Burgie Vinegar Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Nov 27, 1946

71 N.L.R.B. 829 (N.L.R.B. 1946)

In the Matter of BURGLE VINEGAR COMPANY and LooAL INDUSTRIAL
UNION No. 1356, AFFILIATED WITH CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATIONS
Case No. 15-C-1090.Decided November 27, 1946
Mr. Lewis Moore, for the Board.
Messrs. Lowell W. Taylor and James W. Watson, of Memphis,
Tenn., for the respondent.
Mr. W. A. Copeland, of Memphis, Tenn., for the Union.
Mr. Herbert C. Kane, of counsel to the Board.
DECISION
AND
ORDER
On July 24, 1946, Trial Examiner Howard Myers issued his Inter-
mediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the
respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor
practices, and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and
take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the Inter-
mediate Report attached hereto. Thereafter, the respondent filed ex-
ceptions to the Intermediate Report and a supporting brief.
The Board has reviewed the Trial Examiner's rulings made at-the
hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Inter-
mediate Report, the exceptions and brief, and the entire record in
the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommen-
dations of the Trial Examiner to the extent hereinafter indicated.
We agree with the Trial Examiner that the respondent has failed
to comply with the requirement, imposed by Section 8 (5) of the Act,
to bargain collectively with the duly designated representative of its
employees, in good faith, and with "a sincere purpose to find a basis
of agreement." 1 Its initial refusal to negotiate with the Union for a
'In Globe Cotton Mills v N L R B, 103 F. (2d) 91, 94 (C C. A. 5). enf'g as mod.
6 N L. R. B. 461, the Court said, . . there is a duty on both sides, though difficult
of legal enforcement, to enter into discussion with an open and fair mind, and a sincere
purpose to find a basis of agreement touching wages and hours and conditions of labor "
See also N L. R B V. Swift S Co , 127 F (2d) 30, 31 (C C A 6),t enf'g 29 N. L R B.
746, Singer Mfg Co v N L R B, 119 F (2d) 131, 134, 139 (C C A. 7), enf'g as mod
24 N L R B 444, cei t den 313 U S 519 and 314 U S 705, N. L R B v Martin Bros
Box Co, 130 F (2d) 202, 208 (C C A 7), enf'g 35 N. L R B 217, cert. den 817 U S 660
71 N. L. R. B., No. 140.
829
830 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
period of nearly 6 months was unjustified, for, notwithstanding the un-
fortunate predicament in which it was placed by the serious illness of
its president, the respondent was under a positive legal duty to com-
mence bargaining with reasonable promptitude after the certification
and the Union's request for a meeting. The. regrettable handicap
under which the respondent labored due to Burgie's illness, did not
apparently impair its ability to deal with matters related to its ordinary
business affairs, and, theref ore, does not afford a convincing excuse for
its admitted failure to enter into bargaining negotiations with the
Union until more than 5 months after the Union's initial request. In
labor relations, a delay in commencing collective bargaining entails
more than mere postponement of an ordinary business transaction, for
the passage of time itself, while employees grow disaffected and im-
patient at their designated bargaining agent's failure to report prog-
ress, weakens the unity and economic power of the group, and impairs
the Union's ability to secure a beneficial contract. The Act, which
was designed to equalize bargaining power between employees and em-
ployers, does not permit an employer to secure, even unintentionally,
a dominant position at the bargaining table by means of unreasonable
delay.
Subsequent conduct on the part of the respondent further demon-
strates its lack of sincere purpose to effect an agreement with the
Union. Thus, on November 23,1945, after nearly 5 months of negotia-
tions between the parties, the respondent for the first time injected
into, the area, of dispute a proposal that the Union should agree to reim-
burse it for damages it might suffer as the result of a possible strike.
It seems to us that the interjection of a proposal of such significant
import to the parties, after 5 long months of bargaining which had not
even commenced until nearly 6 months had elapsed from the time the
Union had originally requested the respondent to negotiate, must be
construed as a further move to delay and impede the ultimate con-
summation of the agreement.
ORDER
Upon the entire record in the case and pursuant to Section 10 (c)
of the National Labor Relations Act, the National Labor Relations
Board hereby orders that the respondent Burgie Vinegar Company,
Memphis, Tennessee, and its officers, agents, successors, and assigns
shall :
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively with Local Industrial Union
No. 1356, affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations, as
the exclusive representative of all its employees excluding the clerical
BURGIE VINEGAR COMPANY 831
employees, the superintendent, and all or any other supervisory em-
ployees with authority to hire, promote, discharge, discipline, or
otherwise effect changes in the status of employees, or effectively rec-
ommend such action ;
(b) Engaging in like or related acts or conduct interfering with,
restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights to
self-organization, to form labor organizations, or to jour or assist Local
Industrial Union No. 1356, affiliated with the Congress of Industrial
Organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, as guaranteed
in Section 7 of the Act.
Take the following affirmative action, which the Board finds will
effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Upon request, bargain collectively with Local Industrial Union
No. 1356, affiliated with Congress of Industrial Organizations, as
exclusive representative of all its employees in the above-described
appropriate unit and if an understanding Is reached, embody such
understanding in a signed agreement;
(b) Post at its plants in Memphis, Tennessee, copies of the notice
attached to the Intermediate Report herein, marked "Appendix A." 2
Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director of the
Fifteenth Region, shall, after being duly signed by the respondent's
representative, be posted by the respondent immediately upon receipt
thereof, and maintained by it for sixty (60) consecutive days there-
after, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to
employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps sliall be taken
by the respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material;
(c) Notify the Regional Director for the Fifteenth Region, New
Orleans, Louisiana, in writing within ten (10) days from the date of
this Order what steps the respondent has taken to comply herewith.
CHAIRMAN HERZOG took no part in the consideration of the above
Decision and Order.
INTERMEDIATE REPORT
Mr. Lewis Mon e, for the Board
Messrs. Lowell W. Taylor and James W. Watson, of Memphis , Tenn, for the
respondent.
Mr. W. A. Copeland , of Memphis , Tenn., for the Union.
'This notice, however, shall be, and it hereby is, amended by striking from the first
paragraph thereof the words "The Recommendations of a Trial Examiner" and substituting
in lieu thereof the words "A Decision and Order " In the event that this Order is enforced
by a decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals, there shall be inserted, befoi e the words, "A
Decision and Order," the words, "A Decree of The United States Circuit Court of Appeal-
Enforcing
717734-47-von 71-54
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832, DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon an ,amended charge duly filed on June 4, 1946, by Local Industrial
Union No. 1356, affiliated with Congress of Industrial Organizations, herein
called the Union, the National Labor Relations Board, herein called the Board,
by its Regional Director for the Fifteenth Region (New Orleans, Louisiana),
issued its complaint on June 7, 1946, against Burgie Vinegar Company, Memphis,
Tennessee, herein called the respondent, alleging that the respondent had en-
gaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within
the meaning of Section S (1) and (5) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the National
Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449, herein called the Act. Copies of the com-
plaint and the amended charge, with notice of hearing thereon, were duly
served upon the respondent and the Union.
With respect' to` unfair labor practices, the complaint alleged in substance
that the respondent: (1) since January 1, 1945, committed, authorized, insti-
gated, and acquiesced in the making of statements and engaging in conversations
tending to discourage its employees from aiding, joining, or remaining mem-
bers of the Union, or from engaging in concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining and other mutual aid and protection; (2) on or about
September 12, 1944, on or about January 30, 1945, on or about Febi nary 20, 1945,
on or about March 20, 1945, and at all times since those dates, refused to bargain
collectively with the Union as the exclusive representative of its employees in a
certain appropriate unit, although a majority of its employees in the said unit
had selected and designated the Union as their representative for such purpose;
and (3) by the foregoing acts, interfered with, restrained, and coerced its
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
The answer duly filed by the respondent, admitted all the allegations of the
complaint pertaining to the corporate existence of the respondent and the nature,
character, and extent of the business transacted by it and certain other factual
matters, but denied all the allegations of the complaint with reference to the en-
gagement by the respondent in any unfair labor practices. The answer averred
that the Board had no legal right to proceed further with this proceeding for
the reason that the Act is unconstitutional. The respondent predicates its con-
tention that the Act is unconstitutional on that portion of Section 10 (b) thereof
which provides that the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity
shall not be controlling.
Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held on June 26 and 27, 1946, at Memphis,
Tennessee, before the undersigned, Howard Myers, the Trial Examiner, duly
designated by the Chief Trial Examiner. The Board and the respondent were
represented by counsel; the Union by one of its representatives. All parties par-
ticipated in the hearing and were afforded full opportunity to be heard, examine
and cross-examine witnesses, and to introduce evidence pertinent to the issues.
At the opening of the hearing, counsel for the respondent moved to dismiss the
complaint in its entirety on the ground that the Board had no legal right to
proceed further in this matter because the Act is unconstitutional. The motion
was denied with leave to renew.' Oral argument, in which counsel for the
Board and for the respondent participated, was heard at the conclusion of the
taking of the evidence and is part of the record. Although afforded an oppor-
tunity to do so, none of the parties has submitted a brief.
1 The motion was not renewed nor was any other motion to dismiss the complaint, or
any part thereof, made during the course of the hearing.
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BURGIE VINEGAR COMPANY 833
Upon the entire record in the case and from his observation of the witnesses,
the undersigned makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF TIIE RESPONDENT
Burgle Vinegar Company, a Tennessee corporation, is engaged in the manu-
facture, sale, and distribution of vinegar, hot sauce, potato sauce, and mustard, at
Memphis, Tennessee . Respondent's annual products aggregate approximately
$400,000 in dollar value, about $300,000 of which is sold and delivered to customers
located at points outside the State of Tennessee.
The respondent, at the hearing, conceded that it is engaged in commerce within
the meaning of the Act
II THE ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Local Industrial Union No 1356, affiliated with the Congress of Industrial
Organizations, is a labor organization admitting to membership employees of the
respondent.
III THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
The refusal to bargain
1 The appropriate unit and representation by the Union of a majority therein
On January 4, 1945, the Board issued its Decision and Direction of Election
in Case No 15-R-1233 (59 N L. R B. 1425), in which it found that all the re-
spondent's employees, excluding clerical employees, the superintendent, and all
or any other supervisory employees with authority to hire, promote, discharge,
discipline, or otherwise effect changes in the status of em loyees, or effectively
recommend such action, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of col-
lective bargaining On January 13, 1945, an election was held pursuant to the
aforesaid Direction of Election. According to the Tally of Ballots certified to
by representatives of the parties, of the approximately 18 eligible voters, 12 votes
were cast for the Union, none against it. No objections to the voting or to the
conduct of the election were filed by any of the parties On January 23, 1945,
the Board in its Certification of Representatives, certified the Union as the repre-
sentative of the employees in the aforesaid unit for the purpose of collective bar-
gaining
The respondent does not contest the appropriateness of the unit, above referred
to, nor the subsequent certification of the Union therefor, except that the respond-
ent contends that the Act is unconstitutional and hence the Boai d has no legal
right to adjudicate the issues involved herein No evidence other than that
introduced by the respondent in Case No 15-R-1233 to support its contention
was introduced in the present hearing The respondent predicates its contention
that the Act is unconstitutional on that portion of Section 10 (b) thereof which
piovides that the rules of evidence pievailing in courts of law or equity shall
not be controlling. The undersigned finds no merit in the respondent's contention
that the Act is unconstitutional and therefoie rejects it
The undersigned finds that all the respondent's employees, exc111ding clerical
employees, the superintendent, and all or any other supervisory employees with
authority to hire, promote, discharge, discipline, or otherwise effect changes in
the status of employees, or effectively recommend such action, constitute, and
during all the times material herein constituted, a unit appropriate for the pur-
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834 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
poses of collective bargaining The undersigned further finds that on and after
January 23, 1945, the Union was the duly designated bargaining representative
of a majority of the employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit, and that, pur-
suant to the provisions of Section 9 (a) of the Act, the Union on January 23, 1945,
became, and at all times thereafter has been, and now is, the exclusive repre-
sentative of all the employees in the aforesaid unit for the purposes of collective
bargaining with respect to rates of spay, wages, hours of employment, and other
conditions of employment.
2. The Negotiations
As found above, the Board on January 4, 1945, directed the Regional Director
for the Fifteenth Region to conduct an election by secret ballot among the re-
spondent's employees in the appropriate unit. On January 6, J L Burgle, the re-
spondent's president, telegraphed the Regional Director "our attorney has not yet
decided whether he will appeal' stop I am leaving Memphis on January 12th or
13th of this month for Boston where I am to undergo a serious operation. Stop
I should return to Memphis and be able to work by Febiuary 25th "
The 12 voters at the election held on January 13, cast their votes for the
Union.' The Board, on January 23, certified the Union as the exclusive collective
bargaining representative of the employees in the appropriate unit
On January 25, the Union sent Burgle a copy of a proposed contract and
asked him to fix a date for a conference to discuss the demands of the Union.
By letter, dated January 3, Lowell W. Taylor, respondent's attorney, acknowl-
edged receipt of the Union letter of January 25 In his letter, Taylor stated
Ihat Burgie was about to undergo a surgical operation and "just as soon as Mr.
Burgie suthciently iecovers to return to work we will get in touch with you for
the purpose of discussing your proposed employment."
By letter dated Febi nary 15, the Union inquired of Taylor if some preliminary
steps looking toward a conti act could not be taken during the absence of Burgie.
To this letter, Taylor replied under date of February 20, as follows:
Upon i eceipt of your letter I called the Burgie Vinegar Company and
found that Sir Burgie is in the hospital in Boston. They expect to be
advised within the next two or three days as to his present condition and
wi lien he may expect to get back to nw ork.
As you know, the Burgie Vinegar Company is to all intents and puiposes
a one-man business, and Mr Burgie would not want anyone to agree upon
the terius of contract or to execute a contract without his full knowledge
and approval
It is probable that within a very short time Mr Burgle's condition will be
such that he can return to Memphis and discuss this matter with us or I can
handle it to some extent with him by correspondence
There is no intent on our part to delay negotiations, and you may rest
assured that just as soon as Sir Burgie's condition will permit we will get
in touch with you
On March 16, the Union wrote Taylor, in part, as follows:
The union is not trying to take advantage of Mr Burgie's condition, but
we think you will appreciate the fact that in excess of two months is an
e_:traoriinary length of time before beginning negotiations. We don't think
that you or the company would wait two months on the union it it was
2In the Representation Proceeding the respondent had contended the Act is unconstitu-
tional The contemplated appeal evidently refereed to that contention.
3 There were 18 eniploi ees eligible to participate in the election
BURGIE VINEGAR COMPANY 835
called upon to take some action, even though the union president or union
representative might be ill at'the time
We don ' t want to appear to be too impatient , but we feel that steps should
be taken without further delay to begin at least the negotiations on the con-
tract.
Under date of March 18, the Union wrote Taylor enclosing a copy of "an
agreement covering retroactivity of any wage increases which we arrive at during
pending negotiations " The letter then stated that if the respondent would agree
upon a retroactive date, the Union, because of Burgie's illness, would be willing
to wait another 6 weeks to begin negotiations. On April 9, Taylor replied that
Burgie had successfully undergone 2 operations and was expected in Memphis
the next couple of weeks. Taylor did not refer to the Union's proposed retro-
active agreement.
By letter dated April 11, the Union wrote Taylor as follows :
Thank you very much for the information that Mr. Burgle will be back
in Memphis ready for work within the next couple of weeks. However, we
must remind you that previously and some time ago you had notified us
that Mr. Burgie will be available soon for negotiations
Your letter of April 9 with the above information apparently was in answer
to our letter of March 18, but it makes no reieience to the Union's proposal
for an agreement on retroactivity, a very reasonable request in view of the
extraordinarily long delay in this case
We have been quite willing throughout to be reasonable concerning the
protracted delays in negotiations clue to Mr Burgle's illness, but we insist
that our suggestion for an agreement on a retroactive date is also within
reason and that the company and its representatives apparently are not
making a sincere attempt to be as reasonable as the Union.
Because of the continued failure to get a meeting with the Company and
the apparent unwillingness on your part to consider seriously our retro-
active suggestion, and because of the very questionable future status of
negotiations, the Union had requested the services of a conciliation com-
missioner in this case This commissioner's first objective would be to
bring the two parties together in a meeting, and for my part I am willing
to co-operate with him toward that objective, and we certainly hope that
he will be more successful than our own efforts have been.
Taylor, under date of April 20, wrote the Union as follows :
Yesterday a gentleman came to the office who stated lie was a conciliator
with the War Labor Board, and discussed at some length the Burgle Vinegar
matter with me. I told him that Mr. Burgie had undergone two very serious
operations and was now at home recovering from them. I also told him
that it appeared to us that Mr. Burgle would probably be able to transact
business in about a month.
There is no desire on our part to delay negotiations. However, Air
Burgie is the only person authorized to act for the company in matters of
this kind We will be glad to take up negotiations with you just as soon
as Afr Burgle is able.
Mr Leigh said that you thought some sort of grievance committee should
be appointed to function in the interim. While I doubt very seriously the
necessity of this, and while neither Mr. Redus' nor I have any authority
to make any agreements, I am going to suggest to Air Redus that if you do
' J P. Redus is a stockholder of the respondent and its assistant treasurer and general
manager Buigie gave Redus complete charge of the business duiing the former ' s penod
of hospitalization.
836 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
select a grievance committee to act in the interim that he recognize the,
committee merely as a temporary one and without prejudice to any nego-
tiations in the future, and to fully discuss any grievances presented.
On April 26, the Union wrote Taylor as follows:
While we do not catch the significance of your very qualified suggestion
of setting up a Shop Committee in the Burgle plant pending disposition of
the present unsatisfactory state of a contract, the Union has appointed such
a committee with instructions to take up with Mr. Redus anything develop-
ing in the plant which should be called to his attention or which needs
correction.
Very frankly, the effectiveness of such a Shop Committee is virtually
nullified by the qualifying fence your letter of April 20 has built around it.
We see no reason of limiting such a committee to a "temporary" status,
nor why establishment of the committee- should or should not prejudice
negotiations, and we certainly want to put it on a footing of more than
"fully discussing" any grievances.
And while we are on the subject, we would like to call to your attention
the practices of your foreman, Mr. Dodd, who has been and is still telling
his employees that it is his intention to "breaking up the union in the
Burgle plant." We have quite a few affidavits to add to our rather volumi-
nous Burgle file on Mr. Dodd's intimidation of union members, especially
the fact that it is being alleged, and Mr. Dodd is quoted to that effect, that
Mr Dodd has told some of the employees that he "wouldn't fire any Union
members but that he intended to make it so tough on them that they would
quit." Two members have quit, their statements say, because Mr. Dodd
had made it "so tough" on them. Such a condition, I think you will agree,
cannot continue without steps being taken by the Union which the Union
is reluctant to take because it could conceivabley (sic) aggiavate a situation
already aggravating enough.
Members of the Burgle Shop Committee are Henry Roberts and Jesse
Rhodes, and it is the Union's sincere hope that plant management will
cooperate with this committee which has every intention and desire to
cooperate with the management.
On May 3, Taylor acknowledged receipt of the Union's letter of April 26. Tay-
lor closed his letter with the following comment :
I do not believe a word you say about what Mr. Dodd has done. My
personal observation has been that labor organizers can get almost any
kind of affidavits they want. As I told you in my last letter, we are per-
fectly willing to negotiate with you for an agreement just as soon as Mr.
Burgle is able. Usually people accomplish something by negotiations when
they adopt a more friendly attitude towards each other. My suggestion is
that if you intend to participate in these negotiations you change your
attitude.
On June 5, Taylor informed the Union by letter that he had a conference
a few days previous with Burgle but that it would "be some considerable time
before [Burgle] will be able to sit in on a conference" with the Union. Taylor
added that Burgle had authorized him to "conduct negotiations for an agree-
ment with the union, subject to" Burgle's approval and that within the next
few days he would prepare an agreement and forward a copy to the Union.
On June 6, W. A. Copeland, the Union's representative and the person who had
complete charge of this matter on behalf of the Union and conducted its corre-
spondence with the respondent and Taylor, wrote Taylor that he would appre-
BURGIE VINEGAR COMPANY 837
ciate receiving the proposed agreement as soon as possible so that an early
date could be arranged for a conference because he expected to be absent from
Memphis for a period of 2 weeks commencing on June 18.
Under date of June 12, A. R Marshall, a director of the Disputes Division of
the National War Labor Board addressed a joint letter to the respondent and
the Union, which reads as follows :
In my telephone conversation with Mr. Taylor this morning, I was advised
that plans had been made for negotiations on a contract for next week, and
that it was probable that all issues in dispute could be settled.
Mr Copeland informed me by telephone that he was anxious to begin
negotiations as soon as possible, and that lie would contact Mr. Taylor as
soon as possible
In view of the fact that negotiations are to begin in the near future, we
will postpone the Panel Hearing until July. In the event the parties are
able to come to an agreement, a healing will not be necessary.
I would like for both of you gentlemen to write me by the end of next
week what progress has been made on negotiations, and whether an agree-
ment has been reached. If a full agreement has been reached on all issues
in dispute, a copy of such agreement signed by both parties should be sub-
mitted to this office for approval of the wage matters. If an agreement is not
reached on some of the issues in dispute, it is contemplated that the hearing
will proceed in accordance with our custom in such cases
In its letter of June 15, to Marshall, a copy of which was sent that day to
Taylor, the Union outlined the difficulty it had encountered with the respondent
since January 23, the date on which the Board had certified it as the bargaining
representative The letter concludes as follows :
However. the Union is willing to go almost all the way to a sincere effort
to settle this across the conference table and not throw too many unresolved
issues before the War Labor Board. With that thought in-mind we are
arranging with Mr. Walter Carson, 66 South Third, and Mr. Earl Crowder,
also 66 South Third, both on the CIO staff, to meet with Mr Taylor next week
if he so indicates that he wants a meeting to discuss a proposed contract.
We also are asking Mr. Crowder to report, as you have requested, at the end
of next week on the progress at that time of negotiations We are enclosing
copy of a letter written today to Mr. Taylor with that information.
Foi your own information, the Union submitted a contract proposal to
the Company in January with requests based entirely upon the minimum,
not the maximum, usually granted by the War Labor Board in dispute cases.
Because of those minimum requests, we had not anticipated the six months
delay in reaching an agreement
On the same day (June 15) Copeland wrote Taylor that he was leaving town
on June 18 for the following 2 weeks and that if Taylor was ready to meet with
the Union during that period, Taylor should telephone either DIr Carson or Mr.
Crowder, both of whom have been designated by the Union as its bargaining
representatives
On or about June 16, Taylor telephoned the Union that he would submit a
proposed contract the following week and would confer with its representative
shortly thereafter
On July 3, Taylor wrote the Union as follows:
As you know, because of Mr Buigie's illness it has been very difficult for
me to work out some method of bargaining with the Union for an agreement.
Although Mr. Burgle's physicians are not willing for him to undertake any
heavy business problems, I have been able to confer with him with respect
838 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
to an agreement I have prepared an agreement taken from some that I
have written for other clients and which have proved satisfactory both to the
employer and the union I have submitted it to Mr Burgie and it is ac-
ceptable to him. I hope that you and the Union will find it satisfactory,
please advise me and you and I will have it executed by our respective
clients.
The contract which Taylor sent the Union was unsatisfactory to it and Cope-
land so notified Taylor on July 6
On July 12, pursuant to arrangements, Copeland conferred at Taylor's office
with Taylor. There the Union's and the respondent's contracts were discussed at
length. Copeland objected to the recognition clause in the respondent's contract
because it provided for recognition of the Union for members only. Copeland
pointed out to Taylor that the Board had certified the Union, after a secret elec-
tion, as the exclusive bargaining representative for all the employees in the unit.
After some discussion, Taylor agreed to recommend to Burgle that the iespondent
adopt the recognition clause contained in the Union's contract Copeland also
pointed out that while the respondent's contract names certain days as being
holidays, it makes no provision for payment for work performed on those clays.
Taylor agreed to recommend to Buigie that the respondent pay at the rate of
time and one-half for all work performed by the employees on the named holiday
No agreement on the wage clause was made because the Union strenuously
objected to, and Taylor refused to recede from, the respondent's clause reading
as follows :
The Company will at all times during the life of this agreement maintain
rates of pay as high as the average Tate paid by its principal competitors in
its competitive territory, it being agreed that its competitors are those en-
gaged in the manufacture of vinegar, inustaid, hot sauce, Worcestershire
sauce, and syrup, located in Tennessee, Mississippi, Aikansas, Abibaina,
Louisiana, Georgia, Florida, Missouri. Texas, Oklahoma, and South Caro-
lina Hours of work and overtime shall conform to the Federal Wages and
Hours Act
A committee composed of three -employees shall be maintained to-=lake
studies of wage scales paid by the Company's competitors, for the purpose of
ascertaining whether the Company's wage scale conforms to the provisions
of the next preceding paragraph of this section 6 In the event the em-
ployees' committee is of the opinion that the present scale does not conform
to this agreement, the matter shall be taken up with Company representatives
for revision and adjustment In the event of disagreement, the matter shall
be subject to arbitration under Section 7 of this agreement
Certain other clauses of the respondent's proposed contract were accepted by
Copeland and others rejected. The meeting concluded with the understanding
that Taylor would confer with But gie and then meet Copeland later
On July 26, Taylor wrote Copeland as follows :
After discussing the matter at some length with you and reviewing our
proposed draft of the contract and Sours, I took the matter up with dir.
Burgie, and now believe that we have reached an agreement satisfactory to
both parties The matters on which we were not in accord when you and I
had our last discussion were provisions for seniority, vacations with pay,
wage rates, maintenance of membership, aural eheck-off Mr Burgie has
agreed to the following: 1 Maintenance of membership. (2) provisions, for
seniority, (3) vacations with pay, and (4) a nuniiaui wage rate of 500 an
hour for all employees, after three months continuous employment.
BURGIE VINEGAR COMPANY 839
You stated that you did not want to provide for a starting wage in the
agreement . From the best information available , our competitors are not
paying more than 500 an hour for this class of labor , and naturally, we
cannot pay more than our competitors
Mr Burgle says lie is not in a position to assume responsibility for col-
lection of dues, because his office force is very short , very much overworked,
and is now far behind with its work.
We think it would be far better to have the judge of some court in Shelby
County to appoint an arbitrator to settle grievances , and have taken the
liberty of providing that the Judge of the Probate Court shall appoint such
arbitrators.
Enclosed is copy of revised draft of agreement , which I hope you will
find satisfactory , and I hope that the agreement will prove beneficial to
both the Company and the Union.
Taylor and Copeland had a brief conference on July 28 Nothing was accom-
plished at that meeting . They conferred at length on July 30, where the re-
spondent ' s second proposed contract was discussed at length . Taylor agreed
to recommend to Burgle certain demands of the Union and Copeland agreed to
accept certain of the clauses contained in the respondent's second proposed
contract Nevertheless , despite these agreements on the par t of each of them,
the parties were unable to agree to other provisions The amain issues upon which
the parties were unable to agree were those involving ( 1) its so-called "manage-
ment clause ," ( 2) wages, ( 3) exception of certain classifications entitled to over-
time pay for work performed on holidays , ( 4) selection of the arbitrator , ( 5) the
wording of the maintenance of membership clause,s ( 6) manner of computing
time worked to enable an employee to qualify for vacation with pay, and (7) the
inclusion of company rules in the contract.
On August 6, Taylor wrote Copeland that after consultation with Burgle, the
respondent agrees "to substantially everything proposed by you " The letter,
however, then sets forth the following list of, exceptions :
We will agree to a maintenance of membership provision , but must in-
sist upon a provision that the Company will not be required to discharge
any employees for failure to Maintain his membership , unlcis and until
an employee of equal skill and ability is available to take his place.
We will agree to increase all employees making less than 500 an hour up
to 50 > an hour, but we cannot agree to any increase for any employee over
50¢ per hour As stated to you in my last letter , the best information we
can obtain is that our competitors are paying 450 and 500 in hour for this
kind of labor . We cannot pay more than our competitors Furthermore,
our information is that the prevailing maximum scale in Memphis for this
type of labor is 500 an hour.
We feel that the grounds for discharge included in section 12 are all fair
and reasonable , and that much controversy might be avoided by enumerating
those contained in section 12. On August 7, Copeland wrote Taylor that lie
could not agree with Taylor's statement that the respondent had agreed to
substantially all of the Union ' s demands and pointed out to Taylor that
whatever concessions the respondent had agreed to make were offset by the
qualifications attached to the concessions. Copeland concluded his letter
'The Union objected to the respondent's proposed phrase reading "provided, however,
that the Company- shall not be ieijuired to drsehaige anv employee for failure to, maintain
his nienibei ship, unless and until such employee can be i eplaced by a person of equal skill
and ability "
840 DECISIONS OP NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
with the statement that he was requesting the National War Labor Board to
proceed with the matter to final decision.
On or about October 15, the Regional War Labor Board, after hearing, issued
a directive reading in part as follows :
1. Wages:
A hiring in rate of 50¢ per hour shall be established, with progression
to 521/20 per hour after thirty clays' service, with a differential of 5¢ per
hour for the six employees presently being paid 500 per hour.
2 Retroactivity:
The wage increases herein ordered shall be retroactive to May 12, 1945.
The procedure to be followed in making retroactive payment to employees
who have quit or been discharged shall be in accordance with the annexed
copy of the National Board's Resolution of April 2, 1943.
3 Effective Date of Contract:
The effective date of the contract shall be May 12, 1945.
4. Union Security:
The standard maintenance of membership clause, with a fifteen-day escape
period, shall be continued, without the proviso on replacement requested
by the Company.
5. Provision for Length of Tiinie as Temporary Employee under Seniority:
That part of the contract with respect to the provision for length of time
as a temporary employee under seniority shall read as follows :
"Any employee hired after this agreement is signed shall be regarded as
a temporary employee until thirty days after employment."
6. Provision for Vacation Eligibility:
Eligibility for vacations shall be 1800 hours worked in the twelve preceding
months
7. Provision for Discharge:
The reasons for discharge by the Company shall not appear in the contract,
but the following statement, or a similar one, shall be included :
"It is agreed that the right to discharge employees for just cause is a
management prerogative If an employee alleges an unjust discharge, how-
ever, the Union may taken the matter up as a grievance "
8. Thirty-Day Wage Re-opening Clause :
The contract shall contain a clause by which wage negotiations may be
re-opened upon thirty days' notice by either party.
Pursuant to arrangements, Copeland and Taylor conferred on November 14,
at Taylor's office. Taylor told Copeland that he refuses to advise the respondent
to comply with the War Labor Board's directive because "he did not recognize
the jurisdiction of the War Labor Board " Taylor and Copeland then got into
an argument and Taylor ordered Copeland out of his office, stating to Copeland
"We are terminating negotiations because you, as a representative of the Union,
are insulting and abusive." The record is clear, and the undersigned finds, that
Taylor provoked the argument.
Later that day (November 14) Copeland wrote Burgle a summary of what
took place in Taylor's office that morning The letter reads as follows
During a scheduled conference this morning with Mr. Lowell Taylor, who
has represented your company in dealings with Local Industrial Union
BURGIE VINEGAR COMPANY 841
#1356, Mr Taylor informed its in presence of his associate, Mr. Watson,
that "the company would no longer bargain with the union because Copeland
was insulting and abusive."
Those may not have been Mr. Taylor's exact words, but in effect the same.
We had called upon Mr Taylor, after arranging the conference by phone
the previous dav, to discuss completion of the agreement which, as you know,
has been pending now for some 10 months Mr Taylor earlier had said
that the company had no intention of complying with the recent War Labor
Board Directive We had offered to discuss some modification of the terms
of the directive in order to work out an agreement.
We are requesting from you whether Mr Taylor was speaking for the
company when lie nnfornied its that the company would no longer bargain
with the union.
The union is v illiiig to, in fact offer ing to, substitute another negotiator for
myself if that will assist in completing the agreement But, frankly, the
question of "insulting and abusive" pi obably is a matter of personal opinion,
and 11Ir Taylor could conceivably be just as objectionable personally to the
Union representative as lie says I am to him, and it might be a good idea
if both the company and the union changed negotiators in order to reach
an amicable agreement without creating additional misunderstandings. The
Union is agreeable to that suggestion.
Burgle replied to the above quoted letter on November 17 as follows:
This is to acknowledge receipt of your letter of November 14th, in which
you state that Mr Taylor said the company would no longer bargain with
the union because Copeland was insulting and abusing Mr. Taylor has
advised us of what occurred at the meeting you referred to and has fur-
nished us with a copy of registered letter to you, in which he clearly states
that this company is willing to bargain with the union.
This company has since you first proposed a contract stood ready and
willing to negotiate for a contract acceptable to both parties, and we feel
absolutely certain that Mr. Taylor still stands ready and willing to negotiate
on our behalf Mr. Taylor has been the attorney for this company for a long
time and we rely implicitly upon him to represent ibis in matters of this kind.
,Our suggestion is that either you or some other representative of the
union contact Mr Taylor with a view of continuing negotiations upon a
basis and in a spirit of attempting to reach an agreement instead of adopting
an attitude evidently designed to break off negotiations
Taylor on -November 14, wrote Copeland that the respondent stood ready, as it
had in the past,'to execute its second proposed contract and if the Union was of
the opinion that any provision contained therein was unfair, he would gladly
discuss the matter further with any representative of the Union "who will agree
to discuss it on a decent and respectable plan." To this letter, Copeland replied
that the Union was willing to submit the entire matter for settlement to a Con-
ciliator of the United States Conciliation Service or to Judge Ben Capell, whom
Taylor had previously suggested to act as arbitrator under the contract.
On November 23, Taylor wrote Copeland as follows :
This is to acknowledge receipt of your letter on November 19th
Mr. Burgle and I have again discussed this matter, and have gone over
the history of prior negotiations and the last draft of the agreement tendered
by us N e ahe both in accord that we have acceded to all of the reasonable
demands made by the union, and that the company would not be justified in
acceding to any further demands We feel that the last revised draft of the
agreement is fair and reasonable, and the company is still willing to sign it,
842 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
but it feels that in view of the many wildcat strikes that have taken place
since the termination of the war, a turther provision should be incorporated
in the agreement.
The agreement as now drafted imposes many obligations upon the com-
pany, but the only obligation imposed upon the employees is that they will
not sti ike, have any walkouts, sitdowns, or slowdowns We feel that an
additional agreement should be incorporated into the agreement to the effect
that in the event of any strikes, authorized or unauthorized. the union will
unconditionally obligate itself to reimburse the company for any and all
damage, including loss of profits resulting from any such strike, sitdown,
slowdown or walkout. -
In reply to that portion of your letter in which you suggest that the matter
be submitted to Judge Capell for au bitration, we quote fn om your letter of
August 7, 1045, in which you replied to our suggestion that the matter be
submitted to Judge Capell for arbitration:
"Your suggestion that Judge Ben Capell arbitrate the remaining differ-
ences can be taken in no other way except that the company has no intention
of compromising the remaining issues, as the union has attempted to com-
promise all the provisions "
No further communications passed between the parties The November 14 con-
fei ence was the last held by the parties
3 Concluding findings
There is no dispute as to the foregoing facts. The issue, as it arises from them,
turns on the question whether the respondent bargained with the Union in good
faith, within the meaning of Section 8 (5) of the Act This question must be
answer ed in the negative The record fail ly justifies a finding that the respond-
ent entertained no purpose or desire to reach an agreement with the Union, and
made no genuine effort to do so
The fair inference of bad faith is reinforced by a consideration of the aspects
of the respondent's conduct during the negotiations Thus, Burgle, the only per-
son who admittedly had author sty on behalf of the respondent to render the
conferences anything mor
0
e than an exchange of ideas, never attended any of the
meetings with the Union. On the contrary, although he had advised the Union
in reply to its first request for a baiganung conference, that he was unable to
participate personally because of his physical condition and contemplated opera-
tion, he made no effort to notify the Union of his return to active management of
respondent's business, or then to arrange a conference. Instead, he continued to
allow Taylor, who admittedly had no authority beyond relaying to Burgle the
progress of the negotiations, to represent the respondent at the conferences.
Moreover, while thus refusing to submit himself to "the give and rake of personal
conferences," an obvious essential of the bargaining conference,° he, at the
same time, failed to enlarge the authority of Taylor to consummate a contract
with the Union Accordingly, at no,tmie during the negotiations was the Union
afforded an opportunity to confer with or to convince anyone having authority
to agree to anything on the respondent's behalf concerning the merits of the
Union's proposals Further, while the Union was insisting on certain provisions
of its proposed contract and rejecting certain proposals submitted by the respond-
ent, it is entirely possible that it would have changed its position if anyone
with, authotity to bind the respondent had participated in the conference. The
Union's "resistance in discussion may have been only strategy and not a fixed final
0 N L R B v P Loadhird Company, 117 F (2d) 921, 924 (C C A 6).
BURGIE VINEGAR COMPANY 843
intention."' In sum, the respondent's course was the negation of true "bargain-
ing"; there was no opportunity for "give and take" because no one with authority
to "give" or "take" presented himself at the conference table on behalf of the
respondent.
The respondent's conduct, throughout the whole period from January 30, 1945,
the date when Taylor replied to the Union's first request for a bargaining con-
ference to November 23, 1945, the date of Taylor's letter demanding indemnity
from the Union for any loss due to strikes or other work stoppages, evidences a
complete absence of good faith collective bargaining The Union recognized the
difficulties caused by Burgie's illness and went far to accommodate itself to his
absence. Its initial request that some one be designated to discuss the proposed
contract, subject to Burgle's approval was not unreasonable, but it was unreason-
able and an initial evidence of bad faith for the respondent to refuse any degree
of cooperation in this respect. Burgle quite readily put Redus in complete charge
of the business. Inherent in this must have been authority to make commitments.
With this as a background, no plausible reason has been given for not doing some-
thing of the same character in connection with the negotiations with the Union.
It is true there were conferences with Taylor from time to time over a long
period, and standing alone, the propositions offered by the respondent probably
were proper matters for collective bargaining, in connection with which "resist-
ance in discussion may have been only strategy and not a fixed final determina-
tion," but these incidents cannot be considered in a vacuum They must be
viewed as, a part of the whole over-all picture and against the background of
Burgie's persistent refusal to personally participate in the negotiations notwith-
standing lie was the only person with authority to negotiate a binding agreement.
When Burgie, after about 6 months of delay, authorized Taylor to submit a
proposed contract, the contract submitted has all the appearances of being made
intentionally obnoxious to the Union. This is patent from the proposed recogni-
tion clause which was clearly repugnant to the Act in that it ignored the Union's
certification and sought to bargain with the Union for its members only That
kind of proposal is not bargainable when the Board has issued its certification.
That the respondent later receded from the proposition does not purge it of the
had faith inherent in making it.' Furthermore, while claiming to grant certain
concessions to the Union, the respondent usually placed some qualifying clause
to the concession which substantially nullified it. Its refusal to carry out the
directive of the Regional War Labor Board and Taylor's conduct in provoking
in argument with Copeland, are other instances of lack of good faith on the part
of the respondent.
The good faith of the respondent can only be measured by its over-all conduct
during the entire course of the negotiations and the disparity of treatment be-
tween this phase of the respondent's business and that of its general operations,
in Burgle's refusal to make any final negotiations possible by either attending
the conferences inc person or clothing some representative with sufficient authority
to•allow an agreement to be reached. Such conduct is not bargaining as the term
is contemplated by the Act
Under the circumstances, it is found that at no time during the period from
January 30, 1945). to the end of the negotiations, did the respondent bargain in
good faith with the Union and that such refusal was first made on January 30,
1945, and has continued to the present time.
Globe Cotton Mills V. N. L. R. B., 103 F (2d) 91, 95 (C C A 5).
8M(,Quay-No)iis illanufactum ag Company v. N L R B, 116 F (2d) 748 (C C A 7).
Great Southern Trucking Co. v. N. L. R B., 127 F. (2d) 180 (C C A 4)
844 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
In view of the foregoing conduct of the respondent, the undersigned is con-
vinced, and finds, that the respondent did not approach the negotiations with an
open mind, and a sincere effort to arrive at a signed agreement binding upon both
parties The undersigned further finds that the respondent failed to bargain
collectively with the Union in good faith, within the meaning of Section 8 (5)
of the Act and thereby interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees
in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act
The undersigned turther finds that the evidence is insufficient to support the
allegations of the complaint that the respondent "since on or about January 1,
1945, has committed, authorized, instigated, and acquiesced in statements and
conversations discouraging activity on the part of iespondent's employees for the
purpose of collective bargaining and other mutual aid and protection and dis-
couraging membership and activity among said einplol ees in the Union " Ac-
cordingly, the undersigned will recommend that this allegation of the complaint
be dismissed.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PR.\0'I ICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the respondent set forth in Section III, above, occurring in
connection with the operations of the respondent described in Section I, above,
have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce
among the several States, and such of them as have been found to be unfair labor
practices tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and
the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
SincO it has been found that the respondent has engaged in unfair labor prac-
tices, it will be recommended that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain
afflimative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Since it has been found that the respondent has refused to bargain collectively
with the Union as the exclusive representative of its employees in an appropriate
unit, it will be recommended that the respondent, upon request, bargain collec-
tively with the Union, as such repi esentative.
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and upon the entire record in
the case, the undersigned makes the following;
CONCLUSIONS OF L1w
1. Local Industrial Union No. 1350, affiliated with Congress of Industrial
Oiganizations, is a labor organization, within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of
the Act.
2 All the respondent's employees, excluding clerical employees, the super-
intendent, and all or any other supervisory employees with authority to hire,
promote, discharge, discipline, or otherwise effect changes in the status of em-
ployees, or 'effectively recommend such action, constitute a unit appropriate
for the purposes of collective bargaining, within the meaning of Section 9 (b)
of the Act.
3 Local Industrial Union No 1356, affiliated with Congress of Industrial
Organizations, was, on January 23, 1945, and at all times thereafter has been,
the exclusive representative of all the employees in the aforesaid unit for the
purposes of collective bargaining, within the meaning of Section 9 (a) of the Act
4 By refusing on January 30, 1945, and at all times thereafter, to bargain
collectively with Local Industrial Union No 1356, affiliated with Congress of
Industrial Organizations, as exclusive representative of all its employees in the
BURGIE 17INEGAR COMPANY 845
appropi late unit, the respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8 (5) of the Act.
5 By interfering with, restraining, and coercing its employees in the exercise
of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, the respondent has engaged
in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (1)
of the Act.
6 The aforesaid unfair labor practices ale unfair labor practices affecting
commerce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
7 The respondent did not commit, authorize, instigate, or acquiesce "in
statements and conversations discouraging activity on the part of respondent's
employees for the purpose of collective bargaining and other mutual aid and
protection and discouraging membership activity among said employees in the
Union," as alleged in the complaint.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and conclusions of law, and upon
the entire record in the case, including the record in Case No. 15-R-1233, the
undersigned recommends that the respondent, Burgie Vinegar Company, Mem-
phis, Tennessee, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns shall:
1 Cease and desist from :
(a) Refusing-to bargain collectively with Local Industrial Union No 1356,
affiliated with Congress of Industrial Organizations, as the exclusive representa-
tive of all of its employees in the above-described appropriate unit
(b) Engaging in like or related acts or conduct interfering with, restraining,
or coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights to self-organization, to
form labor organizations, or to join or assist Local Industrial Union No 1356,
affiliated with Congress of Industrial Organizations, or any other labor organiza-
tions, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and
to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection, as guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the follovnig affirmative action, which the undersigned finds will effec-
tuate the policies of the Act :
(a) Upon request bargain collectively with Local Industrial Union No. 1356,
affiliated with Congress of Industrial Organizations, as exclusive representative
of all its employees in the above-described appropriate unit and if an under-
standing is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement;
(b) Post at its plants in Memphis, Tennessee, copies of the notice attached
hereto, marked "Appendix A." Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the
Regional Director of the Fifteenth Region, shall, after being duly signed by the
respondent's representative, be posted by the respondent immediately upon
receipt thereof, and maintained by it for sixty (60) consecutive days thereafter,
in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are cus-
tomarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the respondent to insure
that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material ;
(c) Notify the Regional Director for the Fifteenth Region, New Orleans,
Louisiana, in writing, within ten (10) days from the receipt of this Intermediate
Report, of what steps the respondent has taken to comply herewith.
It is further recommended that unless, on or before ten (10) days from the
date of the receipt of this Intermediate Report, the respondent notifies the said
Regional Director in writing that it will comply with the foregoing recommenda-
tions, the National Labor Relations Board issue an order requiring the respondent
to take the action aforesaid
846 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
It is further recommended that the allegation of the complaint that the
respondent "Since on or about January 1, 1945, has committed, authorized,
instigated, and acquiesced in statements and conversations discouraging activity
on the part of respondent's employees for the purpose of collective bargaining
and other mutual aid and protection and discouraging meiuberiship and activity
among said employees in the Union" be dismissed.
As provided in Section 33 of Ai title II of the Rules and Regulations Hof the
National Labor Relations Board, Series 3, as amended, effective November 27,
1945, any party or counsel for the Board may, within fifteen (15) days from the
date of the entry of the order transferring the case to the Board, pursuant to
Section 32 of Article II of said Rules and Regulations, file with the Board,
Rochambeau Building, Washington 25, D. C, an original and four copies of a
statement in writing, setting forth such exceptions to the Intermediate Report
or to any other part of the record or proceeding (including rulings upon all
motions or objections) as lie relies upon, together with the original and four
copies of a brief in support thereof Immediately upon the filing of such state-
ment of exceptions and/or brief, the party of counsel for the Board filing the
same shall serve a copy then eof upon each of the other parties and shall file a
copy with the Regional Director. Ais further provided in said Section 33, should
any party desire permission to angue•oially before the Board, request therefor
must be made in writing to the Board within ten (10) days from the date of the
order transferring the case to the Board. Any party desiring to submit a brief
in support of the Intermediate Report shall do so within fifteen (15) days from
the date of the entry of the order transfers ing the case to the Board, by filing
with the Board an original and four copies thereof, and by immediately serving
a copy thereof upon each of the other parties and the Regional Director
HOWARD MYERS.
Ti sal h'xvrnioicr.
Dated July 24, 1940
APPENDIX A
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the recommendations of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, we hciebv notify our employees that:
We will not in any manner intei fere with, restrain, or coerce our employees
in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form labor osgauuzatlolls,
to join or assist Local Industrial Union No 1350, affiliated with Congress
of Industrial Organizations. or any other labor organization, to bargain
collectively through representatives of their ox^ n choosing, and to engage
in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection. All our employees are free to become or remain
members of this union, or any other labor organization
We will bargain collectively upon request with the above-named union
as the exclusive representative of all employees in the bargaining unit
described herein with respect to rates of pay, hours of employment or other
conditions of employment, and if an understanding is reached, embody
such understanding in a signed agreement The bargaining unit is : All our
employees, excluding clerical employees, the superintendent, and all or any
BURGIE VINEGAR COMPANY 847
other supervisory employees with authority to hire, promote, discharge,
discipline, or otherwise effect changes in the status of employees, or effec-
tively recommend such action.
BURGIE VINEGAR COMPANY,
By ------------------------------
( Representative)
------------------------------
( Title)
Dated ------------------------
Thus notice must remain posted for 60 clays from the date hereof, and must
not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
717734-47-vol. 71 55