at least two of the game engines 122 to 124
may be different from each other.
Id. ¶ 23 (emphases added). Thus, the Examiner finds Chu teaches or
suggests a plurality of game engines implemented on a plurality of
processors and the engines “configured to govern behavior of 3D objects of
a 3D scene and interaction with and between the 3D objects of the 3D
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scene,” e.g., collisions between objects and the objects’ responses to such
collisions. Final Act. 8. Moreover, a person of ordinary skill in the relevant
art would have had reason to combine Chu’s teachings with those of Keefe
and Carr “to provide a wide range of games,” and, thus, to achieve the chips
of claim 1. Id. at 9 (citing Chu ¶ 23).
Appellant contends the Examiner errs in rejecting claim 1 for four
reasons. Appeal Br. 9–14. On this record, Appellant does not persuade us
the Examiner errs.
First, Appellant contends, “the Examiner’s central argument relating
to the teaching of Keefe — that the 3D graphics engine ‘by definition is
responsible for all functions pertaining to 3D graphics, including governing
behavior of the 3D objects’ — is not supported by the actual disclosure of
Keefe.” Appeal Br. 9–10 (underlining omitted). In particular, Appellant
contends that Keefe mentions a “3D graphics engine” only once, and
Keefe identifies the 3D graphics engine only as a possible
location for implementation of Keefe’s “light controller.”
Contrary to the Examiner’s argument regarding its “definition,”
the 3D graphics engine is not defined or even described in Keefe.
There is no reference anywhere in Keefe to 3D objects, let alone
to governing behavior of 3D objects of a 3D scene, or interaction
with and between such objects.
Id. at 10. Further, Appellant contends that Keefe’s disclosure of the use of
OpenGL refers to software, and, thus, does not support a finding that Keefe
teaches or suggests a “hardware game engine.” Id.
Specifically, Appellant contends (a) the Examiner improperly finds
that Keefe inherently discloses a “hardware game engine” and (b) the
Examiner fails to show where Keefe teaches or suggests the “behavior of 3D
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objects of a 3D scene or interaction with and between such objects.” Id. at
10–11. We disagree with Appellant.
With regard to inherency, the Examiner makes no such finding.
Instead, the Examiner relies on Keefe’s disclosure of a 3D graphics engine,
the execution of OpenGL software and game applications on a GPU, and
implementations in hardware, software, or combinations thereof to support
the finding that Keefe teaches or suggests hardware game engines. Final
Act. 5–7 (citing Keefe ¶¶ 12, 16, 30, 41, 57, 58); see In re Preda, 401 F.2d
825, 826 (CCPA 1968) (“[I]t is proper to take into account not only specific
teachings of the reference but also the inferences which one skilled in the art
would reasonably be expected to draw therefrom.”). We are not persuaded
the Examiner errs, because the Examiner does not find Keefe inherently
teaches or suggests the recited, hardware game engine.
With regard to “govern[ing] behavior of 3D objects of a 3D scene and
interaction with and between the 3D objects of the 3D scene” (Appeal Br. 23
(Claims App.)), we are persuaded the Examiner adequately shows that in
Keefe’s disclosure, “OPENGL® ES 2.0 is a cross-platform API for full-
function 2D and 3D graphics on embedded systems—including consoles,
phones, mobile devices, appliances and vehicles” (Keefe ¶ 41 (emphasis
added)) teaches or suggests this limitation. See also Keefe ¶ 53 (“The light
adjustment request 140 may be specific to the application image 124 in the
display area 122, where the application image 124 is owned by the
application 116.”). Nevertheless, as the Examiner explains, to the extent
Keefe’s disclosure is insufficient to teach or suggest hardware game engines
“configured to govern behavior of 3D objects of a 3D scene and interaction
with and between the 3D objects of the 3D scene,” Chu teaches or suggests
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this limitation. Ans. 30; see Keefe ¶ 16; Chu ¶¶ 57, 110 (cited at Appeal Br.
12; Reply Br. 2). The Examiner finds, “Chu recites explicitly a game engine
for 3D graphics where the game engine can include a physics engine and
collision detection (and collision response).” Ans. 30 (emphasis added); see
Chu ¶¶ 22, 23 (quoted above). Within the context of a game, we agree with
the Examiner that collision detection and collision response teach or suggest,
“govern[ing] behavior of 3D objects of a 3D scene and interaction with and
between the 3D objects of the 3D scene.” Appeal Br. 23 (Claims App.).
Thus, we also agree with the Examiner that Keefe and/or Chu teach(es) or
suggest(s) this disputed limitation.9 Final Act. 6–7, 8–9.
Consequently, we are not persuaded of Examiner error by this first
reason.
Second, Appellant contends, “Chu also fails to teach any hardware
game engines configured to govern behavior of 3D objects of a 3D scene
and interaction with and between the 3D objects of the 3D scene.” Appeal
Br. 11 (underlining omitted). Specifically, Appellant contends, “Although
Chu mentions game engines in paragraphs [0023], [0026], [0030], [0059],
and [0068], Chu (like Keefe) fails to disclose a hardware game engine.” Id.
(emphasis added).
Chu discloses, “The game engine may provide a software framework
for developers to create and develop video games.” Id. (quoting Chu ¶ 23

9 The Examiner also cites to several sources to demonstrate that graphics
engines are well known and teach or suggest the recited “games engines.”
Ans. 30–31. Appellant challenges the Examiner’s reliance on those sources.
Reply Br. 4–5 n.1. Because we are persuaded Keefe and/or Chu teach(es) or
suggest(s) the disputed limitation, we need not reach this additional basis for
the rejection.
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(italics added)). From this, Appellant concludes, “Chu’s game engines are
specifically described as being implemented in software.” Id.
Appellant asserts:
Chu makes vague references to possible “hardware”
implementations of certain functions by way of mentioning that
operations depicted in “the flow diagrams of FIGS. 4-6” or
“functions described with reference to the figures” “can be
implemented in hardware, software, or a combination thereof.”
(See paragraphs [0057] and [0110].) But these vague references
do not address game engines and do not overcome Chu’s explicit
identification of game engines as software.
Id. at 12 (emphasis added). We disagree with Appellant.
The applied references “must be considered for all that [they] teach[]
to those of ordinary skill in the art, not just the embodiments disclosed
therein.” In re Arora, 369 F. App’x 120, 122 (Fed. Cir. 2010); see In re
Inland Steel Co., 265 F.3d 1354, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re Fritch, 972
F.2d 1260, 1264 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Initially, Appellant does not persuade us
that the disclosure of a single embodiment limits Chu’s teachings to game
engines embodied only in software. In addition, Appellant does not
persuade us that in Chu’s disclosure, “[t]he term ‘module,’ ‘mechanism’ or
‘component’ as used herein generally represents software, hardware, or a
combination of software and hardware that can be configured to implement
prescribed functions” is vague, or somehow does not refer to a game engine.
Chu ¶ 110; see Appeal Br. 11–12. Chu expressly discloses, “Each game
module 118 may be based on a game engine.” Chu ¶ 23. Thus, we are
persuaded that Chu discloses game engines; and those game engines clearly
may be hardware, software, or a combination thereof.
Nevertheless, as noted above, the Examiner relies on Keefe and/or
Chu to teach or suggest the “hardware game engines.” Ans. 32; see Final
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Act. 6–7 (citing Keefe ¶¶ 12, 16, 30, 41). Thus, either reference’s teachings
alone or their combined teachings is sufficient to teach or suggest this
limitation. As noted above, here, we agree with the Examiner that Keefe
and/or Chu teach(es) or suggest(s) this limitation.
Consequently, we are not persuaded of Examiner error by this second
reason.
Third, Appellant contends, “Carr does not make up for all the
deficiencies of Keefe and Chu, and the proposed combination with Carr fails
to teach a hardware game engine coupled to a ray trace engine configured to
augment functionality of the game engine.” Appeal Br. 12 (underlining
omitted). In particular, Appellant contends, “Carr is not describing a ray
trace engine coupled to a game engine. Instead, Carr is simply raising the
possibility that the efficiency of its ray engine may be improved by
borrowing a strategy for mitigating readback delay that was suggested for a
particular version of OpenGL.” Id. at 12–13. We disagree with Appellant.
The Examiner correctly notes, “Carr is not cited as teaching a
hardware game engine. Rather, Carr is cited as teaching a ray trace engine
on a GPU. Keefe teaches a game engine on a GPU.” Ans. 33. Thus, the
Examiner relies on the combined teachings of Keefe and Carr to teach or
suggest, “at least one of the plurality of processing cores implements an
associated ray trace engine.” Appeal Br. 23 (Claims App.). Appellant
cannot show nonobviousness by attacking references individually when the
rejection is based on the references’ combined teachings. See In re Merck &
Co., Inc., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986); In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413,
426 (CCPA 1981).
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Appellant further contends,
the Examiner’s rationale for combining Carr with Keefe in an
effort to arrive at the claimed invention is deficient. The
Examiner argued that “it would have been obvious to a person of
ordinary skill in the art to use ray tracing as taught by Carr”
because “ray tracing provides a very high degree of visual
realism.” ([Final Act.] 7-8.) However, Claim 1 does not refer
only to using ray tracing, but instead recites that “at least one of
the plurality of processing cores implements an associated ray
trace engine, wherein a game engine implemented by the at least
one processing core is coupled to the associated ray trace
engine.”
Appeal Br. 13. Appellant misunderstands the Examiner’s combination of
the references’ teachings.
As noted above, the Examiner finds Keefe teaches or suggests a
processor with a plurality of processing cores (see Final Act. 6 (citing Keefe
¶ 16)) and Keefe and/or Chu teach(es) or suggest(s) a hardware game engine
(see id. at 6 (citing Keefe ¶¶ 41–43), 8 (citing Chu ¶ 23)). The Examiner
finds that Carr teaches or suggests including a ray tracing engine on a GPU
running OpenGL software (see id. at 7 (citing Carr, Sec. 5.2 (Fig. 5), 6.3)),
the same or substantially similar OpenGL software run on Keefe’s GPU (see
Keefe ¶ 41). Moreover, as also noted above, the Specification discloses that
those of ordinary skill in the relevant art would have known the functionality
and advantages of the ray tracing engines. Spec., 17:15–24. The
U.S. Supreme Court has found, “if a technique has been used to improve one
device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would
improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious
unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill.” KSR Int’l Co. v.
Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007). Here, the Examiner persuades us
that the combination of Carr’s teachings with those of Keefe and Chu results
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in an improvement that is no “more than the predictable use of prior art
elements according to their established functions.” Id.; see Ans. 34–35.10
Consequently, we are not persuaded of Examiner error by this third
reason.
Fourth, Appellant contends, “the Examiner’s allegation that the
recitation of ‘the plurality of processing cores implement a plurality of
hardware game engines’ involves ‘mere duplication of parts’ that ‘has no
patentable significance’ because ‘it combines prior art elements according to
known methods to yield predictable results’ is also unfounded.” Appeal
Br. 13–14 (underlining omitted). In particular, Appellant contends, “the
Examiner has failed to show that even a single one of the claimed hardware
game engines is prior art. Thus, in order to arrive at the claimed
arrangement, a skilled person would need to not simply ‘duplicate’ but
substantively modify the system described in Keefe or Chu.” Id. We
disagree with Appellant.
As noted above, we are persuaded the Examiner adequately shows
that Keefe and/or Chu teach(es) or suggest(s) the recited, hardware game
engines. See, e.g., Final Act. 6 (citing Keefe ¶¶ 41–43), 8 (citing Chu ¶ 23));
Ans. 30. Moreover, we agree with the Examiner that claim 1 does “not
recite additional functional language that makes it more than a duplication,
for example there is no recitation of data being passed between the
engines/cores, the engines/cores working in parallel, etc. merely that a

10 The Examiner proposes an additional rationale based on Chu’s teachings
for combining the teachings of Keefe, Carr, and Chu to achieve the disputed
limitation. Ans. 35. Because the Examiner’s rationale as expressed in the
Final Office Action is persuasive, we need not reach this additional
rationale.
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plurality exists.” Ans. 35; see MPEP § 2144.04(VI)(B) (9th ed., Rev.
10.2019, Last Revised June 2020) (“Although the reference did not disclose
a plurality of ribs, the court held that mere duplication of parts has no
patentable significance unless a new and unexpected result is produced.”
(citation omitted)). Thus, the Examiner’s finding regarding the duplication
of parts in claim 1 is not improper.
In addition, the Examiner finds,
a secondary reference Chu was included and the Office Action
specifically noted that while Keefe teaches the plurality of
processors and engines, Chu provides additional clarity for the
limitations. Therefore the [MPEP §] 2144.04 Duplication of
Parts is not solely relied upon for the teaching. Rather, Chu
teaches a plurality of processors and a plurality of game engines.
Ans. 36; see Chu ¶ 23 (describing the first to the Mth game modules and the
first to the Mth game engines), Fig. 1. We agree with the Examiner that Chu
in view of Keefe teaches or suggests this disputed limitation.
Consequently, we are not persuaded of Examiner error by this fourth
reason.
On this record, we are not persuaded the Examiner errs in rejecting
independent claim 1 as obvious over the combined teachings of Keefe, Carr,
and Chu; and we sustain that rejection. Further, Appellant does not
challenge the obviousness rejection of dependent claims 6, 10–15, 33, and
37, separately. See Appeal Br. 14–15. Thus, we also sustain the rejection of
those claims.
B. Obviousness over Keefe and Chu
As noted above, the Examiner rejects claims 25–27, 30–32, 34, and 35
under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over the combined teachings of Keefe and
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Chu. Final Act. 22–31. Claim 25 is representative and differs from claim 1
primarily because claims 25 does not recite, “at least one of the plurality of
processing cores implements an associated ray trace engine.” Appeal
Br. 24–25 (Claims App.) (emphasis added); see id. at 26 (claim 35). Thus,
the Examiner’s findings regarding the teachings of Keefe and Chu with
respect to claim 25 are substantially similar to the Examiner’s findings
regarding those references’ teachings with respect to claim 1. See Appeal
Br. 17 (“In rejecting Claims 25 and 35, the Examiner used rationale similar
to the rejection of Claim 1 with respect to the proposed combination of
Keefe and Chu, as described above.”).
Appellant challenges the obviousness rejection of claims 25–27, 30–
32, 34, and 35 for the first and second reasons discussed above. Appeal
Br. 16–20; see supra Section A. Therefore, for the reasons discussed above,
we also sustain the obviousness rejection of independent claims 25 and 35,
as well as of dependent claims 26, 27, 30–32, and 34, which are not argued
separately from their base claim.
C. Remaining Claims
The Examiner rejects claims 7 and 8 as obvious over the combined
teachings of Keefe, Carr, and Chu, in combination with the teachings of
Sowizral or Huang. Final Act. 17–20. The Examiner also rejects claims 28,
29, and 36 as obvious over the combined teachings of Keefe and Chu, in
combination with the teachings of Sowizral, Huang, or Carr and Cassin. Id.
at 32–35. Appellant does not challenge the rejections of claims 7, 8, and 36
separately from their base claim, claim 1, or of claims 28 and 29 separately
from their base claim, claim 25. See Appeal Br. 15–16, 20–21. Therefore,
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for the reasons discussed above, we also sustain the obviousness rejections
of dependent claims 7, 8, 28, 29, and 36.
DECISION
1. The Examiner does not err in rejecting:
a. claims 1, 6, 10–15, 33, and 37 as obvious over the combined
teachings of Keefe, Carr, and Chu;
b. claim 7 as obvious over the combined teachings of Keefe, Carr,
Chu, and Sowizral;
c. claim 8 as obvious over the combined teachings of Keefe, Carr,
Chu, and Huang;
d. claims 25–27, 30–32, 34, and 35 as obvious over the combined
teachings of Keefe and Chu;
e. claim 28 as obvious over the combined teachings of Keefe,
Chu, and Sowizral;
f. claim 29 as obvious over the combined teachings of Keefe,
Chu, and Huang; and
g. claim 36 as obvious over the combined teachings of Keefe,
Carr, Chu, and Crassin.
2. Thus, on this record, claims 1, 6–8, 10–15, and 25–37 are not
patentable.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the Examiner’s rejections of claims 1, 6–8, 10–15, and 25–
37.
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DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claim(s)
Rejected
35
U.S.C. §
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 6, 10–15,
33, 37
103 Keefe, Carr, Chu 1, 6, 10–15,
33, 37

7 103 Keefe, Carr, Chu,
Sowizral
7
8 103 Keefe, Carr, Chu,
Huang
8
25–27, 30–32,
34, 35
103 Keefe, Chu 25–27, 30–
32, 34, 35

28 103 Keefe, Chu, Sowizral 28
29 103 Keefe, Chu, Huang 29
36 103 Keefe, Carr, Chu,
Crassin
36
Overall
Outcome
1, 6–8, 10–
15, 25–37

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED