Bryan Schwab

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Sep 30, 2019

13540526 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Sep. 30, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/540,526 07/02/2012 Bryan SCHWAB 45MP-214041 2456
159291 7590 09/30/2019
Esplin & Associates, PC
5411 Avenida Encinas
Suite 100
Carlsbad, CA 92008
EXAMINER
CROSS, MICHAEL J
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3621
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/30/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
Docketing@esplin.legal
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte BRYAN SCHWAB
____________

Appeal 2017-0093331
Application 13/540,5262
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before BRADLEY B. BAYAT, TARA L. HUTCHINGS, and
ROBERT J. SILVERMAN, Administrative Patent Judges.

HUTCHINGS, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s final
rejection of claims 1, 3–7, 9–12, 14–18, and 20–24. An oral hearing was
held on July 12, 2019. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 Our decision references Appellant’s Appeal Brief (“App. Br.,” filed Nov.
16, 2016) and Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed June 21, 2017), and the
Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed April 21, 2017) and Final Office Action
(“Final Act.,” mailed June 16, 2016).
2 Appellant identifies Kabam, Inc. as the real party in interest. App. Br. 2.
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CLAIMED INVENTION
Appellant’s claimed invention “relates to providing dynamic offers for
virtual goods based on dynamic parameters.” Spec. ¶ 1.
Claims 1 and 12 are the independent claims on appeal. Claim 12,
reproduced below with bracketed notations added, is illustrative of the
claimed subject matter:
12. A method for providing dynamic offers for virtual goods
based on dynamic parameters, the method being implemented by
one or more physical computer processors configured by
machine-readable instructions, the method comprising:
[(a)] executing, by the one or more physical computer
processors, an instance of an online game that takes place in a
virtual space and using the instance to generate state information
that is transmitted over a network to client computing platforms
associated with users, wherein the transmission of the state
information over the network facilitates presentation of views of
the virtual space to the users;
[(b)] implementing, by the one or more physical computer
processors, the instance of the online game to facilitate
interaction of the users with the online game via the client
computing platforms;
[(c)] determining using the one or more physical computer
processors one or more dynamic parameters including a spend
velocity associated with one or both of a user or a client
computing platform associated with the user;
[(d)] determining, using the one or more physical
computer processors, one or more offers to sell virtual goods
usable in the online game available to the user, wherein the
virtual goods provide a functional benefit during play in the
online game, a given offer being determined based on the one or
more dynamic parameters, including at least the spend velocity,
and having a user cost being an amount of virtual currency;
[(e)] receiving, by the one or more physical processors, a
request over the network from the client computing platform
associated with the user to view an offer interface including the
one or more determined offers;
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[(f)] determining, responsive to receiving the request to
view the offer interface including the one or more determined
offers, a purchase price associated with individual ones of the
one or more offers, a given purchase price being determined
based on at least the spend velocity; and
[(g)] providing, using the one or more physical computer
processors, the offer interface for presentation to a user, the offer
interface including one or more of (1) an offer field conveying
information associated with individual ones of the one or more
offers available to the user, (2) a price field conveying
information associated with the purchase price associated with
individual ones of the one or more offers to purchase virtual
goods available to the user, or (3) a payment field conveying
information associated with a payment method associated with
individual ones of the one or more offers available to the user.

REJECTIONS
Claims 1, 3–7, 9–12, 14–18, and 20–24 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 as directed to a judicial exception without significantly more.
Claims 1, 3–7, 9–12, 14–18, and 20–24 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as unpatentable over Roeding (US 2011/0029364 A1, pub. Feb. 3,
2011), Lutnick (US 2011/0065490 A1, pub. Mar. 17, 2011), Hirson
(US 2011/0082772 A1, pub. Apr. 7, 2011), and Alfonso (2011/0106607 A1,
pub. May 5, 2011).3,4

3 We treat the Examiner’s identification of canceled claims 8, 13, and 19
among the claims subject to rejection as inadvertent. See Final Act. 10.
4 We treat the Examiner’s omission of Alfonso from the rejection heading at
page 10 of the Final Action as inadvertent in light of the Examiner’s reliance
upon this reference in the analysis portion of the rejection. See Final Act.
12, 17; see also Ans. 4.
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ANALYSIS
Patent-Ineligible Subject Matter
Appellant argues the pending claims as a group. App. Br. 7–21; see
also Reply Br. 3–9. We select independent claim 12 as representative. The
remaining claims stand or fall with claim 12. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, an invention is patent-eligible if it claims a
“new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.”
35 U.S.C. § 101. The Supreme Court, however, has long interpreted § 101
to include an implicit exception: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas” are not patentable. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S.
208, 216 (2014).
The Supreme Court, in Alice, reiterated the two-step framework
previously set forth in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus
Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012), “for distinguishing patents that claim
laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim
patent-eligible applications of those concepts.” Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 217.
The first step in that analysis is to “determine whether the claims at issue are
directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts.” Id. (citation omitted). If
the claims are not directed to a patent-ineligible concept, e.g., an abstract
idea, the inquiry ends. Otherwise, the inquiry proceeds to the second step
where the elements of the claims are considered “individually and ‘as an
ordered combination’” to determine whether there are additional elements
that “‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.”
Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79, 78). This is “a search for an ‘inventive
concept’ — i.e., an element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to
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ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent
upon the [ineligible concept] itself.’” Id. at 217–18 (alteration in original).
The USPTO recently published revised guidance on the application of
§ 101. 2019 REVISED PATENT SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY GUIDANCE,
84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Revised Guidance”).5 That guidance
revised the USPTO’s examination procedure with respect to the first step of
the Mayo/Alice framework such that a claim will generally be considered
directed to an abstract idea if (1) the claim recites subject matter falling
within one of the following groupings of abstract ideas: (a) mathematical
concepts; (b) certain methods of organizing human activity, e.g., a
fundamental economic principle or practice, a commercial or legal
interaction; and (c) mental processes (“Step 2A, Prong One”), and (2) the
claim does not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application, i.e.,
apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a
meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the clam is more than a
drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception (“Step 2A,
Prong Two”). See Revised Guidance 54–55. The Revised Guidance
references MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE (“MPEP”)
§§ 2106.05(a)–(c) and (e)–(h) in describing the considerations that are
indicative that an additional element or combination of elements integrates
the judicial exception, e.g., the abstract idea, into a practical application. Id.
at 55. If the recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical

5 The Revised Guidance is effective as of January 7, 2019, and applies to all
applications, and to all patents resulting from applications, filed before, on,
or after January 7, 2019.
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application, as determined under one or more of these MPEP sections, the
claim is not “directed to” the judicial exception.
Only if the claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application do we then look to
whether the claim “[a]dds a specific limitation or combination of
limitations” that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the
field” or simply “appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to
the judicial exception” (“Step 2B”). Id. at 56. With the legal principles
outlined above, and the 2019 Revised Guidance in mind, we turn to the
Examiner’s § 101 rejection.
In rejecting the pending claims under 35 U.S.C. § 101, the Examiner
determined that the claims are directed to distributing advertising by
collecting, comparing, transmitting, and displaying data which the Examiner
characterized as a method of organizing human activity and, thus, an abstract
idea. Final Act. 7–8. The Examiner further determined that the claims do
not recite additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly
more than the judicial exception. Id. at 7–9.
In so doing, the Examiner notified Appellant of the reasons for the
rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101 in a sufficiently articulate and informative
manner as to meet the notice requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 132, thereby
establishing a prima facie case of patent ineligibility. See In re Jung, 637
F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding that the USPTO carries its
procedural burden of establishing a prima facie case when its rejection
satisfies the notice requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 132 by notifying the
applicant of the reasons for the rejection, “together with such information
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and references as may be useful in judging the propriety of continuing
prosecution”). Therefore, we are unpersuaded by Appellant’s argument
(App. Br. 11–13, 16–17) that the Examiner has not met the burden of
establishing a rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Judicial Exception: Step One of the Mayo/Alice Framework; Step 2A,
Prong 1 of the 2019 Revised Guidance
Appellant’s Specification describes that known approaches for
providing offers for virtual goods within virtual spaces typically present the
same prices and offer packages to every user (i.e., static offers). Spec. ¶ 2.
To overcome this shortcoming, the present invention provides dynamic
offers for virtual goods based on dynamic parameters, such as payment
history and spend velocity. Id. ¶¶ 3, 5. “[O]ffers for virtual goods may be
dynamic in that the offers themselves, offer prices, and/or payment methods
for offers may be different for different users and/or at different times.” Id.
¶ 18. “By making offers dynamic, slow spenders may be enticed to make
more frequent purchases.” Id. ¶¶ 3, 18.
Appellant’s claim 12 recites a method for “providing dynamic offers
for virtual goods based on dynamic parameters.” The method recites the
following steps:
[(c)] determining . . . one or more dynamic parameters
value, including a spend velocity . . . .;
[(d)] determining . . . one or more offers to sell virtual
goods usable in the [] game available to the user, wherein the []
goods provide a functional benefit during play in the [] game, a
given offer being determined based on the one or more dynamic
parameters, including at least the spend velocity, and having a
user cost being an amount of virtual currency;
[(e)] receiving . . . a request . . . associated with the user
to view . . . the one or more determined offers;
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[(f)] determining, responsive to receiving the request to
view the . . . one or more determined offers, a purchase price
associated with individual ones of the one or more offers, a
given purchase price being determined based on at least the
spend velocity; and
[(g)] providing . . . for presentation to a user . . . one or
more of (1) an offer field conveying information associated
with individual ones of the one or more offers available to the
user, (2) a price field conveying information associated with the
purchase price associated with individual ones of the one or
more offers to purchase virtual goods available to the user, or
(3) a payment field conveying information associated with a
payment method associated with individual ones of the one or
more offers available to the user.
When given their broadest reasonable interpretation, limitations (c) through
(e) recite steps for providing an offer, i.e., a commercial interaction, which is
a certain method of organizing human activity, and, therefore, an abstract
idea. See 2019 Revised Guidance 52 (commercial interactions include
“advertising, marketing or sales activities or behaviors”). The Federal
Circuit has held similar concepts, such as tailoring information presented to
a user and targeting advertisements to certain customers, to be abstract. See,
e.g., Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d
1363, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (tailoring information presented to a user based
on particular information); Affinity Labs of Texas, LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc.,
838 F.3d 1266, 1271 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (customizing a user interface to have
targeted advertising based on user information); Morsa v. Facebook, Inc., 77
F. Supp. 3d 1007, 1013 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (concluding that targeting
advertisements to certain consumers is no more than an abstract idea), aff’d,
622 F. App’x 915 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
Accordingly, we are not persuaded of Examiner error at Step 2A,
Prong 1 of the 2019 Revised Guidance. See App. Br. 11–14 (asserting that
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the Examiner does not establish that claim 12 is similar to any concept held
by the courts to be abstract, overgeneralizes the claim, and fails to consider
its character as a whole).
Practical Application: Step One of the Mayo/Alice Framework; Step 2A,
Prong 2 of the 2019 Revised Guidance
Having concluded that claim 12 recites a judicial exception, i.e., an
abstract idea, we next consider whether the claim recites additional
elements, considered individually and in combination, that integrate the
judicial exception into a practical application. See Revised Guidance 54–55.
Here, the additional elements recited in claim 12, beyond the abstract idea,
include limitations (a) and (b). Limitations (a) and (b) recite
[(a)] executing, by the one or more physical computer
processors, an instance of an online game that takes place in a
virtual space and using the instance to generate state information
that is transmitted over a network to client computing platforms
associated with users, wherein the transmission of the state
information over the network facilitates presentation of views of
the virtual space to the users; [and]
[(b)] implementing, by the one or more physical computer
processors, the instance of the online game to facilitate
interaction of the users with the online game via the client
computing platforms[.]
These limitations link use of the abstract idea to a particular technological
environment or field of use, namely an instance of an online game that takes
place in a virtual space. See, e.g., Spec. ¶¶ 20–25 (describing instance of
virtual space).
Claim 12 also additionally recites “one or more physical computer
processors” (limitations (a)–(e), (g)); “an instance” (limitations (a), (b)); “an
online game” (limitations (a), (b), (d)); “virtual space” (limitation (a)); “state
information” (limitation (a)); “a network” (limitations (a), (e)); “client
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computing platforms” (limitations (a)–(c), (e)); and “an offer interface”
(limitations (e)–(g)). The Specification, however, describes each of these
elements broadly and at a high level of generality. See, e.g., Spec. ¶¶ 18,
20–25, 39, 40, 42–45, 47. At best, these elements call for the abstract idea to
be implemented using computers as tools, and links the abstract idea to a
particular technological environment. Evaluating claim 12 as a whole, we
are not persuaded that any of the additional elements recited in the claim
beyond the abstract idea, considered individually and as an ordered
combination, integrate the abstract idea into a practical application.
Appellant argues that claim 12 is directed toward an improvement in
computer-related technology and addresses a challenge unique to online
gaming, analogous to the claims at issue in McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco
Games Am., Inc., 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016) and also to hypothetical
claim 1 in USPTO Example 23.6 App. Br. 14–15. In particular, Appellant
contends that because “some users [are] more engaged in [an] online game
than others,” conventional static offers (i.e., offers that are the same for all
users) for virtual goods that provide an advantage within an online game
“may not be a successful way to encourage users to make purchases.” Id. at
14. Current user parameters may not accurately represent the player’s
engagement within the online game or the rate at which the player will likely
spend in the game (spend velocity), indicating prices a customer may be
accustomed to paying. Id. Appellant’s claimed invention incentivizes
different users “to purchase [] one or more offers at a purchase price that

6 July 2015 Update Appendix 1: Examples, available at
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ieg-july-2015-app1.pdf.

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maximizes potential revenue as well as incentivizes all types of users to
make purchases[,] because the offers are determined based on dynamic
parameters associated with the user and the price is determined based on the
user’s spend velocity.” Id. at 15; see also id. at 20–21, alleging that claim 12
address[es] a problem typical to online gaming in which
determining offers and/or prices for offers based on standard
metrics, and/or providing offers having static prices fails to
incentivize users to make purchases while taking advantage of
the maximum available revenue. The solution described by the
present application improves online gaming technology by
enabling game providers to determine prices associated with
offers that cater to specific users.
However, we are not persuaded that successfully incentivizing users
to make purchases and to maximize revenue is a technological problem
unique to online gaming, rather than a business challenge. Encouraging
sales and increasing revenue are long-standing and ubiquitous business
challenges. We also are not persuaded that determining a dynamic offer
based on a dynamic parameter and a price based on a user’s spend velocity
is an improvement in computer-related technology or a solution necessarily
rooted in computer technology, instead of an improvement to the abstract
idea. We find no parallel between Appellant’s claim 12 and the claims at
issue in McRO involving an improvement to 3-D computer animation
technology, nor to hypothetical claim 1 of Example 23, which involved an
improvement in graphical user interface technology by reformatting and
relocating textual information that it becomes obscured by overlapping
windows.
We also are not persuaded by Appellant’s preemption argument. App.
Br. 15. There is no dispute that the Supreme Court has described “the
concern that drives [the exclusion of abstract ideas from patent eligible
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subject matter] as one of pre-emption.” Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2354. But
characterizing pre-emption as a driving concern for patent eligibility is not
the same as characterizing pre-emption as the sole test for patent eligibility.
“The Supreme Court has made clear that the principle of preemption is the
basis for the judicial exceptions to patentability” and “[f]or this reason,
questions on preemption are inherent in and resolved by the § 101analysis.”
Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (citing Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2354). “[P]reemption may signal patent
ineligible subject matter, [but] the absence of complete preemption does not
demonstrate patent eligibility.” Id.
We conclude, for the reasons outlined above, that claim 12 recites a
method of organizing human activity, i.e., an abstract idea, and we are not
persuaded that the additional elements are more than generic computer
components used to implement the abstract idea, and generally link the
abstract idea to a particular technological environment or field of use. For
example, we find no indication that one or more additional elements reflects
an improvement in the functioning of a computer, or an improvement to
other technology or technical field; requires any specialized computer
hardware or other inventive computer components, i.e., a particular machine;
or effects a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different
state or thing. Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred at
Step 2A, Prong 2 in determining that the additional elements do not integrate
the recited abstract idea into a practical application (Step 2A, Prong Two of
the 2019 Revised Guidance).
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Inventive Concept: Step Two of the Mayo/Alice Framework (Step 2A,
Prong 1 of the 2019 Revised Guidance)
Having determined under step one of the Mayo/Alice framework that
claim 12 is directed to an abstract idea, we next consider under Step 2B of
the 2019 Revised Guidance, the second step of the Mayo/Alice framework
— whether claim 12 recites additional elements that provide an inventive
concept (i.e., whether the additional elements amount to significantly more
than the judicial exception itself).
Appellant asserts that claim 12 is similar to the claims at issue in
BASCOM Global Internet Services, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d
1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016) because “the additional limitations, considered
collectively, describe a specific and discrete implementation of distributing
advertising and/or collecting, comparing, transmitting, and displaying data.”
App. Br. 18. Appellant acknowledges that the limitations individually may
be routine in the art. Id. at 18–19. However, Appellant contends that the
ordered combination of limitations (d) through (f) of claim 12, i.e.,
determining one or more offers to sell virtual goods based on
dynamic parameters associated with a user and/or a client
computing platform associated with the user, determining a
purchase price associated with one or more of the offers based
on at least a spend velocity associated with the user and/or the
client computing platform associated with the user, such that
the purchase price is determined responsive to receiving a
request to view the offer interface including the determined
offers (e.g., a real-time and/or near real-time price
determination), amounts to a technical improvement over priors
ways of distributing advertising and/or collecting, comparing,
transmitting, and displaying data (as further set forth in step
2A).
Id. at 19. However, the relevant question at step two of the Mayo/Alice
framework is whether the additional elements amount to significantly more
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than the abstract idea, not whether they improve upon the abstract idea itself.
Here, the combination of limitations identified by Appellant are part of the
abstract idea (i.e., a commercial interaction) itself. See Berkheimer v. HP
Inc., 890 F.3d 1369, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (Moore, J., concurring in denial
of petition for rehearing en banc).
It is clear from Mayo that the “inventive concept” cannot be the
abstract idea itself, and Berkheimer . . . leave[s] untouched the
numerous cases from this court which have held claims ineligible
because the only alleged “inventive concept” is the abstract idea.
As set forth above, the only additional limitations recited in claim 12
beyond the abstract idea are limitations (a) and (b), and generic computer
elements (“one or more physical computer processors,” “an instance,” “an
online game,” “virtual space,” “state information,” “a network,” “client
computing platforms,” and “an offer interface”). Yet, Appellant cannot
reasonably contend, nor does Appellant contend, that there is a genuine issue
of material fact regarding whether any of these additional elements,
considered alone and as an ordered combination, is well-understood, routine,
or conventional, where nothing in the Specification indicates that these
additional elements are implemented in any unconventional manner. To the
contrary, as described above, the Specification suggests that the functionality
is achieved through the use of routine technology operating in its ordinary
capacity. See, e.g., Spec. ¶¶ 21–25.
We are not persuaded of error in the Examiner’s rejection of claim 12
under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
claim 12, and claims 1, 3–7, 9–11, 14–18, and 20–24, which fall with claim
12.
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Obviousness
We are persuaded by Appellant’s argument that the Examiner erred in
rejecting independent claims 1 and 12 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) because the
combination of Roeding and Alfonso fails to teach or suggest “determining
. . . a purchase price associated with individual ones of the one or more
offers, a given purchase price being determined based on at least the spend
velocity,” as recited in claim 12, limitation (f), and similarly recited in
claim 1. App. Br. 21–38. The Examiner relies on Roeding for disclosing
“spend velocity.” Final Act 17 (citing Roeding ¶¶ 79–81, 96); see also Ans.
4. The Examiner acknowledges that “Roeding does not explicitly state that
spend velocity will be used for targeting purposes.” Id. However, the
Examiner relies upon Alfonso as disclosing “a technique for targeting offers
to users based in part on spend velocity.” Id. (citing Alfonso ¶¶ 44, 46); see
also Ans. 4.
The difficulty with the Examiner’s analysis is that it does not address
“determining a purchase price based on at least the spend velocity,” as
recited in claim 12’s limitation (f), and similarly recited in claim 1. Alfonso
describes at paragraph 44 that profile variable scores may capture
transaction velocity, and that in determining a profile variable score, a decay
function may give less weight to earlier transactions and greater weight to
more recent transactions. At paragraph 46 Alfonso further describes
seasonally adjusting spend patterns for different times of year. For example,
a high profile score for spend in the toy industry may place a score in a
lower centile range in December than in July due to the general pattern of
purchasing toys for the holidays. Alfonso ¶ 46. However, the cited portions
of Alfonso do not describe determining a purchase price associated with
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individual ones of the offers based on spend velocity, as required by claims
1 and 12.
Similarly, Roeding describes updating profile data based on shopping
history and assigning offers and rewards based on an individual’s profile
data set. See Roeding ¶¶ 79–81. Paragraph 96 of Roeding describes
considering factors such as categories and a number of clicks on a product in
a user’s profile data. The cited portions of Alfonso do not describe
determining a purchase price associated with individual ones of the offers
based on spend velocity, as required by claims 1 and 12.
In view of the foregoing, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection
of independent claims 1 and 12, and their dependent claims under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a).
DECISION
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 3–7, 9–12, 14–18, and 20–24
under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is affirmed.
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 3–7, 9–12, 14–18, and 20–24
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) is reversed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED