Brandon S. Dixon et al.Download PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardSep 30, 201915293963 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Sep. 30, 2019) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 15/293,963 10/14/2016 Brandon S. DIXON SIGN0044USC1 3527 138770 7590 09/30/2019 Artegis Law Group, LLP-VERISIGN, INC. 7710 Cherry Park Drive Suite T #104 Houston, TX 77095 EXAMINER CHAI, LONGBIT ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2431 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 09/30/2019 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): algdocketing@artegislaw.com jmatthews@artegislaw.com kcruz@artegislaw.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________________ Ex parte BRANDON S. DIXON and GREGORY S. SINCLAIR ____________________ Appeal 2018-008587 Application 15/293,963 Technology Center 2400 ____________________ Before DANIEL N. FISHMAN, ADAM J. PYONIN, and DAVID J. CUTITTA II, Administrative Patent Judges. PYONIN, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the Examiner’s rejection. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. 1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as VERISIGN, INC. Appeal Brief 2. Appeal 2018-008587 Application 15/293,963 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Introduction The Application is directed to “malware defense, and more particularly, to creating and using an incubator environment to host and study malware and malware operators.” Spec. ¶ 2. Claims 1–20 are pending; claims 1, 13, and 17 are independent. App. Br. 21–25; Final Act. 10. Claim 1 is reproduced below for reference (emphasis added): 1. A system for tracking malware operator behavior patterns in a simulated network environment, the system comprising: a memory storing instructions; and a processor device that is coupled to the memory and, when executing the instructions, is configured to: receive organizational data that describes a virtual organization and comprises a plurality of simulated users that are logged into a plurality of simulated machines; create user profiles for the plurality of simulated users; provide a simulated computer network of the virtual organization based at least partially on the organizational data and the user profiles, wherein after the simulated computer network is provided, malware is installed on the simulated computer network to create an incubator; monitor one or more interactions between the simulated computer network and an operator of the malware, wherein the one or more interactions comprise the operator of the malware illicitly gathering information related to the user profiles; and build a malware operator profile based on the one or more interactions. Appeal 2018-008587 Application 15/293,963 3 References and Rejections2 Claims 1–20 stand rejected under the judicially created doctrine of obviousness-type double patenting as being unpatentable over claim 1–20 of U.S. Patent No. 9,473,520 B2. Final Act. 5.3 Claims 1–17, 19, and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Arnold (US 5,440,723; Aug. 8, 1995) and Chiruvolu (US 8,327,420 B2; Dec. 4, 2012). Final Act. 6. ANALYSIS Appellant argues “the combination of the cited references cannot teach or suggest each and every limitation of claim 1.” App. Br. 15. Particularly, Appellant contends “the directories, data, and files disclosed in Arnold are associated with a single decoy program executing on a single computing system of a single user,” so that “Arnold is completely silent about multiple simulated users that are logged into multiple simulated machines, much less that such simulated users and simulated machines are part of a virtual organization.” Id. at 11, 13. We are persuaded by Appellant’s argument. The Examiner finds that Arnold teaches a “plurality of simulated users are logged into the infected computer(s) as the simulator(s)).” Final Act. 6 (citing Arnold 26:34–35); see also Ans. 11. The cited portions of Arnold, however, only disclose running a simulator program; there is no mention of any users, let alone simulated users as required by the claim. See, e.g., Arnold 26:32–36 (“[E]ach virus 2 The Examiner has withdrawn the rejection of the claims as being patent ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101. See Ans. 3. 3 Appellant does not challenge the Examiner’s double patenting rejection. See App. Br. 9. Accordingly, we summarily affirm this rejection. Appeal 2018-008587 Application 15/293,963 4 sample is executed on a simulator of the operating system calls. This simulator can be executed by the infected computer, or can be executed by the dedicated processor.”). That is, without speculation, we see no support for the Examiner’s determination that Arnold teaches the claimed “plurality of simulated users that are logged into a plurality of simulated machines.” See App. Br. 11; see also In re Warner, 379 F.2d 1011, 1017 (CCPA 1967) (“A rejection based on section 103 clearly must rest on a factual basis.”). Based on the foregoing, we agree with Appellant that Arnold does not teach or suggest all limitations of claim 1. We additionally agree that Chiruvolu—directed to methods of user authentication by presenting both actual and decoy data to a user—also does not teach or suggest a plurality of simulated users. See App. Br. 15; Chiruvolu 2:23–24 (“Fig. 3a illustrates a display screen having authentication data sets and decoy data sets.”). Accordingly, we are persuaded the Examiner errs in finding the limitations of independent claim 1 to be taught or suggested by the cited references. CONCLUSION We summarily sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–20 under the judicially created doctrine of obviousness-type double patenting. We are persuaded the Examiner errs in finding the limitations of independent claim 1 to be obvious in view of the cited references. Independent claims 13 and 17 recite similar limitations. See App. Br. 23– 24. Thus, we do not sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of independent claims 1, 13, 17, or the claims that depend thereon. Appeal 2018-008587 Application 15/293,963 5 DECISION The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–20 under the judicially created doctrine of obviousness-type double patenting is affirmed. The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–17, 19, and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 is reversed. The Examiner’s decision is affirmed because we have affirmed at least one ground of rejection with respect to each claim on appeal. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(a)(1). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation