Bosch, Robert, Corporation

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jul 1, 1981

256 N.L.R.B. 1036 (N.L.R.B. 1981)

1036 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Robert Bosch Corporation and International Associ-
ation of Machinists and Aerospace Workers,
AFL-CIO. Cases 11-CA-8160, 11-CA-8256,
11-CA-8960, and I -RC-4617
July 1, 1981
DECISION AND ORDER
On December 23, 1980, Administrative Law
Judge Benjamin Schlesinger issued the attached
Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, Respond-
ent and the General Counsel filed exceptions and
briefs in support thereof.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and
briefs, and has decided to affirm the rulings, find-
ings,' and conclusions of the Administrative Law
Judge and to adopt his recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re-
lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge and
hereby orders that the Respondent, Robert Bosch
Corporation, Charleston Heights, South Carolina,
its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
take the action set forth in the said recommended
Order.
i We agree with the Administrative Law Judge that Respondent's no-
tation of unexcused absences on employee Pollard's timecard for time
spent as a union election observer constituted conduct which could rea-
sonably tend to coerce employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights
and therefore violates Sec 8(a)(1) of the Act Time-O-Mati. Inc. v.
N.L.R.R., 264 F.2d 96, 99- I(X) (7th Cir. 1959). We therefore filnd it ul
necessary to determine whelher such conduct also violated Sc 8(a)(3) of
the Act
Respondent and the General Counsel have excepted to certain credibil-
ity findings made by the Administrative Lasw Judge It is the Board's es
tahlished policy not to overrule an administrative lasw judge's resolaltiols
with respect to credibility unless the clear preponderance of all of the
relevant evidence convinces us that the resolutions are incorrect. Sland-
ard Dry Wall Product. Inc., 91 NRB 544 (1950), enfd 188 F 2d 362 (3d
Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for
reversing his findings.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
BENJAMIN SCHLESINGER, Administrative Law Judge:
Pursuant to unfair labor practice charges filed by Inter-
national Association of Machinists and Aerospace Work-
ers, AFL-CIO (herein the Union), a consolidated com-
plaint was issued by the Regional Director for Region
11,' alleging that Respondent Robert Bosch Corporation
I The relevant docket entries in the initial stages of this proceeding are
as follows: A complaint was issued in Case IICA-8160 on March 28,
1979, a second consolidated complaint was issued in Cases I -CA-8 160,
Il-CA-8256, and I 1-RC-4617 on June 8, 1979; and an amended consoli-
dated complaint issued in all cases on November 19, 1979. The charge in
Case I I-CA-8160 was filed on February 15, 1979; the charge in Case II-
256 NLRB No. 158
violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by discharging
employees James Coleson, Bobby Russell, and Sandra
Varner on November 10, 1978, and Lanier Waiters on
February 23, 1979, and by threatening various employees
with discharge, interrogating various employees concern-
ing their union activities and the union activities of other
employees, promising benefits to employees, creating an
impression of surveillance, restricting employees' conver-
sations with other employees, threatening to close the
plant if the Union were selected as the employees' bar-
gaining representative, and threatening employees with
unspecified reprisals for promoting the Union.
Originally, the amended complaint alleged many more
unfair labor practices and was consolidated with Case
11-RC-4617 for the purpose of receiving evidence per-
taining to the Union's objections to a representation elec-
tion held on February 5, 1979. During the course of the
initial hearing, however, many of the unfair labor prac-
tice allegations were withdrawn pursuant to a stipulation
settling those allegations, and the representation proceed-
ing was severed from the instant proceeding.2 Respond-
ent denied that it violated the Act in any respect; and
hearings were held before me in Charleston, South Caro-
lina, on December 3-6 and 10-13, 1979.
As part of the settlement, Respondent and the Union
agreed that a new representation election would be held,
and at the conclusion of the hearing of December 13,
1979, the hearing was adjourned sine die, pending com-
pliance with the settlement agreement and in order to
ensure that the forthcoming election, scheduled for Feb-
ruary 15, 1980, would be held free of improper conduct.
The election was held, and the Union filed objections to
it and additional unfair labor practice charges on March
3, 1980, which were later amended on April 21, 1980. An
unfair labor practice complaint issued on April 22, 1980,
in Case I -CA-8960, and on May 5, 1980, the Regional
Director issued a Second Supplemental Report on Objec-
tions in Case 11l-RC-4617 consolidating the unfair labor
practice and representation cases. The General Counsel
then moved, without substantial opposition, to consoli-
date those cases with the proceedings still pending before
me, a motion which I granted on May 20, 1980.
The hearing reconvened in Charleston and was held
on May 28-30, 1980, at which all parties had the oppor-
tunity to examine and cross-examine witnesses. Further,
the parties stipulated in evidence facts relating to some
of the newly alleged violations and further agreed that
the previously settled allegations of unfair labor practices
would not be tried, notwithstanding the General Coun-
sel's motion to vacate the previous settlement agreement.
Instead, the parties agreed that, if I found that new viola-
tions of the Act had been committed, I could set aside
the agreement, require the posting of a new notice, and
order appropriate cease-and-desist relief.
CA-8256 swas filed on April 2, 1979, and amended on April 4 and May
22, 1979.
" Although Respondent agreed, as part of the settlement, to post a
notice to its employees, it did not admit that it violated the Act.
ROBERT BOSCH CORPORATION 1037
Upon the entire record,3 including my consideration
of the briefs filed by the General Counsel and Respond-
ent, and my observation of the demeanor of the wit-
nesses, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. JURISDICTION
I find, as Respondent admits, that it is now and has
been at all times material herein a New York corporation
having a plant in Charleston Heights, South Carolina,
where it is engaged in the manufacture of fuel injections
for diesel engines. During the 12 months preceding the
issuance of the original complaint, which period is repre-
sentative of all times material herein, Respondent re-
ceived goods and raw materials from points directly out-
side the State of South Carolina valued in excess of
$50,000 and manufactured and shipped directly to points
outside the State of South Carolina products valued in
excess of $50,000. I therefore find, as Respondent admits,
that it is now and has been at all times material herein an
employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
I further find, as Respondent admits, that the Union is
a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5)
of the Act. The unit agreed to be appropriate is:
All production, maintenance, and quality control
employees, including set up persons, heat
treat/metal finishers A, expediter,
expediter/planners, apprentices, production secre-
tary, quality control secretary, maintenance secre-
tary, shipping and receiving clerks, and
chauffeur/mail clerk, excluding all office clerical
employees, technicians and group leaders, and pro-
fessional employees, guards and supervisors as de-
fined in the Act.
II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Preliminary Statement
In or about late September 1978, the Union com-
menced an organizational drive among the employees of
Respondent. An organizing committee was formed, of
which Coleson, Waiters, Russell, and Varner were mem-
bers. Varner's husband, a union shop steward at nearby
Lockheed Corporation, was one of the principal organiz-
ers at Respondent's premises. Many of the allegations of
unfair labor practices at the first hearing stem from the
initial organization and the subsequent discharge of Cole-
son, Russell, and Varner on November 10, 1978. Other
allegations of unfair labor practices pertain to conduct
prior to the election held on February 5, 1979, and the
3 The General Counsel moved to correct certain errors hich ap-
peared in the official transcript of the hearings held in December 1979
Respondent apparently agreed to all of the suggested correctionll. except
one. I find that the General Counsel's motion accurately reflected what
transpired and grant the motion in its entirety I also grant the General
Counsel's unopposed motiorns to correct the record of the hearing held in
May 1980 and to supplement the record by adding G.C Exh. I(x), which
was inadvertently omitted. The entire record is corrected accordingly
subsequent termination of Waiters on February 23, 1979.
Yet other allegations concern conduct prior to and after
the February 15, 1980, election.
B. The Discharges of Coleson, Russell, and Varner,
and Related Unfair Labor Practices
The tale of the discharge of Varner, Coleson, and Rus-
sell starts on November 9, 1978, with a poke in Sandra
Varner's sides, termed by most witnesses as a "goose." 4
Varner had been suffering from a back ailment and when
Russell, who was trying to collect money for a party for
Supervisor Randy Craven, jabbed her while she was
working at a machine, she stood up, further wrenched
her back, was in severe pain, shouted "g- d-, Bobby,"
and went off in tears to the nurse's office. When she ar-
rived there, she told nurse Rosemary Raynall that she
had been "goosed" in the sides, prompting Raynall to
immediately notify Pat Pruitt, Respondent's production
manager.
Pruitt came to the nurse's office, talked with Varner,
and later took a signed statement from her relating the
circumstances of her injury. In her statement, she not
only named Russell as the immediate cause of her injury
but also, upon questioning by Pruitt, accused Russell and
Coleson of touching her in her private parts and also
told of poor supervision of her department by Craven.
Following up on these accusations, Pruitt first inter-
viewed Coleson and attempted to obtain a signed state-
ment from him regarding Varner's charges. Coleson, al-
though refusing to sign a statement, admitted hugging
both men and women and patting them on their shoul-
ders, buttocks, and thighs. Pruitt then confronted em-
ployee Russell. Russell, although denying that there
were any sexual connotations in what he did, blamed
Varner for instigating any advances, implying that she
was "a tease," and stating that once, when "he was sit-
ting down on [a bench] . . . [Varner] came up to him &
pressed her vagina against his knee & hunched." He also
alleged in his signed statement that he felt that Varner's
charge against him was a "result of his anti-union" senti-
ments. As a result of these interviews, Pruitt suspended
both Russell and Coleson on November 9 but continued
his investigation of their conduct and that of Varner.
Russell's statement included his allegation that the
"hunching" incident was witnessed by employees Brenda
Sizemore, Carl Osborne, and Mary Rankin, whom Pruitt
proceeded to question. Rankin did not recall any such in-
cident but stated that Russell had a habit of checking her
badge which was on her "bust" pocket and that, when
she requested Coleson to help her in her work, Coleson
asked what he got for it. In addition, Coleson frequently
put his arms around her and, when requested not to do
so, would stop "only temporarily." Sizemore signed a
statement implicating both Russell and Coleson in taking
"certain liberties with female employees but that it was
just in a jesting manner." She further stated that "one of
the female employees placed her vagina against the setup
man's (Bobby Russell) knee & hunched, & that she had
4A "goose" i defined in the Amerian Heritage l)ictionary of the
English Language as "an Inflirewarned lab in the backside"
ROBERT BOSCH ORPORATION 7
1038 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
seen the same employee make advances toward the setup
men." That and other statements were apparently suffi-
cient to prompt Pruitt to convert the suspensions of Co-
leson and Russell into discharges and, further, to dis-
charge Varner, which he did later on November 10,
1978.
1. The pivotal question
Although the facts are somewhat more racy than the
normal 8(a)(3) discharge case, the nub of the controversy
involves the motivation of Respondent-that is, was Re-
spondent motivated by its attempt to discourage the em-
ployees' union activities, in which event there would be
a violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, or was Re-
spondent motivated solely by the improper conduct
which Respondent believed was engaged in by these
three employees? Quite predictably, the General Counsel
contends that Respondent's motive was violative of the
Act and that the motive may be determined, in part,
from the various 8(a)(l) violations alleged in the com-
plaint.
The difficulty he faces, however, is that Respondent
conducted a rather thorough investigation of the dis-
ctarges, and both Varner and Russell signed statements
which conflict with the General Counsel's theory of this
case. Although he attempts to explain away those state-
menits-Varner, because she was under medication and
"groggy," and Russell, because he did not read it--those
explanations are, at best, lame. Indeed, both Varner and
Russell conceded the truth of much of the contents of
thleir statements. Further, it is rather fanciful that the
General Counsel should urge in his brief that Varner's
recollection in December 1979 of events which occurred
on November 9, 1978, is absolutely accurate, while si-
multaneously urging that she was too drowsy to function
coherently on that day. If the latter fact is accurate, one
wonders how she was able to vividly recall at the hear-
ing events that she was too "groggy" to vouch for when
they were occurring.
Counsel for the General Counsel and Respondent have
submitted thorough briefs detailing inconsistencies and
contradictions in the testimony of various witnesses.
There are a multitude, many meaningful and many only
careless. The inconsistencies between Varner's and Rus-
sell's oral testimony and written statements are apparent,
as are those appearing in Coleson's testimony and his in-
vestigatory affidavit. Not so apparent are the inconsisten-
cies in some of Respondent's proof. For example, Randy
Craven, supervisor of the three discharged employees,
insisted that although he knew of Respondent's desire to
obtain a list of union adherents he never reported to
management that Russell had reported his attendance at
a union meeting. Yet, Pruitt testified that he knew that
Russell had spoken to Craven and revealed this informa-
tion. There is no way to explain Craven's failure to dis-
close his conversation and Pruitt's knowledge of it.
These are merely examples. They and other contradic-
tions and inconsistencies, as well as demeanor, lead me to
conclude that many of the witnesses were not wholly
candid or, at least, that their recollections were inaccu-
rate; and the issues may be resolved only by culling out
the truth from misstatements and, on the basis of prob-
abilities, separating accuracies from inaccuracies, 5 and
often crediting some of a witness' testimony, but not all. 6
2. The discriminatees' union activities and
allegations of interrogations and threats
Respondent contends that the General Counsel did not
prove it had any knowledge of the union activities of the
three discriminatees. Varner's husband was a shop ste-
ward at a nearby industrial plant and was instrumental in
helping to organize Respondent's employees, including
attending meetings, leafletting Respondent's premises,
and attempting to persuade employees to sign cards for
the Union. Varner, too, was active in her support of the
Union. I credit Coleson's testimony that approximately 2
weeks after union cards were distributed Craven asked
him if he knew or told him that Respondent knew that
Varner's husband was a union organizer at Lockheed
and was trying to organize Respondent's employees. 7
Varner also testified that Craven admitted that he had
earlier known her husband. Russell stated that she and
her husband had interrogated him about his antiunion ac-
tivities, a fact known to both Craven and Pruitt. There is
sufficient testimony in the record to demonstrate, at the
very least, that Respondent had knowledge of Varner's
husband's union activities and inferred from his union ad-
herence that Varner similarly favored the Union.
I also find that Respondent was well aware of Cole-
son's activities. Coleson testified that he went to union
meetings, that he was on the Union's organizing commit-
tee, that he signed an authorization card, and that he so-
licited cards from other employees. In the middle or
latter part of October, the first week that he handed out
cards, Craven walked up to him and asked if he was
going to help to organize a union at Respondent's plant;
Coleson replied yes. This is sufficient to demonstrate that
Respondent knew of his activities and adherence to the
Union.
I find, however, that Russell was not known to Re-
spondent as a union activist or adherent. Rather, I find
that Russell was opposed to the Union and was willing
to give information to Respondent about union meetings
and other employees who not only attended the meetings
but also were union adherents. Russell openly admitted
this in his signed statement given to Pruitt by stating that
he felt that Varner's charge against him was a result of
I .'L.R.B. v. Walton AManujcturing Company & Loganville Pants Co,
309 UL.S 404. 408 (1962)
o ;V.L.R.B vr Universal Canera Corporation. 179 F.2d 749. 754 (2d Cir
]950)
' I find that Cleson nmade no reply to Craven, which is consistent
with Coleson'S investigatory affidavit hut contrary to Coleson's testimony
at the hearing
s Coleson also testified to a conversation held in the cafeteria in the
presence f various supervisors, during which he swas asked by someone
why he thought the employees nccded a union. Although Coleson testi-
fied n redirect exa;minatiom that everyone at the table heard the question
asked of him and his reply, which included complaints about being rit-
ten up for tardiness, working overtime, and the computation of vacation
time, I credit instead his investigatory affidavit in which he stated that
only Russell and another setup man (an employee) may have overheard
this conversatioin That implies that there were no supervisors present (or,
at least if they were, they were riot close eniough tol hear Accordingly, I
do not rely upon it as proof of Respondent's knovsledge of his union ac-
tivities
ROBERT BOSCH CORPORATION 1039
his antiunion sentiments and that Varner and her hus-
band had interrogated him regarding his antiunion activi-
ties. It may well be argued that his statement was some-
what self-serving, in an attempt to ensure that he would
not be disciplined by Respondent as a result of the
"goosing" incident. However, it would not serve his pur-
pose to lie to Pruitt because Pruitt was aware that Rus-
sell was helping management in its antiunion election
campaign by willingly handing over information to
Craven, if not also to others.
The question left unresolved is whether Russell's ac-
tions resulted from his own willingness or from Re-
spondent's interrogation of him. It is clear that Russell
frequently met with Pruitt early in the mornings, includ-
ing the mornings after union meetings, at which time,
Russell testified, Pruitt interrogated him about what hap-
pened at the union meetings the nights before. Pruitt uni-
formly denied any interrogation of Russell; however, it is
clear from Craven's testimony that management was
most interested in ascertaining those employees who fa-
vored the Union. This is not to say there was a violation
of the Act to express such interest and to maintain a list
of prounion and antiunion employees, as Respondent did;
but it is clear that it is consistent with Respondent's aims
that interrogation may have been the means to obtain a
count of how much support the Union had.
On the other hand, Russell's truthfulness is subject to
question not only because he denied his antiunion role
but also because his testimony about each act of interro-
gation-three to four times a week by both Craven and
Pruitt, and once by Hugh Burleigh, Respondent's vice
president of manufacturing-was almost identical, with
each supervisor asking the same questions, including an
incessant repetition of whether employee Richard Pol-
lard, a known union adherent, was present and partici-
pated at the meeting. I find Russell's testimony most im-
probable. My conclusion is bolstered by Russell's state-
ment given to Pruitt that "he voluntarily gave informa-
tion to supervision and management and was not ques-
tioned or interrogated regarding his activities," an admis-
sion that no violation of the Act occurred. Russell at-
tempted to explain this apparent discrepancy by testify-
ing, first, that he did not read the statement, having been
calmed by Pruitt into a belief that the statement was
really meaningless and, second, that the quoted sentence
meant only that he had not been questioned by Pruitt in
the giving of the statement.
Russell's explanation is unconvincing. It was entirely
unreasonable for Russell to believe that the signing of
the statement was meaningless, when Russell was imme-
diately and peremptorily suspended. Surely, Russell
knew that he was in trouble and could reasonably expect
that the investigation was not merely a meaningless for-
mality. Rather, I believe Pruitt's testimony that he asked
Russell to read his statement, and Russell complied.9
Russell's explanation of the quoted sentence is even more
improbable. First, the sentence follows Russell's state-
ment that Varner and her husband had interrogated him
about "his anti-union activities"; and it was those "activi-
9 Others of the General Counsel's witnesses testified that Pruitl had
asked them to read their statements befoire signing them
ties" to which Russell was referring. Second, it is clear,
as Russell testified, that during Pruitt's interview with
Russell Pruitt asked Russell questions. Accordingly, Rus-
sell's explanation that his admission referred only to his
interview by Pruitt, where he was admittedly questioned,
cannot be credited.
Rather, I find that Russell deliberately concocted his
testimony in an attempt to salvage his employment,' °
and I discredit his testimony, except as may otherwise be
stated herein. As a result, I dismiss the complaint's alle-
gations that Pruitt threatened Russell that the plant
would be closed and moved if the Union successfully or-
ganized Respondent's employees and that Phillip
Schaffner, Respondent's industrial relations manager, in-
terrogated him on November 20, 1978, and gave Russell
the impression of Respondent's surveillance of union
meetings. Rather, I credit Schaffner's denial of such a
conversation and the undenied testimony of Joe McCar-
thy, Respondent's industrial relations specialist, who
stated that Russell called him on November 20 asking
whether his group insurance was still in effect and offer-
ing, without interrogation, information about a union
meeting he attended several days before. Russell's volun-
teering of this information is consistent with his conduct
throughout the entire union campaign.
3. The reason for the discharges
The General Counsel attacks the bona fides of Re-
spondent's actions, claiming that the purported reason of
sexual misconduct was merely a pretext for the employ-
ees' union activities. Because Respondent had no knowl-
edge of Russell's prounion activities and, instead, having
found that Russell was not a union adherent, I conclude
that Russell was not discharged for an illegal motive.
The question remains whether Respondent's discharge of
Varner and Coleson was in violation of the Act.
Much testimony was adduced by the General Counsel
to show that "horseplay" was the general rule in Re-
spondent's plant and that "horseplay" had not been treat-
ed as a major breach of Respondent's code of behavior
for its employees. Conduct such as scaring a fellow em-
ployee, throwing objects, and inserting pellets into air
hoses and shooting them across the room seemed to be
generally tolerated, except when such horseplay was
complained of and a supervisor was quite certain of the
perpetrator whose actions could harm someone. Thus,
Supervisor James Greene credibly testified that, when he
was able to pinpoint an employee who was accused of
having thrown washers or bolts at another employee, he
told the person accused that Respondent's policy was
that, if he were caught, he would receive a written
warning.
Admittedly, Russell was caught in the first instance
with what might loosely be termed "horseplay." that is,
I" Russell exaggerated his alleged involvement with the tl.Ion P'ar-
iculalrly he stated that he sore a union hution and T shirt on numerous
)icalslons When asked whether ruill sas them. Russell stated that he
hoped not No ,itness testificd that Russell xore a union hut ltonI r T-
shirt iand I find that he did not I further find Itlcredlhl i his Iestimrony
that he talked ith Prilit three to four tinlie a reek and 1al the sane time
hoped that I'ruilli would not see the bultton olr shirt
ROBERT BOSCH ORPORATION
1040 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
coming up to Varner from behind and poking her in the
ribs with his fingers. Unfortunately for Russell, his ac-
tions aggravated Varner's previously existing lower back
pain into a more severe sprain which affected her entire
back and sent her crying to the nurse's office. This alone
might be cause for discipline, including discharge, under
Respondent's plant policies. In any event, Russell's origi-
nal actions, however they may be viewed, snowballed
into charges and countercharges by various employees,
one against another, of sexual misconduct or immoral be-
havior, which Respondent's policies clearly prohibited,
under penalty of immediate suspension, subject to dis-
charge or other disciplinary action.
The General Counsel argues that touching between
male and female employees was also the rule and not the
exception. A number of his witnesses testified credibly
that men and women put their arms around each other's
shoulders and waist. Another witness testified that he
saw a male supervisor rub the crotch of a female em-
ployee. The latter denied it, and I credit her denial not
only because she was believable, but also because she tes-
tified that there were several machines between her and
the witness-a fact which would obviously interfere with
the witness' line of sight. In any event, there was no tes-
timony that such "immoral" conduct had been called to
the attention of higher management for their attention.
The conduct of which the three employees were ac-
cused is different, of course, from hugging or putting
one's arm around the shoulder of an employee of the
other sex. It is not necessary for me to impose my own
standards of sexual conduct upon the actions of Re-
spondent, but clearly the touching of a female employee
in her crotch or on her buttocks or breast is something
different from that which most of the General Counsel's
witnesses testified was the norm of the shop. Nor am I
persuaded that Respondent (as the General Counsel sug-
gests) did not take the charges seriously. If anything,
Pruitt appeared to me absolutely self-assured and positive
of his own standards of morality. He and Schaffner were
clearly offended by what they learned from Varner, spe-
cifically that Coleson physically abused her by placing
his hands on sensitive areas of her body; that, despite her
complaints to Coleson, his advances continued; and that
Russell rubbed her back to see whether she wore a bra
and snapped her bra strap.
I credit Pruitt's testimony that both Coleson and Rus-
sell admitted to him they had engaged in at least some
physical contact, although I also credit Coleson's denial
of ever rubbing women in the crotch. I also note that it
was Russell who interjected into the charges and coun-
tercharges his complaint against Varner, that she was the
instigator. This was joined by Coleson, who admitted
hugging and patting, and was further supported by the
testimony of Brenda Cooper who, without prompting, in
order to save the job of Russell, approached Pruitt on
November 10, 1978, accused Varner of being a "pr-k
teaser," and questioned why Respondent would dis-
charge only the two men, without discharging the
woman who initiated it all.
It has often been said that an employer may discharge
or discipline an employee for good reason, or for bad, or
for no reason at all, and that an unfair labor practice may
be found only when an employer discharges an employee
for reasons which violate the Act. There was sufficient
evidence to show that Respondent's motive for the dis-
charge of Varner, Coleson, and Russell was because of
their engaging in what Respondent perceived as sexual
misconduct and immoral behavior. Unless these reasons
may be found to be merely pretextual, no violation of the
Act may be found.
The General Counsel contends that pretext may be
found from Craven's conversation with employee Carl
Osborne on November 10, 1978. Pruitt had just inter-
viewed Osborne about his knowledge of immoral con-
duct in the department. Craven wanted to find out what
had happened and stated that he thought that Respond-
ent was going to get rid of him, that "they are going to
kill two birds with one stone"-Russell and Coleson for
going to union meetings and Craven for supervising a
department which was manufacturing bad parts. He
added that:
Since the union has come in, things had really
gotten tight and . . . they were keeping close
watch on the people, putting everything down on
paper where if they could get enough against a man
on paper, they could just go ahead and let him go.
[The company] had put pressure on the people, and
to try to get something on the organizers, but if
they could get enough on the organizers to let them
go, the rest of the people would run.
Craven denied that this conversation occurred at all,
but I credit Osborne, over Respondent's objections that
he was contradictory and biased because he had been
previously fired by Respondent. I found Osborne more
credible than Craven, who himself had been fired by Re-
spondent on November 10, 1978, along with Varner, Co-
leson, and Russell. In that regard, I find that, as a super-
visor, Craven was warning an employee about the dan-
gers of attending union meetings, an illegal and coercive
threat under Section 8(a)(l) of the Act. Otherwise, I
attach little legal significance to Craven's speculations,
since he was a low-level supervisor and was discharged
along with the three employees. Thus, his statement to
Osborne constituted only his suppositions about, but did
not supply Respondent's true motivation.
However, I am nonetheless disturbed by his inclusion
of Russell as one who should be fired for going to union
meetings, which is inconsistent with Craven's statement
that he thought Russell was opposed to the Union be-
cause he reported to Craven what went on at the meet-
ings. However, Craven may have merely been looking
for a scapegoat for his own shortcomings. Indeed, the
production of bad parts had been going on for at least 3-
4 months, and it is curious that Craven's discharge took
place only concurrently with the discharge of the three
employees. Noting that Pruitt had asked Osborne about
Craven's knowledge of the alleged immoral conduct, it
seems clear-again, notwithstanding Craven's denial-
that Pruitt and Schaffner were genuinely concerned
about the misconduct and fired Craven for that reason,
too, along with his inability to ensure that his department
was producing good parts.
ROBERT^I HOSCH CRPOR)AT[ON~ 1041
The General Counsel further argues that Respondent's
other conduct demonstrates union animus and that it may
be gleaned from Respondent's violations of Section
8(a)(1) that the behavior of the three employees was not
Respondent's true motive. I turn to those violations.
4. The alleged 8(a)(l) violations occurring prior to
the first election
I have previously found that Russell was informing
Respondent's supervisors of union activities within the
plant, that his activities were not the result of interroga-
tion illegal under Section 8(a)(1), and that he was not a
credible witness.
Similarly, I do not credit Craven's denials that he en-
gaged in conduct violative of the Act. I found Craven
generally to be not only untrustworthy but also incapa-
ble of understanding what the Act is intended to prevent
and that Respondent's objective was to ensure that it
would not be exposed to complaints of the commission
of unfair labor practices. Whereas most of the other su-
pervisors seemed to have been instructed in "TIPS" (no
threats, interrogation, promises, and surveillance), Cra-
ven's only impression of instructions was: "Not to talk to
employees about the Union during working hours, we
had to do it on break." When asked what "TIPS" meant
to him, he with some bewilderment answered: "That we
couldn't tip at all about the Union."
With these observations in mind and noting Craven's
admission that he asked Varner what she thought about
the Union, I find it most probable that he engaged in the
8(a)(1) activity attributed to him and that he took seri-
ously management's request for information about who
supported the Union. Specifically, I credit Varner's testi-
mony that in late October 1978 he asked her why she
wanted a Union; and Coleson's testimony that, about the
same time, Craven asked him if he was going to help to
organize a union at Respondent's premises.
I also conclude that it was Craven's impression that
there was a prohibition against talking about the Union
during working time, whereas there was seemingly no
rule prohibiting conversations about any other matter;
and that in Friday meetings conducted from the com-
mencement of the Union's campaign until November 9,
1978, Craven told his department employees that Re-
spondent's rules prohibited them from discussing the
Union during company time. Craven did not deny this,
which I find to be an illegal restriction of employees'
conversations in violation of Section 8(a)(l) of the Act.
Employee Waiters testified that Joseph McCarthy, Re-
spondent's personnel supervisor, gave him similar
instructions in early January 1979, stating that he could
be fired for having such discussions. I find this conduct
to be equally violative of the Act.
The General Counsel further claims that in late Octo-
ber 1978 McCarthy illegally promised benefits to Varner
to induce her to abandon her support for the Union.
Varner testified that McCarthy approached her at her
work table and asked how long she had been working
there and why she had not upgraded her job status
within the department. Varner replied that if she did so,
she would have to deburr, an undesirable job. Varner
also said that a supervisor could veto an employee's
transfer from one department to another and that she
thought she was better off where she was. McCarthy al-
legedly replied with a question whether she thought the
Union was going to change that situation, and Varner
answered that she thought a union would make a differ-
ence. McCarthy then stated, so Varner testified, that he
thought that things could be worked out without a
union, that she ought to bid on the next interesting job
that was posted, and he would see that she got it. Varner
rejected McCarthy's offer, adding that he could have
made it before the union drive, that there was no secu-
rity at Respondent's plant, and that she was going to
continue to attempt to get the Union in.
McCarthy denied any promise of benefits, admitting
only that, upon review of Varner's performance rating,
he was surprised that she had not been raised from her
low grade and approached Varner to ascertain whether a
mistake had been made. She said that, in order to be up-
graded, she would need experience on a machine and she
did not like that kind of work. She further stated that she
was content to remain at her present job until one
opened up that was more to her liking.
I do not credit Varner, because I find it improbable
that she would have stated to McCarthy that she could
not transfer out of her department without the approval
of her supervisor. I find nothing in the record which
would indicate any reason for her saying that. I note
that Varner did in fact bid on three other jobs in differ-
ent departments and was not successful, but her lack of
success was not attributed to the failure of Craven, her
supervisor, to approve her bids. There seems to be no
problem between her and Craven which would indicate
that a bid on a job in another department would be acted
upon unfavorably. In these circumstances, Varner's testi-
mony does not ring true and, finding McCarthy credible
and his testimony logical and probable, I dismiss this al-
legation.
The General Counsel also sets forth several arguments
which, he contends, support the conclusion that the dis-
charge of the three employees was discriminatorily moti-
vated. I have considered them and reject them. Specifi-
cally, I find that Respondent's reasons for the discharge
did not shift. The most that may be said is that individual
representatives of management emphasized different fac-
tors to support the discharges. 12 There is no requirement
that they must be unanimous in their evaluation of the
conduct. Nor do I find that the investigation was "clear-
ly skewed" to reach a desired result by disregarding fa-
vorable testimony and emphasizing only statements ad-
verse to the three employees or that Respondent depart-
" The General Counsel argues hat this statement was not spcificaillN
denied hb McCarthy, hereas other portions of Varner's narration were
Howeer. find a denial implicit in McCarthy's lestimon>
2'" ruitt and Schaffner made vague references to violations of the
Equal Employ ment Opportunili Act in support of their decision to ter-
minate Coleson and Russell After hearing. Respondent submitted certain
newly proposed regulations of the Equal Employment Opportuniy Com-
mission and one judicial decision to demonstrate that their reliance was
ntut fartlcheld The (Jeneral Counsel moved to strike henm front consid-
erationll he momtioti is denied They are matters of public record which
clearl may be considered lto\cer. I do not find them helpful in ascer-
taining Respondent's supers isors' state of mind on November 9 and 10,
1978
RBER OSCH CORPORATION 04
1042 DECISIONS OF NAlIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ed from past practice in discharging the three employees
(if, indeed, there was a past practice).
It is true, as the General Counsel correctly argues in
his brief, that the testimony of Craven, Pruitt, and
Schaffner was contradictory and inconsistent regarding
knowledge of "immoral conduct" prior to November 9,
1978, but such pales in comparison with the inconsisten-
cies and contradictions inherent in the testimony of the
General Counsel's principal witnesses and their damaging
signed statements. Upon consideration of the same, as
well as the demeanor of the witnesses, and finding that
the events on November 9 and 10 were sufficient in
themselves to justify the discharges, I conclude that the
General Counsel did not prove his case by a preponder-
ance of the evidence.
C. The Discharge of Lanier Waiters
1. Credibility findings
Waiters was discharged on February 23, 1979. The
major issue, the same relating to the three other dis-
charges, concerns Respondent's motivation. The General
Counsel once again contends that Respondent discharged
Waiters because of his union activities; Respondent, on
the other hand, argues that Waiters was discharged be-
cause of his insubordination and, specifically, his refusal
to take orders from his leadman and supervisor. Once
again, there are major issues of credibility to be resolved.
Indeed, Waiters testified that he was never insubordinate
and that there was no justification for Respondent's
action, other than Respondent's attempt to rid itself of a
union adherent.
I find that Respondent's witnesses were credible and
reliable. John Radler, Waiters' supervisor, was especially
articulate and had a clear recollection of the events
which resulted in Waiters' discharge. Some of his testi-
mony was supported by leadman Dan Dantzler, who had
previously joined Waiters in objecting to Respondent's
policy of scheduling work in the heat treat department, a
protest which threatened a strike by all of the employees
who joined in the protest. Similarly, McCarthy and
Schaffner had outstanding recall and were impressive
witnesses.
On the other hand, I was unimpressed with Waiters
for a variety of reasons, not because of inconsistencies
and contradictions, but as a result of his general attitude
toward his two immediate superiors, who Waiters be-
lieved (justifiably or not) were always picking on him
and refusing to let him advance to a position that Wait-
ers believed was rightfully due him. Waiters considered
himself to be capable of much more than that to which
he was assigned. He complained at times of the prepara-
tion of reports being "trivial" and represented Pruitt as
having said of him that he was the most intelligent em-
ployee in the plant, a representation that I find Waiters
truly believed but a characterization which I do not be-
lieve Pruitt made. Furthermore, Waiters had the habit of
testifying at great length in answer to more easily an-
swerable questions. Often, bound up in his own excessive
replies, he would find himself lost in a morass of words,
causing him to request permission to "back up" and com-
mence his answers from the beginning. His answers fre-
quently lost a ring of truth and clarity which were, to
the contrary, inherent in the testimony of witnesses
called by Respondent.
2. The facts
By February 23, 1979, Radler was having problems
meeting production; on that day, there was very little in-
ventory between his heat treat department and the de-
partment which received parts from his own. As a result,
he was unable to wait until the end of the day to find out
that he had fallen short of production once again. Ac-
cordingly, he gave instructions to his leadman, Dan
Dantzler, to have Waiters report any time his induction
hardener machine was broken and the number of baskets
(which normally contained 400 to 402 parts) he was pro-
ducing. Dantzler relayed these instructions to Waiters,
who replied: "Fuck you. If you can play games, I can
too." Dantzler returned to Radler and informed him that
Waiters had refused to accept his instructions.
Radler then went into the department to ensure that
Waiters understood that the instructions had come from
him. He told Waiters to operate the induction hardener
that day, that he wanted Waiters to keep track of the
number of baskets worked, and that Waiters was to
report any down time to Dantzler. Waiters looked at
Radler and did not respond. Then Waiters got up,
stopped his machine, and walked away. Radler called
out Waiters' name and walked after him. Waiters turned
around and looked at Radler, who walked up to him and
repeated the instructions. He asked Waiters whether he
understood the instructions, to which Waiters replied "I
heard." Radler again repeated the instructions and asked
Waiters whether he would comply. Again, Waiters said,
"I heard." Waiters then walked out of the department
and, 5 or 6 minutes later, returned, sat down at his ma-
chine, and began to operate it.
A few minutes later, Radler again approached Waiters
who turned to Radler and asked him why he did not
have time to talk to Waiters; that Radler talked to all the
white employees and would not talk to Waiters because
he is black. Radler said that he had talked with Waiters
on many occasions about many things and that, if he had
a specific complaint, he should put it in writing on a
grievance form. In the meantime, Radler said that the
only conversation he was going to have was one regard-
ing work. He added that Waiters was to take his instruc-
tions and those of Dantzler, to which Waiters replied,
"f- you Radler. Let me work."
There is sufficient evidence in this conversation, as re-
lated by Radler, as well as the initial conversation as tes-
tified to by Dantzler, to indicate that Waiters had no in-
clination, or at least did not make known his intention, to
follow the instructions of his superiors. Incensed for
whatever reason, Waiters merely said to Dantzler that if
he could play games, Waiters could too. To Radler's
instructions and his queries as to whether he understood
and would comply with the instructions, Waiters an-
swered only that he heard what Radler was saying.
Though Waiters' language may be construed by some to
be an acknowledgment and an acquiescence to Radler,
__ ____ ____ ___ - ---------
R013ERT BOSCH CRPRAI'ION 1043
Waiters was not going to carry out his work duties. The
final straw was Waiters' curse and shunning of Radler.
Waiters' narration of the incidents that morning is far
different, although he admitted to being perturbed by the
instructions which he received from Dantzler and
Radler. According to him, both of them asked him to
count each part as it was being produced. Because hun-
dreds of parts are produced during the day (Radler esti-
mated that a basket should be filled in approximately 45
minutes), that might constitute an enormous addition to
Waiters' normal tasks. As testified to by Waiters, in his
conversation with Dantzler, Dantzler, in giving his
instructions, acted "nasty." Waiters' retort was that he
was really tired of Dantzler and Radler playing these
silly games with him. Dantzler replied that he did not
know what Waiters meant and Waiters said that he "was
going to get f-d playing these silly games." Dantzler's
reply was that Waiters "was going to get f-d."
The conversation with Radler, as related by Waiters,
was much lengthier than Radler had testified to. In
answer to Radler's first statement of his instructions,
Waiters testified that he just nodded. When Radler re-
peated the instructions and asked whether Waiters had
understood, and then repeated the instructions again.
Waiters replied, "Okay, that's fine," but if Radler needed
the parts that badly Waiters asked whether Radler would
mind if Waiters kept running the parts while Radler was
talking. Radler told Waiters to go ahead, stood there for
a while, and then asked Waiters whether he understood.
Waiters then started running the parts and Radler again
asked whether Waiters understood what he was sup-
posed to do and was he going to do it, to which Waiters
replied "yes, why not." Again Radler, still standing
there, asked whether Waiters understood what he was
supposed to do and whether he was going to do it: and
Waiters again said that he was going to do it.
Waiters then asked whether he could take his medica-
tion. Radler gave him permission to do so and Waiters
walked away. When he was approximately 20 feet away,
Radler told him to come back. Radler again asked
whether Waiters understood his instructions and whether
he was going to follow them; Waiters said, "sure why
not," that Radler was his superior and, whatever he told
Waiters to do, he would do it. Even if it was wrong,
Waiters said that he would do it. Radler still stood there
and Waiters left to take his medication.
When he returned, Radler was gone. Shortly after
that, Radler came back and asked the same questions all
over again, and Waiters once more said that he would
comply and questioned why Radler kept asking the same
question. Waiters complained that if he had been white,
Radler would not be hassling him; Waiters had been
trying for a few months to deal with Radler who just ig-
nored him, to which Radler said that Respondent paid
Waiters to work and not to complain. Waiters said that
he understood that, but he did not have to work under
those conditions; that if he had been white, he would not
have been there; and that Radler never listened to blacks
who complained all the time and Radler simply ignored
them. Waiters also said that he had been trying to solve
some of the problems in the shop. Radler walked away,
laughing. Waiters said he did not appreciate it, but, if
that was Radler's way of proceeding, that was good
enough for Waiters. Finally Waiters said: "If you please
leave me to hell alone. I could do this [my work]."
Thus, according to Waiters, he said four times that he
would follow Radler's directions and, despite his agree-
ment to follow Radler's directions, Radler kept repeating
the same questions over and over again. I find that
highly improbable unless, of course, Radler was attempt-
ing to incite Waiters into being insubordinate, which
makes some sense if Respondent's dislike of Waiters' con-
certed and protected and union activities was as great as
Waiters said it was.
Waiters became aware of the union campaign early,
sometime in November 1978, he testified, but he believed
it to be at or around the time of the second union meet-
ing, which was October 23, 1978. He testified that he
passed out badges, talked with people, and got cards
signed. In addition, he signed a petition to protest week-
end work, along with all of the other members of the
heat treat department, which was handed to Shaffner,
Pruitt, and Radler around the second week of October
1978. About a week and a half or 2 weeks later, Waiters
was interrogated by Pruitt and Shaffner, as were all the
other employees, individually, about why he had signed
the letter and what were the problems. In addition, ac-
cording to Waiters, Pruitt asked who prepared the peti-
tion and whose idea was it: Pruitt denied that.
Also, in October 1978. Waiters testified to a conversa-
tion with McCarthy and Radler in McCarthy's office.
That related to Radler's accusation against Waiters for
taking too long to perform certain tasks 2 days in a row.
During this conversation McCarthy allegedly said that
promoting the Union would get Waiters into a lot of
trouble and that, had this been a union shop, Waiters
would not have been able to come to his office but
would have had to go to a union steward. Further, on or
about December , 1978,1' Radler allegedly told Waiters
that he thought that Waiters was responsible for protest-
ing the weekend schedule and for the union talk and that
Radler was going to fire Waiters if he got a chance, be-
cause of Waiters' union activities.
3. Further credibility resolutions and discussion
I do not believe Waiters, not only because I credit the
denials of Pruitt, McCarthy, and Radler, but also because
I find it improbable that Respondent was motivated to
take action against Waiters because of his petition and
because of his union activities. Indeed, about a month
after the protest and 3 weeks after Waiters commenced
his union activities, on November 13, 1978, Waiters was
promoted to a B operator and transferred to the second
shift to become the lead operator. If McCarthy was
going to punish Waiters for his union activities and
Radler was going to fire Waiters because he was respon-
sible for protesting the weekend time and for the union
talk, actions other than promotion and being given great-
er responsibility would have been more consistent with
" W'ailtcrs Iestified tllt th s coll, r -altion took place on Notnmbcr 17.
107X The General (Counel. I hi, brief, itnded that Waliters wa: oh
,ionsly il error nd that lli the fls, polinTed t the orrect dale being
[)ecember . 1978 I agree
ROBERT BOSCH ORPORATION
1044 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the General Counsel's theory; but Respondent took ac-
tions which lead to the conclusion that it was not moti-
vated at all by Waiters' protected and union activities.
Further, there is no cogent reason why, if Radler intend-
ed to threaten Waiters, he would have waited until De-
cember 1, 1978, to do so, and would have permitted
Waiters to be promoted several weeks before.
The fact that Waiters' promotion in mid-November
did not work out successfully was the result not of his
union activities but his own undoing. When he was
working during inventory day, December 2, 1978, under
the supervision of another person, he refused a request of
Dantzler, his regular leadman, for help in completing a
project. Instead, Waiters sought to insulate himself from
other work by positing that he was not working for
Dantzler that day. While technically correct, I note that
two other employees of his department who were work-
ing with him under the other supervisor complied with
the wishes of Dantzler. A warning notice was given to
Waiters for refusal to carry out Dantzler's order. Al-
though that warning notice was subsequently rescinded,
nonetheless both Radler and Pruitt became convinced
that Waiters was a poor choice for his new assignment,
and that he showed neither enough initiative nor respon-
sibility to work independently on the second shift.
The rescission of that warning lends further support to
Respondent's defense that it was not attempting to use
Waiters' union or protected and concerted activities for
the purpose of finding a pretext to fire him. Rather,
Waiters remained a "B" operator, although he was trans-
ferred back to the first shift. Thus, Respondent ultimate-
ly gave Waiters the benefit of the doubt, which I find to
be contrary to the discriminatory motivation and the
threats which the General Counsel attempts to attribute
to Respondent. I therefore discredit Waiters' testimony
regarding the threats of McCarthy and Radler and find
no violation of Section 8(a)(l) of the Act. The timing of
the Radler threat, almost 2 months after the alleged pro-
tected activities took place, leads me to the conclusion
that it was never made. This conclusion is further sup-
ported by Waiters' testimony regarding his interview
with McCarthy, to whom Radler had brought Waiters
after the incident on February 13. With the exception of
one statement, Waiters made no mention of the fact that
Radler and McCarthy had earlier warned him of disci-
pline because of his union activities. The alleged excep-
tion was Waiters' statement to McCarthy that McCarthy
knew that Waiters knew that Radler was just waiting for
something like that incident to fire him. I do not believe
that was ever said. First, Waiters could not even remem-
ber the statement on cross-examination. Second, in his in-
vestigatory affidavit, he made no mention of such a state-
ment.
The General Counsel argues that the illegal motivation
is proved by the disparate treatment of other employees
who engaged in the same type of insubordination as
Waiters did. I do not find any similarity in the particular
instances related, especially when bearing in mind Wait-
ers' prior employment history. In particular, although
employee Williamson used obscenities to his supervisor,
he was suspended for a day and immediately apologized
for the incident. Employee Santos' recollection of the
use of obscenities was not certain, but in any event was
unrelated to the refusal to perform work. Employee
Staggers ultimately agreed to perform his work as re-
quested by his leadman, as opposed to Waiters' refusal to
comply with requests of both his leadman and his super-
visor and his belligerent attitude when called into
McCarthy's office.
Finally, upon examination of the entire record, I find
no credible basis for the contentions of the General
Counsel that Respondent shifted its reasons for terminat-
ing Waiters, relegated Waiters for reasons illegal under
the Act to a lesser position, or inflated Waiters' employ-
ment history or individual incidents of minor miscon-
duct.
As a result, I find no illegal motivation in Respond-
ent's discharge of Waiters. Although it may be said that
on Febuary 13, 1978, Waiters' reply to Radler of "I
heard" could mean to some persons a begrudging accept-
ance of Radler's instructions and willingness to comply
with them, the Act does not force upon Radler or Mc-
Carthy or any of Respondent's management personnel to
interpret language solely in favor of and for the benefit
of an employee. At the risk of undue repetition, the Act
does not forbid an employer from disciplining an em-
ployee for no reason at all, or for an erroneous reason.
The Act protects only actions taken which are motivated
by employees' protected and concerted and union activi-
ties. In any event, there was sufficient evidence that, be-
cause of Waiters' replies and his use of obscenities,
Radler could have reasonably believed that Waiters had
no intention to comply with Radler's directions. '4
D. The Alleged 1980 Unfair Labor Practices
A second Board-conducted election was held on Feb-
ruary 15, 1980 .15 Thereafter the Union filed objections
to the conduct of the election and new unfair labor prac-
tice charges. In brief, the Union complained of threats
contained in speeches to employees given at meetings
held on January 9, at slide presentations on February 7,
8, and 9, and at final preelection meetings held on Febru-
ary 13; and miscellaneous allegations of preelection and
postelection threats, warnings, creation of an impression
of surveillance of union activities, and taking away of
benefits.
1. The speeches
The General Counsel contends that the three speeches
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act because Respondent
threatened loss of wages and benefits and futility of bar-
gaining if its employees selected the Union as their col-
lective-bargaining representative. He further contends
that the coercive impact of Respondent's speeches is to
be considered in the context of other unfair labor prac-
tices committed by Respondent.
14 Th (icnleral Counel con ttcl(l that thcre \, s n inuilbordination
bhccause Waiters rcturlned to spork and opecratld his machine Ihat is not
ito Ihe pointll Il ilsuhrlbo-t inuatiol conllsstcd Ill ot rtsuillg to work, but
ot Icrfullng to agree Ito kp Coruit io' bahkct produced and to report and
keI p tlilc of, aly breakdoiwn o the ticlliner)
'I All d t.s hereilalltel st forth reler to the Veal 1981), unless ther-
is- st;talI
ROBERT OSCH CORPOATION 1045
Specifically, the General Counsel claims that Respond-
ent, in its January 9 speech, violated Section 8(a)(1) by
stating that (1) Respondent was not required to make any
concessions and did not intend to give any more at the
bargaining table than it decided it could afford to give or
was willing to give; and (2) the Union guaranteed trou-
ble because, if it won the election, there was only one
way it could try to force Respondent to agree to de-
mands which Respondent thought were unreasonable
and not in the best interests of its employees or busi-
ness-and that was by a strike, to which Respondent
would not yield.
Fairly read, Respondent's speech says only that it
would agree to reasonable demands and refuse to agree
to unreasonable demands, which it would not accede to
even if the employees were to strike. The authorities
relied upon by the General Counsel' 6 are distinguish-
able, because Respondent did not indicate that it was
futile to vote for the Union, which could do nothing for
the employees. Instead, Respondent expressly stated that
it would bargain with the Union in good faith. The Act
does not forbid Respondent from refusing to make con-
cessions when it deems, in good faith, such concessions
to be unreasonable or not in its best interests. The Cono-
Ion Corporation, 191 NLRB 254, 255 (1971).
At the time of Respondent's first speech, and within
the succeeding several weeks, the Union distributed a
number of leaflets and letters which, Respondent con-
tends, made exaggerated claims that the necessary effects
of a union victory were higher wages and better terms
and conditions of employment. Respondent argues that it
was thus entitled at its slide presentation in February to
more latitude in responding to the Union's claims; that it
was permissible to state that a "possible consequence" of
bargaining may well be loss of benefits; and that no vio-
lation is committed by telling employees of the "reali-
ties" of the collective-bargaining process. Ludwig Motor
Corp., 222 NLRB 635 (1976). Respondent concedes that
it may be limited in its reply to the extent that its expla-
nation of the realities may not be accomplished legally
by anything more than an explanation of the possibilities,
which may not in turn permissibly be converted into pre-
dictions and thus effective threats of loss. Plastronics,
Inc., 233 NLRB 155 (1977).
The General Counsel argues, on the other hand, that
the Union's propaganda claims did not approach the kind
of exaggerated claims dealt with in Ludwig Motor Corp.,
to justify the statements made by Respondent in its slide
presentation. It is accurate that the Union's statements
quoted by Respondent, when literally read, might be
construed to mean only that Respondent could not
reduce wages solely because the employees voted for the
Union and that the Union, starting from the same base
wages, would negotiate for more. However, the Union
clearly implied that under no circumstances would its
bargaining posture result in a decrease of wages and
benefits; and it boasted-"The boss knows the union
t' Deutsch Company. Metal Components Division , 178 N.RB 6t16, 17
(1969), enfd. 445 F2d 902 (9th Cir. 1971); Textron, Inc (Talon Division .
199 NLRB 131, 134-135 (1972); Aerovox. Corporation of MVrtc Bieach,
South Carolina, 172 NLRB 1011, 1012. 101h (19hX8), cnfd 435 2d 1208
(4th Cir 1970)
means higher wages, better conditions ... " and "He
knows that higher union wages will repay your dues
many times over." 7 Assuming, arguendo, that an em-
ployer is allowed under Ludwig Motor Corp. wider lati-
tude in explaining its position and in countering a union's
exaggerated claims. I conclude that the Union's claims
gave Respondent sufficient basis to answer them in the
way it did.
But the General Counsel's attack on the slide presenta-
tion goes further. He focuses on "a composite of viola-
tive statements which leave no doubt . . . that the em-
ployees would definitely lose benefits and that it would
be ruinous, to say nothing of futile, to select the Union as
their collective bargaining representative." First, the
General Counsel argues not from what Respondent said,
but from what it omitted-that is, a statement that it in-
tended to bargain in good faith. But there are sufficient
statements in the speech that would lead employees to
believe that Respondent was not refusing to recognize its
obligation. By stating that, if the Union won the election,
it would have the right to bargain with Respondent over
wages, hours, and working conditions, there is not only
no statement that Respondent would not bargain with
the Union but also a necessary inference that Respondent
would bargain.
That conclusion finds support in a followup statement
that the General Counsel specifically finds objectionable:
"Each side is going to go after the best deal it can get,
and the smarter, stronger side usually ends up with the
best deal." Contrary to the General Counsel, I find noth-
ing objectionable in the first clause of this statement, as it
represents (perhaps cryptically and in a shallow fashion)
a view of what transpires at the negotiating table. Nor
does "the smarter, stronger side" necessarily mean, as the
General Counsel contends, Respondent, although the
speech is pitched to support that proposition. The Union
was not impeded in arguing that it was the stronger and
smarter. After all, any union attempts to acquire strength
to support its demands-the support of all of its employ-
ees, and of other unions, and of the labor movement gen-
erally, as well as public support. And "being smart"
plays an obvious role, too. If it did not, there would be
no labor bar in this country, and in particular no attor-
neys specializing in labor law on the union side, who
come to the bargaining table armed not only with statis-
tics and comparable bargaining agreements but also with
an expertise of advocacy and persuasion.
Nor, contrary to the General Counsel, do I find any
implication of a veiled threat that "Respondent will give
up its solicitude for the welfare of its employees and
henceforth act only in its self-interest, even at the ex-
pense of the interests of its employees," thus conveying
to employees an impression of futility. There is nothing
in the Act which requires that an employer, once a bar-
gaining duty arises, must give up its "self-interest" and
protect only the interests of its employees, thus trans-
forming itself from a profitmaking to an eleemosynary
institution. The Act seeks to ensure only that the parties
will collectively bargain, and I am persuaded, upon a
I7 ll uoiill it[ic ;u t SI I rc 2 tlhotlr' p.l pr [ lc l
ROBERT BOSCH ORPORATION
1046 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
reading of Respondent's speech as a whole, that Re-
spondent never indicated that it would not listen to the
Union's arguments and make accommodations if it felt
convinced that such were warranted.
The General Counsel also attacks several quotations
by Respondent of court decisions1 8 as being quoted out
of context. These, he alleges, constituted not only mis-
representations but also threats of loss of benefits. Par-
ticularly offensive, he argues, was Respondent's repeti-
tion of a quote from Automation and Measurement Divi-
sion-"The Government does not guarantee that bargain-
ing starts from where you presently are"' 9-implying
that Respondent will bargain from a point lower than the
wages and benefits presently enjoyed by its employees.
In an analogous situation, in Taylor-Dunn Manufacturing
Company, 252 NLRB 799, 800 (1980), the Board stated:
It is well established that "bargaining from
ground zero" or "bargaining from scratch" state-
ments by employer representatives violate Section
8(a)(l) of the Act if, in context, they reasonably
could be understood by employees as a threat of
loss of existing benefits and leave employees with
the impression that what they may ultimately re-
ceive depends upon what the union can induce the
employer to restore. On the other hand, such state-
ments are not violative of the Act when other com-
munications make it clear that any reduction in
wages or benefits will occur only as a result of the
normal give and take of negotiations. TRW-United
Greenfield Division, 245 NLRB 1135 (1979); Stumpf
Motor Company, Inc., 208 NLRB 431 (1979).
The alleged threat falls in the latter category. Re-
spondent clearly explained and emphasized that no em-
ployer, after bargaining, is required to keep all current
benefits. Indeed, later in the speech, Respondent stated
that, if the Union won the election, the employees'
wages would remain the same and be "frozen," 2 0 a state-
ment which is entirely inconsistent with a threat of loss
of existing benefits, which Respondent had earlier in the
speech specifically disavowed, and inconsistent with any
notion that employees may have reasonably received an
impression that whatever they might ultimately receive
depended on what the Union was able to convince Re-
spondent to restore.
The remainder of the slide presentation was devoted
to Respondent's narration of its earlier negotiations with
a union representing employees at its Broadview, Illinois,
plant. Those negotiations lasted a year and resulted, Re-
spondent claimed, in lost benefits and lesser working
conditions. Although the General Counsel does not
argue that Respondent's presentation was inaccurate, he
contends that the implied threats made earlier in the
speech, threats which I have not found, were converted
8 H. K. Porter Co. v. N.L.R.B., 397 US. 99, 104 (1970); 4utonation
and Measurement Division. The Bendix Corporation v N.L.R.B, 400 F2d
141. 146 (6th Cir. 1968).
19 This quotation was also used in Ludwig Motor Corp., supra at 635,
fn. 4. The Board found nothing in it to be inherently destructive of rights
protected by the Act.
20 The General Counsel also objects that these statements are coercive
threats in violation of Sec. 8(a)(1) of the Act. For reasons expressed,
infra, I do not agree.
into explicit threats of loss of benefits and futility of bar-
gaining.21 The General Counsel objects specifically to
Respondent's statement that, once the Union won the
election, wages would be frozen, arguing that Respond-
ent gave regular wage progression increases and that rate
increases within employee job classifications are re-
viewed semiannually and are subject to supervisors' per-
formance reviews. I find that Respondent's speech accu-
rately stated Board law. Liberty Nursing Homes, Inc.,
d/b/a Liberty House Nursing Home, 236 NLRB 456
(1978). No general wage increase was scheduled. The in-
creases subject to the progressions were not referred to,
and I find that Respondent was not referring to them nor
could an employee reasonably understand that progres-
sions were being talked about. 22
There is no question that Respondent's depiction of its
bargaining experience at its Illinois plant constituted a
very strong appeal to its employees that collective bar-
gaining does not necessarily result in the automatic ful-
fillment of union promises. However, Respondent's re-
marks constituted a statement of no more than factual
matter, perhaps slanted in its own favor,2 3 which was in-
tended to demonstrate that bargaining is a two-way
street, a process of both "give" and "take" where em-
ployees may have to give up certain benefits to obtain
other benefits. That Respondent committed itself to be
"tough" in negotiations and to bargain for the best deal
it could get is not a threat that bargaining would be
futile. Rather, Respondent clearly indicated that in Illi-
nois it finally entered into a collective-bargaining agree-
ment (although after 42 negotiating sessions), which in-
cluded at least the union-security and checkoff provisions
that the union there had sought. Thus, there was no
showing that the Union herein would be "unable to in-
fluence Respondent's position either through bargaining
or through a strike" or that Respondent would not bar-
gain in good faith, as the General Counsel contends. Nor
has the General Counsel alleged or demonstrated that
the Illinois negotiations were conducted in bad faith. Air-
stream, Division of Beatrice Food Co., 192 NLRB 868
(1971).
On the basis of the record in this proceeding, all that
may be said is that Respondent commented truthfully on
what happened to it in Illinois. That certain terms of the
resulting contract may have been less than the union
sought or were reductions of certain benefits is unimpor-
tant to the resolution of whether the speech constituted a
threat of reduced benefits or of futility of bargaining.
Collective bargaining often results in unusual accommo-
dations. Unions and employers frequently give up certain
demands or benefits for the sake of other provisions
2 The General Counsel contends that these threats were repeated and
expanded upon in the third speech delivered on February 13.
2 That Respondent referred to the fact that the Union had, in its opin-
ion, made misstatements and that it would file objections to the election,
which might delay certification for as long as a year is only a prediction,
permitted as free speech.
2: While noting that the Illinois employees ended up with lesser per-
centage increases of wages, and without certain fringe and vacation bene-
fits, Resplondent made no mention of whether the union there was able to
obtain a grievance machinery covering all complaints and disputes (in-
cluding discharges), seniority, and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment which may have been important to those employees
ROBERT OSCH CORPORATION 1047
which are more meaningful to them. 24 An employer's
emphasis on reductions is fair game for preelection pro-
paganda and is protected by Section 8(c) of the Act. The
Union's appropriate recourse was to convince the em-
ployees that Respondent's criticisms were unfounded.2 5
Turning to Respondent's last speech of February 13,
the General Counsel claims that Respondent's theme of
"unions breed divisiveness" constituted a violation of
Section 8(a)(l). Respondent's overall view may have
been an overstatement, but in the experience of anyone
familiar with labor relations, there is no doubt that
during an organizing campaign union adherents are often
pitted in battle against those who favor the employer's
position. That kind of attitude is illustrated by the testi-
mony of the relationship between Lorrie Craven, a
member of the "Vote No Committee," and Peggy Sweat,
a union adherent, as more fully described, infra. Further,
I note that what may have prompted Respondent's
speech was the Union's attack upon typical employer
misstatements, such as: "The Union will stir up hard feel-
ings" and that "There is less ill-will in the union plants
than elsewhere." Thus, the Union made divisiveness a
fair subject for discussion and Respondent's comments
constituted no threat in violation of Section 8(a)(l) of the
Act. Ludwig Motor Corp., supra.
Notwithstanding the legality of Respondent's com-
ment, "divisiveness" is used to give an aura of forebod-
ing in the last speech, in which Respondent shifts from
extolling its own beneficence, acting alone, on the one
hand, and emphasizing the necessity for frugality and
caution, if it had to bargain with the Union. Respondent
listed benefits unilaterally granted at its plant, including
vacations benefits and dental and life insurance plans,
which Respondent stated were considerably ahead of
what was available at other union shops in the area.
However, if Respondent were required to bargain with
the Union, it did "not foresee that it would be inclined to
agree to any further improvements at this plant. Rather,
[its bargaining position] would probably be to hold the
line on some items and to bring other items back in step
with the area standards."
Shortly after, Respondent bragged about its progress
over the last 12 months, noting, inter alia, that it had
raised its dental coverage, assumed the total cost of em-
ployees' insurance package, and improved vacations. It
added: "That kind of progress will continue."
Thus, opposed to the certainty of continued progress if
Respondent did not have to bargain collectively with the
24 A first written contract is usually of inestimable importance to a
union, which often reasons that certain reductions and losses may be re-
captured in a second agreement, once it has strengthened its bargaining
position.
25 For example, although it ma) not be said with certainty, the union
at the Illinois plant may swell have agreed to a reduction of vacation
benefits, waiving the right to a fourth week of vacation because no em-
ployee could reasonably be expected to qualify for the extra week within
the forseeable future Thus, although it may have appeared that the union
lost something, it actually gave away nothing. Further, I note that, de-
spite Respondent's facially persuasive comments comparing the percenlt-
age of increase that the union obtained in Illinois with that granted hby
Respondent in South Carolina, Respondent omits mention of what the
base wages were in Illinois The lesser percentage may in fact have repre-
sented a wage increase granting the employees in Illinois far greater
wages than those paid to the employees involved herein
Union was the uncertainty if the Union became certified
as the employees' bargaining representative. At the best,
Respondent left a doubt that progress would continue;
rather, Respondent did not foresee any improvements of
conditions of employment, a prediction that benefits
would continue if the Union were defeated. At the
worst, Respondent predicted it would reduce certain
benefits if the Union won. Noting that Respondent's lan-
guage was somewhat carefully couched, I conclude that
its prediction of what it would be "inclined to agree"
upon was a commitment that it would not improve bene-
fits. In the next sentence, Respondent talks not of an
agreement but what its bargaining position probably
would be, by itself a reasonable prediction protected by
Section 8(c) of the Act. However, in context, it was
clearly intended to be understood by the employees not
only that benefits would not be improved but also that
worsened working conditions could be expected. Madi-
son Kipp Company, 240 NLRB 879 (1979); Visador Co.,
245 NLRB 508 (1979); Paoli Chair Company, Inc., 231
NLRB 539 (1977).
In the same speech, Respondent noted that, in Illinois,
it had explained to the union that Respondent "could be
forced to negotiate a reduction in their wages and bene-
fits in order to make the Company's position plain to the
Union and in order to set the tone for future negotia-
tions" and that "the Union started to learn what bargain-
ing with Bosch was going to be like." The impact of
these statements was no mere description of the process
of the give and take of collective bargaining. Rather,
there is a total shift of emphasis away from collective
bargaining and towards the taking of firm and threaten-
ing positions solely because of the presence of the Union
at the bargaining table.
In N.L.R.B. v. Gissel Packing Co.. Inc., 395 U.S. 575,
618 (1969), the Supreme Court cautioned that, because
an employer's economic predictions are particularly sus-
ceptible to abuse, such predictions must be "carefully
phrased on the basis of objective fact to convey an em-
ployer's belief as to demonstrably probable consequences
beyond his control .... If there is any implication that
an employer may or may not take action solely on his
own initiative for reasons unrelated to economic necessi-
ties and known only to him, the statement is no longer a
reasonable prediction based on available facts but a
threat of retaliation based on misrepresentation and coer-
cion .... " I conclude that implicit in the third speech
are veiled threats that benefits would be reduced and at-
titudes would change only if the Union were victorious
and that these would result "not from the inevitable
forces of the market, but from the deliberate acts of the
company taken in reprisal." N'.L.R.B. v. Kaiser Agricul-
tural Chemicals, a division of Kaiser Aluminum & Chemi-
cal Corporation, 473 F.2d 374, 381 (5th Cir. 1973). Re-
spondent's closing statement in its second speech-"work
with us as we build our future together, or take your
chances with the IAM"-became more ominous as a
result. I conclude that Respondent's statements violated
Section 8(a)(l) of the Act. Textron. Inc., supra.
ROBERT BOSCH ORPORATION 047
1048 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
2. The exclusion of union adherents from one of the
meetings; related allegations
Immediately prior to the January 9 meeting, 26 Re-
spondent herded 14 known union adherents into its plant
training room, including employee Felix Petrowski, who
was forbidden to use the bathroom, where they were to
remain behind closed doors, in a windowless room, with-
out the use of a telephone (the telephone having been re-
moved from its wall plug) for the duration of Respond-
ent's meeting with the remainder of its employees.
It is accurate, as Respondent contends, that an em-
ployer need not invite all employees to its antiunion
speeches. Those individuals it desired not to attend may
be permitted to continue working at their normal work
stations. Mueller Brass Co., A Subsidiary of UV Industries,
Inc., 220 NLRB 1127 (1975), enforcement denied on
other grounds 544 F.2d 815 (5th Cir. 1977); Spartus Cor-
poration, 195 NLRB 134 (1972); Luxuray of New York Di-
vision of Beaunit Corporation, 185 NLRB 100 (1970). That
is not to say that an employer may, as long as it contin-
ues to pay its employees, do with its employees what it
wishes, designating a closed room as the employees'
newly assigned work station where they might hold a
meeting of their own.
Rather, I find that Respondent's action constituted
nothing other than imprisonment, an act which Pruitt
found, at least from the demeanor which I observed, re-
grettable. I find Respondent's actions outrageous and de-
humanizing, including the prohibition of use of bathroom
facilities and the removal of the telephone. Its actions
were clearly intended to coerce the union supporters in
violation of their 8(a)(l) rights. 27 That they succeeded in
frightening the employees is evident from the record.
Such actions also were intended to be made known to
the other employees, who would reasonably have to be
circumspect in their future considerations of whether
they wished to be the subject of such indignities.
The foreseeable result actually came to fruition at a
meeting of employees in the middle of January. Employ-
ee Mary Ann Krantz, infuriated by the treatment of the
14 employees, asked why they had been confined to the
training room and prohibited from going to the regular
meeting. Quality Control Manager Helgo Mehrtens re-
plied that they were troublemakers and would have dis-
rupted the meeting. Although both Schaffner and Mehr-
tens denied the statement attributed to Mehrtens, testify-
ing that he had used a "standard response"-that the 14
employees would not be interested in "objectively listen-
ing" to Respondent's speech-I credit Krantz, finding
that she was sincerely and deeply troubled about Re-
spondent's actions and that she was more credible than
Mehrtens, who was elusive in explaining the origins of
26 There were four separate sessions held on each of the dates in-
volved herein. The subject of this complaint 'wAas what happened at the
time of the third session only With respect to other meetings, these
union adherents remained at their work stations and performed their
normal duties.
27 Contrary to Respondent's suggestions in its brief, I find no business
justification in the employees' confinement If it is true that there was no
supervision in the department at the time of the meeting (the record does
not support this), Respondent was required to arrange for such supervi-
sion or, alternatively, inform the employees not to work The incarcer-
ation was not a legal alternative.
the decision to assign the employees to the training
room.
Respondent argues that its witnesses presented a more
logical narration because it had been anticipated that
questions might arise about the exclusion of those em-
ployees and that a "standard response" was decided
upon. However, I note that when Pruitt, who was pres-
ent at the time the decision was made, was asked at the
hearing why the employees were excluded, he did not
use the same "standard response." Rather, he responded
that the purpose was to deny the employees accurate in-
formation. I find that there was no standard response and
that the reference to the union supporters as "trouble-
makers" who were to be confined is clearly coercive and
violated Section 8(a)(l) of the Act inasmuch as the refer-
ence equated their union support with improper conduct
and gave punitive connotations to their confinement in
the training room. Garrison Valley Center, Inc., 246
NLRB 700, 708 (1979); A. Lasaponara & Sons, Inc., a
wholly owned subsidiary of ERE Industries, Inc., 218
NLRB 1096, fn. 2 (1975), enfd. 541 F.2d 992 (2d Cir.
1976).
The complaint additionally alleges that Supervisor
Tony Hollenbeck created an impression of surveillance
in a conversation with employee Mark Walsnovich. De-
spite the fact that Walsnovich did not testify, the Gener-
al Counsel insisted that he had proven his case solely on
the testimony of Hollenbeck. I disagree. All that appears
in the record is that Walsnovich had previously and vol-
untarily told Hollenbeck that he thought the Union
would be good for Respondent. When, at a later date,
Walsnovich asked Hollenbeck why he had not been in-
vited to one of Respondent's meetings with its employ-
ees,28 Hollenbeck did not create any impression of sur-
veillance by replying that Walsnovich's interests were
not consistent with Respondent's but, instead, were con-
sistent with the Union's. Because Walsnovich had made
statements voluntarily to Hollenbeck, which would lead
the latter to respond in the way he did, there was noth-
ing from which Walsnovich could have reasonably as-
sumed that Hollenbeck received his information by sur-
veillance of the employee's union activities. I dismiss this
allegation.2 9 Tartan Marine Company, 247 NLRB 646
(1980).
3. The verbal warning to Peggy Sweat
On January 10, employee Peggy Sweat was given a
verbal warning for failing to clean up her work station at
the end of her shift the day before, and, additionally,
Sweat contends, for leaving her work station early and
not working. The warning notice recorded on Sweat's
records states: "#1 Not Cleaning up During Clean up
time and Stopping and Engaging in Conversation with
2' Ihe record is barren of any date when this conversation occurred.
2"' At the close of the General Counsel's case, Respondent moved to
dismiss this allegation With much reluctance, I reserved judgment on the
motion, believing that a review of the transcript might reveal some basis
for a prima acie showing of a violation Upon review of the record, it is
clear that the General Counsel never proved this allegation, and Re-
spondent's motion should have been granted. Finally, I note that, despite
the thoroughness and length of the General Counsel's briefs, discussion of
this allegation is completely omitted.
ROBERT OSCH COR11ORATION 1049
other employees #2 for failure to clean up Station at
End of Shift."
Supervisor Tony Fontenot, who was substituting in
Sweat's department that day, testified that the two rea-
sons were identical, i.e., that instead of cleaning up
during the 5-minute period designated for that purpose,
Sweat engaged in other matters and left the station dirty.
It is true that prior to 3:30 p.m., but after 3:25 p.m.,
Sweat was not at her work station but in the company of
two other employees, which prompted employee techni-
cian Lorrie Craven to announce to the three employees
that it was not 3:30 p.m. yet, to which the employees an-
swered that they were working. This may have led
Sweat to believe that she was disciplined for leaving her
own work station prior to 3:30 p.m., which was clearly
permitted by plant practice.
Based on the theory that the warning was premised on
two reasons, the General Counsel contends that the
warning was without merit and that it was given only
because of Sweat's union activities,3 0 relying upon the
testimony of Sweat. Respondent contends, however, that
Sweat's station was dirty, with oil and spare parts on the
floor, relying upon the testimony of Fontenot and
Craven, who originally advised Fontenot of that fact.
It is true that Sweat may have understood from Cra-
ven's comment that one of the reasons for her discipline
was that she left her station early, despite plant practice.
Indeed, there seemingly was no reason for Craven to
remark about it, and Craven's answer to a question of
why she did so was entirely evasive. On the other hand,
because of a rather curious statement by Sweat, it ap-
pears clear that Sweat knew that she was not being disci-
plined on this account, but attempted to hide behind it to
make her case. Thus, when Sweat returned from her dis-
ciplinary interview with Fontenot, she told her fellow
employees that she had been disciplined only for leaving
her station early, whereas she admitted at the hearing
that her failure to clean up was also a reason. When the
two employees offered to inform Fontenot that Sweat
was working after the 3:25 p.m. bell, Sweat told them
that she did not want them to do that.
One would have supposed that, if Sweat really
thought that the reason for her warning was that she left
early, she would have welcomed the support of her
fellow employees. That she did not, and in fact dissuaded
them from helping her, leads me to conclude that she
clearly understood that her dirty workplace was the only
reason for her discipline and that she was attempting to
concoct an invalid reason for her warning for which she
would have a valid excuse.
For this reason, I find that Sweat's denial that she
failed to clean her work station should not be credited.
Indeed, Sweat conceded that her station was dirty when
she arrived for work the following morning, a condition
which she attributed to reasons stretching from condi-
tions left by the night shift to intentional sabotage by
Craven, with whom she was on less than friendly per-
sonal relations. I find none of those excuses persuasive,
ao Sweat was one of the 14 emploses excludtd fronl Ihe netlinlg of
January 9.
especially in light of Fontenot's consistent and credible
testimony.
I recognize that Craven, who originally called this
matter to the attention of Fontenot, was a member of an
employee antiunion committee and that she disliked
Sweat, in part caused by the difference of opinion be-
tween the two regarding the Union. But her act of re-
porting Sweat's dirty work station to Fontenot may not
be attributed to Respondent (she is not alleged to be
either a supervisor, agent. or representative) and, without
her report, Fontenot would not have even investigated
the matter. In the posture of the entire record, there is
nothing to show that Fontenot, a substitute supervisor in
Sweat's department only for that day, intentionally
aimed his venom at Sweat (or at any other union sup-
porter) because of her support of the Union. I find no
violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
4. The allegations involving Richard Pollard
Richard Pollard was involved in several of the com-
plaint's allegations of violations of Section 8(a)(l) and (3)
of the Act. He was one of the employees sequestered in
the training room on January 9 and was admittedly an
open and outspoken supporter of the Union, giving
speeches in Respondent's employees' cafeteria since early
in the union campaign. Various disputes with his supervi-
sor, John Eynon, who personably disliked Pollard be-
cause of both his union activities and his being head-
strong and difficult to direct, were alleged to support the
General Counsel's theory of Respondent's union animus
in the first stage of this proceeding.
Pollard had a tendency to view all these disputes as
not mere personality conflicts but actions taken solely
because of his union activities. He saw himself being con-
stantly punished, amplifying the extent of discussions and
warnings from more innocent day-to-day shop relations
to overall discrimination because of his union activities.
Yet, on cross-examination, Pollard admitted facts which
cast an entirely different light on the events; and his tes-
timony and demeanor persuaded me that his emotional
state and viewpoint were not fully justified.
In the second week of January, Supervisor Jim Greene
passed Pollard's station while Pollard was moving
around a box of union hats and paraphernalia. Greene
commented, according to Pollard, that he should not
hand those out during worktime because Supervisor
John Eynon was "out to get" him. Greene denied that
he made this statement, but I find it likely that he did.
Both Pollard and Greene conceded that Greene was Pol-
lard's protector and that Greene appreciated Pollard's
work and thus kept him separated from his antagonist,
Eynon.
Indeed, Pollard admitted that he knew that Greene, in
connection with the "warning" for not punching in, dis-
cussed, infra, would not have done so because of Pol-
lard's union activities: and the question which is left open
is whether Greene's advice about Eynon was impliedly a
threat to Pollard because of Pollard's union activities.
In the circumstances I find that there wvas a threat of
action by Eynon, which could reasonably be perceived
by Pollard as a threat to inhibit and discourage his union
ROBERT BOSCH CORORATION
1050 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS H()ARI)
activities. Pollard had had conversations with Eynon in
the past in which Eynon had taken a strong position
against the Union. Knowing that Pollard was an open
union adherent, and directing his comments to union
campaign materials, Greene relayed a threat, although
perhaps unintentional, which necessarily violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.
Pollard testified that in early February Eynon restrict-
ed him to his work area, a restriction alleged by the
General Counsel to be discriminatory to discourage Pol-
lard's union activities. The credited facts demonstrate,
however, that Pollard's movement was hardly restricted.
Rather, Eynon was displeased with Pollard's assumption,
termed "officious" by Respondent in its brief, of pro-
ceeding to the locker and handing out rework tickets to
the employees of his department. Eynon told Pollard
that that was the job of material handlers and technicians
and that he was to remain at his work station. Immedi-
ately Eynon called technician Jack Elsey and reminded
him that the handing out of tickets and other supplies
was his job.
That Pollard understood that he was still permitted to
obtain certain materials for himself, when the need so oc-
casioned, is demonstrated by the fact that he felt no com-
punction, within a day of Eynon's instruction, against
proceeding on his own when Elsey was too busy to
comply with Pollard's requests. I dismiss this allegation.
On February 15, Pollard clocked in late and left his
job early in order to attend to his duties as a union ob-
server to the election. Because he was marked "tardy"
and "early leave" by Elsey, both usually signifying unex-
cused absences from work which may be used later to
support discipline such as discharge or suspension, 3 the
General Counsel argues that Pollard was discriminated
against because of his union activities. Respondent con-
tends, however, that no discipline was ever intended.
Indeed, its proof demonstrates that, in the 1979 election,
union observers were not disciplined, but allowed to
come to work late and leave early so that they might
attend to their union functions; that the entries made on
Pollard's attendance record, when called to Supervisor
Greene's attention by Pollard, were supposed to be re-
moved by Respondent's timekeeper, on instructions of
Greene; and that Greene's own record of Pollard's late-
ness and early leave was rendered ineffective as a result
of another of Greene's records, which explained those at-
tendance problems as resulting from Pollard's union ac-
tivities, which Greene credibly testified meant to him
that Pollard had not been disciplined.
There are, of course, obvious problems with Respond-
ent's case, because the timekeeper never corrected Pol-
lard's attendance record, even up to the date of hearing.
Notwithstanding that fact, I credit Respondent's testimo-
ny that it had no intention of disciplining Pollard. That
does not fully dispose of the alleged violation, for if Pol-
lard had reasonable cause to believe that he was being
disciplined-that is, if the actions of Respondent would
logically lead a reasonable and prudent person to believe
that he had been disciplined-that should be sufficient to
al In its brief, Respondent argues that Elsey had no authority to
excuse the incidents It is clear that the noting of Pollard's lateness and
early leave were disciplinary and not excuseu by Elsey.
sustain the complaint. Compare, Ridgeway Trucking Com-
pany, 243 NLRB 1048, 1049 (1979), enfd. 622 F.2d 1222
(5th Cir. 1980).
Here, Pollard made an attempt to ensure that he
would be held blameless. On February 12, Pollard
sought to inform his supervisor of his duties on the day
of the election. Eynon stated that he did not want to
hear what Pollard had to say and that he would not be
at the plant on February 15. When Pollard tried to state
his reasons for signing in late and leaving early to Super-
visor Doug Connolly, Eynon interrupted Pollard and
said that Connolly would not be at the plant on the day
of the election. Pollard then tried to explain his situation
to Elsey, but was once again interrupted by Eynon, who
said that Elsey would not be at the plant, either.
When this "hard-timing" is considered in connection
with the events which followed, it is not difficult to
imagine what its effect on Pollard might be. Although he
had been told by Greene not to worry about the nota-
tion, his followup with the timekeeper demonstrated that
nothing had been done. Nor had anything been done by
either the timekeeper or Greene to cure the situation by
the dates of the hearing. It is true that Pollard had not, a
year before, been disciplined for acting as an observer;
nor had his union coobserver in 1980 been disciplined,
and surely Pollard could have spoken with her. But,
even if she had not, Pollard could still have reasonably
understood that he, as an outspoken adherent of the
Union, was being disparately treated.
In sum, Pollard was justified in believing that his tardi-
ness and early leave had not been excused and might
have been utilized in the future as support for further
discipline. I find that, because the notations were made
as a result of Pollard's service as a union observer-
union activities-Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and
(I) of the Act.
Pollard did not punch his timecard on the morning of
March 18. Admitting that his supervisor, Greene, spoke
with him about his failure to punch in, he denied that
Greene told him that he was being verbally warned.
Greene testified that he advised Pollard of exactly what
was being done, noting that Pollard had previously been
counseled and orally warned about his forgetfulness.
Essentially, the General Counsel disregards Greene's
testimony, contending that two other employees (Tolar
Hardy and Melvin Brown) were not initially disciplined
for failing to punch in. Thus, he argues that, by Greene's
failure to specifically notify Pollard that he was being
warned and to give him an oral warning before a written
warning, an "uncustomary" warning, Respondent depart-
ed substantially from its prior practice and violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
I found Greene, admittedly a defender of Pollard on
numerous occasions, to have testified truthfully. The
warning given to Pollard was oral and specifically noted
as such. I further note that both Hardy and Brown were
known union adherents, and that other employees (Ruth
Brown and Carol Kelley) who were opposed to the
Union were similarly disciplined. I thus find no support
to prove that Respondent violated the Act and dismiss
this allegation.
ROBERT BOSCH CRPORATION 1051
The General Counsel also complained that on May 21
Greene told Pollard that Eynon wanted to lower Pol-
lard's pay because Pollard was unable to test 15 pumps a
day on a new machine. Greene said, however, that he
took Pollard's side, insisting, to Eynon that Pollard's pay
should not be decreased, that it was impossible for an
employee to average that high production, and that it
was necessary for a standard to be established for that
machine. 3 2
The General Counsel claims that Greene's expression
of Eynon's desires constituted an 8(a)(1) threat. Even if I
were to credit Pollard's testimony, I would be hard-
pressed to find the narration of a disagreement between
two supervisors as to whether or not one of their em-
ployees was fully producing, with the possibility that, if
he were not, he might be paid less, is an 8(a)(1) threat.
Once again, I am not inclined to hold that almost all of
Respondent's union animus was expended on threats
against Pollard.
In any event, I credit Greene's denial that he ever re-
layed the Eynon threat to Pollard, and his testimony that
Eynon never made such a threat. I find, instead, that
both supervisors were genuinely concerned solely with
the operation of the testing machinery, that Eynon
thought that more pumps could be tested than were
being tested by Pollard, that Greene disagreed with him,
and that finally the two agreed that a time study would
be made and a standard set. Union animus and Pollard's
prounion sentiments had nothing to do with the supervi-
sor's discussions and no threat was ever imparted to Pol-
lard.
5. Change of work rules
Until late February 1980, Respondent permitted em-
ployees in its quality control department to leave work
early or to take leave time during a day, and, to preserve
their perfect attendance records and thus qualify for a
drawing for a $25 or $50 gift certificate, to clock in
early.3 3 Employee Barbara Connally, who had been pre-
viously granted such permission, was told in late Febru-
ary that her request was denied and that she could no
longer do so; and, the following day, the entire depart-
ment was advised that the practice had been discontin-
ued.
The mere changing of a rule or practice, when the em-
ployer has no obligation to bargain collectively, is not an
unfair labor practice.3 4 The General Counsel seeks to
bring this particular allegation within the ambit of the
Act by arguing that the action was aimed at Connally, a
union adherent; that it was spread to cover all other em-
ployees in her department so that Respondent could
"cover its tracks"; and it was disparately not applied.
Further, the General Counsel argues that the circum-
32 None of the operators of that machine had been able to consistently
test 15 pumps per day.
a3 One of the exhibits showed that, during a particular quarter, 72 em-
ployees had perfect attendance records. Only one employee whose name
was drawn received a $25 certificate It is at best questionable whether
Respondent would have extended itself to deprive one union supporter (of
a 1/72 chance to obtain a $25 gift
a4 There are obviously other situations, not present here, where a
change may violate the Act. See, e.g., .Midwest Piping & Suppv Co., 63
NLRB 1060 (1945)
stances for the rule change, and the reasons therefor,
were shifting and patently invalid.
I admit to having difficulty in believing Respondent's
rationale, the thrust of which is that, if it permitted an
employee to work prior to the commencement of a shift,
it would expose itself to liability for overtime.3 5 The fact
is that its policy had been maintained for several years,
no one had been paid overtime, and no one complained
of Respondent's failure to pay overtime. If that truly cre-
ated a problem, Respondent could have easily changed
its policy to provide for an exception when an employee
requested to work prior to the commencement of a
normal shift in order to make up for time taken off
during a normal shift.
I am more persuaded that Supervisor Dieter Bund-
shuh, to whose attention this practice had been called by
Supervisor Wheat, was new to his job, did not particu-
larly care for the rule for whatever reason,3 6 and wanted
the practice discontinued, which he then took up with
Helgo Mehrtens. There is nothing to show that Mehrtens
was aware of what Wheat had been doing, although one
would expect that he certainly had more than ample op-
portunity to become aware of it over the course of sev-
eral years, and what actually motivated the change is not
entirely clear.
However, it is not necessarily the burden of Respond-
ent to prove that the change of practice was not discri-
minatorily motivated; rather, the General Counsel must
prove that a violation has been committed by a prepon-
derance of the evidence. I find that he has failed to do
so. If this rescission of a long-standing practice were
really intended to discriminate against union adherents, it
would probably have taken place long before. The
timing, therefore, seems not to support the General
Counsel's theory. Moreover, the proof of disparate treat-
ment is sadly lacking, not that there was not proof of
such treatment, but the beneficiary of it was a union ad-
herent, who in late March was permitted to clock in
early. That employee, Felix Petrowski, was one of the 14
employees who were sent to the training room on Febru-
ary 9 so that they might not hear Respondent's antiunion
speech. Thus, all that the General Counsel proved was
that the rule was honored in its breach and the benefici-
ary of the disparate treatment was another known union
adherent.
Accordingly, I find no support for the proposition that
the change of rules was motivated by reasons prohibited
by the Act and dismiss this allegation.
E. The Speeches-A Reprise, The Earlier Settlement
In support of his contention that Respondent's 1980
campaign speeches violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act,
the General Counsel cited a number of decisions holding
"5 Respondent argues that if an employee worked I day, for example.
from 7:45 a.m to 4:15 pm. and then came to work early the following
day at 5.45 am., the employee would have worked 10 hours within one
24-hour period, requiring the payment of overtime under its internal poli-
cies.
a6 Among the reasons posited by Respondent was that the employee
could use his sick time or, if the requested time off were known of suffi-
ciently in advance, vacation time Only sick leave time would disqualify
an emplyee from eligibility for a perfect attendance award.
ROBERT BOSCH ORPORATION
1052 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL I.ABOR RELATIONS BOARD
that, despite the seeming legality of individual statements
contained in the speeches, when considered in their total-
ity and in connection with other unfair labor practices,
the statements "may be unlawful when considered in the
aggregate." 37 Upon consideration of the record as a
whole and my findings of unfair labor practices commit-
ted in 1980, I conclude that they are not as egregious or
widespread so as to impact upon the legality of the
speeches, to the extent that I have found them legal.
There remains, however, a consideration of the effect
of the 1980 violations upon the earlier settlement agree-
ment. The General Counsel contends that the agreement
should be set aside because of the conduct which inde-
pendently violated Section 8(a)(l) of the Act and, thus,
the terms of the settlement. The Board recently restated
its long-held view that: "whether or not to give effect to
or rescind settlement agreements . . . 'cannot be deter-
mined by a mechanical application of rigid a priori rules
but must be determined by the exercise of a sound judg-
ment based on all the circumstances of each case."' Deis-
ter Concentrator Company, Inc., 253 NLRB 358, 359
(1980), quoting from The Ohio Calcium Company, 34
NLRB 917, 935 (1941). There, the Board reinstated a set-
tlement agreement, finding that the employer had taken
affirmative actions to comply with the settlement agree-
ment, including paying back wages, offering reinstate-
ment to employees, placing other employees on a prefer-
ential hiring list, and reinstating and recalling employees
to employment. The Board found that the employer had
substantially complied with the settlement and, even
though it found some post-settlement violations, refused
to rescind the settlement agreement because of their "es-
sentially unrelated nature."
There was in the settlement agreement herein no af-
firmative action to be taken by Respondent, other than
posting the agreed-upon notice. There was no reinstate-
ment of employees to be arranged for, nor backpay to be
paid, nor seniority lists to be prepared. In light of the
8(a)(1) violations to be corrected, Respondent merely
publicly stated that it would not repeat those violations
nor would it in any manner violate Section 8(a)(l) of the
Act nor interfere with employees' Section 7 rights.
Among the promises Respondent made were not to
threaten employees nor to threaten loss of existing bene-
fits, to discourage their engaging in organizational activi-
ties, promises broken by Respondent in its speech to its
employees, in its coercive gathering of 14 employees on
January 10, in its reference to them as troublemakers,
and in the threat to and discipline of Pollard for acting
as a union observer in a Board-conducted election. The
parties stipulated that the earlier settlement could be set
aside only if the General Counsel "wins a sufficient
number of allegations" pertaining to the 1980 conduct.
What "sufficient" was intended to mean was unexplained
and undefined. However, at the risk of an ipse dixit, the
violations found herein are substantial-that is, suffi-
cient-to justify a repetition of the notice to employees
under and pursuant to the earlier settlement. I therefore
grant the General Counsel's motion to set aside the prior
a See, e.g., Daniel Construction Company v. .VL.R.B., 341 F.2d 805,
811 (4th Cir. 1965); General Telephone Directory Company, 233 NLRB 422
(1977), enforcement denied 602 F.2d 912 (9th Cir. 1979).
settlement agreement, noting that Respondent has
waived any findings of fact and conclusions of law as a
predicate to my recommended Order and notice.
III. THE REPRESENTATION PROCEEDING
The objections to the representation election held on
February 15, 1980, overlap certain of the allegations per-
taining to the period from early January 1980 to Febru-
ary 15. To the extent that I have found that there were
violations of Section 8(a)(l) of the Act during this
period, I find and conclude that the objections, specifi-
cally, Objections 1, 4, and 9, have merit;3 8 and I hereby
recommend that they be sustained.
I further recommend that the election held on Febru-
ary 15, 1980, be set aside and that Case II-RC-4617 be
remanded to the Regional Director for Region 11 for the
purpose of conducting a new election at such time that
he deems that circumstances will permit the employees a
free and uncoerced choice of bargaining representative.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
UPON COMMERCE
The activities of Respondent, set forth in section II,
above, occurring in connection with Respondent's oper-
ation described in section 1, above, have a close, inti-
mate, and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and
commerce among the several States, and lead to labor
disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the
free flow thereof.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Robert Bosch Corporation is an employer engaged
in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and
(7) of the Act.
2. International Association of Machinists and Aero-
space Workers, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within
the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By threatening its employees with discharge and un-
specified reprisals for engaging in union activities; inter-
rogating its employees concerning their union activities
and the union activities of other employees; threatening
its employees with reprisals in order to discourage their
union activities; creating an impression among its em-
ployees of surveillance of their union activities; threaten-
ing its employees with the loss of existing benefits if they
select the Union as their collective-bargaining representa-
tive; restricting its employees' conversations with other
employees in order to discourage their union activities;
discriminatorily enforcing its no-solicitation rule; inform-
ing its employees that their fellow employees would be
discharged for going to union meetings; informing its
employees that known union supporters are "troublemak-
ers"; and assigning known union supporters to a separate
room during its delivery to employees of captive-audi-
ence speeches, Respondent has engaged in and is engag-
ing in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) of the Act.
3" The tardy and early leave citations given to Pollard, although
meted out on Feburary 15, 1980, were not discovered until after the elec-
tion and did not affect the result of the election.
ROBERT BOSCH CORPORATION 1053
4. By assessing tardy and early leave citations against
employee Richard Pollard because he engaged in union
activities, Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in
unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section
8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
6. Respondent has not violated the Act in any other
respect not specifically found herein.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain
unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that it be or-
dered to cease and desist therefrom and to take appropri-
ate action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Specifically, having found that Respondent unlawfully
assessed tardy and early leave citations against Richard
Pollard because he engaged in union activities, I shall
recommend that Respondent be required to revoke, re-
scind, and expunge the same from its employment, at-
tendance, and personnel records. Although the General
Counsel seeks a broad remedial order herein, I do not
find that Respondent has demonstrated a proclivity to
violate the Act. Hickmott Foods, Inc., 242 NLRB 1357
(1979); Raymond Buick, Inc., 173 NLRB 1292, 1293
(1968), enfd. 445 F.2d 644 (2d Cir. 1971).
Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of
law, upon the entire record, and pursuant to Section
10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recom-
mended:
ORDER' 9
The Respondent, Robert Bosch Corporation, Charles-
ton Heights, South Carolina, its officers, agents, succes-
sors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Threatening its employees with discharge and un-
specified reprisals for engaging in union activities.
(b) Interrogating its employees concerning their union
activities and the union activities of other employees.
(c) Threatening its employees with reprisals in order to
discourage their union activities.
(d) Creating an impression among its employees of sur-
veillance of their union activities.
(e) Threatening its employees with the loss of existing
benefits if they select the Union as their collective-bar-
gaining representative.
(f) Restricting its employees' conversations with other
employees in order to discourage their union activities.
(g) Discriminatorily enforcing its no-solicitation rule.
(h) Informing its employees that their fellow employ-
ees would be discharged for going to union meetings.
'3 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 4, of
the Rules and Regulations of the National l.abor Relations Board, the
findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided
in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, he adopted bs the Board rnd
become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto
shall be deemed waived for all purposes
(i) Informing its employees that known union support-
ers are "troublemakers."
0) Assigning known union supporters to a separate
room during its delivery to employees of captive-audi-
ence speeches.
(k) Assessing tardy and early leave citations against
employees because they engaged in union activities.
(1) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Revoke, rescind, and expunge from its employ-
ment, attendance, and personnel records the tardy and
early leave citations assessed against Richard Pollard,
dated February 15, 1980.
(b) Post at its facility in Charleston Heights, South
Carolina, copies of the attached notice marked "Appen-
dix."40 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the
Regional Director for Region II11, after being duly signed
by Respondent's representatives, shall be posted by Re-
spondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be main-
tained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in con-
spicuous places, including all places where notices to em-
ployees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be
taken by Respondent to ensure that said notices are not
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 11, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what
steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the election held in Case
11-RC-4617 on February 15, 1980, be, and it hereby is,
set aside, and the case be severed from Cases II-CA-
8160, 11-CA-8256, and 11-CA-8960 and remanded to
the Regional Director for Region 11 for the purpose of
conducting a new election in the appropriate unit at such
time as he deems that the circumstances permit the free
choice of a bargaining representative.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the settlement agreement
in Cases I -CA-8160 and 11-CA-8256 be, and it hereby
is, set aside.
IT IS FURTHER ORDIEREDI that the complaint be dis-
missed insofar as the alleged violations of the Act not
specifically found herein.
4" In the event that this Order is enfirced hb a Judgment of a United
States Coulrt of Appeals, the ords in the notice reading "'osted h)
Order of the National I.abor Relations Board" shall read "Posted I'ursu-
ant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Fnforcing ai
Order of th,: Nationilal Labor Relations Board
APPENDIX
NOiTICE To EMPI.OY:ES
PoSTEl) RY ORDER OF I HE
N.ATIONA. LABOR REATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WF W11 I NOT threaten our employees with dis-
charge and unspecified reprisals for engaging in
union activities.
ROBERT BOSCH ORPORATION
1054 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
WE WILL NOT interrogate our employees con-
cerning their union activities and the union activi-
ties of other employees.
WE WILL NOT threaten our employees with repri-
sals in order to discourage their union activities.
WE WILL NOT create an impression among our
employees of surveillance of their union activities.
WE WILL NOT threaten our employees with the
loss of existing benefits if they select International
Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers,
AFL-CIO (the Union), as their collective-bargain-
ing representative.
WE WILL NOT restrict our employees' conversa-
tions with other employees in order to discourage
their union activities.
WE WILL NOT discriminatorily enforce our no-so-
licitation rule.
WE WILL NOT inform our employees that their
fellow employees will be discharged for going to
union meetings.
WE WILL NOT inform our employees that known
Union supporters are "troublemakers."
WE WILL NOT assign known union supporters to
a separate room during our delivery to employees
of captive-audience speeches.
WE WILL NOT assess tardy and early leave cita-
tions against employees because they engage in
union activities.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner in-
terfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in
the exercise of their rights to self-organization, to
form, join, or assist International Association of Ma-
chinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, or any
other labor organization, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, or to
engage in concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protec-
tion, or their right to refrain from any and all such
activities.
WE WILL revoke, rescind, and expunge from our
employment, attendance, and personnel records the
tardy and early leave citations assessed against
Richard Pollard, dated February 15, 1980.
ROBERr BOSCH CORPORATION