Brittex Financial, Inc.v.Dollar Financial Group, Inc.

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

Sep 30, 2020

92060888 (T.T.A.B. Sep. 30, 2020)

THIS OPINION IS NOT A
PRECEDENT OF THE TTAB

Mailed: September 30, 2020

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
_____

Brittex Financial, Inc.

v.

Dollar Financial Group, Inc.
_____

Cancellation No. 92060888
_____

Robert L. McRae and Nick Guinn of Gunn, Lee & Cave, P.C.,
for Brittex Financial, Inc.
Bassam N. Ibrahim, Bryce J. Maynard, and Laura K. Pitts of
Buchanan, Ingersoll & Rooney, PC, for Dollar Financial Group, Inc.
_____

Before Bergsman, Heasley, and Lebow,
Administrative Trademark Judges.

Opinion by Lebow, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Respondent, Dollar Financial Group, Inc., owns the following registrations on the
Principal Register:
1. Registration No. 4524540 for the mark MONEY MART (standard
characters) for “pawn brokerage and pawn shops; providing monetary
exchange services, namely, exchanging gold and silver of others for cash;
issuing of prepaid debit cards; issuing of prepaid gift cards; gift card
transaction processing services,” in International Class 36;1 and

1 Registered May 6, 2014; Section 8 statement of use accepted.
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2. Registration No. 4532073 for the mark for “loan
financing; check cashing and electronic funds transfer services, but not
including extensions of credit except to the extent evidence by a check;
pawn brokerage and pawn shops; providing monetary exchange
services, namely, exchanging gold and silver of others for cash; issuing
of prepaid debit cards; issuing of prepaid gift cards; gift card transaction
processing services,” in International Class 36.2

Both registrations (“the Registrations”) disclaim the exclusive right to use “MONEY”
apart from the mark as shown.
Petitioner, Brittex Financial, Inc., petitioned to cancel the Registrations on
grounds of (1) priority and likelihood of confusion with Petitioner’s common law mark
MONEY MART for pawn brokerage and pawn shop services, and (2) fraud in the
procurement of the registrations.3
Respondent denied the salient allegations in the petition and asserted various
“affirmative and other defenses,” including lack of distinctiveness, laches,
acquiescence, and unclean hands, which Respondent did not pursue at trial and are

2 Registered May 20, 2014; Section 8 Statement of Use accepted. Color is not claimed as a
feature of the mark. The mark consists of the stylized wording “MONEY MART”
superimposed over a circular design.
3 13 TTABVUE. Petitioner also pleaded an affirmative defense that the registrations were
abandoned due to nonuse, which was stricken during the proceeding. 51 TTABVUE 3-4.
Citations to the record reference TTABVUE, the Board’s online docketing system. The
number preceding “TTABVUE” corresponds to the docket entry number(s), and any
number(s) following “TTABVUE” refer(s) to the page number(s) of the docket entry where the
cited materials appear. Page references in this opinion to the record of the involved
registrations or to any other registration or applications refer to the online database of the
USPTO’s Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (“TSDR”) system.
Cancellation No. 92060888
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therefore waived.4 Respondent’s other alleged affirmative defenses are either not
defenses, improperly asserted, or mere amplifications of its denials.5
Before trial, Respondent filed a motion to amend its identification of services in
the involved registrations to delete “pawn brokerage and pawn shops,” pursuant to
Section 18 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1068, “as an alternative defense, in the
event that the Board finds that Petitioner … proves priority and likelihood of
confusion in connection with [Respondent’s] existing identification of services.”6 The
Board deferred consideration of Respondent’s proposed amendment in the alterative
until final decision.7
For the reasons that follow, we deny the petition for cancellation.
I. Preliminary Issues

Both parties filed a number of objections, which we address briefly here before
turning to the merits. Petitioner objects to the following evidence submitted by

4 See, e.g., Alcatraz Media, Inc. v. Chesapeake Marine Tours, Inc., 107 USPQ2d 1750, 1753
(TTAB 2013) (respondent's affirmative defense of failure to state a claim not argued in brief
deemed waived), aff’d mem., 565 F. App’x 900 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Miller v. Miller, 105 USPQ2d
1615, 1616 n.3 (TTAB 2013) (affirmative defense of unclean hands deemed waived because
applicant failed to argue and present evidence regarding the defense at trial). They were also
insufficiently pleaded.
5 Respondent asserted failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, which is not
an affirmative defense; abandonment of the Registrations through uncontrolled licensing,
which is an impermissible collateral attack in the absence of a counterclaim, Trademark Rule
2.106(b)(3)(ii) (attack on validity of pleaded registration must be made by counterclaim or
separate petition to cancel); Fort James Operating Co. v. Royal Paper Converting Inc., 83
USPQ2d 1624, 1626 n.1 (TTAB 2007) (absent a counterclaim, Board cannot consider
arguments against the validity of a pleaded registration); and a Morehouse defense, which
was stricken by the Board during the proceeding. 51 TTABVUE 17.
6 52 TTABVUE.
7 54 TTABVUE.
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Respondent during its testimony under a “Rule of Optional Completeness”: (1)
excerpts from the discovery deposition transcripts of Petitioner’s witnesses, Larry
Nuckols and Christopher Upton,8 and (2) excerpts submitted by Respondent from a
printed publication titled Fringe Banking: Check Cashing Outlets, Pawnshops, and
the Poor, because only excerpts were provided.9 Petitioner requests that the Board
strike this evidence or, in the alternative, permit full copies to be submitted.10
As Respondent points out, there is no “Rule of Optional Completeness” in the
Federal Rules of Evidence or applicable Trademark Rules. As to the deposition
excerpts, Trademark Rule 2.120(k)(4), 37 C.F.R. § 2.120(k)(4), permits a party to
“introduce under a notice of reliance any other part of the deposition which should in
fairness be considered so as to make not misleading what was offered by the
submitting party.” However, Petitioner did not do so. As to the publication excerpts,
there is no requirement that an entire copy of a printed publication be submitted in
evidence to rely on a portion thereof. If Petitioner believed other portions of that
publication were relevant, it should have made them of record during its rebuttal
testimony period. These objections are overruled.
Petitioner also objects to Respondent’s brief for being over length:11
[I]t appears [Respondent] uses its appendix to avoid page limits. Several
objections should have been raised in the brief and applied toward the
page count. Main briefs are limited to fifty-five pages. DFG’s brief is
fifty-four (54) pages long—with a single paged, single spaced table of

8 117 TTABVUE 48-49.
9 Id. at 50.
10 117 TTABVUE 48, 50.
11 124 TTABVUE 29-30.
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authorities, and no table of contents—and ten pages of appendix, most
which [sic] belongs in the main brief.

Petitioner does not explain why Respondent should have raised certain objections
within the body of its brief as opposed to its appendix. Trademark Rule 2.128(b)
specifically permits a party to raise objections by way of an appendix, which is not
counted toward the 55-page main brief limit. 37 C.F.R. § 2.128(b). Additionally, while
a brief must contain an alphabetical index of cases cited, there is no requirement that
the index be double spaced, or that a table of contents be included with the brief,
although these features of a brief are certainly helpful to the Board’s review.12
Respondent also included a listing of statutes, rules, regulations and other
authorities, which is not required. This objection is overruled.
The parties’ remaining objections are also overruled. Because a cancellation
proceeding is akin to a bench trial, the Board is capable of assessing the proper
evidentiary weight to be accorded the testimony and evidence, taking into account
the imperfections surrounding the admissibility of such testimony and evidence. As
necessary and appropriate, we will point out any limitations in the evidence or
otherwise note that we cannot rely on the evidence in the manner sought. We have
considered all of the testimony and evidence introduced into the record. In doing so,
we have kept in mind the various objections the parties have raised and we have

12 Both parties’ briefs contain numerous footnotes that are single-spaced, some of which are
lengthy. Although the Board has not adopted the Federal Circuit's rule that footnotes, too,
must be double-spaced, we have cautioned that single-spaced footnotes are not to be used as
a subterfuge to avoid the page limitations set forth in Trademark Rule 2.128. Consorzio del
Prosciutto di Parma v. Parma Sausage Prods. Inc., 23 USPQ2d 1894, 1896 n.3 (TTAB 1992).
Cancellation No. 92060888
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accorded whatever probative value the subject testimony and evidence merit. See
Luxco, Inc. v. Consejo Regulador del Tequila, A.C., 121 USPQ2d 1477, 1479 (TTAB
2017); U.S. Playing Card Co. v. Harbro, LLC, 81 USPQ2d 1542, 1540 (TTAB 2006);
Poly-America, L.P. v. Ill. Tool Works Inc., 124 USPQ2d 1508, 1510 (TTAB 2017)
(where the objections refer to probative value rather than admissibility and the
evidence that is subject to the objections is not outcome determinative, “we choose
not to make specific rulings on each and every objection”).
II. The Record
The record includes the Registrations by operation of Trademark Rule 2.122(b)(1),
37 C.F.R. § 2.122(b)(1), and the pleadings. The record also includes the following
evidence introduced by the parties:
A. Petitioner’s Evidence
 Notice of reliance (“NOR”) on Respondent’s responses to Petitioner’s
requests for production of documents13 and interrogatories;14 portions of
the discovery depositions of Mark Prior, Roy Hibberd, and Tim Hickey
(“Hickey Decl.”);15 pages from Respondent’s website;16 pawn and lending
licenses produced by both parties;17 correspondence between the parties’
counsel;18 and

13 55-56 TTABVUE 10-29 (Exhibit A). When documents are not produced in response to a
propounding party’s requests for documents, the responses to those requests are admissible
solely for purposes of showing that the party stated that there are no responsive documents.
City National Bank v. OPGI Management GP Inc./Gestion OPGI Inc., 106 USPQ2d 1668,
1674 n.10 (TTAB 2013). We therefore only consider Respondent’s responses indicating that
there are no documents.
14 Id. at 40-48 (Exhibit B).
15 Id. at 50-335 (Exhibits C-E).
16 Id. at 337-377 (Exhibit F).
17 Id. at 379-453, 455-500 (Exhibits G-H).
18 Id. at 502-503, 505 (Exhibits I-J).
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 Testimony depositions and/or affidavits of Larry Nuckols (“Nuckols T-
Dep.”);19 Christopher Upton (“Upton T-Dep.”);20 Amy Szwajkowski
(“Szwajkowski T-Dep.);21 Jeffrey Weiss (“Weiss Aff.”);22 and Alex
Matthews.23

B. Respondent’s Evidence

 NOR on copies of registration certificates, USPTO Trademark
Electronic Search System (TESS) database records, and file histories,
for other registrations owned by Respondent not involved in the
proceeding (Registration Nos. 3206120 and 2244158) and third-
parties;24 dictionary definitions;25 articles and excerpts from third-party
websites;26 newspaper articles;27 excerpts from telephone and business
directories;28 copies of pawn licenses issued to Respondent and related
companies;29 excerpts of provisions from the State of Texas Code;30 pages
from the USPTO’s website;31 pages from Respondent’s and Petitioner’s
websites;32

 Testimony affidavits or declarations of Nancy Fuschino (“Fuschino
Decl.”); Kathy Bazil; Jeffrey Weis; Kim Love-McLendon (“McLendon

19 58-59 TTABVUE 4-253.
20 60-61 TTABVUE 4-178.
21 76-77 TTABVUE 4-64.
22 80 TTABVUE 2-337.
23 104 TTABVUE 2-161.
24 100 TTABVUE 41-196, 278-300, 310-320, 341-414 (Exhibits 3-8, 26-33, 34-37, 44-68).
Respondent also provided TESS printouts for the involved registrations, which was
unnecessary because they were already of record.
25 Id. at 198-204 (Exhibits 9-11).
26 Id. at 206, 260-276, 302-308, 322-339, 416-468 (Exhibit 12, 24-25, 33, 38-43, 69-77); 102
TTABVUE 33-55 (Exhibits 85-96).
27 Id. at 209-259 (Exhibits 13-23).
28 101 TTABVUE 3-178 (Exhibits 78-81).
29 101 TTABVUE 180-211, 103 TTABVUE 4-31 (Exhibits 82-84).
30 102 TTABVUE 57-58 (Exhibit 97).
31 102 TTABVUE 60-63 (Exhibit 98).
32 103 TTABVUE (Exhibits 99-100).
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Decl.”); and Alex Matthews;33 and

 Transcripts or excerpts from the discovery depositions of Tim Hickey
(“Hickey Disco. Dep.”) Roy Hibberd, Mark Prior, Larry Nuckols
(“Nuckols Disco. Dep.”), and Christopher Upton (“Upton Disco. Dep.”).34

III. Entitlement to a Statutory Cause of Action
To establish entitlement to a statutory cause of action under Section 14 of the
Trademark Act, a plaintiff must demonstrate a “real interest” in the proceeding and
a “reasonable belief of damage.” Australian Therapeutic Supplies Pty. Ltd. v. Naked
TM, LLC, 965 F.3d 1370, 2020 USPQ2d 10837 at *3 (Fed. Cir. 2020); see also Empresa
Cubana Del Tabaco v. Gen. Cigar Co., 753 F.3d 1270, 111 USPQ2d 1058 (Fed. Cir.
2014); Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 101 USPQ2d
1713, 1727 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Ritchie v. Simpson, 170 F.3d 1092, 50 USPQ2d 1023,
1025 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
Petitioner introduced evidence that it has used the mark MONEY MART PAWN
or MONEY MART PAWN & JEWELRY in connection with pawn services since
January 1993, and currently operates over a dozen stores under the name “Money
Mart Pawn & Jewelry.”35 This suffices to show that Petitioner is a competitor of
Respondent with respect to the provision of the “pawn brokerage and pawn shops”

33 87 TTABVUE 2-96 (Fuschino Decl.); 90 TTABVUE 2-201 (Bazil Decl.); 96 TTABVUE 2-114
(Weiss Decl.); 98 TTABVUE 2-201, 99 TTABVUE 2-215 (McClendon Decl.); 116 TTABVUE
2-219 (Matthews Decl.). The parties stipulated that “both parties may introduce and rely
upon the discovery deposition transcript of Respondent’s 30(b)(6) representative, Mr. Hickey,
along with attached exhibits, as evidence during the trial period, subject only to the objections
raised during their depositions.[sic].” 72 TTABVE 2-3.
34 102 TTABVUE 164-678 (Exhibits 101-105).
35 58 TTABVUE 11, 15, 19-20, 59 (Nuckols T-Dep.).
Cancellation No. 92060888
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services identified in the involved registrations and thus a real interest in this
proceeding and a reasonable basis for its belief of damage. Petitioner has therefore
established a right to entitlement to a statutory cause of action in this proceeding.36
See Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp., 222 F.3d 943, 55 USPQ2d 1842, 1844 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (standing can be established by proving a direct commercial interest); Lipton
Indus. Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 670 F.2d 1024, 213 USPQ 185, 189 (CCPA 1982)
(standing may be established when a plaintiff proves a real commercial interest in its
own marks and a reasonable belief that it will damaged); Giersch v. Scripps Networks
Inc., 90 USPQ2d 1020, 1022 (TTAB 2009) (“Petitioner has established its common-
law rights in the [pleaded mark], and has thereby established his standing to bring
this proceeding.”).
Once a statutory basis for a cause of action is established, a petitioner may rely
on any ground set forth in the Trademark Act that negates the respondent’s right to
registration. Jewelers Vigilance Comm., Inc. v. Ullenberg Corp., 823 F.2d 490, 493, 2
U.S.P.Q.2d 2021, 2024 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Estate of Biro v. Bic Corp., 18 USPQ2d 1382,
1385–86 (TTAB 1991) (Once the petitioner shows “a personal interest in the outcome
of the case ... the Petitioner may rely on any ground that negates Respondent’s right
to the registration sought”).
IV. Likelihood of Confusion
To prevail on its Section 2 (d) ground for cancellation, Petitioner, which does not
own a registration, must prove that Respondent’s marks, when used in connection

36 Respondent does not contest Petitioner’s entitlement to a statutory cause of action.
Cancellation No. 92060888
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with Respondent’s services, “so resembles . . . a mark or trade name previously used
in the United States by another [in this case, Petitioner] and not abandoned,” as to
be likely to cause confusion. Trademark Act § 2(d), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d). Thus, there
are two elements of Petitioner’s § 2(d) claim, i.e., that Petitioner has priority, and
that a likelihood of confusion exists.
Because Petitioner has not pleaded ownership of a registered trademark, it must
rely on its common law use of the mark MONEY MART as a service mark to prove
priority. Embarcadero Techs., Inc. v. RStudio, Inc., 105 USPQ2d 1825, 1834 (TTAB
2013) (citing Hydro-Dynamics Inc. v. George Putnam & Co. Inc., 811 F.2d 1470, 1
USPQ2d 1772, 1773 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (The “decision as to priority is made in
accordance with the preponderance of the evidence”)); Giersch v. Scripps Networks,
Inc., 90 USPQ2d at 1023 (In the absence of a pleaded registration, a party may
establish priority in a mark through common law use.). Accordingly, Petitioner must
prove that it established rights in its unregistered mark or name before the earliest
date on which Respondent can rely. Absent proof of such prior rights, Petitioner
cannot prevail on its Section 2(d) claim.
A. The Parties and Their Respective First Use Claims

1. Respondent
Respondent, f/k/a Monetary Management Corporation,37 was founded in 1979 and
currently owns a network of more than 800 retail locations across North America,

37 96 TTABVUE 2-3, 10-12 (Weiss Decl. ¶ 3, and Exhibit 1); 87 TTABVUE 3 (Fuschino Decl.
¶ 7).
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including the United States and Canada, through which it provides various consumer
financial services primarily in connection with the mark MONEY MART.38
Respondent claims use of the mark MONEY MART in connection with in loan
financing, check cashing, and electronic funds transfer services in the United States
since as early as 1984.39 Respondent’s evidence to support this claim includes the
following:
 Jeffrey Weiss, the CEO and Chairman of Respondent between 1990 and
2014, testified, based on his personal knowledge and his review of
corporate records and documents produced in this case, that Respondent
“has used the MONEY MART mark continuously and without
interruption in the United States in connection with check cashing and
loan financing services, including payday lending, since the early
1980s;40

 Nancy Fuschino, currently the Director of Customer Acquisition and an
employee of National Money Mart (a subsidiary of Respondent) since
2008, testified, based on her review of corporate records and documents,
that “[f]rom the 1980s to present, [Respondent] (formerly Money
Management Corporation) has used the MONEY MART mark in
connection with check cashing, money transfer services, and loan
financing services, including payday lending.”41

38 98-99 TTABVUE 3 (McLendon Decl., ¶ 6); 96 TTABVUE 2 (Weiss Decl., ¶ 2).
39 123 TTABVUE 5, 20.
40 96 TTABVUE 2-4 (Weiss Decl. ¶¶ 1, 5, 7, 13-29). A “payday lender” is a company that lends
small amounts of money for a short time, usually at a very high rate of interest.” Collins
Dictionary: (https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/payday-lender). The
Board may take judicial notice of definitions from dictionaries, including online dictionaries
that exist in printed format. In re Cordua Rests. LP, 110 USPQ2d 1227, 1229 n.4 (TTAB
2014), aff’d, 823 F.3d 594, 118 USPQ2d 1632 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Respondent also provided
testimony that “payday loan services are a type of loan financing, namely, short-term, small
dollar unsecured loans that rely upon the recipient of the loan having previous verifiable
payroll and employment records. 87 TTABVUE 8 (Fuschino Decl. ¶ 31), as well as a
Wikipedia article (Payday loans in the United States) explaining that a “payday loan” … is a
small, short-term unsecured loan, “regardless of whether repayment of loans is linked to a
borrower’s payday.” 100 TTABVUE 448 (Respondent’s NOR, Exhibit 76).
41 87 TTABVUE 2-3, 9 (Fuschino Decl. ¶¶ 2-7, 41).
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 Tim Hickey, Respondent’s Vice President of Marketing for North
America since 2014, testified on cross-examination that Respondent has
been providing loan financing and check cashing services since 1984
under the name Money Mart.42

 Kim Love McLendon, Respondent’s Licensing and Compliance Paralegal
and an employee of Respondent since 2005, testified, based on her
review of corporate records and documents, that “[Respondent] has
offered a wide variety of consumer financial services under the MONEY
MART mark in the United States for more than thirty (30) years,
including check cashing; money order and transfer services; and loan
financing services, including payday loans.”43

 Telephone directory excerpts for Respondent’s MONEY MART stores
including a 1984-1985 White Pages listing for 2 of its original Detroit,
Michigan stores; a 1989 Yellow Pages listing under the category of
“Money Order Services” for 12 stores in and around Detroit, Michigan;
and a 1990 Yellow Pages listing for a MONEY MART INC. store in
Taylor, Michigan;44 and

 City and business directory listings of Respondent’s MONEY MART
stores in Lincoln Park (1985, 1987-1988), Detroit (1989-1991, 1994-
1996), and Taylor (1990), Michigan.45

Respondent also provided testimony that “[s]ince at least as early as 2012,
[Respondent] has continuously offered pawn brokerage and pawn store services in
connection with the MONEY MART Marks in commerce in the United States”; it
began “recognizing revenue” for those services in March 2012.46
The foregoing evidence and unchallenged testimony establishes that Respondent

42 102 TTABVUE 546, 550 (Hickey Disco. Dep.).
43 98 TTABVUE 2-3, 5, 8 (McLendon Decl. ¶¶ 2, 4-5, 15, 27).
44 96 TTABVUE 5-6, 14-19, 64-66 (Weiss Decl. ¶ 16-17, 20, and Exhibits 2-3, 7); 87 TTABVUE
4-5, 12-17, 62-64 (Fuschino Decl. ¶¶ 11-12, 15, and Exhibits 1-2, 6).
45 96 TTABVUE 5-6, 21-62 (Weiss Decl. ¶¶ 18-20, and Exhibits 4-6); 87 TTABVUE 4-5, 19-
60, 66-89 (Fuschino Decl. ¶¶ 13-16, and Exhibits 3-5, 7).
46 87 TTABVUE 8-9 (Fuschino Decl. ¶ 39-40).
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has proprietary rights in the mark MONEY MART in connection with loan financing,
check cashing, and electronic funds transfer services in the United States since as
early as 1984 and, in any event, before Petitioner’s alleged 1993 date of first use of
the mark MONEY MART in connection with pawn brokerage and pawn services. See
Powermatics, Inc. v. Globe Roofing Prods. Co., 341 F.2d 127, 144 USPQ 430, 432
(CCPA 1965) (oral testimony alone of a single, credible witness is enough to establish
common law use of a mark for the identified goods or services); National Bank Book
Co. v. Leather Crafted Prods., Inc., 218 USPQ 827, 828 (TTAB 1993) (oral testimony
may be sufficient to prove the first use of a party’s mark when it is based on personal
knowledge, it is clear and convincing, and it has not been contradicted); GAF Corp. v.
Anatox Analytical Servs., Inc., 192 USPQ 576, 577 (TTAB 1976) (oral testimony may
establish prior use when the testimony is clear, consistent, convincing, and
uncontradicted).
2. Petitioner
Petitioner was founded in 2006 and currently owns “a little over a dozen” pawn
shops in the State of Texas that it operates under the name Money Mart Pawn &
Jewelry to provide pawn services.47 Petitioner, through its predecessor-in-interest
Pawn Management, Inc. (“PMI”), claims use the mark MONEY MART in connection
with pawn services in Texas since as early as 1993.48 Petitioner’s evidence to support
this claim includes the following:
 Larry Nuckols, the founder and one of the owners of Petitioner’s

47 60 TTABVUE 11-12 (Upton T-Dep.); 58 TTABVUE 11, 20, 56 (Nuckols T-Dep.).
48 Id. at 16-17.
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predecessor-in-interest, PMI, in January 1993, as well as one of the
founders of Petitioner in 2006 and “one of the principles and owners and
director” of Petitioner, testified that he opened PMI’s first pawn store
under the name Money Market Pawn & Jewelry in 1993,49 which used
the mark MONEY MART PAWN or MONEY MART PAWN &
JEWELRY for that store and subsequent stores acquired by Petitioner
with the permission of PMI;50 and that he has continued to operate
stores under the name Money Mart Pawn from 1993 to the present;51

 Chris Upton testified that he met Larry Nuckols in 1986 and worked
with him in the pawn industry from 1986 through 1993 when Mr.
Nuckols started PMI;52 that he visited PMI’s first Money Mart Pawn
store in the summer of 1993;53 that Petitioner opened its first store
under the mark Money Mart Pawn in January 2008; and that Petitioner
has continued to either acquire or open new pawn stores under the mark
MONEY MART or MONEY MART PAWN until the present day;54

 Undated photographs of stores that have operated or currently operate
under the name MONEY MARKET PAWN showing signage, including
PMI’s/Petitioner’s first store;55

 Petitioner promotional materials distributed under the name Money
Mart Pawn & Jewelry for a couple of its store locations including a
printers’ proof for a mailing regarding a June 14, 2008 giveaway, and a
holiday flyer for a November 29, 2003 holiday sale and promotional
giveaway;56 and

 Copies of 71 State of Texas lending licenses and/or pawn shop licenses
issued to PMI, Petitioner, or licensees thereof, for the years 1993-1994,
1996-1997, 1999, 2001-2007, 2009-2015, including one to Petitioner
indicating an issue date of July 14, 1993.57

49 Id. at 9, 11, 15,
50 Id. at 48.
51 Id. at 20.
52 60 TTABVUE 8-9 (Upton T-Dep.).
53 Id. at 25-26.
54 Id. at 13.
55 58 TTABVUE 20-31, 156-163 (Nuckols T-Dep. and Exhibits 5-12).
56 Id. at 32-34, 164-165 (Testimony and Exhibits 13-14).
57 Id. at 155, 179-249 (Exhibits 4 and 25).
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The foregoing evidence and unchallenged testimony establishes that Petitioner
has used the mark MONEY MART PAWN and/or MONEY MART PAWN &
JEWELRY in connection with pawn services since as early as 1993.58 See
Powermatics, 144 USPQ at 432; National Bank Book Co., 218 USPQ at 828; GAF
Corp. v. Anatox Analytical Servs., Inc., 192 USPQ at 577.
B. Summary of the Parties’ Priority Dispute
Petitioner argues that it has superior rights in the mark MONEY MART with
respect to pawn services because it and its predecessor-in-interest have used the
mark in connection with those services since as early as 1993 and, in any event, prior
to 2012, purportedly the earliest date upon which Respondent may rely upon for
providing pawn services under its mark MONEY MART.59
Respondent does not dispute that Petitioner was the first party to use the term
MONEY MART expressly in connection with pawn services. Nevertheless,
Respondent argues that it has superior rights in the mark MONEY MART for pawn
services because it has been providing loan financing, check cashing, and electronic

58 Although several of Petitioner’s witnesses used the term “MONEY MART” alone, either in
a declaration/affidavit or in response to questioning by counsel, Petitioner’s response to an
interrogatory posed by Respondent clarifies that Petitioner has not actually used that term
without other wording. Respondent’s Interrogatory No. 8 asked Petitioner to “State whether
Petitioner has ever used MONEY MART as a standalone mark or name (i.e., apart from the
names “Money Mart Pawn” and/or “Money Mart Pawn & Jewelry,”).” Answer: “’No.’ However,
‘pawn’ describes Petitioner’s services, and it is more common than not for Petitioner’s
customers and others in the pawn industry who know of Petitioner’s services and pawn stores
to simply refer to Petitioner and/or Petitioner’s stores as ‘Money Mart.’” 103 TTABVUE 120-
121 [Respondent’s NOR].
59 117 TTABVUE 9, 17-19.
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funds transfer services since as early as 1984.60 According to Respondent, pawn
brokerage and pawn shop services are either (1) “a subset of and encompassed by
‘loan financing services,’ and are thus “extremely closely related” or “substantially
identical,” or they are (2) within Respondent’s zone of natural expansion for its loan
financing, payday lending or check cashing services, in that they are “so closely
related that consumers would expect them to be offered by the same company under
the same mark.”61
C. Whether Petitioner’s Pawn Services Are Encompassed by
Respondent’s Loan Financing Services

Earlier in the proceeding, the Board, granting Respondent’s motion for leave to
amend its answer, found—based on the materials provided by Respondent in its
motion—that Respondent’s loan financing services identified in its involved
Registration No. 3206120 are “substantially the same” as Petitioner’s pawn
brokerage and pawn services.62 Subsequently, in denying Respondent’s motions for
summary judgment, and viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Petitioner,
the non-moving party, as it must in such a motion, the Board found that genuine
issues of material fact remained as to whether Respondent could show that pawn
shop and pawn brokerage services are indeed “encompassed by” loan financing
services.63

60 123 TTABVUE 20-21.
61 Id. at 21
62 30 TTABVUE 10 (Board Order of December 16, 2016).
63 51 TTABVUE 15. In a motion for summary judgment, the evidence of record and any
inferences which may be drawn from the underlying undisputed facts must be viewed in the
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We now decide that issue in the absence of the evidentiary restraints dictated by
a motion for summary judgment. If we find that pawn brokerage and pawn shop
services are covered or encompassed by loan financing, then we must resolve the issue
of priority in Respondent’s favor. If we do not, we will discuss Respondent’s secondary
argument that such services are within its zone of natural expansion.
1. Dictionary, Encyclopedia, and Industry Evidence
Respondent provided evidence and testimony in the form of dictionary and
encyclopedia definitions, and a third-party website, in support of its contention that
“a ‘pawn’ is merely a type of loan” and that “pawn brokerage and pawn shop services
are a form of short-term loaning financing services” and thus are encompassed by
them,64 including the following:65
 Pawnbroker – “one who makes loans on personal effects that are left as
security” (The Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia); “a dealer licensed to
lend money at a specified rate of interest on the security of moveable
personal property” (Collins Discovery Encyclopedia, 1st edition); and “a
small lender who lends money at a high interest rate and holds some of
the borrower’s personal goods as collateral, to be sold to the public (in a
pawn shop) in the event of default (InvestorWords.com – Online
Investing Glossary);

 Pawn – “To deliver personal property to another as a pledge or as
security for a debt. A deposit of goods with a creditor as security for a
sum of money borrowed” (West’s Encyclopedia of American Law, Edition
2);

 How does a pawn work? A pawn is another term for a collateral loan.
Pawnbrokers lend money on items of value ranging from gold and
diamond jewelry, musical instruments, electronics, tools, household

light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Olde Tyme Foods Inc. v. Roundy’s Inc., 961
F.2d 200, 22 USPQ2d 1542 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
64 Id.
65 100 TTABVUE 197-206 (Respondent’s NOR, Exhibits 9-12).
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items, firearms, and more. Some pawn shops may specialize in certain
items. Loans are based on the value of the collateral. A customer may
also choose to surrender your collateral as payment in full. Pawn shops
may offer extensions/renewals (where permitted by state law). Why
would someone go to a pawn broker to get a loan? Pawnbrokers offer
the consumer a quick, convenience and confidential way to borrow
money. A short-term cash need can be met with no credit check or legal
consequences if the loan is not repaid. Pawnbroking imposes a discipline
of the borrower that other lenders do not. Pawn loans do not cause
people to overextend credit or go into bankruptcy. (National
Pawnbrokers Association).

Neither party provides a definition for “pawn shop, or “pawnshop” (as that term
is more commonly expressed). As simple as it may seem, we find it appropriate to
have this term defined in the record for our later analysis. A “pawnshop” is a
pawnbroker’s shop,”66 or “the shop of a pawnbroker.”67 Additionally, we note that
“pawn brokerage (“pawnbrokerage”) is defined as “pawnbroking.”68
2. News Articles
Respondent also provided a number of articles in support of its contention that
pawn brokerage and pawn shops are considered providers of loan services, including
the following excerpts:
Though pawnshops are often lauded by customers for their easy and
speedy transactions, the real lure has been their willingness to act as
the lender of last resort for the working poor, who often find themselves
abandoned by the mainstream banking world. But they are being joined
by increasing numbers of middle-class and even more affluent
customers, hard hit by recession-related layoffs, bankruptcies,
foreclosures and tight credit, as well as other modern money maladies,
like high medical bills and costly divorce settlements.

66 https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/pawnshop (Merriam-Webster Dictionary);
67 https://www.ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=pawnshop (The American Heritage
Dictionary).
68 https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/pawnbrokerage
(Merrian-Webster Dictionary).
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Pawnshops profit by making loans in exchange for items that serve as
collateral. Monthly interest rates, excluding storage fees and other
charges… If the interest is not paid on time, the collateral is forfeited to
the pawnbroker, who often sells it at near-wholesale prices. On average,
shops hold goods about 60 days before they are forfeited.

Some pawnshops are even becoming financial centers, cashing checks,
taking payment on bills and making loans for tickets from other
pawnshops. They promote their loan application process as quick and
trouble free and are willing to make frequent and small loans
(sometimes as little as $5). They also run ads on television and are
moving away from seedier sections to more desirable areas, like
suburban shopping centers. [“Upscale Down-and-Outers Try Pawning,”
The New York Times, September 11, 1991]69
___

The woman marched in from the bustle of Frankford Avenue with a
quickness that left little doubt she was in a hurry. “I want to get $10 on
this.”.... In barely five minutes, she was out the door with no questions
asked with what she wanted in hand, courtesy of Art’s Money Loan Inc.,
a self-styled modern-day pawnshop. It’s such quick services, along with
new merchandising ideas, that Arthur Dansky, proprietor of Art’s
Money Loan, hopes will sell more and more people on using pawnshops
as a source of loans. … “Instead of going to a bank, where there is red
tape involved or where you have to put up collateral such as a house or
a car, with us it’s very quick, it’s confidential… It’s very simple.”
[“Lending Pawnshops a New Image,” Philadelphia Inquirer, October 2,
1988]70
___

Pawn shops are used for lending as well as check cashing and money
orders. … “People use pawn shops for loans – they are convenient, a
transaction takes only about 10 minutes and there are no credit
consequences.” [“Pawn Shop Business Has Ripple Economic Effect,”
Tulsa World]71
___

“A pawnshop operates as an integral a part of a community as any

69 100 TTABVUE 209-211 (Exhibit 13).
70 Id. at 213-216 (Exhibit 14).
71 Id. at 237-238 (Exhibit 19).
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bank,” says Keithline, who opened a shop on Broad Street four years
ago. “People of modest means need money, but the way things are now,
it’s very difficult for them to borrow. Banks won’t loan $1,000. They’ll
loan $10,000 maybe, but not $1,000. So a lot of people use us as ATM
machines. They get a little windfall, they buy a piece of jewelry and that
becomes hard currency, and it becomes collateral. This is as
fundamentally a collateral loan as any bank loan.” [“When times get
tough, the tough open up pawnshops,” The Providence Journal, April 11,
1993]72
___

Pawn lending: Pawn lending is a short-term, secured lending
transaction in which the lender typically takes physical possession of
the item securing the loan (often jewelry or other personal goods). The
lending agreement allows the pawn lender to take possession of and sell
the collateral if the borrower does not meet the terms of the agreement.
Recent estimates of the overall scale of pawn lending are not available.
However, the largest publicly traded pawn lender, Cash America
International Inc., with 500 stores in 22 states, reported making $514
million in pawn loans in 2007, with APRs ranging from 12 to 300
percent. [“Alternative Financial Services: A Primer” by the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, FDIC 2009]73
___

Despite their strong retail bias, “you have to think of pawnshops as
lending institutions, because that’s their strength and that’s where they
make their money,” says Edward Antoian, portfolio manager of
Delaware Management’s DelCap growth fund, which owns more than
1.1. million Cash America shares. [“The pawnshop is working to polish
its squalid image,” Texas Journal, The Wall Street Journal, December
22, 1993]74
___

Bolstered by higher poverty rates, a sagging economy and tightening
credit, pawnshops are becoming lenders of last resort for a growing
number of strapped consumers. … [T]he ability to borrow a small
amount of money simply by presenting identification, offering a piece of
collateral and signing on the dotted line. … Driving the growth of
pawnshops is the demand for small, short-term personal loans.

72 Id. at 240-243 (Exhibit 20).
73 Id. at 261-272 (Exhibit 24).
74 103 TTABVUE 58-60 (Exhibit 112).
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[“Pawnships [sic] Make a Comeback,” Newsweek, December 3, 1990]75
___

When money becomes too tight to mention and small, short-term loans
can’t be found, more consumers are turning to one of the oldest lending
institutions: the pawnshop. [“Lien On Me; More People Find Pawnshops
Just The Ticket,” The Commercial Appeal (Memphis), October 17,
1991]76

3. Witness Testimony
Finally, Respondent provided the testimony of witnesses for both Respondent and
Petitioner to further demonstrate that pawn brokerage and pawn shop services fall
within loan financing:
a. Tim Hickey (Respondent’s Vice President)77

Q: Okay. Now, when you say that [Respondent] provides loan financing
services, can you explain what you mean by loan financing?

A: So we view loan financing as really any type of loan, whether that be
a loan that is collateralized or not collateralized. So that could include
payday loans, installment loans, pawn loans.

b. Amy Szwajkowski (Respondent’s Director of Marketing
Communications)78
Q: So what is your understanding of loan financing?

A: Loan financing, it’s when somebody borrows money and promises to
pay it back.

Q: And would that include pawn lending?

A: Yes.

75 Id. at 77-78 (Exhibit 117).
76 Id. at 92-93 (Exhibit 120).
77 102 TTABVUE 554 (Respondent’s NOR, Disco. Dep., Exhibit 105)
78 76 TTABVUE 35-36 (Szwajkowski T-Dep.).
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c. Larry Nuckols (Petitioner’s Founder and Owner)

(Discovery Deposition)79

Q: How would you describe pawn brokerage services?
A: It is collateral lending, loans in tangible merchandise to the public.
Q: And those are short-term loans?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And how would you describe pawn store services.
A: It’s the same thing.
Q: Same thing as pawn brokerage services?
A: Yes, sir.
(Testimony Deposition)80
Q: Okay. And describe briefly what you, in your experience, believe the
pawn business to be.

A: The pawn business is, we’re in the business of loaning money secured
by asserts, collateral that we hold on behalf of our customers.

d. Christopher Upton (Petitioner’s Owner, President and COO)81
Q: Okay. Does Brittex offer the same services in every Money Mart Pawn
store?

Objection by Petitioner’s counsel: Objection. Vague. Go ahead.

A: The same?

79 102 TTABVUE 442 (Respondent’s NOR, Exhibit 103) (emphasis added).
80 58 TTABVUE 11-12 (Nuckols T-Dep.) (emphasis added).
81 60 TTABVUE 33-34.
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Q: The same services.

A: We offer pawn loans.
___

D. Analysis of Priority
The evidence indicates that pawn shops are the location from which pawnbrokers
provide pawn brokerage (the provision of loans based on personal collateral). The
evidence further indicates that the media and public view pawn loans as an
alternative way of obtaining a fast, short-term loan. Most persuasive was the
evidence provided by Petitioner’s own witnesses. Larry Nuckols (an owner and
founder of Petitioner) testified that pawn shop services and pawn brokerage
(collateral lending) are the same thing. Christopher Upton (an owner and president
of Petitioner) testified that Petitioner provides the same services in all of its pawn
shops: pawn loans. Petitioner’s pawn shop loans thus comprise its “pawn services.”
Respondent owns Registration 3206120 for the mark MONEY MART for loan
financing, which is incontestable and unchallenged in this proceeding. That
registration grants Respondent the exclusive right to use that mark in connection
with those services. Stone Lion Capital Partners, L.P. v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d
1317, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2014); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b) (the
registration is prima facie evidence of the registrant’s exclusive right to use the mark
“in connection with the goods or services specified in the certificate”). As such, we
construe Respondent’s “loan financing” in that registration as encompassing all
services that fall within that broad specification, including pawn services, See Sw.
Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015) (Where services
Cancellation No. 92060888
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are identified broadly, “we must presume that the services encompass all services of
the type identified.”) quoted in In re Country Oven, Inc., 2019 USPQ2d 443903, * 4
(TTAB 2019) and cited in In re AC Webconnecting Holding B.V., 2020 USPQ2d 11048,
*11-12 (TTAB 2020).
Consequently, since Petitioner did not provide its pawn services until 1993, well
after Respondent began providing its loan financing services in 1984, Petitioner has
failed to establish priority through its common law rights in the mark MONEY MART
PAWN or MONEY MART PAWN & JEWELRY and thus cannot prevail in its petition
to cancel Respondent’s registrations on grounds of priority and likelihood of
confusion. We therefore do not reach the issue of likelihood of confusion. See Corp.
Document Servs. Inc. v. I.C.E.D. Mgmt. Inc., supra, 48 USPQ2d at 1479 n.4.
V. Fraud
Fraud in procuring a trademark registration occurs when an applicant knowingly
makes false, material representations of fact in connection with its application with the
intent to deceive the USPTO. In re Bose Corp., 580 F.3d 1240, 91 USPQ2d 1938, 1941
(Fed. Cir. 2009). A party opposing registration of a trademark on the ground of fraud
bears a heavy burden of proof. W. D. Byron & Sons, Inc. v. Stein Bros. Mfg. Co., 377 F.2d
1001, 1004, 54 C.C.P.A. 1442, 153 USPQ 749, 750 (CCPA 1967). Indeed, “the very nature
of the charge of fraud requires that it be proven ‘to the hilt’ with clear and convincing
evidence. There is no room for speculation, inference or surmise and, obviously, any doubt
must be resolved against the charging party.” Smith Int’l, Inc. v. Olin Corp., 209 USPQ
1033, 1044 (TTAB 1981); see also Asian and W. Classics B.V. v. Selkow, 92 USPQ2d 1478,
(TTAB 2009).
Cancellation No. 92060888
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Petitioner’s fraud arguments can be boiled down to the following allegations:
(1) Respondent, through its representatives or counsel, falsely
represented in its sworn declarations provided during procurement
of the Registrations that, to the best of their knowledge, no one else
had the right to use the mark MONEY MART in commerce in
connection with the identified services despite having knowledge of
Petitioner’s superior rights in the mark for pawn services;

(2) Respondent, through its representatives or counsel, falsely
represented in its sworn declarations provided during procurement
of the Registrations that the mark MONEY MART was in use in
commerce in the Registrations as of 1997 and 2005;

(3) Respondent “testified falsely in its interrogatory answers” and
during “several depositions” regarding its provision of pawn
services under the mark MONEY MART; and

(4) Respondent failed to withdraw or repudiate its “false evidence”
during this proceeding.82

Petitioner relies on two cease and desist letters Respondent sent to
Petitioner to show that Respondent knew of Petitioner’s prior use of the mark
MONEY MART for pawn services, but nevertheless falsely and knowingly declared
in its applications that no other party had the right to use the mark for pawn
brokerage and pawn shops.83 The first letter, dated December 4, 2000, was sent by
Respondent’s former counsel and alleged prior use of the mark MONEY MART by
Respondent for “consumer financial services, including short-term consumer loans,
using the MONEY MART® in varied media,” and that Petitioner’s use of the mark
MONEY MART name and mark “for consumer financial services” is, inter alia, likely

82 117 TTABVUE 39-40.
83 Id. at 19-20, 40-42.
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to cause confusion with Respondent’s mark.84 Petitioner’s former counsel responded
to this letter by disputing Respondent’s allegations of priority with respect to the
territory of the San Antonio, Texas metropolitan area, where it alleged it had
operated under the same name, Money Mart Pawn & Jewelry since January 1993.”85
The second letter, sent by Respondent’s current counsel on September 19, 2011,
referred to its Registration Nos. 2244158 and 3206120 for MONEY MART for check
cashing, electronic funds transfer, and loan financing services, and alleged prior use
of the mark MONEY MART since as early as 1984. It charged that Petitioner’s “use
of Money Market Pawn in connection with the sale of jewelry and other items on the
internet and your pawn shops is causing harm to our client’s rights and could lead to
confusion in the marketplace.”86 According to Petitioner, its counsel responded to
Petitioner’s letter, but “there wasn’t an outcome” and no resolution was reached with
regard to the substance of Respondent’s second letter.87
There are many reasons why Petitioner’s claim of fraud must fail, not the least of
which is that it has not proven that Respondent had an intent to deceive the USPTO.
That is, Respondent may have had a good faith belief that it had superior rights in
the mark MONEY MART when it filed its applications for the Registrations, such

84 58 TTABVUE 174-175 (Nuckols T-Dep., Exhibit P-22).
85 Id. at 176 (Exhibit P-23).
86 Id. at 177-178. Respondent objects to this letter on the bases that it was not properly
authenticated and is hearsay. We find that the letter was properly introduced into evidence
by Petitioner’s witness, Mr. Nuckols, who testified that he received the letter around the time
that it was sent. It is hearsay, so we consider only what was asserted in the letter, not the
truth of the assertions.
87 Petitioner’s response letter is not of record, so there is no evidence regarding how it
responded to Respondent’s letter.
Cancellation No. 92060888
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that it could truthfully state in the application declaration that no other person, firm,
corporation, or association has the right to use that mark in commerce, either in
identical form thereof or in such near resemblance thereto as to be likely, when used
on or in connection with the goods/services of such other person to cause confusion,
or to cause mistake, or to deceive.88 There is simply no evidence from which we could
infer that Respondent did not believe it had superior prior rights in the MONEY
MART mark. Moreover, such a belief by Respondent’s executives is supported by our
finding that Petitioner failed to established priority of use. The fact that Respondent
sent Petitioner two letters asserting prior rights in the mark, without more, is not
sufficient for Petitioner to meet the stringent requirement that fraud be proven to the
hilt with clear and convincing evidence, including of intent to deceive the Office.
Smith Int’l, Inc. v. Olin Corp., 209 USPQ at 1044; Asian and W. Classics B.V. v.
Selkow, 92 USPQ2d 1478, (TTAB 2009).
Respondent objects to the second prong of Petitioner’s fraud argument related
purported false representations by Respondent in the declarations of its applications
for the Registrations that it had used the mark MONEY MART in commerce as of
1997 and 2005, respectively, because those allegations were not pleaded, were raised
by Petitioner for the first time in its trial brief, and Respondent does not consent to
trial on those unpleaded allegations.89 Petitioner, in response, asserts that these
additional allegations “do not amount to additional theories—they simply bolster the

88 Declaration language from the Registration Nos. 4532073 (March 28, 2013 Application,
TSDR 5) and 4524540 (March 22, 2013 Application, TSDR 5).
89 123 TTABVUE 47 at n. 26, 52.
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single theory” that Respondent ‘did not have superior rights with regard to all of the
goods/services.”90
We agree with Respondent that these allegations were unpleaded and that they
were not tried by consent. Contrary to Petitioner’s understanding, in all averments
of fraud, the circumstances constituting fraud shall be stated with particularity. See,
e.g., King Auto., Inc. v. Speedy Muffler King, Inc., 667 F.2d 1008, 212 USPQ 801, 803
(CCPA 1981) (“While [Fed. R. Civ. P.] Rule 9(b) does not require the pleading of
detailed evidentiary matters, we agree with the board that appellant has not stated
with sufficient specificity the factual bases for its allegations of appellee's fraudulent
misrepresentation to the PTO … Rule 9(b) requires that the pleadings contain explicit
rather than implied expression of the circumstances constituting fraud”). Therefore,
we do not consider these additional allegations, which in any event, would not amount
to fraud. We also agree with Respondent that Petitioner’s remaining allegations
regarding purported Respondent’s false statements made during this proceeding in
an interrogatory answer,91 and during depositions, are irrelevant and have no bearing

90 124 TTABVUE 23-24. Petitioner conflates Respondent’s assertion of claimed dates of use
for all of the services recited in the Registrations, which include additional services beyond
pawn brokerage and pawn services, with Respondent’s purported knowledge of Petitioner’s
superior rights in the mark for loan financing services. Regardless, if a mark was in use at
the time an application is filed, a claim of first use, even if false, is not fraud. See W.
Worldwide Enters. Grp. Inc. v. Qinqdao Brewery, 17 USPQ2d 1137, 1141 (TTAB 1990) (“The
Board repeatedly has held that the fact that a party has set forth an erroneous date of first
use does not constitute fraud unless, inter alia, there was no valid use of the mark until after
the filing of the [Section 1(a)] application.”).
91 Respondent’s purported false statement in response to Petitioner’s Interrogatory No. 1 was
that it “began offering pawn shop services, including cash for gold services, under the
MONEY MART since at least as early as May of 2008.” 55-56 TTABVUE 42 (Petitioner NOR,
Exhibit 2). Respondent’s purported false statements made in depositions was that it began
Cancellation No. 92060888
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on whether Respondent committed fraud during procurement of the Registrations.
Petitioner has failed to establish that Respondent made false, material
representations of fact in connection with the procurement of its applications to
register the mark MONEY MART in the Registrations with an intent to deceive the
USPTO. In re Bose Corp., 91 USPQ2d at 1941.
Decision: Because Petitioner has failed to meet its burden of proving priority or
fraud, the petition to cancel is denied.

preparing to offer pawn loans in 2010, and began recognizing revenue from pawn loans in
2012. 55 TTABVUE 259 (Hickey T-Dep., Exhibit E).