Boston & Associates, LLC

National Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge Opinions

Mar 4, 2015

14-CA-119200 (N.L.R.B. Mar. 4, 2015)

JD–12–15
Florrisant, MO

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DIVISION OF JUDGES
BOSTON & ASSOCIATES, LLC
and Case 14–CA–119200
INTERNATIONAL UNION OF PAINTERS AND
ALLIED TRADES, DISTRICT COUNCIL #58
Kathy Talbott-Schehl, Esq.,
for the General Counsel.
James Simeri, Esq.,
for the Respondent.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
THOMAS M. RANDAZZO, Administrative Law Judge. This case was tried in St. Louis,
Missouri, on June 11, 2014. The International Union of Painters and Allied Trades, District
Council #58 (the Charging Party or Union)1 filed the charge on December 17, 2013, and the
amended charge on February 3, 2014. The General Counsel issued the complaint and notice of
hearing in this matter on March 28, 2014.2
The complaint alleges that Boston & Associates, LLC (the Respondent), violated Section
8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act) by: (1) withdrawing its recognition
of the Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the unit employees,
effective August 31, 2013, and (2) failing and refusing to abide by the successor collective-
bargaining agreement negotiated by the Union and the Painting and Decorating Contractors of
America, Chapter #2, affiliated with the Finishing Contractors of America (the Association),
which is effective by its terms from September 17, 2013 through August 31, 2016. The
Respondent, in its answer and amended answer, denied, inter alia, that it violated the Act as
alleged.

1 The name of the Union was amended at the hearing to reflect the merger of District Council #2
with District Council #58.
2 All dates are in 2013 unless otherwise indicated.
JD–12–15
2
On the entire record,3 including my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses,4 and
after considering the briefs filed by the General Counsel and the Respondent, I make the
following5
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
10
The Respondent, a limited liability corporation with an office and place of business in
Florissant, Missouri (Respondent’s facility), has been engaged in the business of being a painting
contractor in the construction industry. Annually, Respondent, in conducting its business
operations described above, provides services valued in excess of $50,000 for contracting
businesses, such as Whiting-Turner Contracting Company and Roufa Construction d/b/a Tri-Co. 15
Inc., Commercial, which are engaged in interstate commerce, on projects located in the State of
Missouri.
The Respondent admits,5 and I find, that it is an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.20
II. THE ALLEGED STATUS OF THE UNION AS A LABOR ORGANIZATION, DISTRICT COUNCIL #58 AS
A SUCCESSOR TO THE UNION, RESPONDENT’S OWNER AS AN AGENT OF THE RESPONDENT,
THE ASSOCIATION’S STATUS AS A MULTI-EMPLOYER BARGAINING ASSOCIATION,25
AND THE APPROPRIATE BARGAINING UNIT
The Respondent, besides denying the merits of the unfair labor practice allegations set
forth in the complaint, also denies other relevant allegations, such as the allegations that the
Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act, District Council #58 30
is a successor to District Council #2, Evelyn Boston is an agent of the Respondent within the
meaning of Section 2(13) of the Act, the multiemployer bargaining association is an association

3 Abbreviations used in this decision are as follows: “Tr.” for transcript; “GC Exh.” for General
Counsel’s Exhibit; “R. Exh.” for Respondent’s Exhibit; “GC Br..” for the General Counsel’s Brief; and
“Resp. Br..” for Respondent’s brief.
4 In making my findings regarding the credible evidence, including the credibility of the witnesses, I
considered the testimonial demeanor of such witnesses, the content of the testimony, and the inherent
probabilities based on the record as a whole. In certain instances, I may have credited some but not all, of
what the witness said. I note, in this regard, that “nothing is more common in all kinds of judicial
decisions than to believe some and not all” of the testimony of a witness. Jerry Ryce Builders, 352 NLRB
1262 fn. 2 (2008), citing NLRB v. Universal Camera Corp., 179 F.2d 749, 754 (2d Cir. 1950), revd. on
other grounds 340 U.S. 474 (1951). See also J. Shaw Associates, LLC, 349 NLRB 939, 939–940 (2007).
In addition, I have carefully considered the testimony in contradiction to my factual findings, but I have
discredited such testimony.
5 The Respondent initially denied in its answer, but subsequently admitted in its amended answer
dated June 10, 2014, that it was engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of
the Act.
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3
with the purpose of representing employer-members for purposes of collective bargaining, and
Respondent’s employees constitute an appropriate bargaining unit.
A. The Union’s status as a labor organization and the subsequent merger of the Union with
successor District Council #585
The complaint was amended at hearing to allege that at all material times, the
International Union of Painters and Allied Trades, District Council #2 has been a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act, and on or about March 15, 2014, the
Union merged with International Union of Painters and Allied Trades, District Council #58. 10
Thus, the complaint alleges that District Council #2 is a labor organization that merged into
District Council #58, thereby continuing the representative entity of the Union in essentially
unchanged form, and that since March 2014, District Council #58 has been, and continues to be,
a successor to District Council #2. The Respondent denied these allegations on the alleged basis
that it had insufficient information to admit or deny the allegation, and therefore, it denied that 15
the Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act, and that District
Council #58 is a successor to the Union.
Section 2(5) of the Act states that a labor organization is:
20
. . . any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee representation
committee or plan, in which employees participate and which exists for the
purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances,
labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work.
25
The General Counsel presented the undisputed testimony of Union District #58 Organizer
Wendell Harris, who credibly testified that he was an organizer for District #2, and after the
merger, became an organizer for District #58. Harris testified that employee members
participate in the Union by running for union office, serving as union stewards, representing
employees with regard to grievances, and voting on collective-bargaining agreements. He 30
testified that the union members agree to, and are bound by, the Union’s bylaws, and therefore
acknowledge compliance with the bylaws. According to the testimony of Harris, the purpose of
the Union is to represent employees regarding disputes with employers, and that such purpose is
documented in collective-bargaining agreements between the Union and employers. In addition,
Harris testified that the Union represents its members with regard to terms and conditions of 35
employment, such as labor disputes and grievances.
The undisputed record clearly establishes that the Union and its successor, District
Council #58, are organizations in which employees participate and which exist for the purpose,
in whole or in part, for dealing with employers concerning working conditions and terms and 40
conditions of employment for employees. Therefore, I find District Council #2 and District
Council #58 are labor organizations within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
With regard to the merger of the Union into District Council #58, its successor, the Board
has held that an employer’s obligation to recognize and bargain with an incumbent union will 45
continue with the successor union after a merger or affiliation, unless there is a lack of continuity
of representation. Raymond F. Kavis Center for the Performing Arts, 351 NLRB 143, 147
JD–12–15
4
(2007). The Board has noted that the United States Supreme Court’s decision in NLRB v.
Financial Institution Employees Local 1182, 475 U.S. 192, 206 (1986), indicated that with
respect to the continuity of representative factor, the general test for determining whether the
affiliation or merger of a bargaining representative with another labor organization raises a
question concerning representation is whether the affiliation or merger produces a change that is 5
“sufficiently dramatic” to alter the identity of the bargaining representative. Id; May Department
Stores, 289 NLRB 661, 665 (1988), enfd. 897 F.2d 221 (7th Cir. 1990); Western Commercial
Transport, 288 NLRB 214 (1988). In addition, the Board has placed the burden of making such
a showing on the party seeking to avoid its bargaining obligation. Id; See CPS Chemical Co.,
324 NLRB 1018, 1020 (1997); See also Sullivan Bros. Printers, Inc. 317 NLRB 561, 562 (1995). 10
The credible testimony of Harris and Gregg Smith, the District Council #58 business
manager and secretary-treasurer, reveals that the merger of District Council #2 into District
Council #58 was the result of the International Union’s mandate which was in compliance with
the International Union’s constitution and bylaws. Smith testified that with the merger, the 15
Union’s staff remained the same and there were no changes for the union members with regard
to fees, dues, and members’ obligations. He also testified that the pension and welfare funds
remained the same and the District Council #2 members participated in the District Council #58
activities. The Respondent, despite its objection to the amendment to the complaint, failed to
offer any evidence to rebut the credible testimony of Harris and Smith, and therefore it failed to 20
satisfy its burden. I find that with the merger of the Union into District Council #58, the
evidence establishes there has been no substantial impairment or reduction of Union’s local
autonomy, and therefore continuity of representation has been preserved. Accordingly, the
Respondent was obligated to recognize and bargain with District Council #58. Raymond F. Kavis
Center for the Performing Arts, supra. 25
B. Evelyn Boston’s status as an agent of the Respondent within the meaning of
Section 2(13)of the Act
The complaint alleges that Evelyn Boston is a supervisor within the meaning of Section 30
2(11) of the Act, and an agent of the Respondent within the meaning of Section 2(13) of the Act.
While the Respondent, in its answer and amended answer to the complaint, admits that Boston is
a supervisor within the meaning of Section 2(11), it claimed to have insufficient information
upon which to admit or deny, and it therefore denied, the allegation of her agency status.
35
Section 2(13) of the Act states:
In determining whether any person is acting as an ‘agent’ of another person so as
to make such other person responsible for his acts, the question of whether the
specific acts performed were actually authorized or subsequently ratified shall not 40
be controlling.
The Board and the courts have long held that in determining whether a person acts as an
agent of another, the Board applies the common-law principles of agency. Dr. Rico Perez
Products, 353 NLRB 453, 463 (2008); NLRB v. Longshoremen (ILWU) Local 10 (Pacific45
Maritime Assn.), 283 F.2d 558, 563 (9th Cir. 1960), enfd. as modified 123 NLRB 559 (1959).
Under the common-law rules of agency, an agency relationship can be established by vesting an
JD–12–15
5
agent with actual or apparent authority. Actual authority is “created by a principal’s
manifestation to an agent that, as reasonably understood by the agent, expresses the principal’s
assent that the agent takes action on the principal’s behalf.” Restatement (Third) Of Agency,
Section 3.01 “Apparent authority is the power held by an agent or other actor to affect a
principal’s legal relations with third parties when a third party reasonably believes the actor has5
authority to act on behalf of the principal and that belief is traceable to the principal’s
manifestations.” Restatement (Third) of Agency, Section 2.03.
The Board has held that the burden of proving any type of agency “rests with the party
asserting that relationship.” Millard Processing Services, 304 NLRB 770, 771 (1991), enfd. 2 10
F.3d 258 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied 510 U.S. 1092 (1994); See Pan-Oston Co., 336 NLRB
305, 306 (2001); see also Sunset Line & Twine Co., 79 NLRB 1487, 1508 (1948).
Evelyn Boston testified that she is the sole owner of the Respondent and the only person
authorized to sign documents on the Respondent’s behalf, such as contracts for the purchase of 15
paints and supplies, and bids for work. She also admitted that her actions and decisions bind the
Respondent. The record therefore establishes that Boston is vested with actual and apparent
authority on the Respondent’s behalf, and I find that she is an agent of the Respondent within the
meaning of Section 2(13) of the Act.
20
C. The Association’s Status as a Multiemployer
Bargaining Association
The complaint alleges that the Painting and Decorating Contractors of America, Chapter
#2, affiliated with the Finishing Contractors of America (the Association) is an association 25
composed of approximately 160 employers, one purpose of which is to represent its employer-
members in negotiating and administering collective-bargaining agreements with various labor
organizations, including the Union. (GC Exh. 1(c).) The Respondent, asserting that it had
insufficient information to admit or deny the allegation, denied the allegation regarding the
Association and its purpose.30
Daniel Wienstroer, the executive director of the Association, testified that the Association
provides representation for all collective-bargaining matters, such as negotiating collective-
bargaining agreements with unions, including the Union in this matter, for its 160-170 employer-
members or contractors in the St. Louis area who are signatory to its contracts, and the 35
predecessor contracts. He also testified that the Association provides business advice and
industry education and training to its employer-members, and it utilizes member-wide mailings
to inform its members about industry standards and training programs.
Contrary to the Respondent’s denial, I find that the Association is an association 40
composed of approximately 160 employers, one purpose of which is to represent its employer-
members in negotiating and administering collective-bargaining agreements with various labor
organizations, including the Union.
45
JD–12–15
6
D. The Respondent’s Employees Constitute a Unit Appropriate for the Purposes of
Collective-Bargaining Within the Meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act
The Respondent denied that the unit as described in the complaint is the appropriate unit
for purposes of bargaining. I note, however, that the Respondent has failed to present any 5
evidence pertaining to the appropriateness of the bargaining unit of employees. The Respondent
was signatory to the 2005–2010 and 2010–2013 contracts, which state at section 5, “Union
Recognition,” that “[t]he Union is recognized as the exclusive collective bargaining agent for all
journeymen painters, tapers and drywall finisher, paper and wall covering hangers, apprentices,
pre-apprentices, summer help and working foremen employed by the Employer.” (GC Exh. 10
6(a).) I find the description of the unit is accurately described in the complaint, with the addition
of the statutory exclusions set forth in the Act, as:
All journeymen painters, tapers and drywall finishers, paper and wall covering
hangers, apprentices, pre-apprentices, summer help and working foremen 15
employed by the Employer, excluding office clerical and professional employees,
guards and supervisors as defined in the Act.
The Respondent failed to object to the admission of the contracts into evidence and
Boston admitted executing and abiding by the terms of the 2005–2010 and 2010–2013 contracts. 20
The Respondent likewise failed to establish any genuine issue of material fact regarding the
appropriateness of the recognized bargaining unit in the complaint.
It is well established that in regard to an employer’s voluntary recognition of a union,
Board law provides that the Board’s obligation in assessing the appropriateness of the bargaining 25
unit under Section 9(b) is limited to “. . . a determination that the agreed-upon unit is not
inconsistent with the Act or contrary to Board policy.” Alpha Associates, 344 NLRB 782, 784
(2005); Central Washington Hospital, 303 NLRB 404, 412–413 (1991). Where the parties have
agreed to a bargaining unit which is not contrary to the Act or Board policy, such a unit is found
to be appropriate under the Act, regardless of whether the Board would have certified such a unit 30
ab initio. Red Coats, 328 NLRB 205, 207 (1999); Alpha Associates, supra at 784. The evidence
in this case establishes that the parties agreed to the unit as described in the complaint, and there
has been no evidence presented which would indicate the unit is contrary to the provisions or
purposes of the Act. Accordingly, I find that the unit description set forth in the complaint is an
appropriate bargaining unit. 35
III. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The facts
40
1. The Respondent voluntarily recognized the Union on April 13, 2009, as the 9(a)
exclusive collective-bargaining representative of its employees and became signatory to
the 2005–2010 collective-bargaining agreement between the Union and the
multiemployer bargaining association
45
The Respondent’s business began in 1999 as a nonunion contractor in the construction
industry performing painting, dry wall, and taping work for residential and commercial
JD–12–15
7
customers. Respondent’ owner, Evelyn Boston, testified that the Respondent generally employs
between 2 and 4 employees, depending on the size of the jobs.
Boston testified that in April 2009, when the Respondent started its first commercial
project for a Bar Louie restaurant, the contractor it was performing the work for advised her that 5
it was a “union job,” and the Respondent would have to sign a contract “to be union.” Boston
contacted the Union and on April 11, 2009, and submitted a signed application to be recognized
as a union painting or taping contractor. (GC Exh. 5). On April 13, 2009, she met with a union
representative and she signed a Section 9(a) voluntary recognition agreement, which states:
10
Boston & Associates, LLC (“the Employer”) hereby recognizes Painters District
Council #2 (“the Union”) as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent, within the
meaning of Section 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act (“the Act”), of all
full-time and regular part-time painters, drywall finishers, etc. employed on all
present and future job sites within the jurisdiction of the Union. Such recognition 15
is predicated on the Union’s demand for such recognition pursuant to Section 9(a)
of the Act, and on the Union’s presentation of a clear showing that the majority of
employees in the bargaining unit are members of the Union and desire the Union
to act as their exclusive representative within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the
Act. The Employer acknowledges that it has reviewed the Union’s showing and 20
agrees that it reflects the employee’s desire to be represented by the Union under
Section 9(a) of the Act. (GC Exh. 4).
On April 13, 2009, Boston also signed a collective-bargaining agreement between the
Union and the Painting and Decorating Contractors of America, Chapter #2 affiliated with the 25
Finishing Contractors of America (FCA), a multiemployer bargaining association (the
Association) which was effective by its terms from September 1, 2005 to August 31, 2010 (the
2005–2010 contract). (GC Exh. 6(a) and 6(b).) The contract, which provides that the Respondent
authorizes the Association to represent it with regard to collective bargaining, states:
30
The Employer expressly agrees that the Painting and Decorating Contractors of
America, Chapter #2 affiliated with the Finishing Contractors of America (FCA),
(hereinafter referred to as “PDCA”) will represent the Employer for all collective
bargaining purposes during the term of this Agreement, specifically including any
and all negotiations with the Union for any renewal or subsequent Agreements, 35
unless the Employer serves timely and unequivocal notice otherwise in
accordance with the provisions of applicable law. (GC Exh. 6(a) p. 3.)
Thus, the terms of the contract provide that the Association remains the bargaining representative
for the Respondent until the Respondent gives timely notice to the Association of its desire to 40
terminate the relationship.

The terms of the contract also clearly provide that the Respondent agrees to recognize the
Union as the exclusive representative of the unit employees. The contract states at section 5,
“Union Recognition,” that “[t]he Union is recognized as the exclusive collective bargaining 45
agent for all journeymen painters, tapers and drywall finisher, paper and wall covering hangers,
apprentices, pre-apprentices, summer help and working foremen employed by the Employer.”
JD–12–15
8
(GC Exh. 6(a)). In section 45 (“Termination”) of the 2005–2010 contract, the Agreement
provides:
This Agreement shall become effective September 1, 2005 and shall remain in
full force and effect until midnight August 31, 2010, and shall automatically be 5
renewed from year to year thereafter unless either or both parties hereto shall give
the other notice in writing at least sixty (60) days prior to the original expiration
date of the Agreement or the then next expiration date in any year thereafter, of a
desire to terminate or modify this Agreement. (GC Exh. 6(a) and (b)).
10
Boston testified that she has employed 2 to 4 employees on average over the time period
relevant to this case. Specifically, in April 2009, the Respondent employed Stanley Jackson, a
former union apprentice and member. Jackson worked for the Respondent on the Bar Louie job
and signed a union authorization card on December 22, 2009, rejoining the Union. (GC Exh.
16). The record reveals that the Respondent abided by the terms of the 2005–2010 contract, 15
remitting union dues, and paying union wages and benefits.
2. Respondent became signatory to the 2010–2013 collective-bargaining agreement,
performed work under that contract, and abided by the terms of that contract
20
Boston testified that the only job the Respondent performed prior to the expiration of the
2005-2010 contract was the Bar Louie job. She testified that in the summer of 2010, she decided
she did not want to be part of the Union’s collective-bargaining agreement, but admittedly did
nothing to terminate the contract. The 2005–2010 contract expired on August 31, 2010. Since
the Respondent did not provide notice to the Union expressing its desire to terminate the 25
agreement, the contract rolled over into the successor agreement, which was effective from
September 1, 2010 to August 31, 2013 (the 2010–2013 contract). In addition, the Respondent
did not give notice to the Association withdrawing its bargaining rights pursuant to the language
of the contact, and the Association’s bargaining rights rolled over into the 2010–2013 contract.
The Respondent, however, did not sign the 2010–2013 contract at that time. 30
In December 2010, the Respondent started work on the Bellefontaine Rehabilitation
Center job that lasted 4 to 6 months, and was valued at $70,000. From September 2011 through
the end of 2012, the Respondent contracted to work a prevailing wage job at the Hamilton
Apartments, which was valued at $300,000. Harris testified that since he was assigned to 35
monitor union jobs throughout the city of St. Louis, he observed the work being performed on
the Hamilton Apartment job. It was on that job that he noticed union members Stanley Jackson,
Zachary Westover, and Wallace Hull performing work on that job for the Respondent. Harris
testified that his discovering that the Respondent was employing workers on that job resulted in
the Union contacting Boston for a meeting. 40
On or about October 11, 2011, the Union met with Boston regarding the 2010–2013
contract and the fact that she had failed to remit union dues for her employees. Boston testified
that she was accompanied by a local contractor named J.L. Brown, who attended the meeting to
support her, and that she told the union representatives at that meeting that she did not believe 45
she was under any obligation to the Union at that time since the 2005–2010 contract had expired.
Boston testified that the union representative advised her that since she did not give notice to the
JD–12–15
9
Union of her intent to terminate the contract 60 days prior to the contract’s expiration, the
Respondent’s obligation to be bound by its terms rolled over into the next contract. Boston
acknowledged that she did not give the notice required by the termination clause of the contract,
which was shown to her at the meeting. Boston then signed the 2010–2013 contract on October
11, 2011. (GC Exh. 7(a) and 7(b).) Boston also discussed with the Union the requirement that 5
the Respondent be bonded under the contract’s requirements. When she explained that she was
having some difficulty obtaining a bond, the union representatives agreed to assist her in getting
a bond.
Like the 2005–2010 collective-bargaining agreement, the terms of the 2010–2013 10
collective-bargaining agreement also contained very clear recognition language providing that
the Respondent agrees to recognize the Union as the exclusive representative of the unit
employees.6 During the time of the 2010–2013 contract, the Respondent abided by its terms.
The Respondent employed two painters (Jackson and Westover) on a Hyde Park South
Apartment job in December 2012, which was a 3-month job worth $39,000. The Respondent 15
paid the employees union wages and made contractually-required contributions to the Union’s
fringe benefit funds. However, on April 22, 2013, the Respondent provided the Union with
written notice of its intent to terminate the 2010–2013 contact upon its expiration on August 31,
2013. (GC Exh. 8.) The Respondent filed hour contribution reports for the employees through
the end of the contract, but it reported zero hours worked. It is undisputed that the Respondent 20
did not give notice to the Association or the Union of intent to terminate the Association’s
authority to bargain on the Respondent’s behalf.
In the summer of 2013, Boston called the Union and asked to speak with Union
Representative Richard Lucks, who was unavailable. Union Representative David Doerr 25
testified that he answered the phone when Boston called, and that Boston told him she was “no
longer Union.” Doerr testified that he asked Boston if she gave notice terminating the
agreement, and Boston told him that she had given the Union notice in April 2013. Doerr
testified that he told Boston that if she was no longer bargaining with the Union, she still had
obligations under Section 9(a) of the contract. Boston then said she would call to speak to 30
Lucks, but Boston admitted that she did not attempt to call the Union again.
Contrary to Doerr’s testimony, Boston testified that in July 2013, she called the Union
and spoke to Harris about whether the Union received her April 22, 2013 notice to terminate the
2010–2013 contract. Boston asserted that Harris admitted receipt of the notice and she then 35
asked Harris if there was anything further that she needed to do to terminate the relationship.
She testified that Harris said he was not sure and he would get back to her. Boston testified that
a few days later, Harris returned her call and conferenced Doerr on the call, and in that call Doerr
asked Boston if she would meet with the Union, and he asked why she would not consider
staying in the Union. Boston testified that she told Doerr and Harris that she did not feel the 40
Union benefited her or her employees, and that Doerr and Harris told her they would get back to
her, but they never did. Boston did admit that neither Doerr nor Harris informed her she had

6 The 2010–2013 collective-bargaining agreement states at sec. 5 (“Union Recognition”) that “[t]he
Union is recognized as the exclusive collective bargaining agent for all journeymen painters, tapers and
drywall finisher, paper and wall covering hangers, apprentices, pre-apprentices, summer help and working
foremen employed by the Employer.” (GC Exh. 7(a).)
JD–12–15
10
done everything necessary to terminate the bargaining relationship, rather, they simply said they
would look into it. Boston testified that she assumed this meant she did not need to do anything
further with regard to terminating the relationship. Harris denied participating in any
conversations with Boston during the summer of 2013.
5
3. Effective August 31, 2013, upon the expiration of the 2010–2013 contract, the
Respondent withdrew its recognition of the Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining
representative of the unit employees and, effective September 17, 2013, it failed to
comply with the terms and conditions of the 2013–2016 contract
10
On June 24, 2013, the Association was notified by the Union of its intent to begin
bargaining for a new contract. (GC Exh. 11.) The Union sent a notice to its members who had
hours reported on their behalf by signatory contractors (which would have included Jackson)
notifying them that contract negotiations were to start and it sought the members’ input.
Wienstroer testified that it was the Association’s practice to mail literature and other educational 15
information related to the industry to its contractor-members who were signatory to the prior
contract, including the Respondent. On August 16, 2013, the Association notified its signatory
contractors that the Union had requested negotiations and the Association had agreed to bargain.
A successor agreement effective by its terms from September 17, 2013 to August 31, 2016 (the
2013–2016) was executed. (GC Exh. 14.)20
The Respondent admits in its answer and amended answer that effective August 31,
2013, it withdrew its recognition of the Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining
representative of the unit employees. (GC Exh. 1(c).) It is undisputed that the Respondent
thereafter failed to honor or abide by the terms and conditions of the 2013–2016 contract.25
In October 2013, Harris was at the St. Louis City Police Headquarters renovation project,
which was a union job. In speaking to the general contractor, Harris found out that Respondent
was the painting contractor on the job. Boston testified that the Police Headquarters job was
valued at $167,000. Harris testified that saw Respondent employees Jackson and Joshua Perry 30
working on that job. Harris testified that when he discovered that Respondent was working on
the police headquarters project, Harris reported that to the union officials. On November 14,
2013, the Union notified the Respondent that despite Boston’s April 22, 2013 notice that she did
not wish to continue her relationship with the Union, she was obligated to bargain with the
Union because of their 9(a) relationship, and they suggested dates for a meeting with the Union. 35
(GC Exh. 10.) Boston denied ever receiving that letter and never contacted the Union.
Harris testified that on December 9, 2013, he telephoned Boston and informed her that
she was obligated to bargain with the Union, and Boston told him she had no obligations to the
Union since she had given her notice of termination more than 60 days prior to the contract’s40
expiration. Harris testified that Boston told him she wanted to get out of the Union because the
Union was too expensive and she did not have any work. (GC Exh. 9.) Boston admitted that at
no time had she informed the Union that her employees told her they no longer wished to be
represented by the Union.
45
The record reveals that the Respondent was scheduled to complete the St. Louis City
police headquarters project, valued at $167,000, in late June 2014. The Respondent had four
JD–12–15
11
employees on that job and it was paying prevailing wage rate as well as the fringe benefit
amounts directly to the employees.
During the 4-year period when the Respondent was signatory to the two collective-
bargaining agreements, there were no representation petitions or unfair labor practice charges 5
filed challenging the Union’s majority status. It is undisputed that prior to withdrawing
recognition from the Union on August 31, 2013, the Respondent never objected to or challenged
the Union’s showing of majority support in the unit, nor did it object to the recognition language
in the voluntary recognition agreement or in the two collective-bargaining agreements. In
addition, the record is devoid of any evidence constituting an affirmative showing that the Union 10
lost majority support of the bargaining unit employees.
B. The credibility determinations
15
While many of the facts in this case are undisputed, there are occasions where the
testimony of the Respondent’s witnesses conflicts with the testimony of the General Counsel’s
witnesses. As the finder of fact, I must determine the credibility of these witnesses. Credibility
determinations may rely on a variety of factors, including the content of the witness’ testimony,
the witness’ demeanor, the weight of the evidence, established or admitted facts, reasonable 20
inferences that may be drawn from the record as a whole, and the inherent probabilities of the
allegations. Double D Construction/ Group, 339 NLRB 303, 305 (2003); Daikichi Sushi, 335
NLRB 622, 623 (2001) (citing Shen Automotive Dealership Group, 321 NLRB 586, 589 (1996)),
enfd. 56 Fed.Appx. 516 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Credibility findings need not be all or nothing
propositions. Indeed, nothing is more common than for a judge to believe some, but not all, of 25
the testimony of a witness. Daikichi Sushi, 335 NLRB at 622; Jerry Ryce Builders, 352 NLRB
1262 fn. 2 (2008), citing NLRB v. Universal Camera Corp., 179 F.2d 749, 754 (2d Cir. 1950),
revd. on other grounds 340 U.S. 474 (1951). Accord: General Fabrications Corp., 328 NLRB
1114 fn. 1 (1999), enfd. 222 F.3d 218 (6th Cir. 2000). See also J. Shaw Associates, LLC, 349
NLRB 939, 939–940 (2007).30
My overall observation during the trial was that the General Counsel’s witnesses were
largely credible in their testimony and demeanor, and that they testified in a convincing and
straight forward manner indicative of truthfulness. On the other hand, the Respondent’s two
witnesses, Evelyn Boston and Stanley Jackson, testified in a less convincing manner and at times 35
presented inconsistent, vague, and implausible testimony. They also presented testimony that
frequently appeared to be less than forthright, and that at times appeared to be self-serving and
misleading. For example, Jackson, whose demeanor at the trial was evasive and angry, signed
union authorization cards in December 2009 and September 2012 to join the Union. However,
he vaguely testified that he was somehow forced to join the Union, but then admitted that he had 40
a choice in joining the Union or working elsewhere. I found Jackson’s testimony unconvincing
and his assertions incredible. It strains credulity to believe that he was forced to join the Union
when he did not want to, and he then joined the Union not once, but twice. I find it implausible
that if he was forced to join the Union in 2009 against his desires to do so, he would sign an
authorization card and join the Union a second time in 2012. 45
JD–12–15
12
Boston’s testimony was equally unconvincing and incredible. Her responses to questions
revealed vague recollections about meetings and she sometimes required the aide of documents
to refresh her recollection about events. Boston’s testimony was also inconsistent at times.
While she testified that she met only once with the union representatives on November 9, 2011,
to sign the 2010–2013 contract, the record shows that she also signed the contract on October 11, 5
2011 (GC Exh. 7(b)), revealing that she actually met with the Union on two occasions. In
addition, Boston testified that when she met with the union representatives on November 9,
2011, it was only her, inferring that she was alone when she met with the group of union
representatives. However, when specifically asked on cross-examination, she admitted that
another contractor attended the meeting with her as a source of support. 10
I found Boston’s testimony was particularly vague, self serving, and implausible with
regard to her execution of the voluntary recognition agreement on April 13, 2009. While she
testified that she was never presented with evidence of majority support by the Union, she signed
the agreement attesting that she had, in fact, been shown majority support. Boston also admitted 15
on cross-examination that she never objected to the Union about allegedly not being shown
evidence of majority support. I find it implausible that she would fail to register an objection
with the Union at some time within the 4-year period between April 2009 and 2013, if the Union
had in fact failed to present a majority showing to her. In addition, while Boston testified that
she did not have any employees working on the Bar Louie Restaurant job until December 2009, 20
she neglected to indicate she was working on other jobs in April 2009, and Jackson admitted that
while he did not start the Bar Louie job until December 2009, he was employed by the
Respondent in April 2009.
At the hearing, Boston testified that she wanted out of the Union because she allegedly 25
did not have enough work when she was a union contractor, she could not get bonded, and
Jackson did not want to be part of the Union. (Tr. 140.). I found Boston’s testimony in this
regard to be particularly troubling and incredible. Her assertion that Jackson did not want to be
part of the Union is belied by the fact that he signed several union authorization cards to be in the
Union. While Boston testified that she has employed between two and four employees over the 30
time period in question (such as Westover and Wallace Hull, in addition to Jackson), the
Respondent failed to present any credible evidence of other employees’ desires regarding union
representation. In addition, despite her assertion that her employees did not want to be union,
she admitted on cross-examination that she had several meetings with the Union, but neglected
to ever inform the union representatives that her employee or employees did not want to be in the 35
Union. Furthermore, in her April 22, 2013 letter to the Union in which she sets forth her reasons
for not wanting to renew the contract with the Union, she neglected to mention the alleged
reason set forth at trial that her employees did not support or want to be in the Union. (GC Exh.
8.)
40
With regard to Boston’s assertions that the Respondent had very little, and not enough
work after it became a union contractor, her testimony on direct-examination only referenced the
Bar Louie Restaurant job in 2009, the Hamilton Apartment job in 2011, and the St. Louis City
Police Headquarters job in 2013. I find this self-serving testimony was Boston’s attempt to
convey or imply that Respondent was disadvantaged by becoming a union contractor and that 45
she had very few employees, which she believed would support her contention that the Union
failed to make a sufficient showing of majority support when it demanded 9(a) recognition. On
JD–12–15
13
cross-examination, however, she admitted to other jobs she failed to mention on direct
examination. For example, she admitted that on December 17, 2012, the Respondent started
working on a large project for the Hyde Park South Apartments, valued at $39,000, where she
had two employees, Jackson and Westover, employed on that project. (Tr. 146.) She also
admitted that in December 2010, she served as a union contractor at the Bellefontaine 5
Rehabilitation Center, a 4 to 6 month job where Respondent was paid $70,000, and employed
three employees—Jackson, Westover, and Hull. (Tr. 146.) I find that since Boston admitted to
working more jobs on cross-examination than she originally testified to on direct-examination,
her credibility was further undermined, and it is possible there were other jobs that she failed to
testify about. Respondent’s jobs worked during the time period in question could have been 10
established by the Respondent’s production of its records pertaining to the jobs performed and
the amount of work done, which were clearly in its control but never produced at trial.
Therefore, based on the above, I credit the testimony of the General Counsel’s witnesses
where they conflicted with the testimony of the Respondent’s witnesses. 15
C. The Contentions of the Parties
The General Counsel alleges that the Respondent withdrew recognition from the Union 20
as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the unit employees as of August 31,
2013, and failed and refused to abide by the successor collective-bargaining agreement
negotiated by the Association, which is effective by its terms from September 17, 2013 through
August 31, 2016.
25
The Respondent denies that a 9(a) bargaining relationship with the Union was
established, and claims that the 2001-2010 and 2010-2013 contracts between the Union and the
Association are governed by Section 8(f) of the Act. The General Counsel asserts in response,
that the clear language of the April 13, 2009 voluntary recognition agreement establishes a 9(a)
relationship, and that any defense denying 9(a) status is barred by Section 10(b) of the Act. In 30
addition, the General Counsel contends, regardless of whether the status of the collective-
bargaining relationship is based on Section 9(a) or Section 8(f), Respondent failed to give timely
notice to the Association revoking the Association’s bargaining authority on Respondent’s
behalf. Therefore, the General Counsel asserts that the Respondent failed to give timely and
unequivocal notice to the Union or the Association revoking the Association’s authority to 35
bargain on its behalf with the Union, and violated the Act by withdrawing recognition from the
Union and failing to adhere to the 2013—2016 collective-bargaining agreement.
D. Analysis40
1. The Respondent voluntarily recognized the Union as the 9(a) exclusive collective-
bargaining representative of its unit employees, but the Respondent contends it had an
8(f) relationship
45
The complaint alleges that the Respondent recognized the Union as the exclusive
collective-bargaining representative of the appropriate bargaining unit described in the 2005–
JD–12–15
14
2010 and 2010–2013 multiemployer collective-bargaining agreements between the Union and the
Association, by virtue of the voluntary recognition agreement dated April 13, 2009. In its
answer, the Respondent denies these allegations, and despite the undisputed evidence that it
executed the voluntary recognition agreement, the Respondent argues that it does not have a 9(a)
relationship, but instead contends that an 8(f) relationship exists.5
The Board held in John Deklewa & Sons, 282 NLRB 1375, 1385 (1987), enfd. sub nom.
Iron Workers v. NLRB, 843 F.2d 770 (3d Cir.), cert. denied 488 U.S. 889 (1988), that there is a
rebuttable presumption that bargaining relationships in the construction industry are established
under Section 8(f) of the Act, and it placed the burden of proving that such relationships under 10
Section 9(a) of the Act on the party asserting the 9(a) status. Id. at 1385, fn. 41. Thus, the
General Counsel in this case bears the burden of proving a 9(a) relationship exists between the
Respondent and the Union.
Section 8(f) of the Act permits unions and employers in the construction industry to enter 15
into collective-bargaining agreements without establishing that the union has the support of a
majority of the unit employees.7 An exception is therefore created to the general rule under
Section 9(a) that a showing of majority support is required for a bargaining representative.8 The
significance between a union’s representative status under Section 8(f) and Section 9(a) is that an
8(f) relationship may be terminated by either party on the expiration of their collective-20
bargaining agreement. Deklewa, supra at 1386–1387. A 9(a) relationship, in contrast, continues
after expiration of the contract, unless and until the union is shown to have lost majority support.
Levitz Furniture Co., 333 NLRB 717 (2001). The Board has held in cases after Deklewa, that a
union in the construction industry can overcome the presumption of 8(f) status by showing that it
made an unequivocal demand for, and that the employer unequivocally granted majority 25
recognition, based on a showing of majority support in that bargaining unit. Western Pipeline,
Inc., 328 NLRB 925 (1999).
Since Deklewa, the Board has set forth the minimum requirements for written recognition
agreements that establish union recognition as a 9(a) representative solely on the basis of such 30
an agreement, without requiring the use of extrinsic evidence. In Staunton Fuel & Material, Inc.,
d/b/a Central Illinois Construction, 335 NLRB 717 (2001), the Board, in adopting the test
articulated by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in NLRB v. Triple C Maintenance, Inc., 219
F.3d 1147, 1155–1156 (2000) and NLRB v. Oklahoma Installation Co., 219 F.3d 1160, 1164—
1166 (2000), held that “a written agreement will establish a 9(a) relationship if its language 35
unequivocally indicates that the union requested recognition as majority representative, the

7 Sec. 8(f) provides, in pertinent part: “It shall not be an unfair labor practice under subsections (a)
and (b) of this section for an employer engaged primarily in the building and construction industry to
make an agreement covering employees engaged (or who, upon their employment, will be engaged) in the
building and construction industry with a labor organization of which building and construction
employees are members. . . . because (1) the majority status of such labor organization has not been
established under the provisions of Sec. 9 of this Act prior to the making of such agreement. . . . Provided
further, That any agreement which would be invalid, but for clause (1) of this subsection, shall not be a
bar to a petition filed pursuant to Sec. 9(c) or 9(e).”
8 An exception is also created in Sec. 8(f) to the general rule of Sec. 8(a)(2) and Sec. 8(b)(1)(A) that
an employer and a union lacking majority support of the unit employees may not enter into a bargaining
relationship with respect to those employees. Staunton Fuel & Material, 335 NLRB at 718.
JD–12–15
15
employer recognized the union as majority representative, and the employer’s recognition was
based on the union’s having shown, or having offered to show, an evidentiary basis of its
majority support.” Id. at 717, 719–720. In Staunton Fuel & Material, the Board, in an effort to
provide further guidance, held that “…the union’s required request for recognition can be fairly
implied from the contract language stating that the employer grants the required recognition,” 5
and “. . . the employer’s grant of recognition must be express and unconditional.” Id. at 720.
As mentioned above, the Respondent in the instant case signed a 9(a) voluntary
recognition agreement on April 13, 2009, which states:
10
Boston & Associates, LLC (“the Employer”) hereby recognizes Painters District
Council #2 (“the Union”) as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent, within the
meaning of Section 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act (“the Act”), of all
full-time and regular part-time painters, drywall finishers, etc. employed on all
present and future job sites within the jurisdiction of the Union. Such recognition 15
is predicated on the Union’s demand for such recognition pursuant to Section 9(a)
of the Act, and on the Union’s presentation of a clear showing that the majority of
employees in the bargaining unit are members of the Union and desire the Union
to act as their exclusive representative within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the
Act. The Employer acknowledges that it has reviewed the Union’s showing and 20
agrees that it reflects the employee’s desire to be represented by the Union under
Section 9(a) of the Act. (GC Exh. 4).
In addition, the 2005–2010 and 2010–2013 contracts, which were both executed by the
Respondent, provide that the Respondent agreed to recognize the Union as the exclusive 25
representative of the unit employees. (GC Exh. 6(a) and 7(a).)
In analyzing the language of the voluntary recognition agreement and the collective-
bargaining agreements under the established Board law, I find that the clear and unequivocal
recognition language satisfies the criteria set forth in Staunton Fuel & Material to establish a 30
9(a) relationship. In particular, the language of the voluntary recognition agreement clearly sets
forth that the Union’s demand for recognition is pursuant to Section 9(a) of the Act, the
agreement provides that Respondent recognizes the Union “as the sole and exclusive bargaining
agent within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act,” and it states that the recognition was based
on the Union’s having shown an evidentiary basis for majority support. I note that the instant 35
recognition agreement not only meets the Board’s requirements articulated in Staunton Fuel &
Material, it actually contains the added unequivocal assurance that the Respondent not only
reviewed the showing, but also agreed that it reflected the employees’ desire to have the Union
represent them. The Respondent’s grant of recognition in this case was unequivocal, express,
and unconditional. Accordingly, I find that the General Counsel satisfied the burden of proving40
that the Union is the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of Respondent’s unit
employees pursuant to Section 9(a) of the Act.
2. The Respondent’s defense challenging the 9(a) relationship is time-barred
45
The Respondent, more than 4 years after attesting in the voluntary recognition agreement
that it was shown the Union’s majority support, it reviewed the support, and it agreed the support
JD–12–15
16
reflected the employees’ desire to be represented by the Union, now asserts as a defense that it
had no employees at the time it executed that agreement, and that no showing of majority
support had been offered by the Union. In addition, the Respondent challenges the validity of
the voluntary recognition agreement after being signatory to two collective-bargaining
agreements containing union recognition language (the 2005–2010 and 2010–2013 contracts), 5
and after it presumably enjoyed the financial benefits of securing contracts for union work
projects during the duration of those contracts.
The Respondent failed to produce any evidence which would indicate the parties had
only an 8(f) relationship, or any evidence that contradicts the clear and unambiguous language of 10
the voluntary recognition agreement and the two collective-bargaining agreements it complied
with over that 4-year time period. Instead, in support of its asserted defense, the Respondent
relies on Boston’s testimony that over 4 years ago the union business agent who gave her the
voluntary recognition agreement and the 2005–2010 contract to sign, allegedly failed to present
her with a showing of majority status, on Jackson’s testimony that he allegedly did not support 15
the Union, and on the fact that the General Counsel failed to present any evidence showing that
the asserted showing of majority support was true.9 Before considering this defense, I must first
determine whether it is time-barred under Board law.
It has long been held that Section 10(b) of the Act precludes challenges to the lawfulness 20
of recognition granted under Section 9(a) of the Act outside the 6-month 10(b) period.
Machinists Local 1424 (Bryan Mfg. Co.) v. NLRB, 362 U.S. 411 (1960). The Board’s decision to
prohibit unreasonably timed challenges to majority status at the time of recognition is established
law outside the construction industry. In situations where a union requests recognition under
Section 9(a) from a nonconstruction employer, that employer may demand a showing of majority 25
support or accept the union’s claim on its face and recognize the union. Central Illinois, supra at
719, fn. 10; Oklahoma Installation, 325 NLRB 741, 742 (1998); Glaziers and Glassworkers,
Local 767, 228 NLRB 35, 40–41 (1977), enfd. 577 F.2d 100 (9th Cir. 1978). If an employer
recognizes the union, but subsequently discovers the union actually lacked majority support, the
union’s 9(a) status may be challenged at any time with in the 6-month limitation period after 30
wrongfully extending recognition, pursuant to Section 10(b) of the Act. Oklahoma Installation,
supra at 742. If an employer fails to challenge within the 10(b) period, it may terminate its
obligation to bargain only by showing that the union has actually lost majority support, the
burden of which rests on the employer. Levitz Furniture Co., 333 NLRB 717 (2001).
35
In Casale Industries, Inc., 311 NLRB 951 (1993), the Board addressed the issue of timing
for employer challenges to the validity of Section 9(a) relationships in the construction industry.
In that case, the Board considered whether the collective-bargaining agreement between an
multiemployer association and the union covering a multiemployer bargaining unit was entered
into pursuant to Sections 9(a) or 8(f). The Board found that the contract was entered into 40
pursuant to Section 9(a), and the petitions seeking single-employer units were not filed within a
reasonable time after the association extended 9(a) recognition to the union. Therefore, the

9 In its brief, the Respondent argues that since Union Business Manager Gregg Smith testified that he
did not have any knowledge of the Respondent’s employees in 2009, or details about the showing of
interest at that time, the General Counsel failed to present evidence that the assertions of majority status in
the voluntary recognition agreement were true. (Resp. Br. pp. 2–3).
JD–12–15
17
petitioned-for units were not appropriate because they were not coextensive with the recognized
multiemployer bargaining unit. Id. In Casale Industries, the union and association entered into a
written recognition agreement in 1982 based on the results of a private (non-NLRB) election.
Since that time, the association and union had been parties to four successive collective-
bargaining agreements, the third of which expired in August 1988. During the open period of the 5
third contract, the union filed petitions seeking to represent separate units of employees. In
September 1988, the association and union executed their fourth contract. Id. at 952.
The Board found in Casale Industries that the parties intended to establish a 9(a)
relationship by virtue of their use of an election, but recognized that even where the parties 10
intend a 9(a) relationship, that intention can be thwarted if the union did not have majority
support at the time of recognition. Id. The Board found that if majority status is challenged
within a reasonable time, and majority status is not shown, the relationship will not be a 9(a)
relationship. Id. at 953. The Board found in that case that there was a “substantial question” as
to whether majority status was shown. However, the challenge to majority status came 6 years 15
after Section 9(a) recognition was extended and accepted, and the parties reached agreement on
three successive contracts. Id. In that case, the Board noted that for nonconstruction industry
cases, challenges to majority status at the time of recognition that are made after more than 6
months, will not be considered. Id., citing Bryan Mfg. Co., 362 U.S. 411 (1960). The Board,
noting that it found in Deklewa that unions in the construction industry should not be treated less 20
favorably than those unions in the nonconstruction industry, reasoned that the 6 month time
limitation should also apply to the construction industry. Therefore, in Casale Industries, the
Board did not permit the challenge to 9(a) status, finding that challenges to majority status must
be made within a reasonable period of time after 9(a) recognition is granted. In that regard, the
Board held that “if a construction industry employer extends 9(a) recognition to a union, and 6 25
months elapse without a charge or petition, the Board should not entertain a claim that majority
status was lacking at the time of recognition.” Id.
Even though Casale Industries was a representation case, the Board has extended the
rationale and holding of that case to unfair labor practice cases. New Brunswick General Sheet 30
Metal Works, 326 NLRB 915, 919–920 (1998); DiPonio Construction Co., 357 NLRB No. 99,
slip op. at 8–9 (2011). In New Brunswick, supra, the Board was confronted with, inter alia, issues
of whether a union established itself as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative
pursuant to Section 9(a), and whether the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) by withdrawing
recognition from the union. Id. In that case, the employer challenged the union’s majority status 35
after more than 6 years and several successive collective-bargaining agreements. In New
Brunswick, the Board affirmed the administrative law judge’s finding that the employer was
time-barred from challenging the union’s majority status, and it found that the union was the
exclusive collective-bargaining representative pursuant to Section 9(a).10 In addition, in DiPonio
Construction, supra, the Board found that an employer’s defense challenging a union’s majority 40

10 The Board also held in Raymond F. Kravis Center for the Performing Arts, 351 NLRB 143, 144
(2007), that where an employer argued it was privileged to withdraw recognition from the union upon the
expiration of their 1998 collective-bargaining agreement allegedly because the bargaining relationship
was not initially based on a claim or showing in 1992, that argument is time-barred and the relationship
was governed by Sec. 9(a). See North Bros. Ford, 220 NLRB 1021 (1975), citing Machinists Local
Lodge 1424 (Bryan Mfg. Co.) v. NLRB, 362 U.S. 411 (1960) (Sec. 10(b) applies to a refusal-to-bargain
defense that a bargaining relationship was unlawfully established).
JD–12–15
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status through the recognition language after 8 years had passed and the employer was signatory
to three collective-bargaining agreements, was time-barred.
The Board’s findings in Casale Industries and the cases discussed above are clearly
applicable to the instant case. I find that the Respondent’s challenge to 9(a) status after more 5
than 4 years have passed, and after being signatory to, and abiding by, two collective-bargaining
agreements, is well beyond the 6-month 10(b) period, and that defense is therefore time-barred.
DiPonio Construction Co., Inc., 357 NLRB No. 99, slip op. at 8–9 (2011); Strand Theatre of
Shreveport Corp., 346 NLRB 523, 536–537 (2006), enfd. 493 F.3d 515 (5th Cir. 2007). I note
that my finding in this regard is consistent with the purposes and policies of the Act, as to find 10
otherwise “would mean that longstanding relationships would be vulnerable to attack, and
stability in labor relations would be undermined.”11
3. Even assuming the Respondent’s defense is not time-barred, it nevertheless lacks merit
15
I find that even assuming the Respondent’s asserted challenge to the 9(a) relationship is
not time-barred, it is without merit. The record contains clear and unequivocal contractual
language granting the Union recognition. The Respondent has failed to present evidence of a
lack of majority support for the Union at the time the voluntary recognition agreement was
executed, such as business or payroll records identifying the employees employed at that time. 20
Such evidence, which is within Respondent’s control, presumably could have supported its
assertion that it had no employees. I infer from Respondent’s failure to produce documents in its
control which were vital to prove its defense, that the records did not support the Respondent’s
position. Seedoroff Masonry, Inc., 360 NLRB No. 107, at slip op. p. 1, fn. 1 (2014); Galesburg
Construction Co.., 267 NLRB 551, 552 (1983). 25
In support of its defense, the Respondent relies instead on Boston’s testimony that she
was not presented with a showing of majority status, on Jackson’s assertion that he did not
support the Union, and on the General Counsel’s failure to offer evidence to confirm the validity
of the showing of support. As mentioned above, I do not credit Jackson or his assertion that he 30
did not support the Union. I also do not find persuasive the assertion that the General Counsel’s
witness did not confirm the validity of the majority support, because evidence of the majority
support is found in the clear and unequivocal language of the voluntary recognition agreement.
With regard to Boston’s testimony, as mentioned above, I found her testimony 35
unpersuasive. In addition, I find no merit to Respondent’s asserted defense for a number of
reasons. While Boston alleged she was never presented evidence of majority support, she signed
the agreement attesting that she had been shown the Union’s support, she acknowledged she
reviewed the Union’s showing, and she agreed it reflected the employees’ desire to be
represented by the Union. I find it implausible that Boston would sign such a document if in fact 40
the statements in the document were untrue. In addition, Boston admitted on cross-examination
that she never objected to the Union about allegedly not being shown evidence of majority
support. I find it implausible that she would not have registered an objection with the Union if in
fact no majority support had been presented. I also note that Boston never mentioned the
Union’s alleged failure to show majority support when she met with the Union and conveyed the 45

11 Casale Industries, supra at 953, citing Bryan Mfg. Co., supra at 429.
JD–12–15
19
reasons she did not want to be union, and she likewise neglected to mention that fact in her letter
to the Union dated April 22, 2013, wherein she informed the Union of her reasons for no longer
wanting to be a union contractor.
I find that the record contains other evidence which belies the Respondent’s assertion that 5
the Union’s majority support was lacking or never presented. Smith credibly testified that it is
the Union’s practice to present a showing of majority support when requesting voluntary
recognition from a contractor. Furthermore, while Boston testified that she did not have any
employees working on the Bar Louie restaurant job until December 2009, she neglected to
indicate she had on other jobs in April 2009, and Jackson admitted that he was employed by the 10
Respondent in April 2009. Finally, Boston’s testimony that she did not have any employees is
contradicted by her testimony that from 2009 to the present, she had consistently employed
between 2 and 4 employees. Thus, I find that the Respondent’s asserted defense, besides being
time-barred, lacks merit and is not supported by the record evidence.
15
4. The Respondent’s reliance on Nova Plumbing is misplaced
In its brief, the Respondent relies on the D.C. Circuit Court’s decision in Nova Plumbing,
Inc. v. NLRB, 330 F.3d. 531 (D.C. Cir. 2003), denying enf. 336 NLRB 633 (2001), in support of
its assertion that its relationship with the Union was not based on Section 9(a) of the Act. In 20
Nova Plumbing, the Board applied the Staunton Fuel & Material test and found that a 9(a)
relationship was created by virtue of the contractual language. The D.C. Circuit Court, however,
declined to enforce the Board’s order where there was unrebutted evidence which contradicted
the contractual assertions. Nova Plumbing, Inc., 336 NLRB 633 (2001), enf. denied 330 F.3d 531
(D.C. Cir. 2003). In that case, the court specifically relied on evidence that the employees 25
emphatically expressed their opposition to union representation at the time the employer
recognized the union. Nova Plumbing, 330 F.3d at 537. On that basis, the court determined that
the presumption of 8(f) recognition had not been overcome. The court explained that the
language of the contract and the intent are legitimate factors for determination of the nature of a
bargaining relationship in the construction industry, but “[s]tanding alone,. . .[they] cannot be 30
dispositive, at least where . . . the record contains strong indications that the parties had only a
section 8(f) relationship.” Id.
Regarding the Respondent’s reliance on Nova Plumbing, with all due respect to the court
of appeals for the D.C. Circuit, I am obligated to follow Board precedent unless and until it is 35
reversed by the Supreme Court. Waco, Inc., 273 NLRB 746, 749 fn. 14 (1984); Los Angeles New
Hospital, 244 NLRB 960, 962 fn. 4 (1979), enfd. 640 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1981); and Iowa Beef
Packers, 144 NLRB 615, 616 (1963), enfd. in part 331 F.2d 176 (8th Cir. 1964). Accordingly, I
will apply the extant Board law and principles expressed in Staunton Fuel & Material, supra, to
find that the Respondent and the Union had a 9(a) relationship. 40
Notwithstanding the fact that I am not bound by the court of appeal’s decision in Nova
Plumbing, I nevertheless find that the Respondent’s reliance on that case is misplaced as it is
clearly distinguishable from the instant case. In Nova Plumbing, the contract incorporated a
recognition clause that did not specifically mention an intent to create a 9(a) relationship. 45
However, the language of the voluntary recognition agreement in the present case specifically
refers to Section 9(a) on four occasions, leaving little, if any, doubt that the parties intended a
JD–12–15
20
9(a) relationship. In addition, in Nova Plumbing there was substantial evidence concerning the
bargaining relationship between the employer and the union, as well as the fact that the court
relied on evidence that when the employer voluntarily recognized the union, the employees
emphatically expressed their opposition to the employer recognizing the union. Nova Plumbing,
supra at 537. In the present case, no such evidence exists. Instead, the Respondent relies on 5
Boston’s self-serving and unsupported assertion that she had no employees, which I have
specifically discredited, and on Jackson’s assertion more than 4 years later that he did not
support the Union when recognition was granted, which I have also discredited and found
unreliable. Thus, Nova Plumbing is distinguishable from the instant case, and I find that
Respondent’s reliance on that case is misplaced. 10
I therefore find the record establishes that majority support existed for the Union when
the Respondent executed the voluntary recognition agreement and the collective-bargaining
agreements, and that the Respondent recognized the Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining
representative of the Respondent’s unit employees under Section 9(a) of the Act. In addition, I 15
find that the Respondent failed to produce any evidence showing that the Union had, at any time,
lost its majority support in the unit. Levitz Furniture Co., supra at 8.
5. The Respondent was signatory to the contracts that required notice to the Association of
its intent to revoke the Association’s bargaining authority on the behalf of the 20
Respondent
The Respondent’s answer and amended answer admitted the complaint allegations that it
was signatory to the 2005–2010 and 2010–2013 collective-bargaining agreements between the
Union and the Association, that those contracts authorized the Association to bargain on 25
Respondent’s behalf with the Union, including negotiations for any renewal or subsequent
agreements, and that Respondent’s authorization of the Association to bargain subsequent
agreements continued unless Respondent provided timely and unequivocal notice revoking the
Association’s authority. (GC Exh. 1(c), (e), and (i).) In that regard, the 2010–2013 contract
specifically provides at page 3: 30
The Employer expressly agrees that the Painting and Decorating Contractors of
America, Chapter #2 affiliated with the Finishing Contractors of America (FCA),
(hereinafter referred to as “PDCA”) will represent the Employer for all collective
bargaining purposes during the term of this Agreement, specifically including any 35
and all negotiations with the Union for any renewal or subsequent Agreements,
unless the Employer serves timely and unequivocal notice otherwise in
accordance with the provisions of applicable law. (GC Exh. 7(a) p. 3.)
On this issue, Wienstroer’s undisputed testimony also confirmed that the Association is 40
authorized by the contractors to bargain with the Union on their behalf, and those bargaining
rights roll over to the successor agreements unless the employers withdraw their bargaining
rights from the Association by written, timely, and unequivocal notice to the Association.
45
JD–12–15
21
6. The Respondent failed to give timely and unequivocal notice revoking the Association’s
bargaining authority.
The Respondent does not dispute that it signed the 2010–2013 contract, but it denied the
complaint allegation that it failed to give timely and unequivocal notice to the Union or the 5
Association revoking the Association’s authority to bargain collectively on the Respondent’s
behalf with the Union. Wienstroer credibly testified that the Respondent is a member of the
Association pursuant to its execution of the 2005–2010 and 2010–2013 contracts, and it failed to
give notice, timely or otherwise, to the Association withdrawing those bargaining rights. Despite
the Respondent’s assertion that it provided the Association notice, the record is devoid of any 10
evidence that establishes the Respondent provided the Association or the Union with “timely and
unequivocal notice” that it was revoking the Association’s authority to bargain on its behalf, as
required by the contract.
In its brief, the Respondent’s asserts that its April 22, 2013 letter notifying the Union that 15
it would not be “renewing a bargaining agreement” constitutes notice to the Association required
under the contract. The Respondent argues that the 2010–2013 contact was an 8(f) agreement
and it thereby terminated the 8(f) bargaining relationship with timely notice to the Union.
As mentioned above, I find that the bargaining relationship was pursuant to Section 9(a) 20
of the Act, not 8(f). However, even assuming that the parties maintained an 8(f) relationship,
and the Respondent’s April 22, 2013 notice was sufficient to notify the Union of its intent to
terminate the contract, it is nevertheless undisputed that the contracts at issue require the
Respondent to also provide the Association notice of its intent to revoke the Association’s
authority to bargain on the Respondent’s behalf. As set forth above, that language clearly 25
provides that the Association will represent the Respondent for all collective-bargaining
purposes “specifically including any and all negotiations with the Union for any renewal or
subsequent Agreements, unless the [Respondent] serves timely and unequivocal notice otherwise
in accordance with the provisions of applicable law.” (GC Exh. 6(a) and 7(a).) The Respondent’s
theory is therefore flawed, as it neglects to grasp the distinction between a notice informing the 30
Union of its intent to terminate the contract under section 44 “Termination” of the contract, and
notice to the Association of its intent to revoke the Association’s authority to bargain on
Respondent’s behalf. The Board has specifically held that “. . . an employer’s withdrawal of
negotiating authority from a multiemployer association is an action distinct from terminating a
contract. Rome Electrical Systems, Inc., 349 NLRB 745, 747 (2007), enfd. 286 Fed. Appx. 697 35
(11th Cir. 2008); See, e.g., Kirkpatrick Electric, 314 NLRB 1047, 1049–-1052 (1994); Leapley
Co., 278 NLRB 981, 982–984 (1986).
The Board has held that an employer in the construction industry may become bound to
successive 8(f) as well as 9(a) contracts if the employer expressly provides continuing consent to 40
a multiemployer association to bind it to future contacts, and the employer has not taken timely
or effective action consistent with its own agreement, to withdraw that continuing consent from
the association. Seedorff Masonry, Inc., 360 NRLB No. 107, at slip op. 6 (2014), citing Haas
Electric, Inc., 334 NLRB 865, 866 fn. 7 (2001), enf. denied on other grounds 299 F.3d 23 (1st
Cir. 2002); James Luterbach Construction Co., 315 NLRB 976, 781 fn. 11 (1994); Kephart 45
Plumbing, 285 NLRB 612 (1987); Reliable Electric Co., 286 NLRB 834 (1987).
JD–12–15
22
In analyzing this issue, I find that the Board’s decisions in Haas Electric, supra, and
Seedorff Masonry, supra, are on point with the instant case. In Haas Electric, the respondent
employer signed a letter of assent binding it to the contract, and authorizing the multiemployer
association with bargaining authority, unless and until that authority was terminated in
accordance with pre-prescribed procedures. Id. The respondent sent a letter to the union and 5
association announcing its intent to terminate the agreement with the union and withdraw
recognition. Id. at 867. Like the instant case, the respondent claimed its letter constituted timely
revocation of the association’s authority to bargain on its behalf. The Board disagreed, finding
that the letter only purported to terminate the contract and to withdraw recognition from the
union; the letter said nothing about revoking the association’s authority to negotiate on the 10
respondent’s behalf. Id. The Board held that the respondent did not timely revoke the
association’s authority, and the respondent was bound by the contract extension that the
association negotiated on its behalf. On that basis, the Board found that the respondent violated
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act when it abrogated the contract, made unilateral changes to
working conditions, and withdrew recognition from the union. Id. 15
In Seedorff Masonry, the Board found that the respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1)
of the Act by refusing to abide by the terms of the 2010–2014 contract between the
multiemployer association and the union. Id. Similar to the instant case, the respondent in
Seedorff Masonry signed an agreement (an individual building agreement) which expressly gave 20
continuing consent to the association to bind it to successive collective-bargaining agreements,
and the respondent never revoked that authorization. Id. The Board found the respondent was
obligated to abide by the provisions of the contract, and its failure to do so violated the Act.
In the instant case, as in Haas Electric and Seedorff Masonry, the 2010–2013 contract 25
expressly provides for continuing authority to the Association to bargain on Respondent’s behalf
for any renewal or subsequent agreements, unless Respondent provides timely and unequivocal
notice revoking the Association’s authority to bargain. While Boston testified that she was
aware that she joined the Association, she was subject to the collective-bargaining agreements,
and she had an agreement with the Association to represent her and bargain with the Union on 30
her behalf,12 she also admitted at the hearing that she did not provide notice to the Association
rescinding the Association’s right and authority to bargain on Respondent’s behalf.13 Based on
the well established case law, I find that the Respondent’s notice to the Union of its desire to
terminate the contract in its April 22, 2013 letter did not constitute notice to the Union or the
Association of the Respondent’s desire to revoke the Association’s authority to bargain on the 35
Respondent’s behalf. In accordance with the 2010–2013 contract language, since the Respondent
did not provide timely and unequivocal notice to the Association, the Association retained the
authority to bargain for and bind the Respondent to the successor agreement which is effective
by its terms from September 17, 2013 through August 31, 2016 (2013–2016 contract). Rome
Electric Systems, supra at 747; Seedorff Masonry; Haas Electric, supra. Despite the fact that this 40
finding is premised on my determination that the Union is the exclusive 9(a) representative of the
Respondent’s unit employees, I note that I would reach the same conclusion if the parties’
relationship was established pursuant to Section 8(f) of the Act.

12 Tr. 131–132.
13 Tr. 142–143.
JD–12–15
23
7. The Association and the Union executed a successor agreement effective September 17,
2013 through August 31, 2016 (2013–2016 contract), and the Respondent withdrew
recognition from the Union and failed to abide by the terms of the 2013–2016 contract,
thereby violating Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act5
The complaint alleges that the Union and the Association negotiated and executed a
collective-bargaining on September 17, 2013, but the Respondent denied that allegation in its
answer and amended answer. However, Wienstroer and Smith both credibly testified that the
2013–2016 contract was executed by the Union and Association, and it was identified and 10
admitted into evidence without objection from the Respondent. The Respondent also failed to
offer any evidence to rebut the execution of the 2013–2016 contract. Accordingly, I find that the
successor 2013–2016 contract was negotiated and executed by the Union and the Association.
The Respondent admitted in its answer and amended answer that effective August 31, 15
2013, it withdrew its recognition from the Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining
representative of its unit employees. The Respondent also admitted it refused to adhere to the
2013–2016 collective-bargaining agreement, which became effective September 17, 2013.
As mentioned above, I find that the Respondent’s relationship with the Union was 20
pursuant to Section 9(a) of the Act. Under Section 9(a) the Respondent’s associated obligation
to bargain continued after the 2010–2013 contract expired, unless and until the Union is shown to
have lost majority support, which in this case never happened. Levitz Furniture Co., supra. I find
that since the Respondent failed to provide timely written and unequivocal notice to the
Association revoking the Association’s authority to bargain on its behalf prior to the expiration 25
of the 2010–2013 collective-bargaining agreement, the Respondent became bound by the terms
of the 2013–2016 successor contract. Therefore, by its withdrawal of recognition from the Union
effective August 31, 2013, and its subsequent failure to abide by the terms of the 2013–2016
collective-bargaining agreement which was effective September 17, 2013, between the
Association and the Union, the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. 30
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 35
2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The International Union of Painters and Allied Trades, District Council #2 and its
successor, the International Union of Painters and Allied Trades, District Council #58, are labor
organizations within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.40
3. At all material times since April 13, 2009, based on Section 9(a) of the Act, the Union has
been the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the following appropriate unit:
All journeymen painters, tapers and drywall finishers, paper and wall covering 45
hangers, apprentices, pre-apprentices, summer help and working foremen
JD–12–15
24
employed by the Employer, excluding office clerical and professional employees,
guards and supervisors as defined in the Act.
4. By withdrawing recognition from the Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining
representative of the unit employees on August 31, 2013, and since September 17, 2013, failing 5
and refusing to comply with and abide by the terms of the 2013–2016 collective-bargaining
agreement between the Association and the Union, the Respondent has refused to bargain in
good faith with the Union as the exclusive representative of the employees in the unit described
above, in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) and of the Act.
10
5. The above unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and
(7) of the Act.
6. The Respondent has not otherwise violated the Act.
15
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I shall
order it to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate 20
the policies of the Act.
I shall require the Respondent to recognize and bargain with the Union, and to honor and
comply with the terms and conditions of the 2013–2016 collective-bargaining agreement
between the Association and the Union. I shall also require the Respondent to make whole the 25
unit employees for any loss of earnings and other benefits suffered as a result of the
Respondent’s unlawful repudiation of, and failure to abide by, the collective-bargaining
agreement with the Union. The make-whole remedy shall be computed in accordance with Olge
Protection Service, 183 NLRB 682 (1970), enfd. 444 F.2d 502 (6th Cir. 1971), with interest at
the rate prescribed in New Horizons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987), compounded 30
daily as prescribed in Kentucky River Medical Center, 356 NLRB No. 8 (2010).
I shall further require the Respondent to make all contractually required contributions to
the Union’s fringe benefit funds that it failed to make since September 17, 2013, including any
additional amounts due the funds in accordance with Merryweather Optical Co., 240 NLRB 35
1213, 1216 fn. 7 (1979). Moreover, I shall require the Respondent to reimburse the unit
employees for any expenses resulting from its failure to make the required contributions, as set
forth in Kraft Plumbing & Heating, 252 NLRB 891, 891 fn. 2 (1980), enfd. mem. 661 F.2d 940
(9th Cir. 1981). Such amounts are to be computed in the manner set forth in Ogle Protection
Service, supra, with interest as prescribed in New Horizons for the Retarded, supra, compounded 40
daily as prescribed in Kentucky River Medical Center, supra.
Finally, I shall require the Respondent to compensate the unit employees for any adverse
income tax consequences of receiving their backpay in one lump sum and file a report with the
Social Security Administration allocating the backpay to the appropriate calendar quarters for 45
each employee.
JD–12–15
25
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law, and on the entire record, I issue the
following recommended:14
ORDER
5
The Respondent, Boston & Associates, LLC, Florissant, Missouri, its officers, agents,
and representatives, shall
1. Cease and desist from
10
(a) Withdrawing recognition from and refusing to recognize and bargain in good faith
with the International Union of Painters and Allied Trades, District Council #58
(Union), as the collective-bargaining representative of its employees in the
appropriate bargaining unit with respect to wages, hours, working conditions, and
other terms and conditions of employment. 15
(b) Failing and refusing to abide by and comply with the terms and conditions of the
September 17, 2013 through August 31, 2016 collective-bargaining agreement
between the Union and the Painting and Decorating Contractors of America, Chapter
#2, affiliated with the Finishing Contractors of America (the Association), which is 20
authorized to bargain on Respondent’s behalf, and, absent timely and unequivocal
written notice to the Union and the Association, any automatic renewal or extension
of it.
(c) In any like or related manner, restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of the 25
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.

(a) Recognize and bargain with the Union, and honor and abide by the terms and 30
conditions of the collective-bargaining agreement between the Association and the
Union that is effective from September 17, 2013 through August 31, 2016.
(b) Make whole all affected bargaining unit employees for any loss of earnings and other
benefits suffered as a result of the Respondent’s failure to honor and abide by the 35
terms of the collective-bargaining agreement, with interest, in the manner prescribed
in the remedy section of this decision.
(c) Make all contractually required contributions to the Union’s fringe benefit funds that
the Respondent has failed to make since September 17, 2013, and reimburse the unit 40
employees, with interest, for any expenses resulting from its failure to make the
required payments under the collective-bargaining agreement, in the manner
prescribed in the remedy section of this decision.

14 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations, the
findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted
by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
JD–12–15
26
(d) Compensate the unit employees for any adverse income tax consequences of
receiving a lump-sum backpay award, and file a report with the Social Security
Administration allocating the backpay award to the appropriate calendar quarters for
each employee.5
(e) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request or such additional time as the Regional
Director may allow for good cause shown, provide at a reasonable place designated
by the Board or its agents, all payroll records, social security payment records,
timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records, including an 10
electronic copy of such records if stored in electronic form, necessary to analyze the
amount of backpay due under the terms of the Order.
(f) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its Florissant, Missouri facility,
copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix.”15 Copies of the notice, on forms 15
provided by the Regional Director for Region 14, after being signed by the
Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent and
maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places, including all places where
notices to employees are customarily posted. In addition to physical posting of paper
notices, notices shall be distributed electronically, such as by email, posting on an 20
intranet or an internet site, and/or other electronic means, if the Respondent
customarily communicates with its employees by such means. Reasonable steps shall
be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material. If the Respondent has gone out of business or closed
the facility involved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at 25
its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current employees and former employees
employed by the Respondent at any time since August 31, 2013.
(g) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a sworn
certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the 30
steps that the Respondent has taken to comply.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint is dismissed insofar as it alleges
violations of the Act not specifically found.
35
Dated, Washington, D.C. March 4, 2015
__________________________
Thomas M. Randazzo40
Administrative Law Judge

15 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice
reading “Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations
Board.”
JD–12–15
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has
ordered us to post and obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO:
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose a representative to bargain with us on your behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities.
WE WILL NOT withdraw recognition from or refuse to recognize and bargain in good faith
with International Union of Painters and Allied Trades, District Council #58 (the Union), as the
exclusive collective-bargaining representative of our employees in the following appropriate
unit:
All journeyman painters, tapers and drywall finishers, paper and wall covering
hangers, apprentices, pre-apprentices, summer help and working foreman
employed by the Employer, excluding office clerical and professional employees,
guards and supervisors as defined in the Act.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL honor and comply with the terms and conditions of the September 17, 2013 through
August 31, 2016 collective-bargaining agreement between the Union and the Painting and
Decorating Contractors of America, Chapter #2, affiliated with the Finishing Contractors of
America (the Association), which is authorized to bargain on our behalf, and, absent timely and
unequivocal written notice to the Union and the Association, any automatic renewal or extension
of it.
WE WILL make whole all bargaining unit employees for any loss of earnings and other benefits
they may have suffered as a result of our failure to honor the 2013–2016 collective-bargaining
agreement.
WE WILL make all contractually required contributions to the Union’s fringe benefit funds that
we have failed to make since September 17, 2013, and reimburse all our unit employees, with
interest, for any expenses resulting from our failure to make the required payments under the
collective-bargaining agreement.
JD–12–15
WE WILL compensate all unit employees adversely affected for any adverse income tax
consequences of receiving a lump-sum backpay award, and WE WILL file a report with the
Social Security Administration allocating the backpay award to the appropriate calendar quarters
for each employee.
BOSTON & ASSOCIATES, LLC
(Employer)
Dated: ____________ By: ______________________________________________
(Representative) (Title)
The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to enforce the National Labor
Relations Act. It conducts secret-ballot elections to determine whether employees want union representation and it
investigates and remedies unfair labor practices by employers and unions. To find out more about your rights under
the Act and how to file a charge or election petition, you may speak confidentially to any agent with the Board’s
Regional Office set forth below or you may call the Board’s toll-free number 1-866-667-NLRB (1-866-667-6572).
Hearing impaired persons may contact the Agency’s TTY service at 1-866-315-NLRB. You may also obtain
information from the Board’s website: www.nlrb.gov.
1222 Spruce St. Rm. 8 302
Saint Louis, MO 63103-2818
(314) 539-7770
Hours: 8:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m.
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at www.nlrb.gov/case/14-CA-119200 or by using the QR code
below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board,
1099 14th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling (202) 273-1940.
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING AND MUST NOT BE
ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY OTHER MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS NOTICE OR
COMPLIANCE WITH ITS PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE REGIONAL OFFICE’S
COMPLIANCE OFFICER, (314) 539-7770.