Brian David. Marsh et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Sep 5, 2019

11024006 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Sep. 5, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
11/024,006 12/27/2004 Brian David Marsh 120137.496 6134
79502 7590 09/05/2019
Knobbe, Martens, Olson & Bear, LLP
AMAZON TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
2040 Main Street
Fourteenth Floor
Irvine, CA 92614
EXAMINER
STERRETT, JONATHAN G
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3623
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/05/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
SEAZN.Admin@knobbe.com
efiling@knobbe.com
jayna.cartee@knobbe.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte BRIAN DAVID MARSH,
CHRIS VANDER MEY,
and JEFFREY P. BEZOS
____________

Appeal 2017-0111041
Application 11/024,0062
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before JOSEPH A. FISCHETTI, BIBHU R. MOHANTY, and
MATTHEW S. MEYERS, Administrative Patent Judges.

MEYERS, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
Final Rejection of claims 8–15, 17–23, 26–32, 36, 37, 56–58, 60–64, 67–75,

1 Our decision references Appellants’ Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.,” filed
March 27, 2017) and Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed August 28, 2017), and
the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed July 3, 2017) and Final Office
Action (“Final Act.,” mailed December 1, 2016).
2 Appellants identify “Amazon Technologies, Inc., which is the assignee of
the present application, and which is a subsidiary of Amazon.com, Inc.” as
the real party in interest (Appeal Br. 2).
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and 78–90 which constitute all the claims pending in this application. We
have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
CLAIMED INVENTION
Appellants’ claims relate generally “to techniques for enhancing the
credibility of information, and more particularly to using corroborated
identities of users to enhance credibility of information from those users
when that information is provided to other users” (Spec. ¶ 1).
Claims 8, 56, and 67 are the independent claims on appeal. Claim 8,
reproduced below with bracketed notations added, is illustrative of the
claimed subject matter:
8. A computer-implemented method for using corroborated
actual names of users to enhance usefulness of information from the
users, the method comprising:
[a] corroborating, by one or more computing systems and for
each of multiple users, an actual name of the user based at least in part
on evidence of the actual name, wherein the corroborating of the
actual name of the user includes receiving an assertion from the user
of the user’s actual name and verifying the actual name based on the
evidence of the actual name; and
[b] presenting, by the one or more computing systems and
based at least in part on the corroborating, corroborated information
to a first user by:
[c] selecting, by the one or more computing systems and
based at least in part on an evaluation of multiple candidate
groups of information provided by users other than the first
user, one of the multiple groups of information to present to the
first user, including evaluating a candidate group more
favorably if from a user whose actual name has been
corroborated than if from a user whose actual name has not
been corroborated, and wherein the selected one candidate
group is from one of the multiple users whose actual names are
corroborated; and
[d] presenting, by the one or more computing systems
and to the first user, the selected one information group,
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including presenting to the user an indication that the actual
name of the one user who provided the selected one
information group has been corroborated, to increase
usefulness of information provided to the first user based on
the corroborating of actual names.

REJECTION
Claims 8–15, 17–23, 26–32, 36, 37, 56–58, 60–64, 67–75, and 78–90
are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to a judicial exception without
significantly more.
ANALYSIS
Patent-Ineligible Subject Matter
Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, an invention is patent-eligible if it claims a
“new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.”
35 U.S.C. § 101. However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted
35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS
Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with
that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.”
See id. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept
of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate
settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010)
(“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of
hedging, or protecting against risk.”).
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Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611); mathematical
formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and mental
processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 192
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Mayo/Alice framework, where “we must examine the elements of
the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient
to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.”
Alice, at 221 (quotation marks omitted). “A claim that recites an abstract
idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more
than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id.
(alterations in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely
requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that
abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
The PTO recently published revised guidance on the application of
§ 101. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“2019 Revised Guidance”). Under that guidance, we
first look to whether the claim recites:
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(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract
ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human
activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application, i.e., that “apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception
in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such
that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the
judicial exception.” See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 53; see
also MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h).
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to
whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not
“well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to
the judicial exception.
See 2019 Revised Guidance.

