Blue Diamond Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jul 17, 1989

295 N.L.R.B. 1007 (N.L.R.B. 1989)

BLUE DIAMOND CO. 1007
The Blue Diamond Company and Freight Drivers
and Helpers Union No. 557; International
Brotherhood of Teamsters , Chauffeurs, Ware-
housemen and Helpers of America, AFL-CIO.
Case 5-CA-19291
July 17, 1989
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN STEPHENS AND MEMBERS
CRACRAFr AND HIGGINS
On September 20, 1988, Administrative Law
Judge David S. Davidson issued the attached deci-
sion . The Respondent filed exceptions and a sup-
porting brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegat-
ed its authority in this proceeding to a three-
member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the
record in light of the exceptions and brief and has
decided to affirm the judge's rulings, findings, and
conclusions and to adopt the recommended Order.
We agree with the judge's finding that there is a
sufficient showing of relevance to warrant the con-
clusion that the Respondent has an obligation to
furnish the names of E & M Express , Inc. (E & M)
and H & K Equipment Company , Inc. (H & K)
employees. As the judge found, there is "an objec-
tive factual basis for the Union to believe that bar-
gaining unit work was being performed by employ-
ees of E & M and H & K, that H & K and E & M
together with Respondent might constitute a single
employer , and that the assignment or subcontract-
ing of loads to their drivers violated both the rec-
ognition clause of the agreement and the subcon-
tracting clause ." See JD sec. II,B, 3d par . That ob-
jective factual basis makes the Union's request here
a legitimate one and clearly not, as urged by our
dissenting colleague, a fishing expedition. As the
judge noted, the E & M and H & K employees
"are legitimate sources from which further infor-
mation can be sought relating to the possible griev-
ance and with whom information obtained from
other sources may be checked for corroboration or
contradiction."
A union is not required , as our dissenting col-
league suggests, to establish in advance exactly
how the information these employees might pro-
vide would be helpful in pursuing a possible griev-
ance, that the employees in fact have knowledge
that would aid the Union, or that any information
the employees might provide is reliable. Nor is it
necessary , in the circumstances here, to establish
that the E & M and H & K employees have access
to "insider" information. Any information these
employees may provide on the trips they are as-
295 NLRB No. 111
signed and on the customers to whom they make
deliveries will obviously assist the Union in deter-
mining whether bargaining unit work is being di-
verted and whether the nature of the relationship
among the Respondent, E & M and H & K, is that
of a single employer. Thus, the Union's request for
information is merely part of an investigatory proc-
ess through which it determines whether or not
there exists a basis for a grievance against the Re-
spondent. )
We therefore adopt the judge's conclusion that
the Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1)
of the Act by failing or refusing to provide the
names of the employees of E & M and H & K.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the
recommended Order of the administrative law
judge and orders that the Respondent , The Blue
Diamond Company, Baltimore, Maryland, its offi-
cers, agents, successors , and assigns , shall take the
action set forth in the Order.
CHAIRMAN STEPHENS , concurring and dissenting in
part.
I agree with the finding that the Respondent un-
lawfully delayed in furnishing information to the
Union concerning the structure, operations, and
interrelationship between itself, and H & K Equip-
ment Company, Inc. (H & K), and E & M Express,
Inc. (E & M). I dissent, however, from the finding
that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and
(1) by refusing to furnish the Union the names and
addresses of the employees of H & K and E & M,
as requested in the Union's July 26, 1987 letter.
The Respondent has submitted all other items of
information requested by the Union, but refuses to
furnish the names and addresses of employees, ar-
guing that this information is not relevant to the
Union's duties and responsibilities as the exclusive
bargaining representative of the employees in the
unit. As the information sought here pertains to
employees and operations other than those repre-
sented by the Union, the Union has the burden of
establishing the relevance of the information. Ohio
Power Co., 216 NLRB 987, 991 (1975), enfd. 531
F.2d 1381 (6th Cir. 1976). The Union has failed to
meet that burden.
As the judge notes, at the hearing the Union
never answered the question why the Union needs
the names and addresses of these employees and in
its brief to the judge, it states only that, as its col-
lective-bargaining agreement with the Respondent
' We note there is no indication or contention that the Respondent
does not have access to the requested information.
1008 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
may be applicable to the H & K and E & M em-
ployees, a list of their names and addresses would
be "helpful ." Although the standard of relevance
to be applied here is a liberal one, the Union still
bears the burden of demonstrating "the reasonable
and probable relevance of the requested informa-
tion ." Southern Nevada Builders Assn ., 274 NLRB
350, 351 ( 1985).
In my view , the reasons advanced by the Union
for its request for the nonunit employees' names
and addresses fail to demonstrate such relevance.
The Union does not explain how such information
would be "helpful" in establishing whether H & K
and E & M together with the Respondent consti-
tute a single employer , or that bargaining unit
work was being performed by employees of H & K
and E & M . Further, neither the Union nor the
General Counsel has come forward with evidence
that would indicate that the employees of these
two companies have knowledge that would aid the
Union in determining the relationship between the
Respondent and H & K and E & M, or whether
the former was diverting unit work to the latter
two in violation of its contract; and my colleagues'
assertion that the employees might provide the
Union with useful information rests on nothing
more than conjecture . Surely , the reliability of any
information supplied by these employees is suspect
absent evidence indicating they have access to
"inside" information concerning the corporate af-
fairs of their employers . No such evidence has been
presented. This seems little more than a fishing ex-
pedition in which the fish appear to be the employ-
ees and not their employers or the Respondent.
Accordingly, I would find that the Respondent's
obligation to furnish this information has not been
established and thus that its refusal to do so does
not violate the Act.
Angela S. Anderson, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Robert B. Pearlman , Esq., of Greensboro , North Caroli-
na, for the Respondent.
H. Victoria Hedian , Esq. (Abato, Rubenstein & Abato), of
Lutherville, Maryland , for the Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
DAVID S . DAVIDSON , Administrative Law Judge. This
case was tried at Baltimore , Maryland , on June 6, 1988.
The Union filed the charge on December 9, 1987, and
the Regional Director issued the complaint on January
22, 1988 . The sole issue is whether, as part of its obliga-
tion to bargain with the Union , Respondent was obliged
to furnish information about the structure and operations
of two other corporations and particularly the names of
the employees of those corporations.
On the entire record, including my observation of the
demeanor of the witnesses, and after consideration of the
briefs filed by the parties, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent, a Maryland corporation , has a facility in
Baltimore , Maryland, from which it transports freight
interstate and annually derives gross revenues in excess
of $50,000. I find that Respondent is an employer en-
gaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2),
(6), and (7) of the Act. I find further that the Union is a
labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act.
II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Facts
Since 1955, the Union and the Teamsters National
Freight Industry Negotiating Committee have been the
exclusive collective-bargaining Representative of a unit
consisting of all drivers employed by Respondent at its
Baltimore facility. The Union and Committee have en-
tered into a series of collective-bargaining agreements.
The agreement in effect at the times material to this case
was effective from April 1, 1985, to March 31, 1988. In
article 3 of the agreement Respondent recognized the
Union and Committee as exclusive representative of all
covered employees. It provides further:
This provision shall not apply to wholly-owned and
wholly independently operated subsidiaries which
are not under contract with local unions . "Wholly
independently operated "means, among other
things, that there shall be no interchange of freight,
equipment or personnel , or common use, in whole
or in part , of equipment , terminals, property, per-
sonnel or rights.
Article 27 of the agreement provides with respect to sub-
contracting:
Section 1.
Work Preservation
For the purpose of preserving work and job op-
portunities for the employees covered by this
Agreement , the Signatory Employer agrees that no
operation , work or services of the kind , nature or
type covered by, or presently performed , or hereaf-
ter assigned to the collective bargaining unit by the
Signatory Employer will be subcontracted , trans-
ferred , leased , diverted, assigned or conveyed in full
or in part (hereinafter referred to as "divert" or
"subcontract"), by the Employer to any other plant,
business, person, or non-unit employees , or to any
other mode of operation , unless specifically provid-
ed and permitted in this Agreement.
In addition , the Signatory Employer agrees that
it will not, as hereinafter set forth, subcontract or
divert the work presently performed by, or hereaf-
ter assigned to, its employees to other business enti-
BLUE DIAMOND CO. 1009
ties owned and/or controlled by the Signatory Em-
ployer, or its parent , subsidiaries or affiliates.
Section 2.
Diversion of Work-Parent or Subsidiary Compa-
nies
The parties agree that for purposes of this Article
it shall be presumed that a diversion of work in vio-
lation of this Agreement occurs when work present-
ly and regularly performed by, or hereafter assigned
to, employees of the Signatory Employer has been
lost and the lost work is being performed in the
same manner by an entity owned and/or controlled
by the Signatory Employer, its parent, or a subsidi-
ary within sixty (60) days of the loss of the work.
The burden of overcoming such presumption in the
grievance procedure shall be upon the Employer.
Section 3
Subcontracting
The Employer may subcontract work when all of
his regular employees are working , except that in
no event shall road work presently performed or
runs established during the life of this Agreement be
farmed out. No dock work shall be farmed out
except for existing situations established by agreed-
to past practices . Overflow loads may be delivered
by drivers other than the Employer's employees
provided that this shall not be used as a subterfuge
to violate the provisions of this Agreement and is
done in accordance with this provision and Article
25. Loads may also be delivered by other agreed-to
methods or as presently agreed to. Owner -operators
or other persons performing subcontracted work
which is permitted herein shall receive no less than
the equivalent of the economic terms and conditions
of this Agreement and the applicable Supplement.
In the case of permitted subcontracting to a Fleet
Owner . The Signatory Employer shall be responsi-
ble for the Fleet Owner 's failure to maintain the
equivalent of the economic terms and conditions of
this Agreement for the individuals performing the
subcontracted work.
The normal , orderly interlining of freight for
peddle on occasional basis, where there are parallel
rights, and when not for the purpose of evading this
Agreement may be continued as has been permitted
by past practice provided it is not being done to
defeat the provisions of this Agreement.
Henry Schultz has been employed by Respondent as
an over-the-road driver out of its Baltimore facility since
1982 . He became assistant shop steward in April 1987
and shop steward in August 1987.
Over a period of time Schultz observed that work
which he believed was originally done by bargaining
unit emloyees was being done by employees of E & M
Express, Inc. (E & M ), a company which he described as
being started by Respondent in 1983 . It appeared to him
that over a period of time the problem became progres-
sively worse and also involved assignments to employees
of H & K Equipment Company, Inc. (H & K), another
employer. Schultz began with the aid of other drivers to
collect instances of what he believed to be improper as-
signments of bargaining unit work to employees of these
companies . Schultz became a steward in order to try to
do something about it, and in May 1987 presented Union
President McDonald with written grievances protesting
violations of articles 3 and 27 based on subcontracting,
diversion , and assignment of bargaining unit work to em-
ployees of E & M and H & K . After consulting union
attorneys, the Union decided to try to obtain additional
information before filing the grievance.
Drivers gathered information based on their observa-
tion of drivers wearing E & M or H & K hats and driv-
ing similarly marked tractors to haul loads of merchan-
dise from customers of a kind normally hauled by Re-
spondent's drivers. They also collected some freight bills
which showed Respondent as the designated carrier but
reflecting loads hauled by E & M drivers.
Schultz and McDonald were concerned for several
reasons . Even with enough work for Respondent's driv-
ers, they were concerned that employees could lose
better paying trips to the drivers of the other companies
as well as trips which would bring them back to their
homes rather than to a destination away from home.
They were also concerned that nonunit drivers did not
pay union dues, as required by the union-shop provisions
of the agreement and that the Company was not making
contributions to the pension , health, and welfare plans on
their behalf as required by the agreement.
On July 21 , 1987, McDonald wrote Respondent's gen-
eral manager, Roy Franta , as follows:
As you knew , the contract between Blue Dia-
mond and Lccal 557 will expiring [sic] March 31,
1988. In order to prepare for our negotiations for a
new collective bargaining agreement, we need cer-
tain information. We also require this information in
order to police the collective bargaining agreement
between Lccal 557 and Blue Diamond . I request
therefore that you reply in writing to the following
questions within thirty (30) days after you have re-
ceived this letter.
There followed a list of 61 items concerning the struc-
ture, operations, interrelation , and identities of officers,
directors, shareholders, managers, supervisors, and em-
ployees of Respondent, H & K Company , and E & M
Express.
On July 31 , 1987, Franta replied as follows:
In response to your letter of July 21, 1987, to
enable you to prepare for contract negotiations for
our collective bargaining agreement as well as po-
licing the agreement currently in effect , the follow-
ing information will meet your needs.
