CAFFEINATION CREDIT MANAGER (SERIES 1 OF CAFFINATION SERIES,LLC

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Mar 16, 2020

14186128 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Mar. 16, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/186,128 02/21/2014 Myles Kenneth Leighton 1228-2 1432
145423 7590 03/16/2020
Borchers, Hall, Hatfield, Purks & Wall, PLLC
P.O. Box 30789
Raleigh, NC 27622-0789
EXAMINER
LICKTEIG, BLANE A
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3691
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/16/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
instructions@sagepat.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
________________

Ex parte MYLES KENNETH LEIGHTON, and
CURT DANIEL SZYMANSKI1
________________

Appeal 2019–002335
Application 14/186,128
Technology Center 3600
________________

Before: ERIC B. GRIMES, FRANCISCO C. PRATS, and JOHN G. NEW,
Administrative Patent Judges.

NEW, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to the “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.142. Appellant identifies Caffeination Credit Manager
(Series 1 of Caffeination Series, LLC) as the real party-in-interest. App.
Br. 1.
Appeal 2019–002335
Application 14/186,128

2
SUMMARY
Appellant files this Appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the
Examiner’s Final Rejection of claims 1, 6, 9, 11–17, 21, and 23–27 as
unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to nonstatutory subject
matter.
We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

NATURE OF THE CLAIMED INVENTION
Appellant’s claimed invention is directed to methods, systems and
computer program products of aggregating data with minimal data entry to
create, format, share, merge, securely store, update, and display affordability
with reason of a credit application on a mobile device and website. Abstr.

REPRESENTATIVE CLAIM
Independent claim 1 is representative of the claims on appeal
and recites:
1. A computer system, comprising:

a processor; and

a memory coupled to the processor, the memory
comprising computer readable program code embodied therein
that, when executed by the processor, causes the processor to
perform operations comprising:

receiving, via a user interface, a first user input that
comprises a social network login;

Appeal 2019–002335
Application 14/186,128

3
transmitting a request to the social network to receive
personal user data from the social network, wherein the personal
user data includes a name of the user and a city of the user;

aggregating the personal user data in a primary
aggregating operation corresponding to the personal user data
received from the social network;

aggregating secondary data by requesting data from a
plurality of different data repositories including at least two of a
credit data repository, a government agency, and an asset
aggregator;

sorting and matching aggregated personal user data and
secondary data into standard data fields;

generating a user data file corresponding to the user and
including the sorted and matched aggregated data;

receiving, via the user interface, a credit application
selection input corresponding to a credit application type of a
plurality of credit application types;

receiving, via the user interface, a form selection input
corresponding to which form of a plurality of forms to use for a
credit application;

receiving an affordability analysis input from the user via
the user interface; and

generating an affordability analysis responsive to
receiving the affordability analysis input and that is based on the
user data file and the credit application type, wherein the
affordability analysis includes at least one suggestion for
improving an affordability characteristic that includes rates
and/or buying power;

Appeal 2019–002335
Application 14/186,128

4
generating the credit application having a standard format
based on the user data file and the credit application selection
input; and

transmitting the generated credit application to the user.

App. Br. 21–22.

ISSUES AND ANALYSES
We agree and adopt, the Examiner’s findings, reasoning, and
conclusion that the claims on appeal are directed to nonstatutory subject
matter. We address the arguments raised sequentially by Appellant below.

Issue
Appellant argues that the Examiner erred because the claims: (1) are
not directed to a judicially-created exception to 35 U.S.C. § 101; and (2)
recite significantly more than the allegedly abstract idea. App. Br. 8, 11.

Analysis
The Examiner finds that the claims recite concepts relating to data
comparisons and organizing or analyzing information that can be performed
mentally or are analogous to human mental work, specifically: (1)
transmitting a request to a social network to receive personal user data; (2)
aggregating the personal user data in a primary aggregating operation; (3)
aggregating secondary data from a plurality of different data repositories; (4)
sorting and matching the aggregated data into standard data fields; (5)
generating a user data file including the aggregated data; and (6) generating
a credit application having a standard format. Final Act. 15.
Appeal 2019–002335
Application 14/186,128

5
The Examiner finds that the claims also recite concepts relating to
managing relationships or transactions between people that have been
identified as methods of organizing human activity, including: (1) receiving
a first user input that comprises a social network login; (2) receiving a credit
application selection input corresponding to a credit application type; (3)
receiving a form selection input to use for a credit application; (4) receiving
an affordability analysis; (5) generating an affordability analysis based on
the user data file and the credit application type; and (6) transmitting the
generated credit application to the user. Final Act. 15–16.
The Examiner also finds that the claims, as a whole, embody concepts
relating to the performance of financial transactions that have been identified
as fundamental economic practices. Final Act. 16. The Examiner finds that
the claimed method involves gathering data from various sources for a
selected credit application, analyzing the data including an affordability
analysis (analogous to being preapproved for a certain mortgage amount and
recommending ways to increase the amount or determining how much of a
car loan one can afford), and completing the credit application. Id.
The Examiner finds that the claim recites additional elements, viz., a
processor, memory, a user interface and a computer program product;
however the Examiner also finds that these additional elements do not
amount to significantly more than the abstract idea itself. Final Act. 17
(citing Interim Guidance, 79(241) Fed. Reg. 74624 (December 16, 2014)
(The “2014 Guidance”)).
The Examiner concludes that looking at the limitations as an ordered
combination adds nothing that is not already present when looking at the
Appeal 2019–002335
Application 14/186,128

6
elements taken individually, and that the claims are therefore directed to
nonstatutory subject matter. Final Act. 19.
Appellant argues that the claims on appeal are directed to facilitating
data management for, and generation and transmission of, a credit
application. App. Br. 9. Appellant contends that the claims are therefore
directed to a statutory category, i.e., because the claims recite a memory, a
processor, and a user interface, the claims are directed to at least a process,
machine, or manufacture, which are statutory categories. Id.
Appellant next turns to Step 2A of the 2014 Guidance, and argues that
the claimed method of facilitating data management for a credit application,
and generating and transmitting the application, improves the functioning of
credit applications by managing the credit application data and providing a
user customizable credit application to the user. App. Br. 10. Therefore,
Appellant contends, the claims do not recite any judicial exception to
Section 101.2 Id.

2 Appellant argues further that:

Here, by reducing the recitations of Claims 15–24 and 28–43 to
“exchanging and resolving financial obligations based on
probabilities created during a distribution of cards, wagering
tokens/chips used to represent and indicate the financial aspects
of the game,” the Office Action has violated the dictates of
Enfish, and has instead improperly oversimplified the claims in
a manner that is “untethered from the language of the claims.”

For example, like the “physical processing of checks” at issue in
Solutran, claim 15 recites providing a physical “instant win
gaming ticket” with a physical “removable cover.” Claim 15 also
Appeal 2019–002335
Application 14/186,128

7
Appellant argues further that the Examiner’s alleged reduction of the
recitations of claims 15–24 and 28–433 to “exchanging and resolving
financial obligations” merely asks whether the claims involve a patent-
ineligible concept, but by ignoring the physical products and processes
recited by the claims, the Office Action violates the holdings of the Federal
Circuit in Enfish LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir.
2016) and the District Court of Minnesota’s holding in Solutran, Inc. v. U.S.
Bancorp and Elavon, Inc., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 194336, *15 (D. Minn.
Nov. 27, 2017), because it does not consider whether, in light of Appellant’s
Specification, the character of the claim as a whole is directed to excluded
subject matter. App. Br. 11. According to Appellant, just as claims reciting
the physical processing of checks in Solutran were held to be directed to

recites, after the physical “removal of the cover by the player,”
physically “receiving a tender of the instant win gaming ticket
from the player for redemption.”

App. Br. 10–11.

We are unable to follow Appellant’s argument. Dependent claim 15
recites, in its entirety: “The method according to Claim 14, wherein the
user input comprises a social network login corresponding to a social
network.” Nowhere in the claims on appeal can we discern the terms
“player,” “cover,” or “instant win gaming ticket,” let alone the limitations
quoted here by the Appellant. Appellant appears to be arguing claims
other than those presently on appeal, and we are consequently unable to
evaluate Appellant’s argument in this respect.

3 See fn.2. The claims on appeal are claims 1, 6, 9, 11–17, 21, and 23–27.
There are no claims 28–43 on appeal in the present proceeding, and
Appellant appears to be referring to claims in some other appeal.
Appeal 2019–002335
Application 14/186,128

8
eligible subject matter, so too are claims 15–24 and 28–434, which are
directed, inter alia, to providing a credit application that is based on user
data and user inputs that are received via the user interface. Id.
Appellant next argues that the Examiner “provides no express factual
finding that the additional features of the claims are well-understood,
routine, or conventional.”5 App. Br. 12. Appellant contends that the
Examiner has not provided any statements that would satisfy the
requirements of USPTO memorandum, Changes in Examination Procedure
Pertaining to Subject Matter Eligibility, Recent Subject Matter Eligibility
Decision (April 19, 2018) (the “2018 memorandum”). Id. at 15.
Additionally, argues Appellant, the claims of the present application define
subject matter that is both novel and nonobvious relative to the cited
references because there is no prior art rejection of any pending claim. Id.
Appellant asserts that, because the claims recite an inventive concept, they
necessarily recite subject matter that is “significantly more” than an abstract
idea, and therefore patent-eligible.6 Id.

4 See fn.3 supra.

5 Appellant argues that: “The Office Action contends that elements such as
lottery cards are not sufficient to amount to more than the judicial
exception.” App. Br. 12 (citing Final Act. 3–4). Again, we are unable to
find the claim term “lottery cards” recited or implied in any of the claims
on appeal.

6 Similarly, Appellant argues that: “There is no question that the claims
satisfy the textual requirements of § 101, because they recite, inter alia,
physically providing and receiving a physical instant win ticket.” App. Br.
17. And on pages 18–19 of the Appeal Brief, Appellant argues that:
Appeal 2019–002335
Application 14/186,128

9
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments. In performing an
analysis of patentability under Section 101, we follow the framework set
forth by the Supreme Court in Mayo Collaborative Servc’s v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012). We are also mindful of, and guided by, the
United States Patent and Trademark Office’s 2019 Revised Patent Subject
Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84(4) Fed. Reg. 50–57 (January 7, 2019) (the
“2019 Guidance”).
Appellant’s claim 1 recites: “A computer system, comprising: a
processor; and a memory…, the memory comprising computer readable
program code embodied therein that, when executed by the processor,
causes the processor to perform operations comprising….” Following the
first step of the Mayo analysis, we find that the claims are directed to a
machine that performs a process, or method, and therefore fall into one of
the broad statutory categories of patent-eligible subject matter under 35
U.S.C. § 101.
In the next step of the Mayo analysis, we determine whether the
claims at issue are directed to a nonstatutory, patent-ineligible concept, i.e., a
law of nature, a phenomenon of nature, or an abstract idea. Mayo, 566 U.S.
at 70–71. If the claims are so directed, we next consider the elements of
each claim both individually and “as an ordered combination” to determine
whether additional elements “transform the nature of the claim” into a

“Because the claims recite a new or original instant game ticket, the claims
are directed to significantly more than an abstract idea.” Once again, we
are unable to determine the sense of this argument because it does not
reflect, in any way, the language of the claims on appeal. Consequently,
we do not reach these arguments.
Appeal 2019–002335
Application 14/186,128

10
patent-eligible application. Id. at 78–79; see also Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v.
Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Specifically, the
Supreme Court considered this second step as determining whether the
claims recite an element or combination of elements that is “sufficient to
ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent
upon the [ineligible concept] itself.” Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–73.
More specifically, in this second step of the Mayo analysis, we look to
whether the claim recites one of the judicially-created exceptions to Section
101, i.e., an abstract idea, a law of nature, or a natural phenomenon. See
2019 Guidance 54 (Step 2A, Prong 1). If we determine that the claim recites
a judicial exception, we then determine whether the limitations of the claim
reciting the judicial exception are integrated into a practical application. Id.
(Step 2A, Prong 2).
Finally, if we determine that the claim is directed to a judicially-
created exception to Section 101, we evaluate the claim under the next step
of the Mayo analysis, considering the elements of each claim both
individually and “as an ordered combination” to determine whether
additional elements “transform the nature of the claim” into a patent-eligible
application. Mayo, 566 U.S. at 78–79; 2019 Guidance at 56 (Step 2B).
Claim 1 recites “caus[ing] the processor [of the claimed computer
system] to perform operations comprising”: (1) receiving a social network
login; (2) transmitting a request to the social network for personal user data;
(3) aggregating the personal user data; (4) aggregating secondary data by
requesting data from a plurality of different sources; (5) sorting and
matching the aggregated personal user data and secondary data into standard
data fields; (6) generating a user data file; (7) receiving a credit application
Appeal 2019–002335
Application 14/186,128

11
selection input; (8) receiving a form selection input; (9) receiving an
affordability analysis input; (10) generating an affordability analysis that is
based on the user data file and the credit application type; and (11)
generating and (12) transmitting the credit application in a standard format.
We agree with the Examiner that the claims recite an abstract idea
and, more specifically, gathering personal data and generating a credit
application in a standard format, constituting “a fundamental economic
practice long prevalent in our system of commerce,” which is an intangible
entity. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010); see also buySAFE, Inc.
v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
Basically, claim 1 recites a series of receiving (limitation 1, 3, 4, 7, 8),
processing (limitations 3–5, 10–11), and transmitting information (limitation
12) steps performed on a generic computer. See Spec. ¶¶ 54–55. Our
reviewing court, in Electric Power Group, LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d
1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016), held that “[i]nformation as such is an intangible.”
830 F.3d at 1353 (citing Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 550 U.S. 437,
451 n.12 (2007); Bayer AG v. Housey Pharm., Inc., 340 F.3d 1367, 1372
(Fed. Cir. 2003)).
Similarly, the court held that “collecting information, including when
limited to particular content (which does not change its character as
information), [is] within the realm of abstract ideas.” Id. at 1354 (citing,
e.g., TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 613 (Fed. Cir. 2016);
Digitech Image Techs., LLC v. Elecs. for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344, 1351
(Fed. Cir. 2014); SmartGene, Inc. v. Advanced Biological Labs., SA, 555
Fed.Appx. 950, 955 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life
Assurance Co. of Canada (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012);
Appeal 2019–002335
Application 14/186,128

12
CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1372 (Fed. Cir.
2011); SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 601 F.3d 1319, 1333 (Fed.
Cir. 2010)). The Federal Circuit has also recognized that merely presenting
the results of abstract processes of collecting and analyzing information,
without more (such as identifying a particular tool for presentation), is
abstract as an ancillary part of such collection and analysis. Id. (citing e.g.,
Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n,
776 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772
F.3d 709, 715 (Fed. Cir. 2014)).
Here, as in Electric Power Grp., the claims are directed to a
combination of these abstract-idea processes. 830 F.3d at 1354. They are
directed to a process of gathering, processing, and analyzing information of
a specified content, then sending the results to an end user. Id. We conclude
that the claims are therefore directed to an abstract idea.
Furthermore, in DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d
1245 (2014), the Federal Circuit reviewed a number of cases with facts
similar to those of the appeal before us that were found to be directed to
abstract ideas and therefore patent ineligible:
In buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir.
2014), the claims recited no more than using a computer to send
and receive information over a network in order to implement the
abstract idea of creating a “transaction performance guaranty.”
In Accenture Global Servs., GmbH v. Guidewire Software, Inc.,
728 F.3d 1336, 1344–45 (Fed. Cir. 2013), the claims merely
recited “generalized software components arranged to
implement an abstract concept [of generating insurance-policy-
related tasks based on rules to be completed upon the occurrence
of an event] on a computer.” And in Bancorp Servc’s, L.L.C. v.
Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed.
Cir. 2012), the claims recited no more than the use of a computer
Appeal 2019–002335
Application 14/186,128

13
“employed only for its most basic function, the performance of
repetitive calculations,” to implement the abstract idea of
managing a stable-value protected life insurance policy. Under
Supreme Court precedent, the above claims were recited too
broadly and generically to be considered sufficiently specific and
meaningful applications of their underlying abstract ideas.
Although many of the claims recited various computer hardware
elements, these claims in substance were directed to nothing
more than the performance of an abstract business practice on the
Internet or using a conventional computer. Such claims are not
patent-eligible.

773 F.3d at 1256.
Similarly, in the appeal presently before us, the claims recite using a
“processor,” i.e., a generic computer, to receive, organize, and transmit
information to and from customers. As such, we find that the claims are
directed to: “nothing more than the performance of an abstract business
practice on the Internet or using a conventional computer” and use
“generalized software components arranged to implement an abstract
concept [a series of task-based rules] on a computer.” Id.
Even more specifically, we find that the limitations recited in claim 1
are analogous to those at issue in Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315
(Fed. Cir. 2012). In Dealertrack, our reviewing court found that a
computer-aided method of loan processing amounted to little more than
using the general principle of a clearinghouse. 674 F.3d at 1333. The court
held that merely using a computer to enact a computer-based method of
operating a clearinghouse, even when limited to automobile loan processing,
was insufficient to prevent the claimed method from being directed broadly
to an abstract idea. Id. at 1334 (citing Bilski, 561 U.S. at 612 (holding that
claims “limiting an abstract idea to one field of use or add[ed] token post-
Appeal 2019–002335
Application 14/186,128

14
solution components” are not patent eligible). Similarly, Appellant’s claims
are directed to a system of generating a credit application by gathering and
aggregating user information and an affordability analysis, and then
generating a credit application based upon the aggregated information. As
such, the claims recite no more than a method of credit application
generation mediated by a computer.
Appellant points to Enfish, arguing that the claimed method offers
advantages to pre-existing technical systems involving coupon processing by
providing enhanced security and protection against fraudulent usage over
pre-existing systems. See App. Br. 7–8. We disagree. Unlike in Enfish
where the court specifically found the improvement to be in the way
computers operate (822 F.3d at 1332, 1336), in Appellant’s claimed method,
the alleged novelty of the invention goes to the methodological steps of
receiving information, assigning it values in a user data file, and transmitting
it to the user. Nothing in the recited limitations speaks to changing or
altering or improving the methods by which computers operate. Rather, the
“processor” performs steps that are within the normal ambit of generic
computer functions. See Spec. ¶ 71 (“These computer program instructions
may be provided to a processor of a general purpose computer, special
purpose computer, or other programmable data processing apparatus”); see
also buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355 (2014):
The claims’ invocation of computers adds no inventive concept.
The computer functionality is generic—indeed, quite limited: a
computer receives a request for a guarantee and transmits an
offer of guarantee in return. There is no further detail. That a
computer receives and sends the information over a network—
with no further specification—is not even arguably inventive.

Appeal 2019–002335
Application 14/186,128

15
We consequently conclude that Appellant’s reliance on Enfish is
misplaced, and that the claims are directed to an abstract idea.
Having determined that the claims recite an abstract idea, we next
look to see whether the claims are integrated into a practical application.
2019 Guidance 54 (Step 2A, Prong 2). The Guidance provides additional
context for this analysis, stating that: “A claim that integrates a judicial
exception into a practical application will apply, rely on, or use the judicial
exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial
exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the judicial exception.” Id. at 53.
In the present case, we find that the claims recite no more than the
abstract idea, as implemented on a generic computer and using generic
software. As such, we find that the claims do not impose meaningful limits
upon the abstract idea recited in the claims.
For the same reasons, we find that, considering the elements of each
claim both individually and “as an ordered combination” the claims recite no
additional elements that “transform the nature of the claim” into a patent-
eligible application. Mayo, 566 U.S. at 78–79; 2019 Guidance at 56 (Step
2B).
We therefore conclude that the claims are directed to nonstatutory
subject matter, and we affirm the Examiner’s rejection of the claims.

Appeal 2019–002335
Application 14/186,128

16
CONCLUSION
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 6, 9, 11–17, 21, and 23–27
under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is affirmed.

AFFIRMED

Claims
Rejected
35
U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 6, 9, 11–17,
21, 23–27
101 Nonstatutory Subject
Matter
1, 6, 9, 11–17,
21, 23–27