Brian Edmond. Brewington et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Sep 11, 2019

14310029 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Sep. 11, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/310,029 06/20/2014 Brian Edmond Brewington GGL-495 7722
100462 7590 09/11/2019
Dority & Manning P.A. and Google LLC
Post Office Box 1449
Greenville, SC 29602
EXAMINER
MEROUAN, ABDERRAHIM
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2619
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/11/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
usdocketing@dority-manning.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte BRIAN EDMOND BREWINGTON,
BRIAN DANIEL SHUCKER, and ALEXEI GARIANOV
____________________

Appeal 2018-008977
Application 14/310,029
Technology Center 2600
____________________

Before JOHN A. JEFFERY, DENISE M. POTHIER, and JUSTIN BUSCH,
Administrative Patent Judges.

BUSCH, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1, 3, and 6–20, which constitute all the
claims pending in this application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C.
§ 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Google
Inc. Br. 3.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
According to the Specification, “[g]eographic information systems . . .
allow a user to request geographic imagery associated with an object or
location of interest. For instance, a user may request imagery associated
with a particular store, location, landmark, etc.” Spec. ¶ 2.
Appellant’s claimed invention relates to identifying a viewpoint for
displaying geographic imagery by (1) receiving data indicative of a request
for geographic imagery associated with an object; (2) accessing a multi-
resolution textual descriptors map for a geographic area that associates
geographic text to one or more geographic locations in the geographic area
at varying zoom levels relative to the geographic area; (3) determining a
viewpoint for displaying geographic imagery associated with the object
based on the multiresolution textual descriptions map; and (4) providing data
for viewing geographic imagery associated with the object from the
viewpoint. Id. ¶ 6.
Claim 1 is representative and reproduced below:
1. A computer-implemented method of identifying a
viewpoint for displaying geographic imagery, the method
comprising:
receiving, by one or more computing devices, data
indicative of a request for geographic imagery associated with an
object;
accessing, by the one or more computing devices, a multi-
resolution textual descriptors map for a geographic area, the
multi-resolution textual descriptors map associating a plurality
of text objects from a corpus of geolocated text to one or more
geographic locations in the geographic area, the multi-resolution
textual descriptors map further assigning each of the plurality of
text objects to one or more respective zoom levels of a plurality
of varying zoom levels relative to the geographic area, wherein
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the multi-resolution textual descriptors map associates more
specific text objects with more zoomed in levels of the plurality
of varying zoom levels of the multi-resolution textual descriptors
map;
identifying one or more text objects in the multi-resolution
textual descriptors map based at least in part on the data
indicative of the request for geographic imagery associated with
the object;
determining, by the one or more computing devices, a
viewpoint of the geographic area for displaying geographic
imagery associated with the object based at least in part on the
one or more identified text objects in the multi-resolution textual
descriptors map, wherein the viewpoint comprises a geographic
region and a zoom level associated with the one or more text
objects determined at least in part from the multi-resolution
textual descriptors map; and
providing, by the one or more computing devices, data for
viewing geographic imagery associated with the object from the
viewpoint.

REJECTIONS
Claims 1, 3, 6, and 11–16 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
being unpatentable over Fong (US 2012/0019513 A1; Jan. 26, 2012) and
Doubleday (US 2014/0306989 A1; Oct. 16, 2014). Final Act. 2–9.
Claim 7 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable
over Fong, Doubleday, and Grandhi (US 2009/0204582 A1; Aug. 13, 2009).
Final Act. 9–10.
Claims 8–10 and 17–20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Fong, Doubleday, Grandhi, and Shane Ahern et al., World
Explorer: Visualizing Aggregate Data from Unstructured Text in Geo-
Referenced Collections, IN PROC. OF THE 7TH ACM/IEEE-CS JOINT CONF.
ON DIGITAL LIBR. (2007). Final Act. 10–14.
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ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellant’s
arguments that the Examiner erred. In reaching this decision, we have
considered all evidence presented and all arguments Appellant made.
Arguments Appellant could have made, but chose not to make in the Brief,
are deemed waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
CLAIMS 1, 3, 6, AND 11–16
The Accessing Limitation
The Examiner finds Fong discloses many recited elements of claim 1
including, among other things, “accessing, by the one or more computing
devices, a multi-resolution textual descriptors map for a geographic area, the
multiresolution textual descriptors map associating a plurality of text objects
from a corpus of geolocated text to one or more geographic locations in the
geographic area” (hereinafter the “accessing limitation”). Final Act. 3
(citing Fong ¶¶ 29, 40, 58); Ans. 15–16 (additionally citing Fong ¶ 11).
Appellant’s argument merely reproduces Fong’s cited portions,
summarizes Fong’s passages the Examiner cites as disclosing “using the
altitude associated with map metadata elements to determine what elements
to place on a map” and “using map metadata elements associated with
altitudes in 3D space,” and concludes Fong does not disclose the accessing
limitation. Br. 9–10 (citing Fong ¶¶ 25, 29, 40, 58).
We are not persuaded of error. These statements do not apprise us of
Examiner error because Appellant fails to explain in sufficient detail why
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Fong does not at least suggest2 the accessing limitation. See Br. 10. Fong’s
Figure 1 is reproduced below.

Reproduction of Fong’s Figure 1.

2 We consider Appellant’s statement that “the cited art fails to anticipate
each and every element of independent claim 1” as harmless error because
Appellant subsequently argues the cited art fails to “disclose, teach, or
suggest,” apparently recognizing that the rejection is based on obviousness,
not anticipation.
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Fong’s Figure 1 “shows an example of map metadata (100) with
different altitudes in 3D space. The map metadata (100) are text labels that
appear above a surface layer with details of roads and other geographic
features. Different metadata text labels have different altitudes associated
with them in 3D space.” Fong ¶ 29. Notably, Figure 1 illustrates “the
highest altitude map metadata is a text label for Washington associated with
an altitude of 50 miles.” Id. ¶ 30. Moreover, Figure 1 illustrates map
metadata text labels for Occidental at an altitude of 2000 feet, Jackson St.
and King St. at an altitude of 6000 feet, Pioneer Square at an altitude of
18000 feet, International District at an altitude of 36000 feet, and Seattle at
an altitude of 20 miles. Id. Fong, then, at least suggests accessing, by one or
more computing devices, map metadata (100) (the claimed “multi-resolution
textual descriptors map”) for a particular geographic location in the state of
Washington (the claimed “geographic area”), the map metadata (100)
associating “Washington,” “Seattle,” “International District,” “Pioneer
Square,” “Jackson St.,” “King St.,” and “Occidental” (the claimed “plurality
of text objects from a corpus of geolocated text”) to one or more geographic
locations in the State of Washington.
Based on the record, the weight of the evidence favors the Examiner’s
position that Fong at least suggests the accessing limitation. See In re
Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (noting that “[i]n reviewing the examiner’s
decision on appeal, the Board must necessarily weigh all of the evidence and
argument. . . . [T]he ultimate determination of patentability is made on the
entire record.”).
The Geographic Imagery and Viewpoint Limitations
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The Examiner finds Doubleday discloses many recited elements of
claim 1 including, among other things, “determining, by the one or more
computing devices, a viewpoint of the geographic area for displaying
geographic imagery associated with the object based at least in part on the
one or more identified text objects in the multi-resolution textual descriptors
map” (hereinafter the “geographic imagery limitation”), “wherein the
viewpoint comprises a geographic region and a zoom level associated with
the one or more text objects determined at least in part from the multi-
resolution textual descriptors map” (hereinafter the “viewpoint limitation”),
as recited in claim 1. Final Act. 6–7 (citing Doubleday ¶¶ 51, 55; Figs. 4–6).
Similar to Appellant’s argument regarding Fong’s alleged
deficiencies, Appellant’s argument regarding Doubleday merely reproduces
Doubleday’s cited portions, summarizes Doubleday’s passages the Examiner
cites as disclosing “adjusting displayed content length as a function of map
scale [map zoom level],” then concludes Doubleday does not disclose the
geographic imagery limitation or the viewpoint limitation. Br. 11 (citing
Doubleday Abstract; ¶¶ 3, 18, 51–52, 55).
We are not persuaded of error. Appellant’s statements do not apprise
us of Examiner error because Appellant fails to explain in sufficient detail
why Doubleday does not at least suggest the geographic imagery and
viewpoint limitations. See id. Doubleday’s user interface adjusts displayed
content length as a function of map scale. Doubleday ¶ 51; Figs. 4–6.
Doubleday’s Figure 2 illustrates a flow diagram for adjusting displayed
content length as a function of map scale. Id. ¶ 35. Doubleday’s server
retrieves content items, such as advertisements, that are associated with a
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geographic location based on a received geographic search query. Id. ¶ 36.
Doubleday’s server then retrieves a map that encompasses the geographic
location associated with the content items. Doubleday’s retrieved map is
zoomed-in to the greatest extent possible while still encompassing the
geographic location associated with the content items. Id. ¶¶ 37, 51–53; Fig.
4. Doubleday, then, at least suggests the geographic imagery and viewpoint
limitations because Doubleday suggests determining, by one or more
computing devices, a location (e.g., Doubleday’s geographic area meeting
the search results) and a zoom level (e.g., the greatest extent possible to
display all retrieved content) (e.g., collectively, Doubleday’s location and
zoom level, therefore teaching the claimed “viewpoint of the geographic
area”) for displaying geographic imagery associated with a search result of a
geographic location (the claimed “object”) based at least in part on identified
content items (the claimed “text objects”).
Moreover, the Examiner finds Fong alternatively teaches or suggests
the geographic imagery limitation. See Ans. 5–6, 16–17. We emphasize the
Examiner’s alternative reliance on these two references, for the teachings of
Fong are technically cumulative to the teachings of Doubleday at least with
respect to the geographic imagery limitation. See MANUAL OF PATENT
EXAMINING PROCEDURE (MPEP) § 1207.03(a)(II) (9th ed. Rev. 08.2017,
Jan. 2018) (Item 3 dealing with relying on fewer than all references in
support of an obviousness rejection). We see no error in the Examiner’s
reliance on Fong as at least suggesting the geographic imagery limitation.
See Ans. 5–6 (citing Fong ¶¶ 11, 40, 58), 16–17 (additionally citing Fong
¶ 51). Nor has Appellant submitted a reply brief to respond to these
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alternative findings. Appellant’s arguments thus do not address—let alone
persuasively rebut—the Examiner’s reliance on Fong as at least suggesting
the geographic imagery limitation. See generally Br.
Based on the record, the weight of the evidence favors the Examiner’s
position that each of Doubleday and Fong at least suggest the geographic
imagery limitation and Doubleday, alone or in combination with Fong, at
least suggests the viewpoint limitation. See Oetiker, 977 F.2d at 1445.
Conclusion
Appellant’s arguments do not persuade us of error in the rejection of
claim 1. Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of (1) independent claim 1;
(2) independent claim 13, which was argued relying on the arguments made
for claim 1, see Br. 13; and (3) claims 3, 6, 11, 12, and 14–16, which
ultimately depend from one of claims 1 and 13, and were not separately
argued with particularity, see id. at 13–14.
CLAIM 7
We sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of claim 7. Final
Act. 9–10. Despite nominally arguing this claim separately, Appellant
alleges only that the additionally cited reference, Grandhi, fails to cure the
purported deficiencies of claim 1. Br. 14. We are not persuaded by these
arguments for the reasons previously discussed.
CLAIMS 8–10 AND 17–20
We also sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of claims 8–10
and 17–20. Final Act. 10–14. Although Appellant nominally argues these
claims separately, Appellant reiterates arguments similar to those made in
connection with claim 1, and contends that the additionally cited references,
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Grandhi and Ahern, do not cure Fong’s and Doubleday’s purported
deficiencies. See Br. 16–17. We are not persuaded of error in these
rejections for the reasons previously discussed.

CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
Basis  Affirmed Reversed
1, 3, 6, 11–16 § 103 Fong, Doubleday  1, 3, 6, 11–16
7 § 103 Fong, Doubleday,
Grandhi
7
8–10 and 17–20 § 103 Fong, Doubleday,
Grandhi, Ahern 
8–10 and 17–20
Overall Outcome 1, 3, 6–20
AFFIRMED