Independent claim 8 and dependent claims 9–15, 17–23, 26–32, 36, and 37
Appellants argue claims 8–15, 17–23, 26–32, 36, and 37 as a group
(see Appeal Br. 11–23). We select independent claim 8 as representative.
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Claims 9–15, 17–23, 26–32, 36, and 37 stand or fall with independent claim
8. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Appellants argue that the Examiner erred in determining that the
present claims are directed to an abstract idea and that the alleged abstract
idea is a “gross simplification of the claimed subject matter” (see Appeal Br.
11–19; see also Reply Br. 4–9). We cannot agree.
Under the first prong of step 2A of the 2019 Revised Guidance, we
first determine if the claims recite an abstract idea. In this regard, we note
that the Specification is titled “USING CORROBORATED USER
IDENTITIES TO ENHANCE INFORMATION CREDIBILITY,” and states
that “[a]s the Internet and other online access to information continues to
grow, users are increasingly presented with an over-abundance of available
information content without effective means to manage it” (Spec. ¶ 2). The
Specification identifies “item reviews” as “one example of such content”
(id.). According to the Specification, “volunteer users of a Web site, such as
customers of a merchant’s Web site, are often solicited to prepare item
reviews” (id. ¶ 3), but that a “significant problem with item reviews authored
by volunteer reviewers . . . is that the information may be inaccurate, such as
due to biases of the user who provide the information” (id. ¶ 4). Thus, the
Specification identifies that “this problem can be mitigated when the actual
identity of the user who provided the information is indicated to others”
(id.).
Consistent with this description, independent claim 8 recites
broadly “[a] method” including the steps of “corroborating . . . an actual
name of the user based at least in part on evidence of the actual name,”
“selecting . . . based at least in part on an evaluation of multiple candidate
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groups of information provided by users other than the first user, one of the
multiple groups of information,” and “presenting . . . the selected one
information group.”
Upon reviewing the Specification and the claim as whole, as
summarized above, we agree with the Examiner that independent claim 8
recites broadly “the abstract idea of comparing a person’s asserted name
with evidence that the name or alias is real” (Final Act. 8; see also Ans. 4),
which can be characterized as a “practice” of “providing corroboration of a
person’s identity by using evidence and other artifacts” (Final Act. 23–24).
Here, independent claim 8 receives information (i.e., evidence of the actual
name), compares information (i.e., verifying the actual name based on the
evidence), analyzes information (i.e., evaluating multiple candidate groups),
and displays information (i.e., presenting the selected group with an
indication that the actual name has been corroborated).
Thus, it is clear that independent claim 8 recites a form of managing
personal behavior or relationships or interactions between people that, under
the Revised Guidance, fall under the category of “[c]ertain methods of
organizing human activity.” 2019 Revised Guidance at 52. Accordingly,
independent claim 8 recites an abstract idea. See Interval Licensing LLC v.
AOL, Inc., 896 F.3d 1335, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (concluding that
“[s]tanding alone, the act of providing someone an additional set of
information without disrupting the ongoing provision of an initial set of
information is an abstract idea”); Voter Verified, Inc. v. Election Systems &
Software LLC, 887 F.3d 1376, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (finding the concept of
“voting, verifying the vote, and submitting the vote for tabulation,” a
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“fundamental activity” that humans have performed for hundreds of years, to
be an abstract idea).
Having concluded that claim 8 recites a judicial exception, i.e., an
abstract idea, we turn to the second prong of step 2A of the 2019 Revised
Guidance and determine whether the claims recite a practical application of
the recited judicial exception. Here we look to see if, for example, (i) any
additional elements of the claims reflects an improvement in the functioning
of a computer or to another technological field, (ii) an application of the
judicial exception with, or by use of, a particular machine, (iii) a
transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different state or thing
(iv) or a use of the judicial exception in some other meaningful way beyond
generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular
technological environment. See 2019 Revised Guidance, at 55; See also
MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h).
We find no indication in the Specification, nor do Appellants direct us
to any indication, that the steps recited in independent claim 8 invoke any
assertedly inventive programming, require any specialized computer
hardware or other inventive computer components, i.e., a particular machine,
or effects a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different
state or thing. Nor do we find anything of record, short of attorney
argument, that attributes any improvement in computer technology and/or
functionality to the claimed invention or that otherwise indicates that the
claimed invention “appl[ies], rel[ies] on, or us[es] the judicial exception in a
manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that
the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial
exception.” See 2019 Revised Guidance, at 53.
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Appellants assert that like the claims in McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco
Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016) and Trading Technologies
Int’l v. CQG, Inc., 675 Fed. App’x. 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2017,) independent
claim 8 is patent-eligible because it “recites performing computer-
implemented activities to improve a technological process in ways that were
not shown to be previously performed, including by displaying information
to human users to allow them to more efficiently perform related activities”
(Appeal Br. 12–19; see also Reply Br. 4–9). More particularly, Appellants
argue that similar to Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327
(Fed. Cir. 2016), DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245,
1257 (Fed. Cir. 2014), and Amdocs (Israel) Limited v. Openet Telecom, Inc.,
841 F.3d 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2016), independent claim 8
addresses problems specific to a networked environment as in
DDR; involve “logical . . . processes . . . directed to a specific
implementation of a solution to a problem in the software arts”
as described in Enfish; and “entails an unconventional
technological solution . . . to a technological problem” as
described in Amdocs, enabling more efficient operations of the
recited computing systems as well as improved interactions
between computing systems over computer networks, and cannot
be directed to a fundamental economic practice or mental activity
or otherwise to an abstract idea.
(Appeal Br. 18–19). However, we agree with the Examiner that the
additional limitations of “one or more computing systems” (see Final Act.
8–12) simply allow a generic computer to perform the claimed operations
using generic computer functions (cf. Spec. ¶¶ 50–51). In the present
invention, available data are simply analyzed/evaluated in order to
corroborate and display results for addressing a business problem of
enhancing credibility of information and providing assurance to users.
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We find no parallel between independent claim 8 and the claims at
issue in McRO or Trading Technologies. The Federal Circuit premised its
determination that the claims in McRO were patent-eligible, not merely on
the specificity of the claimed animation scheme, but rather, on the fact that
the claims, when considered as a whole, were directed to a technological
improvement over the existing, manual 3-D animation techniques and used
limited rules in a process specifically designed to achieve an improved
technological result in conventional industry practice. Likewise, the Federal
Circuit premised its determination that the claims in Trading Technologies
were patent-eligible, not merely on the specificity of the information
displayed, but rather, on the fact that the claims, when considered as a
whole, were directed to a technological improvement over the existing
graphical user interfaces because the claims “require a specific, structured
graphical user interface paired with a prescribed functionality directly
related to the graphical user interface’s structure that is addressed to and
resolves a specifically identified problem in the prior state of the art” (id. at
1004). We are not persuaded that a comparable situation is presented here.
Instead, we agree with the Examiner that the claims can be viewed as
providing “an indication or verification (i.e.[,] a corroboration as claimed)
that a persons’ name is really their name” (Ans. 4) which does not purport to
improve the functioning of the computer itself and merely uses the computer
as a tool. As our reviewing court has made clear, “relying on a computer to
perform routine tasks more quickly or more accurately is insufficient to
render a claim patent eligible.” OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788
F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
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Likewise, we agree with the Examiner that the “problem of providing
assurance of the identity of someone (and the benefits providing by ensuring
a person is who they say they are) is not a technological problem” (Ans. 8).
In this regard, we note that the Specification identifies that the “computing
system or device may comprise any combination of hardware or software
that can interact” (Spec. ¶ 50). The alleged advantages that Appellants
identify do not concern an improvement to computer capabilities or provide
details on the technological manner in which the steps are performed; but
instead, simply corroborate a name and display results through a process in
which a computer is used as a tool in its ordinary capacity (cf. Spec. ¶¶ 50–
51). Moreover, Appellants have not shown how the claimed subject matter
is rooted in technology given that the Specification describes only the use of
generic computer equipment used in a routine, conventional, and generic
manner.
Appellants last argue that claim 8 is patent-eligible because the
“Office has also failed to provide any support for the proposition that
independent claim 8 recites the only possible method of ‘corroborating the
names of users to enhance usefulness of information from those users,’ so as
to provide a monopoly that preempts use of such an alleged abstract idea in
all possible fields” (Appeal Br. 22–23). However, a lack of complete
preemption does not make the claims any less abstract. See buySAFE, Inc. v.
Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014); see also Ariosa
Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(“While preemption may signal patent ineligible subject matter, the absence
of complete preemption does not demonstrate patent eligibility.”); see also
OIP Techs., 788 F.3d at 1362–1363 (“[T]hat the claims do not preempt all
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price optimization or may be limited to price optimization in the e-
commerce setting do not make them any less abstract.”).
Turning to Step 2B of the of the 2019 Revised Guidance, we
determine whether the additional elements (1) add a specific limitation or
combination of limitations that is not well-understood, routine, and
conventional activity in the field, which is indicative that an inventive
concept may be present or (2) simply appends well-understood, routine,
conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception, which is indicative that an
inventive concept may not be present. See 2019 Revised Guidance, at 56.
Appellants argue that “the elements of independent claim 8 go far
beyond [the] alleged abstract idea” (Appeal Br. 19–21). More particularly,
Appellants argue,
by using such automated techniques to improve information
reliability, the automated operations include efficiency of
computer system operations by reducing or eliminating the need
for other types of resource-intensive activities to increase
information reliability, such as reducing computational power
that would otherwise be used for activities such as performing
encryption, generating checksums, etc.
(Appeal Br. 20–21; see also Reply Br. 4–6). However, other than merely
reciting portions of independent claim 8 (see, e.g., Reply Br. 5–6),
Appellants provide no further argument, such as how the elements are
arranged in a non-generic or unconventional manner such that it is a
technical improvement over prior art ways of “corroborating the names of
users to enhance usefulness of information from those users.” Id. See
BASCOM Global Internet Services, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d
1341, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
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We are not persuaded, on the present record, that the Examiner erred
in rejecting independent claim 8 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Therefore, we
sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent claim 8, and claims 9–15,
17–23, 26–32, 36, and 37 which fall with independent claim 8.

Independent claim 56 and dependent claims 57, 58, and 60–64
Appellants argue claims 56–58 and 60–64 as a group (see Appeal Br.
23–24). We select independent claim 56 as representative. Claims 57, 58,
and 60–64 stand or fall with independent claim 56. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Claim 56 recites generally a non-transitory computer-readable
medium having instructions for “corroborating . . . an actual name
of a first user based at least in part on evidence of the actual name,”
“selecting . . . based at least in part on an evaluation of multiple candidate
groups of information provided by users other than the first user, a first
candidate group of information,” and “providing . . . information for
presentation to the second user that includes the selected first candidate
information group.”
Appellants’ arguments for independent claim 56 are based on the
same arguments discussed above with respect to independent claim 8 (see
Appeal Br. 24). As such, we are similarly not persuaded by Appellants’
arguments for the same reasons as to independent claim 8, supra. Therefore,
we sustain the rejection of independent claim 56, and its respective
dependent claims under 35 U.S.C. § 101.

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Independent claim 67 and dependent claims 68–75, 78,
80–84, 86, 88, and 89
Appellants argue claims 67–75, 78, 80–84, 86, 88, and 89 as a group
(see Appeal Br. 24–26). We select independent claim 67 as representative.
Claims 68–75, 78, 80–84, 86, 88, and 89 stand or fall with independent
claim 67. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Claim 67 recites generally an apparatus comprising “one or more
hardware processors; and one or more memories with stored instructions”
for “corroborat[ing] an actual name of a first user based at least in part on
evidence of the actual name,” “evaluat[ing] multiple candidate groups of
information as part of selecting one or more groups of information” and
“provid[ing] information to the indicated user for presentation that includes
the selected one or more groups of information.”
Appellants’ arguments for independent claim 67 are based on the
same arguments discussed above with respect to independent claim 8 (see
Appeal Br. 25–26). As such, we are similarly not persuaded by Appellants’
arguments for the same reasons as to independent claim 8, supra. Therefore,
we sustain the rejection of independent claim 67, and its respective
dependent claims under 35 U.S.C. § 101.

Dependent claim 90
Appellants argue that the additional automated operation of “obtaining
biometric information from the first user and utilizing that obtained
biometric information as part of the evidence to corroborate that user’s
actual name” further results in claim 90 reciting “significantly more than the
alleged abstract idea of ‘corroborating the names of users to enhance
usefulness of information from those users’” (Appeal Br. 26–27; see also
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Reply Br. 10). We cannot agree.
Instead, we find that dependent claim 90 merely describes further
characteristics of the underlying concept and lacks additional elements that
would render the claim patent-eligible. In this regard, we agree with the
Examiner that the dependent claims “do not provide significantly more to
make these claims eligible” (Final Act. 19). Dependent claim 90 merely
further describes characteristics of the evidence used in the corroboration of
the actual name, which we discern sit squarely within, and does not alter
appreciably, the broader concept of “comparing a person’s asserted name
with evidence that the name or alias is real” (see Final Act. 8).
As such, we are similarly not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments for
the same reasons as to claim 8, supra. Therefore, we sustain the rejection
of dependent claim 90 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.

Dependent claim 79
Appellants argue that the additional automated operations of
“‘tracking activities previously performed by the first user in interacting
with the entity’ and ‘corroborating at least one attribute of the user based at
least in part on the tracked activities’” (Appeal Br. 27 (emphases omitted))
further results in claim 79 reciting “significantly more than the alleged
abstract idea of ‘corroborating the names of users to enhance usefulness of
information from those users’” (Appeal Br. 27–28; see also Reply Br. 10).
We cannot agree.
Instead, we find that dependent claim 79 merely describes further
characteristics of the underlying concept and lacks additional elements that
would render the claim patent-eligible. In this regard, we agree with the
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Examiner that the dependent claims “do not provide significantly more to
make these claims eligible” (Final Act. 19). Dependent claim 79 merely
further describes characteristics of the information used in the corroboration
of the actual name, which we discern sit squarely within, and does not alter
appreciably, the broader concept of “comparing a person’s asserted name
with evidence that the name or alias is real” (see Final Act. 8).
As such, we are similarly not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments for
the same reasons as to claim 8, supra. Therefore, we sustain the rejection
of dependent claim 79 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.

Dependent claim 85
Appellants argue that the additional automated operation of
“controlling access based on the corroborated name of the first user to
additional functionality from that entity” (Appeal Br. 28 (emphases
omitted)) further results in claim 85 reciting “significantly more than the
alleged abstract idea of ‘corroborating the names of users to enhance
usefulness of information from those users’” (Appeal Br. 28–29; see also
Reply Br. 10). We cannot agree.
Instead, we find that dependent claim 85 merely describes further
characteristics of the underlying concept and lacks additional elements that
would render the claim patent-eligible. In this regard, we agree with the
Examiner that the dependent claims “do not provide significantly more to
make these claims eligible” (Final Act. 19). Dependent claim 85 merely
further describes how generic computer equipment used in a routine,
conventional, and generic manner can enhance the usefulness of the
information from the corroboration, which we discern sit squarely within,
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and does not alter appreciably, the broader concept of “comparing a person’s
asserted name with evidence that the name or alias is real” (see Final Act. 8).
As such, we are similarly not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments for
the same reasons as to claim 8, supra. Therefore, we sustain the rejection
of dependent claim 85 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Dependent claim 87
Appellants argue that the additional automated operation of “as part of
evaluating information included in the first candidate information group,
corroborating at least some of that information” (Appeal Br. 29–30
(emphases omitted)); see also Reply Br. 10). We cannot agree.
Instead, we find that dependent claim 87 merely describes further
characteristics of the underlying concept and lacks additional elements that
would render the claim patent-eligible. As such, we agree with the
Examiner that the dependent claims “do not provide significantly more to
make these claims eligible” (Final Act. 19). Dependent claim 87 merely
further describes characteristics for evaluating information, which we
discern sit squarely within, and does not alter appreciably, the broader
concept of “comparing a person’s asserted name with evidence that the name
or alias is real” (see Final Act. 8).
As such, we are similarly not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments for
the same reasons as to claim 8, supra. Therefore, we sustain the rejection
of dependent claim 87 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.

DECISION
The Examiner’s rejection of 8–15, 17–23, 26–32, 36, 37, 56–58, 60–
64, 67–75, and 78–90 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is affirmed.
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No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED