Briggs Business Enterprises, LLCv.Feng Tai Qian Shang Mao, Limited Co.

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

Mar 16, 2021

92073333 (T.T.A.B. Mar. 16, 2021)

LTS
March 16, 2021

Cancellation No. 92073333

Briggs Business Enterprises, LLC

v.
Feng Tai Qian Shang Mao, Limited Co.

Before Wolfson, Lynch, and Johnson,
Administrative Trademark Judges.

By the Board:

Respondent Feng Tai Qian Shang Mao, Limited Co. is the owner of Principal
Register Registration No. 5860750 for the mark HOUSEHOLD IMPRESSIONS (in
standard characters) for “doorstops of metal” in International Class 6.1 Petitioner
Briggs Business Enterprises, LLC seeks cancellation of Respondent’s registration on
the following grounds: (1) likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d) of the Trademark
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), based on prior common law use of the mark
in connection with spring doorstops of metal (“Petitioner’s

1 Issued September 17, 2019, from an application filed on December 11, 2018, based on use
of the mark in commerce under Trademark Act Section 1(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a), and alleging
December 10, 2018, as both the date of first use and first use in commerce. “HOUSEHOLD”
is disclaimed.
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
P.O. Box 1451
Alexandria, VA 22313-1451
General Contact Number: 571-272-8500
General Email: TTABInfo@uspto.gov
THIS OPINION IS NOT A
PRECEDENT OF THE
TTAB
Cancellation No. 92073333

2
HOUSEHOLD IMPRESSIONS Mark”);2 (2) dilution under Section 43(c) of the
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c); (3) false suggestion of a connection under Section
2(a) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a); (4) fraud; and (5) non-ownership. 1
TTABVUE. In its answer, Respondent denies the salient allegations in the petition.
6 TTABVUE.
This proceeding now comes up on Petitioner’s motion, filed December 1, 2020, for
partial summary judgment on the likelihood of confusion claim. The motion is fully
briefed.
We have carefully considered all of the parties’ arguments, presume the parties’
familiarity with the factual bases for their filings, and do not recount the facts or
arguments here except as necessary to explain this decision. See Guess? IP Holder LP
v. Knowluxe LLC, 116 USPQ2d 2018, 2019 (TTAB 2015).
I. The Parties’ Arguments and Evidence
A. Petitioner’s Arguments and Evidence
In support of its motion for summary judgment, Petitioner has submitted the
Declaration of Brannon Briggs, President and sole owner and employee of Petitioner,
and exhibits attached thereto. 15 TTABVUE 22-1251. Mr. Briggs attests that
Petitioner has used Petitioner’s HOUSEHOLD IMPRESSIONS Mark in United

2 Petitioner also pleads ownership of Registration No. 5733616 (issued April 23, 2019) for the
mark for “face masks for use by dental care providers; face masks for use
by health care providers; medical gloves; surgical shoe covers” in International Class 10. 1
TTABVUE 5, ¶ 4. Petitioner, however, relies solely upon its common law rights in Petitioner’s
HOUSEHOLD IMPRESSIONS Mark in moving for summary judgment on its likelihood of
confusion claim.
Cancellation No. 92073333

3
States commerce in connection with “spring doorstops of metal,” by listing the goods
for sale and selling the goods on Amazon.com since at least as early as September 23,
2017, with the first sale of the goods made on November 15, 2017. Id. at 22-24, ¶¶ 2-
10.
The exhibits introduced by Mr. Briggs include, inter alia: (1) screenshots of the
product listing on Amazon.com and the first order confirmation for Petitioner’s spring
doorstops, dated November 15, 2017 (id. at 40-45); (2) images of product packaging,
product labels, and UPC bar codes for Petitioner’s spring doorstops (id. at 58-81);
(3) invoices from suppliers of Petitioner’s spring doorstops, dated between November
9, 2017 and July 29, 2020 (id. at 120-21, 125-26, and 357-81); (4) copies of bills of
lading records for Petitioner’s spring doorstops, dated between November 15, 2017
and October 21, 2020 (id. at 122-24 and 382-402); (5) customs records for Petitioner’s
spring doorstops, dated between November 28, 2017 and October 29, 2020 (id. at 127-
129 and 403-34); (6) advertising expenses on Amazon.com for Petitioner’s spring
doorstops, dated between November 17, 2017 and October 17, 2020 (id. at 201-307);
and (7) sales records for Petitioner’s spring doorstops, dated between November 15,
2017 and November 24, 2020 (id. at 520-1251).3

3 We note that Petitioner submitted several web page screenshots as exhibits to Mr. Briggs’
declaration, and in his declaration, Mr. Briggs identified the date the screenshot was made.
15 TTABVUE 25-38, ¶¶ 20-24, 26-27, 31-33, 43, 48, 49, 61, 67, 82, and 84. To the extent the
web page screenshots do not include their source (URL), the web page screenshots are not
self-authenticating. See Trademark Rule 2.122(e), 37 C.F.R. § 2.122(e). However, because
Respondent has not objected to the evidence on the basis that it cannot be admissible at trial,
we have considered the evidence for the limited probative value of what is shown on the face
of the materials. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2) (Advisory Committee notes) (2010 amendment)
(allowing a court to consider unauthenticated documents on summary judgment); see also
Akers v. Beal Bank, 845 F. Supp. 2d 238, 243 (D.D.C. 2012).
Cancellation No. 92073333

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Petitioner argues that there is no genuine dispute that: (1) its mark is inherently
distinctive (id. at 10-11); (2) it has priority over Respondent’s involved mark (id. at
11-14); (3) the parties’ marks are essentially identical (id. at 16-17); (4) the parties’
goods are identical (id. at 18); and (5) the parties’ goods are offered in identical
channels of trade (id. at 18-19).
B. Respondent’s Arguments
Respondent’s response to the motion consists, in its entirety, of the following
statements:
1. Respondent asserts that Petitioner Briggs Business Enterprises, LLC
has failed to meet its burden of production for the Motion for Summary
Judgment.
2. Respondent asserts that Petitioner’s motion fails to establish standing
pursuant to TBMP § 309.03(b).
3. Respondent objects to Petitioner’s purported “statement of
undisputed facts” which are disputed and largely unsubstantiated
beyond the single declaration of Brannon Briggs.
4. Respondent asserts that Petitioner’s alleged use of the trademark is
not inherently distinctive.
5. Respondent asserts that the pleaded and subject trademarks are not
essentially identical.
6. Respondent asserts that Petitioner’s motion fails to establish priority
of use of the HOUSEHOLD IMPRESSIONS trademark.
7. Respondent asserts that Petitioner’s motion fails to establish a
likelihood of consumer confusion under 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d).
17 TTABVUE 2-3.
II. Standard for Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is an appropriate method of disposing of cases in which there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, thus allowing the case to be resolved as
Cancellation No. 92073333

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a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The party moving for summary judgment
has the initial burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine dispute of material
fact remaining for trial and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1987). All evidence must
be viewed in a light favorable to the non-movant, in this case Respondent, and all
justifiable inferences are to be drawn in the non-movant’s favor. Lloyd’s Food Prods.,
Inc. v. Eli’s, Inc., 987 F.2d 766, 25 USPQ2d 2027, 2029 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Opryland
USA Inc. v. Great Am. Music Show, Inc., 970 F.2d 847, 23 USPQ2d 1471, 1472 (Fed.
Cir. 1992). In deciding a summary judgment motion, the Board may not resolve
disputes of material fact; it may only ascertain whether such disputes exist. Lloyd’s
Food Prods., 25 USPQ2d at 2029; Opryland USA, 23 USPQ2d at 1472; Olde Tyme
Foods, Inc. v. Roundy’s, Inc., 961 F.2d 200, 22 USPQ2d 1542, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
When the movant sufficiently demonstrates that there is no genuine dispute of
material fact, and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the burden shifts
to the non-movant to demonstrate the existence of specific genuinely disputed facts
that must be resolved at trial. Freki Corp. N.V. v. Pinnacle Entm’t, Inc., 126 USPQ2d
1697, 1700 (TTAB 2018); Enbridge, Inc. v. Excelerate Energy L.P., 92 USPQ2d 1537,
1540 (TTAB 2009). The non-movant may not rest on the mere allegations of its
pleadings and assertions of counsel, but must designate specific portions of the record
or produce additional evidence showing the existence of a genuine dispute as to a
material fact for trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Freki Corp.,
126 USPQ2d at 1700. In general, to establish the existence of disputed facts requiring
Cancellation No. 92073333

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trial, the non-movant “must point to an evidentiary conflict created on the record[,]
at least by a counterstatement of facts set forth in detail in an affidavit by a
knowledgeable affiant.” Octocom Sys., Inc. v. Hous. Computs. Servs., Inc., 918 F.2d
937, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1786 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Freki Corp., 126 USPQ2d at 1700. A
dispute as to a material fact is genuine only if a reasonable fact finder viewing the
entire record could resolve the disputed matter in favor of the non-movant. Opryland
USA, 23 USPQ2d at 1472; Olde Tyme Foods, 22 USPQ2d at 1544; Venture Out Props.
LLC v Wynn Resorts Holdings, LLC, 81 USPQ2d 1887, 1890-91 (TTAB 2007).
As the party moving for summary judgment on its Section 2(d) claim based on
common law rights in its pleaded mark, Petitioner must establish that there is no
genuine dispute that: (1) it has an entitlement to a statutory cause of action; (2) it is
the prior user of its pleaded mark; and (3) contemporaneous use of the parties’
respective marks on their respective goods would be likely to cause confusion or
mistake or deceive consumers. See Fram Trak Indus., Inc. v. WireTracks LLC, 77
USPQ2d 2000, 2004 (TTAB 2006); Hornblower & Weeks, Inc. v. Hornblower & Weeks,
Inc., 60 USPQ2d 1733, 1735 (TTAB 2001).
III. Analysis
A. Petitioner’s Entitlement to a Statutory Cause of Action
Entitlement to a statutory cause of action must be established in every inter
partes proceeding.4 Australian Therapeutic Supplies Pty. Ltd. v. Naked TM, LLC, 965

4 Board decisions have previously analyzed the requirements of Sections 13 and 14 of the
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1063-64, under the rubric of “standing.” Despite the change in
nomenclature, our prior decisions and those of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
Cancellation No. 92073333

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F.3d 1370, 2020 USPQ2d 10837, *3 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (citing Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static
Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 125-26 (2014)). To establish entitlement to a
statutory cause of action under Sections 13 and 14 of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1063 and 1064, a plaintiff must demonstrate that cancellation of the registration
is within the zone of interests protected by the statute and that plaintiff has a
reasonable belief of damage proximately caused by continued registration of the
mark. Corcamore, LLC v. SFM, LLC, 978 F.3d 1298, 2020 USPQ2d 11277, *6-7 (Fed.
Cir. 2020); see also Empresa Cubana Del Tabaco v. Gen. Cigar Co., 753 F.3d 1270,
111 USPQ2d 1058, 1062-63 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning
LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1727 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
Petitioner has established the absence of a genuine dispute as to its entitlement
to a statutory cause of action through the declaration, and related exhibits, of Mr.
Briggs. Mr. Briggs attests that Petitioner has sold and continues to sell spring
doorstops of metal under Petitioner’s HOUSEHOLD IMPRESSIONS Mark on
Amazon.com and that Respondent’s registered mark is likely to cause confusion with
Petitioner’s prior use of its mark. 15 TTABVUE 22-39, ¶¶ 1-84. See First Niagara Ins.
Brokers Inc. v. First Niagara Fin. Grp. Inc., 476 F.3d 867, 81 USPQ2d 1375, 1378
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (intrastate use by foreign opposer sufficient for standing); Double
Coin Holdings Ltd. v. Tru Dev., 2019 USPQ2d 377409, *4 (TTAB 2019) (standing
established by testimony with exhibits of use of confusingly similar mark).

interpreting Sections 13 and 14 remain applicable. See Spanishtown Enters., Inc. v.
Transcend Res., Inc., 2020 USPQ2d 11388, *2 (TTAB 2020).
Cancellation No. 92073333

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Furthermore, Mr. Briggs’ testimony that he received “trademark infringement
violation notices from Amazon” that were filed by Respondent, along with the
supporting exhibits, establish that Petitioner has a reasonable basis for its belief that
it is being damaged by the registration and that the belief in damage is proximately
caused by Respondent’s registration. Id. at 25, ¶¶ 17-18; see also id. at 160-163.
Lastly, as exhibits to Mr. Briggs’ declaration, Petitioner submitted copies of (1) its
pleaded application for Petitioner’s HOUSEHOLD IMPRESSIONS Mark for “door
stops of metal” in International Class 6, downloaded from the Trademark Electronic
Search System (TESS) database of the USPTO (id. at 171-180), and (2) the Examining
Attorney’s Office Action refusing Petitioner’s application under Trademark Act § 2(d)
based on likelihood of confusion with Respondent’s registered HOUSEHOLD
IMPRESSIONS mark (id. at 452-519).5
Accordingly, there is no genuine dispute that Petitioner has established its
entitlement to a statutory cause of action, i.e., its real interest in cancelling
Respondent’s registration and reasonable belief that Respondent’s registration is
causing Petitioner damage.6 See Empresa Cubana Del Tabaco, 111 USPQ2d at 1062;
ShutEmDown Sports Inc. v. Lacy, 102 USPQ2d 1036, 1041 (TTAB 2012).

5 Application Serial No. 88769838; filed January 22, 2020, based on use of the mark in
commerce under Section 1(a) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. 1051(a). We note that
Petitioner’s pleaded application was abandoned for failure to respond to the Examining
Attorney’s Office Action.
6 We further note that Petitioner pleaded ownership of Registration No. 5733616 (1
TTABVUE 5, ¶ 4), and to the extent Petitioner alleged a likelihood of confusion between the
mark subject to its pleaded registration and Respondent’s involved mark, this too supports
that Petitioner has established its entitlement to a statutory cause of action.
Cancellation No. 92073333

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B. Priority
Petitioner relies on its common law use of Petitioner’s HOUSEHOLD
IMPRESSIONS Mark for spring doorstops of metal to prove priority. Trademark Act
§ 2(d).7 In order for Petitioner to prevail on a claim of likelihood of confusion based on
its ownership of common law rights in its pleaded mark, Petitioner must establish
priority of use of a mark that is inherently distinctive, or which acquired
distinctiveness, before any date upon which Respondent may rely. Otto Roth & Co. v.
Universal Foods Corp., 640 F.2d 1317, 209 USPQ 40, 44-45 (CCPA 1981); Giersch v.
Scripps Networks, Inc., 90 USPQ2d 1020, 1023 (TTAB 2009). Therefore, to prevail on
its Section 2(d) claim based on common law use of its pleaded mark, Petitioner first
must prove that there is no genuine dispute of material fact regarding its use of the
phrase HOUSEHOLD IMPRESSIONS as a distinctive mark prior to December 11,
2018, the filing date of the underlying application that matured into Respondent’s
HOUSEHOLD IMPRESSIONS registration.8 Towers v. Advent Software Inc., 913
F.2d 942, 16 USPQ2d 1039, 1041 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Giersch, 90 USPQ2d at 1023; Fram
Trak Indus., 77 USPQ2d at 2004-05.

7 Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act provides a ground for cancellation of a registered mark
based on ownership of “a mark or trade name previously used in the United States ... and not
abandoned[.]” See also Fram Trak Indus., 77 USPQ2d 2004-05.
8 Respondent did not present any evidence regarding its alleged use of its HOUSEHOLD
IMPRESSIONS mark. Accordingly, the earliest date on which Respondent can rely for
priority purposes is the filing date of the application that matured into its involved
registration for the HOUSEHOLD IMPRESSIONS mark. Trademark Act § 7(c), 15 U.S.C.
§ 1057(c); Media Online Inc. v. El Clasificado, Inc., 88 USPQ2d 1285, 1288 (TTAB 2008); see
also Trademark Rule 2.122(b)(2), 37 C.F.R. § 2.122(b)(2) (the date of use alleged in a
registration is not evidence on behalf of the registrant; “a date of use of a mark must be
established by competent evidence”).
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In his declaration, Mr. Briggs identifies his role at Petitioner and attests to his
personal knowledge of the facts therein. 15 TTABVUE 22, ¶ 1. He attests, inter alia,
that Petitioner distributes and sells spring doorstops of metal in United States
commerce through Amazon.com; that Petitioner first sold spring doorstops of metal
under Petitioner’s HOUSEHOLD IMPRESSIONS Mark beginning in November
2017; and that Petitioner has continuously sold spring doorstops of metal under
Petitioner’s HOUSEHOLD IMPRESSIONS Mark from November 2017 through to
the present. 15 TTABVUE 22-38, ¶¶ 2-84. As exhibits to Mr. Briggs’ declaration,
Petitioner submitted copies of invoices and sales records, reflecting sales of spring
doorstops of metal under Petitioner’s HOUSEHOLD IMPRESSIONS Mark from
November 2017 to the date Petitioner filed its motion for summary judgment. Id. at
120-21, 125-26, 357-81, and 520-1251.
Mr. Briggs’ declaration statements regarding Petitioner’s use of Petitioner’s
HOUSEHOLD IMPRESSIONS Mark for spring doorstops of metal are consistent,
convincing and uncontradicted by Respondent. See Fram Trak Indus., 77 USPQ2d at
2005 (citing Hornblower & Weeks, 60 USPQ2d at 1736); see also Kohler Co., 82
USPQ2d at 1108. Moreover, Mr. Briggs’ statements are corroborated by the invoices
and sales records. This evidence is sufficient to meet Petitioner’s initial burden of
establishing that there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to Petitioner’s prior
use of the common law mark for spring doorstops of metal.
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In its response to Petitioner’s showing of priority, Respondent asserts, in a single
sentence, that “Petitioner’s alleged use of the trademark is not inherently distinctive.”
17 TTABVUE 2, ¶ 4.
The distinctiveness of a mark spans a spectrum from coined and fanciful terms to
arbitrary to suggestive and then along a descriptiveness continuum (going from
merely descriptive to generic terms). See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World,
Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 189 USPQ 759, 764 (2d Cir. 1976) (discussing spectrum of
distinctiveness of marks). Generic marks are never distinctive. USPTO v.
Booking.com B.V., 140 S. Ct. 2298, 2020 U.S.P.Q.2d 10729, *3. (2020). Descriptive
marks can become distinctive, but only by acquiring “secondary meaning.” Id.
Suggestive, arbitrary, and fanciful marks are “inherently distinctive.” Id.
A mark is considered descriptive “if it immediately conveys knowledge of a quality,
feature, function, or characteristic of the goods or services with which it is used.”
Coach Servs. Inc., 101 USPQ2d at 1728. Respondent does not explain how Petitioner’s
HOUSEHOLD IMPRESSIONS Mark “immediately conveys knowledge of a quality,
feature, function, or characteristic of the goods or services with which it is used.” Nor
has Respondent submitted any evidence to support its contention that Petitioner’s
HOUSEHOLD IMPRESSIONS Mark is not inherently distinctive. The only evidence
regarding use of “household impressions” is the evidence submitted by Petitioner, and
that evidence does not support a finding that the wording “household impressions” is
merely descriptive, let alone that Petitioner’s HOUSEHOLD IMPRESSIONS Mark
is merely descriptive.
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Based on the record before us, a reasonable fact finder could not find that
Petitioner’s HOUSEHOLD IMPRESSIONS Mark immediately conveys information
about Petitioner’s spring doorstops of metal. Respondent’s argument, viewed in the
light most favorable to Respondent, does not raise a genuine dispute regarding the
distinctiveness of Petitioner’s HOUSEHOLD IMPRESSIONS Mark. Based on the
evidence of record, there is no genuine dispute that Petitioner’s HOUSEHOLD
IMPRESSIONS Mark is, at worst, suggestive and thus deemed to be inherently
distinctive. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 23 USPQ2d 1081,
1083 (1992) (“The … three categories of [suggestive, arbitrary and fanciful] marks,
because their intrinsic nature serves to identify a particular source of a product, are
deemed inherently distinctive and are entitled to protection.”).
In sum, there are no genuine disputes of material fact regarding the inherent
distinctiveness of Petitioner’s HOUSEHOLD IMPRESSIONS Mark or of Petitioner’s
priority; its first use of the mark occurred in November 2017, more than a year before
Respondent’s constructive first-use date of December 11, 2018. B & B Hardware, Inc.
v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 113 USPQ2d 2045, 2048 (2015) (“One who first
uses a distinct mark in commerce thus acquires rights to that mark.”).
C. Likelihood of Confusion
We now turn to the issue of likelihood of confusion. Initially, we note that in its
response to Petitioner’s motion for summary judgment, Respondent did not submit
any evidence or arguments relating to either the issue of likelihood of confusion
generally, or any of the specific factors that guide the Board in deciding the issue.
Cancellation No. 92073333

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Nevertheless, Petitioner maintains the burden of proving that there is no genuine
dispute of material fact regarding likelihood of confusion and that it is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.
Consideration of likelihood of confusion in the context of summary judgment is
based on an analysis of all of the undisputed facts in evidence that are relevant to the
thirteen evidentiary factors set forth in In re E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d
1357, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (CCPA 1973) (“DuPont”). Any of the DuPont factors “may
from case to case play a dominant role.” Id. However, two key considerations are the
similarities between the marks and the similarities between the goods, the first two
DuPont factors. Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 192
USPQ 24, 29 (CCPA 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by § 2(d) goes to the
cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods and
differences in the marks.”); see also Bell’s Brewery, Inc. v. Innovation Brewing, 125
USPQ2d 1340, 1344-45 (TTAB 2017). Not all of the DuPont factors are relevant in
every case and only those factors for which there is evidence in the record must be
considered. Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., 901 F.3d 1367, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1800-01
(Fed. Cir. 2018). Therefore, we look to whether there are genuine disputes with
respect to any of the DuPont factors which would be material to a decision on the
merits.9

9 To the extent there are other relevant factors, in the absence of any evidence, we treat them
as neutral. Lebanon Seaboard Corp. v. R&R Turf Supply Inc., 101 USPQ2d 1826, 1831 (TTAB
2012) (treating certain DuPont factors as neutral when no evidence provided by the parties).
Cancellation No. 92073333

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Regarding the first DuPont factor, the word portion of Petitioner’s HOUSEHOLD
IMPRESSIONS Mark and Respondent’s HOUSEHOLD IMPRESSIONS mark are
similar in appearance and sound. Moreover, Respondent has not submitted any
evidence to raise a genuine dispute regarding any potential differences in the
meaning or overall commercial impression of the parties’ respective marks, as applied
to their legally identical goods, and on this record, we find no such differences.
Although Petitioner’s mark includes a design element with a house and a stylized
human figure, we find there is no genuine dispute that the design merely reinforces
the shared “household” wording, and does not distinguish the marks. Further, we find
no genuine dispute that the identification “doorstops of metal” broadly encompasses
“spring doorstops of metal” and that the goods are legally identical.
We therefore find that there is no genuine dispute of material fact that the marks
at issue are similar in appearance, and identical in sound, meaning, and overall
commercial impression.
Regarding the second DuPont factor, both parties’ goods are doorstops of metal,
and thus there is no genuine dispute of material fact that the parties’ goods are legally
identical.
Regarding the third DuPont factor, the similarity or dissimilarity of established,
likely-to-continue trade channels, there is no limitation in the involved registration
to the channels of trade or classes of purchasers, and therefore Respondent’s goods
are presumed to travel in all normal channels of trade and to all prospective
purchasers for the relevant goods. Coach Servs., Inc., 101 USPQ2d at 1722; see also
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Packard Press, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 227 F.3d 1352, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(“When the registration does not contain limitations describing a particular channel
of trade or class of customer, the goods or services are assumed to travel in all normal
channels of trade.”). Mr. Briggs attests that both parties’ products are sold through
online retailer Amazon.com. 15 TTABVUE 22-25, ¶¶ 2-19. In view of the foregoing,
we find that there is no genuine dispute that the parties’ goods travel in at least some
of the same channels of trade and are sold to an overlapping class of purchasers.
The parties have not submitted any evidence or arguments regarding other
DuPont factors. Therefore, based on our determination that there are no genuine
disputes of material fact regarding the similarity of the parties’ marks, and the
identity of their goods, trade channels and classes of purchasers, we find that there
is no genuine dispute of material fact regarding likelihood of confusion. See, e.g.,
Green Spot (Thailand) Ltd. v. Vitasoy Int’l Holdings Ltd., 86 USPQ2d 1283, 1284
(TTAB 2008) (finding no genuine dispute as to the likelihood of confusion where the
marks were identical and the goods overlapped); L.A. Bonaventure Co. v. Bonaventure
Assocs., 4 USPQ2d 1882, 1884 (TTAB 1987) (finding no genuine dispute as to
likelihood of confusion where the marks and services were identical).
IV. Conclusion
Petitioner has carried its burden of proof in establishing that there are no genuine
disputes of material fact regarding establishment to a statutory cause of action,
priority, and likelihood of confusion. Petitioner therefore is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law on its Section 2(d) claim.
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V. Decision
Petitioner’s motion for partial summary judgment on the claim of likelihood of
confusion is granted. Judgment is hereby entered in favor of Petitioner and against
Respondent, and the petition for cancellation is granted. Registration No. 5860750
will be cancelled in due course.
Further, the Board need not, and does not, reach Petitioner’s remaining claims of
dilution, false suggestion of a connection, fraud, and non-ownership.10 See, e.g.,
Multisorb Tech., Inc. v. Pactiv Corp., 109 USPQ2d 1170, 1171 (TTAB 2013) (“Like the
federal courts, the Board has generally used its discretion to decide only those claims
necessary to enter judgment and dispose of the case.”); ShutEmDown Sports, 102
USPQ2d at 1045-46 (“We need not discuss the remaining elements of the fraud claim
or render a decision on it, as we have already determined that the registration must
be cancelled in its entirety both on the abandonment claim and because of the
application's voidness.”); Venture Out Props, 81 USPQ2d at 1894 (“In view of our
decision finding a likelihood of confusion, we need not reach the issue of dilution.”);

10 We note the revocation of power of attorney, signed by Respondent and Respondent’s
counsel and filed February 22, 2021, after this motion was fully briefed. 19 TTABVUE. The
Board’s records have been updated accordingly. Effective August 3, 2019, the USPTO
requires applicants, registrants and parties to a proceeding, whose domicile is not located
within the U.S. or its territories, to be represented by an attorney who is an active member
in good standing of the bar of the highest court of a state in the U.S., including the District
of Columbia or any Commonwealth or territory. See Trademark Rule 2.11, 37 C.F.R. § 2.11.
Because the petition to cancel has been granted and Respondent’s involved registration will
be canceled in due course, we need not suspend this proceeding for Respondent to obtain U.S.
counsel. However, if Respondent files any additional documents in this proceeding, it must
have secured U.S. counsel to represent it in this proceeding before the Board will consider
any such submission. 84 FR 31498 (Requirement of U.S. Licensed Attorney for Foreign
Trademark Applicants and Registrants, July 2, 2019).
Cancellation No. 92073333

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Interlego AG v. Abrams/Gentile Entm’t Inc., 63 USPQ2d 1862, 1864 (TTAB 2002)
(“Having found that there exists a likelihood of confusion, we elect to sustain the
opposition on this basis alone.”).
A copy of this order has been sent to all persons listed below.
cc:

HAIFENG CAI
FENG TAI QIAN SHANG MAO LIMITED CO
XI JIANG NO 35
SHENYANG, CHINA 110000

BEN T LILA
MANDOUR & ASSOCIATES APC
8605 SANTA MONICA BLVD STE 1500
LOS ANGELES, CA 90069

DANIEL M CISLO
CISLO & THOMAS LLP
12100 WILSHIRE BLVD SUITE 1700
LOS ANGELES, CA 90025-7103