The correct name of the company is "The Blue
Diamond Company," a Maryland corporation,
which was incorporated on December 18, 1962.
The Blue Diamond Company is registered to do
business in the State of Maryland and was last regis-
tered with the Department of Assessments and Tax-
ation for the State of Maryland on April 15, 1987.
1010 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Enclosed , you will find the names and addresses
of all employees within the bargaining unit as well
as a copy of the current contract between The Blue
Diamond Ccmpany and Teamsters Local #557.
The information furnished was responsive to the first
four items and part of the eighth item listed in McDon-
ald's July 21 letter.
On August 17, 1987, McDonald wrote Franta further:
I have received your letter dated July 31, 1987.
The information which you have provided is not
sufficient for our needs . We believe that the collec-
tive bargaining agreement between Local 557 and
Blue Diamond is being violated , and that work be-
longing to members of Local 557 is being diverted
to the H & K and E & M companies . We have
reason to believe that Article 27 of the collective
bargaining agreement is being repeatedly violated.
Federal labor law requires you to supply us with
the information we have requested . That informa-
tion is necessary to ascertain that the Company is
abiding by the collective bargaining agreement.
The information is also necessary to prepare for
negotiations on a new collective bargaining agree-
ment . As you know, the current contract will expire
in less than eight months.
If you do not supply the information we have re-
quested , we will have no choice but to take further
legal action . Please supply this information within
10 days from the date of this letter.
On August 31, 1987, Respondent 's labor counsel
Robert Pearlman replied to the August 17 letter as fol-
lows:
In reply to your letter to Mr. Roy Franta of Blue
Diamond Company dated August 17, 1987, con-
cerning H & K and E & M Companies both are
Corporations. As neither H & K nor E & M have
any bargaining relationship with your Union it is
not our intention to supply you with any informa-
tion concerning these two Corporations.
With regard to your contention that Blue Dia-
mond is in violation of Article 27, Subcontracting,
of its collective bargaining agreement with Local
557, this is incorrect . As you know Blue Diamond
has a standing request with your Local to send
them qualified drivers.
In addition the Blue Diamond Company has be-
tween one hundred and fifty and two hundred doc-
umented refusals of Blue Diamond Employees and
members of your Local who have refused or
"marked off" loads without good cause . These re-
fusals span a period of approximately the past six
months.
The current contract between Blue Diamond and
your Local has eight months before expiration. Blue
Diamond will await your request to begin negotia-
tions on a new contract at an approximate time.
On September 29, 1987, Pearlman's letter was an-
swered by H. Victoria Hedian, counsel for the Union:
I have received a copy of your August 31, 1987
letter to Clifton McDonald, President of Local 557.
This office represents Local 557.
The response which you have given to Local
557's information request is insufficient and unsatis-
factory. Blue Diamond is evading legitimate Union
questions . Local 557 is entitled to receive this infor-
mation from Blue Diamond , in order to police the
collective bargaining agreement and protect the
work of its members and to prepare for negotia-
tions . Several NLRB cases have upheld exactly this
type of request.
If Blue Diamond does not furnish the information
which Local 557 has requested in its July 21, 1987
letter within the next 15 days, we will have no
choice but to file charges at the National Labor Re-
lations Board.
On January 21, 1988 , Pearlman replied to Hedian:
On January 14th Blue Diamond met with the
N.L.R.B. on the investigation of the refusal to bar-
gain charges you filed. We answered substantially
all the questions put to us. In addition we gave the
Baltimore Region permission to disclose this infor-
mation to you. They have declined our request to
disclose to you our responses to your questions.
Attached are the board agent's notes on our re-
sponses to your questions and Exhibit II which is
the grievance filed by Mr. Schultz.
After receiving the information enclosed by Pearlman,
on April 19, 1988, Hedian wrote Pearlman listing items
from the July 17, 1987 letter which remained unan-
swered . On April 21, 1988, Pearlman replied furnishing
some additional information, but stating that Respondent
would not submit the names of H & K or E & M em-
ployees . As of that time and as of the time of the hearing
the names of these employees were the only items on the
list in McDonald's original letter which Respondent had
not purported to furnish the Union.
B. Conclusions
There is no dispute as to the principles which govern
this case . As set in Bohemia, Inc., 272 NLRB 1128, 1129
(1984), they are:
It is well established that an employer must pro-
vide a union with requested information "if there is
a probability that such data is relevant and will be
of use to the union in fulfilling its statutory duties
and responsibilities as the employees ' exclusive bar-
gaining representative ." Associated General Contrac-
tors of California, 242 NLRB 891, 893 (1979), enfd.
633 F.2d 766 (9th Cir. 1980); NLRB v. Acme Indus-
trial Co., 385 U.S. 432 (1967). The Board uses a lib-
eral, discovery-type standard to determine whether
information is relevant , or potentially relevant, to
require its production . NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351
U.S. 149 (1956). Information about terms and condi-
tions of employment of employees actually repre-
sented by a union is presumptively relevant and
BLUE DIAMOND CO. 1011
necessary and is required to be produced. Ohio
Power Co., 216 NLRB 987 (1975), enfd . 531 F.2d
1381 (6th Cir. 1976). Information necessary for
processing grievances under a collective -bargaining
agreement , including that necessary to decide
whether to proceed with a grievance or arbitration,
must be provided as it falls within the ambit of the
parties' duty to bargain . NLRB v. Acme Industrial,
supra; Bickerstaff Clay Products, 266 NLRB 983
(1983).
However, when a union's request for information
concerns data about employees or operations other
than those represented by the union, or data on fi-
nancial, sales , and other information , there is no
presumption that the information is necessary and
relevant to the union 's representation of employees.
Rather, the union is under the burden to establish
the relevance of such information . Ohio Power,
supra.
While Respondent has not conceded the relevance of
any of the information requested by the Union pertaining
to the H & K or E & M, it has furnished information in
response to all requested items except the names of the
employees of these companies and has not singled out
any other items for focus.
Here, unlike the situation in Bohemia , there was an ob-
jective factual basis for the Union to believe that bar-
gaining unit work was being performed by employees of
E & M and H & K, that H & K and E & M together
with Respondent might constitute a single employer, and
that the assignment or subcontracting of loads to their
drivers violated both the recognition clause of the agree-
ment and the subcontracting clause . I find that the evi-
dence is sufficient to establish the general relevance of
the information sought by the Union relating to the
structure, operations and interrelationships of Respond-
ent, E & M, and H & K . Boyd-Mulford Construction, 277
NLRB 1631 ( 1986); Walter N. Yoder & Sons, 270 NLRB
652 (1984). While Respondent ultimately furnished infor-
mation in response to all but two items in the Union's re-
quest, the bulk of the information was not sent to the
Union until January 21, 1988, 5 months after it was
sought, 6 weeks after the charge was filed , and 1 day
before the complaint issued . By belatedly furnishing in-
formation in response to the bulk of the request Re-
spondent did not satisfy its obligation to bargain. CRST,
Inc., 269 NLRB 400, 406 (1984). Accordingly, an order
is warranted based on Respondent's refusal to furnish the
requested information promptly.
The principal question in this case is whether Re-
spondent was obligated to furnish the names of the em-
ployees of E & M and H & K even assuming the general
relevance of the requested information.
At the hearing, Schultz was asked why the Union
needed the names of the E & M and H & K employees
but never responded to the question . He conceded that
he knew everyone in Respondent 's bargaining unit and
that if someone outside the Union drove a truck he
would know it. He also testified that most of the time if
he asked strange drivers for their names, they would
give them to him . McDonald also testified that he usual-
ly recognized drivers who were members of the Union
and that he would question those who were strange to
him. He testified that the names of those driving the
trucks were important to him so that he could determine
whether the Union was collecting dues and benefit fund
payments for them.
In her brief, counsel for the General Counsel argues
that the employees of H & K and E & M were legitimate
sources of information to the Union and notes that an
order is needed particularly in view of Franta's testimo-
ny as to the number of drivers employed by H & K
which is inconsistent with the information ultimately fur-
nished by Respondent with its January 21 letter . Counsel
for the Union adds that since E & M and H & K may be
alter egos of Respondent , the agreement may be applica-
ble to their employees , and "It would be helpful to know
who these potential bargaining unit members are."
Respondent argues that the names of H & K and E &
M employees are not necessary to investigate grievances
or represent the bargaining unit and that the General
Counsel has failed to demonstrate their relevance. Re-
spondent points out that the Union can file a grievance
without knowing the names and has done so , and that
the testimony of both Schultz and McDonald fails to es-
tablish the relevance of the names . Respondent contends
that the Union's true purpose in seeking the names is to
use them as an aid to an organizing drive.
The issue to be decided is whether under the applica-
ble liberal discovery standard of relevance the General
Counsel and the Union have shown the relevance of the
requested information . The general purpose for which all
requested information was sought was to investigate
claimed contract violations in the diversion of work from
Respondent to H & K and E & M and to prepare for
contract negotiations . While no one has shown that the
names of E & M and H & K employees have a direct
bearing on either a potential grievance or future negotia-
tions, the General Counsel correctly points out that these
employees are legitimate sources from which further in-
formation can be sought relating to the possible griev-
ance and with whom information obtained from other
sources may be checked for corroboration or contradic-
tion. I find that there is a sufficient showing of relevance
under a liberal discovery standard to conclude that Re-
spondent is obligated to furnish the requested names to
the Union.
I find therefore that by failing or refusing to provide
the information requested in the Union's July 21, 1987
letter, Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of
the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent, The Blue Diamond Company, is an
employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. Freight Drivers and Helpers Union No. 557; Inter-
national Brotherhood of Teamsters , Chauffeurs, Ware-
housemen and Helpers of America, AFL-CIO is a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the
Act.
1012 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
3. At all times material the Union and the Teamsters
National Freight Industry Negotiating Committee have
been the exclusive collective-bargaining representative
within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act for the fol-
lowing appropriate unit:
All drivers employed by Respondent at its Balti-
more, Maryland, location, but excluding all other
employees, guards, and supervisors as defined in the
Act.
4. By failing and refusing to furnish the Union with
certain information requested by it, Respondent has en-
gaged in unfair labor practices affecting commerce
within the meaning of Sections 8(a)(5) and (1) and 2(6)
and (7) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in unfair
labor practices, I shall recommend that it be ordered to
cease and desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative
action to effectuate the purposes of the Act.
Based on the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
the entire record, I issue the following recommended"
ORDER
The Respondent, The Blue Diamond Company, Balti-
more, Maryland, its officers, agents, successors, and as-
signs, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively with Freight Driv-
ers and Helpers Union No. 557; International Brother-
hood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and
Helpers of America, AFL-CIO, and the Teamsters Na-
tional Freight Industry Negotiating Committee, as the
exclusive bargaining representative of the employees in
the following appropriate unit, by refusing to furnish the
Union the information requested in items 5 through 61 of
the Union's letter to the Respondent dated July 17, 1987:
All drivers employed by The Blue Diamond Com-
pany at is Baltimore , Maryland, location, but ex-
cluding all other employees, guards, and supervisors
as defined in the Act.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) On request, furnish to the Union in writing the in-
formation requested by items 5 through 61 of the Union's
letter to the Respondent dated July 17, 1987, not previ-
ously furnished.
1 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102 .46 of the Board's
Rules and Regulations, the findings , conclusions, and recommended
Order shall , as provided in Sec. 102 48 of the Rules, be adopted by the
Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur-
poses.
(b) Post at is facility in Baltimore, Maryland, copies of
the attached notice marked, "Appendix."? Copies of the
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 5, after being duly signed by the Respondent's
authorized representative, shall be posted by the Re-
spondent immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60
consecutive days in conspicuous places including all
places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respond-
ent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20
days from the date of this Order what steps the Re-
spondent has taken to comply.
8 If this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of
Appeals, the word in the notice reading "Posted By Order of the Nation-
al Labore Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of
the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National
Labor Relations Board."
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated the National Labor Relations Act and has or-
dered us to post and abide by this notice.
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with
Freight Drivers and Helpers Union No. 557; Internation-
al Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen
and Helpers of America, AFL-CIO, and the Teamsters
National Freight Industry Negotiating Committee, as the
exclusive bargaining representative of our employees in
the following appropriate unit, by refusing to furnish the
Union those items of information requested in its July 17,
1987, letter not previously or promptly furnished by us:
All drivers employed by The Blue Diamond Com-
pany at its Baltimore, Maryland, location, but ex-
cluding all other employees , guards, and supervisors
as defined in the Act.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL, on request, furnish the Union the informa-
tion requested in its July 17, 1987 letter, not previously
furnished by us, that is relevant and necessary to its role
as the exclusive bargaining representative of our employ-
ees in the bargaining unit.
THE BLUE DIAMOND COMPANY