Brian David. Marsh et al.Download PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardSep 5, 201911024006 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Sep. 5, 2019) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 11/024,006 12/27/2004 Brian David Marsh 120137.496 6134 79502 7590 09/05/2019 Knobbe, Martens, Olson & Bear, LLP AMAZON TECHNOLOGIES, INC. 2040 Main Street Fourteenth Floor Irvine, CA 92614 EXAMINER STERRETT, JONATHAN G ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3623 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 09/05/2019 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): SEAZN.Admin@knobbe.com efiling@knobbe.com jayna.cartee@knobbe.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte BRIAN DAVID MARSH, CHRIS VANDER MEY, and JEFFREY P. BEZOS ____________ Appeal 2017-0111041 Application 11/024,0062 Technology Center 3600 ____________ Before JOSEPH A. FISCHETTI, BIBHU R. MOHANTY, and MATTHEW S. MEYERS, Administrative Patent Judges. MEYERS, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s Final Rejection of claims 8–15, 17–23, 26–32, 36, 37, 56–58, 60–64, 67–75, 1 Our decision references Appellants’ Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.,” filed March 27, 2017) and Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed August 28, 2017), and the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed July 3, 2017) and Final Office Action (“Final Act.,” mailed December 1, 2016). 2 Appellants identify “Amazon Technologies, Inc., which is the assignee of the present application, and which is a subsidiary of Amazon.com, Inc.” as the real party in interest (Appeal Br. 2). Appeal 2017-011104 Application 11/024,006 2 and 78–90 which constitute all the claims pending in this application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. CLAIMED INVENTION Appellants’ claims relate generally “to techniques for enhancing the credibility of information, and more particularly to using corroborated identities of users to enhance credibility of information from those users when that information is provided to other users” (Spec. ¶ 1). Claims 8, 56, and 67 are the independent claims on appeal. Claim 8, reproduced below with bracketed notations added, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter: 8. A computer-implemented method for using corroborated actual names of users to enhance usefulness of information from the users, the method comprising: [a] corroborating, by one or more computing systems and for each of multiple users, an actual name of the user based at least in part on evidence of the actual name, wherein the corroborating of the actual name of the user includes receiving an assertion from the user of the user’s actual name and verifying the actual name based on the evidence of the actual name; and [b] presenting, by the one or more computing systems and based at least in part on the corroborating, corroborated information to a first user by: [c] selecting, by the one or more computing systems and based at least in part on an evaluation of multiple candidate groups of information provided by users other than the first user, one of the multiple groups of information to present to the first user, including evaluating a candidate group more favorably if from a user whose actual name has been corroborated than if from a user whose actual name has not been corroborated, and wherein the selected one candidate group is from one of the multiple users whose actual names are corroborated; and [d] presenting, by the one or more computing systems and to the first user, the selected one information group, Appeal 2017-011104 Application 11/024,006 3 including presenting to the user an indication that the actual name of the one user who provided the selected one information group has been corroborated, to increase usefulness of information provided to the first user based on the corroborating of actual names. REJECTION Claims 8–15, 17–23, 26–32, 36, 37, 56–58, 60–64, 67–75, and 78–90 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to a judicial exception without significantly more. ANALYSIS Patent-Ineligible Subject Matter Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, an invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014). In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo and Alice. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See id. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk.”). Appeal 2017-011104 Application 11/024,006 4 Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible, include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental economic practices (Alice, at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611); mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69 (1972)). Concepts determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes, such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 192 (1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 69 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))). If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second step of the Mayo/Alice framework, where “we must examine the elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.” Alice, at 221 (quotation marks omitted). “A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id. The PTO recently published revised guidance on the application of § 101. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“2019 Revised Guidance”). Under that guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites: Appeal 2017-011104 Application 11/024,006 5 (1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes); and (2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application, i.e., that “apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception.” See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 53; see also MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h). Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether the claim: (3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or (4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. See 2019 Revised Guidance. Independent claim 8 and dependent claims 9–15, 17–23, 26–32, 36, and 37 Appellants argue claims 8–15, 17–23, 26–32, 36, and 37 as a group (see Appeal Br. 11–23). We select independent claim 8 as representative. Appeal 2017-011104 Application 11/024,006 6 Claims 9–15, 17–23, 26–32, 36, and 37 stand or fall with independent claim 8. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). Appellants argue that the Examiner erred in determining that the present claims are directed to an abstract idea and that the alleged abstract idea is a “gross simplification of the claimed subject matter” (see Appeal Br. 11–19; see also Reply Br. 4–9). We cannot agree. Under the first prong of step 2A of the 2019 Revised Guidance, we first determine if the claims recite an abstract idea. In this regard, we note that the Specification is titled “USING CORROBORATED USER IDENTITIES TO ENHANCE INFORMATION CREDIBILITY,” and states that “[a]s the Internet and other online access to information continues to grow, users are increasingly presented with an over-abundance of available information content without effective means to manage it” (Spec. ¶ 2). The Specification identifies “item reviews” as “one example of such content” (id.). According to the Specification, “volunteer users of a Web site, such as customers of a merchant’s Web site, are often solicited to prepare item reviews” (id. ¶ 3), but that a “significant problem with item reviews authored by volunteer reviewers . . . is that the information may be inaccurate, such as due to biases of the user who provide the information” (id. ¶ 4). Thus, the Specification identifies that “this problem can be mitigated when the actual identity of the user who provided the information is indicated to others” (id.). Consistent with this description, independent claim 8 recites broadly “[a] method” including the steps of “corroborating . . . an actual name of the user based at least in part on evidence of the actual name,” “selecting . . . based at least in part on an evaluation of multiple candidate Appeal 2017-011104 Application 11/024,006 7 groups of information provided by users other than the first user, one of the multiple groups of information,” and “presenting . . . the selected one information group.” Upon reviewing the Specification and the claim as whole, as summarized above, we agree with the Examiner that independent claim 8 recites broadly “the abstract idea of comparing a person’s asserted name with evidence that the name or alias is real” (Final Act. 8; see also Ans. 4), which can be characterized as a “practice” of “providing corroboration of a person’s identity by using evidence and other artifacts” (Final Act. 23–24). Here, independent claim 8 receives information (i.e., evidence of the actual name), compares information (i.e., verifying the actual name based on the evidence), analyzes information (i.e., evaluating multiple candidate groups), and displays information (i.e., presenting the selected group with an indication that the actual name has been corroborated). Thus, it is clear that independent claim 8 recites a form of managing personal behavior or relationships or interactions between people that, under the Revised Guidance, fall under the category of “[c]ertain methods of organizing human activity.” 2019 Revised Guidance at 52. Accordingly, independent claim 8 recites an abstract idea. See Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc., 896 F.3d 1335, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (concluding that “[s]tanding alone, the act of providing someone an additional set of information without disrupting the ongoing provision of an initial set of information is an abstract idea”); Voter Verified, Inc. v. Election Systems & Software LLC, 887 F.3d 1376, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (finding the concept of “voting, verifying the vote, and submitting the vote for tabulation,” a Appeal 2017-011104 Application 11/024,006 8 “fundamental activity” that humans have performed for hundreds of years, to be an abstract idea). Having concluded that claim 8 recites a judicial exception, i.e., an abstract idea, we turn to the second prong of step 2A of the 2019 Revised Guidance and determine whether the claims recite a practical application of the recited judicial exception. Here we look to see if, for example, (i) any additional elements of the claims reflects an improvement in the functioning of a computer or to another technological field, (ii) an application of the judicial exception with, or by use of, a particular machine, (iii) a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different state or thing (iv) or a use of the judicial exception in some other meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment. See 2019 Revised Guidance, at 55; See also MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h). We find no indication in the Specification, nor do Appellants direct us to any indication, that the steps recited in independent claim 8 invoke any assertedly inventive programming, require any specialized computer hardware or other inventive computer components, i.e., a particular machine, or effects a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different state or thing. Nor do we find anything of record, short of attorney argument, that attributes any improvement in computer technology and/or functionality to the claimed invention or that otherwise indicates that the claimed invention “appl[ies], rel[ies] on, or us[es] the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception.” See 2019 Revised Guidance, at 53. Appeal 2017-011104 Application 11/024,006 9 Appellants assert that like the claims in McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016) and Trading Technologies Int’l v. CQG, Inc., 675 Fed. App’x. 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2017,) independent claim 8 is patent-eligible because it “recites performing computer- implemented activities to improve a technological process in ways that were not shown to be previously performed, including by displaying information to human users to allow them to more efficiently perform related activities” (Appeal Br. 12–19; see also Reply Br. 4–9). More particularly, Appellants argue that similar to Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016), DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2014), and Amdocs (Israel) Limited v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2016), independent claim 8 addresses problems specific to a networked environment as in DDR; involve “logical . . . processes . . . directed to a specific implementation of a solution to a problem in the software arts” as described in Enfish; and “entails an unconventional technological solution . . . to a technological problem” as described in Amdocs, enabling more efficient operations of the recited computing systems as well as improved interactions between computing systems over computer networks, and cannot be directed to a fundamental economic practice or mental activity or otherwise to an abstract idea. (Appeal Br. 18–19). However, we agree with the Examiner that the additional limitations of “one or more computing systems” (see Final Act. 8–12) simply allow a generic computer to perform the claimed operations using generic computer functions (cf. Spec. ¶¶ 50–51). In the present invention, available data are simply analyzed/evaluated in order to corroborate and display results for addressing a business problem of enhancing credibility of information and providing assurance to users. Appeal 2017-011104 Application 11/024,006 10 We find no parallel between independent claim 8 and the claims at issue in McRO or Trading Technologies. The Federal Circuit premised its determination that the claims in McRO were patent-eligible, not merely on the specificity of the claimed animation scheme, but rather, on the fact that the claims, when considered as a whole, were directed to a technological improvement over the existing, manual 3-D animation techniques and used limited rules in a process specifically designed to achieve an improved technological result in conventional industry practice. Likewise, the Federal Circuit premised its determination that the claims in Trading Technologies were patent-eligible, not merely on the specificity of the information displayed, but rather, on the fact that the claims, when considered as a whole, were directed to a technological improvement over the existing graphical user interfaces because the claims “require a specific, structured graphical user interface paired with a prescribed functionality directly related to the graphical user interface’s structure that is addressed to and resolves a specifically identified problem in the prior state of the art” (id. at 1004). We are not persuaded that a comparable situation is presented here. Instead, we agree with the Examiner that the claims can be viewed as providing “an indication or verification (i.e.[,] a corroboration as claimed) that a persons’ name is really their name” (Ans. 4) which does not purport to improve the functioning of the computer itself and merely uses the computer as a tool. As our reviewing court has made clear, “relying on a computer to perform routine tasks more quickly or more accurately is insufficient to render a claim patent eligible.” OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Appeal 2017-011104 Application 11/024,006 11 Likewise, we agree with the Examiner that the “problem of providing assurance of the identity of someone (and the benefits providing by ensuring a person is who they say they are) is not a technological problem” (Ans. 8). In this regard, we note that the Specification identifies that the “computing system or device may comprise any combination of hardware or software that can interact” (Spec. ¶ 50). The alleged advantages that Appellants identify do not concern an improvement to computer capabilities or provide details on the technological manner in which the steps are performed; but instead, simply corroborate a name and display results through a process in which a computer is used as a tool in its ordinary capacity (cf. Spec. ¶¶ 50– 51). Moreover, Appellants have not shown how the claimed subject matter is rooted in technology given that the Specification describes only the use of generic computer equipment used in a routine, conventional, and generic manner. Appellants last argue that claim 8 is patent-eligible because the “Office has also failed to provide any support for the proposition that independent claim 8 recites the only possible method of ‘corroborating the names of users to enhance usefulness of information from those users,’ so as to provide a monopoly that preempts use of such an alleged abstract idea in all possible fields” (Appeal Br. 22–23). However, a lack of complete preemption does not make the claims any less abstract. See buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014); see also Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“While preemption may signal patent ineligible subject matter, the absence of complete preemption does not demonstrate patent eligibility.”); see also OIP Techs., 788 F.3d at 1362–1363 (“[T]hat the claims do not preempt all Appeal 2017-011104 Application 11/024,006 12 price optimization or may be limited to price optimization in the e- commerce setting do not make them any less abstract.”). Turning to Step 2B of the of the 2019 Revised Guidance, we determine whether the additional elements (1) add a specific limitation or combination of limitations that is not well-understood, routine, and conventional activity in the field, which is indicative that an inventive concept may be present or (2) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception, which is indicative that an inventive concept may not be present. See 2019 Revised Guidance, at 56. Appellants argue that “the elements of independent claim 8 go far beyond [the] alleged abstract idea” (Appeal Br. 19–21). More particularly, Appellants argue, by using such automated techniques to improve information reliability, the automated operations include efficiency of computer system operations by reducing or eliminating the need for other types of resource-intensive activities to increase information reliability, such as reducing computational power that would otherwise be used for activities such as performing encryption, generating checksums, etc. (Appeal Br. 20–21; see also Reply Br. 4–6). However, other than merely reciting portions of independent claim 8 (see, e.g., Reply Br. 5–6), Appellants provide no further argument, such as how the elements are arranged in a non-generic or unconventional manner such that it is a technical improvement over prior art ways of “corroborating the names of users to enhance usefulness of information from those users.” Id. See BASCOM Global Internet Services, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Appeal 2017-011104 Application 11/024,006 13 We are not persuaded, on the present record, that the Examiner erred in rejecting independent claim 8 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent claim 8, and claims 9–15, 17–23, 26–32, 36, and 37 which fall with independent claim 8. Independent claim 56 and dependent claims 57, 58, and 60–64 Appellants argue claims 56–58 and 60–64 as a group (see Appeal Br. 23–24). We select independent claim 56 as representative. Claims 57, 58, and 60–64 stand or fall with independent claim 56. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). Claim 56 recites generally a non-transitory computer-readable medium having instructions for “corroborating . . . an actual name of a first user based at least in part on evidence of the actual name,” “selecting . . . based at least in part on an evaluation of multiple candidate groups of information provided by users other than the first user, a first candidate group of information,” and “providing . . . information for presentation to the second user that includes the selected first candidate information group.” Appellants’ arguments for independent claim 56 are based on the same arguments discussed above with respect to independent claim 8 (see Appeal Br. 24). As such, we are similarly not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments for the same reasons as to independent claim 8, supra. Therefore, we sustain the rejection of independent claim 56, and its respective dependent claims under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Appeal 2017-011104 Application 11/024,006 14 Independent claim 67 and dependent claims 68–75, 78, 80–84, 86, 88, and 89 Appellants argue claims 67–75, 78, 80–84, 86, 88, and 89 as a group (see Appeal Br. 24–26). We select independent claim 67 as representative. Claims 68–75, 78, 80–84, 86, 88, and 89 stand or fall with independent claim 67. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). Claim 67 recites generally an apparatus comprising “one or more hardware processors; and one or more memories with stored instructions” for “corroborat[ing] an actual name of a first user based at least in part on evidence of the actual name,” “evaluat[ing] multiple candidate groups of information as part of selecting one or more groups of information” and “provid[ing] information to the indicated user for presentation that includes the selected one or more groups of information.” Appellants’ arguments for independent claim 67 are based on the same arguments discussed above with respect to independent claim 8 (see Appeal Br. 25–26). As such, we are similarly not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments for the same reasons as to independent claim 8, supra. Therefore, we sustain the rejection of independent claim 67, and its respective dependent claims under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Dependent claim 90 Appellants argue that the additional automated operation of “obtaining biometric information from the first user and utilizing that obtained biometric information as part of the evidence to corroborate that user’s actual name” further results in claim 90 reciting “significantly more than the alleged abstract idea of ‘corroborating the names of users to enhance usefulness of information from those users’” (Appeal Br. 26–27; see also Appeal 2017-011104 Application 11/024,006 15 Reply Br. 10). We cannot agree. Instead, we find that dependent claim 90 merely describes further characteristics of the underlying concept and lacks additional elements that would render the claim patent-eligible. In this regard, we agree with the Examiner that the dependent claims “do not provide significantly more to make these claims eligible” (Final Act. 19). Dependent claim 90 merely further describes characteristics of the evidence used in the corroboration of the actual name, which we discern sit squarely within, and does not alter appreciably, the broader concept of “comparing a person’s asserted name with evidence that the name or alias is real” (see Final Act. 8). As such, we are similarly not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments for the same reasons as to claim 8, supra. Therefore, we sustain the rejection of dependent claim 90 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Dependent claim 79 Appellants argue that the additional automated operations of “‘tracking activities previously performed by the first user in interacting with the entity’ and ‘corroborating at least one attribute of the user based at least in part on the tracked activities’” (Appeal Br. 27 (emphases omitted)) further results in claim 79 reciting “significantly more than the alleged abstract idea of ‘corroborating the names of users to enhance usefulness of information from those users’” (Appeal Br. 27–28; see also Reply Br. 10). We cannot agree. Instead, we find that dependent claim 79 merely describes further characteristics of the underlying concept and lacks additional elements that would render the claim patent-eligible. In this regard, we agree with the Appeal 2017-011104 Application 11/024,006 16 Examiner that the dependent claims “do not provide significantly more to make these claims eligible” (Final Act. 19). Dependent claim 79 merely further describes characteristics of the information used in the corroboration of the actual name, which we discern sit squarely within, and does not alter appreciably, the broader concept of “comparing a person’s asserted name with evidence that the name or alias is real” (see Final Act. 8). As such, we are similarly not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments for the same reasons as to claim 8, supra. Therefore, we sustain the rejection of dependent claim 79 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Dependent claim 85 Appellants argue that the additional automated operation of “controlling access based on the corroborated name of the first user to additional functionality from that entity” (Appeal Br. 28 (emphases omitted)) further results in claim 85 reciting “significantly more than the alleged abstract idea of ‘corroborating the names of users to enhance usefulness of information from those users’” (Appeal Br. 28–29; see also Reply Br. 10). We cannot agree. Instead, we find that dependent claim 85 merely describes further characteristics of the underlying concept and lacks additional elements that would render the claim patent-eligible. In this regard, we agree with the Examiner that the dependent claims “do not provide significantly more to make these claims eligible” (Final Act. 19). Dependent claim 85 merely further describes how generic computer equipment used in a routine, conventional, and generic manner can enhance the usefulness of the information from the corroboration, which we discern sit squarely within, Appeal 2017-011104 Application 11/024,006 17 and does not alter appreciably, the broader concept of “comparing a person’s asserted name with evidence that the name or alias is real” (see Final Act. 8). As such, we are similarly not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments for the same reasons as to claim 8, supra. Therefore, we sustain the rejection of dependent claim 85 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Dependent claim 87 Appellants argue that the additional automated operation of “as part of evaluating information included in the first candidate information group, corroborating at least some of that information” (Appeal Br. 29–30 (emphases omitted)); see also Reply Br. 10). We cannot agree. Instead, we find that dependent claim 87 merely describes further characteristics of the underlying concept and lacks additional elements that would render the claim patent-eligible. As such, we agree with the Examiner that the dependent claims “do not provide significantly more to make these claims eligible” (Final Act. 19). Dependent claim 87 merely further describes characteristics for evaluating information, which we discern sit squarely within, and does not alter appreciably, the broader concept of “comparing a person’s asserted name with evidence that the name or alias is real” (see Final Act. 8). As such, we are similarly not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments for the same reasons as to claim 8, supra. Therefore, we sustain the rejection of dependent claim 87 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. DECISION The Examiner’s rejection of 8–15, 17–23, 26–32, 36, 37, 56–58, 60– 64, 67–75, and 78–90 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is affirmed. Appeal 2017-011104 Application 11/024,006 18 No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation