Burmar Electrical Corp.Download PDFNational Labor Relations Board - Board DecisionsMay 31, 1977229 N.L.R.B. 1028 (N.L.R.B. 1977) Copy Citation DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Local 3, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFLCIO (Burnnar Electrical Corp.) and McLawlin Brathwaite. Case 29-CB-2547 May 31, 1977 ORDER REMANDING PROCEEDING TO ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE BY MEMBERS JENKINS, MURPHY, AND WALTHER On December 14, 1976, Administrative Law Judge Melvin J. Welles of the National Labor Relations Board issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, and on the same date the proceeding was transferred to and continued before the Board in Washington, D.C. The Administrative Law Judge found that the Respondent had not engaged in certain alleged unfair labor practices, and recom- mended that the complaint be dismissed in its entirety. The complaint alleged, inter alia, that Local 3, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO, violated Section 8(b)(l)(A) of the Act by failing and refusing to represent McLawlin Brath- waite in the processing of his grievance concerning his discharge because of Brathwaite's alleged failure to participate in a union-sponsored letter-writing campaign and because Brathwaite allegedly failed and refused to assist and support Respondent. The Administrative Law Judge made no credibility findings. Thereafter, on January 7, 1977, the General Counsel filed exceptions to the Decision of the Administrative Law Judge. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board, having duly considered the matter, issues the following: It is hereby ordered that the above-captioned proceeding be, and it hereby is, remanded to Administrative Law Judge Melvin J. Welles to make credibility findings and conclusions with respect to the unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint, including, but not limited to, the issue of whether Respondent violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) by failing and refusing to represent Brathwaite prior to his discharge. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Administrative Law Judge shall prepare and serve on the parties a Supplemental Decision, setting forth the resolution of such credibility issues, and findings and conclu- Respondent apparently runs an organization called the "Kingsboro Club." The above-purported references to "the club" and "letters" were to this club and Respondent's campaign to have all its members write letters to Senators, Congressmen, etc., apparently designed to obtain additional jobs 229 NLRB No. 149 sions with respect to the unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint. Copies of such Supplemen- tal Decision shall be served on all the parties, after which the provisions of Section 102.46 of the Board's Rules and Regulations, Series 8, as amended, shall be applicable. MEMBER MURPHY, dissenting in part: For the reasons set forth by the Administrative Law Judge, as amplified below, I would dismiss the complaint in its entirety. The difference between my colleagues and myself concerning this case stems from the failure of the Administrative Law Judge to resolve the conflict in testimony between Herb Ackerman, the steward for Respondent on the job, and McLawlin Brathwaite, the employee who charges that Respondent unlaw- fully failed to represent him when, inter alia, Ackerman did not intercede on his behalf just prior to Brathwaite's discharge on February 25. 1976. Brathwaite testified that, after being told to go see General Foreman Vischio, Ackerman passed by and the following conversation ensued. Brathwaite said, "Herbie, I have a feeling something is wrong around here today." Ackerman allegedly responded, "I will not back you. You do not come to the club when you're supposed to." Brathwaite replied, "Herbie, I went to the club. I wrote letters...." Ackerman's purported response was, "I did not see that. In my book. ... You did nothing." 1 Ackerman denied that he spoke to Brathwaite at all on February 25. He testified that the first time he saw Brathwaite in connection with that employee's firing was at noon the next day, at a bar, when Brathwaite informed him of his discharge. He further testified that Brathwaite did not ask Ackerman to get the former's job back, and that nothing then was said about Brathwaite's failure to write letters in further- ance of the Union's job campaign or to go to the union hall. Brathwaite's version of their postdis- charge conversation in the bar was that Ackerman asked him how he was doing, to which Brathwaite replied, "I am doing good, Herbie, I wrote letters, and got letters in return." Ackerman told him, "Forget it, you're off the job. You will get another job." Ackerman allegedly added that he would not back Brathwaite, causing the latter to state, "Herbie, you did not understand me, I told you I was on furlough." My colleagues would remand this matter to the Administrative Law Judge to have him resolve the above credibility conflict between Ackerman and in the construction industry. Brathwaite testified that his name was on a union list to go to the club the third week in January 1976 but he was on "furlough" and unable to do so. He further testified that he had told Ackerman this fact on February I, 1976, when he returned from furlough. 1028 LOCAL 3, IBEW Brathwaite, and then make appropriate findings and conclusions of law based thereon. While the majority agrees with me that the Respondent did not unlawfully refuse to process Brathwaite's grievance over his discharge for cause, it apparently believes that a violation of Section 8(b)(l)(A) would lie if Brathwaite is credited to the effect that Ackerman told him he would not intercede on his behalf because Brathwaite failed to go to Respondent's club and write letters to Congressmen urging creation of additional construction industry jobs. I disagree and therefore see no need for the remand or further findings on this issue. Assuming the incident to have happened as Brathwaite claims, we have here what amounts to a casual fleeting conversation occurring between Ack- erman and Brathwaite prior to the latter's discharge. Brathwaite merely stated that he had "a feeling something is wrong around here today," and Acker- man responded he would not back him because Brathwaite did not go to the club when he was supposed to. I do not view Brathwaite's cryptic and enigmatic statement as a request for Ackerman's help. Nor do I believe that Brathwaite made clear to Ackerman what the nature of "the wrong" was. Although Ackerman's reply suggests he anticipated that Brathwaite was referring to a problem he had with management, I am unwilling to construe his response as an outright refusal to act on Brathwaite's behalf concerning that employee's employment status. To do so reads into what appears to be a spontaneous passing, albeit provocative, remark, much more than is warranted by the ambiguous circumstances attending their brief conversation. 2 Indeed, the fact that the Administrative Law Judge interprets Ackerman's comment as suggesting a threat of future inaction, that I view it as being nothing more than a mere expression of pique, and that the General Counsel sees it as evidencing an unlawful motive points up the ambiguity of this incident and its deficiency as proof of a violation. In addition, I do not believe that the General Counsel has sustained his burden of proof because the evidence fails to establish that Ackerman in fact possessed the authority to intercede with manage- ment on Brathwaite's behalf in advance of his termination. To the contrary, the limitations of Ackerman's authority were made quite apparent to Brathwaite by Besise of Local 3's grievance commit- tee, when the latter told the former that Ackerman did not make decisions for the Respondent in grievance matters. That he had on occasion in the past spoken in Brathwaite's behalf concerning other problems that employee had at work does not establish that Ackerman had the actual or apparent authority so to act. Accordingly, to hold Respondent responsible for Ackerman's remarks in light of the foregoing circumstances and reasons-especially since we all agree that the Union did not unlawfully refuse to grieve Brathwaite's discharge-would strain the application of the Act. Therefore, I would affirm the Administrative Law Judge and dismiss the complaint in its entirety. 2 Nor do I believe that Brathwaite's version of their conversation in a bar the next day, even if accepted as true, casts any light on this incident. If anything, their later meeting was even more informal and ambiguous when considered as a whole. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE MELVIN J. WELLES, Administrative Law Judge: This case was heard at Brooklyn, New York, on October 7, 1976, based on charges filed June 21, 1976, and a complaint issued July 29, 1976, alleging that Respondent Union violated Section 8(b)( I)(A) of the Act. Upon the entire record in the case, including my observation of the witnesses, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT I. THE BUSINESS OF THE EMPLOYER AND THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED Burmar Electrical Corp. is a New York corporation, engaged in the business of providing electrical contracting services and related services. During the 12 months prior to the issuance of the complaint herein, it purchased goods and materials, which were delivered to its place of business in New York City, valued in excess of $50,000, which were shipped directly to it from points outside the State of New York. I find that it is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. Respondent Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES Facts and Discussion The General Counsel alleged that Respondent Union failed to represent the Charging Party, McLawlin Brath- waite, concerning his discharge by the Employer, because Brathwaite failed to participate in a union-sponsored letter- writing campaign, thus refusing to assist and support the Union. The General Counsel presented a single witness, Brathwaite, who testified that the morning of his last day of work, February 25, 1976, he was told by his subforeman, Teddy Zielinski, to go see General Foreman Marty Vischio. Just about then, Shop Steward Herb Ackerman came by and the following conversation ensued. Brath- waite said, "Herbie, I have a feeling something is wrong around here today." Ackerman responded, "I will not back you. You do not come to the club when you're supposed to." Brathwaite said, "Herbie, I went to the club. I wrote 1029 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD letters I got letters in return." Ackerman replied, "I did not see that. In my book it is not that. You did nothing." The next day, about noon, Brathwaite met Ackerman at a bar. Ackerman asked him, "How are you doing?" to which Brathwaite replied, "I am doing good, Herbie, I wrote letters, and got letters in return." Ackerman then said, "Forget it, you're off the job. You will get another job." He told Brathwaite again that he is not backing him, and Brathwaite replied, "Herbie you did not understand me, I told you I was on furlough." The reference to "letters" concerns a union campaign to have all its members write letters to Senators, Congress- men, etc., apparently designed to obtain additional jobs in the construction industry. In pursuance of this campaign, the Union posts lists, at various jobs where its members work, of those whom it wants to come to the "Kingsboro Club" (apparently run by Local 3) to write such letters at particular times. According to Brathwaite, his name was on such a list for the third week in January, but he was on "furlough" and could not go to Kingsboro Club. He testified that he told Ackerman this about February 1 when he returned from furlough, and he repeated this explana- tion on February 25 and 26. Brathwaite had earlier written such letters and received answers. Brathwaite was discharged by Vischio, who told him "Teddy gave me a bad report on you," when he went to see him pursuant to Zielinski's instructions following his conversation with Ackerman on February 25. Brathwaite subsequently (he did not remember the date) went to see Sol Besisie, of Local 3's grievance committee, at the Union's offices, and told Besisie the story. Besisie said that Ackerman had nothing to do with whether the Union was going to back him, stating, in Brathwaite's words, "Herb don't make decisions around here. Herb has nothing to do with whether the grievance is going to be processed." Besisie then added that the Union would not process the grievance because Brathwaite had many bad termination reports from otherjobs. Ackerman testified that he did not talk to Brathwaite at all on February 25, that the first time he saw Brathwaite in connection with the latter's discharge was at noon on February 26, at a bar, when Brathwaite told Ackerman he had been fired. He also testified that he at that time told Brathwaite that he had been "on thin ice for a long time," that he (Ackerman) had talked to Frank Cristallo (Burmar general foreman) for him a number of times about his problems at work, and that Brathwaite did not ask Ackerman to help him get his job back. Ackerman also testified that he did not tell Brathwaite that the latter had not written letters in connection with the Union's cam- paign, nor did Brathwaite tell Ackerman anything to that effect. He also testified that he pays no attention to the names on the "list" to go to the union hall.' Ackerman added that not more than about half the people on any list actually go to write letters, and that the men who do not go I At this project, there were about 80 employees, and about 20 would have been on each list. 2 Local 3's bylaws list the duties of stewards as follows: "(a) To have a copy of the I.B.E.W. Constitution, these bylaws, and the working agreement and rules with them at all times. (b) To see that Union membership is encouraged, and all workmen at their respective shops orjobs have paid-up dues receipts or valid working cards of the Local Union. (c) To report any are not treated any differently from those that do write the letters. Finally, Ackerman testified that it is not the function of a steward to help a man get his job back after he is fired, that his recourse is to "write a letter or go to the Union and ask for a hearing before the Joint Industry Board." 2 In this latter connection, General Foreman Frank Cristallo of Burmar testified that no steward had ever asked that a man be put back to work after he was terminated, 3 but that Ackerman has interceded to save a man's job, asking Cristallo to have "compassion," doing just this on an earlier occasion with respect to Brathwaite.4 Although the merits of Brathwaite's discharge are not at issue here, testimony was adduced concerning the dis- charge for the purpose of showing that the failure of the Union to process any grievance on Brathwaite's part was not arbitrary and capricious. As noted above, the record shows a number (8) of "bad terminations" for Brathwaite, and it demonstrates, at least prima facie, based on the testimony of Cristallo and Zielinski, that Burmar had ample reason for terminating Brathwaite. Assuming the facts in their best posture for the General Counsel's position, that is, assuming that the conversations between Brathwaite and Ackerman occurred precisely as Brathwaite testified on or about February 1, and on February 25 and 26, I nonetheless do not find that the Union violated its duty of fair representation to Brath- waite. Brathwaite's own testimony establishes that he went to the union offices, told his story, and was told, in effect, that Steward Ackerman does not "make decisions around here," and that he "has nothing to do with whether the grievance is going to be processed," but that the grievance would not be processed because of Brathwaite's "bad termination" reports over the years. As Ackerman's testimony, supported by the Union's bylaws, indicates that union stewards had no authority to process or initiate discharge grievances, it is clear on the above facts that the Union (as distinct from its steward, Ackerman) did not refuse to process Brathwaite's grievance because of his failure to go to Kingsboro Club and write letters on or about January 15. Assuming that Ackerman said what Brathwaite testified he did, the statement might well be viewed as a threat to Brathwaite that in the future he had better obey the Union's instructions with respect to letter-writing cam- paigns or other matters at the risk otherwise of incurring the displeasure of the steward, and causing the steward not to assist him in job-related matters. But the theory of this case is that the Union violated its duty of fair representa- tion, not that it merely threatened to do so. Perhaps, had Brathwaite not pursued the matter and proceeded to the union office, the apparent authority with which a union steward is clothed, and which makes him, normally, a union agent, would be sufficient to entail an 8(b)(1)(A) violation based on Ackerman's presumed remarks. But encroachment upon the jurisdiction of this Local Union. (d) To report to the Business Manager any violation of our laws, agreements or rules. (e) To perform such other duties as may be assigned to them by the Business Manager." 3 Cristallo has terminated 10 to 15 employees as general foreman. I Confirming Ackerman's testimony to the same effect. 1030 LOCAL 3, IBEW here there is specific evidence, both testimonial and documentary, that stewards did not possess that kind of authority. 5 And, based on Brathwaite's own testimony, it is clear that the ultimate failure to process his grievance had nothing to do with what Ackerman either thought or said. Accordingly, I shall dismiss the complaint herein. I Cf. Local 1016, United Brotherhood of Carpenters d Joiners of America, AFL--CIO, et a. (Booher Lumber Co., Inc.), 117 NLRB 1739 (1957), where the Board found that a union steward was an agent of the union with respect to union members at the site at which the steward operated, stating, "Where, as in the present case, there is no evidence as to the steward's duties, the Board infers that he possesses the usual authority of a union steward if its existence is not expressly disputed. There was no denial in this case that Stafford performed the normal functions of a union steward." Here, as noted, the existence of the Union's stewards authority with respect to For all the foregoing reasons, I conclude that Respon- dent Union has not violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by refusing to process Brathwaite's grievance, and issue the following recommended: ORDER8 The complaint is dismissed in its entirety. grievances is expressly disputed, and there is a denial, supported by evidence, that the steward's functions included processing grievances. 6 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings. conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes. 1031 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation