C & M Construction Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 26, 1964

147 N.L.R.B. 843 (N.L.R.B. 1964)

C & M CONSTRUCTION COMPANY 843
C & M Construction Company and Local No. 1172 of the United
Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America , AFL-CIO.
Case No. 19-CA-2671. June 26, 1964
DECISION AND ORDER
On,November 15, 1963, Trial Examiner Eugene K. Kennedy issued.
his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Re-
spondent had not engaged in the unfair labor' practices alleged in
the complaint and recommending that the complaint be dismissed
in.its entirety, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision.
Thereafter, the General Counsel and the Charging Party filed excep-
tions to the Decision and supporting briefs and the Respondent filed
a reply brief.
The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed.
The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record
in the case, and hereby adopts the Trial Examiner's findings, con-
'clusions, and recommendations with the following additions : .
The complaint herein states, in substance, that commencing on or
about May 22, 1963, Respondent, C & M Construction Company,
violated Section 8(a) (5) and (1) of the Act by refusing to sign and
comply with an agreement, allegedly binding on it, which the Union
entered into with Billings Contractors' Council (hereinafter referred
to as the Council). Respondent disputes that it became bound by
the agreement made by the Council, contending that prior to the
consummation of that agreement it withdrew from the Council and
that the Union, by its conduct, acquiesced in Respondent's withdrawal,
thereby relieving Respondent of any obligation to be bound by the
Council's action. The Trial Examiner upheld the Respondent's con-
tention, as do we.
Respondent had been a member of the Council for some years prior
to 1963. In February 1963 .negotiations .began for a new contract.
Respondent's president, as a member of the Council's negotiating
committee, participated in all but one of eight or' nine negotiating
sessions. In April 1963 an impasse was reached, followed shortly
thereafter by a strike against Council members. In the early part of
May 1963 Respondent, with the use of nonunion labor, resumed op-
erations. Immediately thereafter, the Union began picketing Re-
spondent with signs which read : "On Strike. C & M Does Not Have
a Contract With Carpenters Local 1172." As a consequence of the
strike and picketing, the Council filed charges against the Union,
147 NLRB No. 103.
844 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
alleging violations of Section 8(b) (1) (B), 8(b) (3), and 8(b) (4) (i)
and (ii) (B). On May 16, 1963, the Union and the Council entered
into a settlement agreement which was approved by the Regional
Director on May 21, 1963. The Union agreed, inter alia, that it would
neither attempt to bargain separately with individual members of the
Council nor picket such individual members (naming Respondent and
one other) in violation of the aforementioned Section 8 (b) (4) (i) and
(ii) (B) of the Act. On May 10, while the charges were pending
but prior to any action on the settlement agreement, Respondent
notified the Council, by letter, of its intent to withdraw from the
Council. Despite the Respondent's letter, the Council's executive
secretary persuaded Respondent's president to attend the next nego-
tiating session scheduled for May 20 in his capacity as a member of
the Council's negotiating committee. When negotiations reconvened,
Respondent's president appeared with the Council's negotiating com-
mittee, attending the entire morning session and returning for the
evening session. During a separate caucus of the Council's negotiat-
ing committee at the evening session, Respondent's president walked
out. When the Council's negotiating committee returned to the nego-
tiating table, the Council's executive secretary, adverting to Respond-
ent, stated that the Council had lost a member "permanently." 'The
Union then. requested official notice of such withdrawal. The Coun-
cil agreed to provide a letter to that effect and negotiations continued
into the early hours of May 21, culminating in a tentative agreement.
On May 22 the parties met again to execute the memorandum agree-
ment reached on May 21. On this occasion, O'Leary, the Union's
business representative, again asked the Council's executive secretary
"for a letter on C R M's withdrawal." O'Leary also asked "if it was
all right to go out and see if they [Respondent] would sign an agree-
ment." The Council's executive secretary replied that "if they [the
Union] wanted an agreement with.C & M, they would have to contact
them individually since they were no longer bound by the Council."
The Union, after consulting with its attorney, arranged with Re-
spondent for a meeting which was held in Respondent's office on May
28. The meeting was attended by O'Leary, accompanied by Union
Representative Hoover, and by Respondent's president. Hoover testi-
fied that the purpose of this meeting was "to give him [Respondent's
president] a chance to sign this agreement." The Union representa-
tive further testified : "As we understood, he [Respondent] moved
out of the Council. We met with him and presented [a contract] to
him. He told us that they would rather not sign at that time. They
would rather wait for a period of time and go along just as they n-ere
to see what would happen."
C & M CONSTRUCTION COMPANY 845
No further discussion took place at this time. Thereafter, the
Union continued to picket Respondent. On July 8 Respondent filed
a petition seeking an election among its employees. Four days later
the Union filed the charge giving rise to the instant proceeding.
The issue presented is whether Respondent was effectively released
from its obligation as a Council member to be bound by the results
of the Council's bargaining with the Union. The law controlling
this case is not in dispute. Where an employer has once entered into
a nniltiemployer bargaining arrangement, he may effectively with'
draw from that arrangement only if he does so at an appropriate time,
except where the withdrawal is with the consent, express or implied,
of the Union. As there is no disagreement with respect to the law,
we need only evaluate the facts to'resolve the issue before us.
On the facts as set forth above, we, like our dissenting colleague,
find that the Respondent's withdrawal was not at a normally appropri-
ate time, coming after the commencement of negotiations for a new
Council agreement. Unlike our dissenting colleague, however, we
are persuaded that the Union's course of conduct, subsequent to the
untimely withdrawal, amply supports a finding of Union acquiescence
in the withdrawal We rely on the following considerations.
When the Union, at the meeting of May 20 and again at the meeting
of May 22, was put on notice that the Respondent had withdrawn and
no longer considered itself bound by the Council agreement, it inter-
posed no objection but simply asked for written confirmation of the
withdrawal. That the Respondent acquiesced in the withdrawal is
evident from its query of the Council at the meeting of May 22 as to
whether "it would be all right to go out and see if the Respondent
would sign an agreement." Nor is the Union's earlier request for
written confirmation inconsistent with acquiescence, since it is clear
that the Union simply desired to protect itself against a charge of non-
compliance with the settlement agreement. Indeed, the Union gave
that as its reason for seeking the Council's consent to sign up Respond-
ent to a separate agreement. Further, the Union's subsequent con-
duct also reflected its acquiescence. Thus, it is Union practice to ap-
proach nonmember employers with a copy of the Council agreement
for individual signature. With respect to Council members, execu-
tion by the Council executive secretary is sufficient to bind all members.
Had the Union refused to accept Respondent's withdrawal from the
Council there would have been no need for it to do anything further.
However, after the meeting with the Council on May 22, the Union
consulted its attorney regarding its position with the Respondent and
immediately thereafter contacted the Respondent to arrange the meet-
ing held on May 28 at which it asked the Respondent's president to
sign an agreement. Bearing in mind the earlier unfair labor practice
846 DECISIONS OF" NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
charges and the terms of the settlement agreement, as well as the
Union's usual practices with respect to the signing of agreements, we
are satisfied that the Union would not have approached Respondent
for a separate agreement had it considered Respondent still a member
of the Council or bound by the Council's agreement. What it did
was therefore an implicit acknowledgment on its part that the agree-
ment reached with the Council was not intended to bind Respondent.
This is confirmed by the fact that the Union continued to picket Re-
spondent with signs stating that Respondent did not have a collective-
bargaining agreement with the Union, and by the absence of any as-
sertion on the Union's part that the Council's agreement was binding
on Respondent until after Respondent had filed its representation
petition.
Concluding as we do that the Union acquiesced in Respondent's
withdrawal from the Council and in the inapplicability to Respondent
of the Council agreement, we find no supportable basis for the alleged
8(a) (5) and (1) violations, and accordingly agree. with the Trial Ex-
aminer's dismissal of the complaint.
[The Board dismissed the complaint.]
MEMBER BROWN, dissenting
I would find that Respondent violated Section 8(a) (5) of the Act
by its conduct in refusing to accept and be bound by the collective-
bargaining agreement reached between the Union and the Council.
It is undisputed that° any withdrawal by Respondent from group bar-
gaining was untimely and, therefore, ineffective unless it was with the
consent of all the parties. My colleagues find that the Union gave
its consent to such untimely withdrawal by acquiescing therein. On
the facts herein, I cannot agree.
As part of the existing bargaining unit composed of members of the
Billings Contractors' Council, Respondent, through its president who
was.a regular member of the Council negotiating committee, actively
participated in association bargaining with the Union for the most
recent agreement. It was during a caucus around 8 p.m. on the last
meeting day, May 20, that Respondent's president walked out.' When
1 On May 10 Respondent mailed a letter to the Council stating that it was terminating
its membership as of that date. However , Respondent admittedly did not send a copy to,
or otherwise notify, the Union of this action. Moreover , despite its resignation from
membership in the Council , Respondent 's president continued to serve on the Council nego-
tiating committee participating in all meetings 'thereafter , including the final evening
session at the end of which agreement was reached . In fact, on the morning of May 20,
the Union asked the Council for a list of the employers covered by their negotiations and
the Council secretary handed over the most recent brochure listing all members of the
Council. Respondent ' s name appeared thereon. It was not until May 22, when the
parties were executing the agreement , that the Council , using the brochure for an appendix
to the contract , scratched Respondent 's name from the list of members.
C & M CONSTRUCTION COMPANY 847
the negotiators returned to the bargaining table, a union representa-
tive observed that one committeeman of the Council was missing and
commented that the Union's group also was incomplete because one of
its number had to leave to fulfill'a prior commitment.' The Council
secretary responded that their "shortage would be permanent." 2
In my view, it is highly questionable whether the departure of'
Respondent's president together with the announcement thereof con-
stituted an unequivocal withdrawal from group bargaining, much less:
a request that the Union release Respondent from its legal obligation
to be bound by the results of the bargaining in which it had partici-
pated. In the context in which the statement concerning Respond-
ent's departure was made, it is as reasonable to infer that the Council
secretary was referring to the composition of the Council negotiating
committee as to conclude that he was speaking of membership in the.
Council or membership in the multiemployer unit. Indeed, only a.
few days before that last meeting the Union executed a settlement
agreement with the Council committing itself not to deal separately
with the members. It would be unreasonable in these circumstance3
to expect the Union to construe such an ambiguous statement as a deci-
sion by Respondent to now go its separate way.
Even the Council secretary recognized that he had not been very
specific as to the portent of Respondent's departure. For, when..
several days later, the parties executed the agreement reached that
night, the secretary told the Union he was not sure he had made'
himself understood with respect to the Respondent and asserted that,.
since Respondent was no longer a member, the Council had no author-
ity to bind Respondent by its execution of, the agreement. This again
was at most only notice with respect to Respondent's status vis-a-vis.
the Council. No representation was made that Respondent was not.
obligated to or did not intend to be bound by the results of the.
negotiations in which it had participated.
Nor can I - see anything in the Union's subsequent conduct which.
warrants a conclusion that it thereafter agreed to Respondent's escape.
from the group commitment. Thus, because of the terms of the exist-
ing settlement agreement and in view of the Council's representation
that it could no longer bind Respondent by its signature, the Union.
requested and obtained from the Council permission to contact Re--
spondent directly and submit "the agreement" for its signature
thereon. When the Union proceeded in this manner, the Respondent.
refused to sign.
2 The Union requested a letter on the subject and the Council promised to comply..
Occurring as it did in the course of special efforts by the negotiators to conclude a bar-
gaining , agreement , a logical interpretation of the Union ' s. request for a letter would be-
so that it could give appropriate consideration and response thereto . Thus, even assum-
ing that the announcement by the Council secretary was notice of the Respondent's with-
drawal , I cannot see in the Union 's reply the necessary consent to the untimeliness of the-
proposed action.
848 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
My colleagues adopt the Trial Examiner's view that by soliciting
Respondent's signature to the agreement reached with the Council,
the Union was "seeking to negotiate a separate agreement." I do
not believe this conclusion is justified. The Union's practice, of
using the agreement negotiated with the Council as its standard pro-
posed contract when approaching individual employers in the area
for recognition and bargaining, does not establish that this was the
situation with respect to the Respondent, for the Union already had
an established bargaining relationship covering Respondent's em-
ployees. Moreover, although a number of employers in the area who
were not members of the Council and had not participated in the
group bargaining had an arrangement with the Union whereby they
executed contracts based upon the terms negotiated with the Council,
no such arrangement existed between the Union and Respondent, nor
was one discussed at their May 28 meeting. The Union simply re-
quested Respondent either to execute "the contract" or to acknowl-
edge before a witness that it would be bound thereby. Respondent
refused to do either solely because of its disapproval of certain specific
provisions therein.' Moreover, Respondent took no position which
would have clearly indicated that it was seeking a change in its unit
status.4 Instead it told the Union that it "would go along . . . for
a while and see how it worked out."
On the facts herein, I would find that at no time did Respondent
clearly evince an unequivocal intent to withdraw from group bargain-
ing to which the Union could be said to have acquiesced. Accordingly,
I would find that by failing to execute the Council agreement or to
8 Respondent ' s president testified that he walked out of the final bargaining session be-
cause he disagreed with some of the contract provisions and that when the Union later
requested Respondent 's signature he refused to sign because of those provisions . Although
no actual document was presented to him, lie asserted his knowledge thereof was based
upon his participation in the bargaining by the Council . Thus his reservations were not
based upon agreements reached after his "walkout ." In the absence of evidence establish-
ing an understanding to the contrary at the outset of joint negotiations ( compare The
Kroger Co ., 141 NLRB 564; J & H Food Inc ., Holan Enterprises , Inc., 139 NLRB 1398),
the participating employers are bound by the agreement reached by the multiemployer
bargaining committee . See Town & Country Dairy, 136 NLRB 517, 523 . Any reservations
Respondent may have had were never conveyed to the Union . Fairbanks Dairy, Division
of Cooperdale Dairy Company , Inc., 146 NLRB 893 (TXD). Moreover , by its testi-
mony, Respondent indicated that at least some of the provisions which displeased it were
contained in the preceding Council contract by which it was admittedly covered.
4 When the Council agreement was executed and the subject of Respondent ' s status was
discussed , the Council secretary displayed to the Union Respondent 's May 10 letter of
withdrawal . The Union therefore knew that Respondent had participated in the group
bargaining even after Respondent 's withdrawal from the Council . At the May 28 meeting
Respondent did not assert that it no longer wished to participate in group bargaining ;
that it did not regard itself legally bound by the results of the bargaining in which it
participated ; or that it now wished to bargain on its own behalf for a separate contract
or to question the Union ' s representative status wtih respect to its employees.
6 There is some conflict in testimony as to whether Respondent said it "would go along
with the contract for a while . . ." or "would go along as it was for a while . . . . " In
any event Respondent did not sign the agreement nor did it agree to be bound by the
Council's signature.
C & M CONSTRUCTION COMPANY 849
accept the Council's signature as binding upon it, Respondent refused
a request to execute a written contract incorporating the agreement
reached as required in Section 8(d.) and thereby violated Section
8 (a) (5) of the Act.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This matter was heard before Trial Examiner Eugene K. Kennedy in Billings,
Montana, on September 17, 1963. The complaint alleges that Respondent, C & M
Construction Company, commencing on May 10, 1963, and thereafter, refused to
bargain in good faith with Local No. 1172 of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters
& Joiners of America, AFL-CIO, the charging union.
Upon the entire record in the case and upon consideration of the authorities cited
by the General Counsel, and a brief filed by Respondent, and from my observation
of the witnesses, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT '
I. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT
Respondent C & M Construction Company is engaged primarily in the construc-
tion of homes in and around Billings , Montana. Its annual purchases of products,
which originate directly or indirectly outside the State of Montana, exceed $50,000
and its annual sales are in excess of $500,000 . Respondent is, and at all times ma-
terial herein has been , an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of
the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Local No. 1172 of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America,
AFL-CIO, herein the Union , is a labor organization within the meaning of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The background events
Respondent, for a number of years prior to 1963, was a member of the Billings
Contractors' Council, herein sometimes referred to as Council. It was bound by at
least one previous contract between the Council and the Union.
Commencing in February 1963, in connection with the negotiation of a collective-
bargaining agreement, Clark Carpenter, president of Respondent, served on the nego-
tiating committee on behalf of the Council and participated in several collective-
bargaining sessions with the Union.
The record establishes that, with the exception of one other contractor primarily
engaged in residential housing construction, C & M was the only member of the
Council in 1963 who was engaged primarily in homebuilding. Several other home-
building contractors had previously resigned from the Council. The record indicates
that the reason for such resignations was that homebuilding contractors were unwill-
ing to grant employee benefits through the Union granted by contractors engaged in
industrial construction.
On May 10, 1963, the Respondent, by letter, sent a notice of resignation to the
Billings Contractors' Council, which mode of resignation was specified by the bylaws
of the Council. By oral designation, it was to become effective when Respondent
so notified the representative of the Council. Notice of the sending of the letter
was not given to the Union. James Lechner, the executive secretary of the Council,
prevailed upon Carpenter to attend a further negotiating meeting with the Union on
May 20, 1963, acting in the role of an observer. This arrangement suggests that
Respondent had some hope of the Council reaching an accommodation with the
Union suitable to it, and also Lechner's urging of Carpenter to attend the May 20
meeting reflects a desire, on the part of Lechner, to have Respondent remain a
member of the Council. Carpenter was present during the morning negotiating
meeting on May 20 and was present for about 1 hour of an evening meeting. During
the time of his attendance there were several major issues unresolved, some of which
were of particular concern to Respondent. On the evening of May 20, after a caucus
756-236-65-vol. 14 7--5 5
850 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
of the employers, Carpenter left and a representative of the Council informed
O'Leary, the Union representative , that Carpenter's absence was permanent . O'Leary
asked Lechner for an official letter and Lechner replied that he would give him one.
On the evening of May 20 and until the early morning of the following day, the
negotiations continued until a tentative agreement was reached. On May 23, 1963,
O'Leary and another Union representative again met with Lechner and verified a
memorandum of understanding reached early on the morning of May 21,.and, on
this occasion, O'Leary again asked Lechner for a letter stating that C & M Construc-
tion Company had withdrawn from the Council. Lechner informed O'Leary that
he had had a letter of resignation from Carpenter in his possession for a few days
and that Carpenter told him when he wanted him to put it into force, which O'Leary
assumed was on the night of May 20. O'Leary then asked Lechner if it was agree-
able with him for the Union to obtain an individual contract with C & M, and
Lechner replied in the affirmative, again advising O'Leary that C & M had with-
drawn from the Contractors' Council.
On May 21 Lechner called a meeting of the members of the Council, not including
the Respondent, and obtained their assent to the understanding that had been nego-
tiated on the previous evening and early morning.
On May 28 two union representatives met with Clark Carpenter and Harlan
Carpenter, secretary-treasurer of Respondent , for the purpose of obtaining a separate
agreement . Apparently, this meeting did not eventuate in an agreement primarily
because Respondent believed the Union was permitting individuals to perform
"moonlighting" work which was regarded by the Respondent as disadvantageous to
its competitive position in the homebuilding industry.
The charge initiating this proceeding was filed on July 12, 1963. The record
reflects that up until this date, at least , the Respondent was picketed by the Union
and the pickets carried signs which stated that the Respondent did not have a
collective-bargaining agreement with the Union. .
B. Discussion and concluding findings
Respondent contends that controlling decisional precedent of the Board supports
its position that the action of the Union in negotiating an agreement after it was
on notice that Respondent was no longer a member of the Council and its subsequent
attempt to obtain a separate agreement conclusively demonstrates that it had ac-
quiesced in the withdrawal of Respondent from the multiemployer -bargaining unit
in a timely fashion so as to relieve it from any. proscription of Section 8(a) (5) of
the National Labor Relations Act, as amended.
The facts outlined above clearly absolve Respondent from any contractual re-
sponsibility based on the usual rules governing principal and agent . However,
Respondent 's conduct must also be measured in connection with the statutory obli-
gation to bargain in good faith as set forth in Section 8(d) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended.' '
The record reflects that Respondent was genuinely concerned with certain pro-
posed provisions ultimately incorporated in the collective -bargaining agreement which
it regarded as inimical to its ' homebuilding contracting operations . Respondent's
business of homebuilding , as opposed to industrial construction , provides a factual
basis for distinguishing its interests from the bulk of the members of the Council.
Its letter of resignation of May 10, 1963, was anticipatory of its withdrawal from
the Council . Respondent 's conduct in leaving the negotiating session of May 20
and the statement by the Council 's representative to Union Representative O'Leary
was an unequivocal representation that Respondent had withdrawn its consent to be
contractually bound by any undertaking of the Council.
' Section 8 ( d) reads as follows:
(d) For the purposes of this section , to bargain collectively is the performance of
the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet
at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours , and other
terms and conditions of employment , or the negotiation of an agreement , or any ques-
tion arising thereunder , and the execution of a written contract incorporating any
agreement reached if requested by either party, but such obligation does not compel
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession : Provided,
That where there is in effect a collective-bargaining contract covering employees in an
industry affecting commerce , the duty to bargain collectively shall also mean that no
party to such contract shall terminate or modify such contract , unless the party de-
siring such termination or modification-
BAGDAD BOWLING ALLEYS, ETC. 851
The action of the union representatives in subsequently seeking a separate con-
tract with Respondent reflected that they were aware that the agreement reached
by the Council was not intended to bind Respondent either in the minds of the
Council or the Union representatives.
In agreement with Respondent , I find the Board 's decision in Metke Ford Motors,
Inc., and Bel-Air Chevrolet Co., Inc., 137 NLRB 950, is controlling in the factual
situation presented here. In the Metke case, the union 's acquiescence to the with-
drawal by an employer of a multiemployer-bargaining unit was regarded by the
Board as a controlling factor in reaching its decision that the agreement reached
was not binding upon the employer involved. The facts reflected by this record
establish beyond question that the Union in this case acquiesced with respect to the
Respondent 's withdrawal from the multiemployer unit before consummating a con-
tract. Furthermore, the Union's conduct subsequently , in seeking to negotiate a
separate agreement , buttresses the finding that the Union did not regard the Re-
spondent as one of the employers covered by the agreement that was negotiated
on the evening of May 20 and the morning of May 21, 1963. Hence it follows
Respondent did not violate the Act by refusing to be bound by the collective-
bargaining agreement reached by the Union and the Council on May 20, 1963. Nor
does the record warrant a finding that Respondent committed an unfair labor
practice by filing with the Board , on July 8, 1963, a petition for an election among
its employees.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAw
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record in
the case, I make the following conclusions of law:
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of the Act.
3. Respondent has not violated Section 8(a)(1) or 8 (a)(5) of the Act.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
It is recommended that an order be entered herein dismissing the complaint in
its entirety.
Bagdad Bowling Alleys ; Broadway-Van Ness Bowl; L and L
Castle Lanes ; Marina Bowl ; Mission Bowl; Park Bowl ; Sports
Center Bowl ; San Francisco Bowling Proprietors Association
and Building Service Employees Union , Local 87, AFL-CIO.
Cases Nos. 20-CA-2667-1, 20-CA-2667-2, 20-CA-2667-3, 20-CA-
2667-4, 20-CA-12667-5, 120-CA-2667-6, 20-CA-2667-7, and 20-CA-
2667-8. June 26, 1964
DECISION AND ORDER
On March 30, 1964, Trial Examiner David Karasick issued his De-
cision in the above-entitled proceedings, finding that, the Respondents
had engaged in and were engaging in certain unfair labor practices
and recommending that they cease and desist therefrom and take cer-
tain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's
Decision. Thereafter, the Respondents filed exceptions to the Trial
Examiner's Decision and a supporting brief, and the General Counsel
filed a brief in support of the Trial Examiner's Decision.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the National Labor
Relations Act, the Board has delegated its powers in connection with
this case to a three-member panel [Chairman McCulloch and Members
Leedom and Brown].
147 NLRB No. 97.