Bloomingdales's

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Nov 25, 1953

107 N.L.R.B. 191 (N.L.R.B. 1953)

BLOOMINGDALE'S
BLOOMINGDALE' S and WILLIAM P. WARD
191
DISTRIBUTIVE , PROCESSING AND OFFICE WORKERS OF
AMERICA, LOCAL 3 and WILLIAM P. WARD. Cases Nos.
2-CA-2584 and 2-CB-810. November 25, 1953
DECISION AND ORDER
On June 30, 1953, Trial Examiner Sidney Lindner issued his
Intermediate Report in the above-entitled consolidated pro-
ceeding, finding that the Respondents had not engaged in the
unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint and recommend-
ing that the complaint be dismissed in its entirety, as set forth
in the copy of the Intermediate Report attached hereto. There-
after, the General Counsel filed exceptions to the Intermediate
Report and a supporting brief.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner
made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was com-
mitted. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has con-
sidered the Intermediate Report, the exceptions and brief, and
the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the findings,
conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner but
only to the extent consistent with our Decision and Order.
1. The Trial Examiner concluded that the Respondent Union
had not violated Section 8 (b) (1) (A) and 8 (b) (2) of the Act by
causing the Respondent Company to discharge William P.
Ward, the charging party, on June 30, 1952. We do not agree.
Briefly, the facts in this case are as follows: The Union and
the Company at all times material herein were parties to a col-
lective -bargaining agreement containing a valid union -security
clause which conditioned an employee's employment upon
membership in the Union. Ward was an employee of the Company
and a member of the Union. He was obligated, under the terms
of the contract and in accordance with the proviso to Section 8
(a) (3) and 8 (b) (2) of the Act, to tender the periodic dues
"uniformly required as a condition of . . . retaining member-
ship." He was discharged, at the request of the Union, ostensibly
because he had failed to pay his dues. The record, however, re-
veals that as early as August 6, 1951, Ward was notified in
writing by the Union that it would not accept his future tender of
dues unless he presented a valid excuse for nonattendance at
union meetings or paid certain fines incident thereto. At no time
was this "FINAL NOTICE" to Ward rescinded by notice from
the Union that it would accept his dues, if tendered. On the con-
trary, thereafter in October and November 1951, and in January
1952, Ward tendered his dues to the Union but on each occasion
his dues were rejected because he would not at the same time
pay his accumulated fines. As the facts detailed in the Inter-
mediate Report reveal, the Union's requirement that fines be
paid before dues would be accepted was the source of a long-
standing, tripartite dispute between Ward, the Union, and the
Company. In his final interview with Vincent Brennan, the Com-
107 NLRB No. 62.
1 92 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
pany's personnel manager, Ward was instructed, as he had been
on each of the previous occasions, to tender his dues. The
Union, Brennan informed him, was interested only in dues and
would accept his tender. Ward was uncommunicative and did not
again tender his dues. He was discharged on the following day.
We cannot agree with the Trial Examiner that it was in-
cumbent upon Ward, after his last interview with Brennan, to
again tender his dues. While we are mindful of and do not con-
done the intransigent and uncooperative attitude adopted by
Ward during this interview, we do not regard Brennan's remarks
to Ward as sufficient to dispel the futility of tendering dues
without the payment of fines. In the absence of specific notice
from the Union to Ward that his dues would be accepted without
regard to fines, we are persuaded on the facts in this case that
another tender by Ward would have been a futile gesture. Under
these circumstances, we conclude that the Union sought and
obtained Ward's discharge not because he had failed to pay his
dues, the assigned reason, but because he refused to pay fines
levied against him. i
Accordingly, we find that by causing the Company to discharge
Ward because he had been suspended from membership in the
Union for a reason other than his failure to tender periodic dues
uniformly required as a condition of retaining membership, the
Union has violated Section 8 (b) (2) of the Act. We also find that
this conduct of the Union is violative of Section 8 (b) (1) (A) of
the Act.2
2. The Trial Examiner concluded that the Company itself had
committed no unfair labor practice in discharging Ward because
it did not know or have reasonable grounds to believe that the
Union had requested his discharge for a reason other than his
failure to tender periodic dues. The record shows that the Com-
pany undertook in a meticulous manner to carry out the terms of
its contract with the Union, and no more. While the Union had
made no statements to Ward disavowing the necessity to pay
fines, company officials were told on numerous occasions by
union agents that the Union was interested only in Ward's dues
and that fines were not involved. In connection with its final re -
quest for Ward's discharge the Union specifically informed
Brennan that it would accept Ward's dues, if tendered. Thus, on
June 30, 1952, the Company was in the position of having been
repeatedly assured that the Union' s sole reason in requesting
Ward's discharge was his failure to pay dues, as required
under the contract. Nor did the Company stop at these assur-
ances. Before the discharge occurred Brennan interviewed Ward
and attempted to determine, with all due diligence, whether
some reason other than his failure to pay dues motivated the
Union's request at this time. Ward was completely uncoopera-
i Westinghouse Electric Corporation, 96 NLRB 522, 525 and cases cited therein; enforced
sub nom N L R. B v. I A. M Local 504, 203 F. 2d 173(C A. 9). Cf. National Lead Company,
106 NLRB 545
2 Westinghouse Electric Corporation, supra
BLOOMINGDALE'S 19 3
tive. In view of these facts , we find, in agreement with the
Trial Examiner , that the Company did not have reasonable
grounds for believing that Ward ' s discharge was requested in
June 1952 , for a reason other than his failure to pay dues.
Accordingly , we find that the Company did not violate Section
8 (a) (1) and ( 3) of the Act.3
THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent Union, set forth above, oc-
curring in connection with the operations of the Respondent
Company described in section I of the Intermediate Report,
have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to commerce,
and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing
commerce and the free flow of commerce.
THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent Union has engaged in unfair
labor practices , we shall order it to cease and desist therefrom
and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the
policies of the Act.
We shall order the Respondent Union to notify both the Re-
spondent Company and Ward that it has no objection to Ward's
immediate reinstatement to his former or substantially equiva-
lent position4 as an employee of the Respondent Company, with-
out prejudice to his seniority or other rights or privileges. We
shall also order the Respondent Union, which we have found
responsible for the discrimination suffered by Ward , to make
him whole , as closely as possible , for any loss of pay he may
have suffered by reason of the Respondent Union ' s unlawful
conduct. 5
In accordance with our practice , the period from the date
of the Intermediate Report to the date of the Order herein
will be excluded in computing the amount of back pay to
which Ward is entitled , because of the Trial Examiner's
recommendation that the complaint be dismissed.
Accordingly , we shall order the Respondent Union to pay
to Ward a sum of money equal to the amount that he normally
3Our dissenting colleague , in expressing disagreement with our holding, asserts that, if
it were reasonable for the Employer to believe that Ward ' s discharge was requested for
failure to pay dues , it was equally reasonable for Ward to reach the same conclusion. The
difference upon which we rely is readily apparent . The Union communicated its assurance
to the Employer , but the Union never communicated to Ward any change in the position
it had previously taken with him, that it would not accept his dues unless he paid fines as
well.
4The expression "former or substantially equivalent position " means "former position
wherever possible , but if such position is no longer in existence , then to a substantially
equivalent position ." See The Chase National Bank of the City of New York, San Juan,
Puerto Rico , Branch, 65 NLRB 827.
5 The absence of any reinstatement order against the Respondent Company in no way affects
our power to issue a back-pay order against the Respondent Union. National Union of Marine
Cooks and Stewards , CIO (George C. Quinley), 92 NLRB 877 , and cases cited therein.
194 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
would have earned as wages from June 30, 1952, the date
of the discrimination , to 5 days after the date on which the
Respondent Union notifies the Respondent Company and Ward,
in accordance with our Order , that it no longer has objection
to his immediate reinstatement , less his net earnings 6 during
such period. 7
Consistent with the Board's established policy, Ewe shall
order that the loss of pay be computed on the basis of each
separate calendar quarter or portion thereof during the
period from the date of Ward' s discharge to the termination
of the Respondent Union's liability, as hereinbefore provided.
The quarterly periods, hereinafter called "quarters ," shall
begin with the first day of January, April, July, and October.
Loss of pay shall be determined by deducting from a sum
equal to that which Ward would normally have earned for each
quarter or portion thereof, his net earnings , if any, in other
employment during that period . Earnings in one particular
quarter shall have no effect upon the back-pay liability for any
other quarter.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record
in this case , the Board makes the additional:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent Union has engaged in and is engaging in
unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (b) (2)
of the Act.
2. By restraining and coercing employees of the Respondent
Company in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7
of the Act, the Respondent Union has engaged in unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8 (b) (1) (A) of the Act.
3. The foregoing unfair labor practices engaged in by the
Respondent Union are unfair labor practices affecting commerce
within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
ORDER
Upon the entire record in this case , and pursuant to Section
10 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that Distribu-
tive , Processing and Office Workers of America, Local3, New
6By "net earnings " is meant earnings less expenses , such as for transportation, room,
and board, incurred by an employee in connection with obtaining work and working elsewhere
than for the Employer, which would not have been incurred but for the unfair labor practices
and the consequent necessity of his seeking employment elsewhere. See Crossett Lumber
Company, 8 NLRB 440. Monies received for work performed upon Federal, State, county,
municipal , or other work - relief projects shall be considered as earnings . See Republic
Steel Corporation v. N L. R B., 311 U. S. 7.
'Our back-pay order shall be construed as set forth in Pen and Pencil Workers Union
Local 19593, AFL, 91 NLRB 883.
8 F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289.
BLOOMINGDALE'S 19 5
York , New York , its officers , representatives , agents, suc-
cessors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Causing or attempting to cause Bloomingdale's, its of-
ficers, agents , successors , and assigns , to discharge orin any
other manner to discriminate against its employees with respect
to whom membership in the Respondent Union has been denied or
terminated upon some ground other than failure to tender the
periodic dues and initiation fees uniformly required as a con-
dition of acquiring or retaining membership or to discharge or
in any other manner to discriminate against its employees in
violation of Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act.
(b) Restraining or coercing employees of Bloomingdale's, its
officers , agents, successors , and assigns, in the exercise of
their right to engage in or to refrain from engaging in any and
and all of the concerted activities guaranteed to them by Section
7 of the Act , except to the extent that such right may be affected
by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization
as a condition of employment as authorized by Section 8 (a) (3)
of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action, which the Board
finds will effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Notify Bloomingdale ' s in writing that it withdraws its ob-
jections to the employment of William P. Ward and requests it
to offer him immediate and full reinstatement to his former or
a substantially equivalent position , without prejudice to his
seniority or other rights and privileges.
(b) Notify William P. Ward in writing that it has advised
Bloomingdale ' s that it withdraw its objections to his reemploy-
ment and requests it to offer him immediate and full reinstate-
ment.
(c) Make whole William P. Ward for any loss of pay he may
have suffered as a result of the discrimination against him in
the manner set forth in the section entitled "The Remedy."
(d) Post in conspicuous places in its business office at New
York , New York , where notices are customarily posted , copies
of the notice attached hereto as an Appendix.9 Copies of said
notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for the Second
Region, shall , after being duly signed by the Respondent Union's
official representative , be posted by it immediately upon re-
ceipt thereof , and maintained by it for sixty (60) consecutive
days thereafter , in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to members are customarily posted . Reasonable
steps shall be taken by the Respondent Union to insure that such
notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material.
(e) Mail to the Regional Director for the Second Region signed
copies of the notice attached hereto as an Appendix for posting,
9 In the event that this Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals,
there shall be substituted for the words "Pursuant to a Decision and Order " the words
"Pursuant to a Decree of the United States Court Of Appeals , F iforcing and Order."
196 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the Employer willing, at its plant in places where notices to
employees are customarily posted . Copies of said notice, to be
furnished by the Regional Director for the Second Region , shall,
after being signed by the Respondent Union's official representa-
tives, be forthwith returned to the Regional Director for said
posting.
(f) Notify the Regional Director for the Second Region in
writing within ten (10 ) days from the date of this Order what
steps it has taken to comply herewith.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint , insofar as it
alleges that the Respondent Union violated Section 8 ( b) (1) (A)
of the Act by conduct other than that found to be violative in this
Decision and Order , and that the Respondent Company violated
Section 8 ( a) (3) and 8 ( a) (1) of the Act , be, and it hereby is,
dismissed.
Member Murdock , dissenting in part:
I do not believe that either of the Respondents in this case has
committed an unfair labor practice . This is not the first time
that an issue of this type has been presented to the Board. In the
National Lead case, cited above, the Union had imposed fines
upon its members who failed to attend union meetings. The
Board held that the Union did not forfeit its right to dues ac-
cumulated during the period when it had insisted upon the pay-
ment of fines together with dues . Moreover , as soon as the Union
changed its position with regard to the payment of fines it could
lawfully request an employee's discharge because of his failure
upon notice to pay his dues. I see no substantial difference be-
tween this case and that precedent . To find, as the majority do,
that the Union ' s change in position must be communicated only
by the Union itself directly to the employees affected seems to
me a highly technical and unIealistic view of what actually oc-
curred in this case.
Ward , the discharged employee, had been feuding with the
Union for some time during 1951 over its attempt to collect
fines for nonattendance at union meetings . Apparently , several
times in 1951 and once in January 1952 , his tender of dues had
been rejected by the Union when he appeared at its offices with
a "witness." Previously , however , inAugust 1951, his dues had
been accepted when, at the suggestion of a company personnel
representative , he sent them in by mail. At this time, accord-
ing to Ward ' s own testimony , the Union had sent notices to the
employees and posted one on the warehouse bulletin board to the
effect that fines had to be paid before dues would be accepted.
Before his last tender in January 1952, the Company ' s personnel
manager, aware of the controversy over fines, had suggested to
Ward that he mail in his dues as he had done previously and as
other employees did. Ward refused.
It is important to note, I think , that all of these events oc-
curred more than 6 months before the Union ' s last and alleged
unlawful request for Ward's discharge. Onthis last occasion the
personnel manager, desirous of administering the contract in
BLOOMINGDALE'S 19 7
accordance with the law, insisted upon and received assurances
from the Union that it was now, 6 months later ,, interested only
in Ward's dues and would accept them, if tendered . As the Trial
Examiner found, this responsible official of the Company called
Ward into his office and told him in no uncertain terms these
facts. Ward refused to comment. When the personnel manager
inquired if Ward felt that his last tender in January 1952, for-
ever absolved him from again tendering dues, Ward again
answered , "no comment."
I have carefully considered the record in this case , particu-
larly the facts with regard to the interview between Ward and the
Company's personnel manager on June 30, 1953, set forth fully
in the Intermediate Report. I am convinced , as was the Trial
Examiner , that Ward seized upon the Union' s previous attempt to
collect his fines with his dues as a pretext to avoid paying the
latter . It is perfectly clear from this record that Ward ran not
the slightest risk of discharge if he had tendered his dues as
the Company requested him to do.
The majority have no difficulty in finding that the Company had
reasonable grounds to believe that the Union' s last request for
his discharge was based solely on his failure to pay dues. But
the facts upon which the Company must have predicated its belief
were known 1equally to Ward . It seems to me that if it was
reasonable for the Company to conclude that the Union meant
what it said ; and no more , it should have been reasonable for
Ward to reach the same conclusion on the same facts. In
exonerating the Company of unfair labor practices the majority
say that the difference in treatment is due to the Union's failure
to communicate the facts to Ward. But the issue , as I see it, is
not who communicated what to whom, but whether Ward and the
Company acted reasonably on the basis of facts within their
knowledge . The record shows that the facts communicated by the
Union to the Company were relayed to Ward by Brennan and that
Ward knew as much as the Company knew. If the Company was
entitled to rely upon the Union' s assurances that it sought only
Ward' s dues, it seems to me that Ward , in turn, was obligated
to rely upon the assurances of his personnel manager that
dues only were invovled . The majority cannot have it both
ways. I would affirm the Trial Examiner ' s dismissal of the
complaint in its entirety.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL MEMBERS OF DISTRIBUTIVE, PROCESS-
ING AND OFFICE WORKERS OF AMERICA, LOCAL 3,
AND TO ALL EMPLOYEES OF BLOOMINGDALE'S
Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor
Relations Board , and in order to effectuate the policies of the
National Labor Relations Act, we hereby notify you that:
198 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
WE WILL NOT cause or attempt to cause Bloomingdale's
to discharge or in any other manner to discriminate against
its employees in violation of Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act, or
to discharge or in any other manner to discriminate against
employees with respect to whom membership in our union
has been denied or terminated upon some ground other than
failure to tender the periodic dues and initiation fees
uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining
membership.
WE WILL NOT restrain or coerce employees of
Bloomingdale ' s in the exercise of their rights to engage in
or to refrain from engaging in any or all of the concerted
activities guaranteed to them by Section 7, except to the
extent that such right may be affected by an agreement re -
quiring membership in a labor organization as a condition
of employment as authorized by Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act.
WE WILL notify Bloomingdale ' s in writing and furnish a
copy to William P. Ward , that we have withdrawn our
objections to the employment of Ward and that we request
his reinstatement.
WE WILL make William P. Ward whole for any loss of
pay he may have suffered because of the discrimination
against him.
Distributive, Processing and Office Workers
of America, Local 3
Union.
Dated ................ By.....................................................
(Representative ) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date
hereof , and must not be altered , defaced , or covered by any
other material.
Intermediate Report and Recommended Order
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On January 22, 1953, upon charges duly filed by William P Ward in each of the above -entitled
cases, the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, by the Regional Director
for the Second Region (New York, New York), issued an order consolidating the cases , a notice
of hearing , and a complaint alleging that Blo-)mingdale ' s i and Distributive , Processing and
Office Workers of America, Local 3 (herein called the Company and the Union respectively,
and sometimes also referred to jointly as the Respondents ), have engaged in and are engaging
in various unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8 and Sec-
tion 2 (6) and (7) of the National Labor Relations Act as amended , 61 Stat 136, herein referred
to as the Act
With respect to the unfair labor practices the consolidated complaint alleges in substance
that:
'As corrected at the hearing by amendment to the complaint
BLOOMINGDALE' S 199
(1) Since on or about January 15, 1952, the Union attempted to cause the Company to dis-
charge William P Ward and other employees for reasons other than their failure to tender the
periodic dues uniformly required as a condition for retaining membership in the Union.
(2) On or about June 30, 1952, the Union caused the Company to discharge William P Ward
and since that time has caused the Company to refuse to reinstate him because of his non-
membership in the Union notwithstanding that the membership of said Ward in the Union was
terminated for reasons other than his failure to tender periodic dues uniformly required as the
condition of retaining membership in the Union
(3) Since on or about January 15, 1952, the Union has restrained and coerced and is re-
straining and coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the
ACt by applying moneys tendered by them in payment of periodic dues to the payment of fines
imposed upon them for nonattendance at union meetings, and thereafter requesting the Company
to discharge said employees for delinquency in the payment of periodic dues under the union-
shop agreement between the Company and the Union, and by threatening said employees with
discharge under said agreement for nonpayment of dues
(4) On or about June 30, 1952, the Company discharged William P Ward and has since that
time refused to reinstate him to his former or substantially equivalent position of employment
(5) The Company discharged William P Ward and thereafter refused to reinstate him
because of his loss of membership in the Union although the Company had and still has
reasonable grounds for believing that Ward's membership in the Union was terminated for a
reason other than Ins failure to tender the periodic dues uniformly required by the Union as a
condition of retaining membership in it.
(6) By its total course of conduct, outlined in the consolidated complaint, the Union--it is
alleged--committed unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (b) (1) (A) and (2)
of the Act The action of the Company with respect to the discharge of Ward is alleged to
have involved an unfair labor practice under Section 8 (a) (1) and (3) of the Act.
The Respondents filed separate answers to the complaint denying the commission of any
unfair labor practices
Pursuant to notice a hearing was held at New York, New York, on March 23 and 24 and April
7, 8, 9, and 10, 1953, before the undersigned Trial Examiner. The General Counsel and the
Respondents were represented at the hearing and all parties were afforded full opportunity
to be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to introduce evidence bearing on
the issues The parties were given the opportunity to present oral argument before the Trial
Examiner and to file briefs, proposed findings of fact, and conclusions of law. A brief has
been received from counsel for the Company and has been duly considered. Upon the entire
record of the case and from his observation of the witnesses, the Trial Examiner makes
the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE COMPANY
Bloomingdale's is a division of Federated Department Stores Incorporated, a corporation
duly organized under and existing by virtue of the laws of the State of Delaware, with its
store and warehouse located in New York, New York. The Company is engaged in the opera-
tion of a retail department store and maintains its principal office and place of business in
New York, New York, and its warehouse operated in connection with the store in Long
Island City, New York During the calendar year 1952, the Company in the course and con-
duct of its business operations caused to be purchased, transferred, and delivered in inter-
state commerce from States of the United States other than the State of New York, house-
hold appliances, wearing apparel, and other goods and commodities valued in excess of
$ 10,000,000 During the same period the Company sold at its retail department store goods
and commodities valued in excess of $55,000,000 of which, approximately 10 percent was
transported and delivered in interstate commerce from the Company's store and warehouse
to points located in States other than the State of New York The Company admits, and it is
hereby found, that it is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act
IL THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Distributive, Processing and Office Workers of America Local 3, is a labor organization
admitting to membership employees of the Company
200 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
The facts
William P. Ward, the charging party , was an employee of the Company from 1935 until
his discharge on July 1, 1952 During the last several years of his employment, Ward
worked as a stock clerk in the Company ' s Long Island City warehouse.
After a Board certification the Respondents on April 27, 1950, entered into a collective-
bargaining agreement which contained inter alia the following clauses:
Article II--Union recognition
A All employees covered by this Agreement shall as a condition of employment
become members of the Union on or within ten (10 ) days after the thirtieth (30th) day
following ( 1) the beginning of such employment or (2) April 27, 1950, whichever is
the later , and shall thereafter maintain their membership in the Union in good standing.
B An employee who is expelled or suspended from the Union because of non-payment
of initiation fees and dues shall be subject to dismissal after notification in writing
to the Employer by the Union
The General Counsel does not contest the validity of the union - shop clause.
On July 10, 1951, the Union sent Ward the following letter by registered mail.
Dear Member:
You have been informed of your dues delinquency before but still have not brought
yourself into good standing
In accordance with the Constitution , we are sending you this final reminder. All
dues must be paid in full , no later than Wednesday , July 18, 1951
Failure to comply by that date means that you will be automatically dropped from
union membership
We are calling to your attention onceagam , what being dropped from union membership
means to you A member who is dropped:
1 Shall be obliged to leave the job.
2. Looses the right to receive any of the benefits accruing under our Security Plan, such
as:
Accident and Sick Benefits , Surgical Benefits , Hospitalization and Death Benefits.
We trust that you are now fully aware of the penalties of being dropped from union
membership and will bring your dues up to date immediately.
Ward admitted receiving the letter He testified he did nothing about it.
Early in August 1951 Ward was called to the employment office in the Company 's store.
Ward requested the right to be accompanied by a" representative of his own choosing"
from the warehouse . His request was granted . Ward and Henry Canin , a coworker, con-
ferred with Veronica Smith , a personnel interviewer for the Company Ward testified that
Smith informed him of the delinquency in dues to the Union . 2 She inquired if Ward was
reluctant to pay the dues. Ward told Smith he would pay the dues but that he was reluctant
to pay fines. Ward testified further that he told Smith that notices had been sent out to
employees and also were posted at the warehouse to the effect that dues would not be ac-
cepted unless the fines were paid Ward asked Smith how he could get the Union to accept
the dues without having to engage in an argument . Smith suggested that Ward send a postal
money order to the Union for the amount of the dues and set the deadline date for Friday
(the conference was on Tuesday ) Ward followed Smith ' s suggestion and on Friday sent a
postal money order to the Union in the amount of $14 80 In turn, Ward received a receipt
2 Ward also testified that Smith mentioned that there were some fines to be paid. He was
unable to state whether Smith noted the amount of fines he owed and was extremely evasive
regarding this phase of the conversation . In view of the action taken by Ward after his
conference with Smith and the findings hereafter made with respect to the Company 's policy
regarding the fines assessed by the Union, I do not accept this part of his testimony even
though it remains uncontradicted in the record. See N L. R. B. v. Howell Chevrolet Co.,
204 F. 2d 79 (C A 9)
BLOOMINGDALE'S 2 01
showing payment of dues for the months of April , May, June , and July, together with a
warning notice as follows:
WARNING
DATE: 8/6/51
You have failed to account for the meetings of March , April , May, June, and July.
We have accepted your dues and are giving you this FINAL NOTICE. NO FURTHER
DUES WILL BE ACCEPTED UNLESS, you present a valid , official excuse , in accordance
with the rules governing meeting excuses or pay the fine.
EXCERPTS OF RULES GOVERNING MEETING EXCUSES ON REVERSE SIDE.
(Reverse side)
Members absent from a meeting without having secured an official excuse shall
be required to pay a fine of one dollar ($ 1 00) for every such absence.
If a member does not present a proper Steward 's excuse , he will be given one written
warning No further dues will be collected unless he presents a valid excuse, or pays
the fine.
No Steward ' s excuse shall be valid unless presented to the Finance dept . within 30 days
after the Membership meeting.
Ward testified that early in October 1951 he went to the union office , accompanied by
Camn, to pay dues for the months of August and September . Ward stated he "put money up"
and told the clerk who he was . According to Ward , the clerk went to the file records, pulled
out a card , told him there were fines noted on the record, and that it was a policy of the
Union that the fines would have to be paid before his dues could be accepted . Ward informed
the clerk he was there to pay 2 months' dues, not fines , that he did not feel obligated to pay
fines . S The clerk thereupon turned to Murray Silverstein, an organizer for the Union, and
said " this fellow just wants to pay dues He won't pay fines. You know I cannot accept dues un-
less he pays the fine " Silverstein told Ward that he was no better than other members who had
to pay fines incurred for nonattendanceof unionmeetings and that he also would have to pay the
fines Moreover , Ward would have to comply with the organization rules and the fines would
have to be paid before dues were accepted.
Ward testified he told Silverstein that he was not obligated to pay fines and called to his
attention " the law handed down through the Taft -Hartley Act and a decision of the National
Labor Relations Board stating that fines were of no obligation , only dues, and the initiation
fee." Ward told Silverstein he was not going to stand there arguing , that he had money to
pay for dues and that Silverstein could " take it or leave it " Ward turned to Canin and
remarked that since Silverstein did not want his money for dues they could leave
Florence Hale , a clerk in the Union ' s employ during the times material herein, whose
duties included the collection of dues at the union office, testified that Ward came to the
office in October 1951 . Without submitting his union book or any money to her , Ward asked
whether it was Hale ' s intention to collect fines or dues from him, stating he would not pay
fines Hale testified further that she told Ward she was not asking for fines but that if he
wanted to pay his dues he should give her his union book and money which he did not do
Hale called Silverstein who talked to Ward . Hale denied that she obtained Ward ' s financial
record card from the file cabinet . She explained that the cards are filed under the union
member ' s number and since she did not know his number and Ward did not give her his
union book which contained the number, she could not obtain his card. Hale also testified
that the Union ' s practice which she followed was never to refuse moneys tendered by a
member in payment of dues even though such member might not have attended union meetings
and had been given a warning notice Further that money tendered was always applied
toward the payment of dues unless the member volunteered that a certain amount be applied
toward the payment of fines. Hale stated that she suggested to Ward , with respect to the
matter of fines, that he see his shop steward and obtain an excuse for absences from various
3 As noted above in accordance with the Union 's rules governing meeting excuses, members
absent from a meeting without having secured an official excuse were required to pay a fine
of $1 for every such absence. Ward did not attend the union meetings nor did he obtain
official excuses.
2 02 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
meetings , and upon presentation of -the excuse to the Union the "whole business of fines would
be cleared up "
Silverstein testified that in October 1951 the office clerk called him to assist with a
problem at the cashier's window. Silverstein found Ward and another unidentified person
there Silverstein inquired if Ward wanted to pay dues, and if so, to submit his union book
to enable them to obtain his financial record card Ward did not submit his union book but
asked whether his money, if offered, would be applied toward the payment of fines first
and then toward dues Silverstein told Ward that his money would be accepted in payment of
dues if that was Ward's wish. Ward, according to Silverstein, broke off the discussion and
left.
Silverstein admitted on cross-examination that when the financial record-card of a member
reveals absences from union meetings , he will routinely ask the member if he wants any of
the moneys tendered to be applied toward the payment of outstanding fines
Ward's testimony hereinabove noted was corroborated in all essential details by Canin
who impressed me as a reliable witness. I find, based on such corroborated testimony which
I credit, that in early October 1951 Ward made a valid tender of union dues.
Upon leaving the union office Ward and Canin called on Vincent Brennan, the Company's
personnel manager in the latter's office Ward told Brennan he was there to find out the
facts regarding the "set-up [here] between the Union and the management" and Ward's
obligations under the collective-bargaining agreement. Ward related the incident which
had just taken place at the union office and inquired if the Company would discharge an
employee whose tendered dues had been refused. Brennan read the union-shop clause in
the agreement to Ward Brennan told Ward that it was his (Brennan's) responsibility to
enforce the agreement and since the agreement did not mention failure to pay fines as a
cause for discharge he would only enforce the agreement where there was a delinquency
in dues. After some further discussion, with Ward insisting on finding out if he would be
discharged for failure to pay fines, Brennan told Ward and Canin they were raising an
academic point, that the Company had not received any request from the Union relating
to Ward and that if there was a request for his discharge, Ward would be notified and given
a full opportunity to present his case before the Company would take any action. Ward re-
ported back to work.
In November 1951 Ward was called to Brennan's office because his name was on a list
of employees whose discharges were requested by the Union. Canin accompanied Ward as
his witness.
Brennan told Ward of the request for his discharge and inquired if he was going to do
anything to have his name removed from the list Brennan again reviewed the terms of the
collective-bargaining agreement and stated that fines did not interest him, that he was
concerned solely with what was specifically included in the agreement, namely, discharge
because of nonpayment of dues At the conclusion of the interview, Ward left Brennan's
office with the stated intention of going to the union office 4
Ward testified that he and Canin proceeded to the union office 5 Ward stated he presented
3 months dues in cash to the clerk and requested a receipt The clerk told Ward, after
looking at his financial record-card, that there were fines to be paid Ward said he was
there to pay dues and not fines Silverstein, according to Ward, was drawn into the con-
versation and told Ward that he had to pay fines as well as dues otherwise his dues could
not be accepted. Silverstein commented that perhaps Dennis Farragher6 could "take care of
this situation " Ward testified he told Silverstein he was not interested in what Farragher
could take care of, he was there to pay 3 months' dues which Silverstein could either take or
leave Ward stated that since Silverstein refused to accept his dues without payment of the
fines, he withdrew his money and left the union office.
Hale recalled that Ward was in the union office several times subsequent to October 1951,
but was unable to state with certainty when she saw him there She testified that Ward never
asked how much he owed for dues or fines, or the number of meetings he failed to attend.
Silverstein testified that he saw Ward in the union office only once in October 1951.
41 do not credit Ward's testimony that Brennan inquired if he was willing to pay his dues;
that upon Ward 's affirmative reply , Brennan wanted to know if he was ready to do it then;
and that Brennan instructed Ward to take the dues to the union office. -
5 The union office is located accoss the street from the Company ' s store.
6Farragher is an organizer for the Union whose duties, among others , consist of handling
problems and grievances of the Company 's warehouse employees.
BLOOMINGDALE'S 2 03
Ward ' s testimony was corroborated in all essential details by Canin I find, based on such
corroborated testimony , which I credit, that in November 1951 Ward tendered his union dues
which Silverstein refused to accept without simultaneous payment of outstanding fines.
Ward and Canin returned to Brennan ' s office and apprised him of what had taken place at
the union office Canin confirmed Ward's statement Brennan thereupon instructed Ward to
return to his job
On or about December 4, 1951 , Ward received a letter from the Union via registered mail
similar to the July 10, 1951 , letter set out in detail above . This letter advised Ward that "All
dues must be paid in full , no later than December 15, 1951 ." Ward did nothing regarding
the letter . He continued working in his job.
In December 1951 the Union requested the Company to discharge certain named employees
who were delinquent in union dues . Ward was one of the employees so named. Early in
January 1951 Ward was asked to come to Brennan ' s office. He was accompanied this time
by Frank Morano, an employee at the Company ' s warehouse and shop steward for the Union.
Brennan informed Ward that the Union was requesting his discharge . Brennan again re-
viewed his responsibility in the administration of the collective - bargaining agreement. He
reiterated to Ward that the Company had no interest in his refusal to pay fines , that it was
concerned only with dues . Brennan suggested that for purposes of convenience and in order
to obviate his having to interview Ward? so often, that Ward mail his dues to the Union just
as other employees do and as Ward did in August 1951 . Ward refused to take Brennan's
suggestion Ward and Morano left Brennan ' s office after telling him they were going to the
union office.
Ward testified that at the union office he again tendered enough money to the clerk to cover
the union dues for the months of August through December 1951 and asked for a "specific
receipt" which would show that his money was accepted for dues.
The clerk spoke to Silverstein about Ward ' s request for a " specific receipt ." Silverstein
told Ward that his money would be accepted but the Union would allocate it its "way " and issue
him a " blanket receipt ." After some further discussion along the same line, Ward picked up
his money and left the union office with Morano.
In the main , Morano corroborated Ward ' s testimony I find based on such corroborated
testimony , which I credit, that Ward in January 1952 tendered his union dues
Ward and Morano returned to Brennan ' s office Ward informed Brennan of the event at the
union office Morano corroborated Ward's statement Brennan told Ward to return to work
with the advice that if anything further had to be done regarding the matter it would be dis-
cussed with Ward
At several grievance meetings held between January and June 1952 Carl Andren and
Silverstein , on behalf of the Union , inquired why Brennan did not discharge Ward as requested.
The union officials insisted that fines owed by Ward was not in issue but that his discharge
was being requested because of delinquency in dues
Early in June 1952 Andren requested Brennan to carry out the provisions of the collective-
bargaining agreement and discharge Ward Upon receiving Andren's definite assurance
that the payment of fines was not involved in the Union ' s request and that Ward's dues
would be accepted if tendered , Brennan asked that the Union send him a written request
which would take under advisement
On June 17 , 1952, the Union sent the following letter to the Company:
Dear Mr. Brennan:
Pursuant to Article II under the collective bargaining agreement on the requirement
of Union Membership , the following member has not lived up to this provision and we
request his discharge immediately
William Ward , Department W8032-98 was suspended from Union Membership for
failure to pay union dues
On June 27 Ward was called to the personnel office . Canin went along with him. Ward
and Canin were directed to see one Webster , an assistant to Brennan 8 Webster asked Ward
about the delinquencies in his union dues and what had taken place in the past regarding this
matter Webster confessed he was not too well acquainted with the subject . Ward told Webster
t It was the Company ' s policy to interview all employees whose names appeared on the
Union ' s lists requesting discharges for delinquency in union dues.
8 Brennan was on vacation until June 30.
204 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
that if he was going to handle the matter either the Company's records should show what
had taken place or Webster should in some manner have prepared himself for the discussion
without requiring Ward to review the entire matter in order to bring Webster up to date
Ward asked Webster if the Company called him in for the purpose of presenting any new
requirements with which he would have to comply. Webster replied "no." Ward inquired if
Webster had anything else in mind other than wanting to know the past events in Ward's
situation Upon Webster's negative reply Ward remarked that he did not know why he was
called to the personnel office and that their meeting was "inconclusive." Ward and Canin
returned to the warehouse
On June 30 Ward was again called to the personnel office where he and Canin , his repre-
sentative , conferred with Brennan and Webster
Brennan told Ward that he received a letter from the Union and offered it to Ward to
read Ward refused to look at the letter and asked if it was addressed to him. Brennan told
Ward that while it was not addressed to him, it concerned him as it contained a request for
his discharge and thereupon read the letter to Ward. Brennan asked Ward what he had to
say about the request to which Ward replied "no comment." Brennan asked Ward whether
or not he intended to make any effort to tender his union dues Ward refused to comment.
Ward inquired if he was being required to do anything different than in the past Brennan
stated the requirements were the same, that the Company was interested only in the terms
of the collective-bargaining agreement and that union fines did not concern him. Ward told
Brennan that he (Brennan) knew that Ward had tendered his dues in the past. Brennan asked
when was the last time Ward tendered his dues and Ward refused to answer. Brennan asked
if January 1952 was the last date that Ward tendered his dues and Ward replied that Brennan
knew it was. Brennan inquired if Ward felt that the last tender in January 1952 forever
absolved him from again tendering dues. Ward answered "no comment." Brennan pointed
out that Ward's job was involved and that it was Brennan's responsibility to administer the
terms of the collective-bargaining agreement Brennan told Ward that the Union gave him
assurance that the question involved, as the letter stated, "was dues only and not fines."
Brennan also told Ward that the Union told him it would accept Ward's dues if tendered.
Ward refused to comment. Brennan reminded Ward that he had to make a decision on the
Union's request and in view of its assurances and the fact that Ward refused to give Brennan
his side of the story, there was no alternative left to Brennan but to comply with the request.
Brennan asked Ward and Canin if they would like to discuss the matter privately outside
of Brennan's office They did not accept this suggeistion. In a further effort to elicit Ward's
story, Brennan mentioned that Ward's job was at stake and if Ward refused to comment
Brennan would have to go through with the discharge request . Ward did not answer nor did
Ward respond when Brennan said some of the men in the warehouse felt that Ward was
"using this as a technical dodge to avoid paying his dues " After about one-half hour with
Brennan unsuccessfully attempting to elicit Ward ' s explanation , Brennan told Ward there
was no choice left but to follow the Union's request under the terms of the collective-
bargaining agreement Brennan asked Ward if money was a problem to him in the tendering
of dues Ward stated his ability to pay was of no concern to the Company and he refused
to answer further A deadline of 6 p in that night was then set for Ward to meet the re-
quirements of tendering the dues, otherwise, he would face discharge from the Company's
employ Ward said "no comment
Upon ascertaining the following day that Ward had said or done nothing, Ward was called
from the warehouse to Smith's office in the personnel department and told he was being
discharged for failure to tender union dues, Ward was asked to sign his final pay slip and on
it he wrote "being discharged for the nonpayment of union dues." Ward has not worked for
the Respondent Company since July 1, 1952.
Conclusions
(a) With respect to the alleged violations of Section 8 (a) (3) and (1) of the Act by theCompany
The complaint alleges that the Company discharged Ward on or about June 30, 1952, and
thereafter refused to reinstate him because of his loss of membership in the Union although
it then had and still has reasonable grounds for believing that Ward's membership in the
Union was terminated for a reason other than his failure to tender the periodic dues.
As found above, in November and December 1951, when the Company received written
requests from the Union to discharge Ward pursuant to the valid union-security clause in
BLOOMINGDALE'S 2 05
the collective-bargaining agreement it did not act on such requests automatically and effect
the discharge On the contrary, in line with its policy and practice it interviewed Ward and
investigated all of the circumstances surrounding the Union ' s request Receiving assurances
from Ward and his corroborating witnesses on these occasions that he (Ward) tendered
dues which were not accepted because he failed to pay outstanding fines, the Company re-
fused to act on the Union ' s requests and continued Ward in his job
In June 1952 , confronted with a new request from the Union for Ward ' s discharge and not
content with the Union ' s oft - repeated verbal and written assertions that the payment of fines
was not involved in this request, the Company again interviewed Ward. Brennan made clear
to Ward what the Union had assured him, namely, that his dues would be accepted if tendered
and that the only issue which the Union had with Ward was his delinquency in dues and not
his failure to pay fines. Ward did not protest that his failure to pay fines was the underlying
motive in his suspension from union membership In fact, Ward was completely uncoopera-
tive with Brennan in the latter 's efforts to ascertain the true picture in the Union ' s request
and even after he was warned that his job was " at stake ," Ward continued either to refuse
to answer Brennan's questions or answered them with a curt " no comment."
The course of the Company's actions with respect to Ward indicates clearly that it went
far beyond any duty imposed on it by law. In the Westinghouse case , 96 NLRB 522, enfd
203 F. 2d 173 (C. A. 9), where the Company knew that an employee was expelled from the
Union because he did not pay a fine but several months later was told by the Union upon
inquiry that its request for the employee 's discharge complied with the terms of the union-
security contract and opportunity for membership in the Union was extended to the employee
without discrimination, the Board held "in these circumstances, we do not believe that the
Company was required to explore the implications of [the employee ' s] protestation , a matter
which would necessarily lead to unwarranted intrusion in the internal affairs of the union."
See Air Reduction Co., Inc., 103 NLRB 64; Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corp., 98 NLRB
753; Standard Brands, Inc., 97 NLRB 737; Chisholm-Ryder Co., Inc., 94 NLRB 508; Pressed
Steel Car Co., 89 NLRB 276.
In view of the foregoing and under all of the circumstances present here, I find that the
Company on June 30, 1952, did not know or have reasonable grounds to believe that the Union
sought Ward 's discharge for reasons other than his failure to tender the periodic dues and
will hereinafter recommend that those paragraphs of the complaint alleging that the Company
committed unfair labor practices be dismissed.
(b) With respect to the alleged violation of Section 8 (b) (2) of the Act by the Union
The complaint alleges that on or about June 30, 1952 , the Union caused the Company to
discharge Ward because of his nonmembership in the Union, notwithstanding that Ward's
membership was terminated for reasons other than his failure to tender the periodic dues
As found above, Ward tendered dues in October and November 1951 and early January
1952 which the Union refused to accept because of Ward ' s failure to pay outstanding fines
or in lieu thereof to obtain valid excuses for not attending union meetings . There would be
no problem here if the Union caused Ward ' s discharge while such conditions continued to
exist , for it is clear that the Union would have been asking for Ward ' s discharge because
of his nonpayment of fines, a reason which the Act does not countenance . See Westinghouse
Electric Corporation, supr ; The Eclipse Lumber Company, 95 NLRB 464 enfd 199 F.
2d 684 (C. A. 9). The Electric Auto-Lite Company, 92 NLRB 1073; Pen and Pencil Workers
Union, Local 19593, AFL, 91 NLRB 883. Indeed, if such conditions continued to exist, in my
opinion it would not have been incumbent upon Ward to " tender" in order to come within
the protection of the Act, for as the Board held in several cases , The Eclipse Lumber
Company, supra- The Baltimore Transfer Company, 94 NLRB 1680, and the Westinghouse
Electric Corporation , supra , " a formal tender is . unnecessary in cases involving pro-
viso (B) where the circumstances indicate that such a tender would have been a futile gesture."
But we are confronted in the instant matter with additional facts. Subsequent to January
1952 the Union changed its position regarding the acceptance of dues from Ward and told
the Company on various occasions that it was not interested in the payment of fines by
Ward and would accept his money for dues if tendered . It is not controlling that the Union-
did not make known its changed position to Ward directly , the fact is, as found above, that
in June 1952 Brennan told Ward in no uncertain terms what was then the posture of the
situation and the Union's assurances that tender of dues at that time would not only have
337593 0 - 55 - 15
206 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
stayed its request for discharge but also in all probability would have obviated the necessity
to discharge Ward 9
Thus, as a result of the Union's affirmative conduct and statements, it was incumbent
upon Ward to go forward with the tender of dues and he could no longer rely on the Union's
past statements to him that it would not accept his dues unless he also paid fines. Of signi-
ficance herein is Ward's attitude and conduct at his meeting with Brennan preceding his
discharge, set forth in detail above I find that Ward demonstrated by his statements and
conduct that he had no intention of tendering dues to bring his membership in the Union into
good standing and that he mistakenly relied upon the Union's past conduct and his belief that
by the institution of these proceedings he could retain his employment.
Accordingly, I find that Ward having failed to tender the dues on June 30, 1952, his discharge
caused by the Union was not in violation of Section 8 (b) (2) of the Act. See Air Reduction Co.,
Inc., supra.
Also alleged in the complaint to be a violation of Section 8 (b) (2) of the Act is the Union's
attempt to cause the Company to discharge Ward since on or about January 15, 1952, for
reasons other than his failure to tender dues
As heretofore found, subsequent to January 1952, the Union changed its position regarding
the acceptance of dues from Ward and unequivocally let it be known that it would accept his
money for dues if tendered and that it was not interested in the payment of fines.
The last overt act by the Union, prior to January 1952, in its attempt to cause the Company
to discharge Ward for reasons other than his failure to tender dues was in December 1951
when Ward was included in a list of names sent by it to Brennan. The charge in the instant
matter made by Ward was filed in the Regional Office of the Board on July 3, 1952, and
served ca the Union by registered mail on July 8, 1952. Thus it is seen that the alleged unfair
labor practice of attempting to cause Ward's discharge occurred more than 6 months prior
to the filing of the charge and is barred by the provisions of Section 10 (b) of the Act. 10
Accordingly, it will be hereinafter recommended that this allegation of the complaint be
dismissed.
(c) With respect to the alleged violation of Section 8 (b) (1) (A) of the Act by the Union
Finally, the complaint alleges that since on or about January 15, 1952, the Union has re-
strained and coerced employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the
Act by applying moneys tendered to them in payment of periodic dues to the payment of fines
imposed upon them for nonattendance at union meetings, and thereafter requesting the
Company to discharge said employees for delinquency in the payment of periodic dues under
the union-shop agreement between the Respondents, and by threatening said employees with
discharge under said agreement for nonpayment of said dues
91n this regard it is interesting to note Brennan's testimony, which I credit, that included
on about a half dozen lists from the Union requesting discharge were the names of several
employees who claimed that the real reason for the discharge request was their failure to
pay fines. In each instance, upon Brennan's advice, the employee tendered money for dues
which the Union accepted and the employees' names were removed from the discharge list.
Brennan stated that to his knowledge no employee who tendered his dues has ever been dis-
charged, nor has he received complaints from employees discharged because of delinquency
in union dues, that the real reason for the discharge was their failure to pay fines. Of
note also is the testimony of Canin, who was friendly with Ward, that his dues were accepted
even though he admittedly did not attend some union meetings.
10 The pertinent provision of Section 10 (b) of the Act, from which the above-quoted language
is taken, is the following:
.That no complaint shall issue based upon any unfair labor practice occurring more
than 6 months prior to the filing of the charge with the Board and the service of a copy
thereof upon the person against whom such charge is made, .. .
UPSHUR RURAL ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE CORPORATION 207
No proof was adduced by the General Counsel that the Union during 1952 or at any time
for that matter applied moneys as alleged in the complaint 11 and thereafter requested the
Company to discharge employees for delinquency in dues.
The proviso of Section 8 (b) (1) (A ) of the Act states:
... This subsection shall not impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its
own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein.
Under the terms of the proviso the Unionhas the right to fine its members for not attending
union meetings and to go so far as to suspend them from membership for nonpayment of
fines . However , threatening employees with the loss of their employment if they fail or re-
fuse to pay the fines where they continue to pay or tender the periodic dues is proscribed
by the Act . See Namm's Inc., 102 NLRB 466.
Standing alone the "Warning" to employees that no further dues would be accepted if they
failed to pay fines or in lieu thereof present valid official meeting excuses is not a threat
of loss of employment . Here, however , the "Warning" was followed by a letter , such as the
one sent to Ward on November 30, 1952 . When the documents are read together it is re-
vealed that if an employee fails to pay fines, no further dues will be accepted from him
thus resulting in a delinquency in dues, automatic suspension from union membership, and
. obliged to leave the job." Clearly, this spells out a threat of loss of employment.
Other than the Union ' s letter to Ward, dated November 30, 1951, the General Counsel did
not adduce evidence that after that date the Union sent a similar letter either to Ward, or to
any other employee . That date however , being more than 6 months prior to the filing of the
charge herein , the alleged unfair labor practice of violation of Section 8 (b) (1) (A ) is barred
by Section 10 (b) of the Act and I so find.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The operations of the Company , Bloomingdale ' s,constitute and affect trade, traffic, and
commerce among the several States within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
2. Distributive , Processing and Office Workers of America, Local 3, is a labor organiza-
tion within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act.
3. The Company has not engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8
(a) (1) and (3) and the Union has not engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of
Section 8 (b) (1) (A) and (b) (2) of the Act.
[Recommendations omitted from publication.]
itIt is noted that Ward never left any money with the Union in October and November
1951 or early January 1952.
UPSHUR RURAL ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE CORPORATION
and INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL
WORKERS, LOCAL UNION NO. 324, AFL. Case No. 16-CA-
503. November 25, 1953
DECISION AND ORDER
Upon a charge filed by International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers , Local Union No. 324, AFL, herein called the Union,
the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board,
through the Regional Director for the Sixteenth Region (Fort
107 NLRB No. 60.